PEOPLE v. NUCKLES

Appellant’s Reply Brief on the Merits

Cal.November 26, 2012

COPY IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, $200612 Plaintiff and Respondent, V. SUPREME COURT JANE NUCKLES, FILED Defendant and Appellant. NOV 26 2012 Frank A. McGuire Clark caeFEE TEFE«ptm me Fifth Appellate District, No. F061562 Deputy / eee \ Kings County Superior Court No. 09CM3022 \ & 25(b)| Honorable DonnaTarter, Judge ‘ ~ APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEFON THE MERITS CENTRAL CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROGRAM GEORGE BOND Executive Director DEANNA LAMB Staff Attorney California Bar No. 92227 2407 J Street, Suite 301 Sacramento, CA 95816 Tel.: (916) 441-3792 Attorneys for Appellant JANE NUCKLES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, $200612 Plaintiff and Respondent, V. JANE NUCKLES, Defendant and Appellant. Fifth Appellate District, No. F061562 Kings County Superior Court No. 09CM3022 Honorable DonnaTarter, Judge APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS CENTRAL CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROGRAM GEORGE BOND Executive Director DEANNA LAMB Staff Attorney California Bar No. 92227 2407 J Street, Suite 301 Sacramento, CA 95816 Tel.: (916) 441-3792 Attorneys for Appellant JANE NUCKLES TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 0 ccc ccccccccccccvcccctbbtbitbtbbinnines 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......... 2 ARGUMENT oo cc ccccccccccceeebeebebetbbtbbbbeenes3 I. THE PLAIN, COMMONSENSE MEANING AND INTENDED EFFECT OF PENAL CODE SECTION 32 DOES NOT PERMIT CONVICTION OF A DEFENDANT WHO MERELY HELPS A PERSON WHO HAS ABSCONDED FROM PAROLE.........-.-..0+00+2005 3 A. De Novo review is appropriate ............... 0.00000, 3 B. The law of accessory liability in this instance involves focus on escaping punishment. .......... 00... eee eee eee 4 C. The fact that parole is a mandatory consequenceof a conviction does not render it as punishment ............. 5 D. The Legislative intent suggests that the purpose of parole is not punishment but successful reintegration and public safety 2.0... 00... . cee eee te eee 9 E. Thestatute should be construed to only criminalize assistance to escape from punishmentas punishmentis defined in section 18 or elsewhere in the Penal Code ..... 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS(cont. ) Page F, The avoidance ofarrest for a parole violation warrant or the avoidance of parole supervision makes no difference so long as there is no assistance to a new felony as a parole violation .......... 0.0.0. ee eee eee 14 G. The section 32 violation defines criminalliability for only the parties toacrime ......... 0. ce eee eee eee 15 CONCLUSION .......eeeeee eee eens 17 Certificate of Appellate Counsel Pursuantto rule 8.520(c) of the California Rules of Court ............ 18 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 791oeeee 4 Inre Alva (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 254 2.eeeeee 7,8, 11 In re Carabes (1983) 144 CaLApp.3d 927 ............. eee eee ee eens 7,8 In re Cook (1910) 13 Cal. App. 399 2...ecee 12, 13 In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914 0...eeeee 7 In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 230, 2...ce ee eee ee 5, 6, 8 Inre Thomson (1980) 104 CalApp.3d 950 22... cece ee eee 8 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 US. 144 Loceene 0, 11 People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal4th 47 2.eeeee ee 12, 13 People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969 2...eeeens 3,4 People v. King . (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617 26...eeeeen 13 iti TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(cont.) Page People v. Mauch (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 669 .. 0...eeeee 11, 12 People v. McPike (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 426 0...eee 11 People v. Moore (1998) 69 Cal. App.4th 626 2.2... . eee eee eee 5, 6, 7, 8 People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803 2...eceee nee 15 Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist. (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 147 2...eee4 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(cont.) Page STATUTES Penal Code SO11 SBneetent n enn 11, 12 011 i1, Passim BBBccceneee ee eee een eens 12 S 12 S L170 (A)oneeee eens 12 § 3000.ceeeeeee e nnn 9, 10 § 3000, subd. (a)(1) 2...eeeete ees 9 § 3000.08 20...cctenet e eee eens 5 Welfare and Institutions Code § 202 eecteee ene nent n eens 9 § 202, subd. (b) weetee 9, 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(cont) Page REGULATIONS California Code of Regulation 15 § 2000, subd. (b)(75) «2.eeeee