Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting

AGENCY:

Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule; guidance.

SUMMARY:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) is adopting amendments to certain rules that govern beneficial ownership reporting. The amendments generally shorten the filing deadlines for initial and amended beneficial ownership reports filed on Schedules 13D and 13G. The amendments also clarify the disclosure requirements of Schedule 13D with respect to derivative securities. We also are expanding the timeframe within a given business day by which Schedules 13D and 13G must be filed, and separately requiring that Schedule 13D and 13G filings be made using a structured, machine-readable data language. Further, we discuss how, under the current rules, an investor's use of a cash-settled derivative security may result in the person being treated as a beneficial owner of the class of the reference equity security. We also are providing guidance on the application of the current legal standard found in section 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to certain common types of shareholder engagement activities. Finally, we are making certain technical revisions.

DATES:

Effective dates: The amendments are effective on February 5, 2024.

Compliance dates: See section II.G.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Nicholas Panos, Senior Special Counsel, and Valian Afshar, Senior Special Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, at (202) 551–3440, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

We are adopting amendments to 17 CFR 240.13d–1 (“Rule 13d–1”), 17 CFR 240.13d–2 (“Rule 13d–2”), 17 CFR 240.13d–3 (“Rule 13d–3”), 17 CFR 240.13d–5 (“Rule 13d–5”), 17 CFR 240.13d–6 (“Rule 13d–6”), 17 CFR 240.13d–101 (“Rule 13d–101”), and 17 CFR 240.13d–102 (“Rule 13d–102”) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. ] (“Exchange Act”). We also are adopting amendments to 17 CFR 232.13 (“Rule 13 of Regulation S–T”) and 17 CFR 232.201 (“Rule 201 of Regulation S–T”) under 17 CFR part 232 (“Regulation S–T”). In addition, we are rescinding 17 CFR 240.13d–7 (“Rule 13d–7”).

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Discussion of the Final Amendments

A. Amendments to Rules 13D–1 and 13D–2 and Rules 13 and 201 of Regulation S–T To Revise Filing Deadlines and Filing Date Assignment

1. Rule 13d–1(a), (e), (f), and (g)

2. Rule 13d–1(b), (c), and (d)

3. Rule 13d–2(a) and (b)

4. Rule 13d–2(c) and (d)

5. Rules 13(a)(4) and 201(a) of Regulation S–T

B. Proposed Amendment to Rule 13D–3 Regarding the Use of Cash-Settled Derivative Securities

1. Proposed Amendment

2. Comments Received

3. Commission Guidance

C. Proposed Amendments to Rule 13D–5

1. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i), and (b)(1)(ii)

2. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii)

3. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(iii)

D. Proposed Amendments to Rule 13D–6 To Create Certain Exemptions

1. Proposed Amendments

2. Comments Received

3. Final Amendments

E. Amendment to Schedule 13D To Clarify Disclosure Requirements Regarding Derivative Securities

1. Proposed Amendment

2. Comments Received

3. Final Amendment

F. Structured Data Requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G

1. Proposed Amendment

2. Comments Received

3. Final Amendment

G. Compliance Dates

III. Other Matters

IV. Economic Analysis

A. Overview

B. Baseline

1. Current Schedule 13D and 13G Filing Requirements

2. Market Trends

3. Affected Parties and Current Market Practices

C. Economic Effects of the Final Rules

1. Shortened Initial Schedule 13D Filing Deadline

2. Shortened Schedule 13G Filing Deadlines

3. Other Amendments

D. Reasonable Alternatives to the Final Rules

1. Alternative Filing Deadlines

2. Tiered Approaches

3. Modify Structured Data Requirement

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Summary of the Collections of Information

B. Summary of Comment Letters on PRA Estimates

C. Burden and Cost Estimates for the Final Amendments

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification Statutory Authority

I. Introduction

We are amending certain rules within 17 CFR 240.13d–1 through 240.13f–1 (“Regulation 13D–G”) and Regulation S–T to modernize the beneficial ownership reporting requirements and improve their operation and efficacy. Some of these amendments are based on the amendments that the Commission proposed in 2022 (“Proposed Amendments”). Specifically, we are adopting revisions to the deadlines for Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings. We also are adopting certain related technical changes to Regulation S–T that the Commission proposed in connection with these amendments. Further, we are requiring that Schedule 13D and 13G filings be submitted using a structured, machine-readable data language.

In response to the comments we received on the Proposed Amendments, however, we are making certain adjustments from the proposal. For example, we are not adopting proposed 17 CFR 240.13d–3(e) (“Rule 13d–3(e)”) to deem certain holders of cash-settled derivative securities as beneficial owners of the reference covered class. Instead, we discuss how, under current Rule 13d–3, persons using these types of derivative securities may already be subject to regulation as beneficial owners. We also are not adopting many of the proposed amendments to Rules 13d–5 and 13d–6. Instead, we are issuing guidance on the application of the current legal standard found in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) to certain common types of shareholder engagement activities.

With respect to the Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filing deadlines, we are amending the following rules:

• 17 CFR 240.13d–1(a) (“Rule 13d–1(a)”): Shortening the filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13D to within five business days after the date on which a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class;

• 17 CFR 240.13d–1(e), (f), and (g) (“Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g)”): Shortening the filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13D required to be filed by certain persons who become ineligible to report on Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D to five business days after the event that causes the ineligibility;

• 17 CFR 240.13d–1(b) and (d) (“Rule 13d–1(b) and (d)”): Shortening the deadline for the initial Schedule 13G filing for Qualified Institutional Investors (“QIIs”) and Exempt Investors to within 45 days after the end of the calendar quarter in which beneficial ownership first exceeds five percent of a covered class;

• 17 CFR 240.13d–1(c) (“Rule 13d–1(c)”): Shortening the deadline for Passive Investors to file an initial Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D to within five business days after the date on which they acquire beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class;

• 17 CFR 240.13d–2(a) (“Rule 13d–2(a)”): Revising the deadline for filing amendments to Schedule 13D to two business days after the date on which a material change occurs;

• 17 CFR 240.13d–2(b) (“Rule 13d–2(b)”): Shortening the deadline for Schedule 13G amendments filed pursuant to that provision to 45 days after the end of the calendar quarter in which a reportable change occurs;
• 17 CFR 240.13d–2(c) (“Rule 13d–2(c)”): Shortening the filing deadline for Schedule 13G amendments filed pursuant to that provision to five business days after the end of the month in which beneficial ownership first exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, and thereafter upon any deviation by more than five percent of the covered class, with these requirements applying if the thresholds were crossed at any time during a month; and
• 17 CFR 13d–2(d) (“Rule 13d–2(d)”): Revising the deadline for Schedule 13G amendments filed pursuant to that provision to two business days after the date on which beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, and thereafter upon any deviation by more than five percent of the covered class.

In addition, we are amending Rule 13d–2(b) to require that an amendment to a Schedule 13G be filed only if a “material change” occurs (replacing the current rule text that requires an amendment upon the occurrence of “any change” in the facts previously reported). Further, we are amending 17 CFR 232.13(a) (“Rule 13(a) of Regulation S–T”) to permit Schedules 13D and 13G, and any amendments thereto, that are submitted by direct transmission commencing on or before 10 p.m. Eastern Time on a given business day to be deemed to have been filed on the same business day. This amendment should provide additional time for beneficial owners to prepare and submit their Schedule 13D or 13G filings. The following table summarizes the changes we are adopting with respect to Schedule 13D and 13G filings, as described more fully in section II.A:

As noted above, we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–3(e). Instead, we discuss the circumstances in which a holder of a cash-settled derivative security, excluding SBS, may be deemed the beneficial owner of the reference covered class under Rule 13d–3. We also are not adopting the proposed exemption in 17 CFR 240.13d–6(d) (“Rule 13d–6(d)”), which the Commission proposed to enable certain persons to transact in derivative securities in the ordinary course of business without concern that they had formed a group under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3), in part because we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–3(e).

To further clarify the disclosure requirements with respect to derivative securities, particularly cash-settled derivative securities, held by a person required to report on Schedule 13D, the Commission is adopting an amendment to Schedule 13D. Specifically, we are amending Item 6 of Schedule 13D, codified at Rule 13d–101, to remove any implication that a person is not required to disclose interests in all derivative securities that use a covered class as a reference security. This amendment is intended to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the scope of the disclosure obligations of Item 6 of Schedule 13D as to derivative securities, including with respect to any derivative not originating with, or offered or sold by, the issuer, such as a cash-settled option or SBS.

As noted above, we are not adopting most of the proposed substantive amendments to Rule 13d–5. We also are not adopting proposed 17 CFR 240.13d–6(c) (“Rule 13d–6(c)”), which would have specified certain circumstances under which two or more persons may coordinate and consult with one another and engage with an issuer without being subject to regulation as a group. Instead, we are issuing guidance regarding the appropriate legal standard for determining whether a group is formed. This guidance is intended to provide clarity on the circumstances under which a person may be deemed to have formed a group with another person or persons within the meaning of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3).

We are adopting the proposed requirement that Schedules 13D and 13G be filed using a structured, machine-readable data language. We are, therefore, now requiring that all disclosures, including quantitative disclosures, textual narratives, and identification checkboxes, on Schedules 13D and 13G be filed using an XML-based language. This requirement is intended to make it easier for investors and other market participants to access, compile, and analyze information that is disclosed on Schedules 13D and 13G.

Finally, we also are adopting certain technical revisions, some of which were not included among the Proposed Amendments.

II. Discussion of the Final Amendments

A. Amendments to Rules 13d–1 and 13d–2 and Rules 13 and 201 of Regulation S–T To Revise Filing Deadlines and Filing Date Assignment

We are adopting a series of amendments to the deadlines for filing initial and amended beneficial ownership reports on Schedules 13D and 13G and expanding the timeframe within a given business day in which such filings may be timely made. These amendments are listed in section I above and discussed in more detail below.

1. Rule 13d–1(a), (e), (f), and (g)

Section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act requires a disclosure statement to be filed “within ten days after [acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class] or within such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule.” Consistent with this provision, Rule 13d–1(a) sets forth the 10-day filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13D. Although the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 13(d)(1) to grant the Commission the authority to shorten the deadline for filing the initial Schedule 13D, the 10-day deadline has not been updated since it was enacted more than 50 years ago.

Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) set forth the initial Schedule 13D filing obligations for investors who are no longer eligible to rely upon Rule 13d–1(b) or (c) (which permit investors to file the more abbreviated Schedule 13G in lieu of the longer-form Schedule 13D). Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) ensure that initial Schedule 13D filings uniformly are subject to a 10-day deadline, regardless of whether the beneficial owners were previously eligible to file a Schedule 13G in lieu of the Schedule 13D.

Rule 13d–1(e) applies to persons who have been filing a Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D in reliance upon either Rule 13d–1(b) or (c). Rule 13d–1(b) and (c) both provide that a person may not rely on those provisions if he or she beneficially owns the relevant equity securities with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer. Institutional and non-institutional beneficial owners who are unable to certify that they do not hold beneficial ownership for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer or in connection with any transaction that would have such purpose or effect, as described more fully under Item 10 of Schedule 13G, or certain institutional investors that also acquire or hold beneficial ownership outside of the ordinary course of business, are considered to have, for purposes of this release, a “disqualifying purpose or effect.” Rule 13d–1(e)(1) requires such persons to file their initial Schedule 13D within 10 days of losing their Schedule 13G eligibility because they beneficially own a covered class with a disqualifying purpose or effect.

Similarly, Rule 13d–1(f) applies to persons who have been filing a Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D in reliance on Rule 13d–1(c). Rule 13d–1(c) provides that persons may not rely on that provision if they beneficially own 20 percent or more of a covered class. Rule 13d–1(f)(1) currently requires that such persons file their initial Schedule 13D within 10 days of losing their Schedule 13G eligibility because they beneficially own 20 percent or more of a covered class.

Finally, Rule 13d–1(g) applies to persons who have been filing a Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D in reliance upon Rule 13d–1(b). Only QIIs may rely on Rule 13d–1(b). Further, in order to rely on Rule 13d–1(b), a QII must beneficially own the relevant equity securities in the ordinary course of its business. Rule 13d–1(g) currently requires that such persons either file their initial Schedule 13D or amend their Schedule 13G to indicate that they are now relying on Rule 13d–1(c) (assuming they are eligible to rely on that rule) within 10 days of losing their Schedule 13G eligibility under Rule 13d–1(b) because they either no longer are a QII or no longer beneficially own the relevant equity securities in the ordinary course of their business.

Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) operate as regulatory safeguards that reestablish the application of Rule 13d–1(a) to beneficial owners who previously relied on Rule 13d–1(b) or (c). Under Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g), beneficial owners “shall immediately become subject to” Rules 13d–1(a) and 13d–2(a), which provisions are reinstated anew with respect to those persons the moment they become ineligible to rely upon Rule 13d–1(b) and (c).

a. Proposed Amendments

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–1(a) to require a Schedule 13D to be filed within five days after the date on which a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. The Commission stated that the deadline for filing an initial Schedule 13D should be revised in light of advances in technology and developments in the financial markets and noted that shortening that deadline would be consistent with previous efforts to accelerate public disclosures of material information to the market. The Commission also asserted that the proposed five-day deadline would maintain an appropriate balance between the requirement that material information be timely disseminated to investors and the competing interest that undue burdens not be imposed in the change of control context. In addition, the Commission stated that it was mindful of the need to balance the market's demand for timely information and the administrative burden placed upon a filer to adequately and accurately prepare that information. Finally, the Commission noted that the current 10-day filing deadline “contributes to information asymmetries that could harm investors” and stated that shortening that deadline could increase transparency and provide assurance “that transactions are not being made based on mispriced securities caused by a prolonged lag in the dissemination of market-moving information,” thereby improving investor confidence, market efficiency, and liquidity.

In the Proposing Release, the Commission also proposed to amend the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline under Rule 13d–1(e)(1), (f)(1), and (g) for largely the same reasons that it proposed to amend Rule 13d–1(a). Specifically, the Commission proposed to make conforming revisions to Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) so that persons who initially elected to report beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G, in lieu of a Schedule 13D, but subsequently lost their eligibility would be treated no differently from persons who make a Schedule 13D their initial filing. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) to make the required Schedule 13D—or, in the case of Rule 13d–1(g), the amendment to Schedule 13G indicating that the filer is now relying on Rule 13d–1(c), if applicable—due no later than five days after the date on which the person became ineligible to report on Schedule 13G.

b. Comments Received

Commenters expressed a range of views on the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(a), (e), (f), and (g). A number of commenters supported shortening the deadline for filing an initial Schedule 13D from 10 days to five days. Several commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would increase the timeliness and quality of information for market participants. A number of commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would increase transparency and fairness in the financial markets.

Several commenters identified potential specific benefits of the proposed amendments. For example, some commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would be particularly beneficial for retail investors by providing them with additional information and transparency. Another commenter stated that the proposed amendments would enable investors and the market to “better track when beneficial owners take significant positions in covered securities for purposes of controlling or exerting influence over issuers, resulting in more informed decision-making by investors and more accurate valuation of securities by the market.”

Other commenters highlighted potential downsides of the current 10-day deadline. For example, one commenter described the 10-day deadline as costly to public companies and investors generally and based its support for the proposed amendments “on the fundamental concept that a public company must have timely information about its owners in order to engage with them effectively and respond promptly to their concerns.” Another commenter stated that “[i]nvestors' and market participants' abilities to prudently manage their positions and exposures is materially undermined by the arbitrary, unnecessary, discriminatory delay in reporting.”

Several commenters suggested that the proposed amendments would reduce information asymmetry among market participants. Other commenters raised similar information asymmetry-based concerns regarding the 10-day filing deadline. For example, one commenter expressed concern that under the current deadline, pension funds are deprived of any short-term gains from hedge fund activism if they sell shares during the 10-day delay in disclosure of a beneficial ownership stake. Another commenter asserted that the current 10-day deadline “disadvantages selling shareholders after the 5% threshold is reached and permits activist investors to ambush public companies, often by disclosing an ownership interest that far exceeds 5% of shares outstanding.” Further, one commenter suggested that the proposed amendments could help address information asymmetries that facilitate “stealth” accumulations at artificially low market prices, which purportedly transfer value from public investors to those activists engaged in seeking ownership, control, or influence over the target company.

Other commenters supported the proposed amendments based on changes in technology and developments in the financial markets. For example, one commenter supported the proposal based on the “increasing effectiveness of activist campaigns and their decreased cost due to advances in information technology and the rise of concentrated economic ownership in the United States,” citing “cost-effective activism” due to both the fact that “little more than 10 to 15 institutions are the target audience” and “the Commission's new universal proxy rule.” Similarly, other commenters described the current Schedule 13D filing deadline as “outdated.” One commenter agreed with the expressed concern in the Proposing Release that material information about potential change of control transactions is not being disseminated to the public in a manner that would be considered timely in today's financial markets. One commenter cited an April 2020 survey it conducted of its members (composed of corporate officers and investor relations consultants) indicating that 82 percent supported modernization of the Schedule 13D filing deadlines.

Several commenters noted that many foreign jurisdictions require beneficial ownership reporting on a shorter deadline than currently required under Regulation 13D–G. One commenter disagreed with the notion expressed in the Proposing Release that the comparison of the beneficial ownership reporting deadline in the United States to foreign jurisdictions is imperfect because U.S. corporate law permits anti-takeover provisions that are not present in those jurisdictions. To the contrary, that commenter asserted that some of those foreign jurisdictions are even less “stockholder” and “activism” friendly than the United States, making corporate takeovers and activism more difficult, and described the corporate laws and corporate governance practices of those foreign jurisdictions as compared to the United States (focusing, in particular, on Delaware corporate law). Other commenters noted that the proposed amendments would be consistent with similar Commission efforts to accelerate filing deadlines.

A number of commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would not impose significant costs or burdens on beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class. For example, one of those commenters stated that the compliance costs of the proposed amendments “are unlikely to be unduly burdensome, in a manner that outweighs the benefits” of the proposal given the nature of investors that generally file a Schedule 13D and the technology available to them. Another commenter agreed that the proposed amendments would be consistent in balancing investors' need for adequate disclosures with the burdens placed on filers to accurately prepare required disclosures.

Several commenters stated that the proposed amendments would not significantly reduce shareholder activism. For example, one commenter asserted that the proposed five-day deadline would not significantly impair the ability of activists to pursue their agendas. Another commenter questioned whether there is an empirical basis for asserting that the proposed amendments would prevent shareholder activism and engagement. Some commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would not interfere with shareholder activism on environmental, social, or governance (“ESG”) issues because many such activists are not Schedule 13D filers. One commenter was “not persuaded that a 10-day delay in beneficial ownership disclosure after acquiring a 5 percent stake is needed to incentivize . . . [a] large investor to be an activist investor.” And, one commenter asserted that the proposed amendments are “more likely to adversely affect short-term behaviors than long-term oriented activism.”

In addition, a number of commenters stated that shareholder activism is not uniformly beneficial for issuers and their shareholders. For example, one commenter asserted that hedge fund activism could be contributing to an emphasis on short-term gains over sustainable, long-term growth that benefits longer-term investors. One commenter noted that while a Schedule 13D filing by an activist may often lead to an immediate bump in the issuer's stock price, there is no compelling evidence that activist interventions deliver long-term value to shareholders. One commenter asserted that the current 10-day deadline may discourage companies from going public, inhibiting capital formation, based on the threat of activism and “the burden of being subject to attacks by activist investors, a number of whom have short-term agendas.” One commenter stated that activist investors often pressure companies and their management to agree to their short-term demands that may or may not be in the long-term interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. Further, one commenter cited a study indicating that activist hedge fund campaigns targeting public companies are associated with a reduction in jobs, research and development spending, and capital expenditures, which arguably harms employees.

Finally, commenters raised a variety of other points in support of the proposed amendments. For example, one commenter stated that the balance that Congress sought to strike in the Williams Act was between activist investors seeking to change companies and those companies' management—not between an activist investor and a company's other investors. One commenter stated that the proposed amendments could moderate the sudden, abrupt changes in corporate governance that often occur in issuers targeted by activist investors. And, one commenter noted that the proposed amendments fall “squarely” within the Commission's legal authority under section 929R of the Dodd-Frank Act and align with the Williams Act's intent because Congress chose a 10-day deadline to accommodate the practical challenges associated with preparing and filing a Schedule 13D.

A number of commenters opposed shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline to five days. Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendments would disincentivize shareholder activism by reducing the amount of time that such shareholders have to accumulate positions in an issuer before filing a Schedule 13D, thereby depriving issuers and their shareholders of the positive benefits of such activism. For example, one commenter stated that “if active shareholders are unable to establish an economically efficient pre-disclosure ownership stake, public company shareholders (and the economy more broadly) will be less likely to benefit from the improved stock price performance that often attends the monitoring and engagement activities pursued by engaged shareholders, given that such shareholders would have difficulty justifying certain engagements with issuers.” Similarly, another commenter asserted that the proposal would “mak[e] it more costly for blockholders to build a sufficient position to effect change” and “reduce the profitability of, and therefore the incentive to pursue, activist strategies,” which would “reduce management's accountability to shareholders and corporate governance generally.” And another commenter stated that “although the SEC requires an activist buyer to disclose information that the buyer has acquired, the SEC fails to ask whether the buyer would acquire the information initially” and suggested that, under the proposed deadline, “the buyer would often be unlikely to make the original investment in information.”

In addition, one commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments would disproportionately disincentivize shareholder activism that is targeted towards reforms other than a sale of the issuer. Another commenter asserted that the proposed amendments would inhibit an activist investor's ability to make overtures to an issuer's management prior to public disclosure and to consult with other shareholders to ensure that shareholders' opinions and proposals are considered when approaching management. And, one commenter stated that the proposed amendments would particularly disincentivize activism at medium- and small-cap companies because a larger economic position is needed to offset the activists' costs.

Several commenters took issue with the information asymmetry concerns that the Commission expressed as a justification for the proposed amendments. For example, one commenter cited data indicating that shareholders who sell during the period after an activist accumulates more than five percent beneficial ownership but before the activist files its Schedule 13D still generally benefit from that activist's accumulation because the stock price generally increases prior to the Schedule 13D filing. Some commenters stated that the information asymmetry described in the Proposing Release is no different from the general asymmetry that exists in the market when any investor—activist or otherwise—determines to invest the time and resources to develop and then implement an investment thesis. Similarly, some commenters asserted that information asymmetry is a quintessential element of the U.S. capital markets where investors are, and should be, entitled to profit from their analysis, hard work, and risk taking. Other commenters stated that selling shareholders are not forced to sell their shares and do so voluntarily, either seeking liquidity or because they have doubts about the issuer's prospects, and noted that such shareholders have the same access as the Schedule 13D filer to disclosures from both the issuer and insiders. Some commenters asserted that the Commission ignored the fact that although some investors may miss out on selling at an appreciated price once the Schedule 13D is filed, a larger number of investors generally will benefit from the efforts of an activist. Finally, one commenter asserted that the Williams Act was not intended to address information asymmetry-based concerns or the interests of shareholders who elect to sell prior to the disclosure of an initial Schedule 13D and cited to the legislative history and a U.S. Supreme Court decision to support such assertion.

A number of commenters also disagreed with the Commission's technological advancement- and financial market development-based justifications for the proposed acceleration of the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines. For example, some commenters asserted that neither Congress nor the Commission previously suggested that technological ability to file is or should be the primary basis to determine the appropriate filing deadlines for Schedules 13D and 13G. One commenter asserted that the Commission has not made significant technological advances over the years to its own systems that market participants rely on to prepare Schedules 13D and 13G, making it challenging and costly for investors to gather the information about beneficial ownership they need to file Schedules 13D and 13G. One commenter asserted that technological advances do not support shortening the filing deadline as proposed because despite advances in technology, the filing process still has numerous operational components that take time to complete. Another commenter stated that recent trends indicate that activist investors are having a moderate and declining impact in the United States and, therefore, the Commission should “encourage new forms of activism, not suppress them.”

Several commenters expressed concerns that the proposed amendments do not align with the purpose or objectives of the Williams Act. For example, one commenter asserted that the proposed amendments “would necessarily be considered to be beyond [the Commission's] statutory authority and an `abuse of discretion,' if not `arbitrary and capricious' under the APA” because the proposed rule does not connect the proposed reduction in filing time with what the commenter described as the “sole purpose” of the Williams Act under Supreme Court precedent, namely the protection of shareholders confronted with a cash tender offer. Another commenter stated that not all of the investors who file on Schedule 13D are activist investors engaging in the types of activities the Williams Act seeks to regulate. Other commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendments would disrupt the balance that the Williams Act sought to strike.

Some opposing commenters detailed the potential compliance burdens that the proposed amendments could impose. For example, some commenters expressed concern that the proposed five-day deadline would be unduly burdensome for smaller and non-institutional beneficial owners. Other commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would present compliance challenges and create significant reporting and monitoring burdens. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments could negatively impact the ability of investors and their advisors to draft meaningful disclosures and engage in thoughtful analysis.

Other commenters raised various other concerns regarding the proposed amendments. For example, a number of commenters expressed concerns that the proposed amendments would increase management entrenchment and reduce shareholder engagement and corporate accountability. One commenter stated that although “some purchasers may file within fewer than the required 10 days for Schedule 13D,” that “does not justify accelerating the reporting timeline.” One commenter also noted that the proposed accelerated initial Schedule 13D filing deadline could result in activist investors relying more heavily on derivatives, such as total return swaps and call options. One commenter asserted that the Commission has not provided a compelling justification for the proposed amendments or provided evidence to support its concerns regarding information asymmetries and reporting gaps that would warrant the proposed acceleration of the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments would induce a front-running effect that would distort market pricing and increase market volatility. Other commenters asserted that investors already have access to all of the volume and price data for publicly traded companies that they need to take appropriate action and, therefore, do not need additional information regarding holdings by significant beneficial owners.

In addition, one commenter expressed concern that the Commission has not cited a market event or failure related to the existing beneficial ownership regime to support the proposed amendments. That commenter distinguished the proposed amendments from other congressional efforts to accelerate public disclosures based on the fact that the proposed amendments apply to unrelated, third-party investors rather than issuers or insiders. Finally, one commenter asserted that the proposed amendments conflict with contract law in the United States, which generally refrains from imposing disclosure obligations on buyers of property.

Some of the commenters that generally supported the proposed amendments also made various recommendations to the Commission. For example, one commenter recommended that the Commission require that an initial Schedule 13D be filed by the end of the day on which a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. Another recommended that the Commission require that an initial Schedule 13D be filed within one calendar day of a person acquiring three percent, rather than more than five percent, of a covered class and that a person be prohibited from acquiring more than three percent until one business day after filing a Schedule 13D. Similarly, one commenter recommended that the Commission require that an initial Schedule 13D be filed within one business day after crossing the five percent threshold and institute a moratorium on the acquisition of beneficial ownership of additional equity securities of an issuer by any acquirer required to file a Schedule 13D that would be in effect from the acquisition of a five percent beneficial ownership stake until two business days after filing the Schedule 13D.

Other supporting commenters recommended that the Commission require that an initial Schedule 13D be filed within two business days, consistent with the filing deadline for a Form 4. One supporting commenter recommended that the Commission require that an initial Schedule 13D be filed within three days rather than five days. Other supporting commenters recommended that the Commission consider further shortening the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines without specifying an alternative filing deadline.

In addition, some of the commenters that generally opposed the proposed amendments made various recommendations to the Commission. For example, one recommended that rather than shortening the Schedule 13D filing deadline, the Commission should impose a prohibition on tipping by an activist as soon as it reaches the five percent threshold until it files a Schedule 13D. Another recommended that the Commission include an assets under management-based threshold for the proposed accelerated Schedule 13D filing deadlines.

Other opposing commenters recommended that the Commission consider a “tiered approach” to Rule 13d–1(a). For example, one commenter suggested a tiered approach designed to vary the reporting deadline for an initial Schedule 13D based on the issuer's market capitalization without any limitation on acquisitions during the period between the time that the investor acquires more than five percent of a covered class and the time that the initial Schedule 13D is filed. Another opposing commenter recommended that the Commission require those who cross certain thresholds ( e.g., 10 percent) or accumulate certain amounts after crossing five percent ( e.g., an additional three percent) to file on the more accelerated timeline, but allowing investors who trigger Schedule 13D filings for more technical reasons and who are not accumulating stock in connection with a potential activist engagement ( e.g., proxy contests or intended take-private activity) to continue filing under the current regime.

Some opposing commenters recommended that if the Commission revises the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline, it should adopt a different deadline than proposed. For example, one commenter recommended that the Commission consider extending the filing deadline ( e.g., to 15 or 30 days) rather than accelerating it. One commenter recommended that the Commission require an initial Schedule 13D be filed within eight days rather than the proposed five days. Other commenters recommended that the Commission require an initial Schedule 13D be filed in five business days rather than five calendar days. Some of those commenters suggested that a five-business day deadline would be more appropriate in light of the steps required to prepare and file an accurate Schedule 13D, and one commenter noted that most analogous securities laws governing reporting of material changes ( e.g., Form 8–K and Exchange Act section 16 filings) require filings within time periods designated in business days rather than calendar days.

Finally, some commenters that neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendments made recommendations to the Commission. Several commenters recommended an alternative filing deadline than proposed, with some suggesting that the Commission require an initial Schedule 13D be filed within one day, within two days, five business days, or on the same day as the event triggering the filing obligation. Some commenters expressed a general preference for a deadline expressed in “business days” rather than “calendar days.” And, one commenter recommended that to the extent the Commission is concerned about Schedule 13D filers acquiring additional shares after crossing the five percent threshold without public disclosure, it should prohibit trading after crossing the five percent threshold rather than accelerating the filing deadlines.

c. Final Amendments

We are amending Rule 13d–1(a), (e), (f), and (g) to shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline. We are adopting a five-business day deadline, however, rather than the proposed five-calendar day deadline based on the input we received from commenters.

As noted above, Rule 13d–1(a) currently requires an initial Schedule 13D to be filed within 10 days after the date on which a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. We are amending Rule 13d–1(a) to require a Schedule 13D to be filed within five business days after the date of such acquisition. Similarly, as discussed above, Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) currently require an initial Schedule 13D to be filed within 10 days after the date on which a person loses its Schedule 13G eligibility. We are amending those rules to require such Schedule 13D to be filed within five business days after such date.

For purposes of determining the filing deadline under these amendments, the Commission must receive the filing by the fifth business day after the date on which the initial Schedule 13D filing obligation arises— i.e., the date on which a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class under Rule 13d–1(a) or the date on which a person loses eligibility to file on Schedule 13G under Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g)—in order for the filing to be considered timely. Pursuant to our amendment to Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T, discussed in section II.A.5 below, the filing will have to be submitted by direct transmission commencing on or before 10 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date.

We believe the current 10-day filing deadline for an initial Schedule 13D filing should be revised to ensure investors receive material information in a manner that is considered timely in light of advancements in technology and developments in the financial markets that have occurred since that deadline was enacted in 1968. Those technological advancements include, for example, market professionals' use of information technologies to compile the necessary data and prepare a filing, as well as their ability to submit filings electronically through the Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system. In addition, the use of modern information technology and other developments in the financial markets may facilitate an investor's accumulation of a large equity stake more quickly than at the time Congress enacted the Williams Act. Before 1993, “the prevailing practice” was to “settl[e] securities transactions within five business days of trade date.” Since then, the Commission has shortened the settlement cycle three times, most recently adopting rule amendments this year that require settlement of most transactions in securities within one business day after the trade date (with which compliance will be required by May 28, 2024). Because a shortened settlement cycle enables investors to access the proceeds of their transactions more quickly, investors also may be able to acquire a significant equity stake more quickly than when settling their transactions within five business days of trade date. Congress, in the Dodd-Frank Act, expressly empowered the Commission to shorten the deadline for filing the initial Schedule 13D. Because of those advances in technology and developments in the financial markets, we are now exercising that authority to shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline.

We note that our shortening of the initial filing deadline for Schedule 13D is consistent with previous congressional and Commission efforts to accelerate public disclosures of material information to the market. For example, in 2002, when the Commission accelerated the deadlines for issuers to submit their periodic reports, it reasoned that “[s]ignificant technological advances over the last three decades have both increased the market's demand for more timely corporate disclosure and the ability of companies to capture, process and disseminate this information.” Similarly, the Commission has long recognized the benefits of more expedient reporting, stating, for example, that “a lengthy delay before . . . information becomes available makes the information less valuable to investors.”

