AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA v. S.C. (CITY OF LOS ANGELES)Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Privacy Information CenterCal.May 17, 2016SUPREME COURT COPY Case No. 8227106 SUPREMECOURT a oe ee IN THE SUPREME COURT MAY 17-2016 OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Frank A. McGuire Clerk AMERICANCIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTERERN CALIFORNIA and ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Petitioners, Vv. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,and the LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,and the CITY OF LOS ANGELES,and the LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, Real Parties in Interest. After a Decision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, Case No. B259392 Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BS143004 (Hon. James C. Chalfant) APPLICATION FOR LEAVETO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF AND AMICUS CURIA4EBRIEF OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER(EPIC) IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS MARC ROTENBERG,rotenberg@epic.org *ALAN BUTLER (SBN 281291), butler@epic.org JERAMIE SCOTT,jscott@epic.org AIMEE THOMSON,thomson@epic.org ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 1718 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: (202) 483-1140 Fax: (202) 483-1248 Counselfor Amicus Curiae TO THE HONORABLE TANI GORRE CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURTOF CALIFORNIA: Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.250(f), non-profit organizationthe Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) respectfully requests leaveto file the attached amicus brief in support of Petitioners American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California and Electronic Frontier Foundation. This brief is timely, as it was filed within 30 days after the last reply brief wasfiled. STATEMENT OF INTEREST The Electronic Privacy Information Centeris a public interest research center in Washington, D.C., established in 1994 to focus public attention on emergingcivil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and other Constitutional values.' EPIC routinely participates as amicus curiae before federal and state courts in cases concerning open governmentlaws. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013) (arguing that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act’s citizens-only provision harmsnoncitizens’ constitutionally protected rights); FCC v. AT&TInc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act exemption for “personal privacy”protects individuals, not corporations); New York ' In accordance with Rule 8.520(f)(4), the undersignedstates that no monetary contributions were madefor the preparation or submission of this brief. This brief was not authored, in wholeor in part, by counselfor a party. Times Co. v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014), opinion amended on denial ofreh’g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014) (arguing that memosprepared by the Office of Legal Counseldo notfall within Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 711 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (arguing that a Freedom of Information Act “determination” must include a decision to grant or deny a request). EPIC has published a leading FOIAlitigation manual, EPIC, Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws (2010), and routinely files Freedom of Information requests andlitigates Freedom of Information Act cases. See, e.g, EPIC v. CBP,_ F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2016); EPIC v. DHS, 117 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2015); EPIC y. DOJ Criminal Division, 82 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D.D.C. 2015); see generally EPIC, EPIC FOIA Cases (2016). EPIC’s amicus brief presents arguments that materially add to and complementthebriefs filed by Petitioners, without repeating those arguments. EPIC hassignificant experience with the federal Freedom of Information Act. EPIC’s brief will argue that the lower court’s decision to exclude “investigative” records from public release will prevent ? http://epic.org/foia/. meaningful oversight of programs that pose significant threats to the privacy of everyday Americans. Forall of the foregoing reasons, EPIC respectfully requests that the Court grant the application and accept the enclosed amicus curiae brief for filing and consideration. Dated: May5, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Alan Butler MARC ROTENBERG ALAN BUTLER JERAMIE SCOTT AIMEE THOMSON ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 1718 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: (202) 483-1140 Fax: (202) 483-1248 Counselfor Amicus Curiae in es g h e e nt oS et Case No. 8227106 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AMERICANCIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA and ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Petitioners, Vv. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,and the LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,and the CITY OF LOS ANGELES,and the LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, Real Parties in Interest. After a Decision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, Case No. B259392 Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BS 143004 (Hon. James C. Chalfant) AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER(EPIC) IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS MARC ROTENBERG,rotenberg@epic.org *ALAN BUTLER(SBN 281291), butler@epic.org JERAMIE SCOTT,jscott@epic.org AIMEE THOMSON,thomson@epic.org ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 1718 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: (202) 483-1140 Fax: (202) 483-1248 Counselfor Amicus Curiae TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES1.0... ceccccceesssseeeeessnrreertaceeestensseaaersenees ii SUMMARYOF THE ARGUMENT........ccceeesseeeeeteeeeeetneeeeeeeeneeeeesens 1 ARGUMENTuuu. cecccccccccssssceeenecseeeceneessneeecnseeeeesseseesenessaneesnsaeesesseenseeeeey 1 I. Open records laws enable public scrutiny of surveillance teChnolOgies. ..c.cceceecceceesescsssseeseescteeeeteeeeneseeeneenseeeressesessseresessennens 1 A. Open Records laws havelimited the use of cell-site SUMUIACOLS. .. ce eeeeescecescceeseceesceeceseessaceseessesenseaeeeeeeseeseeceseneeeenaeersnees 2 B. Police body-worn camerasraise substantial privacy concerns and shoud be subject to public scrutiny...8 C. Freedom of information laws have also enabled oversight Of “FUSION CENtELS.” ....eceeeeeeceseeteneecesesseeesensaeenseeeseeeseneessneseeeers 14 II. Transparency is necessary to ensure accountability for indiscriminate public surveillance. ........ccecceeeene eters rte esee enero21 A. Indiscriminate surveillance programs pose a unique threat tO PYVACY. cece sseetesececsseseteeeeeneeenseneeeeetenseesesesessensseseseeesieesesens22 B. Public access to state records is necessary to assess the impact of programsofindiscriminate surveillance..............00026 CONCLUSION W...cccccecccccsccesecceeeenerereeseesesesensseceseeessseeeeecsseeesneseaeenaees29 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES EPIC v. DHS, 999 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2013)... cceecesccesesesesseseseees26 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Cal. Const. art. 1, § 3(b)(1)..cccecccesscscscsessssscssssscsscssseestsesvavsvacscasvessesees27 STATUTES Cal. Gov’t Code § 6250 (West 2016) ..cccccccssssecesesssesrscsesesessesesees27 H. B. 128, 2014 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014)... ccc cceescsessessscsececessees 7 H. B. 603, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2013).....cccccsccesssessscsesseseeees 7 Leg. Doc. 415, 126th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013) v.ccccscceecseccecsess 7 S. B. SF 2466, 88th Leg., 3d Engrossment (Minn. 2014).....ccccscssesees. 