Leek eee 14 RULES California Rules of Court rule 8.520(c)eeeee eee eee ene eee ees 18 vi IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, S200612 Plaintiff and Respondent, Vv. JANE NUCKLES, Defendant and Appellant. INTRODUCTION The Court has granted review of the following question: Was defendant properly convicted of being an accessory to a felony forassisting another person to abscond from his parole term after serving his sentence for that felony? Appellant has arguedthat the elements of Penal Code section 32! do not include aiding someone whohas absconded from parole. The respondent takes the position that thereis liability as an accessory to a felony “by aiding a convicted felon with the intent that he avoid punishment for his felony conduct [by aiding him to avoid parole supervision or to avoid the consequences of having absconded from parole].” (Respondent’s Answering Brief on the Merits, hereinafter RABM,p. 4.) The respondent’s ' Hereinafter all section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 1 position is not supported by the definition of punishment from the California Penal Code, but relies on extrinsic sources and a broad definition of punishment from constitutional interpretation in the context of ex post facto law. There is no need to reach beyondthe statutory definition to effectuate the purpose ofthe law. The respondent’s position is that any aid to a parolee which avoids parole supervision qualifies as avoiding punishment because supervised parole is punishment. However, aid to a parolee does not makethe aider an accessory and a party to the crime as defined in section 32. The context of section 32, the terms ofthe statute, and the stated legislative intent do not support accessory liability for one who aids a parolee. The conviction in this case exceeds the limits of a criminal sanction and requires reversal. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The Underlying Facts. There are minor discrepancies in the record citations in the respondent’s rendition ofthe case. The testimony of Mr. Amaralis attributed as appellant’s admission at trial that she had viewed she vieweda local paper indicating a fugitive felony warrant had issued for Adam Gray’s arrest. (RABM,p.2, fn3, citing to SRT 656-657.) In fact, Ms. Nucklestestified that she saw the Crime Stoppers photo with an indication that Mr. Gray was wanted for a parole violation rather than for a felony warrant. (6RT 940.) She knew he had been to prison and that he was on parole. (6RT 943.) Respondent’s introduction suggests that events happenedshortly after Mr. Gray was released on parole. (RABM,p. 1.) The inferenceis that any parolee would know that he wasin violation of conditions. (RABM,p. 13.) His release was on July 9, 2008. (SRT 634.) His parole was suspended as of July 21, 2009 and there was a warrantfor his arrest from having absconded. (5 RT 636.) It was over a year after initial release on parole that he visited the Nuckles/Amaral home in August, 2009 and he wasarrested there on September3, 2009. (SRT 640, 644, 647; 6 RT 910-911, 914-915, 920.) ARGUMENT I THE PLAIN, COMMONSENSE MEANING AND INTENDED EFFECT OF PENAL CODE SECTION 32 DOES NOT PERMIT CONVICTION OF A DEFENDANT WHO MERELY HELPS A PERSON WHO HAS ABSCONDED FROM PAROLE. A. De novo review is appropriate. Respondent arguesthat the case presents a mixed question of fact and law requiring a three-step analysis. (RABM,p. 5.) Reliance is on People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984, a case which describes a mixed question involving due diligence. (People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal. 3d atp. 988.) Ultimately, the Louis court found no need to resolve the issue because there waserror under any standard. (/d., pp. 988-989.) Wherethe question implicates constitutional rights, necessitating consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and an exercise of judgmentabout the values that animate legal principles, the factors favoring de novo review predominate. (Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist. (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 147, 157 citing Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 791, 800-801; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 969, 987.) Denovo reviewis appropriate in this case. B. The law of accessory liability focuses on whether “punishment”as set forth in section 32 includes aiding an absconding parolee. Respondentprovides a brief review of the law on principals and accessories originating in English commonlaw. (RBAM,p. 6.) Review of English common law and the wording of California’s statute prior to 1935 provide the purpose of the law. Respondent then employsa shift in wording from “punishment” to “consequences of criminal conduct”to justify including a parole violation as “punishment” within section 32. (RBAM,p. 7.) There is no authority cited for the semantic shift from punishment to consequences. There is no citation to any source which extends the reach of the accessorial culpability to the avoidance of parole consequencesfor the principal. The key phrase in the statute since 1935 is the “escape from... punishment.” (Stats. 