Despite those efforts to accelerate various other reporting deadlines, the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1968. As a number of commenters pointed out, there have been significant changes in technology and developments in the financial markets in the intervening years that have rendered the 10-day deadline “outdated.” Commenters also highlighted some costs that the current 10-day deadline may be imposing on market participants ( i.e., by delaying the disclosure of potentially material information) and identified some potential benefits of shortening that deadline, including increased timeliness of information and improved transparency and fairness in the financial markets. We agree with those commenters that shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline will increase the timeliness of the disclosure of material information, thereby improving market transparency, facilitating better-informed decision-making by investors, and enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation ( i.e., the direction of capital and other resources to their most productive uses) across the economy.

We recognize that several commenters opposed the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(a), (e), (f), and (g). Some commenters asserted that neither Congress nor the Commission previously suggested that technological ability to file should be the primary basis to determine the appropriate initial Schedule 13D filing deadline. There is some indication, however, that when enacting the 10-day deadline, Congress considered the amount of time a beneficial owner would need to prepare and submit a filing. As noted above, there have been significant technological advancements since 1968 that have made it easier to prepare and file a Schedule 13D more quickly. There also is some indication that Congress enacted section 13(d), in part, to provide shareholders with material information regarding potential changes in control in a timely manner to facilitate their investment decisions. Because changes in technology and developments in the financial markets since 1968 have facilitated investors' abilities to rapidly accumulate beneficial ownership, we believe it is appropriate to shorten the initial Schedule 13D deadline so that the rate at which shareholders become aware of such accumulations keeps pace.

Many commenters also expressed concern that shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline could, among other things, disincentivize shareholder activism by reducing the amount of time such shareholders have to accumulate positions in an issuer's covered class before filing a Schedule 13D. According to those commenters, this reduction of time could deprive issuers and their shareholders of the positive benefits of such activism, thereby increasing management entrenchment and reducing shareholder engagement and corporate accountability.

Although we primarily are concerned with ensuring that investors receive material information in a timely manner, we agree that we should remain conscious of the competing interest that undue burdens not be imposed on shareholders engaging in change of control transactions. In the Proposing Release, the Commission “recognize[d] the chilling effect that a shortening of the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline could have on a shareholder's ability . . . to effect changes at companies” if the shortened deadline increases the costs and reduces the incentives for shareholders attempting to effect a change of control. Yet, the Commission further stated that it did not believe “that a shortening of the deadline would unduly disrupt that balance,” noting that “many Schedule 13D filers currently do not avail themselves of the full 10-day filing period.” A number of commenters similarly asserted that the proposed five-day deadline would not significantly impede shareholder activism or impose significant costs or burdens on beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class.

Notwithstanding this support for the proposed five-calendar day deadline, we have decided to instead adopt a five-business day deadline. This change from the proposal comports with a recommendation that a number of commenters, including several that opposed the proposed amendments, made to the Commission. Further, this shift to a “business days”-based deadline also will help to address a variety of concerns that commenters expressed about the burdens associated with the proposed five-day deadline. Specifically, five business days (as compared to five calendar days) gives beneficial owners additional time to accumulate positions in an issuer before filing a Schedule 13D and to prepare and file an accurate Schedule 13D. As with the proposed five-calendar day deadline, we also note that many Schedule 13D filings currently are made within the amended five-business day deadline. This demonstrates that at least some Schedule 13D filers are likely to be unaffected by the shortened deadline. And, many Schedule 13D filers are sophisticated, large investors that have access to technology and resources that should allow them to prepare and file a Schedule 13D within five business days. As such, we do not anticipate a five-business day deadline will be unduly disruptive for Schedule 13D filers.

With respect to shareholder activism in particular, we note that for the vast majority of campaigns, the shareholder currently accumulates at least 90 percent of its equity stake, with many accumulating 100 percent of their equity stake, within the amended five-business day deadline. This demonstrates that most shareholder activists may not be affected by the shortened deadline. In addition, for those campaigns that would be affected by the amended five-business day deadline, we expect the activists will adapt to the shortened deadline and continue to pursue the campaigns. For example, for those campaigns in which the shareholder has accumulated less than 90 percent of its equity stake within the amended five-business day deadline, we note that the unrealized gains attributable to the shares accumulated after the amended deadline generally represent a significantly smaller portion of the shareholder's total unrealized gains (when compared to the shares accumulated prior to the amended deadline).

Finally, we note that profits from shareholder activism may not be derived solely from the increase in share price associated with the public disclosure of an activist's more than five percent beneficial ownership stake. Specifically, shareholder activists may continue to experience abnormal positive returns from activism even after filing their initial Schedule 13D. Thus, to the extent a shareholder activist seeks to profit from increases in share price after the public disclosure of its more than five percent beneficial ownership stake, we would not expect a reduction in the profits associated with such disclosure to be determinative as to whether a shareholder engages in an activist campaign.

The amended five-business day deadline reflects our attempt to ensure investors receive material information in a timely manner while, at the same time, maintaining the appropriate balance between issuers of securities and the shareholders who seek to exert influence or control over issuers, especially when compared with the proposed five-calendar day deadline, which many commenters supported, and the even shorter deadlines many commenters recommended. We believe a five-business day deadline is sufficiently prompt and represents a more modern approach that reflects the technological advancements and other developments in the financial markets in the more than 50 years since the 10-day deadline was enacted. A five-business day deadline, as compared to the current 10-day deadline, also would more closely align the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline with the reporting deadline on Form 8–K for issuers (generally, four business days) and Form 4 for officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of a covered class (two business days), both in terms of the length of the deadline and the use of “business days,” rather than “days,” to express the deadline. This alignment should help to ensure that investors consistently receive prompt disclosures of material information, irrespective of the source. A five-business day deadline for the initial Schedule 13D also is more consistent in both length and form with the filing deadlines for similar beneficial ownership reports in foreign jurisdictions.

Overall, because we expect that the vast majority of activist campaigns, and the value they create, will continue unabated under the amended rules, we conclude that the significant benefits of the amendments outlined here and below justify their costs.

Some commenters expressed other objections to the proposed amendments. For example, several commenters disagreed with the information asymmetry-based concerns in the Proposing Release as a basis for the proposed amendments. We recognize that there are information asymmetries involved in any market transaction and agree that not all information asymmetries warrant a regulatory response. For example, one commenter stated that the information asymmetries described in the Proposing Release “are simply the beneficial result of research and initiative by investors and the sign of properly functioning markets” and expressed concern that “[i]f activists have no economic incentive to pursue activism, other shareholders will not experience the increase in value that would have otherwise resulted from the activist's conduct.” We acknowledge that benefits may stem from the information asymmetry between a Schedule 13D filer and the market, and we recognize that the informational advantage of Schedule 13D filers results, in general, from their own expenditures on research and analysis or from their efforts and expenditures to pursue changes at the issuers in which they accumulate these shareholdings. As such, although the Proposing Release referred to information asymmetries between Schedule 13D filers and selling shareholders and expressed concern that those information asymmetries “could harm investors,” we do not focus on the reduction of these asymmetries as a justification for shortening the initial Schedule 13D deadline, as discussed in sections IV.C.1.a.iii and iv below.

Some other information asymmetries may, however, raise concerns that warrant a regulatory response. Specifically, the research and analysis prepared by the staff of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis indicate that shortening the initial Schedule 13D deadline to five business days could meaningfully reduce information asymmetries between “informed bystanders” and other, less-informed investors who sell their shares during the period after which an initial Schedule 13D filing obligation has been incurred but before the filing is made. The informational advantage those “informed bystanders” have over the selling shareholders in these transactions and the associated wealth transfers may be perceived by some market participants to be unfair. Thus, to the extent that a shortened initial Schedule 13D filing deadline would reduce these wealth transfers, thereby addressing this perceived unfairness, this change could enhance trust in the securities markets and promote capital formation.

We also note that some commenters questioned the appropriateness and legality of the proposed amendments in light of certain U.S. Supreme Court cases that the commenters cited for the proposition that the “sole purpose” of the Williams Act is to protect shareholders confronted with a cash tender offer. In both cases, the Court made the cited statements in the limited context of determining causes of action or remedies that are available for purported violations of certain provisions of the Williams Act. Neither decision suggests that the provisions and protections of the Williams Act are available only when a cash tender offer is involved; in fact, the Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. referred to the defendant-shareholder's belated compliance with section 13(d), notwithstanding the absence of a pending or threatened cash tender offer. We also note statements in the legislative history indicating that Congress intended that the Williams Act would apply to any “acqui[sition] of a substantial block of equity securities . . . by a cash tender offer . . . or through open market or privately negotiated purchases.” We do not believe, therefore, that our shortening of the initial Schedule 13D deadline must be tied to risks shareholders face in connection with cash tender offers.

Finally, some opposing commenters expressed other doubts regarding the Commission's authority to shorten the initial Schedule 13D deadline as proposed and asserted that the Commission did not identify a market event or failure that would justify the proposed amendments. As noted above, however, section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act clearly grants the Commission authority to shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline. In addition, the Commission has long recognized that acquisitions made after a person acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class but before the person files an initial Schedule 13D constitute a “disclosure gap [that] may deprive security holders of a fair opportunity to adjust their evaluation of the securities of a company with respect to [a] potential change in control.” We believe that the current length of that disclosure gap, together with the information asymmetry that it may facilitate and the advancements in technology and developments in the financial markets since Congress enacted the Williams Act, provide grounds to shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline from 10 days to five business days.

2. Rule 13d–1(b), (c), and (d)

Congress enacted section 13(g) in 1977 to address the absence of beneficial ownership reporting by persons who had accumulated large amounts of stock in a public issuer but were not required to file a beneficial ownership report under section 13(d). Section 13(g) was intended to “supplement the current statutory scheme by providing legislative authority for certain additional disclosure requirements that in some cases could not be imposed administratively.” Beneficial owners who currently report on Schedule 13G pursuant to section 13(g) and corresponding Rule 13d–1(d) are not subject to section 13(d) because they either made an exempt acquisition or an acquisition otherwise not covered by the statute. Section 13(d), in contrast to section 13(g), applies only to beneficial owners who make non-exempt acquisitions of more than five percent of a covered class. Section 13(g) was intended to close this gap.

In response to the enactment of section 13(g), the Commission adopted Schedule 13G to serve two purposes: (1) provide an optional short form disclosure statement for certain persons subject to section 13(d); and (2) provide a mandatory disclosure statement for persons subject to section 13(g). Together with section 13(d), section 13(g) was intended to provide a “comprehensive disclosure system of corporate ownership” applicable to all persons who are the beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class. Rule 13d–1(b), (c), and (d) provide the filing deadlines for the initial Schedule 13G. Which deadline a person is subject to for its initial Schedule 13G filing depends on whether the person is a QII, Exempt Investor, or Passive Investor.

A QII relying upon Rule 13d–1(b) currently is obligated under Rule 13d–1(b)(2) to file a Schedule 13G “within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the person became obligated” to report beneficial ownership, but only if such QII beneficially owns more than five percent of a covered class at the end of a calendar year. If the QII beneficially owns more than 10 percent of a covered class as of the last day of any month, then the initial Schedule 13G must be filed within 10 days after the end of that month. A QII relying on Rule 13d–1(b), therefore, may have beneficial ownership in excess of five percent throughout the calendar year without incurring a filing obligation unless the QII beneficially owns more than 10 percent of a covered class at the end of any month during that year.

Rule 13d–1(d), as with Rule 13d–1(b), imposes an initial Schedule 13G filing deadline of 45 days after the end of the calendar year, but only for investors who have become beneficial owners without having made an acquisition recognized under section 13(d)(1). Given that these investors did not make the requisite acquisition that would have subjected them to section 13(d), the Commission has previously referred to this type of beneficial owner as an “Exempt Investor.” Unlike the QIIs and Passive Investors—discussed below, in the context of Rule 13d–1(c)—who file a Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D and at all times remain subject to section 13(d), Exempt Investors are subject to section 13(g) at the time their initial filing obligation arises. Exempt Investors reporting pursuant to Rule 13d–1(d) today may include persons such as founders of companies and early investors in an issuer's class of equity securities who made their acquisition before the class was registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act. These beneficial owners may continue to influence or control the issuer. Accordingly, the Commission has emphasized that the disclosures required under section 13(g) are obtained in connection with the overall regulatory purposes served by section 13(d).

Finally, a beneficial owner electing to report on Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D in reliance on Rule 13d–1(c) as a Passive Investor must file a Schedule 13G within 10 days after acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. A person is eligible to file as a Passive Investor only if such person is not seeking to acquire or influence control of an issuer and beneficially owns less than 20 percent of a covered class. Persons unable or unwilling to certify under Item 10 of Schedule 13G that they do not have a disqualifying purpose or effect because, for example, the possibility exists that they may seek to exercise or influence control, are ineligible to file a Schedule 13G and must instead file a Schedule 13D.

a. Proposed Amendments

The Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) to shorten the filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13G to be filed by QIIs and Exempt Investors to five business days after the end of the month in which beneficial ownership exceeds five percent of a covered class. The Commission expected that the proposed acceleration of these deadlines would result in more timely disclosures while minimizing any potential additional burdens. The Commission also believed that these investors should already have well-established compliance systems in place to monitor Schedule 13G ownership levels to determine whether filing obligations have been triggered.

Given the proposal to shorten the initial reporting deadline to five business days after the end of the month, the Commission also recognized that the current provision of Rule 13d–1(b)(2) that operates to accelerate that initial filing deadline if beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent at the end of any month would be unnecessary in light of Rule 13d–2(c)'s overlapping Schedule 13G amendment requirement. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to further amend Rule 13d–1(b)(2) to delete the language that imposes an initial reporting obligation on QIIs after exceeding 10 percent of a covered class.

The Commission also proposed to amend the filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(c) to five days after the date the person becomes obligated to file an initial Schedule 13G. The Commission believed that it would be appropriate to amend the initial Schedule 13G filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(c) to match the proposed initial Schedule 13D filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(a) in order to maintain the historical consistency between the deadlines in Rule 13d–1(c) and (a) and to facilitate the overall goal of increasing transparency in beneficial ownership.

In proposing these amendments, the Commission stated that the current initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines' length and manner of applicability to QIIs and Exempt Investors together could, in certain circumstances, frustrate the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g). For example, the Commission noted investors reporting pursuant to current Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) may avoid beneficial ownership reporting by selling down their positions before the end of the calendar year, and, in the case of QIIs, selling down before the end of a month if ownership exceeds 10 percent. The proposed amendments to the filing deadlines for initial Schedule 13G filings by QIIs and Exempt Investors, therefore, were intended to improve transparency and avoid any gaps in reporting.

In addition, the Commission noted that when Rule 13d–1(c) was adopted in 1998, Passive Investors may not have had reasonable access to advanced technologies to make more immediate filings possible. Consistent with its justification for proposing to shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline under Rule 13d–1(a), the Commission asserted that Passive Investors today not only have gained valuable experience complying with these reporting provisions, but also have ready access to the necessary filing technology. As such, the Commission proposed amending Rule 13d–1(c) in light of those technological advancements and its proposed amendment to the analogous filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(a).

b. Comments Received

Commenters submitted a variety of views on the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(b), (c), and (d). Several commenters supported the proposed amendments. Some of those commenters supported accelerating the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines for many of the same reasons they supported accelerating the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline. Another commenter asserted that the proposed amendments would benefit shareholders and other market participants by facilitating sound corporate governance.

Several commenters supported the proposed amendments based on changes in technology and developments in the financial markets. A number of commenters noted that some foreign jurisdictions require beneficial ownership reporting on a shorter deadline than currently required under Regulation 13D–G. One commenter viewed the current Schedule 13G filing deadlines as outdated. Other commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would not impose significant costs to beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class. And, another commenter stated that the proposed amendments would be consistent in balancing the need for adequate disclosures with burdens placed on filers to accurately prepare required disclosures.

Several commenters opposed the proposed amendments. Some of those commenters disagreed with the Commission's technological advancement-based justifications for the proposed acceleration of the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines. For example, one commenter asserted that the Commission has never suggested that technological ability to file is or should be the primary basis to determine the appropriate filing deadlines for Schedules 13D and 13G. Another commenter stated that electronic filing of a Schedule 13G can take longer than physical mailing because of the time and effort required to obtain EDGAR filing codes as compared to simply making an overnight mailing or hand delivery of a paper filing. Another commenter questioned why the existence of new filing technologies justify subjecting QIIs to Schedule 13G filing requirements so much shorter than the ones currently in place.

Some opposing commenters acknowledged the technological advances identified in the Proposing Release but disagreed that they justify the proposed amendments. For example, one commenter stated that technological advances do not support significantly reducing filing deadlines as proposed because, despite advances in technology, the filing process still has numerous operational components that take time to complete. Similarly, some commenters stated that notwithstanding any technological advancements, a month-end-based reporting deadline for Schedule 13G would be difficult to meet because much of the process is still manual and cannot be done reliably via any current technology, including exercising the judgment required to determine whether a person is a beneficial owner under the various provisions of Rule 13d–3. Another commenter stated that, despite technological advancements, it is often difficult for QIIs to gather aggregate information quickly, confirm such information for accuracy, draft disclosure documents and receive approval for filing purposes, especially given that QIIs often beneficially own positions in many issuers and those positions change frequently.

Opposing commenters also criticized some of the Commission's other justifications for, or the purported benefits of, the proposed amendments. For example, some commenters stated that the Commission has not provided evidence to support its concerns regarding reporting gaps and information asymmetries that would warrant the proposed acceleration of the reporting deadlines. Others asserted that the Commission has not articulated how the proposed amendments will promote transparency into matters of corporate control and questioned the necessity of the proposed amendments in that respect. Some of those commenters expressed the view that the Commission's existing rules provide sufficient transparency into matters of corporate control with respect to QIIs and Passive Investors, as well as Exempt Investors. In addition, one commenter asserted that the Commission has not persuasively explained why it is appropriate to accelerate the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines as proposed. Some commenters stated that the information filed on Schedule 13G by Passive and Exempt Investors is unlikely to be material information that is market-moving. Other commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would provide little benefit to the market given that institutional investment managers' trading activity is already subject to significant scrutiny by the Commission and the public through the filing of Form 13F.

Several commenters also expressed concern regarding administrative burdens associated with the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d). Some commenters noted that beneficial owners often file a Schedule 13G for multiple different issuers, which “strains” their filing resources at the end of the reporting period. One commenter stated that a month-end-based reporting deadline applicable would burden the external resources (including outside counsel, filing agents, and the EDGAR system) needed to prepare and make these filings given that all QIIs and Exempt Investors would be performing the Schedule 13G filing analysis during the same five-business day period. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) could create practical difficulties for QIIs, including insufficient time to validate the data to be included in a consolidated filing for a large institutional investor with multiple entities. And, one commenter expressed concern that institutional investors and other unregistered entities may lack the infrastructure and personnel to comply with the revised filing deadlines and described year-round monitoring of beneficial ownership reporting obligations and the filing deadlines that would be required under the proposed amendments as burdensome.

Other commenters expressed similar concerns that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) would increase QIIs' filing burdens significantly, without material benefit to investors. Some of those commenters disagreed with the Commission's statement that QIIs already have systems in place to monitor their beneficial ownership levels and asserted that the proposed amendment would require significant changes to their operational systems and processes. One commenter disagreed with the Commission's statement that the proposed amendments only would require QIIs to monitor the beneficial ownership levels on a monthly basis, suggesting instead that the proposed amendments would require daily monitoring. Another commenter expressed concern that, as a practical matter, the proposed five-day deadline under Rule 13d–1(c) would be impossible to comply with in most cases. The same commenter also stated that Exempt Investors that are not affiliated with the issuer are unlikely to become aware of their potential beneficial ownership reporting obligations in a timely manner and, therefore, may be unlikely to be able to comply with the proposed deadline under Rule 13d–1(d) given the practical challenges associated with making a Schedule 13G filing.

Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed deadlines would be unduly burdensome for smaller and non-institutional beneficial owners, with one commenter stating that by increasing overhead costs and expanding an already complex regulatory regime, the Commission's accelerated timeline will render it particularly difficult for smaller managers, who cannot readily bear the costs and administrative burden of monthly filings. Some commenters also asserted that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) raises significant concerns regarding harm to investment advisers and funds and would impose substantial unnecessary costs on their clients. Similarly, some commenters stated that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) would create a significant risk of prematurely disclosing sensitive portfolio holdings information to the market, which may result in front-running, copycatting, and other abusive trading practices that harm advisers and their clients, including funds and their investors. And, more generally, one commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments would create significant reporting and monitoring burdens for all Schedule 13G filers.

Opposing commenters also highlighted some other potential risks associated with the proposed deadlines. For example, one commenter expressed concern that reporting within such a short time period under the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) would increase the risk reported information would subsequently need to be revised through amendments to Schedule 13G, potentially confusing the market. One commenter asserted that the proposed amendments would increase the number of unintentionally inaccurate filings. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments could negatively impact the ability of investors and their advisors to draft meaningful disclosures and engage in thoughtful analysis. Another commenter stated that the proposed amendments could be more broadly disruptive to trading.

Finally, several opposing commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendments do not reflect the differences between Schedule 13D and 13G filers (particularly QIIs) based on the legislative and administrative history of sections 13(d) and (g) of the Exchange Act. And, other commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–1(b) would be unprecedented and inappropriate, unnecessary to accomplish the Commission's regulatory objectives, and inconsistent with the intent and administrative history of the rules under sections 13(d) and 13(g).

The opposing commenters also provided some recommendations regarding the proposed amendments. A number of those commenters suggested a quarter-end-based initial Schedule 13G filing deadline for QIIs and Exempt Investors rather than a month-end-based deadline. For example, some commenters recommended that QIIs be required to file their initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after the end of a calendar quarter as of which the QII beneficially owns more than five percent of a covered class to align with the filing timeframe under section 13(f) and better reflect the distinction the Commission has historically made between QIIs and other institutional investors. Similarly, some commenters recommended that the Commission require that both QIIs and Exempt Investors file their initial Schedule 13G 45 days after the end of a calendar quarter, consistent with the Form 13F filing deadline. One commenter recommended that QIIs be required to file their initial Schedule 13G within 15 business days after the end of a calendar quarter as of which the QII beneficially owns more than five percent of a covered class. Another commenter recommended that QIIs be required to file their initial Schedule 13G on a quarterly basis with at least a 30-day period before the filing deadline.

Opposing commenters also made alternative suggestions regarding the proposed amendments. For example, one commenter recommended that QIIs and Exempt Investors be required to file their initial Schedule 13G within 10 days after the end of the month in which its beneficial ownership exceeds five percent as of month-end. Another commenter recommended that to the extent the Commission is concerned about Schedule 13G filers acquiring additional shares after crossing the five percent threshold without public disclosure, it should prohibit trading after crossing the five percent threshold rather than accelerating the filing deadlines. One commenter suggested that if the Commission seeks to apply the proposed amendments to a broad set of investors whose activities are largely unrelated to matters of corporate control, or where such matters may be implicated but are already subject to disclosure requirements under the existing disclosure regime, it should conduct further study and analysis to better understand what percentage of such investors ever are implicated in actual change in control scenarios—to determine the percentage of activist matters where earlier and more frequent disclosure of such investors' holding would have been materially beneficial to investors. Another commenter recommended that rather than adopting the proposed amendments, the Commission should add a column to Form 13F requiring filers to explicitly note, for each listed class of securities, whether the filer has acquired over five percent beneficial ownership during the reporting period. And, one commenter recommended that the Commission consider extending the filing deadline for Passive Investors ( e.g., to 15 or 30 days) rather than accelerating it.

In addition, some supporting commenters recommended that the Commission consider further shortening the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines. Those commenters, however, did not specify alternative deadlines that the Commission should adopt.

Finally, some commenters that neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendments made recommendations to the Commission. One commenter expressed the view that there should not be filing differences between institutional investors and Passive Investors and suggested that certain institutional investors should have more stringent filing requirements than Passive Investors. Several other commenters recommended that the Commission require Passive Investors to file an initial Schedule 13G in five business days rather than five calendar days.

c. Final Amendments

We are amending Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) to shorten the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines under those rules, with some modifications from the proposals in response to commenter concerns. Specifically, we are adopting an initial Schedule 13G filing deadline of 45 days after calendar quarter-end for QIIs and Exempt Investors. In addition, consistent with our amendment to the initial Schedule 13D deadline, we are amending Rule 13d–1(c) to require that Passive Investors file their initial Schedule 13G within five business days after the date on which the Passive Investor acquired beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class.

As noted above, Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) currently require QIIs and Exempt Investors, respectively, to file an initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after calendar year-end if, as of the end of that year, they beneficially own more than five percent of a covered class. We are amending Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) to require that QIIs and Exempt Investors file their initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after calendar quarter-end if, as of the end of that quarter, their beneficial ownership exceeds five percent of a covered class (rather than five business days after the end of the month in which beneficial ownership exceeds five percent, as proposed). Further, because we are adopting the new 45 days after quarter-end deadline rather than the proposed five business days after month-end deadline, we are not adopting the proposed amendment to delete the language in Rule 13d–1(b)(2) that imposes an accelerated initial reporting obligation. Instead, we are amending that rule to require that such an initial Schedule 13G be filed within five business days (instead of the current requirement of 10 days) after the end of the first month in which the QII's beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, computed as of the last day of the month.

The Commission adopted the current initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines of 45 days after year-end in Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) in the late 1970s. In light of the technological advancements and developments in the financial markets in the more than 40 intervening years, we believe it is appropriate to shorten those deadlines to ensure beneficial ownership information disclosed in an initial Schedule 13G is reported in a manner that is considered timely by modern standards. We also expect that shortening those deadlines from year-end to quarter-end will reduce the risk that QIIs and Exempt Investors sell down their positions before the end of the year and avoid reporting altogether, which should help to ensure large accumulations of beneficial ownership are reported in a timely manner, ultimately improving market transparency.

In the Proposing Release, the Commission stated its expectation that the proposed initial Schedule 13G deadlines under Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) ( i.e., five business days after the end of the month in which beneficial ownership exceeds five percent of a covered class) would result in minimal additional burdens on filers because QIIs and Exempt Investors “already have well-established compliance systems in place to monitor Schedule 13G ownership levels to determine whether filing obligations have been triggered.” Although some commenters agreed with this expectation, several comments disagreed and asserted that the proposed deadlines would be unduly burdensome for QIIs and Exempt Investors (especially those that are smaller and non-institutional investors) given the number of tasks and amount of resources required to prepare a filing in such a limited amount of time and that such burdens are not sufficiently mitigated by any technological advancements to justify adopting the proposed deadlines.

Based on commenters' observations regarding the potentially significant burdens that the proposed deadlines would impose on QIIs and Exempt Investors, we have decided to take a different approach from the proposal and instead amend Rule 13d–1(b) and (d) to require an initial Schedule 13G be filed within 45 days after calendar quarter-end. This change to a quarter-end-based deadline, rather than the proposed month-end-based deadline, is consistent with the recommendations that a number of commenters made to the Commission. We note that those commenters recommended various different numbers of days after quarter-end for the deadline. Taking into account those various recommendations, believe that 45 days is the appropriate length of time because it aligns with the filing deadline for Form 13F, and many institutional investment managers who file a Schedule 13G are already reviewing and assessing their holdings on a quarterly basis in order to prepare Form 13F filings. In addition, although most of the other amended Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines will be expressed in “business days,” we believe the potential compliance benefits of aligning the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines for QIIs and Exempt Investors with the Form 13F filing deadline justify using calendar days rather than business days.

Even for those QIIs and Exempt Investors that are not Form 13F filers, the 45-day period after calendar quarter-end deadline will be familiar given that they currently must file their initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after calendar year-end. As such, we believe that many of those beneficial owners are well-positioned to submit their Schedule 13G filings within 45 days after calendar quarter-end. This deadline, therefore, is likely to be less burdensome and should require fewer changes to QIIs' and Exempt Investors' existing compliance operations than the proposed month-end-based deadline. We also expect that the extended filing deadline ( i.e., 45 days rather than the proposed five business days) will address some commenters' concerns that the more compressed time period under the proposed deadlines could have negatively impacted the accuracy and usefulness of initial Schedule 13G filings.

Further, a 45-day, quarter-end-based deadline (instead of the proposed five-business day, month-end-based deadline) should help mitigate concerns that some opposing commenters expressed regarding the risk of QIIs and Exempt Investors prematurely disclosing sensitive portfolio holdings information to the market ( i.e., “front-running” and “free-riding”), especially given that many of those Schedule 13G filers already are obligated to disclose their holdings via Form 13F on a quarterly basis. We also believe that, as compared with the current year-end-based deadline, a quarter-end-based deadline will increase transparency for market participants and better reflects the technological advancements and developments in the financial markets since the Commission adopted Rule 13d–1(b) and (d). Thus, we believe that this deadline will address the goals that prompted the Commission's reassessment of those rules in the Proposing Release while, at the same time, avoiding inordinately burdening Schedule 13G filers.

In addition, as discussed above, Rule 13d–1(c) currently requires Passive Investors to file an initial Schedule 13G within 10 days of acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. As with our final amendment to Rule 13d–1(a), we are amending Rule 13d–1(c) to require that Passive Investors file their initial Schedule 13G within five business days after acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class. We believe it is appropriate to amend the initial Schedule 13G filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(c) to match the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline in Rule 13d–1(a) in order to maintain the historical regulatory consistency between the deadlines in Rule 13d–1(c) and (a) and to facilitate the overall goals of increasing transparency in beneficial ownership and ensuring that investors receive material information in a timely manner.

Consistent with our rationale for shortening the initial Schedule 13D deadline, we believe that many Passive Investors are large and sophisticated enough to prepare and file an initial Schedule 13G within five business days. The change to a five-business day deadline from the proposed five-calendar day deadline should mitigate commenters' concerns regarding the burdens that a shortened deadline would impose on Passive Investors and the workability of that deadline. Further, we note that research indicates that at least some beneficial owners may improperly rely on Rule 13d–1(c) to file a Schedule 13G in lieu of a Schedule 13D to obscure their control purpose. Given this increased likelihood, as compared to QIIs and Exempt Investors, of Passive Investors ultimately having a control purpose with respect to an issuer, we believe it is appropriate to shorten their initial Schedule 13G filing deadline to five business days in order for that deadline to continue to mirror the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline. This is consistent with the Commission's decision to require Passive Investors to file their initial Schedule 13G in 10 days, the same deadline as Schedule 13D, when it adopted Rule 13d–1(c).

3. Rule 13d–2(a) and (b)

Section 13(d)(2) requires that an amendment must be filed to the statement required under section 13(d)(1) if any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statement filed. Section 13(d)(2) does not, however, identify a specific deadline by which such amendment must be filed. Instead, Rule 13d–2(a) provides that such amendment must be filed with the Commission “promptly.” The obligation to file an amendment under current Rule 13d–2(a) is not limited to acquisitions. Instead, changes in the disclosure narrative that are material also must be reported in an amendment, as must material changes in the level of beneficial ownership caused by an involuntary change in circumstances, such as a reduction in the amount of beneficial ownership caused solely by an increase in the number of shares outstanding.

Section 13(g)(2) requires that an amendment be filed to the statement required under section 13(g)(1) if any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statement filed, but like section 13(d)(2), does not identify a deadline by which such amendment must be filed. Rule 13d–2(b), however, does specify a deadline and provides that for all persons who report beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G, an amendment shall be filed “within forty-five days after the end of each calendar year if, as of the end of the calendar year, there are any changes in the information reported in the previous filing on that Schedule [13G].”

a. Proposed Amendments

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(a) to require that all amendments to Schedule 13D be filed within one business day after the date of the material change that triggers the amendment obligation. The Commission proposed this change from the “promptly” standard to establish a specified filing deadline, remove any uncertainty as to the date on which an amendment is due, and help ensure that beneficial owners amend their filings in a more uniform and consistent manner. The Commission stated that it did not believe that requiring Schedule 13D amendments to be filed within one business day after the date on which a material change occurs would place those filers at a disadvantage. The Commission also stated that because an amendment to a Schedule 13D only requires that the material change be reported and not a complete set of new narrative responses to each of the disclosure form's individual line items, it expected that those amendments should present a lower administrative burden than the initial Schedule 13D filing. In addition, the Commission noted that that the proposed amendment would be consistent with its existing view that, under the current “promptly” standard in Rule 13d–2(a), “[a]ny delay beyond the date the filing reasonably can be filed may not be prompt” and that an amendment to a Schedule 13D reasonably could be filed in as little as one day following the material change.