7 OTHER AUTHORITIES AbeedSarkeret al., Social Media Miningfor Toxicovigilance: Automatic Monitoring ofPrescription Medication Abusefrom Twitter, 39 Drug Safety 231 (2016)... cceccceeceseseesessesssessesscsess25 ACLU,Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them? viccccccccccccssceseses4 Aimee Thomson, Cellular Dragnet: Active Cell Site Simulators and the Fourth Amendment (Jan. 14, 2015) ...cccecssccssccscsecvsesecseseeees2 Body Cameras: Can Technology Increase Protectionfor Law Enforcement Officers and the Public: Hearing Beforethe Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism ofthe S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2015) (statementofthe Electronic Privacy Information Center) ........ccccesscscsessssscsevscscsssscsssssevseecsstevsesesseseveces 13 Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA Today (Aug. 24, 2015) ...cccssccccsseseseccssteessstesesececeeees 3 Brett Clarkson, Who’s Tracking Your Cellphone Now? Could be the Cops, SunSentinel (May 17, 2014)... ccesscecsesesesesessseresseesesees 3 Brian A. Reaves, Census ofState and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, NCJ 233982, DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics LS (July 2011).ceeesceecseeseeseeessecseesevssscsssssresevaveseeevasacatiess 7 Bureau of Justice Assistance, DOJ, Body-Worn CameraToolkit: Technology (2016)... sccscescesessesssesesescsssesescscsevessecsvsvacicasacacassavavasseess 9 Caught on Camera: The History ofthe Police Dashcam, NBC NewsDigital (Oct. 22, 2015) oo... .cccsccssscssscsseccssesteesssescssscssessseees 11 il Comm.on Privacy in the Info. Age, Nat’] Research Council, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in the Digital Age (James Waldo etal. eds. 2007)... sesesesseseeesseteeteneeseetateees22 Cyrus Farivar, California Cops, Want To Use A Stingray? Get A Warrant, Governor Says, Ars Technica (Oct. 8, 2015)......eee7 D.C. Open GovernmentCoalition, Coalition Presents State-by- State Police Body Cam Research wo.cccscccscreciriienntener12 Daily Southtown, Freelance Write Exposes Police Shooting Cover-up, Chicago Tribune (Dec. 2, 2015)... csteserseeeesenees 11,12 DARPA, Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program (2003) wissen15 DHS Monitoring ofSocial Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence ofthe H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong, (2012)......ceeeeeeeee27 DHS,2014 National Network ofFusion Centers Final Report (Jar. 2015) ee eeescescssssceeseseseneeesseneeereeteneesssnesssssesseeseeeeneneenesaseecacanes 15 DHS, Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information (Apt. 21, 2016) ..cceececceceeeesstsecseseesssseeeeeneesseetenteerssnetseneeteesseegens 15, 17, 18 DHS, National Network ofFusion Centers Fact Sheet (2016)... 14 DHS,Resourcesfor Fusion Centers (2016)...ecccsessseseserseeserseesesens 14 DOJ Press Release, Justice Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May 1, 2015) ..eeecsessessseseseseseseseesesesseesenenesnsesissessessenessssseeseregs 14 DOJ, Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policyfor Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015) ....ccccscsesessesteeeeteeeteeeeeseesseneens4 DOJ, What is FOIA? ccccccccccscesesesssssesessenseneeseneeeneeneeneeeneesaesseeseesensges27 Ed O’Keefe, Transcript: Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss Explain, Defend NSA Phone Records Program, Wash.Post (June 6, 2013) ...sccscccceseseseneeenseeeetseeneeenstessssssssenesssesesseneeneneenenens23 EPIC, “Terrorism” Information Awareness (2016)...15 EPIC, EPIC v. Department ofHomeland Security: Media Monitoring (2016) ..cecsscccecseeseseeteeeesenecseeereeenereeteeneaseesseneseeseeeaeeey27 EPIC, EPIC v. FBI - Stingray / Cell Site Simulator (2018) veceeeeeeees2,3 EPIC, Information Fusion Centers and Privacy (2016) ...:.s1:006 14,17 ill EPIC, Suspicious Activity Reporting (2016) ..c.cccccccsssecssssscssseesssesees, 18 Exec. Office of the Pres., Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective (May 2014) ...cccccccesscssssscssscsescestssceecseees22 Info. Sharing Env’t, Functional Standard (FS) Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Version 1.5.5, ISE-FS-200 (Feb.23, QOS) eeeeccccsseccessecsessetevsssessesssesesecsesesssssscsscseveaesesesseaeessevseeueavans 19, 20 Info. Sharing Env’t, Information Sharing Environment Guidance: Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC), ISE- G-112 (June 3, 2011)... ececccsesscesssssssscscsssscsscsesescsssesesstsvsecaseess 17 Jon Campbell, LAPD Spy Device Taps Your Cell Phone, LA Weekly (Sept. 13, 2012)... ccsccssccscssssessssecsscsssssssescsssesessscaessecaeeas 6 Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, Web Policy (Mar. 12, 2014)...23, 24 K. Kaufmann, Law Enforcement Officials: Cell Phone Disclosures Would Hurt Investigations, Desert Sun (Feb. 15, QOL)iceccecccseseesecenerssseseeesessesecsessessessssssssecssvecsusasessucavaceetevaeerssseas 6 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, Forbes (Feb. 16, 2012)..............25 Kate Mather, LAPD Report Defends Ambitious Plan to Outfit Officers with Body Cameras, L.A. Times (Mar. 18, 2016).........00. 10 Kelly Goff, Los Angeles Panel to Gauge Concern Over LAPD Surveillance Programs, L.A. Daily News (Mar. 5, 2014)we20 Kelly Swanson, Advocates Push Back Against FOIA Exemptions for Bodycam Footage, Reporters Comm.for Freedom ofthe Press (June 9, 2015)... cccesessessesssessecesssccscsssessessevssecsasvsecuaravenssazens 13 Kristina Irion, Accountability Unchained: Bulk Data Retention, Preemptive Surveillance, and Transatlantic Data Protection, in Privacy in the Modern Age 78 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz, & Jeramie Scott eds., 2015) .ccccccecscsecssscrsctseseessessens22 LAPD’s Body Worn Video Program — Supplemental Report (Mar. 16, 2016)...ececescescssesessssecsecsesessesssssssssesecesesesavacesseeecateers 10 Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and Rep.Sheila Jackson Lee to Mr. James B. Comey,Director, FBI (Mar.25, 2016). ccccecccscsseseesseeseescessssesssesscseseacescsscessusescessescuresaseaeavaseeserssaees 8 iv Matt Cagle, Dirtbox Over Disneyland? New Docs Reveal Anaheim’s Cellular Surveillance Arsenal, ACLU of N. Cal. (Jann. 27, 2016) ..eeeeccessssesessecseseseneeeseceeseserceteeerseensneeetsnenerecsenessseenenenees 6 Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, Police Body Cam Footage: Just Another Public Record (Dec. 2015) .....sseseeseeeeees 13 Melissa Mecija, Local Police Dealt With Company That Makes Controversial Cellphone Tracking Technology, ABC 10 News (Aug. 4, 2014) iecececcsseseseeeseseseseeeerenenereneneersesseseasassssnteesseeneaneneneass 6 Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Deputy Secretary of DHS,to Sarah Saldafia, Assistant Secretary, USCIS; Joseph Clancy, Director, U.S. Secret Service; R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; Peter Neffenger, Administrator, TSA; & L. Eric Patterson, Director, Federal Protective