1935, ch. 436, sec. 1.) The death penalty is no longer the punishmentapplied, but that makes no difference. The criminal sanction is limited to that as prescribed in the current version of Penal Code section 32. The “gist” is to help a felon to avoid or elude punishmentfor the crime that was committed. (RABM,p.8.) Cc. Thefact that parole is a mandatory consequence of some convictions does not renderit as punishment. Respondent argues that mandatory parole is a direct consequence of a felony conviction. (RBAM,p. 8, heading C. 1.) Parole applies to “all convicted felons . . . in addition to the prison term.” (RABM,p. 9.) While this may be true for some offenses, it does not make parole the equivalent of punishment.’ It is not a measure of good behavior or a meansofreducing the prison sentencethat has been imposed as punishment. Respondent’s argumentthat a direct consequence of a felony conviction is punishment * Parole has undergone changes with Realignment. There is a transition to community supervision and release from prison after July 1, 2013 only includes parole for those convicted of specified violent, serious, or sex offender registration offenses. (See sec. 3000.08.) 5 glosses overthe distinction. There are many consequencesof a conviction which are not punishment. They may require the advice of the court or counsel; they may haveattributes of punishment; and, they may be considered punishment for the purpose of a constitutional analysis which casts a broader meaning than section 32. For example, as pointed out in In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 230, 250, criminal convictions have "dire consequences" beyond the punishment meted out by the state. In that case, the court considered immigration law consequencessuch as deportation as a material matter. The requirement of advice at the time of the plea is becauseofthe risk of dire consequences such as banishmentand exile. Beyondthe court’s duty to advise of immigration consequencesat the time of a plea, an attorney also has a duty to advise his client because of the important consequences which may inexorably flow from a conviction. (In re Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 250-251.) Yet, these consequencesare not considered punishment. People v. Moore (1998) 69 Cal. App.4th 626, 630 wascited in the Court of Appeal opinion as support and by respondent. (RABM,p. 8.) The lengthy quote from the case givesa littany of “direct consequences of conviction” including “punishment provided bystatute [citation]; imposition of a restitution fine and restitution to the victim [citation]; . . the maximum parole period following completion of the prison term [citation]; registration requirements [citation]; and revocation or suspension of the driving privilege [citation].” (People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal. App.4th at p. 630.) There are “consequences” which follow inexorably from a conviction, but are still not punishment within the terms of Penal Code section 32. Thelist in the Moore case provides an example of consequences which are not punishment. Sex offender registration is a consequence,but is no longer considered a punishmentin California since In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 254. Alva found that the description of sex offender registration as punishment, as held in In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, was no longerviable. It cannot be considered a form of “punishment” regulated by either federal or state constitutional proscriptions against cruel and/or unusual punishment. “{W]e and the United States Supreme Court have movedsteadily away from the Reed perspective, both in general and with respect to sex offender registration statutes in particular.” (In re Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Alva points out an important feature of punishment: The object of punishmentis to exact retribution for past misconduct, and to deter future transgressions by imposing painful consequences for violations already committed. Penal deterrence operates by warning the offender, and others tempted to commit the same violation, of the price to be paid for such actions. In re Alva, supra, 33 Cal. 4th at pp. 287-288, emphasis added. Respondentfinds support in Jn