The Commission also proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(b) to require that a Schedule 13G be amended within five business days of the end of the month in which a material change occurs in the information previously reported. The Commission stated that accelerating the deadline for amendments from the current standard of 45 days after the end of the calendar year would help ensure that the information reported would be timely and useful. The Commission also noted that this proposed deadline would be consistent with the proposed five-business day deadline from the end of the month applicable to QIIs' and Exempt Investors' initial Schedule 13G filing obligations arising under Rule 13d–1(b) and (d). In addition, the Commission proposed a “business day” standard for the proposed deadline to partially mitigate the time pressures resulting from the reduction of the current 45-day deadline.

The Commission further proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(b) to substitute the term “material” in place of the term “any” to serve as the standard for determining the type of change that will trigger an amendment obligation under Rule 13d–2(b). The Commission noted that, unlike sections 13(d)(2) and 13(g)(2), Rule 13d–2(b) does not include an express materiality qualifier for Schedule 13G amendments and simply requires an amendment for “any change.” At the time Rule 13d–2(b) was adopted, however, the Commission stated that there is a materiality standard inherent in the provisions governing Schedule 13G filings. This inherent materiality standard is based on the fact that any disclosure provided by a Schedule 13G filer, in light of the infrequency of the reports and comparatively minimal statements required to be made, is effectively material. The Commission's proposed change, therefore, was intended to merely codify this view in the text of Rule 13d–2(b).

b. Comments Received

The Commission received a variety of comments on the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(a) and (b). Several commenters supported the proposed amendments. Some of those commenters supported revising the Schedule 13D and 13G amendment deadlines for many of the same reasons they supported accelerating the initial Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines.

In addition, several commenters supported the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(a) and (b) based on changes in technology and developments in the financial markets. One commenter agreed with the concern in the Proposing Release that material information about potential change of control transactions is not being disseminated to the public in a manner that would be considered timely in today's financial markets. Other commenters asserted that the proposed amendments would not impose significant costs or burdens on beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class and that the proposed amendments would be consistent in balancing the need for adequate disclosures to investors with burdens placed on filers to accurately prepare required disclosures.

A number of commenters opposed the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(a) and (b). Several commenters disagreed with the Commission's technological advancement-based justifications for the proposed acceleration of the beneficial ownership reporting deadlines, some of whom raised many of the same concerns that they expressed with respect to the proposed acceleration of the initial Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines. One commenter stated that filing a Schedule 13D amendment is not just a question of technology, but often a question of marshalling complex and evolving facts and making difficult disclosure judgments.

Some commenters focused solely on the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a), expressing concern that a one-business day deadline would be unduly burdensome and may not be enough time to prepare a Schedule 13D amendment in all circumstances. For example, one commenter stated that in its experience, it generally takes two to three business days, and in some cases longer, to compile and file such amendments. One commenter noted that if the Commission adopts the proposed structured data requirements, this will add more time to the process of preparing a Schedule 13D amendment and may make the proposed one-business day deadline impractical. Another commenter asserted that the proposed extension of the filing “cut-off” time to 10 p.m. would not be sufficient to offset the burden associated with meeting the proposed one-business day deadline for a Schedule 13D amendment.

Further, several commenters expressed concerns regarding the effect of the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) on the accuracy of Schedule 13D amendments. For example, one of those commenters asserted that the proposed amendment would make filing accurate amendments nearly impossible. Some commenters expressed concern that by providing Schedule 13D filers with insufficient time to prepare and file amendments, the proposed amendment would increase the likelihood of errors and risk of liability. Another commenter noted that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) could decrease transparency by increasing the risk of errors in Schedule 13D amendments.

Commenters also expressed concerns about other potential downsides associated with the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a). For example, some commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendment could negatively impact the ability of investors and their advisors to draft meaningful disclosures and engage in thoughtful analysis. Some commenters noted that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) may not leave adequate time to prepare the filing in the event of unforeseen circumstances, including the possibility that a necessary approver or signer may not be available. And, one commenter stated that there have been very few, if any, abuses associated with the current “promptly” regime and asserted that it has worked well and effectively.

In addition, some commenters questioned the basis for the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a). For example, some commenters noted that a one-business day deadline for Schedule 13D amendments would be more restrictive than the filing deadline for a Form 8–K. Similarly, some commenters noted that Form 8–K and section 16 filings do not have as restrictive filing deadlines as proposed under Rule 13d–2(a). One commenter asserted that the “promptly” standard under Rule 13d–2(a) has “generally been understood” to mean within two business days and disagreed with the Proposing Release that Commission precedent supports a one-business day interpretation of that standard.

Further, one commenter stated that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) would “unnecessarily sacrifice” the flexibility that the current version of the rule provides. Other commenters noted that the promptness of a Schedule 13D amendment filing obligation under Rule 13d–2(a) currently is determined by considering the facts and circumstances related to such filing and urged the Commission to continue to consider the variation in circumstances that can lead to an amendment obligation rather than applying the same standard in all circumstances. One commenter asserted that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) could lead to a large increase in the number of late Schedule 13D amendment filings.

In addition, some commenters expressed concern about the costs of the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) relative to its benefits. For example, one commenter stated that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) does not appropriately balance the need for prompt disclosure of important, market-moving events with the need to avoid imposing an undue, impracticable burden on investors making more routine filings. Another commenter asserted that the burdens and risks of the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) associated with venture capital funds that make Schedule 13D filings exceed its benefits.

Several commenters opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b) for many of the same reasons that they opposed the proposed acceleration of the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines for QIIs and Exempt Investors. In addition, one commenter broadly asserted that the costs of the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b) “far outweigh any perceived benefits.” Another commenter noted that many Schedule 13G filers have filing obligations with respect to multiple issuers and that the proposed amendment may require “hundreds of filings on a monthly basis, as their investments fluctuate perpetually.” And, other commenters expressed the same concerns about the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(a) and (b) that they expressed with respect to the proposed acceleration of the initial Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines.

Finally, some commenters made recommendations to the Commission regarding the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(a) and (b). For example, some commenters that generally supported the proposed amendments recommended that the Commission consider further shortening the filing deadlines. Further, specifically with respect to the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a), one supporting commenter recommended that the Commission include an assets under management-based threshold for the proposed accelerated Schedule 13D filing deadlines. Another commenter that generally supported revising the Schedule 13D amendment deadline recommended that the Commission require that Schedule 13D amendments be filed within three business days.

Conversely, several opposing commenters recommended that the Commission retain the requirement that Schedule 13D amendments be filed promptly, but require that they be filed within no more than a specified number of days after the relevant triggering event (with recommendations varying between two and four business days). One opposing commenter suggested that the Commission require that Schedule 13D amendments be filed within five business days. Other commenters, which either generally opposed or neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a), recommended that the Commission require that Schedule 13D amendments be filed within two business days.

In addition to focusing on the Schedule 13D filing deadline, some opposing commenters made other recommendations with respect to the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a). For example, one opposing commenter asserted that a Schedule 13D amendment should not be required for involuntary changes in circumstances caused by the issuer because such amendments do not relate to the Schedule 13D filer's action or intent and are already disclosed to the market by the issuer. Another opposing commenter recommended that if the Commission believes that a one-business day interpretation of “promptly” is not being properly observed, it should clarify that in situations involving acquisition of corporate control, “promptly” means one business day. One commenter, which neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(a), recommended that the Commission define the percentage ownership change that is deemed a “material change” as the specified percentage only, and that it omit the subjective “facts and circumstances” part of the standard.

Further, a number of opposing commenters made recommendations regarding the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b). For example, several commenters recommended that the Commission require Schedule 13G amendments to be filed within 45 days after the end of a quarter in which a material change occurred, consistent with the amendment frequency for Form 13F. One commenter recommended that QIIs be required to file an amended Schedule 13G within 20 business days after the end of a quarter in which a material change has occurred. One commenter, which neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), recommended that the Commission require that Schedule 13G amendments be filed within 10 days after the end of the month in which a material change occurs.

In addition to focusing on the Schedule 13G amendment deadline, some commenters made other recommendations with respect to Rule 13d–2(b). For example, one opposing commenter suggested that the Commission conduct further study and analysis to understand what percentage of Schedule 13G filers are involved in change in control scenarios. A number of commenters, which either generally opposed or neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), also requested that the Commission clarify what constitutes a “material change” for Schedule 13G filers. One commenter recommended that the Commission carve out QIIs from the accelerated filing deadline, including because QIIs must certify that they do not have a control intent. And, one commenter recommended that the Schedule 13G amendment filing deadline be expressed in business days.

c. Final Amendments

We are amending Rule 13d–2(a) and (b) to revise the Schedule 13D and 13G amendment filing deadlines under those rules. In response to commenter concerns, however, we are making some changes to the proposed deadlines. Specifically, we are adopting a Schedule 13D amendment filing deadline of two business days after the date of a material change and a Schedule 13G amendment filing deadline of 45 days after calendar quarter-end. We also are amending Rule 13d–2(b) to require an amendment to a Schedule 13G be filed only if a “material change” occurs.

As noted above, Rule 13d–2(a) currently requires that an amendment be filed promptly if a material change occurs in the facts set forth in a Schedule 13D. Although the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(a) to replace the “promptly” standard with a one-business day deadline, we are instead adopting a two-business day deadline in light of the comments received. As noted in the Proposing Release, establishing a specified filing deadline for Schedule 13D amendments should remove any uncertainty as to the date on which an amendment is due and help ensure that beneficial owners amend their filings in a more uniform and consistent manner. We note, however, that several commenters disagreed with the Commission's expectation that the proposed one-business day deadline would impose minimal incremental burdens on Schedule 13D filers. To the contrary, those commenters expressed concerns about the workability of a one-business day deadline for filing Schedule 13D amendments and described the burdens that beneficial owners would incur trying to meet that deadline.

We believe that shifting from the proposed one-business day deadline to a two-business day deadline will address those concerns and provide beneficial owners with adequate time to prepare and file a Schedule 13D amendment. Relevantly, several commenters, including some that generally opposed the proposed amendment, recommended that the Commission adopt a two-business day deadline under Rule 13d–2(a). We agree with those commenters that a two-business day deadline, as compared to a one-business day deadline, would be less onerous for beneficial owners while at the same time ensuring that investors and markets are provided with material information disclosed in Schedule 13D amendments in a sufficiently prompt manner. We also believe that giving beneficial owners additional time, as compared to the proposed deadline, to prepare their Schedule 13D amendments will reduce the risk of erroneous or incomplete filings, addressing a concern that some commenters expressed with respect to the proposed one-business day deadline and helping to preserve the utility of those filings.

Further, as discussed above, Rule 13d–2(b) currently requires that an amendment be filed within 45 days of calendar year-end if there were any changes to the information previously reported on Schedule 13G during that year. Similar to our amendments to the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines under Rule 13d–1(b) and (d), we are revising Rule 13d–2(b) to require that a Schedule 13G amendment pursuant to that rule be filed within 45 days after calendar quarter-end if, during that quarter, there were any material changes to the information previously reported (rather than five business days after the end of the month in which a material change occurred, as proposed). Thus, there are two components to our amendment to Rule 13d–2(b): we are both shortening the deadline for the filing of a Schedule 13G amendment and adding an express qualifier to require an amendment only if there is a material change to the information previously reported.

We believe that accelerating the Schedule 13G amendment deadline will help ensure the information reported is timely and useful. Numerous supporting commenters also echoed this point. We note, however, that several commenters asserted that the proposed month-end-based deadline would be unduly burdensome for Schedule 13G filers and that such burdens are not sufficiently mitigated by any technological advancements to justify adopting the proposed deadline, reiterating many of the concerns that were expressed about the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d).

To mitigate those concerns, and to conform to the initial Schedule 13G filing deadlines applicable to QIIs and Exempt Investors under Rule 13d–1(b) and (d), we are instead adopting a quarter-end-based deadline for Schedule 13G amendments under Rule 13d–2(b). This change from the proposal comports with the recommendations that several commenters that opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b) made to the Commission. Consistent with the comments provided on the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d), we note that those commenters that suggested a quarter-end-based Schedule 13G amendment deadline recommended various different numbers of days after quarter-end for the deadline. Taking into consideration those various recommendations, as we noted in the context of our amendments to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d), we believe that 45 days is the appropriate length of time because it aligns with the filing deadline for Form 13F, and many institutional investment managers who file a Schedule 13G are already reviewing and assessing their holdings on a quarterly basis in order to prepare Form 13F filings. In addition, although most of the other amended Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines will be expressed in “business days,” we believe the potential compliance benefits of aligning the Schedule 13G amendment deadline with the Form 13F filing deadline justify using calendar days rather than business days.

Even for those Schedule 13G filers that are not Form 13F filers, the 45-day period after calendar quarter-end deadline will be familiar given that they currently must file their Schedule 13G amendment 45 days after calendar year-end. As such, we believe that many of those beneficial owners are well-positioned to submit their Schedule 13G filings 45 days after calendar quarter-end, and we expect that this change from the proposal will produce the same benefits and mitigate opposing commenters' concerns to the same degree as our amendments to Rule 13d–1(b) and (d).

Finally, we also are revising the text of Rule 13d–2(b), as proposed, to substitute the term “material” in place of the term “any” to serve as the standard for determining the type of change that will trigger an amendment obligation under Rule 13d–2(b). As discussed in the Proposing Release, this change is merely intended to codify the Commission's previously stated view that there is an inherent materiality standard in the provisions governing Schedule 13G filings. We note that several commenters requested that the Commission clarify what constitutes a “material change,” with some of those commenters recommending that the Commission deem a change in beneficial ownership of less than five percent to not be “material” for purposes of Rule 13d–2(b). The term “material,” however, already is defined in Rule 12b–2 and is a familiar, established concept in the Federal securities laws. As such, we do not believe it is necessary or advisable to adopt a new materiality standard for purposes of Schedule 13G amendments under Rule 13d–2(b) or to provide an express safe harbor from the application of Rule 13d–2(b) for certain specified de minimis changes in beneficial ownership.

We recognize that Rule 13d–2(a) provides that a “material change” for purposes of that rule includes “any material increase or decrease in the percentage of the class beneficially owned” and provides that “[a]n acquisition or disposition of beneficial ownership of securities in an amount equal to one percent or more of the class of securities shall be deemed `material' for purposes of this section.” We also note, however, that these are non-exclusive circumstances in which an amendment obligation has been triggered. Thus, although this language in Rule 13d–2(a) provides guidance for beneficial owners to determine when a Schedule 13D amendment obligation arises under that rule, it is fundamentally different from the express safe harbor that some commenters requested with respect to the Schedule 13G amendment obligation under Rule 13d–2(b). Further, because both Rule 13d–2(a) and (b) will now share the same materiality standard for determining when an amendment is due, the language in Rule 13d–2(a), including the statement that “[a]n acquisition or disposition of beneficial ownership of securities in an amount equal to one percent or more of the class of securities shall be deemed `material,' ” is equally instructive for purposes of determining what changes are material under Rule 13d–2(b).

4. Rule 13d–2(c) and (d)

Rule 13d–2(c) governs the amendment obligation for QIIs whose beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class. Under Rule 13d–2(c), QIIs are required to file an amendment to their Schedule 13G within 10 days after the end of the first month in which their beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, calculated as of the last day of the month. Once across the 10 percent threshold, QIIs are further required under current Rule 13d–2(c) to file additional amendments within 10 days after the end of the first month in which their beneficial ownership increases or decreases by more than five percent of the covered class, calculated as of the last day of the month.

Rule 13d–2(d) governs the amendment obligation for Passive Investors whose beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class. Under current Rule 13d–2(d), Passive Investors are required to “promptly” file an amendment to their Schedule 13G upon acquiring greater than 10 percent of a covered class. Once across the 10 percent threshold, Passive Investors are further required under current Rule 13d–2(d) to file additional amendments “promptly” if their beneficial ownership increases or decreases by more than five percent of the covered class.

The amendment obligations arising under Rule 13d–2(c) and (d) are in addition to the general amendment requirement in Rule 13d–2(b), which is discussed in more detail in section II.3 above. To comply with Rule 13d–2(c) and (d), QIIs and Passive Investors, depending on their beneficial ownership levels, may have to amend their Schedule 13G filings more frequently and do so throughout the year.

a. Proposed Amendments

In connection with the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(c) to require that QIIs file an amendment to their Schedule 13G within five days after the date on which their beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, rather than 10 days after the end of the month. Similarly, once across the 10 percent threshold, the proposed amendment would have required QIIs to file additional amendments five days after the date on which their beneficial ownership increases or decreases by more than five percent of the covered class, rather than 10 days after the end of the month. The Commission intended that these amendments, when considered in the context of the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), would preserve the utility of Rule 13d–2(c) as a provision that provides the market with earlier notice of QIIs' beneficial ownership exceeding 10 percent of a covered class and, thereafter, upon their beneficial ownership of the covered class increasing or decreasing by more than five percent. The Commission also expressed the view that the imposition of such an accelerated deadline is appropriate in the context of our proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(c) because the high thresholds in that rule—10 percent beneficial ownership of a covered class and any subsequent five percent increase or decrease in beneficial ownership—warranted that the amendment be rapidly disseminated to the market. And, consistent with its rationale for proposing to shorten the other deadlines, the Commission noted that QIIs may have access to the same technology as other Schedule 13D and 13G filers to satisfy this deadline, especially given the size and sophistication of the persons eligible to file as QIIs.

The Commission also proposed to amend Rule 13d–2(d) to change the amendment filing deadline from the “promptly” standard to one business day after the date on which an amendment obligation arises. The Commission proposed this amendment for substantially the same reasons it proposed to shorten the filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13G and change the filing deadline for Schedule 13D amendments.

b. Comments Received

Commenters expressed a variety of views regarding the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(c) and (d). A number of commenters supported the proposed amendments. Some of those commenters supported the proposed amendments for many of the same reasons they supported the revising the other Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines.

Some supporting commenters also expressed their expectation that the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(c) and (d) would not impose significant costs to beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class. One commenter asserted that the proposed amendments would be consistent in balancing the need for adequate disclosures to investors with burdens placed on filers to accurately prepare required disclosures. This commenter also supported the proposed amendments based on changes in technology and developments in the financial markets.

Several commenters opposed the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(c) and (d). Some of those commenters opposed the proposed amendments for many of the same reasons they opposed revising the other Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines.

In addition, some commenters also expressed concern that the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(c) would impose significant and unnecessary additional reporting burdens on QIIs, including costs related to enhancing their systems to comply with potential intra-month reporting. Another commenter asserted that retaining the current Schedule 13G amendment filing deadline under Rule 13d–2(c) would be consistent with the Commission's historical recognition that beneficial ownership by QIIs does not raise the same concerns as beneficial ownership by investors that hold positions with a control intent and, therefore, it is appropriate to minimize the reporting burdens on QIIs.

With respect to the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(d), one commenter asserted that the proposed one business day deadline is unreasonable given that many Passive Investors require assistance of counsel and that a filing under that rule may require input by multiple parties before being filed. One commenter stated that the proposed amendment would compromise the accuracy of Schedule 13G amendments and also would not allow for the possibility that a necessary approver or signer may not be available.

Commenters also criticized the Commission's justifications for the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(c) and (d). For example, several commenters disagreed with the Commission's technological advancement-based justifications for the proposed amendments, some of whom raised many of the same concerns that they expressed with respect to the proposed amendments to the other Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines. One commenter also noted that Passive Investors generally do not have access to specialized technology that would make it practical for them to file an amended Schedule 13G on the proposed accelerated basis. And, some commenters asserted that the costs of the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–2(c) and (d) would exceed their benefits.

Commenters also made some recommendations regarding the proposed amendments. For example, one commenter that generally opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(c) recommended that the Commission require that Schedule 13G amendments pursuant to that rule be filed within 45 days after the end of a quarter, consistent with the amendment frequency for Form 13F.

Some commenters that opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(d) recommended a two-business day deadline under that rule, with one commenter asserting that such a deadline would be less onerous for investors yet would ensure the accuracy and transparency of the information in their filings. One such commenter expressed the view that the Commission should require that Schedule 13G amendments under Rule 13d–2(d) be filed promptly, but within no more than some period of time ( e.g., between two and four business days). Another opposing commenter suggested that the Commission require that Schedule 13G amendments pursuant to Rule 13d–2(d) be filed within 10 business days because Passive Investors “lack control intent and certify to that effect.”

c. Final Amendments

We are amending Rule 13d–2(c) and (d) to revise the Schedule 13G amendment filing deadlines under those rules. In response to commenter concerns, however, we are making some changes from the proposed deadlines. Specifically, we are adopting a filing deadline of five business days after the end of the first month in which an amendment obligation is triggered under Rule 13d–2(c) and two business days after the date on which an amendment obligation is triggered under Rule 13d–2(d).

As noted above, Rule 13d–2(c) currently requires QIIs to file a Schedule 13G amendment within 10 days after the end of the first month in which their beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent of a covered class and, once across the 10 percent threshold, within 10 days after the first month in which their beneficial ownership increases or decreases by more than five percent. Although the Commission proposed to revise Rule 13d–2(c) to shorten the filing deadline to five days after the date on which an amendment obligation arises under that rule, we are instead retaining the month-end-based filing deadline and shortening that deadline from 10 days after month-end to five business days after month-end. The Commission based its proposed deadline under Rule 13d–2(c), in large part, on the proposal to shorten the Schedule 13G amendment deadline under Rule 13d–2(b) from a calendar year-end-based deadline to a month-end-based deadline. Therefore, if we had adopted the Commission's proposed amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), then Rule 13d–2(c), in its current form—which as noted above requires that QIIs file a Schedule 13G amendment within 10 days after the end of the first month in which the triggering event occurs—would not be of any value.

As discussed above, however, we did not adopt the Commission's proposed month-end-based deadline under Rule 13d–2(b). Instead, we revised Rule 13d–2(b) to require that a Schedule 13G amendment be filed within 45 days after the end of a calendar quarter in which a material change occurs to the information previously reported. Because Rule 13d–2(b) will have a quarter-end-based filing deadline, the month-end-based deadline in Rule 13d–2(c) will continue to have utility as a provision that provides the market with earlier notice of QIIs' beneficial ownership exceeding 10 percent of a covered class and, thereafter, upon their beneficial ownership increasing or decreasing by more than five percent. In addition, we expect that retaining the month-end-based deadline in Rule 13d–2(c) will address the concerns that several commenters expressed about the burdens that the proposed amendment would impose on QIIs.

Notwithstanding those commenters' concerns, we believe it is appropriate to accelerate the filing deadline in Rule 13d–2(c) in order for investors to receive material information in a timely manner in light of the technological advancements and other developments in the financial markets in the more than 40 years since the 10-day deadline was adopted. As such, we are shortening Rule 13d–2(c)'s filing deadline from 10 days after month-end to five business days after month-end. Because the deadline is being expressed in “business days” instead of “days,” and given the size and sophistication of the persons eligible to file as QIIs, we do not expect that this new filing deadline under Rule 13d–2(c) will be unduly burdensome.

In addition, as discussed above, Rule 13d–2(d) currently requires that Passive Investors file a Schedule 13G amendment promptly upon acquiring beneficial ownership of more than 10 percent of a covered class and, once across the 10 percent threshold, promptly upon increasing or decreasing their beneficial ownership by more than five percent. As with the Schedule 13D amendment deadline under Rule 13d–2(a), the Commission proposed to change the deadline under Rule 13d–2(d) from the “promptly” standard to one business day. For the same reasons that we changed the filing deadline for Schedule 13D amendments to two business days, and to retain the historical consistency with that deadline, we also are amending Rule 13d–2(d) to change the amendment filing deadline from the current “promptly” standard to two business days after the date on which an amendment obligation arises.

5. Rules 13(a)(4) and 201(a) of Regulation S–T

Regulation 13D–G states that Schedules 13D and 13G should be prepared in accordance with Regulation S–T, which governs the preparation and submission of documents filed electronically on the Commission's EDGAR system. In accordance with 17 CFR 232.12, electronic filings may be submitted to the Commission Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays, from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. Eastern Time. Under Rule 13(a) of Regulation S–T, however, most filings must be submitted by direct transmission commencing on or before 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time in order to be deemed filed on the same business day. Most filings submitted by direct transmission commencing after 5:30 p.m. will be deemed filed as of the next business day. Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T, however, sets forth certain exceptions from that 5:30 p.m. “cut-off” time. Specifically, it provides that certain filings—namely, Forms 3, 4 and 5, Form 144, and Schedule 14N—“submitted by direct transmission on or before 10 p.m. [Eastern Time] shall be deemed filed on the same business day.” Rule 13(a)(4), therefore, effectively extends the “cut-off” time for these filings from 5:30 p.m. to 10 p.m.

In addition, Rule 201 of Regulation S–T and 17 CFR 232.202 (“Rule 202 of Regulation S–T”) address hardship exemptions from EDGAR filing requirements, and Rule 13(b) of Regulation S–T addresses the related issue of filing date adjustments. A filer may obtain a temporary hardship exemption under current Rule 201 of Regulation S–T if it experiences unanticipated technical difficulties that prevent the timely submission of an electronic filing by submitting a properly formatted paper copy of the filing under cover of Form TH. Alternatively, instead of pursuing a hardship exemption, a filer may request a filing date adjustment under Rule 13(b) of Regulation S–T. That rule addresses circumstances in which a filer attempts in good faith to file a document with the Commission in a timely manner, but the filing is delayed due to technical difficulties beyond the filer's control. In those instances, the filer may request a filing date adjustment. The staff may grant the request if it appears that the adjustment is appropriate and consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.

a. Proposed Amendments

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T to provide that any Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G, including any amendments thereto, submitted by direct transmission on or before 10 p.m. Eastern Time on a given business day will be deemed filed on the same business day. Conversely, under the proposed amendment, any Schedule 13D or 13G filing not submitted by direct transmission by 10 p.m. on its due date will be assigned a filing date of the next business day, and for purposes of compliance with the applicable reporting requirements, would be considered late. The Commission proposed this extension of the “cut-off” time to ease filers' administrative burdens in connection with the proposed accelerated filing deadlines for Schedule 13D and 13G filings, including those filers located in different time zones.

The Commission also proposed to amend Rule 201(a) of Regulation S–T to remove a Schedule 13D or 13G filer's ability to rely on a temporary hardship exemption under that rule. The Commission noted that this proposal would be consistent with the treatment of Forms 3, 4, and 5, which have a 10 p.m. “cut-off” time under Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T and are ineligible for a temporary hardship exemption under Rule 201(a) of Regulation S–T. The Commission also based this proposal on the following factors: the relative ease of using the EDGAR on-line filing system; the proposed extended 10 p.m. Eastern Time filing deadline; the limited value to the public of paper filings; and the availability of a filing date adjustment under the same circumstances as a temporary hardship exemption would have been available but for the proposed amendment.

b. Comments Received

Commenters largely supported the proposed amendments to Rules 13(a)(4) and 201(a) of Regulation S–T, with only one commenter expressly opposing the proposed amendment to Rule 201(a) of Regulation S–T. One of the supporting commenters asserted that additional time to file would be critical under the Commission's proposed acceleration of the Schedule 13D and 13G filing deadlines. Another supporting commenter noted that the proposed amendment to Rule 13(a)(4) would conform to the section 16 filing deadlines and help ease the compliance burdens of shortened filing deadlines and time zone differences.

Some commenters also made recommendations in connection with the proposed amendments to Rules 13(a)(4) and 201(a) of Regulation S–T. One supporting commenter recommended that the Commission extend filer support hours beyond 6 p.m. Eastern Time. Another commenter, which neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposed amendment to Rule 201(a), stated that it would not object to making a temporary hardship exemption unavailable to Schedules 13D and 13G filers as long as a filer may request a filing date adjustment under Rule 13(b) of Regulation S–T if it experiences unanticipated technical difficulties that prevent the timely submission of an electronic filing.

c. Final Amendments

We are amending Rules 13(a)(4) and 201(a) of Regulation S–T as proposed. Thus, the filing “cut-off” time for Schedules 13D and 13G under Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T will be extended from 5:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. Eastern Time. In addition, the temporary hardship exemption under Rule 201(a) of Regulation S–T will be made unavailable for Schedule 13D and 13G filers. Schedule 13D and 13G filers will, however, remain eligible to request a filing date adjustment under Rule 13(b) of Regulation S–T.

We are adopting these amendments as proposed for the same reasons the Commission discussed in the Proposing Release, which were largely supported by the commenters. We note that a commenter also requested that we extend filer support hours beyond 6 p.m. Eastern Time. As the Commission noted in the Proposing Release, however, the amendment to Rule 13(a)(4) of Regulation S–T mirrors the existing filing “cut-off” time for Forms 3, 4, and 5. In extending the filing “cut-off” time for those forms, the Commission declined to extend filer support hours. We also decline to do so here in light of the relative ease of using the EDGAR on-line filing system, the extension of the “cut-off” time by four and a half hours, and the availability of a filing date adjustment if the filer experiences unanticipated technical difficulties as previously described.

B. Proposed Amendment to Rule 13d–3 Regarding the Use of Cash-Settled Derivative Securities

Neither section 3(a) nor section 13(d) of the Exchange Act defines the term “beneficial owner” or “beneficial ownership.” Regulation 13D–G similarly does not expressly define those terms. To provide clarity, the Commission adopted Rule 13d–3, which provides standards for the purpose of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner subject to section 13(d) and section 13(g). Over the years, some observers have raised concerns about the ability of investors in cash-settled derivative securities to influence or control an issuer by, for example, pressuring a counterparty to the derivative transaction to make certain decisions regarding the voting and disposition of substantial blocks of securities of the reference issuer. To address these and related concerns, the Commission proposed new Rule 13d–3(e).

1. Proposed Amendment

The Commission proposed to add new paragraph (e) to Rule 13d–3 to deem certain holders of cash-settled derivative securities, other than SBS, to be the beneficial owners of the reference covered class. Proposed Rule 13d–3(e)(1) would have treated a holder of a cash-settled derivative security, excluding SBS, as the beneficial owner of the equity securities in the covered class referenced by the cash-settled derivative security if such person held the cash-settled derivative security with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer of the class of equity securities, or in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or effect. The Commission included this control-based standard in proposed Rule 13d–3(e) to ease the administrative burdens associated with the application of this proposed provision by employing a familiar standard under Regulation 13D–G. In addition, proposed Rule 13d–3(e) would have set forth the formula for calculating the number of equity securities that a holder of a cash-settled derivative security would be deemed to beneficially own.

In proposing Rule 13d–3(e), the Commission noted that non-SBS cash-settled derivative securities held with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer may be used to influence the voting, acquisition, or disposition of any shares the holder's counterparty may have acquired in a hedge, proprietary investment, or otherwise. The Commission also stated that a non-SBS cash-settled derivative holder's probability of success in exerting influence or control over the issuer of the reference security may increase given that any voting power the derivative holder held would be magnified by minimizing the number of shares that potentially could be voted against the holder's plans or proposals. Finally, the Commission recognized that holders of non-SBS cash-settled derivative securities may position themselves to acquire any reference securities that the counterparty may acquire to hedge the economic risk of that transaction. The Commission also noted that holders of non-SBS cash-settled derivative securities may present their economic positions to persuade an issuer or its shareholders to engage with them. The Commission concluded, therefore, that these persons' holdings of non-SBS cash-settled derivative securities may implicate the policies underlying section 13(d).

2. Comments Received

Commenters were divided on proposed Rule 13d–3(e). Many commenters expressed general support for the proposed amendment. A number of these commenters indicated that proposed Rule 13d–3(e) would add needed market transparency. One commenter expressed the view that the proposal would mitigate what it described as “hidden risk concentration.” Another commenter stated that the proposal would provide “the markets more generally with full information” and allow stockholders to better assess whether to support or oppose activists' proposals. Some commenters asserted that an investment fund used derivatives (reportedly forward purchase contracts) to conceal an economic interest in an issuer that it later converted into a profitable beneficial ownership stake ultimately reported on Schedule 13D.

