STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH v. S.C.

Real Party in Interest, Center for Investigative Reporting, Petition for Review

Cal.November 18, 2013

S214679 7 Fs No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT r= 3 FILED DEPARTMENTOF PUBLIC HEALTH, Petitioner, NOV 18 2013 VS. Frank A. McGuire Clerk THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Deputy Respondent. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING. Real Party In Interest After a Published Decision of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Case No. C072325 (Justice M. Kathleen Butz), Vacating a Judgment Entered by the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2012- 80001044 (Hon. Timothy M.Frawley). PETITION FOR REVIEW Duffy Carolan (State Bar No. 154988) Rochelle Wilcox (State Bar No. 197790) Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94111-6533 Tel.: (415) 276-6500 Fax: (415) 276-6599 Attorneys for Real Party In Interest and Petitioner THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Petitioner, VS. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING. Real Party In Interest After a Published Decision of the Court ofAppeal, Third Appellate District, Case No. C072325 (Justice M. Kathleen Butz), Vacating a Judgment Entered by the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2012- 80001044 (Hon. Timothy M.Frawley). PETITION FOR REVIEW Duffy Carolan (State Bar No. 154988) Rochelle Wilcox (State Bar No. 197790) Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94111-6533 Tel.: (415) 276-6500 Fax: (415) 276-6599 Attorneys for Real Party In Interest and Petitioner _ THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. ISSUES PRESENTED...ceceecssssscesesssseesesseecsecseessessssscscssssessatsaesase 1 Il. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED. ..sssseccccsssssssssssssssessssssesssses 1 WY. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......ccccccccscsssssssscsssscsssssssesvsscceeceeecens 7 TV. ARGUMENT.....ccesceseceseseresssssssssssessssersesessseasesseueesseneesesesesseeesseesens 11 A. REVIEW OF THE COURT OF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT VIOLENCE TO TWO STATUTES INTENDED TO PROTECT VULNERABLE POPULATIONS........ cee eescesesseseseeersessesseeessesesesseesessesecessuonees 11 1. The Decision Nullifies the Long-Term Care Act’s Public Disclosure Requirement, Whichthe Legislature Adopted to Protect Vulnerable Citizens, .0.... cee ecsessscessesssseseesceeesscnsusessens 11 2. The Policies Underlying The Lanterman Act Do Not Support the Court ofAppeal’s DOCiSION.«00.02. sec eeeeseeeeseeseesteseseeseseseeseeseeasessneseeeeesesees 15 3. In Attempting to Harmonize These Statutes, The Court of Appeal Harmsthe Interests of the Individuals These Statutes Are Designed to Protect, and in the Process Sets up a Two-Tier System of Enforcement under the Long-Term Care Act Previously Rejected by This Court. ............0c.c008 17 B. REVIEW OF THE COURT OF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY WITH AUTHORITY OF THIS COURT AND ATTORNEY GENERALOPINIONS.00... cece ceeeeseseesesseccessssesesssseneneesseeseas 21 C. |THE COURT OF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION CREATES AN UNWORKABLE, GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE MORASS......cccccccecesesccsscececscscecscssscesesesessscscessessassessssevesasevevans 24 D. REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGETO THE CONSUMER INFORMATION SERVICE SYSTEM ESTABLISHEDIN 1984 UNDER THE LONG-TERM CARE ACT.......ceccsscesessssssstscssscsescenceeees 27 V. CONCLUSIONWceeccnceessstsssessseseseseesesesesersssssssssssesnstansetesaeeaes 29 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796 (2001) 0.0... ceccssccssccscscescssccssecssccesescsccssecesesenesespassim Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Authority, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1381 (2001)... eessssscsssccssscssseccsssccsseeesececesscecsecscecesees 25 California Association of Health Facilities v. Dep’t ofHealth Services, 16 Cal. 4th 284 (1997)...ccc ccssccsscsscssscsssscsssccssssesssesssecsssssecessessesees 3,15 Chavez v. City ofLos Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970 (2010) ...seessseesseessnrecenecssneernneesneesneessnsessnesssseesses beveveceeees 17 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 433 (1978)... ccscesecssscssscssccscscsscssscssssscesessucseccseceresees 17 County ofRiverside v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 478 (1974)... cccccsccsssssccsscsscscssecteeseseessesssesssesssessuscses 16 Dep’t ofFair Employment & Housing v. Mayr, 192 Cal. App. 4th 719 (2011)... ccccscsceccccssscsosssssseseseesccseseseceeecsaes 17 Gates v. Discovery Communications,Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679 (2004)...ccc cccccssccsccssessscssssceccsscesscessecsseseuesseceseereeseses 25 Gilbert v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 161 (1987)... cccccccscsscsssossssssscssssscssctscctsessesssesseees 21 Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139 (1991)eeicccccsccssscsscsssscrscsstedecescceesecssssssensessuessesspassim Nunes Turfgrass v. Vaughn-Jaklin Seed Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518 (1988)...cecccsssscsssssecssccssscsscscsssesssesecasesseesess 17 Office of the Inspector General v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 695 (2010). 0... ceccccccsscssssessscssesccsscsssesscesssusersesseens 18 Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 4th 157 (2013)... cccescsssccsscsscsseccssescsssecsacecseccsesssssascssseseseesssees 18 ili Statutes Gov’t Code § 6253(D) oo. ececssccsscessccccsscessssssssssscssessesssscscsescecsascessceesasccetesecessesssessesees 25 Health & Safety Code S47 eeceecsccssccssecccssscssssscssscscssecsesssscssscsccsssessesscuecsssenscsaecens 12, 20 § 1418oeessccsseeeecesssscsssvssesssssesssescssesseescssstssectusseusceusessueceauess 3, 20 § 1420(a)(1) on. eeesesessecssssseeees Laseessaceessacececseaeccsessseaceceusueecssseaeseeses‘possesses 12 SiAUC.0) 23 § 1422.5 (a)... eecescccssssccessreesscsssscscsssccsscsssccsssscesscceseeseseectacenecenssesueeesees28 § 1422(a)... ee ceesccssccssccsssssccsssesscsscseccsssessescessecessevecesessesssessesesees 3,11, 19 0TC.)0)n 14, 18, 26 § 144occcccsssecsssecscssessnsssssessscsaccsssseesessesesscestesceasesnscessecuecsans 15, 27 § L424(D) ooo eesesssscssssssscsscsssssscessscecccsssseseecesseesnsecesessusceasecasevens 13, 23 § L4Q8(g) oo... cesecssccesseeccssessssscssscssssssccssscsasessceessssecesccssessssssuasenseesarerseace23 § L429(a)CL)(A)occceesecccessesesssssssssscsccssscsssccssesessesescestaserssseaaeessesenace 2, 25 § 1429 (C)..ceesssccsssccssscesesssssssscsscsscsscssssscsecscnsecesaseesseerssesecsussesesensace 6, 14 § 14389 ooeecccssccssssssccccesssscsrsesssccseasssessccssscecesssesesseestsceetssesensecees 14, 15 Penal Code § 290 .cceccscssssccssneessssseescecesssecssssssscvsescsssscesssssesssesecsseceasseuasecsessesessaecens22 § 11165 oeeeesseccssssscccvessescsssessscvscsscsssscesedecosssecscssssetssesssecsesecescaceeaes22 § LL174oeceeseccesssccccesssessssessesvsecsesssecsssascessueeessssscssevesceseacesensaeesees22 Welf. & Inst. Code § 4500 0... cccsssccesssesccecscceevsnssssesaccsseecesenaees eeveestessessesssssscsssseseseescereaeeas3 S$ AS12(D) ue. .ee eeesccccsesscccccessccssscnsescssssesssssesssscessssecsesscacsesssessetaseseteceees 16 S ASIA) ooo... cecsseccssssnecesessseesscsssscseessssssecssecescsssesessessssecetsecessscessnacessaass9 § SOO] oo... eee eeeseccesssecssessctecesssscsscesssvessesssssssessesssesencecsesscssscssnsesearersns 3,15 § SOOL(C).......eceecsessceeeesssessssrsccssscsssseseesecsssecsseceesstesecesarsesecsescesensesecsecese 16 § SOOL(G) ....ccecesccssssccccssssscccsssccsscessscsssacsssssccsseedsossscecessesscctcasessuacessacens 16 § 5328 oeeseeeceseceessecssssesssesscsesseeeesseceueeseeenseeseeeseucseseusescusscsesease passim § 5330 oo eeeecesstecsssscccessseecevenscesssecssccnssssssssesessasesestscecesssosesecseccennscesss 6, 28 § S5330(D) 0... ecsccssssscccssssecsessscesscesscecsvecesssesessessesesseesecasessserteecsstaresenaeees27 § 5328.15 ieeesccssssscccssscscccessscssecssscssnssetssscssnscecesseseesssessesecaseessuesenaes 8,9 Constitutional Provisions Cal. Const., Article 1 § 30D)... eesessscsessescesesessseecaesecseeessssssesscecessssssaeas 17 iv Other Authorities 22 C.C.R. § T6721. ecececsccsssssscsscesscesesesessscsssessscssessssssscscssscsessecasavavacaveveesesees 14 53 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen 20 (1970) ooo. eeeeecsssesesesssesessscsessssssssscsesssesesscssssacavscseees22 53 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen 151 (1970)occesssesssssssssssssscsesssssststsesscarsracscsesesseses22 58 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. 824 (1975) ...ccessssssessssscsesescssssssscscscsssescstsesssseacatatavens22 65 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. 345 (1982)........ seesaeeeeaeeeeseessessteseesessesesscesecseseneesesensenes22 I. ISSUES PRESENTED (1) Can the public posting and access mandates of the Long-Term Care, Health, Safety and Security Act of 1973 governing citations issued to long-term health care facilities for serious violations of laws and regulations relating to patient care be reconciled with the earlier enacted general confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act governing information obtained in the course ofproviding services to developmentally disabled individuals in a mannerthat gives effect to all of the provisions of both statutes? (2) If the statutes cannot be reconciled without compromising the Legislature’s intent in enacting either, which statutory schemecontrols? (3) Must thestate redact information required under the Long- Term Care, Health, Safety and Security Act of 1973 to be contained in an on-line consumerinformation service system about substantiated complaints and citations assessed against long-term health care facilities to protect information obtained in the course ofproviding services to mentally and developmentally disabled individuals under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act? Il. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED In a published decision addressing a matter offirst impression, with a strong dissent adoptingthetrial court’s considered ruling, the Court of. Appeal ofthe State of California, Third Appellate District, has attempted to reconcile two statutory schemes aimed at protecting the state’s most vulnerable populations — those residing in state licensed long-term health care facilities and mentally and developmentally disabled individuals receiving services overseen by the state. But in the process, the Court of Appealhasnullified a key remedial provision of one ofthose acts — the requirementthat facilities publicly disclose serious violations related to patient care — whichthe Legislature adopted specifically to ensure that the public, including families ofpatients and prospectivepatients, have complete information about those violations. And, by protecting some information covered under the other act only in limited circumstances, but not others, it has rendered protections underthis actillusory. Review is necessary to preventnullification of clear legislative intent in enacting both statutory schemes andto protect extremely vulnerable populations covered by the acts. Review also is necessary to ensure a uniform administrative process applied throughoutthe state so that more information is made public to encourage compliance with laws intendedto protect those residing in long-term health care facilities — as the Legislature plainly intended. The Long-Term Care, Health, Safety and Security Act of 1973 (“Long-Term Care Act” or “1973 Act”) specifically requiresthat the ultimate administrative record chronicling seriousviolations of law and regulations pertaining to patient care at state licensed long-term health care facilities be publicly posted at the facility and made availableto the public upon request, with only the namesofpatients and other individuals, except investigating personnel, redacted to protect patient privacy. Health & Safety Code §§ 1429(a)(1)(A); 1429(b); 1423(a)(2); 1439. Asthis Court has recognized, this statutory scheme was enacted to protect one ofthe state’s most vulnerable populationsby,in part, providing “information to the public aboutthe citation record offacilities.” Kizer County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139, 143, 150 (1991). Its public posting and access provisions, along with other provisions pertaining to the issuance | of citations and civil penalties, were “designed to implement the Legislature’s declared public policy objective of ‘assur[ing] that long-term health carefacilities provide the highest level of care possible.” Id. at 143: see also Health & Safety Code § 1422(a). Asthis Court also has recognized, the statute is remedial in nature, and as such it must be “liberally construed on behalf ofthe class ofpersonsit is designed to protect.” California Association ofHealth Facilities v. Dep’t ofHealth Services, 16 Cal. 4th 284, 294-95 (1997) (quoting Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 147-48). Fourofthe eight categories offacilities covered by the 1973 Actare specifically designated for the care of developmentally disabled individuals. See Health & Safety Code § 1418. The other statutory schemeat issue here — the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and a companion provision under the Lanterman Developmental Services Act (collectively the “Lanterman Act”) — governs the evaluation, supervision, protection, care and treatment of persons whoare mentally ill, developmentally disabled or impaired by chronic alcoholism. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5001, 4500. A provision of the Lanterman Act, enacted in 1972, one year before the Long-Term Care Act, requires that “[{a]ll information and records obtained in the course of providing services” under specified divisionsofthe Actshall be confidential. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5328; 4514. This “general”rule of confidentiality is followed by specific exemptions to the general rule under the code, in successive sections of the code and elsewhere. Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796, 805 (2001). | Theintersection ofthese statutes in the instant case arose in the context of a Public Records Act lawsuit brought by Real Party in Interest The Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”). It soughtaccess to citations issued by the Department of Public Health (“DPH”)forserious violations of law and regulations by state owned and operated long-term care facilities for the developmentally disabled. Thetrial court found that the Long-Term Care Act’s disclosure requirements could not be reconciled with the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions; under well-established rules of statutory construction,it ruled that the Long-Term Care Act prevailed, and ordered DPHto disclose to CIR the citations requested. Orderat 9-11, attached. The Court of Appeal vacated the judgment. In the guise of harmonizing these statutes, it held that certain information expressly required to be public under the Long-Term Care Actifrelied on by DPH in issuinga citation must be redacted from citations involving mentally and developmentally disabled individuals receiving services under the Lanterman Act, when, and only when,thosecitations are requested under the Public Records Act. Opinion (“Opn.”). at 21; see also id. at 6, attached. Specific other information required to be considered in issuing citation, which may implicate confidential information under the Lanterman Act, must be disclosed. Opn. at 20-21.’ | Byparsing the statutes in this manner, the Court ofAppeal unabashedly negated express provisions of the 1973 Act requiring that “all . relevant facts” considered by the department in determining the amount of the civil penalty to be assessed under the Long-Term Care Act“shall be documented by the department on an attachmentto the citation and available in the public record.” Health & Safety Code § 1424 (b) (emphasis added). “Relevant facts” to be considered by the department underthe Act are defined to includethe patient’s or resident’s mental condition, medical condition, and history of mental disability or disorder, the risk the violation " Anorder modifying the opinion and judgment was entered on October 9, 2013,in response to a petition for rehearing by CIR addressing the recovery of fees on appeal. See Order Modifying Opinion,attached. Thus, this petition is timely. presents to the patient’s or resident’s mental and physical condition; as well as the facility’s good faith efforts to prevent the violation, and the licensee’s history of regulatory compliance. Id., § 1424 (a)(1). Instead, the Court of Appeal decided that for mentally and developmentally disabled individuals, whoalso are covered by the Lanterman Act, these provisions of the Long- Term Care Act will not be enforced “in PRA-requestcitations,” though they remain in effect for all others residing in long-term health care facilities covered by the 1973 Act,” and in other contexts. Opn.at 21. Review should be granted because the Court ofAppeal’s decision doesviolence to both statutory schemesand, in the process, interjects substantial uncertainty into an administrative process governingall long- term health care facilities throughout the state, as well as the regional centers and state departments that oversee them. If left unchecked, the decision would result in the very type of “two-tiered system of enforcement” under the Long-Term Care Act that this Court rejected in Kizer when a county advocatedthatthe civil penalty provisions of the 1973 Act should only apply to private long-term carefacilities, not facilities owned by governmententities covered by the Tort Claims Act. 53 Cal. 3d at 148. The decision robs the most vulnerable of an already vulnerable population — mentally and developmentally disabled individuals whoreside in long-term health care facilities — of important protections that the Legislature clearly * Indeed, DPH publicly posts on its website citations issued to state licensed nursing homesfalling under the 1973 Act with all of this same information disclosed. 2 Petitioner’s Exhibits (“PE”) 299;20-26; 432-534; see also http://(www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/facilities/Page/AACounties.aspx. Throughoutthis brief the record will be cited by reference to the volume then “PE”followed by the page number (without proceeding zeros) andline numberif applicable. intended to apply to them, while these same protections remain in effect for others covered by the 1973 Act. The Court of Appeal’s view that exceptions to the confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act haveto be set forth in that statute also ignored this Court’s decision in Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796 (2001). There, the Court held that a statute that fell outside ofthe Lanterman Act requiring that an updated medical examination be provided to a petitioning attorney in commitmentproceedings under the Sexually Violent Predictor Act was “an exception to section 5328’s general rule of confidentiality of treatment records, and allowsthedistrict attorney access to treatment record information, insofar as that information is contained in an updated evaluation.” Id. at 805. Most concerning, however, is the fact that the Court ofAppeal’s decision sets up a compliance system — applicable throughout the state — that is simply not workable. By injecting the specterofcivil liability for wrongful disclosure of confidential information under the Lanterman Act (see Welf. & Inst. Code § 5330) into the public posting and access mandates of the Long-Term Care Act, the decision puts long-term carefacilities, and the state and counties charged with overseeing them,in a Catch-22. On the one hand, they must aggressively redactthe citations or risk hefty civil penalties for guessing wrong. Ontheother hand, they face administrative penalties under the Long-Term Care Actif it does not fully disclose the citation information required by the Act. Health & Safety Code § 1429 (c). This could not have been whatthe Legislature intended in enacting a comprehensive statutory schemerequiring the public posting of citations, while carefully protecting patient privacy. But the Court ofAppealdid not stop there. Withoutanybriefing or oral argument, the Court extendedits interpretation of these statutes to disclosures of information that long has been required to be made public through DPH’s on-line consumer information service system established in 1984 under Section 1422.5 of the Long-Term Care Act. Opn.at 24, n. 12. The breadth of the Court of Appeal’s decision is concerning becausethis issue was neverraised by either party below andit arguably would apply to any other information aboutfacility compliance required to be disclosed under the 1973 Act. It similarly injects uncertainty into state mandated, state-wide administrative processes, and creates new, burdensome and unnecessary administrative duties, which ultimately will result in less information being publicly disclosed aboutfacilitycompliance history than clearly is required by the Legislature. | For these reasons, and those morefully set forth below, CIR respectfully requests that the Court grant review of the Court ofAppeal’s published decision in this matter of statewide significance. Ill. STATEMENT OF THE CASE In May of 2011, CIR madea written Public Records Act request to DPHseeking citations issued by DPH to the state’s seven Developmental Centers’ from January 1, 2002 to the present. 1 PE 4:15-23; 19. On June ° Thefacilities were Lanterman Developmental Center, Porterville Developmental Center, Sonoma Developmental Center; Fairview Developmental Center, Canyon Springs, Agnews Developmental Center, and Sierra Vista Developmental Center. The Department of Developmental Services is the state agency responsible for providing services to people with developmental disabilities. It presently operates five Developmental Centers, which house about 1,700 of the state’s most severely developmentally-disabled patients, many with cerebral palsy, severe autism and mental disabilities. 2 PE 294:8-12; 403. 13, 2011, DPH produced 55 citations on a disk. 1 PE 6:1-6; 30-165 (copies ofprinted citations). No citations were produced for years 2002-2006. Each ofthe 55 citations was extensively redacted, removingall information exceptlicensee information, obliquestatutory references and somefactually devoid statements aboutthe violationsor rights at issue on theinitial page of the citation. Even the nameofthe department evaluator was redacted. Id. DPHclaimedthat the near blanket redactions were necessary to comply with the confidentiality provisions of Section 5328 ofthe Welfare _ and Institutions Code and an express exemptionto the confidentiality provisionsfor licensing personnel under Section 5328.15. 1 PE 7:24-27; 174-176. On January 8, 2012, CIR filed a verified petition for writ ofmandate under the Public Records Act and complaint for declaratory relief seeking an order compelling DPHto disclose in unredacted or minimally redacted form the previously produced “aggressively” redacted citations. 1 PE 1-177. On September 13, 2012, Respondent Court issued an 1 1-page order granting the petition and complaint for declaratory relief. 5 PE 1439-1450; Order attached hereto. Applying well accepted rules of statutory construction, Respondent Court found that wherecitations involve mental health records obtained in the course ofproviding services under the Lanterman Act, “DPH cannot make the citations publicly available [as required under the Long- Term Care Act] and simultaneously shield it from public disclosure.” Order at 8. Thus, “tw]here mental health records are involved, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s accessibility provisions. The statutes cannot be harmonizedby disclosing the citations denudeofall the underlying factual information giving rise to the citation.” Id. Having found anirreconcilable conflict, Respondent Court went on to decide which statute prevails. In concluding that the Long-Term Care Act wasthelater enacted, specific act that controls the disclosureofcitations, the court notedthat “the ultimate purpose ofboth the confidentiality and the accessibility statutes is the same: to promote and protect the health and safety of mental health patients.” Id. at 9. “It follows, that publicly disclosing the basis of the citations is consistent with the ultimate purpose of the Lanterman Act to promote the health andsafety ofpatients. The converse is not true. Withholding such information undermines the public’s interest in protecting patients.” Id. Respondent Court also rejected DPH’salternative theory that disclosure was governed bythe later enacted exceptionsto the confidentiality provisions for licensing personnel contained in Sections 5328.15 and 4514(n) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Id. at 10. These provisions “were intended to authorize disclosure to licensing personnel __ conducting licensing duties, and not to supersede the public inspection provisions of the Long Term Care Act’s citation system.” Id. On October 26, 2012, DPHfiled a Petition for Extraordinary Writ of Mandate in the Court ofAppeal. On November21, 2012, the Court of Appealissued an order granting the alternative writ. On September 18, 2013, after full briefing and oral argument, the Court ofAppeal (Butz, J.) issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondent Court to vacate its judgmentandruling and to enter a new onethat directs DPH to produce to CIR the requested citations in accordance with the standardsset forth in the opinion andto grant declaratory relief in favor of CIR. Opn. at 25. The Court of Appeal held that the Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act could be harmonized by allowing disclosure of certain information that is required to be considered by DPHinissuing a citation under the Long-Term Care Act, while prohibiting the disclosure of other information where disclosure implicates mentally and developmentally disabled individuals covered by the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision. Opn.at 19-22; see also id. at 21 (“The patient’s or resident’s mental, physical, and medical conditions, history ofmental disorder, as well as the risk the violation presents to the mental and physical condition, are not discloseable in the PRA-requestedcitations, in light of the mental health-based confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act.”). The Court did notrule that all information obtainedin the course of providing services under the LantermanAcctis required to be redacted from the citations involving covered patients; instead, it categorized certain information that by statute is required to be considered and disclosed in the public record under the Long-Term Care Act. Id. at 19-22. An apt description of the majority’s opinion is set forth in the dissent: Implicitly recognizing that sections 5328 and 4514 ofthe Lanterman Act conflict with section 1423, 1424, and 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act, the majority ‘harmonizes’ these provisions by holding that the Long-Term Care Act controls over the Lanterman Act on the issue of ‘describ[ing] with particularity the nature of the violation’ (Health & Safety Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2)), but the Lanterman Actcontrols over the Long-Term Care Act on the issue ofsetting forth other‘relevant facts,’ including the patient’s or resident’s ‘medical’ and ‘mental’ condition, his or her ‘history ofmental disability or disorder,’ and ‘the risk that the violation presents - to [his or her] mental and physical condition.’ (Health & Safety Code, § 1424, subds.(a), (b)(1)-(3).) Thus, under the guise of bringing harmony,the majority opinion does violence to two statutory enactments—carving out of the Lanterman Act an exception allowing public citations to include unredacted description ofthe nature ofthe violation, and severing from 10 the Long-Term Care Act the requirementthat the public record contain the aforementioned ‘relevant facts.’ Dis. Opn. at 1 (Hoch,J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the twoacts conflict, that no reasonable interpretation of them gives force and effectto all of their provisions, and that the citation provisions of the Long-Term Care Act, which “deal specifically with citations and precisely mandate the contents ofthese citations,” is the later enacted, more specific statute that takes “precedence over the Lanterman Act’s general confidentiality provisions.” Id. at 3, 6, 9. IV. ARGUMENT A. REVIEW OF THE COURTOF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT VIOLENCE TO TWO STATUTES INTENDED TO PROTECT “VULNERABLE POPULATIONS. 