re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 930-932 as categorizing parole as a mandatory part of the prison sentence. (RABM,p. 9.) Language in the opinion seemsto suggestthatit is separate. “Parole is no longer an element affecting when a prisoner may be released from prison but is rather a condition upon and in addition to imprisonment, affecting his life after he is released. (In re Carabes, supra, 144 Cal. App. 3d at p. 930, emphasis added.) Carabes went onto consider the features of parole as punishment under the ex post facto, constitutional standard, in concluding that it should be the subject of advice at the time of a plea of guilty. (/d. at p. 932, citing In re Thomson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 950, 954 [a determinate term followed by a precise time for parole is an increase in punishmentfor ex post facto].) Without discussing the Legislative goal of parole or whether it comes within the statutory definition of punishment, Carabes held that a defendant “should have been advised of that consequencebefore entering his [guilty] plea.” (Carabes, supra, at p. 932.) It is clear from Moore, Resendiz, Alva, and Carabes, that the requirement of advice about paroleat the time of a guilty plea does not 8 render it punishment. Advice about all direct consequences does not convert a consequenceto the status of punishment. These cases do not suggest that punishment should be defined in any way other than asthe California Legislature provided in section 32. D. The Legislative intent suggests that the purpose of parole is not punishment but successful reintegration and public safety. Section 3000, subdivision (a)(1) is cited as support for the proposition that supervised parole is punishment. (RABM,p. 10.) However the quoted purposeofparole is not punitive. Rather, it is to aid in successful reintegration of the offender into society; supervision and surveillance for public safety; and, counseling necessary to assist in the transition between prison and discharge. (RABM,p.10.)° Whenthelegislative intent is punishment, that intent has been made clear. For example, Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 states the purpose of the chapter. Thereis reference to the interests ofpublic safety and protection, the care and treatment of minors, and the minors being held 3 “The Legislature finds and declares that the period immediately following incarcerationis critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship.It is in the interest of public safety for the state to provide for the effective supervision of and surveillance of parolees, including the judicious use of revocation actions, and to provide educational, vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition between imprisonmentand discharge.” (Sec. 3000, subdivision (a)(1).) 9 accountable for their actions. Also, “[t]his guidance may include punishmentthatis consistent with the rehabilitative objectivesof this chapter.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, sec. 202, subd. (b), emphasis added.) There is no suggestion of an intent that parole is punishment in the Legislature’s statement of intent for section 3000. Despite the goal of assisting paroleesin the transition between imprisonmentand discharge, respondent suggests that the Kennedyv. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 multifactor test should be applied to determine that parole is punishment. (RABM,p. 10.) Thetest is not appropriate. The limitations of the multifactor test were plumbedin the Alva decision. Alva recognized that a consequence of a criminal conviction might be “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment and its California constitutional equivalent, though it might not qualify as “punishment” for ex post facto purposes. (Jn re Alva, supra, 33 Cal. 4th at 273.) This Court found the factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S. 144, to remain relevant in a numberof constitutional contexts, and a lengthy consideration of the factors for ex post facto analysis in Alva resulted in a conclusion that sex offenderregistration is not “punishment”for that constitutional definition, but with the caveatthatit still might be “punishment” under some “broader”test that applies to the cruel and/or 10 unusual punishmentclauses. (/n re Alva, supra, at p. 280.) Theissue in this case does not require any “broad”test for whether parole is punishment. This Court does not need to delve into the multifactor analysis ofKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez for a constitutional analysis of parole as punishment. Rather, the definition of punishment, for the purpose of section 32, should rely on the statutory framework. E. The statute should be construed to only criminalize assistance to escape from punishment as punishment is defined in section 18 or elsewhere in the Penal Code. Fixing the penalties for crimes is the province of the Legislature. (People v. McPike (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 426,436, citing Peoplev. Mauch (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 669, 674.) Appellant looked to the preliminary provisions of the Penal Code for a definition of punishment. Those provisions provide definitions and give context to the descriptionsin Part I of crimes and punishments of the Penal Code. Respondent argues that sections 17, 18, and 19 should be disregarded because they are limited to defining what crimes may be punished as felonies or misdemeanors. (RABM,p. 11.) Respondent’s position is that section 18 does not define the contours of punishmentorcreate anylegislative inconsistency regarding the meaning of the word punishment. (RABM,p. 12.) While the descriptive heading of section 18, “Punishmentof felony not otherwise prescribed” 11 may be an enhancementprovided by a publisher, it is more meaningful than respondent’s description of it as creating “stealth wobblers.” (RABM,p. 12, citing People v. Mauch, supra, 163 Cal-App.4th at p. 675.) Mauch recognized that as the purpose of the second clause of section 18. “Thefirst clause of section 18 fixes. . . the term for felonies that do not otherwise identify a determinate prison sentence.” (Mauch, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 675.) It provides that the punishment for felonies may consistof a period of imprisonmentin state prison and fine. If that is unsatisfactory as a source oflegislative intent as to the meaning of punishment, then this Court can also resort to the prescribed punishmentfor the offense of being an accessory. At the time of the instant offense, it provided “an accessory is punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonmentin thestate prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” (Sec. 33.) In re Cook (1910) 13 Cal. App. 399, 402-403 pointed out that whena criminalstatute does not describe the punishment within the same code section, the punishment“is as clearly and definitely fixed and prescribed asif the language of section 18 had been expressly referred to [in “The statute was amendedaspart of Realignment. Jt now provides, “an accessory is punishable . . . by imprisonment. . . pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. (Sec. 33, Stats. 2011, c. 15, sec 232.) 12 the questionedstatute]. The legislature, in other words, hasitself made section 18 a part of [the questioned statute], so far as the penalty is concerned.” (In re Cook, supra, 13 Cal.App.at p. 403.) Whenconstruing statutes, the court must “ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body”in order to “adopt the construction that best effectuates the purposeofthe law.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 54-55.) To that end, the court “first examine[s] the words ofthe statute, ‘giving them their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the statutory languageis usually the mostreliable indicatoroflegislative intent.” (/d. at p. 55.) “Ifthe language ofthe statute is not ambiguous, the plain meaning controls and resort to extrinsic sources to determine the Legislature’s intent is unnecessary.”(Ibid.) If “the statutory language may reasonably be given more than oneinterpretation, courts mayconsider extrinsic aids, including the purpose ofthestatute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassingthe statute.” (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) The statutory language should be given the interpretation whichis clear from its context. Escaping punishment, in the context of section 32, means escaping from serving the term of imprisonment which flows from 13 the commission of the felony. It does not encompass other consequences, including parole supervision. The only need for extrinsic aids or a multifactor test is if there is a need to analyze whatis to be considered punishmentin a constitutional context. Since that is not necessary to a decision in this case, there is no need to search for someother definition of punishment. F. The avoidance of arrest for a parole violation warrant or the avoidance of parole supervision makes no difference so long as there is no assistance to a new felony as a parole violation. Respondent views appellant’s action as having “helped him to abscond from parole which is punishable as a parole violation.” (RABM,p. 12.) Gray was already an absconder who was wanted on a fugitive arrest warrant after his parole had been suspended. (RABM,p. 14.) Respondent cannot have it both ways. Respondentargues that appellant conflates motive