Service (Oct. 19, 2015) ...ccccccecseeeseesteeteeteeetees 5 Michael Bott & Thom Jensen, 9 Calif; Law Enforcement Agencies Connected To Cellphone Spying Technology, ABC 10 News (Mar. 6, 2014)....cceccccseseseeeceteeneeterteeeseesneeteesseesseneesnaeens 6 Michael De Yoanna, Colorado Police Cautiously Eager about Body Cameras That Recognize Faces, Colo. Pub. Radio (July 19, 2015). .ccccccccescectcteeseseeresssesesececseseesenseseeeeeetecesneneenesessueersnesenees 11 Mike Katz-Lacabe, Ventura County SheriffReleases Unredacted FBINDAfor Harris StingRay, Ctr. for Human Rights & Privacy (May 4, 2015)...cccceccscscsssesseeseeseeeeescetieesseseesseneeerecaseseeaes 6 Nat’] Counterterrorism Ctr., OVerview ....cccceeccsscccssscsseeeeseesenssaeneees 16 National Institute for Justice, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center System, Body-Worn Cameras for Criminal Justice: Market Survey (Mar. 2014)...cesses9,10 Nationwide SARInitiative, Nationwide SAR Initiative (2016)....18, 19 Office of Justice Programs, DOJ, Body-Worn Camera Program Fract SNC vecccccccccccssssevsesesececccueveccsucueseseeccsesansesesseccenaaenesecauaaeeseeeaaness 9 Office of the Dir. of Nat’! Intelligence, Members ofthe IC .......:005 16 Permanent Subcomm.onInvestigations, Investigative Report Criticizes Counterterrorism Reporting, Waste at State & Local Intelligence Fusion Centers (Oct. 3, 2012) westerns18 Press Release, Leahy & Grassley Press Administration on Use of Cell Phone Tracking Program (Dec. 31, 2014) ......ccccseeseeeteeetees4 Rachel EmmaSilverman, Bosses Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers Might Get Sick, Wall St. J. (Feb. 17, 2016)...........25 Remarks on Health Insurance Reform and an Exchange With Reporters in San Jose, California, 2013 Daily Comp.Pres. Doc. 397 (June 7, 2013) w.cccecccsccsscsscesssssssseseseecsessceceevacersatseseavseeas23 Ryan Gallagher, FBI Files Reveal New Info on Clandestine Phone Surveillance Unit, Slate (Oct. 8, 2013) ..cccccsccesssessesstseseee,4 Senate Rebuffs Domestic Spy Plan, Wired (Jan. 23, 2002) ...c.ccecseee: 16 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 Harv. J. L & Tech. 1 (2014) oo.eeesesesessesesessesecsscsesvsvsesvsvsesevacasseeesaeeusaacans2,3 Steve Lohr, Data Expert Is Cautious About Misuse of Information, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2003) ...c.ccsccsscsscesesesseseesecseseees 16 Steven Aftergood, Privacy and the Imperative ofOpen Government, in Privacy in the Modern Age: The Searchfor Solutions 19 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz, & Jeramie Scott CdS., 2015) occsecececescsesesessesesecsecsecscsussscssssssveceessesesacevsssusavacens21 Tara Parker-Pope, Keeping Score on How You Take Your Medicine, N.Y. Times (June 20, 2011) .occcccceseceeseesscecessseseeseaees25 The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights Press Release, Civil Rights, Privacy, and Media Rights Groups Release Principlesfor Law Enforcement Body Worn Cameras (May 15, 2015)... cecesesesesesesesesesscsecscsessscscsvevevseeesaveesevavacatatansnsas 12 Tim Cushing, State AG: We Have A Warrant Requirement For Stingrays, State Police: FILE(S) NOTFOUND,Techdirt (Mar. 2, 2016). eeccccscccesescsseesesscstscsecsesssseeseceessecscscscsssessvsessesecesesacseeusaeeaeas 8 White House Press Release, FACTSHEET:Strengthening Community Policing (Dec. 1, 2014) ...cccccccesssssssseesescesesecsessesesseasees 8 Vi SUMMARYOF THE ARGUMENT Automatic License Plate Readers (“ALPRs’) are a technology of mass surveillance. This technology indiscriminately collects personalinformation, unrelated to any particular investigation, and should be subject to public scrutiny. The lowercourt’s interpretation ofthe “investigative record” exemption would undermine the purpose of California’s Public Records Act. This is especially troubling given other similar programs—cell-site simulators, police body-worn cameras, and fusion centers—that pose significant threats to the privacy of everyday Americans. Public scrutiny is essential to counter the unique threats posed by these programsofbroad-scale surveillance. EPIC’s experience obtaining important information about these programs under the federal FOIA andthe reforms that followed demonstrate the need for public access to information about the Automated License Plate Reader technology. ARGUMENT I. Open records laws enable public scrutiny of surveillance technologies. California law enforcement agencies are deploying new surveillance systems—-Automated License Plate Readers,cell-site simulators, fusion centers, and police body-worn cameras—that indiscriminately collect data about individuals. These programsraise substantial privacy concerns. The public’s ability to obtain information about these programsis critical to prevent misuse and abuse. A. Open Records laws havelimited the use of cell-site simulators. A cell-site simulator, also knownasa “stingray,”? is a surveillance device that can monitorcell phoneactivity, identify and locate mobile devices, and even intercept mobile communications of individuals whoare not the target of any particular investigation. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 Harv. J. L & Tech. 1, 16-18 (2014); Aimee Thomson, Cellular Dragnet: Active Cell Site Simulators and the Fourth Amendment 5-10 (Jan. 14, 2015).! Prior to the release of documents under federal andstate open governmentlaws,see, e.g., EPIC, EPIC v. FBI - Stingray / Cell Site Simulator (2016),’ the public was largely unaware of the widespread * The trademark “StingRay”refers specifically to the cellsite simulator produced by Harris Corporation. StingRay & AmberJack, Harris Corporation,http://files.cloudprivacy.net/Harris_Stingray_ product_sheet.pdf(last visited Apr. 29, 2016). The term “stingray,” however, has becomethe genericized term forall cell site simulators. ~ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2546052. ° http://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/. deploymentof stingrays, and their use was not subject to congressionaloversight, see Brad Heath, Police Secretly Tirack Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA Today (Aug.24, 2015).° As aresult of these disclosures, Congress convenedhearings and the Department ofJustice adopted new procedures. The government has attemptedto keep stingray use secret, in part by failing to disclose stingray devices to courts when submitting pen register applications. Pell & Soghoian, supra, at 34-40. As a result, state and local police departments have used stingrays thousandsoftimes without judicialor legislative oversight. See, e.g., Brett Clarkson, Who’s Tracking Your Cellphone Now? Could be the Cops, SunSentinel (May 17, 2014)’ (“Florida Department ofLaw Enforcement spokeswomanGretl Plessinger said in an email: “This technology hasbeen utilized approximately 1,800 times by FDLE and Electronic Surveillance Support Teams.””). But public awareness has grownin the last few years, thanksin part to public records requests, e.g., EPIC, EPIC v. FBI- Stingray / Cell Site Simulator (2016); ACLU,Stingray Tracking Devices: Who's ° http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police- stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181/. ’ http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-05-17/news/fl-cell-site- simulator-surveillance-florida-20140507_1_stingray-cellphone- simulator. Got Them?