Opposing commenters, by contrast, raised numerous objections to proposed Rule 13d–3(e). Some of these commenters questioned whether there was a sound basis for the proposal. One commenter asserted that the proposal was not based on empirical analysis or “evidence to establish . . . an actual problem in the marketplace” and is a “solution in search of a problem.” Other commenters asserted that holders of cash-settled derivative securities should not be deemed beneficial owners because such derivative securities confer no control or influence over the voting or disposition of the reference equity securities. Some commenters asserted that in actuality, a counterparty would not look to the derivative holder as to whether to acquire for hedging purposes, or how to vote and/or dispose of, any securities of the reference class or that doing so would be contrary to market practice and/or standard industry legal documentation. Several opposing commenters asserted that investors in cash-settled derivative securities already may be subject to regulation as beneficial owners under existing Rule 13d–3 in applicable circumstances or that the Commission could proceed via interpretation or other means and without a rule amendment. Similarly, one commenter stated that it may not be necessary to deem investors in cash-settled derivative securities beneficial owners if the Commission is satisfied that derivative counterparties can effectively and irrevocably contract out of the right to convert such derivatives to either physical ownership of underlying shares or any other form of voting rights.

In addition, some opposing commenters expressed concerns regarding proposed Rule 13d–3(e) related to the APA or the Commission's statutory authority to adopt the proposal. For example, some commenters said that the proposal represents an inappropriate expansion of the applicable statutory provisions or would be arbitrary and capricious, if adopted. Further, one commenter emphasized that “[b]y focusing on speculative harms; failing to engage seriously with the question whether new or different rules were needed to combat them; and failing to consider costs, the Proposed Rule falls short of providing a sound justification for the proposals being made.” The commenter stated that “[f]or these reasons, the Commission has not satisfied its obligations under sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act.”

Finally, some opposing commenters discussed other concerns regarding proposed Rule 13d–3(e). Some commenters expressed concern that the proposal would inhibit activist investment strategies. Other commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule, including its “change of control” standard, is overly broad, unclear, and would be difficult to administer. Many commenters indicated that the proposal's computational methodology, including the need to conduct daily calculations, would be complex or increase the compliance burden of the rule. In addition, one commenter noted that the “concept of beneficial ownership is used . . . in many other federal and state laws and rules, as well as in contracts” and, therefore, “expanding the definition of `beneficial ownership' ” as proposed in Rule 13d–3(e) could have “significant unintended consequences.” Further, another commenter indicated that the proposed rule's expansion of the scope of the matters that may give rise to beneficial ownership “could result in potential and significant overreporting by [investment] advisers, leading to unfounded inferences from public filings that holders of cash-settled derivatives may have voting and investment power over securities that they do not, in fact, have, nor do they have the right to acquire.”

3. Commission Guidance

We are not adopting proposed paragraph (e) to Rule 13d–3 to deem certain holders of cash-settled derivative securities as beneficial owners of the reference covered class. Consistent with the views expressed by several commenters, we have determined that Commission guidance on the applicability of existing Rule 13d–3 to cash-settled derivative securities, similar to the guidance provided in the Security-Based Swaps Release, would provide sufficient clarity.

The Commission explained in the Security-Based Swaps Release the circumstances under which a holder of a SBS may become a beneficial owner as determined under Rule 13d–3. It noted that “our existing regulatory regime may require the reporting of beneficial ownership” in cases in which a SBS (1) “confers voting and/or investment power (or a person otherwise acquires such power based on the purchase or sale of a [SBS]),” (2) “is used with the purpose or effect of divesting or preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership as part of a plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements,” or (3) “grants a right to acquire an equity security.” Although the determination under Rule 13d–3 as to whether the holder of any cash-settled derivative security is the beneficial owner of the reference covered class ultimately will depend on the relevant facts and circumstances, the above-described reasoning in the Security-Based Swaps Release (the three elements of which correspond to Rule 13d–3(a), (b), and (d)(1), respectively) provides an instructive analytical framework with respect to cash-settled derivative securities.

As is the case with persons holding cash-settled SBS, Rule 13d–3 similarly may be applied to holders of non-SBS cash-settled derivatives to treat those persons as beneficial owners in applicable instances. Although non-SBS derivative securities settled exclusively in cash generally are designed to represent only an economic interest, discrete facts and circumstances could arise where the holder of these securities may have voting or investment power as described in Rule 13d–3(a) or otherwise could be deemed to be a beneficial owner as determined under Rule 13d–3(b) or (d), as described below. First, under Rule 13d–3(a), to the extent a non-SBS cash-settled derivative security provides its holder, directly or indirectly, with exclusive or shared voting or investment power, within the meaning of that rule, over the reference covered class through a contractual term of the derivative security or otherwise, the holder of that derivative security may become a beneficial owner of the reference covered class. Second, to the extent a non-SBS cash-settled derivative security is acquired with the purpose or effect of divesting its holder of beneficial ownership of the reference covered class or preventing the vesting of that beneficial ownership as part of a plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) or 13(g), the derivative security may be viewed as a contract, arrangement, or device within the meaning of those terms as used in Rule 13d–3(b). The holder of such cash-settled derivative security, therefore, may be deemed a beneficial owner under Rule 13d–3(b) in this context. Finally, under Rule 13d–3(d)(1), a person is deemed a beneficial owner of an equity security if the person (1) has a right to acquire beneficial ownership of the equity security within 60 days or (2) acquires the right to acquire beneficial ownership of the equity security with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer of the security for which the right is exercisable, or in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, regardless of when the right is exercisable. As the Commission stated in the Security-Based Swaps Release, Rule 13d–3(d)(1) applies regardless of the origin of the right to acquire the equity security. If such a right originates in a derivative security that is nominally “cash-settled” or from an understanding in connection with that derivative security, Rule 13d–3(d)(1) would apply.

C. Proposed Amendments to Rule 13d–5

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–5 to, among other things:

• Revise Rule 13d–5(b)(1) to remove the potential implication that it sets forth the exclusive legal standard for group formation under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3);
• Add new paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to specify that if a person, in advance of filing a Schedule 13D, discloses to any other person that such filing will be made and such other person acquires securities in the covered class for which the Schedule 13D will be filed, those persons will have formed a group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3); and
• Add new paragraph (b)(2)(i) to specify that when two or more persons “act as” a group under section 13(g)(3) of the Act, the group will be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, for purposes of section 13(g)(1) and (2) of the Exchange Act, of the beneficial ownership held by its members.

Rather than adopt these amendments, we instead are issuing guidance on the operation of existing Rule 13d–5(b) and sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) that clarifies and affirms that, among other matters, two or more persons who “act as” a group for purposes of acquiring, holding, or disposing securities may be treated as a group.

In addition to the foregoing, we are adopting certain amendments to Rule 13d–5 that the Commission included in the Proposing Release. Specifically, we are:

• Adding new paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to specify that a group subject to reporting obligations under section 13(d) shall be deemed to acquire any additional equity securities acquired by a member of the group after the group's formation;
• Adding new paragraph (b)(1)(iii) to carve out from paragraph (b)(1)(ii) any intra-group transfers of equity securities;
• Adding new paragraph (b)(2)(i) to specify that a group regulated under section 13(g) shall be deemed to acquire any additional equity securities acquired by a member of the group after the group's formation;
• Adding new paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to carve out from paragraph (b)(2)(i) any intra-group transfers of equity securities;
• Redesignating current Rule 13d–5(b)(1) as Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i) to accommodate the inclusion of these amendments, but otherwise not altering the substance of that rule; and

• Making other technical changes to Rule 13d–5.

Those amendments, as well as our guidance, are discussed in more detail below.

1. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(i), and (b)(1)(ii)

a. Proposed Amendments

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–5 to track the statutory text of sections 13(d)(3) and (g)(3) and specify that two or more persons who “act as” a group for purposes of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities are treated as a group. Specifically, the Commission proposed to redesignate Rule 13d–5(b)(1) as Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i) and revise it to, among other things, remove the reference to an agreement between two or more persons and instead indicate that when two or more persons act as a group under section 13(d)(3), the group will be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of all of the equity securities of a covered class beneficially owned by each of the group's members as of the date on which the group is formed. The Commission also proposed new Rule 13d–5(b)(2)(i), which would contain nearly identical language to proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i), with conforming changes to address circumstances in which two or more persons act as a group under section 13(g)(3) and the group is deemed to become the beneficial owner of all of the equity securities of a covered class beneficially owned by each of the group's members as of the date on which the group is formed.

The Commission proposed these amendments, among other things, to (1) make clear that “the determination [under sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3)] as to whether two or more persons are acting as a group does not depend solely on the presence of an express agreement and that, depending on the particular facts and circumstances, concerted actions by two or more persons for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer are sufficient to constitute the formation of a group,” and (2) eliminate any potential for Rule 13d–5(b)(1) to be misconstrued as the definition of a group and consequently used as a basis to narrow the application of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3).

In addition, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–5 to include new paragraph (b)(1)(ii). The proposed paragraph would provide that a person who shares information about an upcoming Schedule 13D filing such person is or will be required to make with respect to a covered class, to the extent this information is not yet public and was communicated with the purpose of causing others to make purchases of securities of the same covered class, and a person who subsequently purchases securities of that class based on this information, will have formed a group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3).

b. Comments Received

Commenters expressed a wide range of views on proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i) and (b)(2)(i). A number of commenters supported the amendments. One supporting commenter expressed the view that the proposed amendments would ensure that the terms of sections 13(d) and (g) will be applied as originally intended. Another commenter observed that the proposed amendments appear designed to simply adhere to the underlying statutory language in the Exchange Act. One commenter stated that it supported the proposed amendments and observed that, under the proposed amendments, compliance with the group formation rules would not depend on whether an express or implied agreement exists among the parties that are acting together. One commenter asserted that the proposed amendments “could prevent sophisticated investors from skirting reporting requirements when coordinating accumulations of significant stakes” which could “help[ ] ensure retail investors have fair insight.”

Several commenters expressed views rejecting criticism that the proposed amendments would interfere with shareholder activism or collaboration. One of these commenters disagreed with the contention by other commenters that such amendments would prevent the build-up of ownership stakes and chill shareholder communications. Another commenter disagreed with concerns that the proposal “would put mainstream institutional investors at risk of being deemed part of a group simply because they take a meeting with an activist or management and indicate that they may be inclined to vote in favor of their proposed course of action.” This commenter further stated that it did not view the proposal as propounding a definition of “group” that would consider a “regular passive institutional investor” as a member of a group with an activist simply because it met with an activist, heard its proposed plans, and signaled it would likely use its voting power to support the activist's proposed campaign. One commenter stated a similar view, asserting that nothing in the proposal would limit the ability of investors to engage with company management.

In addition, although the IAC did not make a recommendation with respect to the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–5 “because of a lack of consensus on the effects of the proposed definition of a `group' and how that would impact shareholder communication,” the IAC stated that it “agree[d] with the SEC's description of existing case-law regarding the definition of `group' ” and “would support the inclusion of such description in any final rulemaking regarding Schedule 13D reporting to highlight to market participants the scope of such case law when considering the applicability of the `group' rules.”

Numerous commenters opposed the proposed amendments, largely because, in their view, the proposed amendments would eliminate a requirement that there be some form of “agreement” among members of a group. Some opposing commenters expressed the view that the proposal—particularly the removal of some form of an “agreement”—would exceed the Commission's authority under the Exchange Act or raise concerns under the APA or the U.S. Constitution. One commenter asserted that eliminating the “agreement” requirement in determining whether a group has been formed would contravene the plain meaning of the statutory text, disregard the legislative history, and depart from “long-established” judicial precedent. The same commenter asserted that the initial adoption of Rule 13d–5, with what the commenter described as its express requirement for an agreement to exist in order to establish group status, simply reflected the Commission's affirmation of established judicial precedent, not an unwarranted departure from the statutory language. A number of commenters expressed similar points of view, and, among other things, used canons of construction or statutory analysis to assert that persons can only “act as” a group under section 13(d)(3) if an agreement exists among the group members. Another commenter suggested the absence of the term “agreement” from section 13(d)(3) did not restrict the Commission's capacity to use the term “agree” in Rule 13d–5(b) because administrative rulemakings commonly include language not present in a statute in order to implement congressional intent.

Some opposing commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendments would introduce a standard that was overly broad and that could chill or eliminate shareholder communications with other shareholders, issuers' management and/or other parties. One commenter expressed the view that the proposal could deter investors from engaging in “socially valuable activism” and noted that to the extent that the proposed rules resulted in restraints on shareholder communications, that may lead to claims that the proposed rules burden investors' First Amendment rights. The commenter also stated that the Commission “should take care to minimize any burdens on investors' expression.” Other commenters anticipated that under the proposed amendments, ordinary course business transactions or conversations, without more, could result in a finding of group formation. One commenter raised the concern that the proposed rule would produce disruptive collateral consequences, including in relation to ownership reporting under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 Act as it is uncertain whether being deemed a member of a group would deprive an investor of relying on the “passive investor” exemption from the antitrust notification requirements under that statute. A number of commenters also asserted that the proposed amendments would prompt litigation over whether communications between parties resulted in group formation. Some commenters expressed the view that the resulting increase in uncertainty that would be caused by the proposed amendments also would result in additional legal exposure under Exchange Act section 16 for persons alleged to have formed a group.

Opposing commenters also criticized the proposed amendments as inconsistent with those Federal court opinions that have addressed the standard for group formation. One commenter asserted that courts have recognized an “agreement” as being a necessary element of group formation based on the need for a “workable compromise” between the regulatory objective of having a statute's policies implemented, on one hand, and the market's need for clear rules, on the other hand. Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments would, in its view, dispense “with more than 40 years of practice and court decisions” and replace them “with a vague, circular rule . . . impossibly burdensome to market participants.” One commenter noted that Federal courts “have consistently held that the existence of an agreement is necessary to establish the existence of a `group' under Section 13(d).” Other commenters expressed the view that the existing standards in Rule 13d–5(b) have worked well for decades or are not in need of reform. Notwithstanding these and other similar criticisms, we note that multiple opposing commenters recognized that, even today, the determination of whether or not a group exists is ultimately dependent upon the facts and circumstances.

A number of commenters offered suggestions on how the Commission should proceed with respect to the proposed amendments. Some commenters expressed the view that the Commission should set forth more specific parameters of what joint conduct or communications may result in group formation. A few commenters offered alternative language to be used in any revision the Commission may ultimately adopt. One commenter encouraged the Commission to consider exempting QIIs from any new “group formation” provisions so long as QIIs act consistently with the requirements of Rule 13d–1(b). One commenter suggested that the Commission adopt the equivalent of an exemption from section 16 for any groups formed pursuant to the proposed amendments. Another commenter suggested that the proposed amendments should not be adopted unless a safe harbor is created for securities dealing activities. One commenter recommended no change to the proposal but expressed the view that the proposed rules would not interfere with shareholder rights to engage in, among other things, shareholder activism on ESG issues, collaboration on shareholder proposals under 17 CFR 240.14a–8 (“Rule 14a–8”), and “vote no” initiatives and any concerns regarding the filing obligations of such investor groups could be clarified by the Commission in an explanatory statement issued with any final rule. Another commenter stated the Commission should consider whether the public dissemination of information on message boards or through media interviews, and, by extension, social media platforms, could result in group formation. A number of commenters recommended no change be made to current Rule 13d–5(b)(1), which, according to some of these commenters, would result in retention of the “agreement” standard. One commenter made reference to existing Rule 13d–5(b) and advocated for the Commission to retain what it referred to as the “current `group' definition,” including the requirement that there be an agreement to act as a group, because the current provision does not: (1) chill shareholder engagement; (2) create the challenge to determine whether a group has been formed or if an exemption applies; or (3) make activist campaigns more difficult to pursue.

Commenters also expressed differing views on proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(ii). Some commenters expressly supported the proposal. One commenter stated that because information about a planned Schedule 13D filing is clearly material to investors, it makes sense to deem tippers and tippees to be acting as a group even without an explicit agreement. Another commenter, while expressing the view that modifications should be made to the Commission's overall proposed amendments relating to group formation, stated that the “definition of who should constitute a `group' under the proposal . . . should only apply to the sharing of material nonpublic information related to not yet disclosed large positions instead of efforts to improve the long-term corporate governance of companies.”

Other commenters opposed the proposal. One commenter analyzed the proposed rule text and observed that linking “indirectly discloses” to the “with the purpose of causing” clause appears intended to establish a presumption, for all practical purposes, that an acquisition by “such other person” was “based on such information.” Another commenter similarly expressed the view that such a rule would be unfair given that an adviser may also have independently determined to acquire or even continue to hold the same securities and disclosure of the imminent Schedule 13D may have been outside of the adviser's control and without his or her input or expression of approval. Another commenter similarly asserted that the proposed rule would place those who receive information from a blockholder at risk of inadvertently becoming subject to group reporting obligations in circumstances that were “never intended to be covered by Section 13.”

Some commenters provided recommendations to revise the proposal. One commenter suggested the Commission alternatively “impose a prohibition on tipping by an activist as soon as it reaches the 5 percent disclosure threshold until it files a Schedule 13D.” One commenter recommended that the Commission address concerns that the proposal could result in a passive institutional investor becoming a member of a group with an activist simply because it met with the activist, heard its proposed plans, and signaled that it would likely use its voting power to support the activist's proposed campaign by revising proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(ii) to include its suggested alternative text. One commenter, who neither clearly supported nor opposed the proposal, stated that it would be “deeply troubled if the Commission were to invent a new, extremely difficult to establish element to insider trading law, such as a requirement that the recipient of the tip have an intention of coordinating with the tipper or make its purchases in reliance on the non-public information that the tipper provided.” A commenter objected to the concept of “indirect” disclosure within proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(ii) on grounds that the term “indirect” is “intrinsically ill-defined” and could create a presumption that certain transactions in the ordinary course of a market-making business were executed “based on such [indirect] information.” Another commenter similarly suggested that the rule, if adopted, should only apply to situations where an express or implied intent by parties exists to form a group.

Commenters also expressed observations concerning the collateral consequences to an investor that received information about an impending Schedule 13D filing. One commenter implicitly asked the Commission to consider that once the tippee has the information, “[t]his quasi-lock-up period not only discourages other shareholders from meeting with the activist but also, effectively, removes the liquidity these other shareholders may provide to the market in that issuer.” Another commenter suggested the rule should clarify for how long a recipient of information that a Schedule 13D filing would be forthcoming must remain “frozen” from making further purchases, particularly if such filing does not get filed in the near term.

c. Commission Guidance

As noted above, we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i) and (ii) and (b)(2)(i). The Commission's stated objectives were to (1) align the text of Rule 13d–5(b) with the statutory provisions that it serves to implement while clarifying and affirming its application and operation and (2) provide clarity on whether a group is formed if a person shares information about an upcoming Schedule 13D filing that the person is or will be required to make. The proposed amendments were not intended to change how the Commission views what is meant by “act as a group” for purposes of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3). They were intended to codify through a rule amendment our views that “the determination of whether two or more persons are acting as a group does not depend solely on the presence of an express agreement and that, depending on the particular facts and circumstances, concerted actions by two or more persons for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer are sufficient to constitute the formation of a group.” Several commenters generally shared our view that the formation of a group does not depend on the presence of an express agreement. However, some commenters raised objections to the proposal based on their view that the amendments could result in a group being formed for purposes of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) absent some evidence of agreement, arrangement, understanding, or concerted action. That was not the Commission's intent. Upon consideration of the comments received, we believe that the better approach is not to adopt the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–5 but instead to provide guidance as to the application of the existing legal standard established in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) with respect to the formation of a group.

i. Background of the Regulatory Framework

Sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) are identical, and each of these provisions provides that “[w]hen two or more persons act as a . . . group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such . . . group shall be deemed a `person.' ” As the Commission noted in the Proposing Release, Congress enacted these provisions based on two practical considerations. First, sections 13(d)(1) and 13(g)(1), by their terms, apply to, and impose filing obligations upon, a single “person.” Second, Congress recognized the need to protect against the evasion of disclosure requirements by persons who collectively sought to change or influence control of an issuer yet who each acquired and held an amount of beneficial ownership at or just below the reporting threshold.

Congress sought to address this problem of coordinated circumvention by deeming two or more persons to be one person for purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g). Based on the statutory treatment of two or more persons as if they were a single person when they “act as” a group for at least one of the three purposes specified in the statutory provisions ( i.e., acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer), the beneficial ownership collectively held by the group members is imputed to the group. If the aggregate amount of beneficial ownership exceeds five percent of a covered class, the group may be required to file a beneficial ownership report. The determination of which statutory provision ( i.e., section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3)) applies to a group depends on whether a non-exempt acquisition of beneficial ownership has been made that can be imputed to the group and, when on its own or added to any other beneficial ownership held by the group, results in the group's beneficial ownership exceeding five percent of the covered class. If such an acquisition occurs, the group is subject to regulation under section 13(d). If no such acquisition attributable to the group has occurred, but the collective amount of beneficial ownership held by the group members exceeds five percent of a covered class at the end of a calendar year under current rules (or at the end of a calendar quarter based on the amendments to Rule 13d–1 we are adopting in this release), the group is subject to section 13(g).

ii. Guidance

Neither the statute nor our rules provide a definition of a “group.” The appropriate legal standard for determining whether a group is formed is found in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3). While some may view the language of Rule 13d–5(b) as providing a definition of “group,” we reiterate that neither the current rule nor its predecessor was designed or adopted by the Commission to serve as a substitute for the legal standard expressly stated in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) for determining when two or more persons form a group.

Whether two or more persons have formed a group as contemplated by sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) depends on a determination of whether they acted together for the purpose of “acquiring,” “holding,” or “disposing of” securities of an issuer. Such persons could be viewed as acting together if they are taking concerted actions in furtherance of any of these purposes. The determination depends on an analysis of all the relevant facts and circumstances and not solely on the presence or absence of an express agreement, as two or more persons may take concerted action or agree informally. This approach is consistent with the statutory language of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) and with the purpose of these statutory provisions. It also is consistent with views previously expressed by courts and the Commission, which have determined that groups were established by activities that fell short of an express agreement. Indeed, the Commission recognizes that for a finder of fact, including the Commission itself, to determine that a group has been formed under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3), the evidence must show, at a minimum, indicia, such as an informal arrangement or coordination in furtherance, of a common purpose to acquire, hold, or dispose of securities of an issuer. If two or more persons took similar actions, that fact is not conclusive in and of itself that a group has been formed. We therefore disagree with the comments raising constitutional concerns, as well as the comments concerning the scope of our authority under the Exchange Act and the APA. We note, however, that those comments were directed at the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–5 and the belief that the contemplated rule change meant the Commission was taking a position that a group could be formed without some type of an agreement, arrangement, understanding, or concerted action. As explained above, this is not the Commission's view, and we are not adopting the proposed amendment to Rule 13d–5. Further, the commenters' concerns are not implicated by the guidance we provide here.

Relatedly, we recognize the concern expressed by some commenters that the Commission's proposal to amend Rule 13d–5 could chill shareholder engagement, with, some commenters asserted, shareholders unable to communicate freely with each other or with the issuer's management without forming a group. In response to some of the concerns raised by commenters, we provide guidance below on the application of the current legal standard found in section 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) to certain common types of shareholder engagement activities.

Question: Is a group formed when two or more shareholders communicate with each other regarding an issuer or its securities (including discussions that relate to improvement of the long-term performance of the issuer, changes in issuer practices, submissions or solicitations in support of a non-binding shareholder proposal, a joint engagement strategy (that is not control-related), or a “vote no” campaign against individual directors in uncontested elections) without taking any other actions?

Response: No. In our view, a discussion whether held in private, such as a meeting between two parties, or in a public forum, such as a conference that involves an independent and free exchange of ideas and views among shareholders, alone and without more, would not be sufficient to satisfy the “act as a . . . group” standard in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3). Sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) were intended to prevent circumvention of the disclosures required by Schedules 13D and 13G, not to complicate shareholders' ability to independently and freely express their views and ideas to one another. The policy objectives ordinarily served by Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G filings would not be advanced by requiring disclosure that reports this or similar types of shareholder communications. Thus, an exchange of views and any other type of dialogue in oral or written form not involving an intent to engage in concerted actions or other agreement with respect to the acquisition, holding, or disposition of securities, standing alone, would not constitute an “act” undertaken for the purpose of “holding” securities of the issuer under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3).

Question: Is a group formed when two or more shareholders engage in discussions with an issuer's management, without taking any other actions?

Response: No. For the same reasons described above, we do not believe that two or more shareholders “act as a . . . group” for the purpose of “holding” a covered class within the meaning of those terms as they appear in section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3) if they simply engage in a similar exchange of ideas and views, alone and without more, with an issuer's management.

Question: Is a group formed when shareholders jointly make recommendations to an issuer regarding the structure and composition of the issuer's board of directors where (1) no discussion of individual directors or board expansion occurs and (2) no commitments are made, or agreements or understandings are reached, among the shareholders regarding the potential withholding of their votes to approve, or voting against, management's director candidates if the issuer does not take steps to implement the shareholders' recommended actions?

Response: No. Where recommendations are made in the context of a discussion that does not involve an attempt to convince the board to take specific actions through a change in the existing board membership or bind the board to take action, we do not believe that the shareholders “act as a . . . group” for the purpose of “holding” securities of the covered class within the meaning of those terms as they appear in sections 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3). Rather, we view this engagement as the type of independent and free exchange of ideas between shareholders and issuers' management that does not implicate the policy concerns addressed by section 13(d) or section 13(g).

Question: Is a group formed if shareholders jointly submit a non-binding shareholder proposal to an issuer pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a–8 for presentation at a meeting of shareholders?

Response: No. The Rule 14a–8 shareholder proposal submission process is simply another means through which shareholders can express their views to an issuer's management and board and other shareholders. For purposes of group formation, we do not believe shareholders engaging in a free and independent exchange of thoughts about a potential shareholder proposal, jointly submitting, or jointly presenting, a non-binding proposal to an issuer in accordance with Rule 14a–8 (or other means) should be treated differently from, for example, shareholders jointly meeting with an issuer's management without other indicia of group formation. Accordingly, where the proposal is non-binding, we do not believe that the shareholders “act as a . . . group” for the purpose of “holding” securities of the covered class within the meaning of those terms as they appear in section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3). Assuming that the joint conduct has been limited to the creation, submission, and/or presentation of a non-binding proposal, those statutory provisions would not result in the shareholders being treated as a group, and the shareholders' beneficial ownership would not be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the five percent threshold under section 13(d)(1) or 13(g)(1) had been crossed.

Question: Would a conversation, email, phone contact, or meetings between a shareholder and an activist investor that is seeking support for its proposals to an issuer's board or management, without more, such as consenting or committing to a course of action, constitute such coordination as would result in the shareholder and activist being deemed to form a group?

Response: No. Communications such as the types described, alone and without more, would not be sufficient to satisfy the “act as a . . . group” standard in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) as they are merely the exchange of views among shareholders about the issuer. This view is consistent with the Commission's previous statement that a shareholder who is a passive recipient of proxy soliciting activities, without more, would not be deemed a member of a group with persons conducting the solicitation. Activities that extend beyond these types of communications, which include joint or coordinated publication of soliciting materials with an activist investor might, however, be indicative of group formation, depending upon the facts and circumstances.

Question: Would an announcement or a communication by a shareholder of the shareholder's intention to vote in favor of an unaffiliated activist investor's director nominees, without more, constitute coordination sufficient to find that the shareholder and the activist investor formed a group?

Response: No. We do not view a shareholder's independently-determined act of exercising its voting rights, and any announcements or communications regarding its voting decision, without more, as indicia of group formation. This view is consistent with our general approach towards the exercise of the right of suffrage by a shareholder in other areas of the Federal securities laws. Shareholders, whether institutional or otherwise, are thus not engaging in conduct at risk of being deemed to give rise to group formation as a result of simply independently announcing or advising others—including the issuer—how they intend to vote and the reasons why.

Question: If a beneficial owner of a substantial block of a covered class that is or will be required to file a Schedule 13D intentionally communicates to other market participants (including investors) that such a filing will be made (to the extent this information is not yet public) with the purpose of causing such persons to make purchases in the same covered class, and one or more of the other market participants make purchases in the same covered class as a direct result of that communication, would the blockholder and any of those market participants that made purchases potentially become subject to regulation as a group?

Response: Yes. To the extent the information was shared by the blockholder with the purpose of causing others to make purchases in the same covered class and the purchases were made as a direct result of the blockholder's information, these activities raise the possibility that all of these beneficial owners are “act[ing] as” a “group for the purpose of acquiring” securities of the covered class within the meaning of section 13(d)(3). Such purchases may implicate the need for public disclosure underlying section 13(d)(3) and these purchases could potentially be deemed as having been undertaken by a “group” for the purpose of “acquiring” securities as specified under section 13(d)(3). Given that a Schedule 13D filing may affect the market for and the price of an issuer's securities, non-public information that a person will make a Schedule 13D filing in the near future can be material. By privately sharing this material information in advance of the public filing deadline, the blockholder may incentivize the market participants who received the information to acquire shares before the filing is made. Such arrangements also raise investor protection concerns regarding perceived unfairness and trust in markets. The final determination as to whether a group is formed between the blockholder and the other market participants will ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstances, including (1) whether the purpose of the blockholder's communication with the other market participants was to cause them to purchase the securities and (2) whether the market participants' purchases were made as a direct result of the information shared by the blockholder.

2. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii)

a. Proposed Amendments

The Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–5 to expressly impute acquisitions made by a group member after the date of group formation to the group once the collective beneficial ownership among group members exceeds five percent of a covered class. Specifically, proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) would provide that a group under section 13(d)(3) will be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of equity securities of a covered class if any member of the group becomes the beneficial owner of additional equity securities of such covered class after the date of the group's formation. Similarly, proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(2)(ii) would contain nearly identical language, with conforming changes to address circumstances in which a member of a group under section 13(g)(3) becomes the beneficial owner of additional equity securities of a covered class after the date of the group's formation. The Commission noted that absent an express provision that would treat post-formation acquisitions of beneficial ownership by group members as acquisitions by the group, the Commission or other affected parties must prove the acquisition is attributable to the group.

b. Comments Received

The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii).

c. Final Amendments

For the reasons set forth in the Proposing Release, we are adopting the text of Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii) substantially as proposed. We also are redesignating these provisions as Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(i) and slightly modifying them to account for the possibility that group members may make acquisitions in furtherance of the group's common purpose on the same day the group has been formed. Accordingly, the rule text will now attribute acquisitions by group members to the group at any time after the group has been formed rather than after the date on which the group has been formed.

3. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(iii)

a. Proposed Amendments

The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 13d–5 to carve out from the purview of proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii) intra-group transfers of equity securities of a covered class. Specifically, proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iv) would provide that a group under section 13(d)(3) will not be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership in a covered class if a member of the group becomes the beneficial owner of additional equity securities in such covered class through a sale by, or transfer from, another member of the group. Proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(2)(iii) would contain nearly identical language, with conforming changes to address circumstances in which a member of a group under section 13(g)(3) becomes the beneficial owner of additional equity securities in a covered class through a sale by, or transfer from, another member of the group.

b. Comments Received

The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(iii).

c. Final Amendments

For the reasons set forth in the Proposing Release, we are adopting the text of Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2)(iii) substantially as proposed, but redesignating these provisions as Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(iii) and (b)(2)(ii). We also are slightly modifying the rule text to account for the possibility that group members may make intra-group transfers on the same day but after the time at which the group has been formed instead of “after the date of group formation.”

D. Proposed Amendments to Rule 13d–6 To Create Certain Exemptions

Congress granted the Commission the authority to issue exemptions from the application of sections 13(d) and 13(g). The Commission can, under section 13(d)(6)(D), exempt acquisitions “as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of [section 13(d)].” Congress similarly granted the Commission authority, under section 13(g)(6), to exempt any person or class of persons from section 13(g) “as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” The Commission exercised this authority when it adopted Rule 13d–6, titled “Exemption of certain acquisitions.” Rule 13d–6 currently sets forth one exemption from section 13(d) for the acquisition of securities of an issuer by a person who, prior to such acquisition, was a beneficial owner of more than five percent of the securities of the same class as those acquired, provided certain conditions are met.

1. Proposed Amendments

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to exempt certain circumstances from resulting in a person being deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of, or otherwise to beneficially own, equity securities of a covered class for purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g). Specifically, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 13d–6 to:

• Add new paragraph (c) to create an exemption from sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) for certain circumstances in which two or more persons take concerted actions with respect to an issuer or a covered class; and
• Add new paragraph (d) to create an exemption from sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) for certain circumstances in which two or more persons enter into an agreement setting forth the terms of a derivative security.

The Commission proposed these amendments to Rule 13d–6 to exempt certain actions taken by two or more persons from the scope of sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) if those actions do not have the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of an issuer and thus are not within the purpose of section 13(d).