1, The Decision Nullifies the Long-Term Care _ Act’s Public Disclosure Requirement, Which the Legislature Adopted to Protect Vulnerable Citizens. Through the Long-Term Care Act, the Legislature adopted a comprehensive inspection andcitation system aimedat “assuring that long- term health care facilities provide the highest level of care possible.” Health & Safety Code § 1422(a). It wasthe intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 2.4 (Sections 1417-1439.8) of Division 2 ofthe Health and Safety Codeto establish: “(1) a citation system for the imposition ofprompt and effective civil sanctions against long-term health carefacilities in violation ofthe laws and regulationsofthis state relating to patient care; (2) an inspection and reporting system to insure that long-term health care facilities are in compliance with state statutes and regulations pertaining to patient care; and (3) a provisional licensing mechanism to insure that full-term 11 licenses are issued only to those long-term health care facilities that meet state standardsrelating to patient care.” Health & Safety Code § 1417.1: see also Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 143, 147 (recognizingthat the primary purpose of the 1973 Act wasto “secure obedienceto statutes and regulations imposed to assure importantpublic policy objectives.”). The Act was intended to be moreefficient and less drastic than the then-present system for enforcing compliance with laws and regulations throughlicense suspension andrevocation proceedings under Chapters 2 and 3 ofDivision 2 of the Health and Safety Code. 3 PE 725, 728. (Assembly Committee on Health Analysis ofAB 1600); see also id. at 845- 0848 (Report of the Joint Committee on Aging, Sept. 14, 1973, published in the Assembly Journal); id. at 744 (Staff Analysis ofAB 1600, as amended June 21, 1973). That law, as noted by the Office ofAttorney General in a study submitted to the Joint Committee on Aging, was a system shrouded in secrecy. Id. at 877-879. Importantly, the Act’s posting and public access mandates were integral to the bill. As noted, the bill “[r]equires posting of such citations until the violation is corrected up to a maximum of 120 days.” Id. at 606 (Leg. Counsel’s Dig., April 25, 1973); see also id. at 723 (Summary Digest) (“Requires posting of specified citations until the violation is corrected up to a maximum period of 120 days and requires licensee to promptly make available for inspection by any memberofthe public whoso requests a copy ofall final uncorrected violations.”). As enacted, the law requires the DepartmentofHealth Services, whose authority is now vested in DPH, to conductonsite inspections and investigations of any complaints unless determinedthatit is willfully intendedto harass a licensee. Health & Safety Code § 1420(a)(1). All the 12 authorizations necessary to conduct the complaint investigations under the Act, including the records to be disclosed to the inspectors and the timing and mannerin which the inspections are to be conductedare set forth under the Act. Id. §§ 1420, 1421, 1423. The Act requires DPHto consider “all relevant facts,” including the patient’s medical and mental condition and history ofmental disability in imposing civil penalties. Id. §§ 1424(a); 1421(a). Importantly, “[r]elevant facts considered by the department in determining the amountofthe civil penalty shall be documented by the departmenton an attachmentto the citation and available in the public record.” Id. § 1424(b) (emphasis added). The Act further specifies that each citation issued “shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a reference to the statutory provision, standard,rule or regulation alleged to have been violated, the particular place or areaofthe facility in which it occurred, as well as the amount of any proposed assessmentofa civil penalty.” Id., § 1423 (a)(2). To fulfill the Act’s goal ofproviding vital information to families and to the public about serious violations of law foundto have occurred at long- term health care facilities, the Act specifically mandates access to citations through its public posting and access mandates. The two most serious violations, class “AA” and “A,” must be prominently posted at the facility at “[a]n area accessible and visible to members of the public.” Id., § 1429(a)(1)(A). Class “B”violations, while not required to be posted at the facility, “shall be made promptly available by the licensee for inspection or examination by any memberofthe public who so requests.” Id., § 1429(b) 13 | (emphasis added).* In response to a citation, the facility may post a plan of correction, a statement disputing the citation or the appealstatus of the citation, along with the citation. Id., § 1429(a)(3) & (a)(4).° Even where the citation is ultimately dismissed, the Act requires that the department take action “immediately to ensure that the public recordsreflect in a prominent mannerthat the citation was dismissed.” Id., § 1428(j) (emphasis added). In addition to these specific provisions, the Actreiterates its intent that records generatedin the course of conducting a complaint investigation underthe citation system are public. Section 1439 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny writing received, owned,used, or retained by [DPH] in connection with the provisions of [the Long-Term Care Act] is a public record within the meaningof [the Public Records Act], and, as such, is open to public inspection pursuant to the provisions of Sections 6253, 6256, 6257, and 6258 ofthe Government Code.” Health & Safety Code § 1439. In requiring public disclosure of the citations, the Legislature expressly protected patient privacy. In particular, Section 1423 provides, “ft]he namesofany patient jeopardized by the alleged violation shall not be specified inthe citation in order to protect the privacy ofthe patient.” Health & Safety Code § 1423(a)(2) (emphasis added). Moreover, while the licensee is authorized to receive list ofthe namesofpatients allegedly * To ensure compliance with these posting and public access mandates, the Legislature madeit a class “B”violation, subjectto a civil penalty of $1,000.00,for a licensee to violate any provision of Section 1429. Health & Saf. Code § 1429(c). > These public posting mandates are repeated in the California Code of Regulations without exception for developmentally disabled individuals under the Lanterman Act. 22 C.C.R. § 76721. 14 jeopardized by violation, this list is not subject to disclosure as a public record. Id., § 1423(a)(2). Similarly, Section 1439 providesthat the “names of any persons contained in such records, except the namesofthe duly authorizedofficers, employees, or agents of the state department conducting an investigation or inspection in response to a complaint filed pursuant to this chapter, shall not be open to public inspection and copies of such records provided for public inspection shall have such namesdeleted.” Id., § 1439 (emphasis added). Asthis Court has recognized, the Act’s posting requirements,along with other reporting provisions of the Act, were intended “to provide information to the public about the citation record offacilities.” Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 143 (recognizing that Act’s measures were intended to “protect patients from actual harm, and encouragehealth care facilities to comply with the applicable regulations and therebyavoid imposition of the penalties.”). It also has recognized that as a remedial statute, the Long-Term Care Act“is to be liberally construed on behalfofthe class ofpersonsit is designed to protect.” California Association ofHealth Facilities, 16 Cal. 4th at 295 (reviewing “reasonable licensee defense” under Section 1424 and concluding that unreasonable conduct of employee can be imputed to licensee to further remedial purposeofstatute). 2. The Policies Underlying The Lanterman Act Do Not Support the Court of Appeal’s Decision. The Lanterman Act is a comprehensive law directed at the evaluation, supervision, protection, care and treatment of persons whoare mentally ill, developmentally disabled or impaired by chronic alcoholism. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001. Section 5328 ofthe Welfare and Institutions Code, added to 15 the Lanterman Act in 1973, makesall information and records obtained in the course ofproviding services underspecified divisions of the Act confidential, subject to defined statutory exemptions. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5328 (Hist. & Stat. Notes); see also id., § 4514.° The Act defines “services” broadly to cover essentially anything “directed toward the alleviation of a developmental disability [or mentalillness] or toward the social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmental disability [or mental disability]. Welf. & Inst. Code 4512 (b). Thelegislative purpose for confidentiality is to encourage persons with mental or severe alcohol problems or developmentaldisabilities to seek, undergo and accept treatment, and to be candid and openin the treatment. County ofRiverside v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 478, 481 (1974). Asthe dissent pointed out below, however, “the Lanterman Act as a whole must be construedto, amongother things, ‘guarantee and protect public safety’ and ‘protect mentally disordered persons and developmentally disabled persons from criminal acts.’” Dis. Opn.at 4 (quoting Welf. & Inst. Code § 5001 (c), (g)). ° Section 4514 was enacted in 1982 as a technical amendment intended to movethe confidentiality laws as they relate to the developmentally disabled from existing Section 5328 under the Lanterman- Petris-Short Act to the Lanterman Developmental Services Act. The substance of the law did not change. Opn.at 11, n. 7; 4 PE 886-887 (Leg. Counsel’s Digest of Senate Bill 1736); 901 (enrolled bill report); 903 (Senate Committee on Health and Welfare, staff analysis). 16 3. In Attempting to Harmonize These Statutes, The Court of Appeal Harmsthe Interests of the Individuals These Statutes Are Designed to Protect, and in the Process Sets up a Two- Tier System of Enforcement under the Long- Term Care Act Previously Rejected by This Court. Whenengaged in statutory construction, the court’s aim is “to ascertain theintent ofthe enacting Legislative body sothat [it] may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.” Chavez v. City ofLos Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970, 986 (2010). The court first examines the words themselves “because the statutory languageis generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citation] When construing the interaction of two potentially conflicting statutes, we strive to effectuate the purpose of each by harmonizing them,ifpossible, in a way that allows both to be given effect.” Id. However, where the statutes cannot be reconciled, later and more specific enactments prevail over earlier and more general ones. Id. (citing Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v. Mayr, 192 Cal. App.4th 719, 725 (2011)). When a special and a general statute are in conflict, the specific provision governs, whether it was passed before or after the general statue. Id. (citing Nunes Turfgrass v. Vaughn-Jaklin Seed Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 1539 (1988), Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 433, 446 (1978)). Becausethe issue of statutory construction here arose in the context of a Public Records Act case, the constitutional mandate ofnarrow construction of limitations on the right of access must also be considered. See Cal. Const., art. 1 § 3(b) (“A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construedif it furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly 17 construedifit limits the right of access.); see also Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 4th 157, 175 (2013) (“To the extent the term ‘computer mapping system’ is ambiguous, the constitutional canon requiresus to interpret it in a way that maximizes the public’s access to information ‘unless the Legislature has expressly provided to the contrary.’”) (quoting Office ofthe Inspector General v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 695, 709 (2010) (emphasis in original)). While the Court ofAppeal noted the generalrules of statutory construction in its opinion,it failed to apply them;and,it also ignored entirely the construction mandate of the California Constitution. Engaging in its own rewrite of both statutes, the Court held that the Long-Term Care Act’s provision requiring thatthe citations “describe with particularity the nature ofthe violation” (Health & Safety Code § 1423 (a)(2)) trumpsthe Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision, but the Lanterman Act controls over the Long-Term Care Act’s requirementthat “all relevant facts” be madepart ofthe public record. Opn. at 19-22. Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that information that discloses “the patient’s or resident’s mental condition, medical condition, and history ofmental disability or disorder, andthe risk the violation presents to the patient’s or resident’s mental and physical condition, are not discloseable in PRA-requested citations in light.of the mental health-based confidentiality provisionsofthe Lanterman Act.” Id. at 21. This holding implicitly recognized that the statutes conflict. Far from harmonizing the statutes, the Court ofAppeal steppedintotherole ofthe Legislature and unilaterally decided which provisions ofthe Long-Term Care Act will be enforced and which will not. And,asnoted bythedissent, it provided noanalysis as to howits holding 18 comports with any theory of statutory construction. Dis. Opn.at 6. It does not. By construing the statutes in this manner, the Court ofAppeal “does violence to two statutory enactments—carving out of the Lanterman Act an exception allowing public citations to include an unredacted description of the nature of the violation, and severing from the Long-Term Care Act the requirementthat the public record contain the aforementioned ‘relevant facts.’” Dis. Opn.at 1. Moreover, by withdrawing the protections of the Long-Term Care Act from the developmentally disabled individuals who also receive services under the Lanterman Act, the Court ofAppeal’s holding sets up the very type of “two-tier system of enforcement” under the Long-Term Care Act that this Court rej ected in Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 324. There, a county that operated a long-term care facility which had been issueda citation claimed that the Tort Claim Act (Gov’t Code § 818) preventedthe state from imposing statutory civil penalties against it under the 1973 Act. Id. at 139. In evaluating this contention, the Court extensivelyreviewed the provisions ofthe Act and the legislative intent underlying them. Id. at 142-144. This Court recognized that several of the provisions ofthe Act are intended to provide information to the public, and that, considered together, “the Act’s provisions are designed to implementthe Legislature’s declared public policy objective of ‘assur[ing] that long-term health care facilities provide © the highest level of care possible.’” Id. at 143 (citing Health & Safety Code § 1422(a)). In rejecting the county’s contention, the Court noted that “Tg}jranting immunity to public entities from the penalties would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature to provide a citation system for the imposition ofprompt and effectivecivil sanctions against long-term health 19 care facilities in violation of the laws and regulationsofthis state.” Id. (citing Health & Safety Code § 1417.1). The Courtcharacterized the county’s argumentthat only private nursing homes should be subject to the statutory fines, not public entities, as “a two-tiered system of enforcement of the Healthy and Safety Code provisions.” Id. at 149. It furtherstated, “It)his procedure contradicts the very public policy that the Legislature sought to implementwith the citation and penalty provisions of the Act.” Id. The Court ofAppeal’s decision here does exactly what this Court rejected in Kizer. It adopts different sets of rules for public access — one governing facilities licensed to care for developmentally disabled individuals (which comprise one-halfofthe facilities covered underthe Long-Term Care Act, Health & Safety Code § 1418), and the other governingthe rest of the facilities covered by the Long-Term Care Act. But the Court ofAppeal’s decision is a far more serious contradiction of legislative intent than wasat issue in Kizer. The decision effectively strips an entire class of individuals — mentally and developmentally disabled individuals residing in long-term health care facilities — from the protections of the Act, although the Legislature clearly intended that they also be | protected. Review is necessary to protect this statewide class ofindividuals’ and to ensure that the Long-Term Care Act is uniformly enforced against licensed long-term health care facilities. 