® (collecting news reports of cell site simulator operations by state and local law enforcement agencies). In response to EPIC’s federal FOIA suit against the FBI, the public first obtained in 2013 “non-disclosure” agreements between federal and state law enforcement agenciesthathadstrictly limited information about stingray use for a decade. Ryan Gallagher, FBI Files Reveal New Info on Clandestine Phone Surveillance Unit, Slate (Oct. 8, 2013).’ In 2014, Senators Grassley and Leahy wroteto the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security regarding the use ofcell site simulators. As a result, both agencies adopted procedures to limit the use of the devices. Press Release, Leahy & Grassley Press Administration on Use of Cell Phone Tracking Program (Dec. 31, 2014);'° DOJ, Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policyfor Use ofCell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015);'' Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Deputy Secretary of DHS,to Sarah Saldafia, Assistant Secretary, USCIS; Joseph Clancy, Director, U.S. Secret Service; R. Gil Kerlikowske, 8 https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). ° http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/08/fbi_wireless_ intercept_and_tracking_team_files_reveal_new_information_on.html. 0 http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/leahy-grassley- press-administration-use-cell-phone-tracking-program. " https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces- enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators. S e t t e e B o m Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; Peter Neffenger, Administrator, TSA; & L. Eric Patterson, Director, Federal Protective Service, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2015). The concerns aboutcell-site simulators that prompted the federal FOIA requests and led to the actions by the Congress and the response by federal agencies, havealso given rise to changes in California and other states. Public records requests in California have also revealed that at least 13 police and sheriff's departments use stingrays, in addition to the California DepartmentofJustice. They include: Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, Anaheim Police Department, Freemont Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, Oakland Police Department, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department, San Diego Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's Department, San Francisco Police Department, San Jose Police Department, and Ventura County Sheriff's Department. Michael Bott & Thom Jensen, 9 Calif’ Law Enforcement Agencies Connected To Cellphone Spying Technology, ? https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department”% 20Policy%20Regarding%20the%20Use%200f%20Cell- Site%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf. 5 ABC 10 News(Mar. 6, 2014);’* Matt Cagle, Dirtbox Over Disneyland? New Docs Reveal Anaheim’s Cellular Surveillance Arsenal, ACLU of N.Cal. (Jan. 27, 2016);'* Jon Campbell, LAPD Spy Device Taps Your Cell Phone, LA Weekly (Sept. 13, 2012);'> Mike Katz-Lacabe, Ventura County SheriffReleases Unredacted FBINDA for Harris StingRay, Ctr. for Human Rights & Privacy (May4, 2015);'® K. Kaufmann, Law Enforcement Officials: Cell Phone Disclosures Would Hurt Investigations, Desert Sun (Feb. 15, 2014);"” Melissa Mecija, Local Police Dealt With Company That Makes Controversial Cellphone Tracking Technology, ABC 10 News (Aug. 4, 2014).'* But California has 509 state and local law enforcement agencies as of 2008 (the most recent census year), so current public knowledge covers only 2.7% of California agencies. Brian A. Reaves, Census ofState and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, NCJ ' hnttp://legacy.abc10.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/2014/ 03/06/5-california-law-enforcement-agencies-connected-to-stingrays/ 6147381/. " https://www.aclunc.org/blog/dirtbox-over-disneyland-new-docs- reveal-anaheim-s-cellular-surveillance-arsenal. 5 http://www.laweekly.com/news/lapd-spy-device-taps-your-cell- phone-2176376. ‘6 http://www.cehrp.org/ventura-county-sheriff-releases-unredacted- fbi-nda-for-harris-stingray/. 7 http :?//www.desertsun.com/story/tech/2014/02/16/law-enforcement- officials-cell-phone-disclosures-would-hurt-investigations/5528517/. 8 http://www.| Onews.com/news/local-police-dealt-with-company- that-makes-controversial-cellphone-tracking-technology-08052014. 6 233982, DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics 15 (July 201 1).’States have now imposedrestrictions on stingray use. California has mandated that police officers in the state obtain a warrant before using stingrays during investigations. Cyrus Farivar, California Cops, Want To Use a Stingray? Get A Warrant, Governor Says, Ars Technica (Oct. 8, 2015)” (discussing S.B. 178, the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act). Other states have passed similar laws restricting cell phone locationtracking. E.g., Leg. Doc. 415, 126th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013);”' S. B. SF 2466, 88th Leg., 3d Engrossment (Minn. 2014);” H. B. 603, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2013);3 H. B. 128, 2014 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014). Although these are promising developments, the public must still be able to review recordsthe use of cell-site simulators. Despite the federal government’s self-imposed warrant requirement, House Judiciary Committee leaders also sharply criticized the FBI for limiting disclosure of stingray information in a way that “shields the " http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf, 0 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/california-governor- signs-new-law-mandating-warrant-for-stingray-use/. 1 http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_126th/chapters/ PUBLIC409.asp. ? https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=SF2466& version=3&session=Is88&session_year=2014&session_number=0 3 http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2013/billhtml/HB0603.htm. ** http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/hb0128.html. 7 technology from debate.” Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee to Mr. James B. Comey,Director, FBI (Mar. 25, 2016).”° Transparency will help ensure agency compliance with newly imposedrestrictions. Tim Cushing, State AG: We Have A Warrant Requirement For Stingrays; State Police: FILE(S) NOTFOUND,Techdirt (Mar. 2, 2016)”° (discussing how Delaware State Police have no records of the warrants that the Delaware Attorney General says police must obtain before using stingrays). Transparencywill also ensure that law and policy can appropriately respond to technological developments. B. Police body-worn camerasraise substantial privacy concerns and shoud besubject to public scrutiny The use of body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) is increasing police surveillance of individuals across the country. In December 2014, the Obama Administration budgeted $75 million over three years to subsidize the purchase of 50,000 cameras. White House Press Release, FACTSHEET: Strengthening Community Policing (Dec.1, 2014).*” In 2015,the Departmentof Justice’s Body-Worn Camera > http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/stingray_technology__ letter.pdf. *° https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160223/121635 33688/state-ag- we-have-warrant-requirement-stingrays-state-police-files-not- found.shtml. 77 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet- strengthening-community-policing. 