In light of the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–5, the Commission proposed to add new paragraph (c) to Rule 13d–6 to avoid potentially chilling communications among shareholders or impeding shareholders' engagement with issuers where those activities are undertaken without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer (and are not made in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect). Proposed Rule 13d–6(c) would provide that two or more persons would not be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of, or otherwise beneficially own, an issuer's equity securities as a group solely because of their concerted actions related to an issuer or its equity securities, including engagement with one another or the issuer, provided they meet certain conditions. The Commission noted that such interactions, depending upon the level of coordination and degree to which the persons advocated in furtherance of a common purpose specified within the statutory framework, could be found to satisfy the “act as” a group standard under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3) for the purpose of “holding” a covered class. To help ensure that the exemption is available only where such persons independently determine to take concerted actions, the proposed exemption would be available only if such persons are not obligated to take such actions ( e.g., pursuant to the terms of a cooperation agreement or joint voting agreement).

In addition, the Commission proposed to add new paragraph (d) to Rule 13d–6, in light of proposed new Rule 13d–3(e), to avoid impediments to certain financial institutions' ability to conduct their business in the ordinary course. Proposed Rule 13d–6(d) would have provided that two or more persons would not be deemed to have formed a group under section 13(d)(3) or 13(g)(3) solely by virtue of their entrance into an agreement governing the terms of a derivative security. This exemption would have been available if the agreement is a bona fide purchase and sale agreement entered into in the ordinary course of business. Further, the exemption would have been available only if such persons did not enter into the agreement with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect.

2. Comments Received

Some commenters supported proposed Rule 13d–6(c), while others generally supported the proposal's intent but expressed some reservations regarding Rule 13d–6(c) as proposed. Some of those commenters generally indicated that the exemption (as proposed or as modified in accordance with their recommendations) could provide clarity that would help prevent the chilling of communications among shareholders and shareholder engagement with issuers. In addition, one commenter appeared to support the inclusion of the “no obligation” to act concept in the second prong of the proposed exception and noted that when the institutional investors that are its members act jointly, they are acting independently, consistent with their fiduciary, legal, and other obligations to their fund participants and beneficiaries.

Other commenters opposed the proposed Rule 13d–6(c) exemption. Some commenters appeared to base their opposition on the argument that such an exemption would impliedly define what a group is by stating what it is not. Several commenters said that ambiguity in the proposed exemption could inhibit market participants' ability to readily discern when a “purpose or effect of changing or influencing control” has been manifested. One commenter further submitted that the subjective “control intent” standard likely will create more uncertainty and confusion than it will resolve. One commenter indicated, in light of its comments on the proposed amendments to Rule 13d–5, that “[t]his rule [exemption] would chill the kind of shareholder communications that are central to a proxy contest” and stated that “[c]onsultation among fellow shareholders and discussion with the activist are . . . essential.”

A number of commenters made recommendations regarding proposed Rule 13d–6(c). Some commenters requested that coordination with respect to Rule 14a–8 shareholder proposals be expressly made exempt. Several commenters requested that coordination with respect to “vote no” campaigns be expressly made exempt. Other commenters requested that it be made clear that the state of mind of one person would not be imputed to another for purposes of determining the availability of the exemption. Some commenters asked that the “in connection with [any change of control] transaction” language be removed from the exemption. One of those commenters stated that the “in connection with” language “might be read too broadly and have an unintended chilling effect of the sort of communications that routinely occur today.” Some commenters indicated that the “indirectly obligated to act” standard was in need of clearly defined boundaries and/or should be deleted. One of these commenters asserted that the “indirectly obligated” standard is vague and would engender additional uncertainty, and recommended that the Commission eliminate the proposed condition that “[s]uch persons, when taking such concerted actions, are not directly or indirectly obligated to take such actions.” One commenter stated the Commission should consider the circumstances under which investors advocating for specific changes ( e.g., board composition or diversity) might later be subjected to an inquiry about whether their communications or activities were protected by the exemptions given the terms in the proposal such as “solely,” “only,” “indirectly,” “purpose,” “effect,” and “contemplated.”

In response to the Commission's solicitation for comments on proposed Rule 13d–6(d), several commenters expressed support for the proposal. One commenter stated that the proposal would “help investors understand when they could become subject to regulation as a `group' under these circumstances and avoid costly regulatory filings for activity in the ordinary course of business.”

Several other commenters opposed the proposed Rule 13d–6(d) exemption. Some of those commenters questioned whether the proposed exemption is necessary, and implied that the proposal's inclusion in this rulemaking intimates that ordinary course of business transactions currently present risks of group formation. One of those commenters said that it was fairly settled that a bilateral transaction, negotiated at arm's length, would not by itself be sufficient to create a group absent other indicia of group status such as agreements to vote and other factors. Another of these commenters questioned whether this proposed provision or any explicit exemption is necessary or would instead create further uncertainty given that market participants have been entering into ordinary course derivatives transactions for years without treating these transactions as creating a group. One commenter expressed concerns regarding potential negative collateral effects of the exemption. This commenter said that proposed Rule 13d–6(d) suggests that, “outside of the safe harbor,” the parties to a derivative security transaction may be deemed to form a “group” and implied that the exemption's existence would create a risk of eroding the confidence of parties to any “ordinary” securities purchase and sale transactions that they do not constitute a “group.”

Some commenters indicated that few dealers or market participants would be able to rely on the exemption or that it would not serve its intended purpose. Another commenter similarly implied the exemption should not be adopted because “financial institutions would not just be apprehensive about, or marginally disincentivized from, entering into transactions with an activist counterparty” but instead “would avoid the risk altogether, and wholly refrain from engaging in these transactions that are economically useful and unrelated to the purposes of Section 13.” Another commenter echoed the concerns regarding the projected heightened level of risk arising in relation to the exemption and stated that the exemption would significantly impair ordinary-course derivatives transactions by dealers and financial institutions, even with counterparties who do not have any control intent. A similar criticism was offered by a commenter who explained that if the proposed exemption were adopted, an implication would be created that counterparties to a derivative transaction agreement that did not qualify for the exemption would be viewed as having formed a group.

Some commenters expressed doubt that proposed Rule 13d–6(d) would operate to only exempt legitimate business activity, suggesting the purpose of the proposed amendments regarding group formation and derivatives would be undermined. One of these commenters said that the proposal “sounds like this is an open invitation for high profile firms to actually work together as a group without [repercussion] of regulation.” Another of these commenters appeared to refer to proposed Rule 13d–6(d) and expressed concern that the proposed exemption “will get taken advantage of too easily and will obscure transactions that might substantially and singlehandedly affect a security.” A different commenter impliedly alluded to the undermining of the proposed change to Rule 13d–5(b) and speculated that no benefit of other proposed rule changes will be received if derivative position holders can claim an exemption under a different law.

3. Final Amendments

We are adopting the proposed redesignation of current Rules 13d–6 and 13d–5(b)(2) as Rule 13d–6(a) and (b), respectively, for the reasons set forth in the Proposing Release and as discussed above. As discussed in more detail below, however, we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–6(c) or (d).

The Commission proposed Rule 13d–6(c) in connection with proposed Rule 13d–5(b)(1)(i) and (b)(2)(i). As discussed above, we are not adopting those amendments. Proposed Rule 13d–6(c) was intended to avoid potentially chilling communications among shareholders or impeding shareholders' engagement with issuers where those activities are undertaken without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer (and are not made in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect). Some commenters, however, expressed concern that the exemption would in fact have the opposite effect. This concern appears to be based on their view that the exemption would be too narrow and impliedly define what actions would be sufficient to constitute “acting as a group” ( i.e., any actions that would not qualify for the proposed exemption). To address those concerns, and in light of the fact that we are not adopting the amendments to Rule 13d–5 that prompted the proposal of the exemption in Rule 13d–6(c), we are not adopting Rule 13d–6(c). We also believe that the discussion and guidance we provided in section II.C.1.c above will help to address the Commission's goals of preserving shareholder communications and engagement with issuers that are undertaken without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control.

Similarly, after considering the comments received regarding proposed Rule 13d–6(d), we also do not believe adoption of that exemption is necessary. Under sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3), formation of a group requires that two or more persons be found to have acted as a group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing “of securities of an issuer.” Many cash-settled derivatives, including those that were intended to be covered by proposed exemption, are not considered “securities of [the] issuer.” Those derivatives originate with persons other than the issuer and simply reference a class of an issuer's securities. The holders of such cash-settled derivative securities are, therefore, generally not owed a fiduciary duty by the issuer and do not generally have legal standing to bring a claim against the issuer. Moreover, holders of such derivative securities are not, by virtue of those instruments, debt or equity holders of the issuer and are not entitled to a right to vote or dispose of any security “of an issuer” based on their investment in these derivatives. Absent the circumstances in which a holder of a derivative settled exclusively in cash that did not originate with the issuer could become a beneficial owner of the reference security, the Commission does not believe that persons who, in the ordinary course of business, acquire derivative securities settled exclusively in cash would generally be deemed to “act as a . . . group” under sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) with the financial institutions that sell such derivatives. Simply put, such persons cannot be found, as a matter of law, to have acquired, held, or disposed “of securities of an issuer” as that term is used in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3).

While investors in a cash-settled equity-based derivative security, in order to acquire the derivative security, may need to enter into an agreement governing the terms of such instrument with a financial institution that, in the ordinary course of its business, acts as a counterparty to such investors, that agreement, without more, does not result in group formation. We believe that a bilateral transaction, negotiated at arm's length and entered into solely for commercial purposes, as described, would not by itself introduce facts sufficient to find that a group exists. In our view, an agreement between an investor in a cash-settled derivative security and a counterparty entered into for the ordinary course of business would fail to satisfy the “act as a . . . group” element in sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) absent other indicia of group status such as agreements to vote or other factors.

To offset any risk exposure to that derivative security, including any obligations that may arise at settlement, the financial institution counterparty may, in practice, purchase securities in the reference covered class and hold such reference security for the duration of the agreement. While it may be true that but for the joint actions of the parties in entering into the agreement, that specific acquisition of beneficial ownership in the covered class by the financial institution would not have occurred, we believe that if the counterparty acts on its own initiative and not at the direction of the investor or otherwise on its behalf, there is no basis to assert that the investor and counterparty acted in concert and thus subjected themselves to regulation as a group. As such, entry into such an agreement will not implicate sections 13(d)(3) and (g)(3) because the two persons cannot be viewed as acting as a group even given the financial institution's foreseeable acquisition of securities of a covered class. Assuming that the investor and the financial institution did not enter into the agreement with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer, the regulatory purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) would not be furthered by treating the investor and the financial institution as members of a group under section 13(d)(3) or section 13(g)(3) solely by virtue of their entrance—for strictly commercial purposes and not for purposes of acquiring, holding, or disposing of a covered class—into that agreement. Accordingly, we have elected not to adopt proposed Rule 13d–6(d) as the exemption is not needed in order for such ordinary course of business transactions in derivative securities to freely occur.

E. Amendment to Schedule 13D To Clarify Disclosure Requirements Regarding Derivative Securities

Schedule 13D sets forth the information that beneficial owners reporting pursuant to section 13(d)(1) and Rule 13d–1(a) must disclose. Item 6 of Schedule 13D requires beneficial owners to “[d]escribe any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships (legal or otherwise) among the persons named in Item 2 [of Schedule 13D] and between such persons and any person with respect to any securities of the issuer” and sets forth a non-exclusive list of examples of such contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships. Because cash-settled derivative securities were not expressly included among these examples, questions may arise as to whether beneficial owners should report their holdings of these derivative securities as contracts “with respect to” an issuer's securities under the rationale that (1) only a purely economic, but no legal, interest is generally held through such derivatives in any class of an issuer's securities and (2) the issuer's securities are only used as a reference security. Further, as discussed below, the current requirement could be interpreted as excluding the disclosure of cash-settled options not offered or sold by the issuer, or other derivatives not originating with the issuer, including other cash-settled derivatives such as SBS.

1. Proposed Amendment

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to amend Schedule 13D to clarify the disclosure requirements with respect to derivative securities held by a person reporting on that schedule. The Commission noted that, at present, the formulation “with respect to securities of the issuer” in Item 6 might be read to suggest that contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships that only create economic exposure to the issuer's equity securities or are otherwise considered synthetic could be excluded. Accordingly, to remove any ambiguity as to the scope of the required disclosures, the Commission proposed to revise Item 6 to expressly state that the use of derivative securities, including cash-settled SBS and other derivatives settled exclusively in cash, which use the issuer's securities as a reference security are included among the types of contracts, arrangements, understandings and relationships which must be disclosed. The Commission also proposed the amendment to clarify that the derivative security need not have originated with the issuer or otherwise be part of its capital structure in order for a disclosure obligation to arise. The proposed amendment thus specified that a person filing a Schedule 13D would be required to disclose interests in all contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships, including derivative securities, that use the issuer's equity security as a reference security.

2. Comments Received

Commenters expressed various views on the proposed amendment to Item 6 of Schedule 13D. Some commenters supported the proposed amendment. One commenter, which did not clearly support or oppose the proposal with respect to Item 6, appeared to indicate, in connection with a response to a request for comment with respect to Item 7, Exhibits, that Item 6 may already apply to cash-settled derivatives.

Other commenters opposed the proposed amendment to Item 6 of Schedule 13D, stating that requiring disclosure of SBS arrangements in Item 6 would be confusing and indicating that it did not believe this disclosure would serve any additional purpose. One commenter explained that determining which type of derivative security to include in different parts of Schedule 13D would present a logistical challenge. The commenter anticipated that the compliance-related challenge would arise, from an operational point of view, because of the regulatory inconsistency created by the exclusion of SBS from the beneficial ownership calculation under proposed Rule 13d–3(e) but the inclusion of SBS under Item 6 (to the extent they use the issuer's equity security as a reference security). The commenter expressed additional concern that requiring disclosure of SBS arrangements under Item 6 would negate the benefits to these holders of non-disclosure of counterparties in proposed Schedule 10B.

3. Final Amendment

We are adopting the amendment to Item 6 of Schedule 13D as proposed. Specifically, we are amending Rule 13d–101 to expressly state that derivative contracts, arrangements, understandings, and relationships with respect to an issuer's securities, including cash-settled SBS and other derivatives which are settled exclusively in cash, would need to be disclosed under Item 6 of Schedule 13D in order to comply with section 13(d)(1) and Rule 13d–1(a). We also are eliminating the “including but not limited to” language in Item 6 that currently precedes the itemization of the instruments or arrangements covered to remove any implication that additional interests may need to be disclosed.

We believe that investors could benefit from a more complete disclosure of a Schedule 13D filer's economic interests in the relevant issuer, including economic interests via positions in cash-settled derivatives. For example, disclosure of any such cash-settled derivatives may help investors evaluate whether their interests with respect to the issuer's securities are aligned with the Schedule 13D filer's. In addition, disclosure of this information is consistent with other interests required to be disclosed under Item 6, such as, for example, “division of profits or loss.”

Our adoption of the amendment also furthers the congressional purpose of section 13(d)(1), as demonstrated by the legislative history accompanying Congress' enactment of this provision. The disclosures required under Item 6 of Schedule 13D originated with a congressional mandate. Congress specified certain information within sections 13(d)(1)(A) through (E) that beneficial owners must report once they incur a filing obligation. In addition to the disclosure required under sections 13(d)(1)(A) through (E), Congress also authorized the Commission to require disclosure of “such additional information” it prescribes as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Under section 13(d)(1)(E), Congress provided that a beneficial owner must report “information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including [the] transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies.” Consistent with the mandate of section 13(d)(1)(E), which forms part of the basis for the disclosure requirements of existing Item 6, this baseline disclosure requirement has existed in Schedule 13D since 1968.

We note that one commenter opposed the proposed amendment to Item 6. The commenter stated, among other things, that requiring disclosure of SBS holdings in Item 6 would be confusing. Specifically, the commenter pointed out that proposed Rule 13d–3(e) would have excluded SBS and stated that there would be a “logistical challenge” associated with excluding SBS from the beneficial ownership calculation but including them in the narrative disclosure in response to Item 6. We disagree. Item 6 (as well as the other items in Schedule 13D) already requires disclosure of various information that does not factor into calculating a Schedule 13D filer's beneficial ownership. We do not believe that requiring disclosure in Item 6 of SBS that may be excluded from a Schedule 13D filer's beneficial ownership calculation would present any unique complications or be more complex than disclosure of this other information, and the commenter did not present any specific “logistical challenges” that could arise from this requirement. Moreover, we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–3(e), further diminishing this concern about potential confusion.

The commenter also noted that the proposed amendment to Item 6 would be unnecessary in light of, and could conflict with, the disclosure of SBS positions in proposed Rule 10B–1. While the Commission will consider concerns about a potential conflict if it takes any final action with respect to proposed Rule 10B–1, we note that proposed Rule 10B–1 (along with proposed Schedule 10B) is intended to serve a purpose different from Item 6 of Schedule 13D. The Commission proposed Rule 10B–1 to, among other things, provide market participants (including counterparties, issuers, and issuers' stakeholders) and regulators with access to information that may indicate that a person (or a group of persons) is building up a large SBS position, and to alert market participants and regulators to the existence of concentrated exposures to a limited number of counterparties, which should inform those market participants and regulators of the attendant risks, allow counterparties to risk manage and lead to better pricing of the SBS with respect to transactions with persons holding large positions in those SBS (as a result of all market participants having access to the information about the positions). Item 6 of Schedule 13D, on the other hand, is intended to implement section 13(d)(1)(E), where Congress specifically mandated that the disclosure statement filed would include information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including the names of relevant parties, as part of its intent to require disclosures to security holders regarding persons with significant holdings. Thus, in light of that congressional mandate, we believe it is appropriate to require disclosure of such information pursuant to Item 6 of Schedule 13D.

F. Structured Data Requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G

Currently, the EDGAR Filer Manual requires Schedules 13D and 13G to be filed electronically on the Commission's EDGAR system in HTML or ASCII format. HTML and ASCII are both unstructured data languages; thus, the disclosures reported on Schedules 13D and 13G are not currently machine-readable. As a result, information disclosed on Schedules 13D and 13G is generally more difficult for investors and other market participants to access, compile, and analyze as compared to information that is submitted in a machine-readable data language.

While the majority of EDGAR filings under the Commission's rules are submitted in HTML or ASCII, certain EDGAR filings are submitted using machine-readable, XML-based languages that are each specific to the particular EDGAR document type being submitted. This includes filings that, like Schedules 13D and 13G, are submitted by individuals and entities other than the registrant of the class of securities. For these EDGAR XML filings, filers are typically provided the option to either submit the filing directly to EDGAR in XML, or manually input their disclosures in a fillable web form as part of an online web application developed by the Commission that converts the completed form into an EDGAR-specific XML document.

1. Proposed Amendment

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposed to require that beneficial ownership reports on Schedules 13D and 13G be filed using a structured, machine-readable data language. In particular, the Commission proposed to require that Schedules 13D and 13G be filed in part using an XML-based language specific to Schedules 13D and 13G (“13D/G-specific XML”). For both Schedules, all disclosures, including quantitative disclosures, textual narratives, and identification checkboxes, would be structured in 13D/G-specific XML under the proposal, with the exception of the exhibits to the Schedules, which would remain unstructured. The Commission stated that a structured data requirement for the disclosures reported on Schedules 13D and 13G would greatly improve the accessibility and usability of the disclosures, allowing investors to access, aggregate and analyze the reported information in a much more timely and efficient manner.

2. Comments Received

Commenters largely supported the proposed structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G. Other commenters objected to the proposed structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G, with one commenter expressing concern that the proposed structured data requirement would be unduly burdensome for small beneficial owners.

Some of the supporting commenters asserted that the proposed structured data requirement would improve the fairness and transparency of the markets. One commenter asserted that the proposal would be a fundamental step toward ensuring that the beneficial ownership reporting requirements remain modern and comprehensible. One commenter noted that the proposed structured data requirement would not impose significant costs to beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class and stated that the requirement would allow the Commission to make use of advancing technologies in order to reduce costs to taxpayers and more speedily provide the public with the information it needs to accurately assess the conditions of the market. Another commenter asserted that the proposal would enable the Commission to process filings instantaneously and therefore allow for real-time analysis and if necessary, remedial action and stated that any data which cannot be easily processed by machines will become largely useless as the century progresses. In addition, one commenter agreed with the Commission that tagging the data reported on Schedules 13D and 13G will make it easier for investors and other market participants to access, compile, and analyze this information and expressly supported the Commission's development of electronic “style sheets” that, when applied to the reported XML data, would represent that data in “human readable” format.

Some of the supporting commenters also made recommendations to the Commission regarding the proposed structured data requirement. One commenter requested that the Commission release the taxonomy at least six months in advance of the date by which any revised Schedules 13D or 13G must be filed so that reporting persons can incorporate the taxonomy into their filing system. Similarly, other commenters recommended that the Commission provide for a test period in which reporting persons can make test filings using the taxonomy in advance of the date by which the revised schedules must be filed. Finally, one commenter suggested that the Commission opt for the XBRL data language, rather than creating an XML schema designed specifically for beneficial ownership reporting as proposed.

3. Final Amendment

We are adopting the structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G as proposed. Specifically, we are replacing the current HTML or ASCII requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G in the EDGAR Filer Manual with a requirement to use 13D/G-specific XML for the disclosures reported on those Schedules. As is the case with other EDGAR XML filings, reporting persons will be able to, at their option, submit filings directly to EDGAR in 13D/G-specific XML or use a web-based reporting application developed by the Commission that will generate the Schedule in 13D/G-specific XML in connection with the submission of the filing to EDGAR.

In adopting the structured data requirement as proposed, we note that commenters overwhelmingly supported the proposal. Although one commenter opposed the proposed structured data requirement on the basis that it would be unduly burdensome for small beneficial owners, we believe the web-based reporting application that will generate the Schedule in 13D/G-specific XML should serve to reduce the burden of preparing a Schedule 13D or 13G for small beneficial owners (and other Schedule 13D and 13G filers), as compared to the current system whereby beneficial owners generally use third-party software to prepare their Schedule 13D or 13G. In addition, because 13D/G-specific XML lends itself more readily to the development of a web-based reporting application on EDGAR than XBRL does, we believe 13D/G-specific XML is more suitable than XBRL for structuring Schedules 13D and 13G. In response to commenters requesting a test period for the revised Schedules and requesting a taxonomy ( i.e., schema) release at least six months before compliance is required, we are providing an extended voluntary compliance period during which the schema will be publicly available. The compliance period is discussed in further detail in section II.G below.

G. Compliance Dates

The Commission did not propose a transition period for any of the Proposed Amendments. Some commenters suggested, however, that the Commission should provide for an extended compliance period with respect to the proposed structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G. Based on this feedback, we believe that an extended transition period for compliance with the structured data requirement is appropriate. As such, compliance with the structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G will not be required until December 18, 2024. We welcome, however, early compliance with this requirement, and Schedule 13D and 13G filers may begin to voluntarily comply with the structured data requirement on December 18, 2023.

In order to further reduce some of the potential burdens that commenters described, compliance with the revised Schedule 13G filing deadlines under Rules 13d–1 and 13d–2 will not be required before September 30, 2024. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the final amendments will become effective on February 5, 2024, beneficial owners will continue to be required to comply with the current Schedule 13G filing deadlines through September 29, 2024. Beginning on September 30, 2024, however, beneficial owners will be required to comply with the revised Schedule 13G filing deadlines. For example, under Rule 13d–2(b), as amended, a Schedule 13G filer will be required to file an amendment within 45 days after September 30, 2024, if, as of end of the day on that date, there were any material changes in the information the filer previously reported on Schedule 13G.

III. Other Matters

If any of the provisions of these amendments, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has designated these amendments a “major rule,” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

IV. Economic Analysis

A. Overview

As discussed in section II, the final amendments generally shorten the filing deadlines for initial Schedule 13D and 13G filings, together with other changes described below. These filings are required in accordance with sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act. Section 13(d) was enacted in 1968 with the intent to alert issuers and the marketplace to rapid accumulations of equity securities by persons who would then have the potential to change or influence control of the issuer. Section 13(g), subsequently enacted in 1977, was intended, together with section 13(d), to provide a “comprehensive disclosure system of corporate ownership” applicable to all persons who are the beneficial owners of more than five percent of a covered class.

The efficiency of financial markets rests on material information becoming public in a timely fashion. In addition to protecting investors, greater availability of information allows securities prices to better reflect their issuers' fundamental value, and ultimately promotes capital formation. The widespread enactment of laws and regulations that restrict the use of information obtained by virtue of insider status, as well as regulations that restrict selective disclosure to certain persons in the absence of public disclosure, point to the public-good nature of rules requiring public disclosure.

This same principle motivates the requirement to disclose beneficial ownership of significant shareholders with the potential to change or influence control of the issuer. Knowledge of who is influencing control is highly material. Investors benefit from this information just as they benefit from material information regarding their investments more broadly. The five-business day deadline balances the interest of investors to be in possession of material information with the interest of investors seeking changes in control that may benefit shareholders, and is longer than the filing deadline for other settings involving ownership changes, such as for Form 4 under Exchange Act section 16 reporting.

Moreover, as we discuss below, studies suggest that traders other than the filer may be in a position to become aware of a potential activist campaign and buy stock of the target issuer immediately prior to a Schedule 13D filing, thereby benefiting directly from foreknowledge of the filing rather than their own efforts. Shortened filing deadlines may lessen the opportunity for these traders to gain such an advantage, as discussed below, which could enhance trust in markets and thereby capital formation. Finally, shortening the deadline is expected to reduce overall informational asymmetries in the market. Both theoretical and empirical studies have connected information asymmetry, and in particular the presence of informed traders, to wider bid-ask spreads. We therefore expect shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline to improve liquidity.

Shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline will have costs. Specifically, activist investors will have less time in which to accumulate shares before the filing deadline and, therefore, before the price of the stock reflects their plans. This may reduce their expected profit, and accordingly some of the incentives for activism. However, although we cannot predict with precision the magnitude of the ultimate effect on activism and how the overall markets and activists themselves will respond to these changes, we believe it is likely that the shortened deadline will not significantly reduce the level of activism as we expect most campaigns will not be affected by the amended deadline, based on our analysis of historical campaigns, and most activists will have ability to adapt to the shortened deadline through various alternatives.

We are also, among other things, revising the filing deadlines for Schedule 13D and 13G amendments and amending Item 6 of Schedule 13D, which requires the disclosure of certain contracts, arrangements, understandings, and relationships, to remove any implication that a person is not required to disclose interests in all derivative securities that use a covered class as a reference security. Each of these final amendments may allow investors and other market participants to make better-informed decisions by accelerating the disclosure of information or expanding the amount of information disclosed. The final amendments also require that Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G be filed using a structured, machine-readable data language, which may facilitate the extraction and analysis of information in the filings, and make technical changes to Regulation S–T associated with extending the filing “cut-off” time from 5:30 p.m. to 10 p.m., which may ease the compliance costs for filers.

We are mindful of the costs and benefits of the final amendments. Below, we discuss in more detail the economic effects of the final amendments, including their anticipated costs and benefits and, integrated into that discussion, the likely effects of the final rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. We also analyze the potential costs and benefits of significant alternatives to the final amendments.

B. Baseline

The baseline against which the costs, benefits, and the effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation of the final amendments are measured consists of the current state of the market and the current regulatory framework. The economic analysis considers existing regulatory requirements, including recently adopted rules, as part of its economic baseline against which the costs and benefits of the final amendments are measured.

1. Current Schedule 13D and 13G Filing Requirements

The current Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filing requirements are discussed in detail in section II.A above. Briefly, an initial Schedule 13D is currently required to be filed within 10 days after any acquisition of beneficial ownership of a covered class that results in a person directly or indirectly being the beneficial owner of more than five percent of the covered class. Among other disclosures, the reporting person must describe, pursuant to Item 6 of Schedule 13D, any contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships among the reporting persons or between the reporting persons and any other person with respect to any securities of the issuer. In addition, a Schedule 13D amendment must be filed “promptly” upon any material change in the facts reported in the Schedule 13D filing, inclusive of any amendments thereto.

The initial filing deadline for the initial Schedule 13G varies by investor category. QIIs and Exempt Investors must file an initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which their beneficial ownership exceeds five percent of a covered class at the end of the last day of that calendar year. Further, if a QII beneficially owns more than 10 percent of a covered class as of the last day of any month, then the initial Schedule 13G must be filed within 10 days after the end of that month. Passive Investors must file an initial Schedule 13G within 10 days of acquiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class.

For all Schedule 13G filers, if, as of the end of the calendar year, there are any changes in the information previously reported in a Schedule 13G filing, a Schedule 13G amendment must be filed within 45 days after the end of that calendar year. In addition, QIIs must file a Schedule 13G amendment within 10 days after the end of the first month in which their beneficial ownership either exceeds 10 percent of a covered class, or, once across that threshold, increases or decreases by more than five percent of the covered class. Similarly, Passive Investors must “promptly” file a Schedule 13G amendment upon acquiring beneficial ownership of more than 10 percent of a covered class, or, once across that threshold, if they increase or decrease their beneficial ownership by more than five percent of the covered class.

2. Market Trends

There have been significant changes in the technological, financial market, and regulatory environment since the enactment of the Williams Act. In particular, various new technologies developed over this time period facilitate the filing process, including both the preparation and submission of a filing. For example, communications have become easier and faster over this time, facilitating the gathering of information to be disclosed and any necessary coordination among parties. Further, information technologies used to compile the necessary data and prepare and transmit filings may have helped to reduce the time required to produce and submit filings. Also, electronic submission relieves filers of the need to mail or hand deliver filings. On the other hand, as some commenters noted, some of the tasks necessary for filers' preparation and submission of filings have not been automated or otherwise accelerated. Further, as one commenter noted, information technologies have also facilitated easier and faster access to filings, which may reduce the time for the information in filings to reach market participants even under the same deadline. Modern information technologies and the faster pace of communication may also allow investors and other market participants to react more quickly to disclosures, such that they may benefit more from disclosures being made a few days earlier than they might have in earlier decades, when decision-making may have proceeded at a slower pace.

In addition to the ease of communication, the introduction of electronic trading, new types of financial contracts and instruments, and advances in order-splitting and other trade execution optimization techniques, as well as the rise of dark pools, may facilitate an investor accumulating a large equity stake more quickly than at the time of the enactment of the Williams Act. On the other hand, we also recognize that accumulating significant ownership could instead be more difficult in the face of modern algorithmic and high-frequency trading, more sophisticated surveillance of equity trading and ownership by other traders, market participants, and issuers, and the defenses and tactics currently used by issuers with respect to potential unsolicited takeover bids or shareholder activism.

At least one study presents evidence that, despite variations in the number of filings from month to month and from year to year, the absolute number of initial or total Schedule 13D filings made per year did not increase overall from 1985 to 2012. Commission staff analysis of more recent filings supports the observation that the number of total filings made per year has not increased over recent decades; in fact, the number of Schedule 13D filings has decreased somewhat in the most recent decade. Further, according to academic research examining different time periods and subsets of filings from 1985 through 2018, there has been no significant change in the average level of beneficial ownership of a covered class reported in individual initial Schedule 13D filings over that time horizon. Commission staff analysis of more recent filings supports the observation that the average level of beneficial ownership reported in initial Schedule 13D filings has not meaningfully changed in recent decades.

There is also research that addresses whether other developments may have changed the significance of lower ownership stakes in an issuer's securities over time. For example, some observers have stated that the increase in stock ownership by institutional investors, the rise of proxy advisory services, and regulatory and legal developments regarding shareholder communications may have made it easier for an investor with a lower ownership stake to influence other shareholders, and, ultimately, the issuer. On the other hand, others have stated that the increased presence of institutional investors may make it more difficult for an investor with a lower ownership stake to exert control, without the support of these institutional investors. Overall, it is unclear whether regulatory, legal, and market developments have led activist campaigns by investors with lower ownership stakes to become more or less effective over time. That said, researchers have noted that today's market for corporate control, in contrast to that at the time of the enactment of the Williams Act and the Commission's original adoption of the related rules, prominently features investors with minority interests in issuers who seek to influence these issuers' governance or corporate policies by convincing other shareholders to support their causes instead of pursuing direct control of issuers through majority ownership.

3. Affected Parties and Current Market Practices

The parties affected by the final amendments include: all investors that are required or potentially required to report their beneficial ownership of covered classes on Schedules 13D and 13G; the issuers of covered classes; shareholders of these issuers who are not Schedule 13D or 13G filers; and other investors, market participants, and issuers. Below we provide information about the current nature of Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings and filers, which has not changed markedly since publication of the Proposing Release.

a. Schedule 13D Filings

i. Number of Filings, Filer Types, and Time To File

During calendar year 2022, the Commission received a total of 5,179 Schedule 13D filings, including 1,161 initial filings and 4,018 amendments. Overall, these initial filings and amendments involved 2,194 unique lead filers. Additional details specific to the initial filings, including their breakdown and characteristics by filer type, are presented in Table 1.