7 Thoughthe decision doesnot say so, it presumably also would apply to chronic alcoholics receiving services under the Lanterman Act who reside in licensed long-term health care facilities covered under the 1973 Act. 20 B. REVIEW OF THE COURT OF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY WITH AUTHORITY OF THIS COURT AND ATTORNEY GENERALOPINIONS. The Court ofAppeal’s decision was, in part, constrained byits erroneous view that exceptions to the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions must be set forth under Section 5328 and 451 5, or in successive sections to these statutes. Opn. at 15 (“Gilbert concluded that the Legislature intended, in fact ‘intended precisely,’ that these Lanterman Act records ‘be absolutely confidential except for the specifically listed cases set forth in the several subdivisions of’ sections 5328 and 4515 (andin their companionstatutes).”) (citing Gilbert v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 161, 169 (1987)). This construction ofthe Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision contradicts this Court’s decision in Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796 (2001). There, the issue before the Court was whether the petitioning attorney in a commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (““SVPA”) (Welf. & Inst. §§ 6000-6609.3) could obtain otherwise confidential information concerning a sexually violent predatorto the extent that information was contained in an updated mental evaluation. Id, at 804, 807. In concludingthat the attorney could, the Court looked to newly enacted amendments to the SVPA whichauthorized updated or replacement evaluations ofpersons subject to commitment proceedings and disclosure of the evaluation to the petitioning attorney. Id. at 803. It also took note of the fact that the evaluation wasto include review ofavailable treatment records and interviewsofthe person being evaluated. Id. at 805. Given this language, the court stated that “the current provision clarifies within the SVPA an exception to section 5328’s general rule of confidentiality of treatment records, and allowsthe district attorney access 21 to treatment record information, insofar as that information is contained in an updated evaluation.” Id. The California Attorney General similarly has opined that the Child Abuse Reporting Laws (Penal Code §§ 11 165-1 1174) are a specific exception to the general confidentiality provisions of Section 5328 to the extent the laws require disclosure of information obtained in the course of providing services. 65 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. 345 (1982); 58 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. 824 (1975). The AG noted in both opinions the remedial nature of the reporting statutes and described the apparent conflict between Section 5328’s confidentiality law and the mandatory reporting provisions as “merely superficial” given that the over-riding concern ofboth statutes is the patient’s well-being. Id. at 349 (citing 58 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. at 827). The AG assumedthat persons required to report underthe act acquire information in the course ofrendering services under the Lanterman Act, | that this information is confidential under Section 5328 and that none ofthe exceptions under Section 5328 applied. Id. at 348. Nevertheless, the AG concludedthat the reporting laws “would be seriouslycurtailed if the persons whoobserve or who have knowledge of child abuse cases remain silent.” Id. at 353. Accordingly, the AG opinedthat “a special statute, like» the reporting law, overrides the general statute, section 5328.” Id. at 355.° ® The AG hasreached similar conclusions with respect to other laws it found to be exceptions to the general confidentiality provisions of Section 5328. See 53 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen 20, 23 (1970) (opining that earlier enacted Penal Code Section 290 requiring a limited class of patients who have been adjudged sexual psychopaths or have committed specified crimes to register with law enforcement was a special statute and thus an exemption from Section 5328’s confidentiality law); 53 Ops.Cal.Att.Gen. 151 (1970) (opining that then-Welf. & Inst. Code Section 4118, requiring the Department of Mental Health to cooperate with Bureaus ofImmigration “in 22 Thus, while sections 5328 and 4515 of the Lanterman Act provide that “[i]nformation and records shall be disclosed only in any ofthe following cases,” followed by several exceptionsto the confidentiality rule, Albertson and the several opinions by the AG makeclearthat exceptionsto this general rule may be foundin other statutory enactments. Moreover, these authorities support the conclusion that the Long- Term Care Actis a specific exception to the general confidentiality rule set forth in Section 5328. Like the statute at issue in Albertson, the 1973 Act expressly authorizes a “review ofall available evidence,” including “interviewing residents and reviewing records,” and requires unannounced inspectionsofhealth care facilities. Health & Safety Code § 1420(a)(2); 1421(a). It further requires that in determining the amountofthe penalty a _ patient’s “medical condition,” “mental condition” and “history of mental disability,” among other things, be considered. Id., § 1428(g). Thereafter, the Act mandates that citationsissued to facilities found in violation of the law be posted or made accessible to the public. Id., § 1429. While the namesofpatients are not to be includedin the citations to protect their privacy, relevant facts considered by the department must be documented and “made part of the public record.” Id., § 1424(b). Thus, to the extent the citations include information falling within Section 5328, the Act poses as mucha conflict with Section 5328 as do the SVPAprovisionsat issue in Albertson and the child abuse reporting statutes considered by the AGinits two opinions. arranging for the deportation of all aliens whoare confined in, admitted, or committed to any state hospital,” was an exception to Section 5328). 23 As aptly explained in the dissent below: Thesecitation provisions are the more specific provisions because the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions, standing alone, includethecitationsat issue in this case, but also broadly cover any ‘[i]nformation and records obtained in the course ofproviding services’ under the Lanterman Act and other specified statutory enactments. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328.) The citation provisions, on the other hand, deal specifically with citations and precisely mandate the contents of these citations. Dis. Opn. at 9. Thus, as the more specific statute governing the exact administrative record at issue here, the Long-TermCare Act’s posting and - public access mandates control over the Lanterman Act’s general confidentiality provisions. As both the dissent and trial court recognized, this reading of the statutes effectuates the purpose of both acts — to promote andprotect the health and safety of mental health patients. Dis. Opn. at 10; Orderat 9. Because the Court of Appeal’s structural error on fundamental principles of statutory construction,if left unchecked, will harm one ofthe state’s most vulnerable populations, as well as determine the duties ofDPH, regional centers andall licensed long-term care facilities subject to the 1973 Act throughoutthe state, review is necessary. C. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S PUBLISHED DECISION | CREATES AN UNWORKABLE, GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE MORASS. By holding that certain information required to be contained in the citations must be disclosed while other information must be withheld “in PRA-requested citations,” the Court ofAppeal’s decision sets up a statewide compliance system that is nonsensical and unworkable — creating problems as agencies and facilities struggle to understand and comply with the Court’s 24 mandate in the multitude ofsituations the Opinion will be applied. Opn.at 6, 21. - First, confining the non-disclosure obligations to PRA-requested citations, as opposed to those required to be postedat the facility at “{a]n area accessible and visible to members of the public” (Health & Safety Code § 1429 (a)(1)(A)), or those required to be madeavailable under provisions of the Long-Term Care Act for inspection by “any memberofthe public whoso requests” (id., § 1429 (b)), makes no sense. Facilities would have no basis to distinguish between a request made under Section1429(b), for example, and a request under the Public Records Act. Under the Public Records Act, requests do not needto be in writing;indeed, they need only “reasonably describe an identifiable record.” Gov’t Code § 6253(b); Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Authority, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1381 (2001). The government’s obligation to comply with a requestfor access to public records may be triggered merely by a citizen’s over-the- counter request to see a documentin the hands ofthe government. Thus, there is no basis for facilities to distinguish between PRA-requested citations thatit must redact and othersit is obligated to make public under the 1973 Act. Nor does it make sense to havethe statutory vehicle under which access is sought determine the facility’s disclosure obligations. Because the citations must be postedin an areavisible to any memberofthe public, once a Citation is posted pursuant to Section 1429(a)(2), it is public. No private right of action for invasion of privacy, for example, could thereafter be stated for the republication ofthose facts. See Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679 (2004) (rejecting publication of - private facts claim where published facts came from official records of 25 criminal proceedings). Thus, any intended protections afforded to Lanterman Act patients throughthe obligation to redact PRA-requested citations are completely lost once the citation is posted. Second, the Court ofAppeal’s decision injects uncertainly into a facility’s disclosure obligation by substituting a clear statutory requirement that citations be publicly posted with namesredacted, other than investigating personnel (Health & Safety Code §§ 1423(a)(2);1439), for one | requiring that various categories of information be redacted. What information will actually be redacted from the citations based on these categories necessarily will be decided on a case-by-case basis andleft to the complete discretion of the disclosing entity. This is all the more concerning given that the categories of information to be redacted are readily susceptible to broad interpretation. For example, could Sonoma Developmental Center redact the fact that 11 of 27patients in a single unit - received significant thermal burn injuries consistent with being shot with a Taser gun under a claim that this information pertains to the “physical” condition of a patient. 5 PE 1388-1391; 1378:25-27.7 Similarly, could DPH redact information necessary for the public to understandits classification of a violation by broadly reading the requirementthatit redact “the risk the violation presents to thatmental and physical condition.” Opn. at 21. The entire classification system turns on the degree ofharm presented to the * Because manyofthecitations involve crimes and abuse at the hands of caregivers or other residents, as opposed to a lack of adequate care, such a reading ofthe decisionraises significant concerns. This is especially so where the redaction decisionsare being made by entities whose own conduct is being questioned and whohavestrong financial incentives to redact informationthat arguably falls within the Court ofAppeal’s broad categories. 26 patient by the violation. Health & Safety Code § 1424. Ifread in this manner, the public will be unable to oversee whether DPHis properly classifying violations, whichtrigger significant obligations on the part of the licensee depending on the severity and frequency ofthe violations, including | potential revocation ofits license. Third, by holding that some informationin thecitations is protected under the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision, the decision introduces the specter ofcivil liability for wrongful disclosure of confidential information for complying with the Long-Term Care Act. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5330 (b) (“Any person may bring an action against an individual whohasnegligently released confidential information or records concerning him or herin violation of this chapter...”). By injecting the potential for civil liability into the public posting and access mandates of the Long-Term _ Care Act, the decision ensures that long-term care facilities, and the state and counties charged with overseeing them, will aggressively redact the citations or risk hefty civil penalties for guessing wrong. Surely, this was not what the Legislature intended whenit enacted a comprehensivestatutory schemerequiring, among otherthings, the public reporting ofcitations to | encourage facility compliance with laws and regulationsrelating to patient’ care. D. REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE CONSUMER INFORMATION SERVICE SYSTEM ESTABLISHEDIN 1984 UNDER THE LONG-TERM CARE ACT. Seemingly as an after-thought, the Court ofAppeal in a footnote at the conclusion ofits decision decides that the Long-Term Care Act’s consumerinformation services system also must conform to its decision. Opn. at 24, n. 12. The Legislature required the implementation ofthis 27 system “to provide updated and accurate information to the general public and consumers regarding long-term care facilities’ in their communities.” Health & Safety Code § 1422.5 (a). It requires disclosure ofa facility’s history ofcitations and complaints for the last two survey cycles, information regarding substantiated complaints, information about citations, including the status of each, and the facilities plan of correction. Id., § 1422.5 (a)(2), (3), (4). Information is required to be madeaccessible through a statewidetoll-free telephone number and theInternet. Id., § 1422.5(a)(1). During the implementation phase,the statute provided temporary disclosure methods to ensure disclosureof information about substantiated complaints, state citations assessed and the action taken against the facility. Id., § 1422.5(d)(1)(A), (B) & (C). The statute requiring the consumerinformation service system has beenin effect since 1984. Now,the Court ofAppeal’s decision requires DPH to conform this statutorily-mandated information system to its decision. Presumably, this meansthat the same categories of information that must be redacted from the citations must not be made available through the consumerservices information system. What this meansin practice is uncertain. This issue was neverraised by the parties below andthe recordis silent on the matter. To be sure, however, this requirementinjects uncertainty into a statutorily-mandated, administrative process adopted specifically to provide information to the public abouta facility’s compliance history. By introducing Lanterman Act protections into the consumer information services system, DPH undoubtedly will err on the side ofwithholding information when confronted with the risk ofcivil liability for wrongful disclosure of confidential information under the Lanterman Act. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5330. It simply could not have been the Legislature’s intent in 28 enacting Section 1422.5 to saddle DPH withthe prospect of civil sanctions for carrying out a mandatory duty underthe law. This aspect of the Court ofAppeal’s decision also imposes new, burdensomeand unnecessary, administrative responsibilities that did not previously exist. And, because the decision is apparently unbounded,it could just as readily apply to other existing information systems or new ones adopted in the future. The uncertainties raised by the decision to the present and future administrative duties ofDPH, undertaken forthe benefit ofthose living in long-term carefacilities, their loved ones and the public, warrant review by this Court. Vv. CONCLUSION Review by this Court is necessary to preserve important protections afforded extremely vulnerable populations under present laws and to ensure uniformity of enforcement of these laws. Review is also necessary because the Court of Appeal’s decision sets up statewide administrative obligations that are unnecessary, uncertain and that ultimately will lead to less information being released to the public about facility compliance with laws designedto protect those residing in long-term health carefacilities. Absent review, the enforcement system over long-term care facilities could readily revert to the system shrouded in secrecy that the Legislature sought to correct in 1973 through enactment of the Long-Term Care Act. Dated: November 18, 2013 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP By: Hpifly CatZe Duffy @arolan Attorneys for Real Party In Interest The Center for Investigative Reporting 29 COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE I certify that pursuant to Rules of Court 8.204(c) and 8.486(a)(6), the attached Petition for Review is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 13 points, and contains 8,300 words. Dated: November18, 2013. By: foJi LatJ Duffyf @arolan DWT22819322v2 0200375-000001 CERTIFIEDFORPUBLICATION COPY| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, C072325 Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2012- 80001044)V. ORDER MODIFYINGTHE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO OPINIONCOUNTY, ' [CHANGEIN JUDGMENT]Respondent; CENTERFOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, FILED OCT -92013 Court of Appeal, Third Appeliate District. , Deena C. Fawcett, ClerkTHE COURT: BYDeputy Real Party in Interest. It is ordered that the Disposition ofthe published majority opinion filed herein on September 18, 2013, be modified as follows: 1. Delete the third sentence (andits following citation) ofthe Disposition, which reads “Each party shall pay its own costs in this writ review proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B); Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).)” 2. __ At the endofthelast sentence ofthe Disposition, which begins “To the extent the trial court” and ends with “court costs incurredin thetrial court.” insert the following text “, and in this court.” so that the Disposition now reads: DISPOSITION Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance ofa peremptory writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the peremptory writ forthwith. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.) Leta peremptory writ ofmandate issue directing respondent Superior Court to vacate its judgment ofOctober 22, 2012, and its ruling under submission of September 13, 2012, andto enter a new judgment(1) that directs Public Health to produce to News Center the requestedcitations in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion, ante, at pages 19 to 22 (pt. ITI.D. ofthe Discussion), and (2) that grants declaratory reliefto News Centerto this same extent (on News Center’s parallel complaint for declaratory relief). To the extent thetrial court determines that NewsCenterprevailed in this matter, News Centeris entitled to recover, upon appropriate application, reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred in the trial court, and in this court. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)14 This modification represents a changein thejudgment. BY THE COURT: HULL , Acting P.J. BUIZ _ J. 14 Tn this writ review proceeding, we have resolved the specific issue presented regardingthe potential conflict between the LantermanAct’s confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisionsin the context ofthe PRA requesthere. Public Health also asks us, more generally, whetherit is obligated to produce otherinformation and documents, and whetherit is immune from sanctions for wrongfuldisclosures. To the extent these twoissues are not covered by our resolution here, wedecline to address them atthis point. (See Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th419, 432, 434-435 [public agency maynotinitiate declaratory relief action to determineits duties under the PRA].) IN THE Court of lppeal of the Stateof California IN AND FOR THE THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MAILING LIST Re: State Department of Public Health v. The Superior Court of Sacramento CountyC072325 Sacramento County No. 34201280001044 Copiesof this document have been sentto the individuals checked below: JSerant Lien Office of the State Attorney General P.O. Box 944255 1300 | Street, Suite 125 Sacramento, CA 95814 uffy Carolan i avis Wright Tremaine 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94111-6533 Veonorable Timothy M. Frawley Judge of the - Sacramento County Superior Court 720 Ninth Street Sacramento, CA 95814 _ CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COPY IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) STATE DEPARTMENTOF PUBLIC HEALTH, | _ C072325 Petitioner, | (Super. Ct. No. 34-2012- 80001044) Vv. THE E SUPERIOR COURTOF SACRAMENTO FI[ED Respondent; . SEP 1 8 2013 CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, ortRoc Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ ofmandate. Timothy M. Frawley, Judge. Peremptory writ issued. Kamala D.Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant . Attorney General, Niromi W.Pfeiffer and Grant Lien, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Davis Wright Tremaine, Duffy Carolan and Jeff Glasser for Real Party in Interest. 1 (SEE DISSENTING OPINION) This is an action under the California Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). Pursuantto the PRA,an investigative news organization requested citations for patient care violations that the State Department ofPublic Health (Public Health) issued to state facilities housing mentally ill and developmentally disabled patients. These citations were issued under California’s Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973 (hereinafter, Long-Term Care Act) (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.). Long-Term Care Act citations are publicly accessible in certain contexts, including through a PRA request. However, another statutory scheme, the Lanterman- Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and companionstatutes in the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (id., § 4500 et seq.), renders mental health records, and information obtained in the course ofproviding such services, confidential (id., §§ 5328, 5328.15, 4514).! Pursuant to the Lanterman Act, Public Health redacted from the citationsit provided the newsorganization essentially all the facts concerning the nature of the violations. In this writ review proceeding (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c)), we harmonize the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions with the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions in the context of this PRArequest. We conclude, among other things, that Public Health must not redact from the citations provided underthe PRA the particular description ofwhat the nature ofthe violation was, a description required by the Long-Term Care Act. Consequently, we issue a peremptory writ ofmandate along these lines. 1 Wewill refer to this statutory scheme—the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act—collectively as the Lanterman Act. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In May 2011, the Center for Investigative Reporting (NewsCenter), an investigative news organization, requested under the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) copiesofcitations for violations ofpatient care standards that Public Health issued to seven ofthestate’s residential facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled (occasionally hereinafter, state facilities; these facilities are operated by the State Department of DevelopmentalServices, not a party herein).2. News Center sought citations issued from January 1, 2002, to the present. Public Health responded to News Center’s PRA request by stating that Public Health was required to maintain citations for only four years, and that any citations produced would be redacted pursuanttq the confidentiality provisions set forth in the Lanterman Act, applyingto the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. Public Health produced 55 extensively redacted citations for the years 2007 to 2011. Public Health removedessentially all factual information aboutthe nature of the violation from the citations, so that they stated generically along the following lines: “Thefacility failedto keep Client 1 free from harm”; “The facility . . . failed to ensure clients’ rights to be free from the harm of abuse”; “Thefacility . . . failed to treat clients with dignity and respect”; or simply, “Thefacility failed to: [remainder redacted].” NewsCenter filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandateto obtain the PRA-requestedcitations in unredacted or minimally redacted form. News Centerrelied principally on the Long-Term Care Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.), the statutory scheme under which Public Health issued the 2 The term “developmentaldisability” includes “mental retardation, cerebralpalsy, epilepsy, and autism”and disabling conditions “closely related to mental retardation”: the term does notinclude “handicappingconditions that are solely physical in nature.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4512, subd. (a).) citations. The Long-Term Care Actprovidesthatits citations (for foundviolations) are publicly available (id., § 1429; see id., §§ 1423, 1424), andthatits writings are open to public inspection pursuant to the PRA, except for the namesofindividuals other than certain investigating officers (id., § 1439). In ruling on NewsCenter’s complaint and writ petition, the trial court concluded that (1) “[w]here mentalhealth records are involved[(i.e., the recordsat issue here)], there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s accessibility provisions”; (2) “{t]he statutes cannot be harmonized bydisclosingthe citation denudedofall the underlying factual information givingrise to the citation”; and (3) “the Legislature intended the accessibility provisions ofthe Long-Term Care Act to prevail as a special exception to the Lanterman Act’s general rule of confidentiality.” Consequently, the trial court issued a writ of mandate (and corresponding declaratory relief) directing Public Health to producethe citations requested by News Center “without redaction, except as to the namesofindividuals other than investigating officers... .”5 3 Thetrial court also stated that Public Health could not rely on “its internal retention policy”(i.e., Public Health’s policy that it was required to maintaincitations for only four. years), and concludedthatifPublic Health still has responsive documents,it is obligated to produce them. In the context of our resolutionofthis Case, we agree. Public Health filed a petition for extraordinary writ of mandate with us, seeking reviewofthetrial court’s decision. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).)* We issued an alternative writ and stayed further proceedings.> 4 In a one-paragraphi passagein its writ review petition, Public Health contendsthetrial court’s writ ofmandate also overlooked the privacy protectionsset forth in the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.), which prohibits state agencies from releasing an individual’s personal identifying information unless authorized to do so—for example, name, home address, home phone number, social security number, or medical history or financial matters. (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.3, subd. (a), 1798.24.) Thetrial court’s ruling and writ order redacted names, and contemplated redacting any personal identifying information that could be akin to “naming” someone (except, as the relevant statutes provide, the names ofcertain investigators). We intend our resolution ofthis case to similarly foreclose the release of personalidentifying information. 5 NewsCenter claims that welack jurisdiction to consider Public Health’s writ review petition, because Public Healthfiledits petition late. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd.(c); People v. Superior Court (Brent) (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 675, 683 {wherea statute sets forth a specific time limit within which a writ petition mustbefiled, the failure to do so has been held jurisdictional].) We disagree. Under the PRA review procedure, Public Health had 25 days from the date the court clerk served notice ofthetrial court’s ruling (20 daysplus five days for mailing) eitherto file with usits petition for extraordinary writ (seeking review), or to request a filing extension from thetrial court of up to 20 more days. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c); see Cornell University MedicalCollegev. Superior Court. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 311, 314 [it is generally implied in such a statute that an extension must be requested before the statutory filing deadline expires].) The court clerk stated that it mailed thetrial court’s ruling on September 13, 2012, butthetrial court’s postage meter disclosed the ruling was mailed September 17, 2012. Public Health’sfirst act regarding its writ review petition was to seekin thetrial court on October 10, 2012, an extension oftimetofile the petition (andthetrial court granted Public Health a 20-day extension). This October 10 date is 27 days from September13, but only 23 days from September 17. Recognizing the import ofwhich mailing date was the correct one given the 25-day deadlineto act, the parties letter-briefed the trial court on — this issue, and the trial court, as authorized by Code of Civil Proceduresection 1013a, subdivision (4), impliedly determined that the September 17 date was the correct one. Public Health thenfiled its petition for extraordinary writ of mandate (seeking review) with us on October 26, 2012, which is 39 days from September 17. DISCUSSION I. Issue and Standard of Review New Center’s PRA request for the Public Health citations for the state facilities implicates three statutes: the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.); the Long-Term Care Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.); and the Lanterman Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5000 et seq., 4500 et seq.).© The issueis, in the context of a PRA requestfor citations issued by Public Health to state facilities housing the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled: Can the public accessibility provisions for citations issued underthe Long-Term Care Act be reconciled with the confidentiality provisions ofthe Lanterman Act, and, if so, how? The PRA providesfor the inspection ofpublic records maintained by state and local government agenciesto fulfill the “fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state” to have access to information concerning the conductofthe people’s business. (Gov. Code, § 6250.) The PRA’s general policyis to favor disclosure; a claim of nondisclosure must be foundin a specific exemption enumeratedin that act. (Cookv. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781; Gov. Code, § 6253.) The PRA exemptionat issue here masks “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exemptedor prohibited pursuantto . . state law . . [the state law here being the Lanterman Act confidentiality provisions].” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) The Long-Term Care Act, however, makesitscitations publicly accessible via statutory provisions on posting, requesting, and the PRA. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1423, 1424, 1429, 1439.) © Becausethe statutes we discuss are found in various codes, for simplicity, we will refer to the statutes in discussion pursuantto their act rather than their code—for example, section 6254 of the PRA (i.e., the Government Code); section 1417 of the Long-Term Care Act(i.e., the Health and Safety Code); and section 5328 ofthe LantermanAct(i.e., the Welfare and Institutions Code). Wewill, however, cite to the acts by their respective code attributions. Asfor any reconciliation between the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions and the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions, “[t]he issue presentedis essentially one of statutory construction. When engagedin statutory construction, our aim is ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the | constructionthat best effectuates the purposeofthe law.’ [Citations.] ‘We first examine the words themselvesbecausethe statutory languageis generally the most reliable indicatoroflegislative intent.’ [Citation.] When construing theinteraction oftwo potentially conflicting statutes, we strive to effectuate the purpose of each by harmonizing them,ifpossible, in a way that allows both to be given effect.” (Chavez v. City ofLos Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 986 (Chavez).) Weturn nowtothe statutory purposesand relevant language ofthe Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act. If. The Statutory Purposes and Relevant Languageofthe Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act A. The Long-Term Care Act The Long-Term Care Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.), which applies to the state facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled at issue here, also applies to the much more populousskilled nursingfacilities and convalescent hospitals in the state (andessentially to all long-term health care facilities in the state). (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1418, 1250.) The Long-Term Care Actestablishes an inspection,citation, reporting, andcivil (monetary) penalty system that is designed to create a less cumbersome, less draconian, and more preventative enforcement method than the system of suspending and revoking health facility licenses. (See Health & Saf. Code,div. 2, chs. 2, 2.4, 3; Health & Saf. Code, § 1417.1; CaliforniaAssn. ofHealth Facilities v. Department ofHealth Services (1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 294-295 (California Assn.); Kizer v. County ofSan Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 150 (Kizer).) This act is designed to “ensure that long-term health care facilities provide the highest level of care possible,” by ensuring that patient care standards are met. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1422, subd. (a), 1417.1.) The Long-Term Care Act applies to some “of the most vulnerable segments of our population”—for example, “ ‘nursing care patients .. . who are already disabled by age andinfirmity’ ” and,as here,the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. (California Assn., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 295; Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 150.) As a remedialstatute, the Long- Term Care Act’scitation provisionsare to be liberally construed on behalf ofthe class of personsthey are designedto protect. (California Assn., supra, at p. 295; Health & Saf. Code, § 1424.) Public Health (formerly the Department ofHealth Services) administers and enforces the Long-Term Care Act. (California Assn., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 288.) The Long-Term Care Act contains provisions that makecitations publicly available, except for the namesofindividuals other than specified investigating officers. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1423, subd. (a)(2), 1424, 1429, 1439.) Public availability of the citationsis accomplished primarily through prominentpostingat the facility (for the more serious | class A and class AA citations), public request, and PRA request. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1429, 1439.) In this way, the Long-Term Care Act affords the public an oversightrole concerning long-term health care facilities. We note, however, that the media, such as NewsCenter, has no greater right of access to public records pursuant to a PRA request than the general public. (Dixon v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1279.) The two most pertinent provisions ofthe Long-Term Care Act covering the nature of citation information available to the public are sections 1423 and 1424. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1423, 1424.) | Health and Safety Code section 1423, subdivision (a)(2) specifies, as relevant, that “[e]ach citation shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation,including a reference to the statutory provision, standard, rule or regulation alleged to have beenviolated, the particular place or area ofthe facility in whichit occurred, as well as the amount of any proposed assessmentofa civil penalty. The name of anypatient jeopardized by the alleged violation shall not be specified in the citation in orderto protect the privacy ofthe patient. ... The citation shall fix the earliest feasible time for the elimination ofthe condition constituting the alleged violation, when appropriate.” And Health and Safety Code section 1424, subdivisions (a) and (b) add, as relevant: “Citations issued pursuantto [the Long-Term Care Act] shall be classified accordingto the nature ofthe violation and shall indicate the classification on the face thereof[(i.e., class ‘B’, class ‘A’, and class ‘AA’[in increasing severity])]. “(a) In determining the amountofthecivil penalty, all relevant facts shall be considered, including, but not limited to, the following: “(1) The probability and severity ofthe risk that the violation presents to the patient’s or resident’s mental and physical condition. “(2) The patient’s or resident’s medical condition. “(3) The patient’s or resident’s mental condition and his or her history of mental disability or disorder. “(4) The goodfaith efforts exercised bythefacility to prevent the violation from occurring. “(5) Thelicensee’s history of compliance with regulations. “(b) Relevant facts considered by [Public Health] in determining the amountofthe civil penalty shall be documented by [Public Health] on an attachmentto the citation and available in the public record. . . .” NewsCenter madeits request for the Public Health citations pursuant to section 1439 ofthe Long-Term Care Act, the act’s PRA provision. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439.) Section 1439 of the Long-Term Care Actstates that “[a]ny writing received, owned,used, or retained by [Public Health] in connection with the [Long-Term Care Act] - is a public record within the meaning of[the PRA], and, as such, is open to public inspection pursuantto the [PRA] provision[s] of Sections 6253, 6256, 6257, and 6258 of the Government Code. However, the names of any persons contained in such records, except the namesofduly authorized officers, employees, or agents of the state department conducting an investigation or inspection in response to a complaintfiled pursuantto [the Long-Term Care Act], shall not be open to public inspection and copies of such records provided for public inspection shall have such names deleted.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439.) Government Code section 6253, subdivision (b) of the PRA states, as relevant, that public records are to be made promptly available, “[e]xcept with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law. . . .” Government Code sections 6256 and 6257 have been repealed. (Stats. 1998, ch. 620, §§ 7, 10, p. 4121.) GovernmentCode section 6258 governs the proceedings to enforce the right to the record. Section 6254 of the PRA specifies the particular types of records exempt from PRA disclosure. The PRA disclosure exemption at issue here, as noted, is for “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuantto . . . state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Coderelating to privilege.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) 10 Thatleads usto the state law here on exempting or prohibiting disclosure— sections 5328 and 4514 ofthe Lanterman Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) B. The Lanterman Act The Lanterman Act (see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4500 et seq., 5000 et seq.) is a comprehensivestate law directed at the evaluation, supervision, protection, care and treatment ofpersons whoare mentallyill, developmentally disabled or impaired by chronic alcoholism. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001.)7 The Lanterman Actstates thatall information andrecords obtained in the course ofproviding services under the Lanterman Act(and other specified mental health programs)shall be confidential, subject to defined statutory exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4514, 5328.) The legislative purpose for confidentiality is to encourage persons with mentalor severealcohol problems or developmentaldisabilities to seek, undergo and accept treatment, and to be candid and open in such treatment, knowing such treatment will remain confidential and any embarrassment, undesired publicity or stigma will be avoided. (in re S. W. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 719, 721; County ofRiversidev. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 478, 481 (County ofRiverside); see also Tarasoffv. Regents ofUniversity ofCalifornia (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 440 (Tarasoff).) Section 5328 of the Lanterman Actsets forth the following general rule of confidentiality applying to the mentallyill: “All information andrecords obtained in the 7 As originally enacted, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, includingits confidentiality provisions, applied to both the mentally ill and the developmentallydisabled. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328, added by Stats. 1972, ch. 1058, § 2, pp. 1960-1961; Gilbert v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 161, 168-169 (Gilbert).) For our purposes, a later nonsubstantive statutory division kept the mentally ill (and chronically alcoholic) in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, and placed the developmentally disabled in the parallel companion statutory scheme ofthe Lanterman DevelopmentalDisabilities Services Act; the confidentiality provisions ofboth acts are quite similar. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4500, 4514, 5328; Gilbert, supra, at pp. 168-169.) 11 course ofproviding services under Division 4 (commencing with Section 4000 [mental health]), Division 4.1 (commencing with Section 4400 [developmentalservices]), Division 4.5 (commencing with Section 4500 [the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act]), Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000 [the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]), Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000 [admissions andjudicial commitments]), or Division 7 (commencing with Section 7100 [mentalinstitutions]), to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services shall be confidential. . . . Information and records shall be disclosed only in any ofthe following cases.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328.) Presently, section 5328 has 25 exemptionsto its general rule of confidentiality, covering service provider communications, patient consent, insurance claims, research purposes, courts, law enforcement, senate and assembly rules committees, patient’s attorney, coroner, licensing and investigative agency personnel, medical boards, and patient safety. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328, subds. (a)-(y).) In addition, additional exemptionsare set out in successive code sections to section 5328.8 Section 4514 ofthe Lanterman Act—as noted, enacted as a nonsubstantive amendmentintended to movethe confidentiality laws concerning the developmentally disabled from the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act to the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act—sets forth now the general confidentiality rule for the developmentally disabled, and providesas pertinent: “All information and records obtained in the course ofproviding intake, assessment, and services under Division 4.1 (commencing with Section 4400), Division 4.5 (commencing with Section 4500), 8 See Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5328.01 (particular law enforcement investigation), 5328.02 (correctional authorities), 5328.04 (social workers/probation officers), 5328.05 (elder abuse), 5328.06 (protection and advocacy agency), 5328.1 (patient’s family), 5328.2 (Justice Department), 5328.3 (patient disappearance), 5328.4 (crimes byor againstpatients), 5328.5 (elder abuse), 5328.8 (patient death), 5328.9 (employer), and 5328.15 (authorized licensing personnel). 12 Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000), or Division 7 (commencing with Section 7100) to persons with developmentaldisabilities shall be confidential. .. Information and records shall be disclosed only in any ofthe following cases.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4514; see Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at pp. 168-169.) Section 4514 has exemptionsto its general confidentiality rule that parallel those for section 5328. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4514, subds.(a)-(v), 4514.3, 4514.5.) “Services”is defined broadly in the Lanterman Act, as including, but not limited to, “diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, personalcare, day care, domiciliary care, special living arrangements, physical, occupational, and speech therapy,training, education, . . . employment, mental health services, recreation, counseling . . . , protective and other social and sociolegal services, information andreferral services, follow-along services, adaptive equipmentand supplies, advocacyassistance,. . . assessment, assistance in locating a home,child care, behaviortraining and behavior modification programs, camping, community integration services, community support, daily living skills training, emergencyandcrisis intervention,facilitating circles of support, habilitation .. . ,” and so on and so forth, covering essentially anything “directed toward the alleviation ofa developmental disability [or a mental illness] or toward the social, personal, physical, or economichabilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmentaldisability [or a mentalillness]... .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4512, subd. (b).) Wenow turn to the application of this statutory language. Let reconciliation begin, if it is possible. Ill. Applying and Harmonizing the Lanterman Act’s Confidentiality Provisionsand the Long-Term Care Act’s Public Accessibility Provisions A. Application ofthe Lanterman Act Wemustfirst consider Public Health’s threshold argumentthat “(t]he Long-Term Care Act authorizes [PRA] requests for citations issued to long-term carefacilities, 13 subject to the exceptionsset forth in the [PRA]. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439.) The [PRA] does not require the disclosure ofrecords whosedisclosure is exemptedor prohibited under. . . state law. (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) Under the Lanterman Act, all information and records obtained in the course ofproviding services to mentally ill and developmentally disabled patients shall remain confidential. (Welf. & Inst. Code, [§§ 5328, 4514].)” “Hence, any request for [Long-Term Care Act] citations should not result in the production of information or documents privileged by the Lanterman Act.” “The [Long-Term Care Act] and the Lanterman Act are not in conflict, and Public Health abided by both statutes whenit produced heavily redacted citations[i.e., devoid ofall facts regarding the nature ofthe violation] to [News Center].” The problem with this argumentis that it uses the Long-Term Care Act to defeat the Long-Term Care Act with respect to the mentally ill and the developmentally . disabled. Public Health’s argumentuses one ofthe Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions—PRA requests (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439)toforeclose, almost completely, public accessibility to Long-Term Care Act citations issued to state facilities housing the mentallyill and the developmentally disabled. In makingthis argument Public Health notesthat, since nearly everything that happensto a patient in one ofthe state facilities at issue happens“in the course ofproviding services”to that patient, the Lanterman Act’s general confidentiality rule conceivably applies to nearly all patient-related mental health records. Through this argument, Public Health completes a hattrick ofpublic oversight denial, by effectively nullifying the public accessibility of Long-Term Care Actcitationsvia facility posting, public request, and PRA request; and Public Health doesso in the context of one ofthe most vulnerable populationsprotected by the Long-Term Care Act. The Legislature did not exemptstate facilities housing the _ mentally ill and the developmentally disabled from the Long-Term Care Act’s public 14 oversight protection through its public accessibility provisions. But Public Health’s argument does; so werejectit.? Asnoted, “[wjhen construingthe interaction oftwo potentially conflicting statutes, westrive to effectuate the purpose ofeach by harmonizingthem,ifpossible, in a waythat allowsboth to be given effect.” (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.) On the one hand, the case for confidentiality under the Lanterman Actis indeed strong. The Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions are quite broad, given the statutory definition of “services,” and use mandatory language—“[a]ll information and recordsobtained in the course ofprovidingservices . . . shall be confidential” and “shall be disclosed only in any of the following[statutorily identified] cases.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514, 4512, subd. (b); Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 169.) In light of this mandatory language,Gilbert concludedthatthe Legislature intended,in fact “intended precisely,” that these Lanterman Act records“be absolutely confidential except for the specifically listed cases set forth in the several subdivisions of” sections 5328 and 4514 (andin their companion statutes). (Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 169; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) Gilbert held, for our — 9 As an opposing aside to this point, News Center argues that information obtained in a citation investigationis not information “obtained in the course ofproviding services.” (Citing Devereaux v. Latham & Watkins (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1585-1586 {in an action for breach ofLanterman Act confidentiality, the court stated, “[w]here there is no showingby the person claiming confidentiality ofrecords under {Welfare and Institutions - Code] section 5328 that the records were generatedin the course of receiving treatment underthestatutory sections therein specified, disclosureis not governedbysection 532877}; see also Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 443 [because the psychotherapyat issue there was not provided under any ofthe mental health programs specified in the Lanterman Act, that act’s confidentiality provisions did not apply].) We agree with the trial court that a citation for violating patient care standardsstill is likely to include information obtainedin the course of providing servicesto patients. 15 purposes, that an owner/operatorofa facility for the developmentally disabled, in an administrative license revocation proceeding, could not obtain records ofthree ofits formerpatients for possible use in impeaching complaining witnesses or in mitigating any penalty. (Gilbert, at pp. 164-165, 169; see also County ofRiverside, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at pp. 480-481 [state chiropractic board,in license revocation proceeding, could not obtain alcoholic treatment center records involving the accused chiropractor, because the matter did not fall within any of the specific disclosure exceptionsset forth in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328 and succeeding sections]; People v. Gardner (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 134, 140 [§ 5328 prohibited patient information disclosure to probation officer preparing probation report for court, because the section (at that time) had no such confidentiality exception].) This strict interpretation of the confidentiality provisions of sections 5328 and 4514 ofthe Lanterman Act(and succeedingstatutes) is further buttressed by a trio of amendmentsto that act, including a very recent one: (1) a 1980 enactment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5328.15, subd. (a)) and a 1982 enactment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4514, subd. (n)) authorizing disclosure ofLanterman Act confidential information and records to authorized licensing personnel of Public Health, as necessary to the performance oftheir duties to inspect, license, and investigate health facilities to ensure that the standards of care are being met; andsetting forth measures to keep such information confidential in related criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings(Stats. 1980, ch. 695, § 1, p. 2095; Stats. 1982, ch. 1141, § 1, pp. 4111-4112); (2) parallel amendmentsin 1985 to the twostatuteslisted in (1), broadening those sections to also include authorized legal staff and special investigators of the Department of Social Services, in connection with inspecting, licensing andinvestigating (Stats. 16 1985, ch. 994, §§ 1, 2, pp. 3190-3 194, 3198-3199; see Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 172); and (3) amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5328.15 and 45 14, adoptedjust last September(2012), that authorize protection and advocacy agencies— i.e., private, nonprofit corporations created by statute to protect and advocatefor the rights ofthe mentally ill and the developmentally disabled (andother disabled persons)— | to obtain otherwise confidential Lanterman Actinformation andrecords incorporated within unredactedcitation reports, licensing reports, survey reports, statements of deficiency, andplansof correction (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328.15, subd. (c), 4514, subd. (v), Stats. 2012, ch. 664, §§ 3, 1, respectively; see §§ 4514.3, 5328.06, 4900et seq., 4901, subd.(a)). The point is—if explicit statutory permission was neededfor authorized licensing personnel, legalstaff, special investigators, and protection and advocacy agenciesto fully obtain the otherwise confidential Lanterman Act information and records—it is clear the Legislature intends to maintain confidentiality in the Lanterman Act context. Furthermore,if nearly all of this information could have been obtained through a simple PRA request, these statutory enactments and amendments would have been unnecessary. B. Application ofthe Long-Term Care Act - Onthe other hand,the case for public accessibility to Long-Term Care Act citations is strong as well. Through the Long-Term Care Act, the Legislature intendedto establish an inspection, citation and reporting system to ensure that long-term health care facilities comply with patient care standards. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417.1.) An integral part of this system is public oversight—a public look behindthe doorsofthese institutions—by making citationsfor violations ofpatient care standards publicly available through 17 variousstatutory means, including facility posting, public request, and PRA request. (/d., §§ 1423,1424, 1429, 1439.) The Long-Term Care Act is designed to protect some ofthe “most vulnerable | segmentsofour population.” (California Assn., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 295; Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 150.) The mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in the state facilities comprise someofthe most vulnerable of these most vulnerable—i.e., some of those most in need ofthe safeguards provided by public oversight ofpatient care standards as envisioned in the Long-Term Care Act. Given the strong handsplayed by both the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions, legislative intention would best be served by harmonizing them,ifpossible, in a way that allows both to be given effect. (See Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.) Asthetrial court recognized, because the confidentiality provisions ofthe Lanterman Act apply to mental health programs, any conflict between those confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions occurs in the context of mental health records (including the developmentally disabled). C. Common PurposeofBoth Acts The mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in state facilities comprise a relatively small portion ofthe overall population protected by the Long-Term Care Acct. Significantly, with respect to the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled in state facilities, the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act apply to the same population and seek the same purpose—to promote andprotect the health and safety ofmental health patients. But the twoacts effectuate this common purpose from opposite directions. The Lanterman Act effectuates this purpose by ensuring the confidentiality of mental health records—this encourages persons with mental problems to seek, accept and undergo treatment, and to be open and candid in treatment. The Long-Term Care Acteffectuates 18 this purpose, as relevant here, by makingcitations for violations ofpatient care standards publicly accessible, so the public can oversee whatis happening in these facilities. This congruence ofpopulation and purpose,andthis effectuation ofpurpose from opposite directions, creates a complementarity of method to effectuate the common purpose for this commonpopulation. In this way, these confidentiality and public accessibility provisions can be harmonized. That takes care of the theory supporting harmonization here. What does harmonization mean in practical terms, in termsofthe statutory languageat issue? D. Giving Effect to Both the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term CareAct We have seenthata citation issued under the Long-Term Care Act (1) must describe “with particularity the nature ofthe violation” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd.(a)(2)), and (2) mustset forth certain “[r]elevant facts”(id., § 1424, subd.(b)), except for the namesofthe personsinvolvedin the incident(other than specified investigators and inspectors) (id., § 1439). 1. involvedpersons. Westart, then, with the easiest harmonization concerning the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions and the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions—any names contained in the citations, other than those of the authorized inspectors and investigators specified in section 1439 of the Long-Term Care Act, must be deleted. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1439; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) 10 Moreover, this congruenceofpopulation and purposealso distinguishes the present case from the strict view of Lanterman Act confidentiality taken in the Gilbert line of decisions, where the competing legal interests did not involve such congtuity. (See,e.g., Gilbert, supra, 193 Cal.App.3dat pp. 164, 168-169 [confidential records of developmentally disabled patients sought by accusedfacility to assist its defense in license revocation proceeding]; County ofRiverside, supra, 42 Cal.App.3dat p. 481 [in license revocation proceeding, chiropractic board sought confidential alcoholic treatment recordsofthe accused chiropractor]; see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) 19 2. Nature ofthe violation. Turning to the description ofthe nature of the violation, Health and Safety Code section 1423, subdivision (a)(2) of the Long-Term Care Act specifies that each citation issued “shall be in writing and shall describe with particularity the nature ofthe violation, including referenceto the statutory provision, standard,rule or regulation alleged to havebeen violated, the particular place or area of the facility in which it occurred, as well as the amountofany proposed assessmentofa civil penalty. ... The citation shall fix the earliest feasible time for the elimination of the condition constituting the alleged violation, when appropriate.” The redacted citations provided by Public Health did properly cite and set forth “the statutory provision, standard,rule or regulation [found] to have been violated” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2)), “the amountof[the] assessment ofa civil penalty” (ibid.), and “the earliest feasible time for the elimination ofthe condition constituting thealleged violation”(by specifying a deadline for compliance) (ibid.), as well as the “classification”ofthe citation (in increasing severity, Class “B,” Class “A,” and Class “AA”as required by Health & Saf. Code, § 1424). Thecitations also properly listed the name and addressofthe facility. The redactedcitations that Public Health provided to News Center stated next to nothing, however, regarding the nature of the violation;all that was said along those lines, for example, was that the client was not kept free from harm or from abuse, orthat the facility failed to comply with the designated regulation,or that the facility simply “failed to: ...” Interms of describing the nature ofthe violation, the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions can be harmonized with the Lanterman Act’s mental health-based confidentiality provisions, by having the citations describe with particularity, for example, what was the harm, what wasthe abuse, what wasthe lack of respect or dignity afforded, and what wasthe action that the facility did or failed to do. In addition, Public Health mustalso identify “the particular place or area ofthefacility 20 in which [the violation] occurred.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2),italics added.) Onefurther point on this topic deserves mention. Atoral argument, News Center’s counsel agreed that if a requested citation specifies facts that identify an | individual whose nameis not to be disclosed (i.e., specifies facts that are the functional equivalent ofnamingthat individual), those facts may be redacted. At this stage ofthe proceedings, we do not know ifthe (heavily redacted) requested citations contain any such facts. On remand,if there is a disclosure issue in this regard,the trial court can determine that issue by reviewing the challengedcitation in camera. That covers the issue of harmonizing the disclosure of“the nature ofthe violation.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2).) We turn to the issueofthe “relevant facts.” | 3. Relevantfacts. Section 1424, subdivision (b) of the Long-Term Care Actstates that “frJelevant facts considered by [Public Health] in determining the amountofthecivil penalty shall be documented by [Public Health] on an attachmentto the citation and available in the public record.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subd. (b).) These relevant facts include the patient’s or resident’s mental condition, medical condition, and history of mental disability or disorder, and the risk the violation presents to the patient’s or resident’s mental and physical condition; as well as the facility’s good faith efforts to prevent the violation, andthe licensee’s history ofregulatory compliance. (Id., § 1424, subd. (a)(1)-: (5).) The patient’s or resident’s mental, physical, and medical conditions, history of mental disability or disorder, as well as the risk the violation presents to that mental and physical condition,are not disclosable in PRA-requestedcitations,in light of the mental health-based confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act. (Health & Saf. Code, 21 § 1424, subd. (a)(1)-(3); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, 4514.) However, the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions do not foreclose public disclosureofthe “good faith efforts exercised by the facility to prevent the violation from occurring” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subd. (a)(4)), and “{t]he licensee’s history of compliance with regulations” (id., § 1424, subd. (a)(5)); indeed, these disclosures to the public would further the Long- Term Care Act’s public oversight component. E. Conclusion Public Health argues that it properly harmonized the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions with the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions by redacting essentially all facts in the citation concerning the nature ofthe violation, given the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions. As wesawat the outset of this part of the Discussion, ante (pt. III.A.), though, Public Health’s position effectively writes public oversight ofstate facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled out ofthe Long-Term Care Act. The Long-Term Care Actis an integral, complementary part ofthe statutory protection afforded to patients and residents of long-term health care facilities, including the state facilities; indeed, the Long-Term Care Act provides the more efficient, more preventative, less draconian citation-based protective system to thé system of suspending or revoking licenses. And an integral part of this integral act is the accessibility it affords the public to the citations issued under it. The Long-Term Care Actis a remedialstatute, andas such,is to be liberally construed on behalf ofthe class of personsit is designed to protect; as we have seen, a most vulnerable class here. (See California Assn., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 295.) That said,News Center argues that the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions trump the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions,andall that must be 22 redacted from the requested citations are the names of those involvedin an incident (except investigating and inspecting officers). NewsCenter’s position, however, effectively dismisses the strong protections of confidentiality afforded the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled under the Lanterman Act in state facilities.. The Legislature has determinedthat these protections are necessary for the mentally ill to seek and accept treatment, andfor that treatment to be effective. The Legislature, just late last year, amended the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisionsto allow protection and advocacy agenciesto obtain, among other information, information within unredacted citation reports; this amendment recognized that the Legislature has long granted to mentalhealth records a strong protection of confidentiality. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328.15, subd. (c), 4514, subd.(v), Stats. 2012, ch. 664, §§ 3, 1, respectively.)!!_ We must keep in mindthat what is before 11 News Centersalso cites to three instances where later enacted, non-Lanterman statutes were deemed to constitute exceptions to the Lanterman Act confidentiality provisions. The first instance, Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, involved an amendmentto the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6000 et seq.), which permitted a district attorney in an SVPA proceeding to obtain otherwise confidential treatment information in an updated mental evaluation of the inmate. As Public Health notes, Albertsonis distinguishable because the Legislature specifically consideredthe confidentiality provision of section 5328 ofthe Lanterman Actin drafting this SVPA amendment. (Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 805-807.) The other two instances involve Attorney Generalopinions, both ofwhich concluded that a mandated reporter’s statutory duty to report child abuse supersedesthe confidentiality provisions of the Lanterman Act, because these reporting and confidentiality laws both promote the safety of children and becausetheentire legislative schemein the area ofchild - protection,as it has developed, has been directed toward discovering more abuse cases and preventing serious harm by taking prompt remedialaction. (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 345 (1982); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 824 (1975).) The Attorney General opinions did not encompassstatutory reconciliation, but one statute trumpingthe other. Furthermore, we must note the informational context presented here: a PRA request from the public for Long-Term Care Actcitations. 23 us is a PRA request from the public for Long-Term Care Actcitations involving state facilities for the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled.12 Because wehave found that the Lanterman Act and the Long-Term Care Act can be reconciled in the manner we have set forth in part III.D. of this Discussion, ante, we need not consider the parties’ arguments as to whichstatute is general or specific, and whichstatute is earlier or later. (See Department ofFair Employment & Housingv. Mayr (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 719, 725.)45 12 We also note that the Long-Term Care Act has a consumerinformation service system. under which the general public may obtain the following information, among other information: a history ofall citations and complaintsfor the last two full survey cycles pursuantto a facility profile; substantiated complaints, including the action taken and the date ofthe action; state citations assessed, including the procedural status ofthe citation andthe facility’s plan or correction; state actions, including license suspensions, revocations, and receiverships; and federal enforcement sanctions imposed. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1422.5, 1439.5, subd. (b).) Under this system, Public Health must “ensure the confidentiality of personal and identifying information of residents and employees and shall not disclose this information... .” (/d., § 1422.5, subd. (e).) The disclosure of this information under the Long-Term Care Act’s consumer information service system is, or can be made, compatible with our interpretation of the citation information publicly available in the context of the state facilities at issue. > 13 We grant News Center’s November 5, 2012 requestfor judicial notice ofcertain legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1377 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) chapter 664, sections 3 and 1, which added subdivision (c) to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328.15, and subdivision (v) to section 4514, respectively—concerning information available to _ protection and advocacy agencies as exemptions to the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) Wealso grant Public Health’s October 26, 2012 requestfor judicial notice ofcertain legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1377, and twoincidents involving unique circumstances akin to naming an otherwise confidential individual. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) 24 DISPOSITION Having complied with the procedural requirements for issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, we are authorized to issue the peremptory writ forthwith. (See Palmav. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandateissue directing respondent Superior Court to vacateits judgment of October 22, 2012, andits ruling under submission of September 13, 2012, and to enter anew judgment(1) that directs Public Health to produce to News Centerthe requestedcitations in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion, ante, at pages 19 to 22 (pt. III-D. of the Discussion), and (2) that grants declaratory relief to News Center to this sameextent (on NewsCenter’s parallel complaintfor declaratory relief). Each party shall pay its own costs in this writ review proceeding. (Cal. Rules ofCourt, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B); Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (c).) To the extentthe trial court determines that NewsCenter prevailed in this matter, News Centeris entitled to recover, upon appropriate application, reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurredin thetrial court. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)!4 (CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION) BUTZ ,J. I concur: HULL , Acting P.J. 14 Tn this writ review proceeding, we have resolved the specific issue presented regarding the potential conflict between the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions and the Long-Term Care Act’s public accessibility provisions in the context of the PRA request here. Public Health also asks us, more generally, whetheritis obligated to produce other information and documents, and whetherit is immune from sanctions for wrongful disclosures. To the extent these two issues are not covered by our resolution here, we declineto address them at this point. (See Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 432, 434-435 [public agency maynotinitiate declaratory relief action to determine its duties under the PRA].) 25 I respectfully dissent. Implicitly recognizing that sections 5328 and 4514ofthe Lanterman Act conflict with sections 1423, 1424, and 1439 ofthe Long-Term Care Act,! the majority “harmonizes” these provisions by holding that the Long-Term Care Act controls over the Lanterman Acton the issue of “describ[ing] with particularity the nature of the violation” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1423, subd. (a)(2)), but the Lanterman Act controls over the Long-Term Care Act on the issue of setting forth other “relevant facts,” including the patient’s or resident’s “medical” and “mental” conditions, his or her “history of mental disability or disorder,” and “therisk that the violation presents to [his or her] mentaland physical condition.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1424, subds.(a), (b)(1)- (3).) Thus, under the guise of bringing harmony,the majority opinion does violence to two statutory enactments—carving out ofthe Lanterman Act an exception allowing public citations to include an unredacted description of the nature of the violation, and . severing from the Long-Term Care Act the requirementthat the public record contain the aforementioned “relevant facts.” As will be explained immediately below,I believe such an approachrunscontrary to established rulesof statutory construction. | I Principles ofStatutory Construction “*As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intentso as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory language because the wordsofa statute are generally 1 In this dissenting opinion, the Lanterman Actrefers to the combined Lanterman- Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.). The Long-Term Care Act refers to the Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1417 et seq.). The petitioner, Department of Public Health, is referred to as Public Health. the mostreliable indicatoroflegislative intent. [Citations.] We give the words ofthe statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their Statutory context. [Citation.] We harmonize the variousparts ofthe enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.] ‘If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go nofurther.’ [Citation.] ‘Only when the statute’s language is ambiguousor susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aidsto assist in interpretation.’ [Citations.]” (In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100-101; San Leandro Teachers Assn.v. Governing Bd. ofSan Leandro Unified School Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 822, 831.) “