8 Pilot Implementation Program awarded nearly $20 million to purchase 21,000 cameras. Office of Justice Programs, DOJ, Body-Worn Camera Program Fact Sheet.”* Six different locales in California were awarded funds throughthe pilot implementation program.Id. Police body-worn cameras (“BWCs’) are audio and video recording devices typically mounted on the chest, shoulder, or head area ofthe police officer. Bureau of Justice Assistance, DOJ, Body- Worn Camera Toolkit: Technology (2016).”’ These devices record the activities of individuals from the viewpoint ofthe officer. Generally, officers are expected to turn their cameras on wheneverthey are interacting with civilians in public. Jd. Most body cameras also have a buffer to capture anywhere from 3-60 secondsofthe footage prior to initiation, which meansthat they are recordingat all times. National Institute for Justice, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center System, Body-Worn Camerasfor Criminal Justice: Market Survey (Mar. 2014). The buffer or pre-event recording typically only includesthe visual aspect but some BWCsalso record audio. Seeid. BWCssystemsrangein their technical capabilities. Most body camerasrecord in high definition at a minimal speed of 30 frames per *8 https://www.bja.gov/bwe/pdfs/BWCPIP-Award-Fact-Sheet.pdf. ? https://www.bja.gov/bwe/Topics-Technology.html. 9 second. National Institute for Justice, supra. The cameras can record from 3-12 hours of video on one charge and often have a night mode for dark conditions. Jd. Mostif not all body camerasincludea date and time stampofthe recordings and several BWC systems have GPS capabilities. /d. The widespread use of BWCswill sharply increase indiscriminate surveillance of the public. In Los Angeles, one of the departments that received federal funding, law enforcement agencies are planning to purchase an additional 6,000 camerasto addto their 860 current BWCs. Kate Mather, LAPD Report Defends Ambitious Plan to Outfit Officers with Body Cameras, L.A. Times (Mar. 18, 2016). Last year between August and December the LAPD recorded and uploaded an average of 237 hours of BWCper day. LAPD, LAPD ’s Body Worn Video Program — Supplemental Report (Mar. 16, 2016).*° As the use of BWCshas expanded,so has the interest in using the camerasasa tool of surveillance. The body camera vendor, Strategic Systems Alliance, has body cameras capable of performing license plate and facial recognition.*' Police in Colorado have already expressedinterest in body cameras with facial recognition *0 http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/032216/BPC_16-0081.pdf. *T http //www.stratersys.com/. 10 capabilities. Michael De Yoanna, Colorado Police Cautiously Eager about Body Cameras That Recognize Faces, Colo. Pub. Radio (July 19, 2015).** Police body camerarecords,like license plate records, will need to be released to the public to provide the necessary oversight of their use. Similar to the BWCs, police dashboard cameras were implemented asa toolof police oversight after numerousallegations ofracial profiling by police conducting traffic stops. Caught on Camera: The History ofthe Police Dashcam, NBC NewsDigital (Oct. 22, 2015). Like with BWCs, ALPRs, and othertools of surveillance, public record accessis essential to ensure proper oversight. Recent events surrounding public access to police dashcam footage demonstrate how importantpublic record accessis for oversight and accountability. In October 2014 Chicago Police Office Jason Van Dykeshotand killed 17-year-old Laquan McDonald. Daily Southtown, Freelance Write Exposes Police Shooting Cover-up, Chicago Tribune (Dec. 2, 2015).** The Chicago Police claimed that *? http://www.cpr.org/news/story/colorado-police-cautiously-eager- about-body-cameras-recognize-faces. *3 http://www.nbenews.com/feature/long-story-short/video/caught-on- camera-the-history-of-the-police-dashcam-5487084 19951. 4 http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily- southtown/opinion/ct-sta-reeder-mcdonald-shooting-st-1203- 20151202-story.html. ll the teenager had lunged at an officer with a knife. Jd. It was only after freelance reporter, Brandon Smith,filed a request underthe Illinois freedom of information law for the video and subsequently sued to get it did the truth comeout. Jd. Laquan McDonald neverlunged at police and he was shot 16 timesby a single officer while walking away from the police. Jd. The video was released 13 monthsafter the incident and only whenits release became imminent did the officer who shot Mr. McDonald get charged with murder. Jd. For BWCsto be aneffective tool for police accountability, the public will need access to the record ofpolice conduct. Civil Rights, Privacy, Media Rights, and Open Governmentgroupsall agreethat public access to BWCfootageis essential for police accountability. The Leadership Conference on Civil and HumanRights Press Release, Civil Rights, Privacy, and Media Rights Groups Release Principlesfor Law Enforcement Body Worn Cameras (May 15, 2015);°° D.C. Open Government Coalition, Coalition Presents State- by-State Police Body Cam Research.** Where the government has sought to restrict or exempt public access to BWC footage there has been pushback.See, e.g., Kelly Swanson, Advocates Push Back Against FOIA Exemptionsfor Bodycam Footage, Reporters Comm. % http://www.civilrights.org/press/2015/body-camera-principles.html. 6 http://www.dcoge.org/printpdf/content/coalition-presents-state- state-police-body-cam-research-0. 12 for Freedom of the Press (June 9, 2015).°” Transparency through public accessis essential to legitimizing BWCsas a tool of police accountability. See Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic, Police Body Cam Footage: Just Another Public Record (Dec. 2015).°8 Indeed, even EPIC, which does not support the adoption of BWCsbecauseofthe privacyrisks, advocates for public access to the agency records of BWCsystems. Body Cameras: Can Technology Increase Protectionfor Law Enforcement Officers and the Public: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime andTerrorism oftheS. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong., 4-5 (2015) (statement of the Electronic Privacy Information Center).*” Attorney General Loretta Lynch hasstated, “Body-worn cameras hold tremendous promise for enhancing transparency, promoting accountability, and advancing public safety for law enforcementofficers and the communities they serve.” DOJ Press Release, Justice Department Announces $20 Million in Funding to °7 http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/advocates- push-back-against-foia-exemptions-bodycam-footage. *® http://isp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/publications/police_body_ camerafootage-_just_another_public_record.pdf. * https://epic.org/privacy/testimony/EPIC-Body-Camera-Statement- 05-19-15.pdf. 13 Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May1, 2015) (emphasis added).*° A broad interpretation of the investigative record exemption will not only undermine public oversight of ALPR programs,butit will threaten the police accountability promised by BWCs. C. Freedom of information laws have also enabled oversight of “fusion centers.” Overthe past ten years, the Department of Homeland Security has facilitated the “receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing” of information about individuals through the “fusion center” program. DHS,National Network ofFusion Centers Fact Sheet (2016).‘' Given the broad scope of data collected about everyday Americans, these programs require intense public scrutiny and oversight to ensure strong privacy protections. See EPIC, Information Fusion Centers and Privacy (2016)."* The Department of Homeland Security has recognized that it cannot simply conduct these programsinsecret without public knowledge, and has provided resourcesto learn about their development. DHS, Resourcesfor Fusion Centers (2016).The “9 https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20- million-funding-support-body-worn-camera-pilot-program. *" https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet. % https://epic.org/privacy/fusion/. * https://www.dhs.gov/resources-fusion-centers. 14 agency has never suggestedthat providing information about these programsimpacts individualinvestigations. But even where the governmenthas provided the public with information about programs,thereis still a need for additional accountability through public records requests. Even though the government acknowledgedits increasing reliance on fusion centers nationwide—see DHS, 2014 National Network ofFusion Centers Final Report 9 (Jan. 2015);“4 DHS, Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information (Apr. 21, 201 6)"°—freedom of information requests arestill necessary to ensure that the public understands what data is being collected and prevents abuse. Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the rollout of fusion centers nationwide, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency created a program aimedat achieving “total information awareness.” DARPA, Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program (2003).*° EPIC wasable to obtain documents about the program underthe federal Freedom of ** https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014%20 National%20Network%200f%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20 Report_1.pdf. * https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact- information. * https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/may03_report.pdf. 15 Information Act. EPIC, “Terrorism” Information Awareness (2016). Soonafter this and other information was uncovered aboutthe program, lawmakers held hearings and reacted to the government’s overreach. Senate Rebuffs Domestic Spy Plan, Wired (Jan. 23, 2002)."* Following these developments, formerofficials acknowledgedthe need for greater privacy protections to prevent misuse. See Steve Lohr, Data Expert Is Cautious About Misuse of Information, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2003).”” These public oversight efforts played a key role in underscoring the need forlimits on broad scale data collection—collection that would subsequently be taken on by fusion centers. Fusion centers, which operate at the local level, combine records from federal and state agencies, and governmentandprivate record systems. They are the “local arm”ofthe intelligence community, the 17 federal agencies administered by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and coordinated by the National Counterterrorism Center. Nat’! Counterterrorism Ctr., Overview;>° Office of the Dir. of Nat’! Intelligence, Membersofthe IC.°' "7 https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/#foia. “8 http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/01/57386. ”° http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/25/technology/25DATA.html. *0 https://www.ncte.gov/overview.html(last visited May 1, 2016). >! https://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members- of-the-ic (last visited May 1, 2016). 16 The term “fusion center”—first coined by the Department of Defense—refersto the “fusing” of information from public and private sources for analysis. See EPIC, Information Fusion Centers and Privacy (2016). Today there are two types of fusion centers: (1) primary fusion centers, which provide “information sharing and analysis for an entire state,” and (2) recognized fusion centers, which provide “information sharing and analysis for a major urban area.” DHS, Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information, supra.” Primary fusion centers receive “the highest priority for the allocation of federal resources to centers” because they are “the focus points within the state and local environmentforthe receipt, analysis, gathering, andsharing ofthreat-related information,”in addition to having “responsibilities related to the coordinationofcritical operational capabilities across the statewide fusion process with recognized fusion centers and nodes.” Info. Sharing Env’t, Information Sharing Environment Guidance: Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC), ISE-G-112, at 3 (June 3, 2011).” California has six fusion centers: one primary (California State Threat Assessment Center) and five recognized (Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, CA; Los Angeles Joint Regional »? https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact- information. 3 http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/RAC_final.pdf. 17 Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, CA; Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, CA; Orange CountyIntelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, CA; San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, CA). DHS, Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information, supra. Serious problems with fusion centers remain, underscoring the ongoing need for public oversight. E.g., Permanent Subcomm.on Investigations, Investigative Report Criticizes Counterterrorism Reporting, Waste at State & Local Intelligence Fusion Centers (Oct. 3, 2012)" (finding that DHSintelligence officers at state and local fusion centers “produced intelligence of uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy,rarely timely, sometimes endangeringcitizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Actprotections, occasionally taken from already- published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Fusion centers have also spearheaded the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (“NSI’”’), which poses serious threats to fundamentalcivilliberties. EPIC, Suspicious Activity Reporting (2016)°°; see Nationwide SAR Initiative, Nationwide SAR “4 https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/ investigative-report-criticizes-counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at- state-and-local-intelligence-fusion-centers. °° https://epic.org/privacy/suspicious-activity-reporting/. 18 Initiative (2016).°° The NSIis a “joint collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state, local, and territorial law enforcement partners”to identify and report suspiciousactivity across the country, as well as to centrally share suspiciousactivity reporting (“SAR”) information. Nationwide SAR Initiative, supra. For the purposes of the NSI, “suspiciousactivity”is “To]bserved behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.” Info. Sharing Env’t, Functional Standard (FS) Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Version 1.5.5, SE-FS-200,at 4 (Feb. 23, 2015)” [hereinafter FS SAR]. Individuals,state, and federal officials can all report suspiciousactivity. /d. at 4, 58. Federal guidance mandates that a state, federal, local, tribal, or territorial official investigateall suspicious activity observations to determine whetherthe activity is innocent or worthy of escalation to a SAR./d. at 53. Investigative techniques include personal observations, interviews with the subject, or accessing a number of information databases.Id. Once a SARhasbeencreated, the information undergoes additional analysis before becoming an Information Sharing ° https://nsi.ncirc.gov/?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. *7 https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/SAR_FS_1.5.5_IssuedFeb 2015.pdf. 19 Environment SAR (“ISE-SAR”): a SAR “that has been determined, pursuant to a two-part process, to have a potential nexus to terrorism (i.e., to be reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism).” FS SAR, supra, at 3. Yet federal agency guidance suggests that lawfulor constitutionally protected behavior—suchas “[l]earning how to operate, or operating an aircraft,” “[q]uestioning individuals or otherwise soliciting information at a level beyond mere curiosity,” “[t]aking pictures or video of persons,facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in an unusualor surreptitious manner,”or “[a]ttempts to obtain or conducttraining or otherwise obtain knowledgeor skills in security concepts, military weaponsortactics, or other unusual capabilities”’—canjustify creation of an ISE-SAR.Jd. at 41-50. Once information becomes an ISE-SAR,it can be shared with the FBI, homeland security personnel, and state and local law enforcement agencies, Following the rollout of NSI suspicious activity reporting systems, there has been a strong opposition in California and across the country based on the “lack of a reasonable suspicion threshold” and the fact that innocent activities such as “taking photosofpublic buildings, using binoculars and taking notes about building measurements” could provide the basis for a report. Kelly Goff, Los 20 Angeles Panel to Gauge Concern Over LAPD Surveillance Programs, L.A. Daily News (Mar. 5, 2014).°* Public outcry overthe use ofthese reports has also led the LAPDto prohibit reports “taken on the basis of race, creed orreligion,” and continued public pressurehas led to oversight hearings by the city’s Human Relations Commission. Id. Public records requests are necessary to ensure that agencies continue to follow these newrules. Il. Transparencyis necessary to ensure accountability for indiscriminate public surveillance. It is critically important that open government laws enable public access to information about law enforcement surveillance programs.“[T]he essential problem raised by secret bulk collection of telephone metadata records [was] the fact that the public was denied any opportunity to grant—or withhold—its consentto this practice.” Steven Aftergood, Privacy and the Imperative ofOpen Government, in Privacy in the Modern Age: The Searchfor Solutions 19, 20 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz, & Jeramie Scott eds., 2015). First, these programsare surreptitious by nature; individuals have no other way of learning how muchdatais collected or howit is used. Second, the use of indiscriminate surveillance without public oversight will have a chilling effect on lawfulactivities. And third, such broad-scale °8 http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20140305/los- angeles-panel-to-gauge-concern-over-lapd-surveillance-programs. 21 surveillance systems present opportunities for abuse. “Transparencyis a prerequisite of accountability, and whereit is not mission-critical, the cloak of secrecy that covers entire electronic surveillance programsbynationalintelligence shouldbelifted.” KristinaIrion, Accountability Unchained: Bulk Data Retention, Preemptive Surveillance, and Transatlantic Data Protection, in Privacy in the Modern Age 78, 83-84. A. Indiscriminate surveillance programspose a unique threat to privacy. Unlike traditional andtargeted investigatory techniques, indiscriminate surveillance systems pose unique threats to privacy that require a greater degree oftransparency andoversight. “[T]hese new technologies raise concerns aboutthe privacy of those who are— rightly or wrongly—thetargets of the new technologies.” Comm. on Privacy in the Info. Age, Nat’] Research Council, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in the Digital Age 254 (James Waldoet al. eds. 2007). This is especially true as government agencies seek to compile large data sets to be analyzed in a way that can reveal much more about individuals’ traits and behaviorsthat initially expected. See Exec. Office of the Pres., Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective ix (May 2014)”(noting that “big data”is big “in the 8 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-may2014.pdf. 22 quantity and variety of data that are available to be processed,” and also big “in the scale of analytics . . . that can be applied to those data, ultimately to make inferences and draw conclusions”). For example, a recent study showedthat telephonecall data, whencollected indiscriminately and subject to close analysis, revealed “unambiguously sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time window,” Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone:Tihe Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, Web Policy (Mar.12, 2014). This discovery contradicted numerous statements by government officials dismissing privacy concerns about the Section 215 telephone metadata surveillance program. Remarks on Health Insurance Reform and an Exchange With Reporters in San Jose, California, 2013 Daily Comp.Pres. Doc. 397, at 4-5 (June 7, 2013)”(stating that the Section 215 telephone metadata surveillance program is not looking at content); Ed O’Keefe, Transcript: Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss Explain, Defend NSA Phone Records Program, Wash.Post (June 6, 6° iittp://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of- telephone-metadata/. ©! https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300397/pdt/DCPD- 201300397.pdf. 23 2013)(“As you know,this is just metadata. There is no content involved.”). Instead, Mayer foundthat just matching called phone numbers to public phonedirectors on Yelp and Google Places allowed for a numberofsensitive inferences. Mayer & Mutchler, supra. Participants called “Alcoholics Anonymous, gun stores, NARAL Pro- Choice, labor unions,divorce lawyers, sexually transmitted disease clinics, a Canadian import pharmacy,strip clubs, and much more,” allowingfor direct inferences of purpose.Id. Calls to specialty medical practice areas allow an inference thatthe calleris seeking specialty medical care (e.g., sexual and reproductive health; cardiology; neurology). /d. In addition,a pattern of calls can be even more revealing. /d. For example, one participant “spokeat length with cardiologists at a major medicalcenter, talked briefly with a medical laboratory, received calls from a pharmacy, and placed short calls to a homereporting hotline for a medical device used to monitor cardiac arrhythmia”—andlater corroborated the participant’s medical condition. /d. Anotherparticipant“hada long, early morning call with hersister. Two dayslater, she placeda series ofcalls to the local ° https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 2013/06/06/transcript-dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain- defend-nsa-phone-records-program/. 24 Planned Parenthood location. She placed brief additional calls two weekslater, and madea final call a month after.” Jd. Research has also shownthat large data sets collected for other purposes can reveal sensitive—and unexpected—facts about individuals. A 2016 report revealed that insurance claims, credit histories, and voter histories can predict precise individual health needs, such as whois at risk for diabetes or a heart attack, who is considering costly medical procedures, and whois pregnant. Rachel EmmaSilverman, Bosses Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers Might Get Sick, Wall St. J. (Feb. 17, 2016).