We present the breakdown of filer type in the initial Schedule 13D filings under the baseline in Table 1 to characterize the affected parties. We did not limit our analyses of costs and benefits to any of these categories.

A detailed day-by-day breakdown of the percentage of the filings made each day after the trigger date is provided in Figure 1 below.

About 71 percent of all of the initial Schedule 13D filings in 2022 were filed within the existing 10-day filing window (represented by the dark grey bars), with about 34 percent of the filings being made on the filing deadline. Approximately 29 percent of the initial Schedule 13D filings, representing about 41 percent of all of the initial Schedule 13D filings that were filed by the current filing deadline, were filed within the amended five-business day deadline.

ii. Types of Filings

An initial Schedule 13D filing obligation is triggered by the acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a covered class, which can be achieved through various means, including via the purchase of shares on the open market as well as the receipt of shares through events involving off-market transactions. Initial Schedule 13D filings are required in a number of different circumstances, only some of which reflect shareholder activism, as noted by commenters. As discussed further below, filings involving the acquisition of shares as a result of certain corporate actions and other off-market transactions ( e.g., compensatory equity grants to executives) are less likely to be characterized as announcements of activist campaigns.

Based on staff review of over a decade of Schedule 13D filings, we believe that the nature of transaction history disclosures, which are required pursuant to Item 5(c) of Schedule 13D, provide a reasonable means of distinguishing, in a large sample, those filings that are likely to reflect the acquisition of beneficial ownership through corporate actions or other off-market transactions as opposed to those that are more likely to represent activist campaigns. In particular, for those filings for which we could not extract a history of transactions in tabular form, we found that most reported only one or two transactions, representing off-market transfers of shares. We found that these filings are typically associated with beneficial ownership acquired in events such as the consummation of negotiated mergers and acquisitions, IPOs, other restructurings, private placements, or compensation awards. We therefore categorize these filings as “corporate action filings.” In contrast, we found that filings that report a transaction history pursuant to Item 5(c) in tabular form are typically associated with the accumulation of shares in open-market trading through a series of multiple transactions and are more likely to discuss potential plans and proposals that are commonly viewed as characteristic of activist campaigns. We therefore categorize the filings for which we are able to extract a transaction history in tabular form as “non-corporate-action filings,” which we view as more likely to involve activist campaigns, acknowledging that we may be somewhat over-inclusive in our application of the term “activist campaign.” We present a breakdown of the percentages of initial Schedule 13D filings in calendar years 2011 through 2021 that we characterize as “non-corporate-action filings” or “corporate action filings” based on the nature of transaction histories extracted from the filings in Table 2.

The categorization of filings presented in Table 2 was also included by staff in the DERA Memorandum. One comment letter addressing the DERA Memorandum indicated that the analysis presented in that memorandum (which is similar to analysis included in this economic analysis) was not replicable because it is “not based on publicly available information,” citing staff's references to programmatic text analysis and manual review. To clarify, the analyses in the DERA Memorandum and this economic analysis are based on publicly available filings and datasets. The reliance of the staff's analysis on programmatic text analysis is limited primarily to the extraction of trigger dates, the reported level of beneficial ownership, and the tabular trading histories (as discussed in this section) from public initial Schedule 13D filings from EDGAR. This data or other data that would allow us to understand the share accumulation patterns of filers is not available from any third-party sources that we are aware of, and our extraction of this data is not novel; other researchers have extracted similar transaction history data from public Schedule 13D filings for the purpose of academic studies. Further, the manual review (as well as certain additional programmatic text analysis) discussed in this section and elsewhere in this economic analysis is used to validate our methodologies and not to generate the results of the analyses.

Another commenter addressing the DERA Memorandum raised concerns about potential errors in the classification of filings as “non-corporate-action filings” category, as acknowledged by staff in the DERA Memorandum, and questioned why the magnitude of any overstatement of this category is not quantified. In the discussion above, we acknowledge that some filings classified as non-corporate-action filings do not state plans and proposals typical of activist campaigns. That said, these filings are still due consideration. That is, to the extent the share accumulation patterns reported in these filings would be affected by a shortened deadline, and to the extent these filings are associated with abnormal stock returns, they may still be important to consider in evaluating the costs and benefits quantitatively analyzed in this economic analysis. We also acknowledge above that some non-corporate-action filings may be incorrectly categorized as corporate action filings. While we acknowledge the potential noise in our data, we believe that any large dataset or classification approach applied to a large dataset would be subject to some degree of error. Another commenter suggested that we consider using an alternative database, stating that it “includes a more comprehensive dataset on non-corporate action filings and activist campaigns than that created by DERA.” Our initial dataset includes all Schedule 13D filings on EDGAR, so we expect it to be fully comprehensive. As discussed above, the subset of these filings that are categorized as non-corporate-action filings may not include every filing that some may consider to represent an “activist campaign.” However, it is not practical to extend the key analyses conducted later in this economic analysis to additional filings because staff was, by definition, unable to systematically extract transaction history data for the filings classified as corporate action filings, and data on the share accumulation patterns of the filer are required for these analyses. We do not believe that potential misclassifications have a meaningful impact on the results or interpretation of the analyses in this economic analysis.

iii. Timing of Share Accumulation

Because the final amendments will shorten the window between the trigger date and filing deadline for an initial Schedule 13D filing, we also consider current practices under the baseline with respect to the timing of the filer's accumulation of shares during the filing window.

As discussed above, for those initial Schedule 13D filings that we classify as “corporate action filings,” which represent about 80 percent of initial Schedule 13D filings (per the second row of Table 2), we found that most reported only one or two transactions representing off-market transfers of shares. These transfers typically took place on or very close to the trigger date. We found that very few of these transfers occur following the fifth day after the filer crosses the five percent threshold.

For initial Schedule 13D filings that we classify as “non-corporate-action filings,” we use data extracted from the filings to examine filers' current patterns of share accumulation. We extracted such data from the 3,067 non-corporate-action filings from 2011 through 2021 reflected in the first row of Table 2. We further refined the sample of filings to exclude late filers and filers with no beneficial ownership reported as of the filing date and to adjust for multiple filings on the same date. Our refinements resulted in a sample size of 2,370 non-corporate-action filings, which we use for Figures 2, 3a, 3b, and Table 3 below. Figure 2 displays the percentage of non-corporate-action filings for which filers completed acquiring the total beneficial ownership reported in their initial Schedule 13D filing by the specified day after the trigger date.⁷¹⁹

The dark grey bars in Figure 2 represent filers that completed acquiring their total reported stake by the amended deadline, i.e., five business days after their trigger date. Summing the dark grey bars of the figure, we find that about 80 percent of the filers completed acquiring their reported stake by the amended deadline. The remaining approximately 20 percent of filers (represented in the light grey bars) continued accumulating shares after the amended deadline.

We next explore the significance of additional accumulations of shares after the amended deadline. Figures 3a and 3b display, for the same sample of filings as in Figure 2, the percentage of filers that complete acquiring 90 percent and 75 percent, respectively, of their stake on the indicated day after the trigger date.

The dark grey bars in Figures 3a and 3b represent filers that completed acquiring 90 percent or 75 percent, respectively, of their reported stake by the amended deadline. Summing the dark grey bars of Figure 3a, we find that about 97 percent of the filers completed acquiring 90 percent of their reported stake by the amended deadline, while the remaining three percent of filers (represented in the light grey bars) continued to accumulate shares constituting 10 percent or more of their reported stake after the amended deadline. Similarly, summing the dark grey bars of Figure 3b, we find that about 99 percent of the filers completed acquiring 75 percent of their reported stake by the amended deadline, while the remaining one percent of filers continued to accumulate shares representing 25 percent or more of their reported stake after that date.

The number and percentage of non-corporate action filings with different degrees of accumulation from Figures 2, 3a, and 3b are summarized in Table 3.

Column 1 of Table 3 (representing the same filings as those in the dark grey bars of Figure 2) presents information about campaigns in which the filer completed accumulating their shares by the amended deadline (five business days after crossing the five percent threshold). Column 2 (representing the same filings as those in the light grey bars of Figure 2) presents information about the remainder of the campaigns, in which the filer continued accumulating shares after the amended deadline. Columns 3 and 4 (representing the same filings as those in the light grey bars of Figure 3a and 3b respectively) present the subsets of the campaigns in Column 2 in which the filer had accumulated less than 90 or 75 percent, respectively, of their stake by the amended deadline ( i.e., 10 percent or 25 percent, respectively, or more of their stake was accumulated between the amended deadline and their actual filing date).

b. Schedule 13G Filings

During calendar year 2022, the Commission received a total of 26,523 Schedule 13G filings, including 8,433 initial filings and 18,090 amendments. Overall, the initial filings and amendments involved 4,321 unique lead filers. Additional details specific to the initial filings, including their breakdown and characteristics by filer type, are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 demonstrates that initial Schedule 13G filings are somewhat concentrated among QIIs, who represent about one fifth of the filers but are responsible for over half of the filings. Per the second row of the table, QIIs are also more likely to report their ownership of securities on a quarterly basis on Form 13F, with 84 percent of QIIs filing a Form 13F (compared to 30 percent for all initial Schedule 13G filers).

C. Economic Effects of the Final Rules

In this section, we discuss the anticipated benefits and costs of the final rules, some of which cannot be quantified for reasons discussed below. We considered all of these costs and benefits in their entirety. We have integrated our discussion of potential effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation within our discussion of the other benefits and costs of the final amendments. Our analysis of the economic effects includes certain quantifiable elements based on historical data. These elements may provide insights into certain benefits and costs—including with quantitative data and also with non-quantifiable benefits and costs—but those insights are conditional on, and constrained by, the reactions of market participants to the final amendments. Finally, we have indicated where quantitative data discussed in our analysis do not represent the Commission's cost or benefit estimates of the final amendments.

1. Shortened Initial Schedule 13D Filing Deadline

The final amendment to Rule 13d–1(a) shortens the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline from 10 calendar days to five business days after the date of the acquisition that results in a person's beneficial ownership of a covered class exceeding five percent of that class. The final amendments to Rule 13d–1(e), (f), and (g) similarly shorten the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline for investors who are no longer eligible to file Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D.

a. Benefits

The disclosures required under Schedule 13D consist, among other matters, of information related to significant shareholders and potential changes of corporate control. An earlier filing deadline for Schedule 13D will allow information to be incorporated into securities prices sooner and allow market participants to make better-informed investment decisions. Shortened filing deadlines may lessen the opportunity for what we have termed “informed bystanders” to gain advantages over the average selling shareholder, as further discussed below, which could ultimately enhance trust in markets and thereby capital formation. Finally, we expect that shortening the deadline will reduce overall informational asymmetries in the market, thereby improving liquidity, which benefits all market participants, including activists. While we think the benefits to market participants arising from the final amendments will be significant, these benefits are not quantifiable.

i. Extent of Earlier Disclosure of Information

This subsection provides some data about the extent of information that may be revealed to the market more quickly under the final amendments, as support for the discussion of benefits in the subsections that follow. As discussed in section IV.B.3 above, among initial Schedule 13D filings that were timely filed in 2022 in accordance with the existing filing deadline, roughly 41 percent were already filed within the amended filing deadline. The final amendments may thus result in earlier filing for about 59 percent of timely Schedule 13D reports.

For those initial Schedule 13D filings that would be filed earlier under the amended filing deadline, the amount of market-moving information that could be revealed more quickly under the final rules varies across filings. To better understand the extent of information that could be more quickly incorporated into market prices under a shortened filing deadline, we explore how the stock market reacts on and around Schedule 13D filing dates for different types of filings. Figure 4 presents the average pattern in abnormal returns for filings from 2011 through 2021 that we classify as “non-corporate-action filings,” using the methodology described in section IV.B.3.ii. In order to align the trigger and filing dates across the filings reflected in the graph, we limit the filings included in the figure to those that used the full 10-day filing window to file.

Figure 4 demonstrates that the stocks of issuers that are the subject of these filings experience an abnormal return of roughly three percent from day seven—the approximate number of calendar days corresponding to five business days—following the trigger date to the day after the filing date. This pattern of returns suggests that, for this group of filings, there is market-moving information that is currently not fully incorporated into market prices as of the amended filing deadline, and which would be likely to be revealed earlier if similar filings were made under the amended filing deadline. We estimate that about 43 percent of timely non-corporate-action filings are currently filed by the amended filing deadline, such that the remaining 57 percent of timely non-corporate-action filings would be subject to earlier disclosure under the final amendments and are expected to generate the benefits discussed in the following subsections.

We next consider the filings that we classify as “corporate action filings.” The average pattern in abnormal returns for these filings from 2011 through 2021 is presented in Figure 5. In order to align the trigger and filing dates across filings reflected in the graph, we again limit the filings included in the figure to those that used the full 10-day filing window to file.

Figure 5 demonstrates that, in contrast to the pattern observed for non-corporate-action filings, the vast majority of the market stock price reaction to corporate action filings occurred close to the day on which the filers crossed the five percent ownership threshold, triggering the requirement for a Schedule 13D filing. The limited market reaction between the amended deadline—five business days after the trigger date (or approximately seven calendar days)—and the day after the actual filing date implies that little market-moving information is revealed during this period. We did not conduct a systematic analysis to investigate potential explanations for this pattern of abnormal returns. However, it is possible that this pattern may reflect the existence of other disclosures about the associated events (outside of the Schedule 13D filing) that are made public on or close to the trigger date. To the extent that the most value-critical information contained in the filing is already known to the market prior to the amended filing date (through legal means, such as other disclosures made outside the Schedule 13D), we do not expect the amended filing deadline to result in the earlier revelation of significant new information for corporate action filings.

ii. Improved Information Content of Stock Prices

The amended Schedule 13D initial filing deadline will get material information to investors faster. This will allow new information contained in Schedule 13D filings to be incorporated into market prices earlier, allowing investors and issuers to make better-informed decisions.

Commenters agreed that the acceleration of filing deadlines would allow market prices to incorporate the information contained in a filing earlier, investors to make better-informed decisions, and issuers to make better-informed decisions in responding to the presence of a new significant shareholder. On the other hand, some commenters questioned whether a shortened filing deadline would enhance market efficiency or requested further evidence or analysis of the effects on market efficiency.

As suggested by a commenter, we have considered patterns in abnormal returns around Schedule 13D filings to better assess the potential effect of the accelerated filing deadline on market prices (and, thereby, on decision-making by market participants). We note that decision-making and the efficiency of resource allocation are unlikely to materially improve with a shortened deadline for corporate action filings because, as discussed in the previous section, the vast majority of any market price reaction around the time of these filings seems, on average, to occur well before the amended deadline.

By contrast, we documented that for non-corporate-action filings there are, on average, meaningful abnormal returns between the amended filing deadline and the day after the filing date. These abnormal returns patterns suggest that market-moving information is revealed during this period. A shortened deadline will accelerate the remaining market price reaction with respect to non-corporate-action filings, as investors incorporate the new information into their buying and selling decisions. Investors and issuers, with earlier access to the information and an updated stock price, may then be able to make better-informed investment and resource allocation decisions. At the level of the economy as a whole, better investment and resource allocation decisions by individual issuers and investors under the amended filing deadline may improve the efficiency of resource allocation overall.

As discussed in the previous section, about 57 percent of timely non-corporate-action initial Schedule 13D filings, or about 122 filings of this type per year, are currently filed after the amended deadline. Based on this historical filing behavior, we expect the amended deadline may give rise to an earlier market reaction than would otherwise have been experienced for approximately this number of filings per year. Thus, investors, issuers, and other market participants may have access to updated stock prices and the information disclosed in a Schedule 13D up to three days earlier for over 120 such events per year according to current estimates, allowing them to make better-informed decisions in each of those periods.

Some commenters stated that the market cannot impound new information into a price if that information has not been developed, or more generally indicated that the benefits of a shortened deadline were predicated on investors not forgoing investments that may give rise to a Schedule 13D filing in response to the amended deadline. We continue to believe that, holding the content of the filings constant, amending the deadline will allow for more informed decision-making and improve the information content of stock prices, with associated benefits for investors, issuers, and other market participants. We acknowledge that the improvement in the efficiency of resource allocation at the economy level could be mitigated to the extent that some of the research and/or investment activities giving rise to these filings are reduced or otherwise change after the adoption of the final amendments (see section IV.C.1.b).

iii. Transfers From Selling Shareholders and Trust in Markets

In the days between the trigger date for an initial Schedule 13D and the filing date of that Schedule 13D under the current 10-day deadline, various investors may buy and sell shares of the subject issuer. The resulting trading losses and gains (whether or not the trading is based on information from or about the Schedule 13D filer) generally represent wealth transfers among individual investors, not net costs to investors (and market makers) as a group. However, the possession of an informational advantage regarding the future control or potential strategic or operational changes at an issuer, together with the knowledge of the precise date of informational revelation, creates a near-arbitrage opportunity. The incentives to gain access to such information, and thus profit from it, can be strong. An extended window of time between the trigger date and the date on which the filer's beneficial ownership and plans are made public on Schedule 13D may increase the likelihood of information leakage to “informed bystanders” who may then buy shares during the window of time just before the filing of the Schedule 13D. Such informed bystanders can thus profit from access to this information rather than from their own fundamental research or effort to improve the issuer's performance. We acknowledge, however, that some of these informed bystanders may be associated with shareholder value creation to the extent they may represent the entry of additional “activism-friendly” shareholders, which academic researchers have associated with greater returns to activism.

Investors may possess information regarding activism for a variety of reasons. Some may emerge from fundamental research. For example, some investors may use research to identify companies that are likely to be targeted by activists. These investors may be able to glean information about the likelihood of an activist campaign from, for example, unexpected increases in trade volume. However, information leakage that creates a near-arbitrage opportunity for some investors (who themselves have not performed fundamental research to generate the information) is likely to erode trust in markets, reducing participation and capital formation. We would expect that amending the filing deadline would increase perceptions of fairness in the markets, which could, in turn, lead to benefits in participation and liquidity. These benefits cannot be quantified but are nonetheless important.

Academic research provides evidence consistent with informed bystanders buying shares just prior to Schedule 13D filings. For example, studies have identified unusual EDGAR search activity during the 10 days prior to a Schedule 13D filing and abnormally high trading volume on the same day the filer crosses the five percent threshold as evidence of certain traders other than the filer being aware of the filer's intentions. While the researchers note that some of the trading behavior investigated in these studies may simply reflect the reaction of sophisticated investors to unusual, public market data (such as that associated with the filer's purchases) in advance of a Schedule 13D filing, further evidence led them to suggest that at least some of the increased trading is by informed parties.

Other research identifies specific types of informed bystanders or more direct evidence of those traders' source of information. For example, one study presented evidence suggesting that the broker of a filer may leak information about the filer's trades to other traders before the Schedule 13D filing. Another study observed a correlation between purchases by insiders and by the filer before the Schedule 13D filing, and suggested this trading reflected inside information and insiders' surveillance of trading volume and ownership data for the issuer's stock.

Several commenters indicated that the economic analysis in the Proposing Release lacked evidence or quantitative analysis with respect to potential effects on selling shareholders under the current Schedule 13D filing deadline. Others questioned the magnitude of any effects with respect to selling shareholders. To better understand the potential effects of a shortened deadline on the type of activity discussed in these studies, we designed a quantitative analysis intended to estimate the wealth transfers, under the current rules, from selling shareholders to potential informed bystanders between the amended filing deadline and the actual filing dates.

Our analysis focuses on those initial Schedule 13D filings that we classify as “non-corporate-action filings,” which represent about 20 percent of initial Schedule 13D filings (per the first row of Table 2). For filings that we classify as “corporate action filings,” we found that there was limited stock price movement, on average, between the amended deadline and the day after the actual filing date. We therefore expect that it is unlikely that there would have been material wealth transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders just prior to the actual filing date of these filings.

For the sample of non-corporate-action filings, we first examine abnormal trading volumes in the days prior to an initial Schedule 13D filing to identify trading activity that could be curtailed by a shortened filing window. We focus on trading before the filing date to exclude trading in reaction to the information in the filing and use information on the filer's trades from Schedule 13D to exclude their trading activity from this analysis.

For non-corporate-action filings from 2011 to 2021, Figure 6 compares the average trading volume excluding the filer's accumulations (“Total Non-Filer Trading Volume”) to the filers' average pattern of accumulations (“Filer Trading Volume”). Both measures are scaled by the normal level of daily trading volume in the issuer's stock such that a value of one for “Total Non-Filer Trading Volume” would mean there is zero abnormal trading volume outside of the filer's trades while a value of two for “Total Non-Filer Trading Volume” would mean that trading volume is double the usual level ( i.e., there is an amount of abnormal trading volume equal to the amount of normal trading volume). Because we exclude trading on or after the filing date, the graph ends before day 10.

Abnormal trading volume in an issuer's stock by traders other than the filer peaks on the same day the filer's trading peaks ( i.e., on the trigger date, when the filer crosses the five percent threshold). However, abnormal trading volumes continue to remain elevated for the rest of the 10-day filing window, including after the amended filing deadline, which occurs at approximately day seven after the trigger date, which may represent purchases by informed bystanders that were aware of the impending campaign. We note that there is also abnormal trading well in advance of the trigger date, and that this and other abnormal trading volume in the graph could reflect trading by informed bystanders, but could also reflect other traders simply reacting to the same news, market conditions, or trends in issuer performance that may have attracted the filer to engage in its transactions.

To understand the potential transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders that may be prevented or reduced by a shortened deadline, we focus on abnormal trading volume by traders other than the filer in the days between the fifth business day after the filer crosses the five percent threshold and the actual filing date. As in the case of Figure 6, we exclude trading on the actual filing date because there is typically significant trading volume in reaction to the filing on that date. While it is possible that there is additional trading by informed bystanders on the actual filing date but before the actual time that the filing becomes public, we are unable to distinguish any such trading from trading in reaction to the filing. For this reason, we exclude this trading, and our analysis will not include the transfers between informed bystanders and selling shareholders on the filing date.

In order to estimate potential transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders, we also collected information on abnormal returns to understand the amount of appreciation obtained by potential informed bystanders by trading prior to the filing becoming public information. The pattern of abnormal returns varies across scenarios in which the filer completed accumulating their reported stake by five business days after the trigger date but submitted their Schedule 13D filing later, and those in which the filer was still accumulating shares after five business days. Figures 7a and 7b present the average pattern of abnormal returns for these two scenarios separately. In order to align the trigger and filing dates across filings in the graph, we limit the filings in the figure to those that used the full 10-day filing window to file.

The transfers from a selling shareholder to a potential informed bystander between the amended filing deadline and the current filing date would consist of the stock return between the day that they sell and the day after the filing date, when the information previously known to their trading counterparty is known to the whole market. Based on Figures 7a and 7b, there are meaningful abnormal returns between the amended filing deadline (which occurs around day −3 in the figure, as five business days generally corresponds to seven calendar days) and the day after the actual filing date for both subsamples of the filers in our analysis, with a greater abnormal return when the filer is still accumulating shares after five business days ( i.e., Figure 7b).

To estimate transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders that may be occurring between the amended filing deadline and actual filing dates, and thus might be avoided under the final rules, we used the data discussed above to conduct the analysis presented in Table 5. As discussed in detail in section IV.C.1.b below, the extent of filer share accumulation after the amended deadline may be associated with the likelihood that filers may modify or forgo these types of campaigns after the effective date of the final amendments. We therefore estimate the transfers separately for filings with the different patterns of filer share accumulation from Table 3.

Rows 2 and 3 of Table 5 present information on the abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume between five business days after the trigger date (the amended deadline) and the filing date in each subset of campaigns. Both the abnormal returns (which would drive the extent of wealth transferred by trading with an informed bystander in this timeframe) and the abnormal volume (which characterizes the potential number of such trades) are higher for campaigns in which the filer is still accumulating a significant portion of their stake after five business days following the trigger date.

The estimates in Row 5 of Table 5 represent potential transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders after five business days following the trigger date for each subset of campaigns based on a day-by-day analysis of the abnormal volume and the potential forgone return for each underlying campaign. For example, the aggregate estimate of potential transfers to informed bystanders that could be avoided by shortening the filing deadline to five business days if no filers forgo campaigns (and filers do not adapt in such a way that these transfers may still occur) is about $49 million per year ($23 million from Column 1 plus $26 million from Column 2). Alternatively, if we assume that filers accumulating 25 percent or more of their stake after five business days forgo such campaigns, the aggregate estimate of potential transfers to informed bystanders that could be avoided would be about $42 million per year ($49 million, as computed above, minus $7 million from Column 4). We note that the wealth transfer estimates in Table 5 do not represent estimates of the benefit of the final rule amendments. Rather, the estimates provide insight into an informational disparity that could weaken trust in the market and consequently market participation and capital formation.

The estimates in Table 5 assume that abnormal trading volume on the days between the amended deadline and the actual filing date, other than that representing the filer's own trades, represents trades by informed bystanders. It is possible that the abnormal trading volume represents other traders' reactions to similar news, market conditions, and trends as those to which the filer was reacting. For example, researchers have found that filers time their accumulations to coincide with significant selling by institutions, so it is possible that some of this abnormal volume may represent the extent of the institutional selling pressure. We also acknowledge that informed bystanders, like filers, may adapt to the final amendments by condensing their trades to five business days following the trigger date.

Staff presented a similar quantitative analysis with respect to potential transfers from selling shareholders to informed bystanders under the current rule in the DERA Memorandum. Some commenters stated that the analysis in the DERA Memorandum demonstrated that a shortened filing window would reduce “harms” or “costs” to selling shareholders. Others stated that the DERA Memorandum's characterization of selling shareholders as “harmed” was inappropriate and did not account for the benefits these selling shareholders experienced in terms of, for example, price improvement and improved liquidity as a result of the impending activist campaign.

We acknowledge, as mentioned by commenters, that most investors selling shares during the filing window seem to benefit from the impending activist campaign. In particular, as demonstrated in Figures 7a and 7b, we observe a meaningful amount of stock price appreciation during the filing window for non-corporate-action filings, some of which would accrue to selling shareholders. Despite the assertions of a commenter, the analysis in the DERA Memorandum and the similar analysis in this economic analysis do not characterize the trading between the Schedule 13D filer and a selling shareholder as harmful; in both cases, the analyses focus only on trading between informed bystanders (who are not the filer) and selling shareholders. We also acknowledge concerns that it may be inappropriate to construe the failure to benefit from future stock appreciation when selling shares to the filer as a harm to the selling shareholders, given that the stock appreciation in question results from the actions of the filer and, if there is a more limited opportunity to receive some of the economic benefits resulting from their actions, the filer may have a more limited incentive to initiate a campaign. We do not include sales to the filer in this analysis. Our analysis quantifies the transfer between selling shareholders and informed bystanders that results from the price change between the day of the sale and the day after the filing date. That is, an earlier deadline would potentially benefit these selling shareholders to the detriment of the informed bystanders.

Some commenters addressing the DERA Memorandum indicated that staff provided insufficient evidence of the existence of informed bystanders. One of these commenters added that activists have significant incentives to maintain the confidentiality of their strategies until they are ready to make a public disclosure. We believe the academic studies discussed above support the conclusion that informed bystanders purchase shares in issuers shortly before the filing of Schedule 13D reports pertaining to such issuers. Some of the researchers suggest that filers themselves, in some cases, may leak information about their impending filing; others specifically identify other channels for information leakage unbeknownst to the activist. However, the methodologies used in these studies to identify informed bystanders in specific cases cannot be expanded to reliably identify trades by all informed bystanders in a broad sample. One comment letter suggested that we use Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”) data in the analysis of “informed” trading but did not specify what methodology we should use. We do not believe this data would allow us to identify which trades may involve a counterparty that benefited from information leakage. We recognize that our own analysis does not directly identify informed bystanders, and may, for example, represent buyers who have learned of the probability of activism through fundamental research. However, we acknowledge those limitations and are unaware of approaches that would allow us to obtain a better estimate of trades by informed bystanders.

Some commenters criticized the DERA Memorandum for failing to describe the likely characteristics or nature of the selling shareholders and their reasons for selling. Some commenters responding to the Proposing Release indicated that it was likely that the selling shareholders were not retail investors but rather sophisticated institutions who could appropriately weigh the possibility that an activist investor may be buying up shares, with one providing an analysis supporting this assertion. We acknowledge that the potential effects of reducing transfers from selling shareholders may be tempered somewhat to the extent the counterparties of the potential informed bystanders are, for example, institutions with liquidity needs, and that there is some evidence that this may be common. However, gains by informed bystanders may be viewed by some market participants as unfair regardless of the counterparties bearing the other side of these transfers.

Some commenters raised concerns related to the statement in the DERA Memorandum that lessening an informational advantage that some market participants may perceive to be unfair could enhance trust in the securities markets and promote capital formation. In particular, one commenter indicated a lack of evidence that activism is contributing to an erosion of trust in the markets, while another requested evidence that the acceleration of filing deadlines in other contexts changed the investors' behavior or enhanced their level of trust in the market. This commenter did not suggest how we might gather such evidence, however, and trust has been shown to be an important determinant of participation.

One comment letter presented an alternative analysis of the effects on selling shareholders based on the computation of abnormal net selling activity, which they state better “separates any allegedly `harmed' selling . . . from other trading” than the analysis in the DERA Memorandum. In particular, these commenters categorize trades as either seller-initiated or buyer-initiated in order to compute abnormal net selling. The commenters concluded that there is no statistically significant evidence of systematic net selling during the five days preceding the filing such that they “cannot meaningfully infer that any alleged `harm' has occurred.”

We note that signing trades as seller- and buyer-initiated is generally intended to reflect which side of the trade is demanding liquidity, as opposed to providing liquidity. Net order imbalances therefore provide information about which type of traders (sellers or buyers) are demanding liquidity on a given day, while the opposite side of any order imbalance is borne by liquidity providers (historically, these would be market makers, but today other investors including high-frequency traders typically play this role). An analysis of net order imbalances in the days around Schedule 13D filings can therefore provide information about wealth transfers on these days between those investors that are demanding liquidity versus those providing liquidity. However, we do not believe that trades that are signed as seller-initiated versus buyer-initiated provides sufficient information about which trades are more likely to involve a buyer that has a one-sided informational advantage because of their knowledge of another investor's share accumulations, which is the focus of our analysis.

In summary, informed bystanders may profit, as a result of information leakages rather than from their own fundamental research or effort to improve the issuer's performance, from a near-arbitrage opportunity during the window of time between the trigger date and the date on which the filer's beneficial ownership and plans are made public on a Schedule 13D. In this section, we have presented a quantitative analysis based on historical data that, subject to certain assumptions and limitations, provides a reasonable basis to believe that wealth transfers from selling shareholders to potential informed bystanders can be significant under the current rules.

iv. Information Asymmetries and Liquidity

Shortening the Schedule 13D filing deadline and thereby more quickly resolving an information asymmetry between some market participants and the rest of the market is likely to enhance liquidity.

Some commenters to the Proposing Release agreed that a shortened filing deadline would reduce information asymmetries. Others stated that the academic paper cited in the Proposing Release to support the relation between information asymmetry and liquidity is not applicable to the setting at hand, or more generally questioned the basis of statements in the economic analysis of the Proposing Release indicating that the shortened deadline would result in increased liquidity. In response to these comments, we have expanded the literature that we review. We continue to believe that the amendments will reduce information asymmetries and improve liquidity.

Specifically, empirical and theoretical work point to a linkage between information asymmetry and measures of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads and price impact. Generally, a greater proportion of strategic information-based trading ( i.e., trading based on private, or non-public, information) in contrast to “noise trading” ( i.e., trading based on, for example, liquidity needs rather than private information) lowers liquidity in an issuer's securities, as other market participants adjust their behavior in light of the risk of adverse selection ( i.e., a situation in which the buyer of an issuer's security has more information than the seller, or vice versa, about the true value of the security). In contrast, liquidity should generally increase when there is a lower proportion of information-based trading to noise trading. For example, a reduced risk of trading with the informed bystanders discussed in the previous section may lead liquidity providers to charge lower bid-ask spreads, resulting in higher liquidity.