with intent and that the necessary intent was to aid Gray to evade parole supervision. (RABM,p. 14.) “She conveniently overlooks the fact that she aided a convicted felon to abscond from parole supervision entirely.” (RABM,p. 12.) Respondentrelies on 15 CCR section 2000, subdivision (b)(75) which defines a paroleeat large as “an absconder from parole supervision, who is officially declared a fugitive by board action suspending parole.” Whether 14 she concealed Gray to protect him from a parole violation or a return to parole supervision,either result is not with an intent to escape punishment for the felony for which the prison sentence was complete. G. Thesection 32 violation defines criminalliability for only the parties to a crime. Respondentargues that “Gray himself could have been prosecuted as an accessory if the evidence showedthat he solicited appellant’s aid to avoid punishment.” (RBAM,p. 16.) The argument relies on People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 806-807 whichis characterized as similar to the situation in this case. (RBAM,p.16.) Wallin involved the crime of murder. Once the murder was completed, the murderess enlisted the aid of Wallin in disposing of the body. The murderess’ testimony described how they dug a grave and buried the body. The conviction against Wallin was reversed because the jury was not instructed that they hadto find corroboration for the murderess’s testimony based on herliability as an accomplice. The reasoning rested on criminal responsibility as an accessory after the fact to the crime of murder. Respondent’s position is that Gray committed the offense of absconding. Therefore he wasa principal. If he were to ask for aid from Ms. Nuckles to avoid parole supervision, he would become an accessory to his own absconding offense. (RABM,p. 15-16.) The argumentfails 15 because the Penal Code does not describe any crime of absconding from parole. He could not have been so charged, he would not be entitled to the full panoply of rights which attend a criminal jury trial. He could only be subject to the penalties as proscribed in the California Code of Regulations, an administrative code. Respondent ignores the context of section 32, which defines parties to acrime. The focus should be on holding those responsible as accessories if they assist those who are seeking to avoid punishment for a crime. The focus on an expandeddefinition of punishment takes the element out of the context of the criminal statute. 16 CONCLUSION The appellate court erred in concluding that a parolee who has abscondedis punishableas a principal for the underlying felony which initially resulted in his prison term. The conviction of Jane Nuckles, as an accessory for helping an absconding parolee avoid potential administrative sanctions must be reversed. It is for the Legislature and not the courts to devise a criminal sanction for harboring and concealing the whereabouts of a parolee who is knownto haveviolated parole. Dated: November 20, 2012 Respectfully submitted, Vlas DEANNA LAMB Counsel for Appellant JANE NUCKLES 17 Certificate of Appellate Counsel Pursuantto rule 8.520(c) of the California Rules of Court I, Deanna Lamb,appointed counsel for appellant, certify pursuant to rule 8.520(c) of the California Rules of Court, that I prepared this reply brief on behalf of my client, Jane Nuckles and that the word countfor this opening brief is 4174. This brief complies with the rule that limits a reply brief to 8,400 words, including footnotes. I certify that I prepared this documentin WordPerfect 15 and that this is the word count WordPerfect generated for this document. Dated: November 21, 2012 Dinas Deanna Lamb Attorney for Appellant 18 DECLARATION OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows: Iam a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 2407 J Street, Suite 301, Sacramento, CA 95816. On November 21, 2012, I served the attached: e APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the person(s) named below at the address(es) shown, and by sealing and depositing said ~ envelope in the United States Mail at Sacramento, California, with postage thereon fully prepaid. There is delivery service by United States Mail at each ofthe places so addressed,or there is regular communication by mail betweenthe place of mailing and each of the places so addressed Fifth District Court ofAppeal Jane Nuckles Clerk 2424 Ventura Street Fresno, CA 93721 Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244 Kings County Superior Court 1426 South Drive Hanford, CA 93230 Kings County District Attorney 1400 W.Lacey Blvd. Hanford, CA 93230 I declare under penalty ofperjury that the cBi Executed on November21, 2012, at Sacramento j 2 _AtieilaBrown