© Retailer Target discovered that women whopurchasedlarger quantities of unscented lotion, cotton balls, and vitamin supplements werelikely pregnant, and couldpredict their due date to the month. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, Forbes (Feb. 16, 2012).FICO,a credit score generation company, discovered that publicly available data such as home ownership and job status can “predict which patients are at highest risk for skipping or incorrectly using prescription medications.” Tara Parker-Pope, Keeping Score on How You Take Your Medicine, N.Y. ° http://www.wsj.com/articles/bosses-harness-big-data-to-predict- which-workers-might-get-sick-1455664940#:Tt2bneJzyT0qGA. * http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target- figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father- did/#5c4246cd34c6. 25 Times (June 20, 2011).° And researchers recently discovered that analysis of Twitter user posts can clearly signal prescription medication abuse. Abeed Sarkeret al., Social Media Miningfor Toxicovigilance: Automatic Monitoring ofPrescription Medication Abusefrom Twitter, 39 Drug Safety 231, 231 (2016). Large sets of data, even innocuous data, can now beanalyzed to reveal sensitive information about individuals. Consequently, the privacy risks are heightened and thusindiscriminate surveillance programs,like the ALPR program, require greater transparency and oversight of the data collected. B. Public access to state records is necessary to assess the impact of programsof indiscriminate surveillance. Public disclosure of ALPR data is necessary to understand the scope and impact of the massive data collection program. Information collected from the general public to identify stolen cars might eventually be used to build profiles of individuals based on travel patterns, the placestheyvisit, and the people they know. Butthe public and lawmakers cannot meaningfully limit the government’s use of that data if they are not awareofthe scopeofthe program,the data 6° http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/201 1/06/20/keeping-score-on-how- you-take-your-medicine/. 66 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40264-015-0379-4, 26 that is collected, or how it is used. Thatis the reason for open records laws, such as the California Public Records Act. Public disclosure has played a key role in facilitating oversight of governmentsurveillance programs. A FOIA lawsuit pursued by EPIC about the DHS monitoring of social network and media organizations produced 285 pages of documents. EPIC v. DHS, 999 F. Supp.2d 6, 75 (D.D.C. 2013). These documents revealed that DHS was monitoring for media reports and social media that reflected negatively against the agency. EPIC, EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security: Media Monitoring (2016).°’ The documentsled to a Congressional hearing on DHS’s social media monitoring program. See DHS Monitoring ofSocial Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism andIntelligence ofthe H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (2012). The purposeof freedom of information lawsis to promote governmenttransparency. The federal Freedom ofInformation Act, 5 USS.C. § 552,is “the law that keeps citizens in the know abouttheir government.” DOJ, What is FOIA2° The California Public Records Act “declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the °7 http://epic.org/foia/epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/. ° http://www.foia.gov/about.html(last visited May 2, 2016). 27 people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every personin this state.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 6250 (West 2016). And thanks to the overwhelming approvalofProposition 59 by California voters in 2004, the California Constitution enshrines the people’s “right of access to information concerning the conductofthe people’s business.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 3(b)(1). 28 CONCLUSION Amicus Curiae EPIC respectfully requests that this Court rule in favor of the Petitioners and reverse the decision of the lower court. Dated: May 5, 2016 29 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Alan Butler MARC ROTENBERG ALAN BUTLER JERAMIE SCOTT AIMEE THOMSON ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 1718 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: (202) 483-1140 Fax: (202) 483-1248 Counselfor Amicus Curiae CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT I certify pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.520thatthis Application For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief And Amicus Curiae Brief OfElectronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) In Support Of Petitioners is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 13 points or more, contains 4,867 words, excluding the cover,thetables, the signature block,the verification, and this certificate, whichis less than the total numberofwords permitted by the Rules of Court. Counsel relies on the word count of the Microsoft Word word- procession program usedto preparethisbrief. Dated: May5, 2016 ALAN BUTLER ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER Counselfor Amicus Curiae CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Alan Butler, do herebyaffirm that I am a citizen of the United States and employed in the City of Washington, District of Columbia. I am over the age of 18 years andnot a party to the within action. My business address is 1718 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20009. On May5, 2016, I served the following document: Application For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief And Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) In Support Of Petitioners upon eachofthe parties by placing a true and correct copy of the document, enclosed in a sealed envelope, on the persons below as follows: Peter Bibring ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West Eighth Street Los Angeles, CA Counsel for Petitioner American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California Jennifer Ann Lynch Electronic Frontier Foundation 815 Eddy Street San Francisco, CA | Counselfor Petitioner Electronic Frontier Foundation James Christopher Jardin Collins Collins Muir & Stewart, LLP 1100 El Centro Street South Pasadena, CA Counsel for Real Party in Interest County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Lisa S. Berger Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office 600 City Hall East 200 North Main Street Los Angeles, CA Counsel for Real Party in Interest City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Police Department Clerk of the Court of Appeal of California Second Appellate District Division Three Ronald Reagan State Building 300 S. Spring Street 2nd Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 Clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court 111 North Hill St. Los Angeles, CA 90012 I deposited the sealed envelopes with the United States Postal Service, with postage thereon fully prepaid. The envelopes were placed in the mail in Washington, D.C. I declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this document was executed on May 5, 2016. ALAN BUTLER