We would expect the amended deadline to improve liquidity by lowering information asymmetry. While one study finds theoretically mixed results of shortening the filing deadline with respect to liquidity and efficiency during the period prior to the filing, this study does not address the period subsequent to the now-earlier date. Another study shows that empirical proxies for liquidity are higher than otherwise on days that the activist is accumulating shares, concluding that this is so both because activists submit limit orders and because activists strategically trade when liquidity is higher. This study also does not address the period subsequent to the now-earlier filing date. Reducing the number of days prior to the filing should reduce information asymmetry in the period after the filing (through the date the disclosure would otherwise have been made) because after the filing is made the information about a filer's holdings and intentions is public. Thus, liquidity should improve in this period.

We expect that liquidity benefits are more likely to be associated with the types of filings that we classify as “non-corporate-action filings,” and not with “corporate action filings.” Indeed, the abnormal stock return patterns presented in Figures 4 and 5 above demonstrate that the latter are, on average, not associated with a meaningful stock price reaction between the amended deadline and the day after the actual filing date. Because only the non-corporate-action filings seem to be associated with significant new information that is not already incorporated in market prices earlier in the filing window, these are the filings that are likely to be associated with meaningful information asymmetries whose duration could be reduced by the shortened filing deadline. As noted above, about 68 percent of timely non-corporate-action filings, or about 152 initial Schedule 13D filings of this type per year, are currently filed after the amended deadline. Based on this historical filing behavior, we expect that the amended filing deadline to result in earlier public disclosure, and thus an earlier stock price reaction and resolution of the related asymmetric information than would otherwise have been experienced, for approximately this number of filings per year, thus enhancing liquidity.

Some commenters stated that an information asymmetry between the filer and the market should not be viewed as problematic, with some referring to such information asymmetries as simply a feature of a functioning market. Some commenters responding to the DERA Memorandum raised similar concerns about the usage of “information asymmetries” in that document and a potential implication that these information asymmetries were problematic.

We acknowledge that benefits may stem from the information asymmetry between a Schedule 13D filer and the market. The informational advantage of Schedule 13D filers results, in general, from their own expenditures on research and analysis or from their efforts and expenditures to pursue changes at the issuers in which they accumulate these shareholdings. With a reduced ability to receive some of the economic benefits of their actions, the filer may have reduced incentives to initiate a campaign. Consistent with this view, we have expanded our analysis of the potential costs with respect to reduced activism in section IV.C.1.b below. We have also narrowed the consideration of selling shareholders in the previous section vis-à-vis the Proposing Release to focus on those trading with informed bystanders who are not the filer and yet may profit from the advance knowledge or suspicion of a filer's potential actions, rather than from their own fundamental research or effort to improve the issuer's performance. We have also expanded our consideration of the literature regarding liquidity beyond what was considered in the Proposing Release to reflect additional findings pertinent to the setting of activist campaigns. We believe that the literature cited in the Proposing Release still has relevance in considering, for example, the potential impacts of trading by informed bystanders.

b. Costs

An earlier filing deadline for Schedule 13D may affect significant shareholders seeking to affect control of an issuer. There may be indirect effects as well, as we describe below. We also expect the final amendments to impose relatively minor compliance costs on all Schedule 13D filers.

i. Potential Effects on Activism

By shortening the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline, the final amendments may increase costs of activist campaigns. Commenters expressed mixed views as to whether a shortened filing deadline would reduce activism. Some commenters stated that a shortened filing deadline would not significantly impair activism. Others, however, stated that a shortened filing deadline was likely to reduce the number of activist campaigns, and expressed disagreement with statements in the Proposing Release as to why such a reduction or the impact of any reduction would be limited. Some commenters indicated that the economic analysis in the Proposing Release could have been enhanced by further consideration of the potential effects on activist campaigns, including a quantitative analysis.

A Quantitative Analysis of Historical Activist Campaigns: Assumptions, Findings, and Limitations

We use the data presented in section IV.B.3.a.iii above on filers' current patterns of share purchases to provide some insight into the number and type of filings that have historically involved trading between the amended deadline and their actual filing date.

Our analysis focuses on those 3,067 Schedule 13D filings from 2011 through 2021 that we classify as “non-corporate-action filings” (as opposed to “corporate action filings”), which represent about 20 percent of initial Schedule 13D filings during the sample period, per the first row of Table 2.

As in Figures 2, 3a, and 3b and Table 3 above, we further refine the sample of non-corporate-action filings to exclude late filers and filers with no beneficial ownership reported as of the filing date and to adjust for multiple filings on the same date, resulting in a sample size of 2,370 non-corporate-action filings. Our analysis, presented in Table 6, provides information about the characteristics of current campaigns delineated by filers' degree of accumulation of shares as of the amended deadline.

The columns of Table 6 reflect the same subsamples of filings as the corresponding columns of Table 3 above. A similar analysis with respect to the potential effects of a shortened initial Schedule 13D filing deadline on activism was presented in the DERA Memorandum. Whereas the analysis in the DERA Memorandum was based on the proposed five-calendar day deadline, the analysis summarized in Table 6 is based on the five-business day deadline. One commenter stated that the analysis demonstrated that “shortening the deadline should not significantly impede activist campaigns” because “[t]he overwhelming majority of past filers have acquired at least 75% of their reported stake” by the amended deadline. Another commenter questioned whether the data supporting the findings with respect to the percentage of past filers that completed their share accumulations by the amended deadline is “representative of the broader market.” This commenter recommended that the analysis be expanded to focus on campaigns where the activist filer continued its purchases throughout the 10-day window and reported initial beneficial ownership of 10 percent or more.

We acknowledge that the campaigns in our non-corporate-action sample are heterogeneous, and that the percentage of filers that continued to accumulate shares after the amended deadline would vary across subsamples. For example, Row 6 of Table 6 demonstrates that “prominent activists” were somewhat more likely than others to continue to accumulate a significant fraction of their reported beneficial ownership after the amended deadline. Per the commenter's suggestion to focus on filers reporting beneficial ownership of 10 percent or more, we note that Row 7 of Table 6 indicates that the reported initial beneficial ownership was not systematically higher for filers that continue to accumulate shares after the amended deadline in comparison to those that do not. Per the commenter's other suggestion, we note that both Table 6 and Table 5 above do isolate (in Column 2 of each table) the results for those filings that continue to accumulate shares after the amended deadline.

Other commenters, referencing the dollar estimates in the DERA Memorandum, asserted that the analyses demonstrated that the costs of the proposed Schedule 13D filing deadline amendments related to effects on activist campaigns exceed the benefits of the proposed amendments. One commenter stated that the DERA Memorandum “fail[ed] to adequately quantify the benefits to long-term shareholders of the target issuer in the form of substantially higher share prices.” In response to these commenters, we note that the dollar campaign values in rows 11 and 12 of Table 6 do not represent cost estimates of the final amendments. Rather, the values reflect the value creation from the historical campaigns. Interpreting these figures as a cost would require assuming all of these campaigns would have been abandoned under a five- business day filing deadline. Instead, we expect that a five-business day deadline would not have deterred the vast majority of campaigns. Accordingly, we believe that the costs of the final amendments would be significantly less than any of the figures in Table 6 or identified by commenters because we expect that activists will adapt to the amended deadline rather than forgo campaigns. We acknowledge that some activist investors have indicated that the proposed amendments would make them less likely to carry out activist campaigns. Nonetheless, we expect that the vast majority of the value creation reflected in the table above would continue unabated. Results in Row 1 show that 80 percent of campaigns (173 out of 215 campaigns per year) over the period from 2011 to 2021 would not have been affected by a five-business day filing deadline. While the remaining 20 percent (42 out of 215 campaigns per year) could have been affected to some degree, we expect most of these campaigns would still have occurred, as there are several ways activists can adapt to the amended deadline. In particular, as we discuss below in this section, activists can adapt to a shorter deadline using strategies such as (a) accumulating a smaller stake in the issuer's shares; (b) accumulating shares more quickly; or (c) accumulating an economic stake using other instruments, such as cash-settled swaps or other derivatives. We expect that in most if not all cases, they will do so.

A Literature Review

In considering the implications of a potential reduction in activist campaigns, we have expanded our consideration of the existing literature on activist campaigns, as suggested by commenters. There is a large body of literature finding that activist campaigns are, on average, associated with an economically significant increase in shareholder value ( i.e., positive abnormal stock returns) around the Schedule 13D filing or other announcement date. As noted in the Proposing Release, the literature does not find that these returns reverse in the long term, though the determination of long-term returns is inherently more complicated than measuring short-term returns. Researchers have also found that the degree of impact that these activities have on shareholder value varies significantly with an issuer's market capitalization, with smaller-cap issuers experiencing significantly larger returns (expressed as a percentage) around the disclosure of an activist campaign than larger-cap issuers. Researchers have debated whether the activists' actions are responsible for any of this increase in value. Some researchers argue that any stock price reaction may instead reflect activists' ability to select issuers that are likely to be taken over or to recover from underperformance for other reasons. However, broader evidence supports the hypothesis that activists' actions are responsible for the vast majority of the increase in value.

There is also academic research on the effect of activist campaigns on investors other than shareholders of the targeted issuers. Studies have associated activist campaigns with a positive effect on the operational and financial performance, as well as shareholder value, of issuers other than the targeted issuers, based on the perceived likelihood of a potential activist campaign targeting these other issuers. Other research has found that issuers that are the suppliers or close competitors of the targeted issuers, in certain circumstances, experience decreases in shareholder value around an activist campaign, which researchers have associated with cost-cutting and increased efficiency at the target issuer. These effects on suppliers and competitors of targeted issuers are consistent with activism having beneficial competitive effects related to improvements in operational efficiency, as noted by a commenter. Other academic studies have found that activist campaigns have a mixed impact on debtholders of the targeted issuer, depending on the nature of the campaign's goals and how pursuing those goals would impact both performance and also the level of financial risk of the issuer.

Considerations

Commenters noted that if there are fewer activist campaigns under the amended deadline, there will be reduced shareholder value creation. Commenters also noted that a reduction in activist campaigns would result in decreased corporate accountability and, on average, a reduction in operational efficiency, both because of the reduced direct beneficial effect of activists (on average) on the operations of targeted issuers and because of the reduced indirect beneficial effect of the possibility of becoming a future activist target (or of competition with targeted issuers) on the operational performance of non-targeted issuers. Some commenters indicated that activist investors would continue their activities despite reduced profitability. Others indicated that such reduced profitability and the acceleration of potential defensive responses by the target issuer would impede activism. Some commenters indicated that a reduction in the pursuit of activist campaigns and in the disciplining effect on corporate accountability of the possibility of such campaigns would result in reduced market efficiency, a less optimal allocation of resources, reduced liquidity, and reduced trust in markets because managers are not held accountable.

We acknowledge that a reduction in investment research and in significant shareholdings by investors who undertake such campaigns could reduce market efficiency (and thereby the efficient allocation of resources) because of the role that investments based on such research and analysis play in moving stock prices closer to their fundamental values. A reduction in such activities could also reduce liquidity, as noted by commenters, by lessening liquidity provision in the securities market by these investors (through, e.g., limit orders) as they build their stakes. We acknowledge the beneficial effects of activism to the market. However, our analysis of historical data indicates that 80 percent of campaigns were completed by the amended deadline, with 97 percent of campaigns having completed 90 percent of their stakes by the amended deadline. We therefore expect the majority of campaigns will be largely unaffected by the deadline. In addition, for those campaigns that would be affected by the deadline, we expect the activists will adapt to the shortened deadline and continue to pursue the campaigns, thereby preserving the beneficial effects of their activism.

Some commenters indicated that activist campaigns are not uniformly beneficial, and that the short-term price reaction to such campaigns may not translate into positive shareholder value impacts in the long-term. Some commenters stated that a reduction in such campaigns and the threat of such campaigns could be beneficial because it would reduce the pressure on issuers to make changes in governance, payouts, or investments that are not in the interest of long-term shareholders. One commenter stated that activist campaigns are a deterrent to going public, implying that a reduction in such activities could encourage more companies to enter the public markets. We acknowledge that activist campaigns are heterogeneous. While the average impact of activist campaigns on shareholder value is likely to be positive in the long-term as well as the short-term, some campaigns may have a negative impact on shareholder value either in the short- or long-term. It is possible that some of the activist campaigns that are less likely to occur after the adoption of the final rules would have decreased shareholder value, such that activists forgoing those campaigns could benefit shareholders. A lower risk of facing an activist campaign could, per the commenter cited above, also be a positive factor in the decision of additional companies to enter the public markets. That said, the final amendments are not intended to discourage activism. Instead, they reflect our attempt to ensure investors receive material information in a timely manner while, at the same time, maintaining the balance between issuers of securities and the shareholders who seek to exert influence or control over issuers that Congress sought when enacting section 13(d).

Some commenters stated that certain types of activist campaigns were more likely to be forgone as a result of a shortened deadline. For example, some commenters stated that a reduction in campaigns was more likely among those campaigns targeting smaller issuers with lower trading volumes or for certain types of activist campaigns ( e.g., those pursuing changes at an issuer rather than a potential sale of the issuer). Some commenters noted that the final amendments may reduce competition among investors who pursue activist campaigns, as more sophisticated and experienced investors may be better able to adapt to the final amendments. We acknowledge that the final amendments may have differential impacts on different types of activist campaigns. For instance, it may be more costly for a filer to accelerate the completion of its stake under a shortened filing window for smaller, less liquid issuers. However, in Table 6 above, we find that the targets of filers who currently continue to accumulate a significant fraction of their stake after the five-business day deadline are, on average, slightly larger and more liquid than other targets. Further, studies cited earlier in this section find that the abnormal stock returns around the announcement of activist campaigns are lower for larger issuers. These lower expected gains from campaigns at larger issuers could make investors less likely to bear additional costs to conduct such a campaign by one of the adaptation strategies discussed (rather than forgoing the campaign) relative to potential campaigns at smaller issuers even if these costs of doing so are lower than they would be at smaller, less liquid issuers, as noted above.

To summarize, while the amended filing deadline may make a minority of campaigns less profitable and, as a result, could potentially reduce shareholder value creation, we do not expect a substantial reduction in the extent of activism as most historical campaigns would not have been impacted by the amended filing deadline and since activists may adapt to accommodate the amended deadline and we expect that in most if not all cases, they will do so.

Implications of Changes to Activist Campaigns

As referenced above, filers have various ways to adapt to the amended filing deadlines and we expect that many filers will likely use these methods of adaption to the amended filing deadline where they remain incentivized to pursue their campaigns. For example, some filers may proceed with smaller stakes, other filers may accumulate shares more quickly during the amended filing window (or add to their stake after the filing date), while others may acquire an economic interest in the issuer, such as by using cash-settled swaps or other derivatives. We expect that such adaptations are most likely to arise in the context of non-corporate-action filings in which filers would otherwise have continued to accumulate shares on the open market after the amended filing deadline ( i.e., campaigns like those represented in Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 6). Some commenters stated that investors have a target share accumulation that would be required to make a campaign worthwhile and that in some cases this target would not be achievable under the amended deadline. One of these commenters noted that investors may file early if they reach their target ownership before the filing deadline, but implied that one should not assume from observing these filings that they can reach their target ownership with the same speed in all instances. We note also that some commenters stated that the proposed five-calendar day filing window would provide activist investors ample time to accrue a significant stake, implying that filers would be able to adapt to the revised deadline. While a filer's adaptation strategy will ultimately be based on its assessment of the benefits and costs of various available strategies, which will likely vary across filers and specific situations, we expect that most of the profitable campaigns will continue to be profitable notwithstanding the five-business day filing deadline. In these cases, we expect activists to use adaptation strategies rather than forgo the campaigns. And, we expect that most campaigns will not be constrained by the amended filing deadline as, historically, 97 percent of campaigns achieved 90 percent of their position by the amended deadline.

The degree to which the benefits associated with earlier disclosure under a shortened filing deadline would be achieved also depends on how the filers respond to the shortened deadline. As an adaptation strategy, some filers may simply proceed with acquiring a smaller stake in an issuer, notwithstanding the reduced potential profits.

Alternatively, filers could adapt to the amended filing deadline by accumulating shares more quickly during the modified filing window or adding to their stake after the filing date. Such approaches are likely to preserve more fully both the current shareholder value impact of the campaigns and the benefits of earlier disclosure. We acknowledge that these adaptations would entail greater costs to filers because the additional shares would likely be purchased at higher prices than under the current accumulation pattern. Further, in some cases post-filing purchases may be precluded because issuers could react to the disclosure by adopting low-threshold poison pills or other defensive measures. While some commenters suggest that adaptations that rely on accumulating shares more quickly could further reduce market efficiency should volatility increase as a result of aggressive purchasing, we do not believe that a temporary increase in volatility would be disruptive enough to override the benefits to price informativeness mentioned above.

Filers could also adapt by instead acquiring an economic interest in the issuer, such as by using cash-settled swaps or other derivatives. Although these instruments would not replace the ownership of shares in the issuer, and generally do not provide voting rights, they may have the effect of providing economic exposure to the issuer without triggering the section 13(d) beneficial ownership reporting obligation. Such economic exposure would allow filers to remain financially incentivized to pursue campaigns that create shareholder value, as opposed to forgoing such campaigns solely due to the shortened filing deadline.

Some commenters indicated that such a heavier reliance by activist investors on derivatives may be an unintended consequence of a shortened Schedule 13D filing window. Adaptations involving the use of derivatives would generally entail some incremental costs to these investors because of the premiums charged by counterparties for these products, and, as noted, would not provide the investors with voting rights beyond those associated with any shares they otherwise beneficially own. That said, such approaches may often be the most cost-effective alternative for activist investors and may preserve the shareholder benefits associated with the campaigns.

An increased reliance on these products may, in certain situations, reduce the overall benefits associated with a shortened filing deadline by reducing the likelihood that disclosure of economic interests would occur any earlier than under the status quo. In particular, cash-settled swaps and related derivatives do not generally give rise to beneficial ownership as they do not generally provide voting or disposition rights over the reference securities. They therefore generally fall outside the scope of the primary purpose of the Schedule 13D filings and the section 13(d) beneficial ownership reporting system, which are focused on disclosure of a filer's accumulation of equity securities that provide rights that could allow the filer to control or influence control over an issuer. Nevertheless, it is possible that some market participants may look to Schedule 13D filings (in particular, Item 6 of Schedule 13D) for information about a filer's accumulation of economic interests, such as cash-settled swaps and derivatives without voting or disposition rights. Acquisition of these instruments could allow a filer to obtain more than five percent of economic interest in an issuer's covered class and then, at a later point, cross the five percent beneficial ownership threshold through holding or acquiring equity securities of the covered class—triggering the requirement for a Schedule 13D filing in five business days—at a later date. In this scenario, there is no delay in the disclosure of the information that Schedule 13D filings and section 13(d) are intended to provide—the beneficial ownership of the equity securities that provide voting and disposition rights. However, the filer does delay disclosure relative to obtaining the purely economic exposure of more than five percent of the issuer represented by the cash-settled swaps or derivatives. As such, an investor's pattern of accumulation of economic interest, relative to when their campaign is revealed to the market, may not differ from that under the status quo. In fact, depending on the degree of reliance on cash-settled derivative securities, complete disclosure of an investor's total economic interest in an issuer may, under the final rules, be reduced or further delayed than under the baseline, such as in cases where, notwithstanding acquisition of these instruments, the investor beneficially owns five percent or less of a covered class and no Schedule 13D filing obligation is triggered. Still, we cannot predict the extent to which investors will adapt by accumulating cash-settled swaps or derivatives in lieu of equity securities, including because cash-settled swaps and derivatives generally represent only an economic interest in the issuer, with no voting rights or disposition rights with respect to the reference securities, and therefore cannot be presumed to be equivalents to equity securities that do provide such rights.

Initial Schedule 13D filings signal to the market that an investor may intend to influence an issuer, often through activism. For market participants that value such signals, regardless of beneficial ownership, an increased reliance by activist investors on financial instruments that generally do not trigger the section 13(d) beneficial ownership reporting obligations, such as cash-settled swaps or derivatives, may reduce the overall benefits associated with a shortened filing deadline by reducing the likelihood that disclosure of such information would occur any earlier than under the status quo.

We note that one commenter stated that potential adaptations presented in the DERA Memorandum are “neither cost-free nor viable,” and we recognize that the amended filing deadline may make a minority of campaigns more costly, including as a result of the adaptations. Similarly, we acknowledge that there would be costs, and reduced benefits, to the extent activism is reduced as a result of the final rules. However, we do not expect a substantial reduction in the extent of activism as historical evidence suggests most campaigns would not be impacted by the amended filing deadline.

ii. Compliance Costs

A shortened initial Schedule 13D filing deadline may increase compliance costs for beneficial owners who have an obligation to file an initial Schedule 13D under the final rules. For example, beneficial owners who regularly make significant stock investments could incur a one-time cost to update their information technology systems to monitor securities transactions and generate alerts and reports in time to accommodate the rule change. They may also need to allocate more resources on an ongoing basis to monitor their holdings in accordance with the amended deadline so that they can meet their obligation to file an initial Schedule 13D. In addition, external service providers and advisers may charge higher fees for expedited processing and/or for weekend services, which may be more frequently required under the final amendments. Compliance costs may increase both in the context of non-corporate-action filings and corporate action filings. The compliance costs could be more significant for some filers ( e.g., those with more complex affiliate structures or investment strategies) than others.

Commenters identified additional compliance challenges that may arise as a result of the shortened initial Schedule 13D deadline. For example, some commenters noted aspects of the initial Schedule 13D filing process that have not become simplified as a result of technological advancements, including nuanced legal analysis, drafting of narratives, and certain data collection, determinations, and computations that are accomplished manually or with reliance on external resources. Others noted issues for first-time filers that may be hard to resolve within five business days, such as the processing time (including delays) for receiving EDGAR filing codes, or stated that compliance burdens would be greater for non-institutional filers or smaller institutional filers lacking certain infrastructure or personnel, and that the accelerated filing deadline may require an increased reliance on third parties.

We acknowledge that not all aspects of preparing and submitting an initial Schedule 13D have been simplified by technology, and that the amended filing deadline may increase certain compliance costs given the need to complete these tasks in a shorter timeframe. We also acknowledge that the incremental compliance burdens may be greater for smaller, less experienced filers than for other filers due to their more limited internal resources and expertise in preparing filings. In particular, these filers are less likely to have operational systems and processes in place to facilitate compliance with the revised filing deadline. They are also likely to be more reliant on external advisers and service providers, who may charge higher fees for expedited processing and/or for weekend services.

2. Shortened Schedule 13G Filing Deadlines

The final amendments to Rules 13d–1(b), (c), and (d) and 13d–2(b), (c), and (d) shorten the filing deadlines for both initial and amended Schedule 13G filings as well as, in certain cases, increasing their frequency. As discussed in more detail in section II.A.2 above, under the final amendments, QIIs and Exempt Investors will be required to file an initial Schedule 13G within 45 days after calendar quarter-end if, as of the end of that quarter, their beneficial ownership exceeds five percent (rather than the current deadline of 45 days after the calendar year-end at which beneficial ownership exceeds five percent). The filing obligation for QIIs will be accelerated from 10 days to five business days after month-end if, as of such month-end, their beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent. Passive Investors will be required to file an initial Schedule 13G within five business days (rather than the current deadline of 10 days) after crossing the five percent beneficial ownership threshold. All three filer types will be required to file a Schedule 13G amendment within 45 calendar days after any calendar quarter-end at which there is a material change in the information previously reported in a Schedule 13G (rather than the current deadline of 45 days after any calendar year-end at which there are “any changes” in the information previously reported). For QIIs and Passive Investors, the requirement to file a Schedule 13G amendment upon exceeding 10 percent beneficial ownership or an increase or decrease in beneficial ownership thereafter of more than five percent will be accelerated. Specifically, QIIs will be required to file an amendment five business days (rather than the current deadline of 10 days) after any month-end at which beneficial ownership meets one of these thresholds, while Passive Investors will be required to file an amendment within two business days (rather than the current deadline of “promptly”) after beneficial ownership meets one of these thresholds.

A. Benefits

Academic research has provided evidence that at least some Schedule 13G filings contain value-relevant information that is not already incorporated in market prices, as discussed in more detail below. The acceleration of such Schedule 13G filings under the final rules may thus benefit market participants. Specifically, investors and issuers, with earlier access to the information and an updated stock price, may be able to make better-informed investment and resource allocation decisions. At an economy level, this better-informed decision-making may improve the efficiency of resource allocation overall.

Some commenters agreed that the proposed acceleration of beneficial ownership reporting as a whole, including the proposed revisions to Schedule 13G filing deadlines, would make material information available to all investors in a more timely manner. Some commenters also specified reasons that the information in Schedule 13G filings in particular is important to investors and issuers. For example, one commenter stated that there are “significant risks and impacts of large holdings on investors irrespective of the stated intentions of a large position holder,” such as the risk of stock price volatility if a large shareholding were to be sold. Another commenter stated that the disclosure of beneficial owners in Schedule 13G filings, together with Schedule 13D filings, “help inform the education and advocacy efforts of those with a stake in . . . important votes.” Other commenters indicated that information about all large shareholders facilitates issuer efforts to identify and engage with these shareholders in order to elicit their views and ideas.

On the other hand, some commenters stated that they do not believe there is a “harmful” information asymmetry or other problem that justifies an acceleration of the Schedule 13G deadlines, or indicated that the earlier disclosure of the information in Schedule 13G filings would be of limited, if any, benefit. For example, some indicated that the concerns that could justify accelerating Schedule 13D filings would not equally apply to Schedule 13G filings. Some commenters stated that the information in Schedule 13G filings is unlikely to be material because of the passive intent of the filers or because of existing disclosures (such as Schedule 13F or Form N–PORT for some QIIs, or registration statements for some Exempt Investors) that provide similar information.

Given commenters' statements regarding a lack of material information in Schedule 13G filings and limited benefits from the acceleration of these filings, we reconsidered the evidence on the market impact of these filings. Initial Schedule 13G filings by hedge funds in particular have consistently been associated by multiple academic studies with, on average, a statistically significant positive stock price reaction around the filing date. Similarly, one study found that all initial Schedule 13G filings that are not submitted 45 days after the end of the calendar year ( i.e., generally Schedule 13G filings by Passive Investors, including some hedge funds, which are required to be made within 10 days of the trigger date) are associated, on average, with a statistically significant stock market reaction. This study also finds that initial Schedule 13G filings submitted 45 days after the end of the calendar year ( i.e., generally Schedule 13G filings by QIIs and Exempt Investors, which include some hedge funds) are not associated with a meaningful stock market reaction on average. It is unclear whether this finding with respect to post-year-end filings, in contrast to the findings with respect to other Schedule 13G filings, is attributable to the different types of persons filing on a calendar-year-end filing schedule or by an effect of the year-end filing schedule itself on the significance of the information to the market by the time it is reported on Schedule 13G. Overall, this and other studies provide support for commenters' assertions that at least some Schedule 13G filings contain market-moving information.

Some commenters stated that any benefits of the proposed filing deadlines would be limited due to an increase in inaccurate filings as a result of the accelerated preparation of filings or due to a risk of information overload from the increased number of filings. The filing deadlines we are adopting in the final amendments for Schedule 13G require, in many cases, less frequent filing, and provide longer windows prior to filing, than the proposed filing deadlines. Accordingly, the adopted filing deadlines, as compared to the proposed filing deadlines, may mitigate the risk of inaccurate filings or information overload suggested by commenters.

One commenter stated that the Commission did not address “ which investors stand to benefit” from the proposed accelerated filing deadlines, and indicated that, while retail and long-term investors would not benefit, “sophisticated short-term professional investors” would profit at the expense of the investors filing Schedule 13G. While we are unable to predict with a reasonable degree of confidence which specific investors or categories of investors are likely to benefit most from the acceleration of disclosures, we note that the revisions to the final deadlines relative to the proposed amendments in many cases should mitigate the commenter's concern that the benefits would accrue primarily to short-term traders at the expense of Schedule 13G filers. In particular, as discussed below, the lower frequency of disclosure and increased filing windows being adopted, relative to the proposed amendments, should reduce the risk that parties (including short-term professional investors) profit by anticipating and “front-running” the trades of the filer. We also acknowledge that the benefits are likely to vary across filings, across filer types, and across issuers. For example, there may be lower benefits in cases where alternate, existing disclosures provide similar information on a similar timeframe, such as with respect to QIIs that also file Form 13F.

The economic analysis in the Proposing Release also indicated that the proposed frequency of Schedule 13G filings could have particular informational benefits resolving a concern whereby, currently, QIIs and Exempt Investors may avoid beneficial ownership reporting by selling down their positions by the end of the calendar year. Some commenters indicated that statements in the Proposing Release that investors may currently avoid beneficial ownership reporting in this way were unsubstantiated or inconsistent with their experience. We acknowledge that it is unclear whether and to what extent investors sell down securities holdings before calendar year-end to avoid beneficial ownership reporting, as well as what motives would be likely to drive such behavior, particularly given that many filers would likely be required to disclose such holdings before year-end on other forms and schedules in any event. We are unable to undertake a systematic quantitative analysis of such behavior because we can only observe holdings that are sold before year-end when they are reported on Form 13F or through other disclosures, which are precisely the situations that present less of a concern with respect to the lack of a Schedule 13G filing during that period. We also acknowledge that it is unclear how material any information about the filers' beneficial ownership may be in these cases in light of the short-term or transient nature of this ownership and the academic research discussed above. That said, by requiring disclosure at the end of a quarter, the final amendments may reduce the opportunities to avoid a Schedule 13G filing, which could elicit incremental value-relevant information to the benefit of market participants as more filings are disclosed.

b. Costs

All Schedule 13G filers may incur one-time compliance costs to update their systems and processes to comply with the revised filing deadlines, such as updating any information technology systems used to monitor beneficial ownership and generate associated alerts and reports. All such filers are also likely to incur incremental ongoing compliance costs to review beneficial ownership on a more frequent basis and potentially (to the extent that there are material changes in the information previously reported) prepare more frequent Schedule 13G filings. These ongoing costs may include costs associated with gathering information from multiple sources, determining whether changes are material, and, if changes are deemed to be material, drafting a filing, validating its content, obtaining signatures, processing the filing into the required format (via internal personnel or an external EDGAR filing agent), and submitting it. In addition, filing agents (and potentially other external advisers) may charge higher fees for expedited processing and/or for weekend services, which may be more frequently required (particularly for Passive Investors) under the accelerated deadlines.

Some commenters, although not expressly distinguishing between the Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G requirements, stated that they did not expect the proposed accelerated deadlines to be overly burdensome on filers, with one stating that filers are “highly likely to be sophisticated and experienced investors with the proper resources to file promptly.”

Other commenters stated that they expected significant increases in compliance burdens from the proposed Schedule 13G filing deadlines which were not sufficiently accounted for in the Proposing Release, citing, for example, the significant increase in the required frequency of reporting and of monitoring holdings; that many investors must file Schedule 13G for many different issuers; and that filers may not already have the required systems in place or have access to the required infrastructure and personnel to comply.

Some commenters also noted various practical challenges that would make it difficult to complete all of the required steps to submit an accurate Schedule 13G within the proposed filing windows ( i.e., five business days, five calendar days, or one business day), such as steps that require manual work or cannot be expedited through the use of technology; constraints with respect to the availability and system capacity of any outside staff or services that are used; issues related to the necessary involvement of multiple parties, entities, or signatories; and a lack of sufficient time to validate the content of the filing. Some commenters noted that first-time, non-institutional, or smaller filers may face particular challenges in complying with the proposed filing deadlines.

In response to the concerns about compliance costs and challenges related to the proposed amendments, we note that, for QIIs and Exempt Investors, the final amendments require a lower frequency of initial and amended filings (generally quarterly as opposed to monthly) and allow more time to prepare filings (45 calendar days as opposed to five business days) as compared to the proposed amendments. Many of these filers (about 84 percent of QIIs and 10 percent of Exempt Investors in 2022, per Table 4 above) already file Form 13F on a similar schedule. As indicated by some commenters, filers may thus be better equipped to assess their holdings and (potentially) prepare Schedule 13G filings on a quarterly schedule. Further, under the final amendments, QIIs should be able to monitor beneficial ownership that could exceed 10 percent of a covered class (or, thereafter, change by more than five percent) on a monthly basis, as they do now, rather than daily, as may have been required under the proposed amendments. Passive Investors will also be permitted to submit most Schedule 13G amendments on a quarterly cadence (rather than monthly, as proposed), with 45 calendar days (rather than five business days, as proposed) after the end of the period to submit the filings, though their initial filings will be required within five business days after the trigger date (rather than five calendar days, as proposed). They will also be permitted to file a Schedule 13G amendment within two business days of their holdings exceeding 10 percent of a covered class (or, thereafter, for changes of five percent or more), rather than one business day, as proposed. Finally, to provide time to implement the new Schedule 13G filing deadlines, compliance is not required until September 30, 2024.

