Decastro v. Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim -

D. Del.October 24, 2016

ME1 23576199v.1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE JOHN DECASTRO and VICKI ) DECASTRO, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civ. No. 16-951-SLR/SRF ) AEROJET ROCKETDYNE HOLDINGS, ) INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. ) TEXTRON, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Comes Now Textron Inc. (hereafter “Textron”), on October 24, 2016, and submits its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). As grounds therefore, Textron shows unto the Court the following: 1. Textron was served with a Summons and Complaint after this case was first filed in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. It filed no pleadings before this matter was removed to this Court by United Technologies Corporation. 2. The Complaint served on Textron identifies this Defendant as “Textron, Inc., (sic) individually, and as successor in interest to CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY and BEECH HOLDINGS.” Plaintiffs have dismissed all claims against Beech Holdings and Beech Aircraft Corporation; accordingly this Motion will not address Beech Holdings any further. See Exhibit A. Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 49 2 ME1 23576199v.1 3. The claims purportedly pleaded against Textron individually and as successor in interest to CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY (hereafter “Cessna”) are based on product liability against 13 alleged manufacturers, sellers, distributors and installers of asbestos containing products. Textron is not the successor in interest to Cessna, but that is an issue for another motion. 4. Count I purports to plead negligence. Count II purports to plead damages for willful and wanton conduct. Count III purports to plead strict product liability. The last count (IV) seeks damages for loss of consortium (Doc. #1-1). 5. Plaintiffs do present some information about Plaintiffs’ residences. See Complaint, paragraph 2 (Doc. #1-1). They further present some information about places where Plaintiff John DeCastro was employed. Id. at paragraph 3. In paragraph 4, they allege that Mr. DeCastro was exposed to asbestos from various sources including but not limited to aircraft brakes, engines, and gaskets. Id. at paragraph 4. They further allege exposure to asbestos from automobile brakes, brake linings, clutches, and gaskets, and aircraft brakes and gaskets. 6. Plaintiffs’ Complaint presents no information about Textron and what product(s) or conduct gives rise to Plaintiffs’ claims against it. The only mention of Textron is in the caption, and in paragraph 10 where it is identified by name, alleged to be successor in interest to Cessna, identified as a Delaware corporation, and its registered agent for service of process is identified. 7. All other allegations lump all Defendants together and allege that they were engaged in the specification, mining, manufacturing, distribution, sales, licensing, leasing, Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 50 3 ME1 23576199v.1 installation, removal or use of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. See Complaint, paragraph 10, e.g. (Doc. # 1-1). 8. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff John DeCastro was exposed to asbestos fibers “emanating from the use of the above-mentioned products” and that such exposure was completely foreseeable. See Complaint, paragraph 13 (Doc. # 1-1). However, no product of any kind is specifically identified as a product for which Textron is allegedly responsible. 9. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. While a complaint may survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by pleading that short, plain statement of Plaintiffs’ claims, the pleading must give the defendant sufficient facts upon which to understand the matter for which it is charged. A complaint cannot leave “defendants having to guess” what they are alleged to have done. Binsack v. Lackawanna Cty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007). In a product liability action, a complaint that fails to identify the product for which a defendant is potentially liable, and the circumstances whereby plaintiff was allegedly harmed by the product, falls far short of meeting the federal standards of pleading. Plaintiffs herein have filed just such a Complaint, and thus their claims should be dismissed as to Textron. Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 51 4 ME1 23576199v.1 ARGUMENT 10. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, if accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility means the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. This requires more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed me” accusations. Id. See also Neology, Inc. v. Kapsch Trafficcom IVHS, Inc., No. CV 13-2052-LPS, 2014 WL 4675316, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2014) (discussing inadequacy of complaint that frames its allegations in “conclusory, ‘take my word for it’ terms”). Rule 8’s notice-pleading standard “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678-79. 11. Allegations that are not factual allegations, but rather naked assertions or legal conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and the Court need not accept such allegations without supporting factual averments. Id. at 677-82; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011), Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010). “[I]t is no longer sufficient to allege mere elements of a cause of action; instead ‘a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.’” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8). Defendants are entitled to “notice of a claim and its grounds,” not just “a pleader's ‘bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.’” Id. at 233 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3). “[C]onclusory or ‘bare-bones’ allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “To prevent dismissal, all civil Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 52 5 ME1 23576199v.1 complaints must now set out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Id. 12. Moreover, where a complaint pleads facts that are merely “consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed facts need not be alleged, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 13. Contrary to established authority, the Complaint in this action lumps all Defendants together, and makes collective allegations against them. A plaintiff’s complaint must “provide a short and plain statement of each claim against each defendant.” Binsack, 438 F. App’x at 160 (emphasis added). Pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal, this means the complaint must make “a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of [the plaintiff’s] entitlement to relief” against each defendant. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n. 3). The complaint should “specifically set forth the particular actions allegedly taken by each defendant, the date(s) of such actions, the bases for plaintiffs' claim(s) against each defendant, and the relief sought.” Desmond v. Phelps, No. 12-1120-SLR, 2016 WL 2742384, at *2 (D. Del. May 10, 2016) (emphasis in original). 14. A complaint that makes “repeated and collective use of the word ‘Defendants’”, as this complaint does, fails to “name which specific Defendant engaged in the specific conduct alleged,” and consequently may fail to satisfy the Iqbal standard. Lawal v. McDonald, 546 F. App'x 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2014). Put another way, where a complaint relies upon allegations Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 53 6 ME1 23576199v.1 that make “blanket reference to all ‘Defendants’ generically,” it fails to make the required “showing” as to each defendant. Neology, Inc., 2014 WL 4675316 at *4. “These kinds of allegations, specific to no Defendant and generic as to all, are unhelpful in further flushing out a facially plausible claim of [a particular defendant’s] pre-suit knowledge.” Id. (quoting Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir.2001)). In Atuahene, the original complaint “failed to differentiate among the defendants, alleging instead violations by ‘the defendants,’ and failed to identify any factual basis for the legal claims made.” Id. An amended complaint “replaced the allegations against ‘the defendants’ with the names of all of the defendants,” but “still fail[ed] to identify which defendants were alleged to be responsible for which alleged violations.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint, noting that by “lumping all the defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct,” the complaint had failed to “give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Id. See also Desmond, 2016 WL 2742384, at *2 (complaint inadequate where its “allegations ‘lump’ together the activities of [various defendants], and it is not clear what role each defendant played”). 15. The authority of this District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court make it clear that the Complaint in this case does not pass muster - it does not provide that factual basis to distinguish the conduct of Textron from any of the other 13 Defendants against whom Plaintiffs brought claims in this suit. No facially plausible claim has been pleaded against Textron, and accordingly the Complaint should be dismissed. Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 54 7 ME1 23576199v.1 CONCLUSION Wherefore, Textron prays that this Court dismiss the claims against it, and award it costs and other relief as the Court deems proper. Respectfully submitted, McCARTER & ENGLISH /s/ Matthew J. Rifino James J. Freebery (DE Bar# 3498) Matthew Rifino (DE Bar# 4749) 405 N. King Street, 8 th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 984-6306 (telephone) (302-984-2492 (fax) jfreebery@mccarter.com mrifino@mccarter.com Dated: October 24, 2016 Attorneys for Defendant Textron, Inc. Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7 Filed 10/24/16 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 55 EXHIBIT A Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7-1 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 56 ME1 23459457v.1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION : : C.A. No.: N16C-09-019 ASB JOHN DECASTRO and : VICKI DECASTRO, his wife, : ASBESTOS : Plaintiffs, : : v. : : AEROJET ROCKETDYNE HOLDINGS, : INC., as successor in interest to PRATT : & WHITNEY, et al., : : Defendants. : NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs John DeCastro and Vicki DeCastro (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), by and through their attorneys, voluntarily dismiss (1) Defendant Beech Aircraft Corporation f/k/a Beech Aircraft Corporation and Raytheon Aircraft Corporation and (2) Defendant Textron Inc., as successor in interest to Beech Holdings from the above-captioned matter pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. For the avoidance of doubt, this Notice of Voluntary Dismissal does not address Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Textron Inc., individually and as successor in interest to Cessna Aircraft Company. Signature Block Shall Appear On The Following Page EFiled: Oct 03 2016 04:05PM EDT Transaction ID 59642752 Case No. N16C-09-019 ASB EXHIBIT A Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7-1 Filed 10/24/16 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 57 ME1 23459457v.1 Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF A. DALE BOWERS, P.A. By: /s/ A. Dale Bowers A. Dale Bowers, Esquire, ID 3932 Michael B. Galbraith, Esquire, ID 4860 203 North Maryland Avenue Wilmington, DE 19804 (302) 691-3786 (302) 691-3790 (FAX) dale@bowerslegal.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Dated: October 3, 2016 Case 1:16-cv-00951-SLR-SRF Document 7-1 Filed 10/24/16 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 58