FRIENDS OF THE EEL RIVER v. NORTH COAST RAILROAD AUTHORITY (NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY)Appellants, Californians for Alternatives to Toxics and Friends of Eel River, Request for Judicial NoticeCal.August 27, 2015 SUPREME COURT FILED AUG 27 2015 Case No, 8222472 In the Supreme Court of the State of California Frank A. McGuire Clerk FRIENDS OF THE EEL RIVER AND CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO ToRRRuty Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS. NORTH COAST RAILROAD AUTHORITY AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NORTH COAST RAILROAD AUTHORITY, Defendants and Respondents, NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. After a Decision by the Court ofAppeal First Appellate District, Division One, Case Nos. A139222, A139235 Appeal from Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Marin Case Nos. CIV 1103605, CIV 1103591 The Honorable Roy Chernus, Presiding PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Ellison Folk (SBN 149232) Sharon E. Duggan* (SBN 105108) Amy J. Bricker* (SBN 227073) 336 Adeline Street Edward T. Schexnayder (SBN 284494) Oakland, California 94607-2520 Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP foxduggan@aol.com 396 Hayes Street Telephone: (510) 271-0825 San Francisco, California 94102-4421 Facsimile: By Request folk@smwlaw.com bricker@smwlaw.com Attorneyfor Californiansfor Alternatives Telephone: (415) 552-7272 to Toxics Facsimile: (415) 552-5816 Attorneysfor Friends ofthe Eel River Additional Counselfor Plaintiffs appear onfollowingpage Helen H. Kang (SBN 124730) Environmental Law and Justice Clinic Golden Gate University School of Law 536 Mission Street San Francisco, California 94105-2921 hkang@ggu.edu Telephone: (415) 442-6647 Facsimile: (415) 896-2450 Attorneysfor Californiansfor Alternatives to Toxics William Verick (SBN 140972) Klamath Environmental Law Center 424 First Street Eureka, California 95501-0404 wverick@igc.org Telephone: (707) 268-8900 Facsimile: (707) 268-8901 Attorneysfor Californiansfor Alternatives to Toxics Deborah A. Sivas (SBN 135446) Environmental Law Clinic Mills Legal Clinic at Stanford Law School 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, California 94305-8610 dsivas@stanford.edu Telephone: (650) 723-0325 Facsimile: (650) 723-4426 Attorneysfor Californiansfor Alternatives to Toxics MOTION AND MEMORANDUMOF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT Pursuant to Rules 8.520(9) and 8.252(a) of the California Rules of Court and Sections 452(d) and 459 of the Evidence Code, Plaintiffs Friends of the Eel River and Californians for Alternatives to Toxics hereby move this Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit A, attached hereto. This documentwas not presentedto the trial court because it relates to the California Attorney General’s filing of amicus brief in this proceeding. Exhibit A containsa true and correct copy of Defendants’ Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Ass’n ofAm. R.Rs. v. Cal. Office ofSpill Prevention and Response, Case No. 2:14-cv-02354-TLN- CKD (E.D.Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). Evidence Code section 459 allows a reviewing court to take judicial notice of any matter specified in section 452. Section 452(d) allows a court to take judicial notice of “[r]ecords of . . . any court of record of the United States.” Exhibit A is an official court record filed by the California Attorney General’s Office in a proceeding before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, and it is relevant to the Attorney General’s arguments with respect to the preemptive reach ofthe Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. In Exhibit A, the Attorney Generalarguesthat the ICCTA does not preempt generally-applicable state laws. including “direct environmentalregulations,” that have only a remote or incidentaleffect on rail transportation. This assertion supports Plaintiffs’ arguments in the present case that the ICCTA does not preempt the application of CEQAto a public rail agency’s internal decisionmaking process regarding the repair and reopening of the North Coast Rail Line. Forthe foregoing reasons,the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant this Motion. Dated: August 26, 2015 Respectfully submitted, SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP By: CLbvanr Folk/pas ELLISON FOLK Attorneys for Friends of the Eeli LAW OFFICES OF SHARON E. DUGGAN y_ SSttaron LAggerLo ” ARON E. DUGGAN Attorneys for Californians for“a, To Toxics G o a | O N M N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 |, 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 1 of 27 KAMALAD., HARRIS, STATE BAR NO. 146672 Attorney General of California RANDY L. BARROW, STATE BAR No.111290 Supervising Deputy Attorney General NICHOLAS STERN, STATE BAR No. 148308 Deputy Attorney General CAROLYN NELSON ROWAN,State Bar No. 238526 Deputy Attorney General 1300 I Street, Suite 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Telephone: (916).322-0345 Fax: (916) 322-5609 E-mail: Carolyn.Rowan@doj.ca:gov Attorneysfor Defendants California Office ofSpill Prevention and Response, Thomas M. Cullen, Jr., California Administratorfor Oil Spill Response, and Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General ofthe State ofCalifornia IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN Case No. 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD RAILROADS, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY AND BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF Plaintiffs, | POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Vv. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND | DECLARATORYRELIEF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SPILL Date: December11, 2014 PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, Time: 2:00 p.m. THOMAS M. CULLEN,JR., Dept: 2 CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATOR FOR Judge: The Honorable Troy L. Nunley OIL SPILL RESPONSE,in his official Trial Date: | None Set capacity, AND KAMALAD. HARRIS, Action Filed: October 7, 2014 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,in her official capacity, Defendants. Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) ~ s S N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 2 of 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction .....ccccecscsecsceceseesesseseseeseseeressecneenees ssesseseaevasesaceasccseaseesecsesscseaeceseeeer sseneessaeseeeneeieegeneas 1 Background ..... ce sscsseseseseesesseeneeneesssessenssseasesssennsencasenenesesenanengeangers sessneeeneeynessneenneac aneenneneneeatesnecs 3 I, The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act Responded to Concerns Regarding Discharges of Oil into Marine Waters Of the State..c..cccccccscccccessessesscssessessesceceecsesssesecesnecsassanessecesssenenssisesessenesensers erenerstensegs 3 q. S.B. 861 Expanded the Act to Cover All Waters oftheState........daeeeeeqerenesren seenenes 3 A. Oil Spill Contingency Plans... sssccesssseereessessneeseeseeisseesesereaneesceseecenet ey 4 B Certificates of Financial Responsibility .........:cccceeeeeseeeeeseseseeeseeneneeatenes5 C. Enforcement Provisions..........ssceceseeueeneseeneeseesnceneeescsesesnecceneanenensanennce nen 6 IU. The Administrator Has Not Yet Adopted Regulations Implementing the SB. 861 Amendment. ....cccccccssssescsssseesscensesseessnssseeceeensnesstssnsesssessssecneenersesc nesersees 6 ALBUMent ...ssescsssssssecseessseesssnnscssssrecnsenssnenssesenseteeeeneeteses eee eee et eeg ee gente ettTE EEERE7 I. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter JUTISGICTION...cccccceccsseeesecseeeeceeseesecseseeeeseescensesnecenessceseeenerseseenansesseci enasrasensessrseesteees 7 A. Standard of Review Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule L2(b)(1). .eeseeesseeeseeeeseeeeeenenerenes eaucaneeueceseeuuesecaessecesaeserssiseseeceesaesaeensseneey 7 B. In the Absenceof Final Regulations, the Railroads’ Claims Are Not Ripe for Adjudication......ccsecesesecseeesenenenrerreneeneesersnseses daseneeaeeageesaeteeenes 8 1. The Railroads Do NotSatisfy the Constitutional Component of the Ripeness Doctrine Because their ComplaintIs a Pre- Enforcement Challenge and There Is No ThreatofImminent PLOSECULION.......cecsseeeeeereesteeesseueceescesesesaesenascnseagaseesensanensenreneaneasaaees 8 2. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction Under. the Prudential Componentof the Ripeness Doctrine...........0+ 11, a. The Complaint Does Not Raise Issues Fit for Judicial REVICW....cccecccecscessecectercsetsetecesscsecsesenreeaeneserenaesees 11 (1) Without S.B. 861’s Implementing Regulations, It Is Too Soon to Conductan Analysis of Whether DOT Regulations “Substantially Subsume” the Same Subject Matter for Purposes of FRSA Preemption............ 12 (2) Whether a State Regulation Is Permissible under ICCTAIs a Fact-Intensive Question........... 14 (3) Preemption Analysis Under Other Federal Laws Requires Similar Speculation..........:00 16 b. The Railroads Will Not Suffer Hardship if the Court Withholds Consideration ofthis Matter at this Time........ 17 q. The Railroads’ Claims against OSPR Should Be Dismissed Because They Are Barred By the Eleventh Amendmentto the United States Constitution........ 17 Conclusion......ccccceceececeecececeeceeeaeceeeeceaeeseseneeecaneneeeeeee ee eeseeean esSiuccavseceusessscneacees 19 i Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) u o f f a NA N M N Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 3 of 27 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner 387 US. 136 (1967) seseccccccccssesseessssseecsssnmnesssecececeeneneecessssssetasnannsansseesnegtennennasess e eeete 8,11 Ammex,Inc. v. Cox 351 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2003)... ccsssesesseeseesnecnseneeesseresersneessssensnerecnerasenieescessessesananens egscestnen ite 11 Andrews v. Daw 201 F.3d 521 (4th Cir, 2000)... cecceeececerenseeeerseeneenenereraces cesaseaueucsacenenesaecaecsesaseresusaee essenseseats 18 BNSFRailway Co. v. Box 470 F. Supp. 2d 855 (C.D. Ill. 2007)...--ecseessssesssnsesssnssenesetseneecesensecansennecntenennceneag neesseege 9,15 Boating Industry Associations v. Marshall 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979)....sssssscseeseecseesssnresssnesseersssseneeneencansansanreccsasesseessacnn aneteeegenecnesce 9 Chandler v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. | 598 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010)... eccccessesecseeceesssteesresenssseeeneneaceneassnesenarsenennescarera censuaeansnersgst04s 7 Del Puerto Water Dist. v. U.S. Bureau ofReclamation 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2003)....ssessecsenneersensesenesesenenescsecseenenecaesecsn eceeeeeegeenessesenseey 7 Exxon Corp. v. Heinzé - 32 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1994)....csecesssecseeccensessssneseeeeecnnsensenesenscencenstensscessassnnananenansg nngennsssene e108 8 Franceschi v. Schwartz 57 F.3d 828 (Sth Cir. 1995)... cescseneesssereseeseseassnennenssesesnecnecuesnecevecsanecesssensnensansc eneceunecansssoies 18 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica 511 U.S. 375 (1994) vv cesssseeereerenenees eseeveeeeaeeeneees vessneeeeee vecesnesesuseseenesecetcateneea secenenesseenenaesrenees 7 Louisiana Dept. ofAgriculture & Forestry v. Louisiana Railroad Ass’n No.09-996, 2010 WL 4393899 (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 2010) ....sesssseessesreessseseetseeene senetneens 14, 15, 16 Loyd’s Aviation, Inc. v. Centerfor Environmental Health No. 1:11-CV-01078, 2011 WL 4971866 &.D.Cal. Oct. 19, 2OL1) wee eeeeesssete eeseeeeeeeeees 9, 10 McCarthy v. United States 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988)... cscsecseectscseeesrecssessssssneeesnessnerseesssasessessnrsnsnessatanecenn seensnascensessssete sss 8 New York Susquehanna and Western Railway Corp. v. Jackson 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2007)... .ecsecsecssecsecsneqesnnecsssseressnenseenenseracencessenssnenssssuneenanen sege renee sgeess 2002 14 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Developme nt Comm'n 461 U.S. 190 (1983) sesssssccsvsessssssessssneeseeneensecuneeennnecevessssavenseaenacenceaccenvensssessasasensceng eesnnsg estes itt4y 9 il | Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2: 14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) Case2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 4 of 27 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) . Page PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89 (1984) .ocsesccescescessssneerseescsesressessesenesneensansseecssesssnenmensanaasansnennstatecercecssanessesssenstey 18 Rattlesnake Coal. v. U.S. EPA . 509 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir, 2007)... cccecsceessssessessesneerereserstesenesenetersnenenenenenrereeseatenecescateceesenensees 7 Rhoades v. Avon Products, Inc. 504 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir, 2007)... ccsseeccecssecseseectesnerescersecseensnseereneeneacensencescaceececssenencncesensags 7 Savage v. Glendale Union High School Dist. 343 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003)......:cccccsseeseeteeeeeerereeenensens syieceenecccessescensnessessaasseeentenonnecsssnsenes 7 Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida | 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ccscccccseecsesssssessccssssesseenensseseesseensessarsessseveacsseseeserseasensecnnsenssncasssesennnasysstsetts 18 Smith v. Reyes 904 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D, Cal. 2012) ..-ssssccececcserseceesesretsssenesescennnnnannascerennnnranentsssetetiey 17 Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Public Utility Commission ofthe State ofOregon ; 9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir, 1993)... sescccessssnsssseesssnmnnssssesesesnntenassssnssssseeererentesste sere geet eee tent 2229 13 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 1999).............sosecessaiesnsnancensececuecnreesnessseranennnentaceeanensusetaecanss 8,9, 11,17 U.S. v. Power Co., Inc. 2008 WL 2626989 (D. Nev. 2008).....esccssecsssesesseneereesreaseesenenseessetencnersnsensseassseriesenenerssaaentniees 11 Union Pacific Railroad Companyv. California Public Utilities COMMISSION .....ccciccetseeseeeeeteees 13 . 346F,.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2003) Valeria G. v. Wilson 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ..sssssssesssssssesssseeereecnrersnssesnnsrtisecanarcnnnenteneenessanserets 9,12 YakamaIndian Nation v. Wash. Dep't ofRevenue . 176 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir, 1999)....secssecsssssseseessessesnsecsseesees1 csucssuesteseeresevssesatssesseesesecsvecueeateenecs 18 STATUTES 49 US.C. | §§ 2OLOL-20 167 v.nesseessesseecssecsetenenecreeseeevieereressnecenssansnnenneenenncreneeseescenstessegseneenegs senseseateeeeneeaes 1 § 20106(A) oss scccssecsssscnssecsveessecsssenseeseesnconsecsnetecnneessnssssntansanscaseqneenanecesasacsssrenscanscnaseasensceensnensset 12 § 20106(a)(2) oscecseecsveccsssssessseccessneneeseesnecsnecssecnnsseavecnsesseasaneanensaenaneretancoasanseasnnaseggngsenaseen 12, 13 §§ 20301-20306... ..eiscsesscsssseecseerecseceessnesereesnecsnstsssssenessssessasansrenseecenstessseensesscancsanescessccesenessettes 1 §§ 20701 - 20703 oe seeesssessesssscsseesenecenecnecsvscsnneensnecsseenessseseesennacsusecncenssnconsceaseasereanaenanneasgaaeensertty 1. ill Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2: 14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) O o O o S D 10 11 (12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 5 of 27 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page Cal. Fish and Game Code . § OO ..ecececcsscssecevscsssescsssseessssccessceanecsnensuessesseensrseeensegneneeeneeieegenses eeeieseeet sgt 00 stent 00 COS 2E TC 28e 8 18 Cal. Government Code § 8574.1 — 8574.10 eccesecssssscsssenseesssessneesesnessssseceensssnecsnesnnecsenneccnceqaesenssssnanssneneeengenegeerscees rete 1 § 8670.1 — 8670.95 ....cesccscescsseestecneecneessesssneecsscesnnncareaneceanennensnesnenennes seen eenne stan ee eege sees s0089 Leveseeen 1 § 8670.2... scecueacunscecuraceveracenstenaeecenstieesteeasoennaeneens# suaeecsnccesscseceeevese easeescesentensesseses 3 |. § 8670.2(D) .eccesseeccseveesssecsssseecsseesnecsnecsnreecssnecssssesansceasenancanenesarisnnseesasecsssenassanneceg tenn ceessseee 200 3 § 8670.2(€) coeceecseseseeesseesosseccanecsscesscesceseeesnesssecsnesessesseesnesneneneeeePeQOeeOAStOHHCAHe ee AAg Peg gR e et T sc eee gee 3 § 8670.2()) ..cescesesceeserseserseecsenees sc cccececcuueusevencesunsenscercuensesceeaueuensesueaceseceeeeadeseeeeepagaenasennegeeseeeesaay 3 § 8670.3(BE).eceessecssescrstscsssesssscesecssecssssneessnccenicdoveneassansnasacneccanecenecarecesssenscsnnscesataagesennsenesseeen sc 884 3 § 8670.3(Ag) coeecssecssessssesssnsvccsncensesnacesssecsesnecssnssnseneenseganeeueeneneseeeeeesseneeseeee gegen eeeet ee geese eee 208 3 § 8670.3(B)(L) ccsesccesecsescsseescsseersssnecsaceerecesssessusenssseeseanecnneencenssssasenecnsensanenseneenseeeenseesseer ee 2ees5s 3,4 § 8670.4 vc eeeeecescsssesseeeesseenencererenereneretseseeseaenees sevecteneacsecseneseceeseeaesennecasaeeueareceneesenenenenscseenecuate ns 18 § 8670.5 ccccsesccsecscnecsssecesseseesssscensecuacensceqsssessserssssseenssesneeeueesieensnnesesenssgeeenene gece sg gts cess 2200 18 § 8670.6 .ecselecsecssssesseesssssecsssnscssneesnensseesseesssssersssseneesesneseeneeseegseeseeeeeeeeeseQe gee n g UO s LOTSAeee 18 § 8670.7 ccsscccsesessseesssvssssvssececnsssacanecenseensnnesseessseeessssneaaeeeeeeeeneneesseesGORASeQene se teee stan neg 0us ce eee28 18 § 8670.7. 5 cocccsccsseecsseesssssessssseessneessecssseenseseesnensssseneeaeeasennugeenenes esse eteobeeQeeeeeee cteneg geeteee 4,6 § 8670. LO sceecasecceescesssessssssieseessnecsnceessceesnssesesssssenesnneeeaseeseeneeeeeesseneessee sense eeeesee eee geng tenes ee tee ss reee 80% 5 § 8670.19.........cccceevacanacaeseuageassenceaecsecsessenesscssnenesneeseneeeeeedceeeHsneesseseeeeeeesseneeeeeneaneneenesegnesageesrts 5 § 8670.25 vescccescecsecvsssescssssvececanscsnnceensenssnsnessssnesensssssesneeenyeeguseeQsssene4sseeesseneeanege ne seegeee see eeeeseeee 8084 5 § 8670.27(a) seccauceuscasessensceaeeanensenesscesssussenevavcansonensusceerenssessaees seseasceevensensesenecess esecenseeneentassaceneens 5 § 8670.28....... seneececseeseateserssensenesceueuaceueaccacersesaususeesecseaeeessvanenesseeeneecesdesseneeesesaseensseegsees 4,5, 10 - § 8670.28(a) vevseaessevsessesesseeeesunencesusaceenennnereceeseessnnsneeQAneseQUneeeeQeseeeenesQesseeegeQesseen ee ege eee eee 00 00 3,4 § 8670.28(a)(1)-(1 1) .cssssssescerseersneecscersseeecssnsssennnsneceancennscessenssnesenasaecenssannanegensssesseegssecenessss Masene OD § 8670.28(D) .ssssecscseesecesseneecseeneeserceneesesessesnsesaneesseressees seuceseuacevsnccosneesecensn eceneecorseesensteenees 5 § 8670.28(C)....sessesiceeeresrerees "oc ccccesuasucesuascrucsascavuneccessuevsusecesnenacensnesecenessersesnesessnanseneseesenecensates 5 § 8670.28.5......e eeesececoseeceensccedestaceeunegessiessceciecsisoeueesees eseceveeseaeeseseesesseseeecseesseeesenenee sesenesteseeres 5 § 8670.29 ..eecsssessssssssessensecssenteneescareneseenecssesssenecenceasarereavesser sess“ssuageceeneceseseeeseusen eeceeeeseaeesseeases 5, 10 § 8670.29(a). ...ersereeretereeereees cssuesasecussecessusesasuuecesupenvessecaveccasecssusscensessarsosunesnseuseasvecauscseseenece 4,5 § 8670.29(b) sssersscssseressensssssveccsnecssnsccensssesecnsnsnsssnesseessneesessesseses see geessseeeeesgeeu geese eee geneeet 5 § 8670.29(d) ...cecccsseseeererererereeerseerensaesnenesatenceneensseenanquccasancesquserecseneeenreeseeennses saceaeececeseesesesceeensnees 5 § 8670.29(€) coeecesscscsscsssseccssseccssecsncennecenrecsssnseessnssesseessenaneeaeeesnyes a eees sees geeee seen e gee gee seems Oe greet e8 5 § 8670.29(E)...sescssecceecseesnsanenerestereneseeneasennenseneneneeeney spececseaeceaueqesvssenscesnscecsuntegetsesneess esensuteenies 5 § 8670.29(g)..... «cconceacacuauceccuvenaveraucessuacesenssessssecesassedsnneeenesseaesdeneeeeeeieeeeeegaeseeseeeeeneeaeensaeeaeegetee 5 § 8670.294) ..cseceecsescssesesssessssceseennenneccnseesnesssnsessneseseesseeneeneneuengneeHeee ee eets eens StO TOU egg g TeteAO5 § 8670.30.5 .ccssssescssssssesssessessneceeeseneeesoneresensensesessesuscaerenesucauerssassseasecsesseseneeneseneaneeneesecasersesess 5 § 8670.31...cecesevecuesussusscseavasssesesnecuccuscesunesesnecsesesenesecseacenecssersscasanesequenenaricasnsanessonssesessctntes 5 § 8670.31(D) .sseccseesssssssssecseasscesvesenecsuscesneceesnsccssanensecenencucennereanacsssenansnessennasnensseeseensegsnseeess 20 10 § 8670.37.51(d)........ cccccueceuseuuscesscecuscucscacencesssnsseneseanessseesenesseuasseesesenesseesavenenseenesveessseeeeseeas 5 § 8670.37.53(C)(L)soresssssesssssecevecenecsnssennecssnecesnsvecssnesseenaensenneresessscsssensansnasscnnsceaggnsetnnssteenssscettes 5 § 8670.37.S3(C)(2)..ceeeceereerererereeeeseeseneseeesscosuecuecsuetcauecsanacecessanessesenseessanecnenereseseanepeasteeneseesss 5, 10 § 8670.37.54 ceeccsesssseesssesssssesssecssecaccnscesueessrensuseeesseseneneeeeeseseeeseeseeeeeeeeeeee een g tee see gee seen eects eee ens 5 § 8670.37.54(D) ooeceesssesessesecoseceseceeesuseseseesneossveensneasenseconsenecnscconscessssscenesausnsenaaeacengnensengssce0es 5,10 iv Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354- TLN-CKD) 10 11 12 13 14 15 “16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 6 of 27 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page § 8670.64 — 8670.67 .0..sesssccsscssseessenseessesneesneestensennesssssessssnananaceenconssnesseessessnena nastessen atest e88s 7,15 ~ § 8670.64(a)(4) cessescceccrecsrecsessseessecssesssessscnnecserseescevesseccuseancanennacncensnscensess enensssesseegeegeegeeeeesie4s 6 § 8670.64(b) vessscsscseessecreesssssesssvcsssessvesnesnensueesnennearsoncssseasecassnenatersancarssstensesnara nsananssesssesgenseseneeseey 6 § 8670.64(C) vceceseesesueaueauecsecscosencsucaussensesuasesuccucersenennesseanesensaseneneceasagere snesgeessvaeseaeeeteeneess 6 § 8670.65 .ecceccssseseseseeseeseseseseeeessueenerersees ceveesecuececucessnessesneevecseceeaesacacaecereuneaseuss essesensensagensenersngey 6 § 8670.66(2)(4).cccscesecseescssecsssecsssecssnesssseennessersssnsesneranseensnsssnnessneaseeyseenssennss negee gees ceric ees e2ee 2008 6 § 8670.66(D) ccsssscconeccesessesssecesecsssecsnecenecsuecennceseavensnesnesstseeaeeeayeeseeandaeeueeeseeg ensegeeng eset egeseee se 244 6 § 8670.67(a)(1)...recesc ccecececccuceucensavsrslauecaceaccevsnsnceessesecassneeceessaeceseeensecsenscnseaesee ssarssenaeeesenseegs 6 § 8670.67(A)(4)occecscseserecescscesecneseseeeeeneneastseesaeseseenenedeeneninenssceuatececeesenseceasetsnevers heee enecvanstenssceeess 6 § 8670.69.4 ccsccsesscceseecsssessessssessscnsssssneccnecsuecenseseeescanenssensnesceneteneseceeeeseeeeesese eenegenegeesee sees 6, 15 Cal. Public Resources Code § 8750 - 8760 v.cesesseccscsecteeenerssseereeetensnenesens cececaeesvacseseeeesesesecenseaceaseeseeseceeesecsase reaesaneeanaeensnenneery l CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const., Eleventh Amendment .......cccceeecsereeesesectereerssteeeeererenetesenesenes ecseenenens 3, 17, 18, 19 U.S. Const. Article TI, § 2, cl. 1...cescueecaeneceseaesensescatscsscaeeneceeeescesacnsseesceneanenese nsqueatanasansaees 7 COURT RULES Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, § L2(D)(1) ceseessenesssvessseeesensesseseennserenreseseueneeasasensengaeenenneanenssccoseaaueulevecnuecevsea vacerstecsceeressaeees 1,7, 18 § 12(D)(6) weeceescsssersssssessseesensseeseeceneenseesecanecsersseesecneensqanennecancesscescesenaseaeeyecn eesnecneeceeneeareneensees 1,18 Vv Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) 10 1] 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case-2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 7 of 27 Defendants California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Thomas M. Cullen, Jr., California Administrator for Oil Spill Response (Ad ministrator), and Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of the State of California (Attorney Gen eral) (collectively, Defendants), hereby moveto dismiss the Complaintfor Injunctive and Declar atory Relief on file in this action pursuant to Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b) (6), as set forth below. _ INTRODUCTION Acting in responseto the potential threats posed by dischargesof oil into state waters, the California Legislature passed S.B. 861, which became law on June 20, 2014. S.B. 861 amended and expanded the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill P revention and Response Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 8574.1-8574.10, 8670.1-8670.95 and Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 8750-8760 (Lempert-Keene Act), to protect all waters of the state, n ot just marine waters. To that end, S.B. 861 imposescertain requirements on “facilities” located where an oil spill could impact state waters. The requirements,includingoil spill contingency pla ns and certificates of financial responsibility, are designed to facilitate response and cleanu p in the eventofa spill, thereby promoting health and safety and protecting the natural res ources of the state. One ofthe “facilities”that is now subject to these requirementsis a ra ilroad transporting oil as cargo; other facilities to be regulated include oil production facilities and pipelines transporting oil, among others. | Less than three monthsafter $.B. 861 was enacted and whil e collaborating with the Administrator to develop implementing regulations, plaintiffs Association of American Railroads, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and BNSF Railway Compa ny (the Railroads) filed this action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against OSPR,the Ad ministrator, and the Attorney General. The Railroadsallege that S.B. 861 is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20167 (FRSA), the Interstate Commerce Co mmission Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as amendedin scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (ICCTA), the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20703, and th e Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20306. They also allege that S.B. 861 violates the I nterstate Commerce Clause. However,these claims are premature andtherefore should be d ismissed. ] Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declar atory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) r m | O N w n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 8 of 27 Uponits effective date, $.B. 861 did not imposeany affirmative ob ligations on the Railroads or any other facilities subject to the new requirements. Ra ther, S.B. 861 expressly providesthat the Administrator shall adopt regulations implementi ng thestatute. Those regulations will specify the required components ofan oil spill cont ingency plan and describe the types of evidence of financial responsibility that will support issuan ce of a certificate of financial responsibility, among other things. The Administrator’s team has bee n working with stakeholders and other governmententities to develop draft regulat ions, but that collaboration is ongoing and no draft language has been formally proposed. Until the implementing regulations are finalized, the Railroads’ claims are unripe. Article Ill of the United States Constitution limits the Court’s ju risdiction to actual casés or controversies. Where,as here,a plaintiff brings a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute, there must be a genuine threat of imminent prosecution. Suchthreat is a bsent in this case at this time. The Administrator previously notified the Railroads,as well as oth erentities potentially subj ect to the implementing regulations, that the new S.B. 861 requirements would not be enforced until after the regulationsare finalized, and the Railroads’ own Compla int agrees that no enforcement action should be taken until after regulations are finalized. Even if the minimum constitutional requirements were met , the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuantto the prudential components ofth e ripeness doctrine. Absent the issuanceof final implementing regulations, the preemption is sues identified in the Complaint are notfit for review. A complete preemption analysis will not be po ssible until the boundaries of S.B. 861 are better delineated by the issuance of implementing regu lations.’ And,in light of the fact no enforcementis imminent, there is no danger the Railroads wi ll suffer hardship if the Court withholdsjurisdiction at this time. As such, the Court should dismi ss the Complaint as unripe. ' Defendants vehemently dispute Plaintiffs’ assertion that the federa l statutes on which Plaintiffs’ preemption arguments are based apply to and preempt S.B. 861. Defendants are confidentthat the final regulations will substantiate this position. Ho wever, because S.B. 861 expressly requires the adoption ofregulations that will explain and cla rify the statute’s reach,it is simply too soon for a complete preemption analysis. 2 Defts” MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) u o ow O o C O J H D W N 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 9 of 27 | Further, evenif the Railroads’ claims were ripe to proceed against the A dministrator and the Attorney General, their claims against OSPR are barred by the Eleventh Amendmentof the United States Constitution and therefore should be dismis sed. BACKGROUND:S.B. 861 1. Tae LEMPERT-KEENE-SEASTRAND OIL SPILL PREVENTION AN D RESPONSE ACT RESPONDED TO CONCERNS REGARDING DISCHARGESOF OIL INTO MARINE WATERS OF THE STATE. The Lempert-Keene Act wasoriginally enacted to address the significant th reat posed -by discharges of petroleum into marine waters of the State of California by vessels and marine facilities along the coast. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.2 (amended June 20, 2014). The legislative findings and declaration explained that transportation of oil can be a si gnificant threat to | environmentally sensitive areas, and “California’s coastal waters , estuaries, bays, and beaches are treasured environmental and economicresources which the state cannot aff ord'to place at undue risk from an oilspill.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.2(b), (e) (amended J une 20, 2014). Further, the legislature found that the state government should improve its respon se and management of oil | spills that occur in marine waters. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.2(j) (amend ed June 20, 2014). Whenfirst enacted, the Lempert-Keene Act required, inter alia, the administrator for oil spill response “to adopt and implement regulations governing the a dequacy ofoil spill contingency plans to be prepared and imiplemented and. . . for the best achievable protection of coastal and marine waters.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.28(a) (amended June 20, 2014). Ul. §.B. 861 EXPANDED THE ACT TO COVER ALL WATERS OF TH E STATE. In June of 2014, S.B. 861 expanded the Lempert-Keene Act and the Adm inistrator’s responsibilities to cover not only “coastal and marine waters,” but “all aspects of any oil spill in waters ofthe state.” Jd.; see also Cal. Gov't Code § 8670.3(ag).” As part of the Act’s expansion, S.B. 861 amendedthe Act to apply not only to vessels and marine faciliti es but also to inland facilities as well, including railroads transporting oil as cargo. Cal. Gov’t Cod e § 8670.3(g)(1), (ae). Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, “facility” is now defined as follows: 2 «Waters of the State” for purposesofthe Act doesnotinclude ground water. C al. Gov’t Code § 8670.3(ag). 3 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 base 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 10 of 27 “Facility” means anyof the following located in state waters or located wherean oil spill may impact state waters: (A) A building, structure, installation or equipment used in oil expl oration, oil well drilling operations, oil production,oil refining, oil storage, oil gather ing, oil processing, oil transfer, oil distribution, or oi] transportation. (B) A marine terminal. (C) A pipeline that transports oil. (D) A railroad that transportsoil as cargo. (E) A drill ship, semisubmersible drilling platform, jack-up type dr illing rig, or any otherfloating or temporary drilling platform. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.3(g)(1). Thus, S.B. 861 amendedthe Act to impose certain requirements | on a variety of facilities located wherever an oil spill may affect sta te waters. A railroad is one of many facilities with that potential. The Administratoris expresslyauthorized to adopt regulations to im plementthe Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.7.5. As relevant to this lawsuit, $.B. 861 amended the Act to require facilities to have oil spill contingency plans, participate in drills, an d demonstrate financial ability to pay for cleanup and damages connected with an oil spill in state wa ters. A. Oil Spill Contingency Plans With respectto oil spill contingency plans, the Act now provides , “In accordance with the rules, regulations, andpolicies established by the adminis trator pursuant to Section 8670.28, an owneror operator ofa facility” must havean approve doil spill contingency plan whenoperating in.waters of the state or where a spill could impac t waters of the state. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.29(a) (emph. added). Section 8670.28, in turn, provi desthat the Administrator shall adopt regulations governing the adequacy ofoil spill contingencypl ansto be prepared and implemented underthe Act. Cal. Gov't Code § 8670.28(a) (“The ad ministrator . . . shall adopt and implement regulations governing the adequacy ofoil spill contin gencyplans to be prepared | and implemented underthis article.”). The Complaint concedes tha t the Administrator must issue these regulations. Compl., { 39. In deciding whether to approve an oil spill contingency plan, the A dministrator reviews whetherthe plan complies with the rules, regulations, and policies adopted pursuantto 4 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) p p o O O o Y N W N N M 10 11 12 13 | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 11 of 27 sections 8670.28 and 8670.29. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.31. Sections 8670.28 and 8670.29 broadly discuss the minimum requirements of the regulations and contentofoil spill contingency ‘plans, but the regulations are to specify the standards against which the planswill be compared. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8670.28(a)(1)-(11), (c), 8670.29(a), (b), (a), (e), (i). In addition, section 8670.10 provides that the Administrator, in coordination with federal, state, and local governmententities, shall carry out drills to test oil spill contingency plans, but this necessarily requires the plans have already been developed and approved. Similarly, the Act provides that the plans are subjectto, public review, review by response. personnel and relevant agencies, periodic review by the Administrator, and updating, but those provisions all assume that the Administrator has adopted regulations and reviewed and approved a facility’s oil spill contingency plan in accordance with those regulations. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8670.19, 8670.28(b), 8670.29(f), 8670.29(g), 8670.30.5, 8670.31. The sameis true for provisions requiring action in accordance with applicable contingency plans. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8670.28.5, 8670.25, 8670.27(a). B. Certificates of Financial Responsibility The Act requires an owneroroperatorof a facility wherea spill could impact waters ofthe state to apply.for and obtain a certificate of financial responsibility. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.37.51(d). To receive a certificate of financial responsibility, the applicant must demonstrate the ability to pay for any damagethat might arise during a reasonable worst case scenario spill, but the statute does not explain the meaning ofthe phrase “demonstrate the ability to pay.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.37.53(c)(1). Rather,this is left to the adoption ofregulations implementing the provision. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.37.53(c)(2) (“The administratorshall adopt regulations to implementthis section.”). Further section 8670.37.54 gives examples of how financial responsibility may be demonstrated including, for example, evidence of insurance, but again provides for implementation by the Administrator. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.37.54(b) (“In adopting requirements underthis Article, the administrator may specify policy or other contractual terms, conditions, or defenses which are necessary or which are unacceptable in 5 Defis’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) 2 o N N D N A O F ‘O o 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 " 26 27 28 Case 9:1.4-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 P age 12 of 27 establishing evidence offinancial responsibility, in ord er to effectuate the purposesof this article.”’). C. Enforcement Provisions Criminal,civil, and administrative penalties are available for certain types of knowing,intentional, and negligent violations of the Act . Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8670.64(a)(4), (b), (c), 8670.66(a)(4), (b), 8670.67(a)(1), (a)(4), (b), 8670.65 . The Act also provides sanctions, includingthe possibility that the Administrator may issue a cease and desist order under certain circumstances. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.69.4. As stated above, the Administrator is expressly authorized to adopt regulations implementing.the Act, whi ch may give further guidanceasto the . circumstances in which these penalties are available as w ell as to the specific penalties that should be considered for different types of statutory violations. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.7.5. Il. THE ADMINISTRATOR Has Nor YET AD OPTED REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE S.B. 861 AMENDMENTS. The Complaint concedesthat the Administratorhas not a dopted regulations implementing any of these provisions. Compl., 39, fn.3 ; see also Lavin-Jones Decl., { 5. Although the Administrator has been meeting with stak eholders, including trade groups, regarding the regulations, so far drafts are only prelimin ary. Lavin-Jones Decl., Ff 4-5. Noticeably absent from the Complaint are any allegatio ns that the Administrator or the Attorney Generalhas threatened to enforce the chall enged provisions against the Railroads in the absence ofthe regulations. While the Complaint doe s allege that “State officials . . . persist in threatening enforcement of[S.B. 861 provisions],”it d oes not allege that the Administrator or the Attorney General have threatened to enforce anyofthe challenged provisions in the absence of final regulations. Compl., 41. Indeed, any such allega tion would be contradicted by other statements in the Complaint recognizing that S.B. 861 sho uld not be enforceduntil after the Administrator adopts the implementing regulations. See, e.g ., Compl., J 46 (alleging that the civil and criminal penalties available under the Act will not have any force until after the . Administrator adopts the regulations called for in S.B. 861). It wouldalso be contradicted by letters sent from the Administrator to “Rail, inland production, pipeline and mobile unit transfer 6 Defts’ MPA ISO Motionto Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 i o f© & “S N W N M& M ase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 13 of 27 operators,” which generally described the process that would be follow ed to develop regulations implementing S.B. 861. Yamamoto Decl., Exs. A & B. Theletters, referr ed to in the allegations of the Complaint({ 39 fn. 3), expressly informedrail operators that “OSP R will not enforce the provisions of Government Code section 8670.64 through 8670.67 as they rela te to contingency plans andcertificates of financial responsibility until after the emergency re gulations have been promulgated.” See Yamamoto Decl., Ex. B, p. 1 (emph. added). - Nevertheless, on October 7, 2014, the Railroads filed this suit seekin g to enjoin the Act’s enforcement. Compl., 41. ARGUMENT I. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SU BJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. A. Standard of Review Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure , Rule 12(b)(1). Under Article ILI of the United States Constitution, federal courts may adjud icate only cases or controversies; they may not issue advisory opinions. U.S. Const. art. IIT, § 2, cl. 1; Rhoades v. Avon Products, Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court’s subject matter jurisdictionis limited to matters “ripe” for adjudication, andif a caseis notr ipe, it should be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Chandler v. State Farm Mutual Automo bile Insurance Co., (598 F.3d 1115, 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). . Whena defendant brings a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the p laintiff has the burden of establishing the federal court’s jurisdiction. Rattlesnake Co al. v. U.S. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Del Puerto Water Dist yv. U.S. Bur eau ofReclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1230 (E.D.Cal. 2003). In fact, because federal courts have limited | jurisdiction, the Court must presumelack ofjurisdiction until the plaintiff proves otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 511 U.S. 375; 376-78 (1994). A challengeto jurisdiction “can be either facial, confining the inquiry to the allegations of the complaint, or factual, permitting the court to look beyondthe c omplaint.” Savage v. Glendale Union High SchoolDist., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 fn. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court ‘“‘may review any evidence,such as affidavits and testimony, to resol ve factual disputes 7 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) BS O o ° © ~ l O N W A 10 11 12 13 14 15 ‘16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 “24 25 26 27 28 hase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 14 of 27 concemingthe existence ofjurisdiction.”” McCarthy v. United Sta tes, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). B. Inthe Absenceof Final Regulations, the Railroad s’ Claims Are Not Ripe for Adjudication. The “ripeness” doctrine prevents premature adjudication of cla ims that do notyet have a concrete impacton the parties. Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). “The Supreme Court instructs that ripenessis ‘peculiarly a question of timing,’ [citation], designedto ‘prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature ad judication, from entangling themselvesin abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Anchorage Eq ual Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134,1138 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Regional Rail Reorganizatio n Act Cases, 419 US. 102, 140 (1974) and Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1 967)).? The doctrine is “born of Article Iof the Constitution; the same provision that grants judg estheir authority constrainsits ” use. [It] ensure[s] that an adequate factual and legal context wi ll sharpen and cabin judicial decision-making. [It] preserve[s] the separation of powers a nd safeguard(s] democracy by constraining the authority of the unelected judiciary to pass judgmentontheacts of legislatures.” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142-43 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring). The ripeness doctrine contains both constitutional and prud ential components. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138. The Railroads’ Complaint is u nripe under both components. 1. The Railroads Do NotSatisfy the Constitutional Co mponentof the Ripeness Doctrine Becausetheir Complaint Is a Pre-Enfo rcement Challenge and There Is No Threat of Imminent Prosecuti on. Article Il] mandates that there must exist a “case or controve rsy,” and that the issues presented must be definite and concrete, not hypothetica l or abstract. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139. The Court considers “whetherthe plaintiffs face ‘a real danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement,’ [citation], or whetherthe alleged injury is too ‘imaginary’ or ‘speculative’ to support jurisdiction.” Jd.(citati on omitted). The controversy must 3 The constitutional componentofthe ripeness inquiry coincide s with standing’s injury in fact requirement. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138. “«(Blecause the focus of our ripeness inquiry is primarily temporal in scope,ripeness can be characterized as sta nding on a timeline.” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138. : 8 Defts’ MPA ISO Motionto Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) oN o O oO o ™ ~ N W A N 10 11 12 13 14. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23° 24 25 26 27 28 Pase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 15 of 27 be “substantial” and“of such immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Boating Industry Associationsv. Marshall, 601 F.2d 13 76, 1384 (9th Cir. 1979). The mereexistence ofa statute is not sufficient to create a ripe case o r controversy. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139; see also Boating Industry Association s, 601 F.2d at 1384. In fact, the ripeness doctrine “seeks to avoid the premature adjudication of cases when. . . the nature and extent of the statute’s application are not certain.” BNSF Railway Co.v. Box, 470 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (C.D.Ill. 2007). | “When a litigant brings a preenforcementchallenge, ‘a generalized threatof prosecution will not satisfy the ripeness requirement.” Loyd’s Aviation, Inc . v. Centerfor Environmental Health, No. 1:11-CV-01078, 2011 WL 4971 866, a t *2 (E.D. Cal: Oct. 19, 2011) (citing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009)). R ather, “there must be a ‘genuine threat of imminent prosecution.” Loyd ’s Aviation, Inc., 2011 WL 4971866, at *2; see also Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 199 8) (where no regulations or programshad been adopted under Proposition 227, ripenessissue tur ned on whetherplaintiffs’ alleged injuries were so inevitable and imminentthat judicial interve ntion would be appropriate). “Plaintiffs must face a ‘realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.’”” Loyd ’s Aviation, Inc., 2011 WL 4971866,a t *2. “Thus, ‘[w]hen plaintiffs “do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosec ution,that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible,” they do notallege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court.” Jd.; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources ‘Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). To evaluate whether a genuine threat of prosecutionexists, the Court co nsiders: “whetherthe plaintiffs have articulated a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the l aw in question, whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning ort hreat to initiate proceedings, and the history of past prosecution or enforcement under t he challengedstatute.” Jd. “A plaintiff must establish all three elements in its favor in order to surv ive a motionto dismiss on ripeness grounds.” Loyd’s Aviation, Inc., 2011 WL 4971866, at *3. 9 Defts’? MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) C o 6 m N O - 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 tase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 16 of 27 Applying these principles, the Eastern District dismissed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Proposition 65 waspreempted by federal law and an injunction against the law’s enforcement. Loyd’s Aviation, Inc., 2011 WL 4971866,at *4. The Court found plaintiffs’ preemption claims were notripe becauseplaintiffs did not face a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the enforcement of Proposition 65 by the defendants. Jd., at *3, | Here too, the Railroads do not present a ripe case or controversy under Article Il. ‘The Railroads do not allege that the Administrator or the Attorney General has communicated a specific warningor threatto initiate proceedings againstthe Railroads at this time in the absence of regulations. Further, as explained in the Background section above, the Administrator has not yet finalized regulations implementing S.B. 861. Whenhe does, the facilities that are subject to the Act will have a responsibility to submitoil spill contingency plans, but until regulations are issued, the precise contents of the plans are unknown. Similarly, regulations have not yet been adopted detailing how the proofoffinancial responsibility requirement mightbe satisfied, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 8670.37.53(c)(2), 8670.37.54(b), so it is unclear how a facility could obtain a certificate at this time. Simply put, the nature and extent of S.B, 861’s application are uncertain. As explained above, the regulations may also give further guidance as to how thestatute will be enforced. Absent implementing regulations, an enforcement action against the Railroadsfor lack of an oil spill contingency plan orcertificate of financial responsibility would be premature. Though the Act does providefor penalties in the eventa facility operates without an approved plan or certificate, the statute requires the Administrator to review a submitted plan to determine whether it complies with the Administrator’s regulations adopted pursuant to California Government Code sections 8670.28 and 8670.29. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8670.31(b). Thus, it would defy both the terms ofthe statute and commonsense to impose penalties on railroads lacking approved plansorcertificates before issuance ofthe regulations governing the contents of such plans and the forms of proofthat are acceptable. The Railroads admit this importantfact intheir Complaint. Compl., { 46. Further, the Administrator previously informed the Railroads that - 10 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) B R Ww W W N “ O o o O ~ ] n N W w 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 hase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 17 of 27 therewould be no enforcementuntil after the regulations were promulgated. Yamamoto, Ex.B, p. 1; Compl., 939 n.3. As such, absent final implementing regulations, the R ailroads do not face a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury. The Railroads cannot claim t hat a prosecution is likely or even that a prosecution is remotely possible, and the Railroads do not allege a dispute susceptible for resolution by the Court. 2. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction Underth e Prudential Componentof the Ripeness Doctrine. Evenif the Railroads’ claims were ripe for purposesof Article III, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction underthe prudential componentof the ripeness doctrine. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141. Under the prudential component, the Court conside rs “the fitness of. the issues for judicial decision andthe hardship to the parties withholding c ourt consideration.” Id. (citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149). Neither factor supports the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case at this time. a. The Complaint Does Not Raise Issues Fit for Judicial Rev iew. A court should dismiss a case where the issues are notfit for judicial revi ew. Thus, courts generally avoid deciding pre-enforcement challenges that do no t permit enforcement agencies to refine their‘policies. Ammex,Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 2003); see also US. v. Power Co.,-Inc., 2008WL 2626989, *4 (D. Nev. 2008) (“That the City of Las Vegas,as the primary governmentalentity chargedwith construing the challenged law,has not yet had an opportunity to construe the ordinancesat issue weighs against exercise ofj urisdiction.”). Further, courts should notdecide“‘constitutional questions in a vacuum.’” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141. While a purely legal question maybe fit for judicial re view, a preemption argument requiring at least some factual development is not. Thomas, 220 F .3d at 1141-42. “A concrete factualsituation is necessary to delineate the boundaries of what c onduct the government may or may not regulate.” Jd. As described in more detail below, a preem ption claim may require additional factual development where implementing regulations hav e not yet been adopted or wherethere has not yet been an attempt to enforce a statute. In those cases,it is too early to understand the boundariesofa statute and howit will be applie d. 11 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) a oO o O o NH N D N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 18 of 27 Applying this reasoning, the court in Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Su pp. 2d 1007, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1998), found a facial challenge to Proposition 227 was not r ipe. The Railroads had asked the court to bar implementationoftheinitiative in an anticipato ry manner, before issuance of regulations. “Tt is axiomatic that a statute is not facially invalid simply becauseit is pos sible to contemplate circumstances in which the application ofthe statute could resu lt in (violation of federal law] where there is no evidence to support the claim that the termsofthe statute in themselves producethatresult.” Courts regularly deny anticipatory review whenfurther developmentby state officials may reduce or avoid constitutional problems,or changethe nature ofthe issues presented. ... This is particularly so whererelevant programs have not yet been adopted orapplied. Id. at 1026. As explained in more detail below, the absence of final regulations renders this case unfit for judicial review. Regardless of which federal statute is ci ted as a basis for preemption,at this stage, the Railroads’ claims are hypothetical and base d on speculation as to how the Railroads think S.B. 861 will be applied and enforced. As such, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over this case. | | | (1) Without S.B. 861’s Implementing Regulations,It Is Too Soon to Conduct an Analysis of Whether DOT ‘ Regulations “Substantially Subsume” the Same Subject Matter for Purposes of FRSA Preemption. Though the FRSA provides that lawsin the area of railroad saf ety “shall be nationally uniform to the extent possible,” the statute contains important e xceptions. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a). For example,a state regulation may address “an essentially local s afety or security hazard.” Id. § 20106(a)(2). And “[a] State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, or order related to railroad safety .. . until the Secretary of Transportation . . . prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requiremen t.” Id. § 20106(a)(2). “(TJhis is not an easy standard to meet: ‘To prevail on the claim tha t the regulations have preemptiveeffect, petitioner must establish more than that they “touch u pon”or “relate to” that subject matter, for “covering” is a more restrictive term which ind icates that preemption will 12 Defts? MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) hase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 19 of 27 1 || lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsumethe subject matter of the relevant state 2 law.” Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Public Utility C ommission ofthe State of Oregon, 3 9 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1993) (emph. in original) (citing CSX Transportation, Inc. v. 4 Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993)). When considering whether a federal regulation substantially - § | subsumes the subject matter of a state regulation, the court does not look to broad categories such O n as railroad safety; rather, the court applies a “level of specificity” in its analysis. Southern Pacific ~ Transportation Co., 9 F.3d at 813. For example, in Southern Pacific Transportation Company, the Ninth Circuit concluded a federal regulation on the subject of trai n whistle capacity did not 9 | preempt Oregon regulationsrestricting the use of train whistles. Id . at 813. And in Union Pacific 10 Railroad Company v. California Public Utilities Commission , the Ninth Circuit again compared 11 | federal and state regulations with specificity before concluding the federal regulation did not 12 “substantially subsume”the subject matter ofthe state reg ulation. 346 F.3d 851, 863-68 (9th Cir. | 13} 2003) (finding federal regulation addressing internal oper ating rules including TTD rules* and 14 | requiring compliancetesting and training did not preempta st ate regulation requiringrailroads to 15 comply with their own internal TTD train configuration rules and providingcivil penalties for 16 | violations of those rules). | | 17 The Railroads’ Complaint alleges that DO Tregulations cover the subject matter of 18 “oil spill prevention and response plans”“in whole ori n relevant part.” Compl., § 50.° The 19 | Complaint also alleges that DOT regulations cover the.subject matter of “transportation of 20 hazardous materials.” Compl., $f 2, 21, 22, 51. However , the Court must apply a muchgreater 21 || level of specificity in its analysis. Southern Pacific Transporta tion Co. 9 F.3d at 813.° Given 22 1 that even the subject of “train whistles” has been found t oo broad, subjects such as “transportation 23° 4 “TTD is a general term covering almost any subject that affect s a train’s ability to stay 24 on the tracks,” including train configuration. Id. at 862. > The Complaint’s lack of specificity in this regard provides fu rther support for the factit 25 || istoo soon to comparethe subject matters regulated. © The Complaint alleges that the DOT regulations cover the sub ject matters of techniques, 26 training, equipment, processes, and procedures for deli vering hazardous materials byrail. Complaint, J 51. Even these categories are too broad for a c omplete analysis undersection 27 20106(a)(2).. The FRSArequiresa specific comparison of the matt er regulated. What exactly is 28 regulated under each law? How? 13 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) f b o N N N X o 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 20 of 27 of hazardous materials” and even “oil spill prevention plans” and “trai ning” do notsatisfy the level of specificity required for an FRSAanalysis. Until the regulation s are finalized and one can determine precisely what and how facilities, including railroads, will be regulated under S.B. 861, any FRSAclaim is unripe. (2) Whether a State RegulationIs Permissible under ICCTA Isa Fact-Intensive Question. ICCTA does not preemptall state regulation affecting rail transportatio n. New York Susquehanna and Western Railway Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 2 52 (3d Cir. 2007). The question of whethera state regulation is permissible under ICCTAis inherently fact-intensive. Id. at 253. While pre-construction permitting programs may unreasona bly interfere with railroad operations, less burdensome and non-diseriminatory regulations ma y be permissible. Jd. The Court must analyze each individual regulation to determine whethe rit is preempted by ICCTA, considering whetherthe regulationsare reasonable, certain, and n on-discriminatory. Jd. at 256. Accordingly, in the absence offinal regulations, a court shouldr efuse to exercise jurisdiction over an action seeking a judgment declaring a state statute preempted by ICCTA. Louisiana Dept. ofAgriculture & Forestry v. Louisiana Railro ad Ass'n, No. 09-996, 2010 WL 4393899, **4-5 (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 2010). _ In Louisiana Dept. ofAgriculture & Forestry, the state legislatu re had enacted a statute pertaining to railroad crossings, which required the prom ulgation ofrules and regulations implementing the statute no later than January 1, 2009. As of October 16, 2009, no regulations had been promulgated,though a preliminary draft had been prepa red. In the context of a motion to remand,the railroad defendants claimed subject matter jurisdict ion based on complete federal preemption by ICCTA. Id., at *2, The court found the case wasn otripe, reasoning that the preemption argument required at least some factual development b ecause the statute imposed no initial obligation orrestriction on the railroad. Jd., at *2. The court exp lained: the railroad defendant’s “complete preemption argumentrelies onits assertion that the nature of the law as enacted—andasit believes it will be enforced-—will havetheeffe ct. of giving the [state] permitting or pre-clearance authority, and therefore the power to re gulate rail transportation. 14 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declarator y Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) a s a D W W N 10 1] 12 13 ~ 414 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 . 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 21 of 27 Thus, in the absence offinal regulations, procedures or orders by the [state] to enforce the statute, or which describe howit will enforce the statute, the nature ofthe law in relation forail transportation cannotbe accurately predicted and the court cannot determine w hether the law is completely preempted _.. 2? Id., at *4 (emph. added)(citations and footnotes om itted). The state had not issued anyorders, nor hadit taken any other action to enforce the stat ute. While a preliminary draft of proposed regulations was prepared,the final regulations could look very different from thoseinitially proposed. “Withoutfinal rules and regulations, or anyot her steps to carry outthe law, the [railroad defendant’s] argument that the effects/results ofthe legislation makeit a permitting orpre-clearance statute are based on conjecture rather than facts.” Id., at *5 (emph. added); cf BNSF Railway Co. v. Box, 470 F. Supp. 2d 85 5, 863 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (finding the issues were sufficiently developed where statute affirmatively o bligated plaintiffs to act upon statute’s effective date ). Here too, the Railroads’ arguments that ICCTA preempts SB. 861 are based o n speculation as to how the Railroadsthink S.B. 861 will be enforced. For ex ample, the Railroads apparently believe the lawwill impede their ability to carry out their commonca rrier obligations and that the law will constitute a “pre-clearance”statute. They claim S.B. 8 61 will require railroads to take steps to preventspills, Compl., q 4, and they assert that a rail road will be barred from continuingits operationsin thestate if the Administrator does not ultima tely approve a railroad’s contingency plan. Compl., { 38. But these are not the words of S.B . 861. Again, this is simply speculation as to how S.B. 861 will be implemented. Unlike in Box, the issues are not sufficiently developed for review because the Railroads will have no affirmativ e obligations with respectto oil spill contingency plans until after the regulations are finalized. The Administrator has notyet issued regulations regarding the content of oil spill contingency plan s,so it is too soon to know what exactly will be required. ’ Further, $.B. 861 states that the Administrator may issue a cease and desistlett er in certain circumstancesbut provides other enforcement options as well. See Cal. Go v’t Code §§ 8670.64-8670.67, 8670.69.4. Asthis time,it is not known whether the Adm inistrator will ever use this provision against a railroad. The implementing regulations may give further guidance as 15 . Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) o O C O “ T N 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 - 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 22 of 27 to the circumstances in which each type of penalty are available as well as to the speci fic penalties that should be considered for different types ofstatutory violations. Just as in Lo uisiana Dept. ofAgriculture & Forestry, the implementing regulations (and likely an enforcementa ction) are needed before a determination can be made as to whether S.B. 861 will be used to prev ent railroads from operatingin the state without an approved oil spill contingency plan. _ Similarly, the Railroads also contendthey will be required to obtain a “certificate of financial responsibility” from the state upon a showing that they are “sufficiently capital ized” to cover damagesresulting from a spill. Compl., 4. The Railroads allege, “S.B. 861 asserts S tate oversight of carriers’ financial condition... .” Compl., 135; see also Compl., 45. Agai n,this is speculation. The regulations may well provide that a “certificate of financial responsibil ity” could issue upon proofthat does not require “oversight of carriers’ financial condition.” Thus, the ICCTA preemptionclaim is notfit for review at this time. (3) Preemption Analysis Under Other Federal Laws Requires Similar Speculation. The Railroads assert that federal regulations under the Locomotive Inspection A ct or the Safety Appliance Act occupy the “field of railroad safety equipment,” Compl ., § 29, but the Complaintdoesnot identify any statutory text that would be preemptedby thes e statutes. The Complaintalso alleges that the Interstate Commerce Clause prohibits a State fro m imposing “ostensibly local regulations on railroadsthat will have the effect of forcing mod ifications toa train’s makeup and equipment wheneverit enters the State .. . ” Compl., 730. The Railroads appear to believe that the “best achievable technology” requiremen t will be used to force railroads to make modificationsto their trains and to impo se a new “standard of care with respect to the use ofrail technologies.” Compl., { 52. But this is yet an other case of speculation—the Railroads describe what they think might happen under S.B.861. The regulations might well be limited to technologies for response and cleanup. This analy sis is simply premature in the absence of regulations implementing the “best achievabl e technology” requirement. 16 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) & a H n W a 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 23 of 27 The regulations will thus explain andclarify $.B. 861’s reach. Instead of rushing to judgment on hypothetical claims, the Court should permit the Administrator to develop and refine the regulations, a collaborative process in which the Railroads have been heavily engaged, before allowing the Railroads’ claims to proceed.It is likely that when the regulationsare issued,it will be clear that the federal statutes cited by the Railroads’ do not apply and there is no preemption. Even assuming arguendothat there maybe constitutional issues,at the very least the regulations may reduce or avoid constitutional problems or change the nature of the issues presented. Accordingly, the case is not fit for judicial review at this time. b. The Railroads Will Not Suffer Hardship if the Court Withholds Consideration of this Matter at this Time. The absenceof regulations also meansthe Railroadswill not suffer any substantial hardship if the Court withholds consideration of this matter. “TTjhe absence of any real or imminentthreat of enforcement, particularly, criminal enforcement, seriously undermines any claim ofhardship.” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142. Here, there is no threat of any immedi ate enforcement, as the regulations have notbeen finalized. Accordingly, the Railroads will no t | suffer any hardship if the Court withholds consideration atthis time. Whether based on the constitutional “case or controversy” requirementor prudential factors, this case is notripe for review and should be dismissed. Il. Tee RAILROADS’ CLAIMS AGAINST OSPR SHOULD BE DISMISSED B ECAUSE THEY ARE BARRED BY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENTTO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. Assumingfor the sake of argument that the preemption issues were ripe for review, the Railroads’ action against defendant OSPR cannot proceed because OSPRis immunefro m suit } under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. A motion to dismiss claims barred by the Eleventh Amendmentis properly made as a motion to dismiss forfailure to sta te a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 12(b) (6). Smith v. Reyes, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072-73 (S.D.Cal. 2012).” 7 Although there is some ambiguity as to whether a motion to dismiss claims barred by the Eleventh Amendmentis properly raised as a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction pursuant to (continued...) 17 Defis’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2: 14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 24 of 27 Here, the Court need not look beyondthe face of the Complaintto find the Rai lroads’ claims against OSPR are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any sui t in law or equity, commencedor prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of anot her State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign immunity to the states against any suit brought in federal court. Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 U.S.44, 54 (1996). . Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, anyaction is barred in federal court again st a State, an “arm of the State,” its instrumentalities, or its agencies, regardless of whet herthe plaintiff seeks damagesor injunctiverelief. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Yak ama Indian Nation v. Wash. Dep’t ofRevenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999)(the Eleventh Amendmentsovereign immunity extends to actions for declaratory and injunctive relief). The Railroads brought suit against OSPR for injunctive and declaratory relief on groundsthat provisions of S.B. 861 allegedly are preempted by federal law. C ompl., {{ 1-6. The Lempert-Keene Act establishes an Administrator whois appointed by the Govern or to implement the Act and whois a Chief Deputy Director of the California Department of Fish an d Wildlife. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 8670.4, 8670.5, 8670.6, 8670.7. OSPR was establish ed by the Administrator in 1991 to accomplish the mandates ofthe Act. TheRailroads concedethat OSPRisa d ivision of the California DepartmentofFish and Wildlife. Compl., ff 4-5, The California Department of Fish and Wildlife is a departmentunder the California Natural Resources Agency. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 700. As such, OSPRis a state agency or instrumentality of the state of California, is protected by the Eleventh Amendment from any suit brought in federal court, and should be dismissed from this case. (...continued) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon whichrelief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), see Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th - |. Cir. 2000), here the motion should be granted undereither theory. 18 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaintfor Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) o O C o S N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2] 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 fase 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 25 of 27 CONCLUSION The Eleventh Amendmentbars the Railroads’ suit against OSPR. But the Court - should not even reachthat issue becauseit lacks jurisdiction to hear the Railroads’ claimsat this -time. Absent regulations implementing S.B. 861, it is simply too soon to analyze the complex _preemptionissuesthat are the subject of the Railroads’ Complaint. The effect of the regulations—howS.B.861 will be applied and enforced—is notyet known. The Railroads face no genuinethreat of imminentprosecution and will suffer no hardship if the Court withholds judgmentuntil after implementing regulations are issued. Accordingly, the Railroads’ claims are not yet ripe, and the Complaint should be dismissed. Dated: October 30, 2014 . Respectfully Submitted, KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California RANDY L. BARROW Supervising Deputy Attorney General /s/ Nicholas Stern NICHOLAS STERN Deputy Attorney General Attorneysfor Defendants California Office ofSpill Prevention and Response, Thomas M. Cullen, Jr., California.Administratorfor Oil Spill Response, and Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Generalfor the State ofCalifornia SA2014118526 11569147.doc 19 Defts’ MPA ISO Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD) Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 26 of 27 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CaseName: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN No. 2:14-cev-02354-TLN- RAILROADS,et al. v. CALIFORNIA CKD OFFICE OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE,etal. Therebycertify that on October 30, 2014,I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF; DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUMOF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF DECLARATION OF JULIE YAMAMOTOIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF; DECLARATION OF JOY LAVIN-JONES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TODISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF; AND, [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF Participants in the case whoare registered CM/ECFusers will be served by the CM/ECFsyst em.. I am employedin the Office of the Attorney General, whichis the office of a memberofthe California State Bar at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. J am familiar with the business practice at the Office of th e Attorney Generalfor collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in theinternal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United State s Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. 5 I further certify that someof the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. On October 30, 2014, I served the attached NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF; | DEFENDANTS’? MEMORANDUMOF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INSUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF; DECLARATION OF JULIE YAMAMOTO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF; Case 2:14-cv-02354-TLN-CKD Document 18-1 Filed 10/30/14 Page 27 of 27 DECLARATION OF JOY LAVIN-JONES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF; A ND, [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONTO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORYRELIEF by placing a true copythereof enclosedin a sealed envelope in the internal mail collec tion system at the Office of the Attorney General at 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. B ox 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550, addressed as follows: . Louis P. Warchot Jacob D. Flesher Association of American Railroads Jeremy J. Schroeder 425 3rd Street SW, Suite 1000 ° Flesher McKague L LP Washington, DC 20024 2202 Plaza Dr. Rocklin, CA 95765 1 declare under penalty of perjury under the lawsofthe State of California the fo regoingis true and correct and that this declaration was executed on October 30, 2014, at Sacramento, California. Kim Lahn /s/ Kim Lahn Declarant Signature 11569463.doc CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE LYNDA F. JOHNSTONdeclares: I am overthe age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305- 8610. On August 26, 2015, I served the foregoing PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICEoneach person named below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail at Stanford, California, addressed to each recipient respectively as follows: Christopher J. Neary, Esq. Neary and O’Brien 110 South MainStreet, Suite C Willits, California 95490-3533 Attorneysfor North Coast Railroad Authority and Board ofDirectors ofNorth Coast Railroad Authority Clare Lakewood, Attorney at Law Center for Biological Diversity 1212 Broaway, Suite 800 Oakland, California 94612-1805 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae Center for Biological Diversity Andrew B. Sabey, Esq. Linda C. Klein, Attorney at Law Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP 555 California Street, 10th Floor San Francisco, California 94104-1513 Attorneysfor Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company Kurt R. Wiese, General Counsel Barbara Baird, Chief Deputy Counsel South Coast Air Quality Management District 21865 Copley Drive DiamondBar, California 91765-4178 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict Jason W. Holder, Esq. Holder Law Group 339 15th Street, Suite 202 Oakland, California 94612-3319 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Madera County Farm Bureau and Merced County Farm Bureau Stuart M. Flashman, Esq. 5626 Ocean View Drive Oakland, California 94618-1533 Attorneyfor Amici Curiae Town of Atherton, California Rail Foundation, Transportation Solutions Defense and Education Fund, Community Coalition on High-Speed Rail, and Patricia Hogan-Giorni Mark N. Melnick Myung J. Park Carolyn Nelson Rowan Deputy Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, California 94102-7004 Attorneysfor Amici Curiae the California Environmental Protection Agency, the California Natural Resources Agency, and certain oftheir Departments and Boards Brian C. Bunger, District Counsel Bay Area Air Quality ManagementDistrict 939 Ellis Street San Francisco, California 94101-7714 Attorneyfor Amicus Curiae Bay Area Air Quality ManagementDistrict David Pettit, Esq. Melissa Lin Perrella, Attorney at Law Ramya Sivasubramanian, Attorney at Law Natural Resources Defense Council 1314 SecondStreet Santa Monica, California 90401-1103 Attorneysfor Amici Curiae Sierra Club, Coalitionfor Clean Air, Natural Resources Defense Council, Planning and Conservation League, and Communitiesfor a Better Environment Danae J. Aitchison, Deputy Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 1300 I Street, Suite 125 P. O. Box 944255 Sacramento, California 94244-2550 Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae California High-Speed Rail Authority I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed August 26, 2015 at Stanford, California. afte LLokaahin YIDA F, JORINSTON