We acknowledge that the incremental compliance burdens of the revised deadlines may be greater for smaller, less experienced filers than for other filers due to their more limited internal resources and expertise in preparing filings. In particular, these filers are less likely to have operational systems and processes in place that would facilitate compliance with the revised filing deadlines. The compliance burdens may be greatest for smaller, less experienced Passive Investors when filing an initial Schedule 13G, as these investors may, for example, be most likely to incur fees for expedited processing and/or for weekend services given the revised deadline for their filings (five business days after the trigger date) and their likely reliance on external advisors and service providers. That said, all of the changes relative to the proposed amendments should at least partially mitigate commenters' concerns about compliance costs and challenges discussed above, including for first-time, non-institutional, or smaller filers. For example, under the Proposed Amendments, Schedule 13G filers could have been required to file as many as 12 amendments per year under the month-end filing deadline in Rule 13d–2(b). Under the final amendments, however, Schedule 13G filers' burdens may be significantly lower, as the quarter-end filing deadline in amended Rule 13d–2(b) results in a maximum of four amendments per year pursuant to that rule.

We also acknowledge that the accelerated Schedule 13G filing deadlines may give rise to incremental free-riding and front-running risks. That is, there is a risk that more frequent filings with a shorter filing window may reveal a filer's proprietary information or trading strategies to other market participants, thus allowing those participants to “free ride” by copying the filer's strategies without incurring the same cost as the fund to research, identify and devise profitable strategies. Further, more frequent filings with a shorter filing window could also allow other investors to better anticipate trades of the filers. These other investors may attempt to “front run” or trade ahead of filers to capture any impact on the prices of traded securities. Any increase in free-riding and front-running may ultimately diminish a filer's investment returns and thus harm the filer and any clients or investors of the filer. Such risks may also reduce incentives to engage in research and analysis about potential shareholdings or to pursue some investment opportunities, which may reduce market efficiency and the efficient allocation of capital to its most productive uses. Any related reduction in the number of significant shareholders of issuers may also reduce the operational efficiency of affected issuers, due to the role large shareholders may play in the promoting of corporate accountability either through direct monitoring of management or the threat of exiting an investment.

Some commenters disagreed with the Commission's statement in the Proposing Release that the risks of front-running and free-riding associated with the proposed Schedule 13G filing deadlines were likely to be low, raising concerns that both the proposed frequency of reporting and the proposed filing windows ( i.e., five business days, five calendar days, or one business day) would lead to significant risks of revealing proprietary trading strategies and, because disclosure may be required while trades or trading strategies are still in progress, of facilitating predatory trading. We believe that the revised deadlines in the final amendments relative to the proposed amendments should reduce these risks, particularly for filers that are already reporting holdings on a similar timeframe on Form 13F. That said, confidential treatment requests for Form 13F filings that may allow some filers to defer disclosing some or all of their holdings on that form are not available for Schedule 13G filings, so even Form 13F filers and their clients may bear some additional risk of free-riding and front-running when filing Schedule 13G.

There could also be negative effects on competition in the market for investment management services from accelerated Schedule 13G filing deadlines, as noted by some commenters. In particular, the free-riding and front-running risks discussed above could reduce incentives for investment managers to construct proprietary investment strategies, and any increased compliance burdens may increase barriers to entry. However, for the reasons discussed above, we expect such risks and burdens, and therefore any resulting effect on competition, to be mitigated under the revised filing deadlines as compared to the proposed filing deadlines.

3. Other Amendments

a. Revised Filing Deadline for Schedule 13D Amendments

The final amendment to Rule 13d–2(a) revises the filing deadline for amendments to Schedule 13D to two business days after the date on which a material change occurs, as compared to the baseline requirement that amendments be filed “promptly” after such date.

We believe that replacing the “promptly” requirement with a bright-line, two-business day requirement will provide greater clarity as to when material changes are to be disclosed, which could reduce any current filer confusion. In addition, to the extent that the revised deadline results in earlier disclosure of some Schedule 13D amendments than under the baseline, this deadline may allow the information to be incorporated into market prices earlier, allow market participants to make better-informed investment decisions, and enhance the efficiency of resource allocation at the economy level. For those filers that would not otherwise have filed their amendments within two business days after a material change, the revised deadline for Schedule 13D amendments may somewhat increase compliance costs.

In particular, these filers may bear greater costs due to the need to complete the necessary tasks (including gathering information from multiple sources, determining whether changes are material, drafting and validating the content of the filing, obtaining signatures, processing the filing into the required format via internal personnel or an external EDGAR filing agent, and submitting the filing) more quickly. In addition, filing agents (and potentially other external advisers) may charge higher fees for expedited processing and/or for weekend services, which may be more frequently required under the revised deadline. There may also be compliance challenges involved in accessing external advisers or coordinating among multiple signatories or parties in a short timeframe. Any such costs and challenges are likely to be more burdensome for small, non-institutional, and less experienced filers with fewer in-house resources. In particular, these filers are less likely to have operational systems and processes in place that would facilitate compliance with the revised filing deadline and are likely to be more reliant on external advisers and service providers. The compliance costs and challenges are also likely to be greater for institutional filers with more complex business organizations, including those with sub-advisory relationships common in the investment management industry.

One commenter asserted that the “promptly” standard under Rule 13d–2(a) has “generally been understood” to mean within two business days. Accordingly both the benefits and costs of the revised deadline for Schedule 13D amendments will likely be limited in the case of Schedule 13D amendments that would have been made within two business days even in the absence of the final amendments. Some commenters questioned whether a revised deadline for Schedule 13D amendments would materially improve the information available to investors and other market participants, with two commenters questioning the benefits with respect to specific subsets of filers and one stating that “there have been very few, if any, abuses associated with the current `promptly' regime and . . . it has worked well and effectively.” We acknowledge that the extent of any benefits of the revised deadline are likely to vary across filers, types of filings, and issuers, with greater benefits associated with those Schedule 13D amendments that have more of a market impact ( e.g., because they report a more significant change in holdings or plans) and that also would otherwise have been filed a greater number of days after the material change.

The proposed amendments would have required amendments to Schedule 13D to be filed one business day after the date on which a material change occurs. Many commenters raised concerns about compliance challenges and costs associated with the limited time that would be available to consider the need for, prepare, and submit a filing under this proposed deadline. While some of the commenters raising such concerns indicated that more than two days may be required to complete the required tasks, some identified a two business day deadline as a more practicable period for compliance. We agree with these commenters and therefore expect that the revision of this filing deadline to two business days, rather than one business day, after the date on which a material change occurs will mitigate some concerns about difficulties in complying with the amended deadline.

b. Amendments to Item 6 of Schedule 13D

The final amendment to Item 6 of Schedule 13D makes explicit that cash-settled derivative securities (including cash-settled SBS) that use the issuer's securities as a reference security are included among the types of contracts, arrangements, understandings, and relationships that must be disclosed under that Item. This final amendment will not change the treatment of derivative securities for the purpose of determining beneficial ownership. To the extent that this final amendment elicits additional disclosure that may not otherwise have been provided, investors and the market may benefit from a more complete understanding of all of a filer's interests in an issuer. In particular, this final amendment may provide more information about the overall economic exposure of the filer to the issuer, which may be associated with the actions the filer may be expected to take and thus the shareholder value impact associated with the filing. However, filers could incur additional compliance costs to the extent that they have not already been providing such disclosure. In particular, filers may need to expend additional internal resources and/or consult external advisors to draft the required disclosures and to monitor interests in cash-settled derivative securities in order to report any material changes. In section V.C below we estimate for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (“PRA”) that this final amendment will impose, on average, an additional 0.1 burden hour per filing.

One commenter indicated that the inclusion of SBS in Item 6 would not provide incremental benefits beyond other disclosures, including disclosures that are under consideration in a different proposed rulemaking. We continue to believe that, given current disclosure requirements, the final amendment to Item 6 may elicit additional disclosure that may not otherwise have been provided. Further, to the extent some of this information may be made public in other documents, investors may benefit from being able to review all of a filer's interests in an issuer in a single location.

c. Structured Data Requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G

The final rules require all disclosures reported on Schedules 13D and 13G other than the exhibits to be submitted using 13D/G-specific XML. We continue to believe, as discussed in the Proposing Release, that requiring the disclosures in a structured, machine-readable data language will improve the public dissemination and accessibility of the information in these disclosures by facilitating its extraction and analysis. Some commenters agreed that a structured data requirement would enhance the benefits of the disclosures by making the information easier to access and analyze.

We expect that the structured data requirement will impose some incremental compliance costs on filers. In section V.C below we estimate for purposes of the PRA that these requirements will impose, on average, an additional 0.5 burden hour per filing. One commenter expressed concern that structured data requirement would be unduly burdensome for small beneficial owners. Filers will have the option of using a fillable web form that converts inputted disclosures into 13D/G-specific XML, which should limit the incremental burden on filers that elect to use this approach. In particular, we expect that the availability of a fillable web form should, due to its ease of use, mitigate the concern raised by a commenter that the structured data requirement would be unduly burdensome for small beneficial owners. Filers who instead choose to submit filings directly in 13D/G-specific XML may bear implementation costs of establishing related compliance processes and expertise and/or, as one commenter indicated, ongoing costs of working with third-party vendors. Making submissions directly in 13D/G-specific XML is an approach that may be more likely to be taken by filers expecting to submit larger numbers of Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings, such as QIIs. We expect the costs of submitting Schedule 13D/G directly in 13D/G-specific XML will vary based on prior experience with encoding and transmitting structured disclosures. Per Table 4 in section IV.B.3.b above, 84 percent of the QIIs filing initial Schedule 13Gs in 2022 were also Schedule 13F filers, and thus have such experience.

One commenter, while supporting the proposed structured data requirement, raised concerns about the additional time necessary to comply with the structured data requirement within the shortened filing windows that were proposed. We acknowledge that the structured data requirement will increase the amount of time needed to submit filings. We believe the extended time permitted to file Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G amendments, and, for QIIs and Exempt Investors, to file initial Schedule 13G filings under the final rules as compared to the proposed deadlines should mitigate some of the concerns raised by this commenter about the time required to comply with the structured data requirement.

d. Amendments to Regulation S–T

The final amendments to Regulation S–T revise the time by which Schedule 13D and 13G filings must be submitted in order to be deemed to have been filed on a given business day from 5:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight Saving Time, whichever is currently in effect, on that day. This change may, on the margin, mitigate the incremental compliance challenges and costs associated with the revised filing deadlines, particularly for filers located in a different time zone than the Commission's principal office or those operating in multiple time zones. Some commenters agreed that these extended filing hours would benefit filers in light of the shortened filing deadlines.

The final amendments to Regulation S–T also make temporary hardship exemptions under Rule 201 of Regulation S–T unavailable with respect to Schedule 13D and 13G filings. We expect this change to have no meaningful economic effects as filers will be able to request a filing date adjustment under existing Rule 13(b) of Regulation S–T under similar circumstances as a temporary hardship exemption.

D. Reasonable Alternatives to the Final Rules

We considered many alternatives to the final rules. Some of these are discussed earlier in this release. In this section, we present certain significant alternatives and a discussion of their benefits and costs relative to the final rules.

1. Alternative Filing Deadlines

We considered both earlier and later (and more and less frequent) filing deadlines relative to those that we are adopting. In general, earlier (or more frequent) filing deadlines may have increased the benefits, but also the costs, of the amendments, while later (or less frequent) deadlines would have decreased the costs but also the benefits of the amendments. The economic implications of some alternative filing deadlines (namely, those that were proposed but not adopted) are discussed in more detail above.

With respect to the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline, which will be five business days after the trigger date, we also considered a deadline of greater or fewer days after the trigger date. Additionally, we considered deadlines stated in calendar days as opposed to business days, which, when applied to the same number of days ( i.e., five calendar days), would have the effect of decreasing the number of days a person would have to file an initial Schedule 13D in cases where weekends or holidays fall in the middle of the filing window. In general, a shorter deadline and the resulting earlier disclosures may have increased the benefits discussed above for those non-corporate-action filings that would not already be considered timely with respect to such shorter deadline. A shorter deadline may also have further reduced the risk discussed above of shareholders selling to informed bystanders prior to a Schedule 13D filing (as demonstrated in Figure 6 above), which may have further enhanced trust in markets and capital formation.

However, a shorter deadline may also have increased the number of activist campaigns forgone compared to the amended filing deadlines, due to two effects. First, a shorter deadline would mean that, given current share accumulation patterns, there would be a greater number of potential campaigns for which filers would have to consider whether or not to proceed and if so, how. Second, the likelihood of adapting may decrease if it is more difficult for filers to adapt to an even shorter deadline than that which we are adopting. An increase in forgone activist campaigns may have further reduced shareholder value creation. A reduction in the pursuit of activism may also have related negative effects on operational efficiency, market efficiency, liquidity, and capital formation, as discussed in the context of the adopted deadline above.

In the case of a longer deadline, the implications for the incremental benefits and costs would have been the reverse of those for a shorter deadline. We note that there is no clear breakpoint in either the accumulation pattern of filers or in the abnormal trading volume prior to Schedule 13D filings that could help to support a particular filing deadline, including five-business day deadline we are adopting.

A deadline expressed in calendar days would also have incremental effects beyond a direct effect on the length of the filing window. In particular, such a deadline would decrease the consistency in the total number of business hours that persons would have to continue accumulating shares and to draft and submit a filing after their trigger date. For example, a five-calendar day deadline may represent anywhere from two to five business days depending on the occurrence of weekends and holidays after the trigger date. This inconsistency may distort the campaigns that are pursued by activists or the timing of these campaigns. For example, an activist who crosses the five percent threshold on a Monday would generally have five trading days from the trigger date to accumulate further shares and potentially increase their profits prior to filing and informing the market of their activity. In contrast, an activist who reaches the same threshold on a Friday prior to a Federal holiday on the following Monday would only have two trading days after the trigger date to accumulate shares before making a Schedule 13D filing. Because investors who reach the threshold near a weekend or holiday would thus be at a relative disadvantage, activists may be relatively more incentivized to pursue campaigns at issuers where liquidity conditions ( i.e., availability and ease of share purchase transactions) facilitate crossing the five percent threshold early in a week at a lower cost. Any effect of this kind, in turn, would have a detrimental effect on operational efficiency at the market level by influencing which campaigns are more likely to be pursued.

A deadline expressed in calendar days could also increase compliance costs, given that external service providers and advisers may charge higher fees for weekend or holiday services, which may be more frequently required under a deadline expressed in calendar days. However, a deadline expressed in calendar days would increase the consistency in the total number of calendar days that persons would have to submit a filing. For example, five business days may represent anywhere from seven to 10 calendar days. If a significant amount of investment, advisory, drafting, or other activities in preparation of a Schedule 13D filing takes place on weekends and holidays, it is possible that this inconsistency in calendar days would advantage some filers over others ( i.e., those who are better positioned to work over weekends and holidays versus those who are not).

With respect to the initial Schedule 13G filing deadline for Passive Investors, which will be five business days after the trigger date, we also considered longer and shorter deadlines (and the use of deadlines expressed in business as opposed to calendar days, which would have had the effect of lengthening the deadline for the same number of stated days). A longer deadline would have eased commenters' concerns about the compliance costs and complications for Passive Investors. However, researchers have found that those Schedule 13G filings that are not made 45 days after year-end ( i.e., generally Schedule 13G filings by Passive Investors) are associated, on average, with a statistically significant positive abnormal stock return, albeit smaller than that generally found for Schedule 13D filings. This result may imply that at least some of these disclosures contain material information whose earlier disclosure could benefit investors (and which may have enhanced the efficiency of resource allocation at the economy level). A longer deadline would have reduced any such benefits. In the case of a shorter deadline, the implications for the incremental benefits and costs would have been the reverse of those for a longer deadline.

2. Tiered Approaches

We considered “tiered” approaches to the initial Schedule 13D filing deadline, in contrast to the uniform approach to the filing deadline being adopted. We considered, for example, maintaining the current 10-day deadline for acquisitions of more than five percent but no more than 10 percent of a covered class while instituting an amended, shorter deadline in cases where beneficial ownership exceeds 10 percent. We also considered whether the deadline for the initial Schedule 13D filing should vary based on a specified characteristic of the issuer of the covered class, such as its market capitalization or trading volume. Finally, we considered maintaining the 10-day deadline for those filers that elect to “stand still” by not acquiring additional beneficial ownership of the covered class once the five percent threshold has been crossed until the corresponding Schedule 13D is filed.

One commenter stated that a tiered approach that would maintain a 10-day deadline for filing a Schedule 13D pertaining to beneficial ownership in micro-, small-, and mid-capitalization issuers “may serve to limit the impact that reforms to Rule 13d–1(a) have on shareholder engagement and monitoring,” particularly at micro-, small-, and mid-capitalization issuers where, in the commenter's view, “such effective engagement and monitoring is most necessary.” Another commenter suggested requiring persons who cross certain higher thresholds ( e.g., a 10 percent beneficial ownership threshold) or who accumulate certain amounts after crossing the five percent threshold ( e.g., an additional three percent) file their initial Schedule 13D on the proposed accelerated timeline, but “allowing investors who trigger Schedule 13D filings for more technical reasons and who are not accumulating stock in connection with a potential activist engagement ( e.g., proxy contests or intended take-private activity) to continue filing under the current regime.” This commenter also supported maintaining the 10-day deadline for “an investor who crosses the 5% threshold but acquires no additional stock after the initial crossing transaction,” stating that “there is no informational disadvantage for existing investors in such circumstances” and that in some cases there is “earlier disclosure by the issuer relating to the [crossing] transaction” and therefore “little purpose [is] served by accelerating the timeline for the investor to prepare its disclosure.”

We acknowledge that there is significant heterogeneity in the benefits and costs of the amended filing deadline across different types of filers and issuers. For example, as discussed above, these benefits and costs are likely to vary across “corporate action” as compared to “non-corporate-action” filings, across issuers of different sizes, and by the identity of the filer. Ideally, a tiered approach would be used to accelerate disclosure specifically in circumstances where the benefits of accelerated disclosure are greater and the costs of accelerated disclosure are lower. However, there are many important dimensions across which the benefits and costs are likely to vary, complicating the task of designing a tiered approach. Further, the subgroups of filings that are associated with the greatest costs under an accelerated filing deadline (and where there thus could be significant advantages of maintaining the 10-day deadline) are also the same subgroups associated with the greatest benefits under an accelerated deadline, while those associated with lower costs are associated with lower benefits. This pattern mitigates our ability to improve the costs of the amendments by implementing a tiered approach.

3. Modify Structured Data Requirement

We considered modifying the proposed structured data requirement for Schedules 13D and 13G. We considered, for example, requiring only the quantitative disclosures reported on Schedules 13D and 13G to be provided in a structured data language. Narrowing the scope of the structuring requirement in this way could simplify the resulting dataset to include only the information that might be used most widely by market participants, analysts, and Commission staff for aggregation, comparison, and analysis, which may better suit those users who wish to focus their analysis on such information and forgo the additional step of filtering out other data. However, the non-quantitative disclosures on Schedules 13D and 13G, such as textual narratives and identification checkboxes, are also likely to be valuable for many data users, including market participants, analysts, and Commission staff, to access and analyze in an efficient and automated manner. In addition, we expect that the incremental cost savings to filers of requiring only the quantitative disclosures to be structured would be low, because filers would only be forgoing the costs of inputting their textual and checkbox disclosures into fillable web forms (or of tagging those disclosures directly or by means of a filing agent) rather than broader costs associated with structured data implementation more generally. For these reasons, we have determined not to modify the scope of the structured data requirement.

One commenter recommended that the Commission opt for the XBRL data language, rather than creating an XML schema designed specifically for beneficial ownership reporting. This commenter stated that using the XBRL standard, rather than the proposed 13D/G-specific XML requirements, would result in significantly lower costs and greater efficiencies for filers, users of filings, and the Commission, while also enhancing the benefits of a structured data requirement by facilitating improved data quality and the ability to commingle the data with other datasets. We acknowledge that different structured data languages entail different costs and benefits for filers and data users. We believe that 13D/G-specific XML is more suitable than XBRL for Schedules 13D and 13G because it facilitates the use of a fillable form that should result in a lower cost of complying with the structured data requirement compared to XBRL, particularly for smaller and infrequent filers. Under an XBRL requirement, filers (including smaller and infrequent filers) would incur costs and burdens associated with tagging the disclosures ( e.g., software licensing costs, time spent applying tags) or with paying a third party to do so. Thus, although some Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filers, such as those currently subject to Inline XBRL reporting requirements ( e.g., filers that are Commission registrants) or that otherwise have experience with XBRL may realize some efficiencies under an XBRL alternative, we believe the cost savings expected to arise from having a fillable form option under the 13D/G-specific XML requirements would have a more substantial positive impact with respect to filers as a whole.

In addition, while some Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filers and data users may have familiarity with XBRL data and software, such filers and data users likely also have familiarity with data structured in form-specific XML languages on EDGAR. For instance, the Commission has found the use of form-specific XML on section 16 ownership reporting forms to have had positive impacts on filers (with respect to compliance costs) and users (in terms of data usability) of those disclosures without imposing significantly higher implementation costs on the Commission than other structured data requirements impose. For these reasons, we are requiring 13D/G-specific XML rather than Inline XBRL for Schedules 13D and 13G.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Summary of the Collections of Information

Certain provisions of our rules, schedules and forms that will be affected by the final amendments contain “collection of information” requirements within the meaning of the PRA. The Commission published a notice requesting comment on changes to these collection of information requirements in the Proposing Release and submitted these requirements to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) for review in accordance with the PRA. The hours and costs associated with maintaining, disclosing, or providing the information required by the final amendments constitute paperwork burdens imposed by such collection of information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

The title for the affected collections of information is “Regulation 13D and Regulation 13G; Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G” (OMB Control No. 3235–0145). These schedules contain item and other requirements that outline the information a reporting person must disclose. The schedules were adopted under the Exchange Act. A description of the final amendments can be found in section II above, and a discussion of the economic effects of the final amendments can be found in section IV above. Compliance with the information collections is mandatory. Responses to the information collections are not kept confidential and there is no mandatory retention period for the information disclosed.

B. Summary of Comment Letters on PRA Estimates

In the Proposing Release, the Commission requested comment on the PRA burden hour and cost estimates and the analysis used to derive the estimates. We did not receive any comment letters in response to the request for comment on the PRA estimates and analysis included in the Proposing Release.

C. Burden and Cost Estimates for the Final Amendments

Below we estimate the incremental and aggregate effect on the paperwork burden as a result of the final amendments. As discussed in section II above, we have made a number of changes from the Proposed Amendments, and we have adjusted our estimates accordingly. For example, in the Proposing Release, the Commission estimated paperwork burden increases for Forms 3, 4, and 5 as well as Schedules 13D and 13G associated with proposed Rules 13d–3(e) and 13d–5(b)(1)(i) and (ii) and (b)(2)(i). Because we are not adopting those proposed rules, we have adjusted the paperwork burden estimates from the Proposing Release accordingly. In addition, rather than basing our PRA estimates on the actual number of Schedule 13D and 13G filings in calendar year 2020, as the Commission did in the Proposing Release, we base our PRA estimates with respect to the final amendment to Rule 13d–2(b), in part, on the actual number of Schedule 13G filings in calendar year 2022.

At the outset, we note that the current OMB inventory for Regulation 13D–G reflects 8,587 annual responses. This number is based on the number of initial Schedule 13D and 13G filings made. We think that the better approach is for the PRA to reflect the burdens arising from both the initial Schedule 13D and 13G filings and amended Schedule 13D and 13G filings. Accordingly, we first update the existing PRA burden estimates to reflect this new approach. Specifically, we are updating the current OMB inventory from 8,587 annual responses to 29,793 annual responses to reflect the average number of initial and amended Schedule 13D and 13G filings per year that were made in calendar years 2020, 2021, and 2022. We then estimate the PRA impact of the final amendments using the updated inventory numbers as the baseline. Table 1 below illustrates the resulting incremental change to the total annual compliance burden in hours and in costs. Additionally, we note that the current OMB inventory for the above-referenced collections of information reflect an average of hourly rate of $400 per burden hour borne by outside professionals. Similarly, in the Proposing Release, the Commission used an estimated cost of $400 per hour, recognizing that the costs of retaining outside professionals may vary depending on the nature of the professional services. The Commission recently determined to increase the estimated costs of such hourly rate to $600 per hour to adjust the estimate for inflation from Aug. 2006. Accordingly, we first update the existing PRA burden estimates to reflect this new cost estimate, as set out in the following Table 1.

We believe that the final amendments potentially could increase the number of responses to this updated collection of information for Schedules 13D and 13G. Specifically, although we do not anticipate an increase in this collection due to our final amendment to Rule 13d–1, our final amendment to Rule 13d–2(b) with respect to the standard that requires an amendment to Schedule 13G could potentially increase the number of Schedule 13G amendments filed annually. For purposes of this PRA, therefore, we estimate that there could be an additional 41,679 annual responses to the collection of information under Regulation 13D–G as a result of the final amendment to Rule 13d–2.

In addition to a potential increase in the number of annual responses, we expect that the final amendments will change the estimated burden per response for Regulation 13D–G. For both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filers, we expect that the structured data requirement will increase the estimated burden per response by requiring that the disclosures in those schedules be made using the 13D/G-specific XML. In addition, for Schedule 13D filers, we expect that the final amendment to Item 6 of Schedule 13D potentially could increase the estimated burden per response by specifying that disclosure is required under Item 6 for the use of cash-settled derivative securities with respect to an issuer's securities.

The burden estimates were calculated by estimating the number of parties we anticipate would expend time, effort, and/or financial resources to generate, maintain, retain, disclose or provide information in connection with the final amendments and then multiplying by the estimated amount of time, on average, such parties would devote in response to the final amendments. The following table summarizes the calculations and assumptions used to derive our estimates of the aggregate increase in burden corresponding to the final amendments.

The table below illustrates the incremental change to the total annual compliance burden in hours and in costs as a result of the final amendments. The table sets forth the percentage estimates we typically use for the burden allocation for each response.

Below we summarize the requested paperwork burden for Regulation 13D–G that will be submitted to OMB for review in accordance with the PRA, including the estimated total reporting burdens and costs, under the final amendments. This table includes both the adjustments to the PRA inventory reflected in PRA Table 1 and the aggregate burden increase resulting from the final rules reflected in PRA Table 3.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”) requires Federal agencies, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules on small entities. Section 603(a) of the RFA generally requires the Commission to undertake an initial regulatory flexibility analysis of all proposed rules, or rule amendments, to determine the impact of the proposed rulemaking on “small entities,” while section 604(a) requires that the Commission generally provide a final regulatory flexibility analysis of rules it is adopting. Section 605(b) of the RFA states that these requirements shall not apply to any proposed or final rule or rule amendment if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission certified in the Proposing Release that the Proposed Amendments would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for purposes of the RFA.

For purposes of Commission rulemaking in connection with the RFA, a small entity includes: (1) when used with reference to an “issuer” or a “person,” other than an investment company, an “issuer” or “person” that, on the last day of its most recent fiscal year, had total assets of $5 million or less; or (2) a broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of which its audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to 17 CFR 240.17a–5(d), or, if not required to file such statements, a broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the last business day of the preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if shorter); and is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business or small organization. An investment company, including a business development company, is considered to be a “small business” if it, together with other investment companies in the same group of related investment companies, has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its most recent fiscal year.

A description of the final amendments can be found in section II above, and a discussion of the economic effects of the final amendments can be found in section IV above. Although the final amendments will apply to beneficial owners regardless of their size, we believe that the vast majority of the beneficial owners that will be subject to the amendments will not be “small entities” for purposes of the RFA. For example, the amendments to the filing deadlines in Rules 13d–1 and 13d–2, as well as the amendments to Rules 13 and 201 of Regulation S–T and the structured data requirement, only apply to persons who beneficially own more than five percent of a covered class of securities, thus providing a basis to conclude that such a person is unlikely to fall within the definition of “small entity.” In addition, to the extent that the final amendments to the filing deadlines apply to members of a group, in addition to individual entities, we believe that members of a group generally would be larger investors and similarly are unlikely to fall within the definition of “small entity.”

We did not receive any comment letters in response to the request for comment on the RFA certification in the Proposing Release. Although some commenters asserted that certain of the Proposed Amendments would be unduly burdensome for smaller and non-institutional beneficial owners, those commenters did not indicate (or provide data that would suggest) that those beneficial owners would be small entities for purposes of the RFA. Thus, those comments do not alter our belief that the vast majority of the beneficial owners that will be subject to the amendments will not be small entities for purposes of the RFA. In addition, the final amendments include some modifications to the Proposed Amendments. As discussed in more detail in section II above, we are not adopting proposed Rule 13d–3(e), nor are we adopting many of the proposed amendments to Rules 13d–5 and 13d–6. We also have adopted longer deadlines than proposed for initial and amended Schedule 13G filings. We believe these modifications generally would reduce any burdens of the final amendments in the event any small entity becomes subject to them. Moreover, we do not believe that these modifications alter the basis upon which the Commission made the certification in the Proposing Release.

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission certifies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the final amendments will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for purposes of the RFA.

Statutory Authority

We are adopting the rule amendments contained in this release under the authority set forth in sections 3(b), 13, and 23(a) of the Exchange Act.

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 232

• Administrative practice and procedure
• Reporting and recordkeeping requirements
• Securities

17 CFR Part 240

• Reporting and recordkeeping requirements
• Securities

Text of Amendments

For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Commission is amending title 17, chapter II, of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 232—REGULATION S–T—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC FILINGS

1. The general authority citation for part 232 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z–3, 77sss(a), 78c(b), 78 l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78 ll, 80a–6(c), 80a–8, 80a–29, 80a–30, 80a–37, 80b-4, 80b–6a, 80b–10, 80b–11, 7201 et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless otherwise noted.

2. Amend § 232.13 by:

a. Revising paragraph (a)(4); and

b. Designating the note following paragraph (a)(4) as note 1 to paragraph (a).

The revision reads as follows:

3. Amend § 232.201(a) introductory text by:

a. Removing the word “or” that immediately precedes “an Asset Data File”; and

b. Adding after the phrase “Asset Data File (as defined in § 232.11),” the phrase “or a Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G (§§ 240.13d–101 and 240.13d–102 of this chapter),”.

PART 240—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

4. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read, in part, as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c–3, 78c–5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 78g, 78i, 78j, 78j–1, 78j–4, 78k, 78k–1, 78 l, 78m, 78n, 78n–1, 78o, 78o–4, 78o–10, 78p, 78q, 78q–1, 78s, 78u–5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78 ll, 78mm, 80a–20, 80a–23, 80a–29, 80a–37, 80b–3, 80b–4, 80b–11, 7201 et seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; and Pub. L. 111–203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112–106, sec. 503 and 602, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.

Section 240.13d-3 is also issued under Public Law 111–203 § 766, 124 Stat. 1799 (2010).

5. Amend § 240.13d–1 by revising paragraphs (a), (b)(1)(i) and (iii), (b)(2), (c) introductory text, (d), (e)(1) introductory text, (e)(1)(ii), (f)(1), (g), (i), and (j) to read as follows:

6. Amend § 240.13d–2 by:

a. Revising paragraphs (a) through (d); and

b. Removing the sectional authority citation from the end of the section.

The revisions read as follows:

7. Amend § 240.13d–3 by:

a. Revising paragraphs (d)(3) introductory text and (d)(4); and

b. Removing the sectional authority citation from the end of the section.

The revisions read as follows:

8. Revise § 240.13d–5 to read as follows:

9. Revise § 240.13d–6 to read as follows:

10. Remove and reserve § 240.13d–7.

11. Amend § 240.13d–101 by:

a. Removing the note that reads “Note: Schedules filed in paper format shall include a signed original and five copies of the schedule, including all exhibits. See Rule 13d–7 for other parties to whom copies are to be sent.”; and

b. Revising Item 6 and the paragraph following the “Name/Title” block.

The revisions read as follows:

12. Amend § 240.13d–102 by:

a. Revising Item 8 and the paragraph following the “Name/Title” block; and

b. Removing the note at the end of the section.

The revisions read as follows: