Case No. 214855 ‘\, SUPREME COURT
FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT\®
OCT 2 9 2014
OF CALIFORNIA
Frank A. McGuire Clerk
STATE DEPARTMENTOF FINANCE,etal, Deputy
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
VS.
COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES,
Defendant and Respondent;
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELESetal.,
RealParties in Interest and Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND APPELLANTS
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND CITIES OF BELLFLOWER, CARSON,
COMMERCE, COVINA, DOWNEY AND SIGNAL HILL
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division One
Case No. B237153
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS130730
Hon. Ann I. Jones, Superior Court Judge
BURHENN & GEST LLP
Howard Gest (SBN 076514)
‘David W. Burhenn (SBN 105482)
624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2200
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 688-7715
Facsimile: (213) 624-1376
Email: hgest@burhenngest.com
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest
and Appellants County of Los
Angeles and Cities of Bellflower,
Carson, Commerce, Covina, Downey
and Signal Hill
MARK SALADINO
County Counsel
JUDITH A. FRIES (SBN 070897)
Principal Deputy
OFFICE OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY COUNSEL
500 West Temple Street, Room 653
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Telephone: (213) 974-1923
Facsimile: (213) 687-7337
Email: jfries@counsel.lacounty.gov
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and
Appellant County of Los Angeles
Case No. 8214855
_ IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA
STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,etal,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES,
Defendant and Respondent;
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELESetal.,
RealParties in Interest and Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF REAL PARTIESIN INTEREST AND APPELLANTS
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND CITIES OF BELLFLOWER, CARSON,
COMMERCE, COVINA, DOWNEY AND SIGNAL HILL
California Court ofAppeal, SecondDistrict, Division One
Case No. B237153
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS130730
Hon. Ann I. Jones, Superior Court Judge
BURHENN & GEST LLP
Howard Gest (SBN 076514)
David W. Burhenn (SBN 105482)
624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2200
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 688-7715
Facsimile: (213) 624-1376
Email: hgest@burhenngest.com
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest
and Appellants County of Los
Angeles and Cities of Bellflower,
Carson, Commerce, Covina, Downey
and Signal Hill
MARK SALADINO
County Counsel
JUDITH A. FRIES (SBN 070897)
Principal Deputy
OFFICE OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY COUNSEL
500 West Temple Street, Room 653
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Telephone: (213) 974-1923
Facsimile: (213) 687-7337
Email: jfries@counsel.lacounty.gov
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and
Appellant County of Los Angeles
Il.
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION oie eccecssssssseesesseseessesecsssesssssecsssssesseenees
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY LOOKED TO FEDERAL
AUTHORITY TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
MANDATE eeiciccseseeseseteeeecetseeeeseseeseseseseaesesesensnseenes
A. When the Regional Board Issues an NPDESPermit, It
Does So as a State Agency Pursuantto a State
PHOQTAM se eeececcesssssesessescessesccsssessesecscscssescsstacsavaesaes
The Commission Properly Looked to Federal Authority
To Define the Scope ofthe Federal Mandate................
THE COMMISSION, NOT THE REGIONAL BOARD,
HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINEIF A PERMIT
REQUIREMENTIS A STATE OR FEDERAL MANDATE
WITHIN THE MEANINGOF ARTICLEXIII B,
SECTION 6 hieeeccssecseseesesesseseceesessesscsscsvsusavevscsatavseerees
A. The Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine
If a Reimbursable State Mandate Exists...cece
B. The Commission Held a Full Public Hearing on the
Obligation at Issue; Its Decision Should be
Respected o.eeeeessssesessessesssessescecssesessesesscsscsssussecesens
C. The State Agencies’ Argumentthat the Regional Board
Should Resolve the Issue of Whether the Trash and
Inspection Obligations are State or Federal Mandatesis
Inconsistent with Legislative Intent and the Commission’s
Exclusive JurisGiction .........ccccccccssccssseeessssesssscscseceeseeens
1. The State Agencies’ Argumentis Inconsistent
With the Commission’s Jurisdiction................0..
2. Allowing the Commission to Perform its Statutory
Function Would Not Invite Multiplicity of
Litigation, Inconsistent Results or Legal Error...
3. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply Here..........
1
1]
I]
14
18
IV. THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
PERMIT’S TRASH RECEPTACLE AND INSPECTION
OBLIGATIONS WERE STATE MANDATES..........cesses
A. The Commission Properly Found That the Trash
Receptacle and Inspection Obligations Imposed Costs
That Exceeded the Mandate in Federal Law.................
B. A State Mandate is Created Where a State Agency
Usurps a Local Agency’s Discretion as to The Manner
In Which to Comply With a Federal Mandate...............
C. A State Mandate is Created Within the Meaning of
Article XIII B, Section 6, Where the State Freely
Chooses to Shift a Federal Obligation from Itself to
Local AQencies........cccsccscessessssseessssseessesssseseeesesesseeeees
D. Substantial Evidence Supported the Commission’s
DeCiSiOn —seeeceeecccesecstecssseeseesessteeseeessecesesseeeeeesseees
CONCLUSION —oieeiecececcssesseesseetesenetecsseeseeseeeeseesneseeees
il
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25
28
29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases
Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010)
AB Cala 788 ivccscesessusssssessessecsssscsssesseessesssessssessasesesees 18
Building Industry Ass'n. ofSan Diego County v. State Water Resources
Control Board (2004)
124 Cal.App.4” 866 ceccccccssssssssssssssssssessseessssessecssecssseesssseesssees 5
California School Board’s Ass'n v. State ofCalifornia (2009)
171 Cal.App.4™ 1183 v.ccccscccscsssssssscsssssessusecsssessecssueessssessssseessvecs 13
Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State ofCalifornia (1987)
190 CalApp.3d 521 eeeecccsessssssssssesscscssescsscsescessscsscscssseseseeses 4,13
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC. Inc.
467 U.S. 837 (1984) oo cccccccccsscsssssscscecstsseesteessssecessecssserseesees 4,21
City ofBurbank v. State Water Resources Control Board (2005)
BS Cal4™ 613 eecesssssccsssssssssssesstssccssssssvesesssueesssesessessnsvesss 3, 16, 17
City ofLodi v. Randtron (2004)
118 Cal.App.4'? 337 cecccscscsssssssssscsssecssessseesseesstessvessstecsaecsses 18
City ofRancho Cucamonga v. Regional Water Quality Control
Board (2006)
135 Cal.App.4'? 1377 vecccscsccsssssssssssssssecessessseccseessesssessseeecssvesssecs 27
Coleman v. Department ofPersonnel Administration (1991)
S2 Cab.3d 1102 eeeeecccscsssssssssesecseestesscseecsseseusssssssesesseees 16
County ofLos Angeles v. California Regional Water Control Board
For the Los Angeles Region
Superior Court Case No. BS080758 .........ccccscsssscsscsssscreeseeecees 19
County ofLos Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (Davis) (1997)
32 Cal.App.4 805 ccccccccscsscssssssssessssessseseseressessessatssssessssvesasess 13
County ofLos Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (2007)
150 Cal.App.4" 898 oecccccccscsssscssstssssueessesssvecsessecesusssssesessessseees 9
lil
County ofLos Angeles v. State ofCalifornia (1987)
AB Cal3d 46 icccscsesssssssssesesssscsscsucsvsscsvsnsssssesstseeesecaees 6
County ofSan Diego v. State ofCalifornia (1997)
V5 Cala? 68 acessssssscesesccessssssssnsessecsssssvuesssissssesssessesnnee 6
Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency
344 F.3d 832 (9™ Cir, 2003)..cssccccsssssssssssseesessesssssssssssessesssssseen 14
Grossmont Union High Schoolv. State Dept. ofEducation (2008)
169 Cal.App.4™ 869 vecccescsccscsssssssusessuecssssecssscssusesssessssecsssesseee 7, 12
Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992)
LL Cal.App.415640 vi.cceccccccsssessescsssecstessesssessseceseessseesssessseee passim
Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig
S41 US. 232 (2004) oo. eeceseccsessssssssesesecseeseseesesssessssnsccsvevacenseves 3
Jackson v. County ofLos Angeles (1997)
60 CabApp.4™ 171 cecceeccssecssssssssssssssecscesecessessseesssessseeessesessees 19
Kinlaw v. State ofCalifornia (1991)
54 Cal.3d 326 ciicccsccsssssscsssseseescsressesscsessssecsssscsessveseeeaees 6, 7
Long Beach Unified School District v. State ofCalifornia (1990)
225 Cal.App.3d 155 oeeccccsscescsscssesssssessscssssssssssccsesscestsecessers passim
Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig (1988)
AA Cal.3d 830 iiseessssssesssseseseesesscsecsessscssssseussvsssevsceaseesees 5,7
Lucido v. Superior Court (1990)
ST Cal.3d 335 iiececsessesssscsssseessessssesecsesesscsesscsssessaees 18
Neary v. Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia (1992)
B Cala 273 aeesesssssesssessesssssssssscesecsssssssesssesssesssssseasesen 16
People v. Javier A. (1985)
38 Cal.3d B11 iecsesseseseesesessesseseseesesessersecseesessnsass 28
San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water Authority v. State
Water Resources Control Board (2010)
183 Cal.App.4™ 1110 vcccccecsscscsssssscesssecessesscecsssesnesstesssesseeen 8.
iv
Spurrell v. Spurrell (1962)
205 Cal.App.2d 786 oo. ceccccsccsssscsssscsssscsesscsssssssssscsssccasscsssenecaes 28
State Dept. ofFinance v. Commission on State Mandates (2013)
Case No. B237153 oicieecccscsscssessssesessssesesscssesssscsecccesrssetereeaes 5, 13
State ofCalifornia v. Superior Court (1974)
V2 Cab.3d 237 ieiseceessssssssseseescessesesesceusessssssssusaescesseasers 17
State ofCalifornia v. United States Departmentofthe Navy
845 F.2d 222 (9" Cir. 1988)....ceccsccscescssesscseecsuesssecssscessecsssseeseses 2
Constitution, Statutes and Regulations
Cal. Const. article XTID B, section 6........ccccccccccsessessssssssssssssseresseatseeeee passim
Cal. Const., article XTII B, § 6(b) .....ccccccescescsscscssesssssssesseccatseseeees 18
Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5... .cccccccsccscssssccsssscsessecseessceseseassees 11, 15,17
Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(f)........ccccccssssssscscsssssssesssecsersessseess 17
Education Code § 59300 o.veccccceccscssssscsstsssecsscsscssssececsceeerseersasens 7
Govt. Code § 17500 et S€q. oececcecccecceescccsssssesssscesecsreesscsseusesssesseeaesenses 5, 6, 7, 11
Govt. Code § 17500 iieceesssssessssesesesesesecseeecscsecstsssesasacseneares 6, 11, 16
Govt. Code § 17551(A) eeeeiscssssssessssesesssecsssesseecsssussssuevscsessasaces 6
Govt. Code § 17551(C) eee eeccceccesssssesesssceessesesscsssesssecsuvsesssssesees 15
Govt. Code $ 17552 eecccecessssssesesssseseseseeecsesscevsucevsssescaeases 6, 10
Govt. Code § 17553 ccsccccccsessscsessesesscsscssceaceeceesesseseeasneeass 6
Govt. Code § 17556 aceceeccessessesccseeseesesessccssssavsessessseaeesctecseaees 15
Govt. Code § 17556(C) eceieceecsssssesseseesesenseseesesssssesssusevseeessasavevaes 20, 21
Govt. Code § 17559(D) eeeccccccscsesscesecsessssecsessessessesseseeseesactanenees 11
Govt. Code § 17581(a) eeeisesesessesceesececsesseseeecsessesssscsseesseeeesees 18
Water Code § 13050(d) eeccccccecccscesecsseesscessssescseesssessesssesssacseeeaees 25
Water Code § 13050(€) eeeececseeseeesseeseessssessesseeseseesscsesessecsssees 25
Water Code § 13260 eeieeeeescssesscsssseseseseessssseseesesseseessseesecenens 25
Water Code § 13260(d)(2)(B)(iii) 0... eee eeeetsescssecetesseeseesesesesseseecesesess 27
Water Code § 13263 icsiiccscecssscsssessesessscesecscssssessessensssssecseesaes 25
Water Code § 13267(C) eeeessesssseesseeesseseseseeerenseseeecseseseesesseneeees 25
Water Code § 13320 —icscessscssecssesssesteeseceeceseeeseesssstesssessesensees 15, 17
Water Code § 13330 iceiiccseccssscsstessscesssesseeenssesecssssssescessessseseee 15, 17
Water Code § 13330(d) ieeeeccsseessessescssssessssessssssnssssssesssseaseeas 15, 16
Water Code § 13377 ——aeccssscessccesesssesscesseessecssccsseessesssscessnsossesaes 16, 26
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) aeeeeeeeeesestececeesetecsessesseesseseeseessssesesseeaeees 2, 14
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) eeececesesesceseeeseecesseeseeeeeeecsesseseeseeseseees 26
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(B)(B)GI) oeee eeesseeeeeeceeeeenesesessessssseessesseseenes 23
33 U.S.C. § 1342(pyAMA) eeeeccecseseeeeseeeeceeserseeeseseseeessseseessenees 4
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(B) eeeee eeeeeeeeetseeesaceseeeeesseessessesaeeseeseesenee 4
B3 U.S.C. § 1370 eeeaeesesssesseteesseesesecsceseneessessesseseeseeessenseaee 14, 16
40 CLFLR. § 122.26(D)(14) eeeeceeseeseesseseceeeeecseeseesseesesesessessesseeseees 26
AO C.F.R. § 122.26(C) aeceeeecesecsecssesceeeeeeseesecseeaeeseesessesaneeeseesesaees 26
AO C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)GV) oo. eee eeseeeeeeneeeeeeesersecseseeeessessesesateseseees 8
40 C.F.R. § 1226.26(d)(2)GIV)(A).... cee eeeseeeeesetetsesseeseteessecseeseersseeeecaees 23
40 C.F.LR. § 1226.26(d)(2)(V)(B).... ee eeeseeeeeceeeceseenreseeesscsseesesaeesensens 23
Vi
40 CER. § 1226.26(d)(2)(iV)(C) .scecccccsseecssccesssestesesecsssecesssssseseesessanen
40 CER. § 1226.26(d)(2)(iV)(D) sssessccosssecsscscssssssesessesssecsssssseseseesesssase
55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48027-38 (Nov. 16, 1990) ..cccccccssssssssssssssssesccesen
55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48052 (Nov. 16, 1990)... ceesesteesessesseeseseeees
Vii
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I, INTRODUCTION
Respondents’ arguments in this case essentially amount to a single
concept: “trust us.” But there is a fundamental disconnect between
respondents’ arguments and the very purpose of the Commission on State
Mandates — to prevent state agencies from imposing programs on local
governments without also providing a subvention of funds. Respondents
effectively are asking this Court to ignore decades of jurisprudence
concerning the exclusive authority of the Commission to determine the
existence of a state mandate and to carve out special rules for the State
Water Resources Control Board andits regional boards.
According to respondents California Department of Finance, State
Water Resources Control Board (“State Board”) and Los Angeles Regional
Water Quality Control Board (“Regional Board”) (collectively, the “state
agencies”), there was essentially nothing for the Commission to decide in
this case. They contendthat, by reason of the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”)
general standard that efforts be made to reduce pollutants in stormwater to
the “maximum extent practicable” (“MEP”), virtually any requirement the
State Board or regional boards may impose is necessarily a federal
mandate, and local entities must bear the cost of such requirement without a
subvention of funds. The Commission’srole, they insist, is to do nothing
more than to accept a regional board’s own determination that a permit
requirement has been imposed in furtherance of a federal, and not a state,
mandate.
The state agencies’ position is flatly inconsistent with the purpose of
the Commission and uniform case law from both this Court and the courts
of appeal concerning the Commission’s independent role in determining
whether a particular requirement imposed by a state agency constitutes a
state or federal mandate. Indeed, the state agencies would have this Court
entirely sidestep one of the key issues on which review has been granted —
how the Commission is to determine the nature and extent of a general
federal statutory standard when the federal statute does not define that
scope. The state agencies’ position is essentially that the Commission
should do nothing — a general federal standard is simply that, and that vast
umbrella of generality effectively immunizes any mandate from a claim for
a subvention of funds.
The Commission must employ, and indeed has repeatedly employed,
basic principles of statutory interpretation in resolving both the inherently
factual questions and inherently mixed questions of fact and law as to
whether a particular requirement constitutes a state or federal mandate.
Applying those principles here, the Commission found that the
requirements imposed on the Cities and County were state, not federal,
mandates. That determination is squarely supported by existing authority
and the state agencies present no reason whyother, special rules should
apply. The Commission’s determination was correct and should be
affirmed.
Il. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY LOOKED TO FEDERAL
AUTHORITY TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
MANDATE
A. Whenthe Regional Board Issues an NPDESPermit,It
Does So as a State Agency Pursuant to a State
Program
The state agencies do not dispute that the state implements its own
NPDES permit program in lieu of the federal program (Answer Brief
(“A.B.”) at 4). See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); State of California v. United
States Departmentofthe Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9" Cir. 1988). Thus,in
issuing NPDESpermits, the Regional Board acts as a state agency, issuing
NPDESpermits pursuantto a state program.
B. The Commission Properly Looked to Federal
Authority to Define the Scope of the Federal Mandate
The state agencies also do not dispute that a NPDES permit can
contain both federal and state requirements and, when the permit contains
state requirements, it is subject to state law (A.B.at 4, 14 and 34 n.3). See
e.g. City of Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Board (2005) 35
Cal. 4" 613, 627-28.
Because an NPDES permit can contain both federal and state
requirements, there must be a principled means to distinguish federal and
state requirements for the purposes of mandate jurisprudence. The state
agencies do not suggest one. Instead, the state agencies argue that a permit
provision required by the federal MEP standard is not a state mandate (A.B.
at 20).
As the Cities and County stated in their Opening Brief, however,
they do not dispute that the MEP standard is a federal requirement
(Opening Br. at 26-27). Instead, the issue is how the scope of that
requirementis to be defined where, as here, the federal statute does not do
so. The state agencies provide no answer to this question. At best, they
argue that federal regulations authorize the trash receptacle and inspection
obligations at issue here (A.B. at 23-25), although the state agencies
criticize the Commission for taking this very approach (/d. at 16-17, 28-29.)
The Commission looked to federal authority to determine whether
the permit provisions at issue were in fact required by the MEP standard.
This approach wascorrect.
Whendefining the scope of a federal mandate, the Commission must
give effect to the intent of Congress. Household Credit Servs., Inc. v.
3
Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004). Here, Congress specifically delegated
to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) the
obligation to adopt regulations setting forth the permit application
requirements for stormwater discharges. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A) and
(B). Where Congress hasexplicitly directed an agency to adopt regulations
to elucidate specific provisions of a statute, such regulations are to be given
controlling weight. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984). The Commission thus properly looked first to these
regulations to define the scope of the statutory MEP requirement.
To the extent that the regulations do not fully define the scope of
federal requirement, the Commission should look to other federal authority.
See Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State of California (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 521, 543-44 (Board of Control and court looked to letter
from federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration as well as
federal statute in determining whether state requirement wasstate or federal
mandate).
The Commission did this also. Here the Commission had beforeit
USEPA’s MS4 Program Evaluation Guidance manual (AR 3391-3493),
other USEPA-issued permits (AR 3891-4190), evidence that the trash
receptacle and inspection obligations had not been includedin prior permits
issued by the Regional Board and approved by USEPA (AR 1540-41, 1552,
1782, 3865), and letters from the USEPA Administrator and a senior
regional USEPA administrator, confirming that the state, and not the Cities
and County, was obligated to inspect facilities for compliance with state-
issued general permits (AR 3878-81).!
' The Court of Appeal did not look to any federal authority to define MEP.
Instead, the court applied a definition created by a state agency, the San
Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, in another permit, as cited in
4
Ill. THE COMMISSION, NOT THE REGIONAL BOARD, HAS
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE IF A_ PERMIT
REQUIREMENT IS A STATE OR FEDERAL MANDATE
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE XIII B, SECTION6
A, The Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction to
Determine if a Reimbursable State Mandate Exists
Instead of setting forth how the Commission should define a federal
mandate, the state agencies argue that the Commission should not even
perform this function, but should defer to the agency that itself imposed the
mandate, here, the Regional Board. This approach ignores the legislative
intent underlying Government Code §17500 et seg., would represent an
unprecedented departure from this Court’s mandate jurisprudence, and
would undermine the process put into place by the Legislature to
implementarticle XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Article XIII B, section 6 was added to the Constitution in 1979 as
part of Proposition 4, a larger initiative aimed at limiting state and local
spending. Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992) 11 Cal.App.4"
1564, 1580 (‘Hayes’). Section 6 was included to prevent the state from
shifting to local governments the financial responsibility for providing
public services in view of the restrictions that had been placed on their
taxing and spending powers. Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 835-36; Hayes, supra, 11 Cal.App.4” at 1580. As
this Court noted, arguments contained in the voter pamphlet describing
Proposition 4 stated that the purpose of the proposition was not only to
limit state and local government spending, but also to “not allow the state
government to force programs on local governments without the state
another court of appeal case, Building Industry Ass’n. ofSan Diego County
v. State Water Resources Control Board (2004) 124 Cal.App.4" 866, 876
n.7, 889. (State Dept. ofFinance v. Commission on State Mandates, Case
No. B237153, Slip op. at 31, 34-35.)
5
paying for them.” County ofLos Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43
Cal.3d 46, 56, quoting California Ballot Pamphlet, Special State-Wide
Election, November 6, 1979, p. 18. See also County ofSan Diego v. State
ofCalifornia (1997) 15 Cal.4" 68, 80-81.
In 1984, the Legislature enacted Government Code § 17500 et seq.,
which “provide the sole and exclusive procedure by which a local agency
or schooldistrict may claim reimbursement for costs mandated by the state
as required by Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution.”
Govt. Code § 17552. Local agencies or school districts must initiate that
process by filing claims with the Commission. Govt. Code § 17551(a).
The Commission holds a public hearing on the claim, at which time the
Commission determines whether the local agency or school district is
entitled to be reimbursed. Govt. Code § 17553.
The Legislature adopted this comprehensive administrative process
“because the absence of a uniform procedure had resulted in inconsistent
rulings on the existence of state mandates, unnecessary litigation,
reimbursement delays, and, apparently, resultant uncertainties in
accommodating reimbursement requirements in the budgetary process.”
Kinlaw v. State ofCalifornia (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331. As the Legislature
stated in Government Code § 17500:
The Legislature finds and declares that the existing
system for reimbursing local agencies and school districts for the
costs of state-mandated local programs has not provided for the
effective determination of the state's responsibilities under
Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution .. . [I]n
order to relieve unnecessary congestion of the judicial system,it
is necessary to create a mechanism which is capable of
rendering sound quasi-judicial decisions and providing an
effective means of resolving disputes over the existence ofstate-
mandatedlocal programs.
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this part to
provide for the implementation of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of
6
the California Constitution. Further, the Legislature intends that
the Commission on State Mandates, as a quasi-judicial body,
will act in a deliberative manner in accordance with the
requirements of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California
Constitution.
Since the adoption of Government Code § 17500 et seq., the courts
have consistently held that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine if a state mandate exists in the first instance. For example, in
Lucia Mar, this Court, after finding that Education Code § 59300’s shifting
of costs onto local school districts to fund special education constituted a
“new program,” 44 Cal.3d at 835, declined to go further and decide whether
this shifting constituted a reimbursable mandate, holding that “[t]he issue is
for the commission to determine, as it is charged by section 17551 of the
Government Code with the duty to decide in the first instance whether a
local agencyis entitled to reimbursement... .” Jd. at 837.
In Kinlaw, this Court upheld a superior court’s dismissal of a
taxpayer action seeking to require the state to reimburse the County of
Alamedafor the cost of providing health care services to medically indigent
adults pursuant to article XIJI B, section 6. 54 Cal. 3d at 328-29. The
Court held that filing a test claim with the Commission was the exclusive
procedure for resolving mandate claims. Jd. at 333.
In Grossmont Union High Schoolv. State Dept. ofEducation (2008)
169 Cal. App. 4" 869, the court of appeal affirmed a demurrer to a
complaint in which the school district, without having filed a test claim
with the Commission, sought relief from or payment of the costs of mental
health services for special education students that had been ordered by the
state. Id. at 879-82. The court held that the mandate may be a “mixed”
federal and state mandate, id. at 875, and that the Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue. Jd. at 883-85. See also San
Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water Authority v. State Water
Resources Control Board (2010) 183 Cal. App. 4" 1110, 1135
(Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determineifregulatory action by
State Water Resources Control Board and a regional water board
constituted an unfunded state mandate).
B. The Commission Held a Full Public Hearing on the
Obligationsat Issue; Its Decision Should be Respected
The Commission held a full hearing on whetherthe trash receptacle
and inspection obligations were state mandates. After the test claims were
re-filed, interested parties, including the state agencies, had a full
opportunity to submit written comments and evidence (See AR 2677-84,
2685-3800). The Commission’s staff issued a draft analysis on which the
state agencies had the opportunity to comment (AR 4701-65, 5143-5320;
5321-26).
The Commission then issued a proposed Statement of Decision (AR
5345-16) and held a public hearing at which representatives of the state
agencies testified (AR 5417, 5444-60). After hearing the testimony and
considering the evidence beforeit, the Commission issued a 71-page, single
spaced final Statement of Decision (AR 5555-5626).
The Commission’s decision was based not only on a review of
federal regulations but also involved factual determinations, including
whether the trash receptacle and inspection obligations exceeded federal
requirements and whether the state could perform these obligationsitself.
While the CWA’s implementing regulations set forth the types of programs
that should be included as elements in a municipal separate storm sewer
system (“MS4”) permit, they leave the design of those programs to the
MS4applicant. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv). Because the regulations do
not explicitly require the Permit’s trash receptacle or inspection programs,
8
whether they are federally required, as opposed to other programs that
would be more cost-effective or “practicable,” is a factual question or a
mixed question of fact and law.
Indeed, in the hearing before the Commission, the State and
Regional Board representative described this MEP determination as
involving “balancing a number of factors in order to determine what the
maximum extent practicable is.” (AR 5451.) When the Regional Board
wasbefore the court of appeal in the first appeal in this case, it argued that
the court did not have to reach the constitutional question because the trash
receptacle and inspection obligations in the Permit were federal mandates
as a matter of law. County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State
Mandates (2007) 150 Cal.App.4" 898, 913-14. The court of appeal
explicitly rejected that argument, holding that “a review of the pleadings
and the matters that may be judicially noticed [citations] leads to the
inescapable conclusion that whether the two obligations in question
constitute federal or state mandates presents factual issues which must be
addressedin the first instance by the Commission... .” Jd. at 917-18. The
test urged by the state agencies themselves in their AnswerBrief (A.B.at 7)
characterizes the MEP standard as “a highly flexible concept that depends
on balancing numerousfactors, including the particular control’s technical
feasibility, costs, public acceptance, regulatory compliance and
effectiveness” — all factual matters.
The Commission considered the arguments and evidence presented
to it. The Commission considered the federal authority that described the
CWArequirements. It considered the federal regulations that the state
agencies cite in their answer brief (A.B. at 23-25) and found that these
regulations did not require the trash receptacle or inspection obligations (1
9
CT 124-25; 130-32; 134-36, 139-42). The Commission considered the
MEPstandard, specifically recognizing that MS4 permits shall require
controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the MEP (1 CT 119, 123,
124, 132). The Commission considered the federal guidance manual,
USEPA letters, and obligations imposed upon the Regional Board under
state-issued permits to industrial and construction sites (1 CT 129, 131-32,
135-36, 141-42).
Although not mentioned in its decision, the Commission also had
before it other USEPA-issued stormwater permits that did not include the
trash receptacle obligation (AR 3891-4190), evidence that prior Los
Angeles County permits that did not include the trash receptacle and
inspection obligations (AR 1540-41, 1552, 1555, 1782-83, 3865), letters
from the USEPA Administrator and head of the water program for Region
IX of USEPAstating that the state, and not cities and counties, had the
obligation to inspect facilities for compliance with the state-issued permits
(AR 3878-881), and evidence that the Regional Board had initiated
negotiations for a contract with the County to pay the County to perform
the inspections of industrial facilities on the Board’s behalf (AR 3885).
After considering this evidence, the Commission concluded that the trash
receptacles and inspections were state mandates (1 CT 124-25, 132, 136,
141-42).
The state agencies invite this Court, as they invited the superior
court and the court of appeal, to ignore the Commission and independently
find that the trash receptacle and inspection obligations are federal
requirements (A.B. at 23-25). The Commission, however, has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a local agency is entitled to
reimbursement for costs mandated by the state. Govt. § 17552. A party
10
may seek review of that decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §
1094.5, but the Commission’s decision must be upheldif it is supported by
substantial evidence. Govt. Code § 17559(b). This Court therefore should
decline the state agencies’ invitation and reaffirm the administrative process
enacted by the Legislature.
C. The State Agencies’ Argument that the Regional
Board Should Resolve the Issue of Whether the Trash
and Inspection Obligations are State or Federal
Mandates is Inconsistent with Legislative Intent and
the Commission’s Exclusive Jurisdiction
1. The State Agencies’ Argument is Inconsistent
with the Commission’s Jurisdiction
The state agencies argue that the Commission should have deferred
to the Regional Board’s determination of whether the trash and inspection
obligations were federal requirements (A.B. at 25-26). In other words, the
state agencies ask this Court to hold that the very agency imposing the
mandate, the Regional Board, should determine whether municipalities are
entitled to a subvention of funds because, according to the state agencies,
the Commission should defer to the Regional Board’s determination as to
whether the mandate is state or federal (A.B. at 28-29).
Such a holding would be inconsistent with the legislative intent
underlying Government Code § 17500 et seg. and the Commission’s
exclusive jurisdiction. No court has ever held that the Legislature or the
state agency that imposes the mandate also defines whether the mandate is
federal or state for subvention purposes.
The Legislature centralized all decisions regarding the existence of
an unfunded state mandate in the Commission. Govt. Code § 17500.
Inherent in the Commission’s power to determine the existence of an
unfunded state mandate is the power to determine whether the mandate is
1]
state or federal. Grossmont Union High School, supra, 169 Cal.App.4"at
883-85.
The state agencies nevertheless argue that the Government Code and
several decades of mandate jurisprudence should be ignored because the
Commission is “ill-equipped” to determine if a permit requirement is
federally mandated and because the regional boards have expertise in such
permits (A.B. at 25-28).” The Regional Board’s expertise, however, is in
choosing the terms of a permit, not in determining whether a mandate is
state or federal. The cases cited by the state agencies, Fukuda v. City of
Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4" 805 and Yamaha Corporation ofAmerica v. State
Board ofEqualization (1998) 19 Cal.4" 1, address deference by reviewing
courts when theissue is within the agency’s expertise (and jurisdiction) and
there is a challenge to the agency’s action. Fukada, 20 Cal.4™ at 812;
Yamaha, 19 Cal.4"™ at 12. Here, it is the Commission, not the Regional
Board, that has the expertise with respect to subvention, and there is no
challenge to the Permit’s terms before the Commission.
The state agencies do not explain why the Commission has expertise
to determine if education, criminal procedure, OSHA and other state
agency or legislative mandates are state or federal mandates, but is ‘ill-
equipped” to make the same determination with respect to regional board
mandates. See e.g., Grossmont Union High School, 169 Cal.App.4" at 883-
85 (Department of Education order requiring mental health services for
* The Cities and County do not concedethat the sole source of expertise as
to the practicability of controls in an MS4 permit lies with a regional board.
Because municipalities are the entities actually designing and implementing
their pollution prevention programs and designing, constructing and
maintaining structural projects in the field, the municipalities have as much
or more expertise in such issues. The municipalities bring that expertise to
bear when they submit proposed programs and controls in conjunction with
their permit applications and renewals.
12
special education); County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State
Mandates (Davis) (1995) 32 Cal.App.4™ 805, 811 n.3, 818-19 (Penal Code
provision requiring counties to provide indigent defendants with
investigators and experts); Hayes, 11 Cal.App.4" at 1570, 1594 (special
education); Carmel Valley, 190 Cal.App.3d at 530-31, 543-44 (Board of
Control review offirefighter protective clothing).
The state agencies do not identify anything unique to the regional
boards or the stormwater program that would make those boards or that
program an exception. Indeed, every state agency administering a program
where issues of state and federal law are intertwined has expertise in
implementing the programs they oversee, as is claimed on the Regional
Board’s behalf here. Nevertheless, no case has ever held that those
agencies’ determinationsare entitled to deference for subvention purposes.’
The state agencies also argue that the Regional Board had an
extensive administrative record before it when it adopted the Permit (A.B.
at 26). This is not a basis for ignoring the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Nothing prevented the Regional Board from submitting excerpts of that
administrative record to the Commission and explaining why those excerpts
or other evidence supported their argument that the Permit’s mandates at
issue were federally required. Although given the opportunity, the state
agenciesdid notdo so.*
3 Similarly, as noted in Section IV.B.3 of the Opening Brief, the courts
uniformly have rejected arguments that the Legislature’s declared intent is
binding on the Commission and instead have held that the “Commission
must disregard any declarations of legislative intent and, instead, decide for
itself whether a reimbursable state mandate exists.” California School
Board’s Ass'n v. State ofCalifornia (2009) 171 Cal.App.4™ 1183, 1204.
* The state agencies assert that there was an 80,000 page administrative
record before the Regional Board (A.B. at 26). They do not identify,
13
The state agencies finally argue that Congress conferred discretion
on the Regional Board to determine whether the trash receptacle and
inspection obligations were federal requirements (A.B. at 26). The
agencies, however, cite no authority for this proposition other than 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b), which simply authorizes a state to operate its own
program in lieu of the federal program. Although the Regional Board is
required to assure that a permit meets minimum federal requirements, cf
Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 344 F.3d 832, 856 (9" Cir. 2003), the CWA does not
authorize or require the Regional Board to determine if a permit exceeds
federal requirements. Given that the state is authorized to include
provisions that exceed federal requirements, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, the fact that
the Regional Board wasthe permitting agency does not, byitself, indicate
that it has the authority or expertise to determine if a mandate is state or
federal for the purposeofarticle XIII B, section 6. That expertise lies with
the Commission, as the Legislature has directed and the courts uniformly
have found.
2. Allowing the Commission to Perform its
Statutory Function Would Not Invite
Multiplicity of Litigation, Inconsistent Results
or Legal Error
The Commission does not address the wisdom or the lawfulness of a
mandate. The Commission cannot relieve a municipality from performing
that mandate. The Commission’s only task is to determine whether, when
performing a mandate, a municipality is entitled to a subvention of funds.
however, what part if any of that record addressed whether the trash
receptacle or inspection obligations were federal requirements. Although
given the opportunity to do so before the Commission, they did not make
that part of this record.
14
The state agencies nevertheless argue that allowing the Commission
to perform its statutory function with respect to municipal stormwater
permits wouldinvite a multiplicity of actions, inconsistent results, and legal
error (A.B.at 28-30). Such is not thecase.
First, placing the determination of whether a mandate is state or
federal in a regional board will result in more litigation before the State and
regional boards andthe courts, not less. As the state agencies argue (A.B.
at 32 n.2), any finding by a regional board must be appealed to the State
Board and then to the superior court pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5.
Water Code §§ 13320 and 13330. Every permittee will be thus be boundto
litigate the unfunded mandate issues before the State and regional boards
and to appeal those decisions to the courts or have the issues waived.
Water Code § 13330(d).
The state agencies’ requested alternative procedure also will not
eliminate Commission proceedings. A test claim must be filed within one
year after the effective date of a permit, or within one year of incurring
increased costs. Govt. Code § 17551(c). In manycases, this deadline will
arise before State Board and court proceedings are complete. The regional
board and the courts also lack authority to decide the other issues that must
be addressed pursuant to Government Code § 17556 in order to determine
if a permittee is entitled to a subvention of funds. There thus will be a
multiplicity ofproceedings addressing the mandateissue.
Placing the determination in the Regional Board also will increase
the likelihood ofinconsistent results, not eliminate them. Each superior
court that is faced with a permit provision will be making its own decision
as to whetherit is a federal or state mandate. The court will be making this
decision without the guidance or record that the Commission would
15
otherwise provide. Nor does having the Commission decide the issue shift
the burden of proof. It is the claimants who have the burden before the
Commission.
The multiplicity of superior courts hearing these appeals and the
possibility of inconsistent rulings is exactly the result the Legislature sought
to avoid. Govt. Code § 17500. The Commission, on the other hand, can
apply its rulings consistently across all test claims that comebeforeit.
The state agencies also ignore the fact that there is no legal
requirement for the Regional Board to address whether a mandateis state or
federal because a regional board is not limited by federal law when issuing
an MS4permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1370; Water Code § 13377; City ofBurbank,
supra, 35 Cal. 4" at 627-28. Neither the CWAnor California law requires
a regional board to address whether an MS4 permit’s terms are federally
required. Thus, whether a permit term is a federal mandate is not ordinarily
addressed in the proceedings before the regional board; a permittee may not
challenge a provision on the ground that it is not federally required since
the board may impose the requirement under state law regardless. Under
the state agencies’ approach, however, a permittee hasto litigate the issue
before the regional board and the courts, or else it is waived. Water Code §
13330(d).
Third, holding that regional boards should determine whether a
mandate is state or federal faces a legal impediment because it requires
courts to render advisory opinions, something which courts are not
authorized to do. Neary v. Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia (1992)3
Cal.4” 273, 284; Coleman vy. Department of Personnel Administration
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1126. As discussed above, any finding by a
regional board must be appealed to the State Board and then to the superior
16
court pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, or review is waived. Water
Code §§ 13320 and 13330. Requesting a determination that a mandate is
state-required, however, is asking the court (and the State Board) to provide
an advisory opinion, because whether a permit provision is: state or
federally required in itself would not result in the court ordering the
provision stricken; the state may include permit terms that exceed federal
requirements.
Additionally, in a mandate proceeding under section 1094.5, the
court must either command the agencyto set aside the order or decision or
deny the writ. Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(f). Because a permittee would not
be asking the court to set aside the permit, but to declare that a permit
requirement was a state as opposed to federal requirement, the permittee
would essentially be asking for declaratory relief, not a writ of mandate.
Declaratory relief, howeveris not available for review of an administrative
decision. State ofCalifornia v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249:
Finally, allowing the Commission to perform its statutory function
will not invite legal error. As discussed above, it is the Commission that
has expertise in mandate jurisprudence, not a regional board. Thestate
agencies are free to submit to the Commission all of their evidence and
legal arguments, whether or not part of the administrative record generated
before the regional board. The Commission then will apply its expertise to
the record beforeit, with any decision subject to judicial review.°
> The state agencies contend that having the Commission decide whether a
permit provision is a state or federal mandate could result in conflicting
obligations under state and federal law because, when the state does not
provide a subvention of funds for a state mandate, the mandate is
suspended (A.B. at 30). There would be no conflicting obligations. Any
state requirement would be enforceable only if it is enforceable understate
law. See City ofBurbank, 35 Cal. 4™ at 618, 627. A state mandate that is
17
3. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply Here
The state agencies also argue that collateral estoppel precludes the
Commission from determining whether the Permit obligations are state or
federal mandates. The agencies concede, however, that although they have
previously argued that the prior substantive challenge to the Permit should
have preclusive effect, they never addressed this argument in terms of
collateral estoppel (A.B. at 31 n.1).
The requirements for collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue sought to
be precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessarily |
decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the prior decision is final and on the
merits; and (3) the party against whom preclusion is sought is identicalto,
or in privity with, the party in the prior proceeding. Boeken v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4" 788, 797; Lucido v. Superior Court
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341. Contrary to the state agencies’ contention, the
issue of whether the trash and inspection obligations were federal mandates
was not actually litigated or necessarily decided in the priorlitigation over
the merits of the Permit.
First, the Regional Board had no jurisdiction in the permit
proceedings to make a mandate determination. Thus, even if the Regional
Board had made any such determination, it would be entitled to no weight.
City of Lodi v. Randtron (2004) 118 Cal.App.4” 337, 361 (“[A]n
administrative order will not be given preclusive effect when the order is
made in excess of the agency’s jurisdiction.”’).
Second, the state agencies are judicially estopped from makingthis
argument. The County andseveral cities attempted in the permit challenge
suspended is not enforceable. Cal. Const., article XIII B, § 6(b); Govt.
Code § 17581 (a).
18
to litigate whether the Permit’s trash and inspection obligation constituted
reimbursable state mandates. The Regional Board demurred to those
causes of action on the ground that the issue must first be presented in the
form of a test claim to the Commission. The superior court agreed and
granted the demurrer, holding that the Cities and County could not seek a
judicial determination that the Permit contained an unfundedstate mandate
until they filed an administrative claim with the Commission. County of —
Los Angeles v. California Regional Water Control Board for the Los
Angeles Region, Superior Court Case No. BS080758, Ruling on Demurrer,
filed December 5, 2003 at 6; Ruling on Demurrer, filed February 19, 2004,
at 2-3.° The agencies are now judicially estopped from arguing that the
prior litigation resolved the mandate issue. Jackson v. County of Los
Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4" 171, 181 (“Judicial estoppel prevents a party
from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position
previously taken in the same or someearlier proceeding.”)
Third, as the Commission found,the prior litigation did not address
the issue of unfunded mandates (1 CT 120). Once the superior court
granted the demurrer without leave to amend, that court had no reason to
address whetherthe trash receptacle and inspection obligations were federal
or state mandates. The court of appeal in that case recognized that the
Regional Board could impose requirements that went beyond the federal
standard (AR 3259), and addressed whether the Regional Board complied
with California law in adopting portions of the Permit, such as the
°In response to the argument in the court of appeal that the issues had been
decided, the court of appeal took judicial notice of these orders and held
that this issue was not decided by either the superior court or court of
appeal in the prior case (Slip. op. at 36 n.14).
19
monitoring and reporting obligations. The court concluded that the Permit
did not violate state law (AR 3259-60).
Based onits review of the state agencies’ arguments and the court of
appeal decision, the Commission found that the prior litigation did not
address whether the trash or inspection obligations were state, as opposed
to federal, mandates (1 CT 120). The court of appeal also rejected this
argument (Slip. op. at 36 n.14). Collateral estoppel does notapply.
IV. THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
PERMIT’S TRASH RECEPTACLE AND INSPECTION
OBLIGATIONS WERE STATE MANDATES
Three principles of mandate jurisprudence support the Commission’s
decision:
1. An executive order constitutes a state mandate where it mandates
costs that exceed the mandate in federal law or regulation. Govt. Code
§17556(c).
2. An executive order constitutes a state mandate wherethe issuing
agency usurps the discretion given to a local agency and requires specific
actions that exceed federal requirements. Long Beach Unified School
District v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 173 (“Long
Beach Unified”).
3. An executive order constitutes a state mandate where federal law
imposes a requirementon the state and the state then freely choosesto shift
that obligation onto a local agency. Hayes, 11 Cal.App.4™ at 1593-94.
All three principles apply in this case.
A. The Commission Properly Found That the Trash
Receptacle and Inspection Obligations Imposed Costs
That Exceeded the Mandate in Federal Law
Where a state agency imposes costs that exceed the mandate in
federal law or regulation, a local agencyis entitled to a subvention of funds.
20
Government Code §17556(c). The Commission correctly found that the
Regional Board did that here (1 CT 125, 131-32, 136, 141). Asset forth in
the Opening Brief, neither the trash nor the inspection obligations were
required by federal law or regulation, which instead allows the permittees
to choose the measures they will include in their proposed programsas long
as they meet the MEPstandard (see Opening Br.at 31-35, 40-41).
The state agencies argue that the Commission simply compared the
text of the permit and the federal regulations and found a state mandate
because the regulations did not expressly require the trash receptacle and
inspection obligations (A.B. at 34-35). This argument mischaracterizes the
Commission’s action. Because Congress delegated to USEPA the
obligation to adopt regulations defining federal municipal stormwater
permit requirements, the Commission lookedfirst to the federal regulations,
which, under Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, are to be given controlling
weight (1 CT 124-25, 131-32, 134-36, 139-42). The Commission then also
looked to other federal authority, such as the EPA guidance manual, to
determine the scope of the federal mandate (1 CT 131-32) and had other
evidence before it (AR 1551-52, 1782, 3878-81, 3885).
In making its determination, the Commission acknowledged the
existence of the MEP standard (1 CT 119, 123-24, 132). The Commission
found the obligations to be state mandates not merely because they were
not expressly required, but because, after review of the materials beforeit,
there wasno evidenceindicating that these tasks were federally required.
Contrary to the state agencies’ argument (A.B.at 35), this approach
did not misconstrue mandate law. The Commission did notrest its decision
solely on whether the requirements were expressed in the federal
21
regulations, but whether they were generally imposed by the federal law.
After a full hearing, the Commission concluded that they were not.
The Commission also reviewed the regulations that the state
agencies now cite in support of their argument that the obligations were in
fact federally mandated (A.B. at 23-25). The Commission found that these
regulations did not require the Permit obligations (1 CT 124-25, 131-32,
134-36, 139-42). As set forth in the Cities and County’s opening brief, the
Commission wascorrect (see Opening Br. at 31-35).
The state agencies also contend that Long Beach Unified does not
support the Commission’s decision because, in that case, the court was
addressing state regulations that attempted to interpret and codify federal
law, not a “flexible permitting standard,” and that the CWA presupposesa
need for intervention through issuance of a permit (A.B. at 34). In Long
Beach Unified, however, the court was in fact addressing a flexible
standard, the constitutional duty to take “reasonably feasible” steps to
eliminate segregation. 225 Cal.App.3d at 173. The “reasonably feasible”
standard at issue in Long Beach Unified is no more concrete a standard than
“maximum extent practicable.”
The fact that the Regional Board issued a permit in order to
implement a state program for regulating discharges into the waters of the
United States is also not a distinguishing factor. The California constitution
applies when a state agency imposes a mandate, whether by regulation or
permit. The Constitution does notdistinguish between the two.’
’ The state agencies argue that they have the authority to impose
requirements that exceed federal law, but that is “not likely to be a common
occurrence in the context of MS4 permits.” (A.B. at 34 n.3). In other
words, the state agencies argue, “trust us.” As this case demonstrates,
however, state agencies can and do impose obligations that exceed federal
requirements.
22
B. A State Mandate is Created Where a State Agency
Usurps a Local Agency’s Discretion as to The Manner
in Which to Comply With a Federal Mandate
The Commission also found that the trash receptacle and inspection
obligations were state mandates because the Permit usurped the permittees’
discretion as to how to comply with the federal requirements (1 CT 124-25,
132, 141). This finding was also correct. See Long Beach Unified, 225
Cal.App.3d at 173.
The state agencies argue that the Cities and County did not have any
discretion as to the design of their program but instead that discretion rested
with the Regional Board (A.B. at 35-36). This argument, however,fails to
address the legislative history underlying the municipal stormwater permit
requirements in the Clean Water Act or the regulations adopted to
implement those requirements.
The legislative history is clear that notall the types of controls listed
in 33 U.S.C. §1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) are required to be in every MS4 permit.
See House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Section-by-
Section Analysis (100Sess. 1987) reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.AN. (101
Stat. 7) at 38-39. USEPA reflected this flexibility by adopting regulations
that allow permits to reflect site-specific conditions, with an emphasis on
management programs rather than “end-of-pipe” treatment imposed by
traditional, industrial NPDES permits. 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48037-38,
48052 (Nov. 16, 1990).
Under these regulations, a municipality must submit a permit
application with a proposed management program addressing four
categories of sources. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(iv)(A), (B), (C), and (D).
It is the municipality that proposes these programs. As USEPAstated in
the Preamble to these regulations, “Part 2 of the permit application has been
designed to allow the applicant the opportunity to propose MEP control
23
measures for each of these components of the discharge.” 55 Fed. Reg.at
48052. It is the Regional Board’s obligation to ensure that the
municipality’s program has controls designed to reduce pollutants to the
MEPin the four categories set forth by the regulations. The municipality,
however, has the discretion to design its own program within these
categories.
Long Beach Unified held that a state mandate was created when the
state Department of Education mandated specific activities instead of
allowing school districts discretion as to how to comply with the federal
constitutional mandate. 225 Cal.App.3d at 173. That is exactly what
occurred here. The Cities and County had proposed alternatives to trash
receptacles and inspections (AR 3670-71, 3675-78). It is not enough,
therefore, to argue that trash receptacles or inspections are an “obvious
remedy” (A.B. at 23) to make receptacles or inspections a federal
requirement for subvention purposes. These methods must be compared to
the alternatives that were proposed and that accomplish the sameresult, but
which may be more cost-effective or have other benefits.
The Regional Board did not do this. Instead, the Regional Board,
without comment, simply rejected those alternatives and required trash
receptacles and inspections. In doing so, the Regional Board mandated
these obligations. The Commission correctly found that the Regional
Board’s mandate of these specific activities imposed requirements that
went beyond federal law and constituted a state mandate (1 CT 124-25,
132, 141).
24
C. A State Mandate is Created Within the Meaning of
Article XIII B, Section 6, Where the State Freely
Chooses to Shift a Federal Obligation from Itself to
Local Agencies
The Commission also correctly found that the inspection obligations
were state mandates because the Regional Board freely chose to impose
them on the Cities and County rather than to perform the inspectionsitself
(1 CT 136, 142). When the manner of implementation of a federal program
is left to the discretion ofthestate, the state is not obligated to impose those
costs on an agency or school district. When the state does so, a state
mandate is created. Hayes, 11 Cal.App.4” at 1593.
The issue here, therefore, is not whether the inspection requirements
fell within the MEP standard or were otherwise federally mandated. The
issue is whether the state freely chose to impose those inspection
obligations on the Cities and County instead of performing them itself. As
the court held in Hayes, “[i]f the state freely chose to impose the costs upon
the local agency as a means of implementing a federal program then the
costs are the result of a reimbursable state mandate regardless whether the
costs were imposed upon the state by the federal government.” 11
Cal.App.4™ at 1594.
Here, under California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act, it is the
state, not cities or counties, which is obligated to regulate the discharge of
pollutants from commercial, industrial and construction sites. Water Code
§§ 13050(d) and (e); 13260; 13263. The Porter-Cologne Act authorizes
regional boards to inspect the facility of any person or entity to ascertain
whether the purposes of the act are being met. Water Code § 13267(c).
The State Board is given the same authority if it will not duplicate the
efforts of a regional board. Jd., subd. (f). The state thus has the authority to
and could perform these inspectionsitself.
25
The state agencies cite no authority for the proposition that the
stormwater permit issued to the Cities and County would not comply with
federal law if the inspection obligations had been omitted because the
Regional Board was instead performing them (A.B.at 37-38). By contrast,
the Commission had before it the USEPA guidance manual, which did not
set forth these inspections as a federal requirement (AR 3446, 3467),
USEPA-issued permits that did not contain the inspection of commercialor
industrial facilities that were present here, as well as the fact that the prior
Los Angeles County MS4 permits did not include such inspections (AR
1551-52, 1782-83, 3891-92), all evidence that the inspection obligations
werenot federally required.
The shifting of obligations from the state to municipalities is
particularly true with respect to inspections of industrial and construction
sites holding state-issued general industrial or general construction activity
stormwater permits (“GIASP” and “GCASP,” respectively). The CWA
requires industrial and construction sites to hold permits authorizing their
discharge of stormwater. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) and (3)(A); 40 C_F.R.
§ 122.26(b)(14) and (c). In California, the State Board has issued GIASP
and GCASP permits to industrial and construction facilities pursuant to
Water Code §13377. Both permits provide that the regional boards shall
enforce their provisions, including “conducting compliance inspections”
(AR 3596, 3601, 2419, 2423). By statute, the State Board collects a fee
from these permittees in an amount necessary to cover the costs incurred in
connection with the permit’s issuance, administration and enforcement.
Water Code § 13260(d)(1)(A) and (B). Each Regional Board receives a
portion of this money, with not less than 50% of that portion to be spent
“solely on stormwater inspection and regulatory compliance issues
26
associated with industrial and construction stormwater programs.” Water
Code § 13260(d)(2)(B)(iii).
The state agencies attempt to obscure the Hayes analysis by not
describing the industrial and construction inspections at issue, arguing that
the inspection of industrial sites was for compliance with “county and
municipal ordinances” and that regional boards perform permit inspections
of industrial and construction sites “to determine compliance with other,
state-wide permits.” (A.B. at 15, 38.) The Permit, however, requires the
inspection of industrial and construction sites not only for compliance with
County and municipal ordinances, but for compliance with the state-issued
GIASP and GCASP permits that the Regional Board is charged with
enforcing (AR 2419, 3596) and for which the State Board collects fees (1
CT 56, 69).8 As the Commission found, nothing prevented the state or
regional boards from performing these inspections for compliance with the
state-issued permits as they did before adoption of the Permit (1 CT 136,
142).
No federal law or regulation required the Regional Boardto shift this
obligation. Other regional boards have not shifted this obligation onto
municipalities. For example, in City of Rancho Cucamonga vy. Regional
Water Quality Control Board (2006) 135 Cal,App.4" 1377, cited by the
state agencies, the MS4 permit required industrial and commercial facility
inspections only for compliance with local municipal ordinances, with the
® The Cities and County were required to confirm that each industrial and
construction site had a Waste Discharge Identification Number (““WDID”)
and a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (1 CT 56, 68-69), both
requirements of the GIASP and GCSAP, not County or municipal
ordinances (AR 2425, 3604, 3649 (issuance of WDID upon approval of
submitted Notice of Intent)). The Cities and County were also required to
inspect for compliance with Regional Board Resolution 98-08 (1 CT 56,
69), requirements imposed by a state agency, the Regional Board.
27
regional board continuing to be responsible for inspections to determine
compliance with the GIASP and GCASPandstate law. 135 Cal.App.4™ at
1390.
The state agencies nevertheless argue that separate NPDES permits
imposing the same inspection obligations do not create a state mandate
(A.B. at 38). Where the Regional Board, however, is simply shifting its
own inspection obligations under those permits, and no federal authority
requires it to do so, the Cities and County are entitled to a subvention of
funds. Hayes, 11 Cal.App.4™ at 1594.’ This is precisely the circumstance
article XIII B, section 6 is meant to address.
D. Substantial Evidence Supported the Commission’s Decision
Finally, the state agencies argue that substantial evidence did not
support the Commission’s decision (A.B. at 40-42). Substantial evidenceis
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Spurrell v. Spurrell (1962) 205 Cal.App.2°4 786,
790-91. It requires only that the evidence be reasonable, credible and of
solid value. It does not require that the evidence appear to the appellate
court to outweigh the contrary showing. People v. Javier A. (1985) 38
Cal.3d 811, 819.
The state agencies make arguments about the weight to be given to
the USEPA-issued guidance documents, USEPA-issued stormwater
permits, the prior permits, and letters from the USEPA administrators
regarding the limits of municipal inspection obligations, and evidence that
” It is not enough for the state agencies to argue that the Cities and County
are required to have a MS4 permit that meets the MEP standard (A.B.at
37). The issue under Hayes is whether the state could perform the federal
requirement itself or whether it freely chose to impose that requirement on
the Cities and County.
28
the Regional Board hadinitiated negotiations to pay the County to perform
the inspections of industrial facilities on the Board’s behalf (A.B. at 40-42).
These arguments, however, are properly made to the Commission,
not this Court. It is the Commission that is charged with weighing the
evidence. The evidence before the Commission was reasonable, credible,
and of solid value, and supports its decision in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasonsset forth in the Cities’ and
County’s Opening Brief, the court of appeal’s decision should be reversed
and the court directed to uphold the Commission’s decision that the trash
receptacle and inspection obligations are state mandates. This case should
then be remandedto the superior court to address the Cities’ and County’s
cross-petition regarding the availability of funding for the inspection
obligations, which the superior court did not address in light of its
judgment.
Dated: October 21, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
MARK SALADINO
County Counsel
JUDITH A. FRIES
Principal Deputy County Counsel
BURHENN & GEST
HOWARD GEST
DAVID W. BURHENN
py: Afar
Howard Gest
Attorneys for Real Party in
Interest and Appellant County of
Los Angeles
BURHENN & GEST
HOWARD GEST
DAVID W. BURHENN
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By: AEC
Howard Gest
Attorneys for Real Parties in
Interest and Appellants Cities of
Bellflower, Carson, Commerce,
Covina, Downey and Signal Hill
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to Rule 8.520(c) of the California Rules of Court, the
undersigned counsel certifies that this reply brief contains 8,345 words,
including footnotes, as indicated by the word count of the word processing
program used.
Dated: October 21, 2014
31
MARK SALADINO
County Counsel
JUDITH A. FRIES
Principal Deputy County Counsel
BURHENN & GEST
HOWARD GEST
DAVID W. BURHENN
By: LE
“Howard Gest
Attorneys for Real Party in
Interest and Appellant County of
Los Angeles
BURHENN & GEST
HOWARD GEST
DAVID W. BURHENN
Howard Gest
Attorneys for Real Parties in
Interest and Appellants Cities of
Bellflower, Carson, Commerce,
Covina, Downey and Signal Hill
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am employed in Los Angeles County. I am overthe age of 18 and nota party to this
action. Mybusiness address is 624 S. Grand Avenue, 22™Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017.
On October 21, 2014, I served the foregoing document, described as
REPLY BRIEF OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND APPELLANTS
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND CITIES OF BELLFLOWER, CARSON,
COMMERCE, COVINA, DOWNEY AND SIGNAL HILL
[_] the original of the document
[X] true copies of the document
in separate sealed envelopes addressedas follows:
See Attached List
><] BY U.S. MAIL: I sealed and placed such envelope for collection and mailing to be
deposited on the same day at Los Angeles, California. The envelopes were mailed with postage
thereon fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with Burhenn & Gest LLP’s practice of collection and
processing corresponding for mailing. Under this practice, documents are deposited with the U.S.
Postal Service on the same daythatis stated in the proofof service, with postage fully prepaid at
Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business.
[ BY FEDERAL EXPRESS:| am familiar with the firm’s practice ofcollecting and
processing correspondencefor delivery via Federal Express. Underthat practice, it would be picked
up by Federal Express on that same day at Los Angeles, California and delivered to the parties as
listed on this Proof of Service the following business morning.
[_] BY FACSIMILE: | causedthe above referenced documentto betransmitted via facsimile
and to the parties as listed on this Proof of Service.
[_] BY PERSONAL SERVICE:I caused such envelopeto be delivered by messengerto the
office or home ofthe addressee(s).
XxX] STATE:I declare under penalty of perjury underthe lawsofthe state of California that the
aboveis true and correct.
[_] FEDERAL: declare that Iam employedin the office of a memberofthe bar of this court at
whosedirection the service was made.
Executed on October 21, 2014 at Lds Angeles, California.
LO. nutty CEal
Danette Armstead
SERVICE LIST
State of California Department ofFinance v. County ofLos Angeles
Case No. B237153/BS130730
Kamala Harris
Attorney General of the State of California
Nelson Richards
Deputy Attorney General
California Attorney General’s Office
455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
Telephone: (415) 703-5559
Facsimile: (415)703-1234
Attorneys for California State Department
of Finance, State Water Resources Control
Board, and Los Angeles Regional Water
Quality Control Board
Camille Shelton
Chief Legal Counsel
Eric D. Feller
Senior Staff Counsel
Commission on State Mandates
980 Ninth Street, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 323-3562
Facsimile: (916) 445-0278
Attorneys for Respondent
Commission on State Mandates
Ginetta Giovinco
Richards, Watson & Gershon
355 S. Grand Ave., 40"Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 253-0281
Facsimile: (213) 626-0078
Email: ggiovinco@rwglaw.com
Attorneys for Cities of Artesia, Beverly
Hills, Norwalk, Rancho Palos Verdes and
Westlake Village
Christi Hogin
Jenkins & Hogin
Manhattan Towers
1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
Telephone: (310) 643-8448
Facsimile: (310) 643-8441
Attorney for City of Monterey Park
Nicholas George Rodriguez
City Attorney
City of Vernon
4305 Santa Fe Avenue
Vernon, CA 90058
Telephone: (323) 583-8811
Facsimile: (323) 826-1438
Attorney for City of Vernon
Clerk, Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District
Ronald Reagan State Building
300 S. Spring Street,
2" Floor North Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90013
Clerk
Los Angeles County Superior Court
111. Hill Street
Department 86
Los Angeles, CA 90012