Motion Summary Judgment Adjudication

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 6, 2018

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Maria Barron et al vs Suprema, LLC et al Hearing Start Time: 9:00 AM Hearing Type: Motion: Summary 18CV324420 Judgment/Adjudication Date 0f Hearing: 11/19/2020 Comments: Heard By: Kulkarni, Sunil R Location: Department 8 Courtroom Reporter: - N0 Court Reporter Courtroom Clerk: Mark Rosales Court Interpreter: Court Investigator: Parties Present: Future Hearings: Exhibits: - Brian Leach for Defendant Gabrielle Freedom. Elizabeth Rhodes for Defendant Coteco Distributing C0. Both counsel by Courtcall. The tentative ruling is not contested. The tentative ruling is adopted as follows: Defendant/cross-complainant/cross-defendants Coteco Distributing C0., Inc. dba Coast Counties Peterbilt Paclease ( Coast ), defendant Paccar Leasing Company( PLC ) and defendant Jayleaf LLC ( Jayleaf) (collectively, Defendants ) move for summary judgment, 0r in the alternative, summary adjudication in their favor and against plaintiffs Maria Guadalupe Sandoval de Barron, individually and as successor in interest 0f the estate 0f Efrain Barron, Daniela S. Barron, Dacia Nohelia Barron Sandoval and Efrain Barron Sandoval (collectively, Plaintiffs ). IV. Background C. Factual This is an action for wrongful death arising out 0f a multi-vehicle accident in Gilroy. According t0 the allegations 0f the operative complaint (Complaint ), 0n January 12, 2018, the alleged negligent operation 0f vehicles driven by defendants Levi Jonathan Posadaspayes ( Posadaspayes ) and Gabrielle Freedom ( Freedom ) resulted in the death 0f decedent Efrain Moreno Barron (the Decedent ), also driving a vehicle, when they collided at the intersection 0f State Route 25 and Bolsa Road in Hollister. (Complaint, 16-22.) Posadaspayes is alleged t0 have been operating his vehicle at the time 0f the accident in the course and scope 0f his employment with Defendants, while Freedom is alleged t0 have been operating her vehicle in the course and scope 0f her employment with defendant Garden 0f Life LLC ( GoL ). D. Procedural Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVSE-l-LZO Page l OfS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Plaintiffs initiated this action 0n March 6, 2018, asserting claims against Defendants for (1) wrongful death sounding in negligence and (2) survival action. A motion for summary judgment filed by defendant (30L, Freedom s employer, was granted in July 2020. On August 25, 2020, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment, 0r in the alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. V. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, 0r in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication A. Burden 0f Proof A defendant seeking summaryjudgment [0r adjudication] must show that at least one element 0f the plaintiff s cause 0f action cannot be established, 0r that there is a complete defense t0 the cause 0f action The burden then shifts t0 the plaintiff t0 show there is a triable issue of material fact 0n that issue. (Alex R. Thomas & C0. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. C0. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [internal citations 0mitted].) The tried and true way for defendants t0 meet their burden 0f proof 0n summary judgment motions is t0 present affirmative evidence (declarations, etc.) negating, as a matter 0f law, an essential element 0f plaintiff s claim. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide; Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2014) 10:241, p. 10-104, citing Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Ca|.4th 317, 334.) The moving party s declaration and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate (disprove) an essential element 0f plaintiff s claim in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts 0r ambiguities in plaintiff s (opposing party s) favor. (|d., 10241.20, p. 10-105, citingJohnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Ca|.4th 56, 64.) Another way for a defendant t0 obtain summary judgment is t0 show that an essential element 0f plaintiff s claim cannot be established. Defendant does so by presenting evidence that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence (because plaintiff must be allowed a reasonable opportunity t0 oppose the motion). (|d., 10:242, p. 10-105, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield C0. (2001) 25 Ca|.4th 826, 854-855.) Such evidence usually consists 0f admissions by plaintiff following extensive discovery t0 the effect that he 0r she has discovered nothing t0 support an essential element of the cause 0f action. (|d.) B. Analysis With the instant motion, Defendants maintain that they are entitled t0 summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) PLC and Coast are merely the owner and commercial lessee 0f the subject truck; (2) neither Coast nor PLC are liable for Plaintiffs claims pursuant t0 the Graves Amendment; and (3) Jayleaf should be dismissed because they had n0 employment relationship with Posadaspayes and there is otherwise no basis for liability against it. 1. Defendants Undisputed Material Facts In support 0f the foregoing arguments, Defendants submit the following purportedly undisputed material Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVSE-l-LZO Page 2 OfS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER facts: 0n January 12, 2018, a Jeep driven by Freedom struck a Peterbilt truck driven by Posadaspayes when the Jeep failed to stop at the stop sign and attempted to merge onto southbound Highway 25 near Bolsa Road in Hollister. (Defendants Separate Statement 0f Undisputed Material Facts in Support 0f Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication( UMF ) 2.) The Jeep s impact caused the Peterbilt truck t0 swerve 0n the wrong side of the road and onto southbound Highway 25 towards the Toyota Prius driven by the Decedent, where the truck and the Prius collided. (UMF N0. 3.) The Decedent passed away as a result 0f the collision. (|d.) The Traffic Collision Report indicates that Freedom was at fault for the accident due t0 her failure t0 yield t0 oncoming traffic in violation 0f Vehicle Code section 21802, subdivision (a). (|d.) At the time 0f the accident, Posadaspayes was employed by defendant Suprema, LLC ( Suprema ), and possessed the necessary license t0 drive the truck in question. (UMF Nos. 5, 7.) The truck is legally owned by PLC, who leased the vehicle t0 Coast as a rental vehicle. (|d.) Coast, in turn, rented out the truck t0 Suprema at the time of the accident. (|d.) Pursuant to the Vehicle Lease and Service Agreement executed between Coast and Suprema, the driver was t0 be furnished by and at the choice 0f Suprema. (UMF Nos. 5, 20.) At the time 0f the subject accident, witness Karla Reyes ( Reyes ) was driving a Toyota Highlander that was stopped six t0 seven cars behind the vehicle 0f the Decedent. (UMF N0. 12.) Reyes observed two cars g0 through in the intersection from Bolsa onto State Route 25. (|d.) She then saw Freedom s Jeep roll through the stop sign, where it was then struck by the truck. (|d.) The truck went left and into the Decedent s vehicle. (UMF N0. 12.) The Jeep appeared t0 Reyes t0 be accelerating, and she stated that less than 30 seconds passed from the time one 0f two cars she observed coming from Bolsa entered the northbound lane until the time 0f the collision. (|d.) She testified as follows: [T]he way | saw it happened [sic] was that the Jeep rolled their stop trying t0 merge onto 25 southbound, and the truck was coming north from 25 going north. Well, they tried- he, the Jeep, tried t0 avoid the accident but they couldn t really and the truck hit the Jeep or the Jeep hit the truck, and so the truck going north went left. (UMF No. 12.) At n0 time did Reyes testify that she observed the truck suffering from a malfunction, or that the driver 0f the truck did anything t0 cause the accident. (|d.) Witness Miguel Ruiz was driving a Chevy 2500 work truck southbound 0n State Route 25 in Hollister in the company 0f his coworker Jose Cruz Virgil. He recalled he was fully stopped at the time 0f the accident and testified that five or six cars were not making stops, and that the last car was a Jeep that entered the intersection, crossed over the limit line 0n Bolsa, after the vehicle ahead 0f it had already entered and merged onto southbound 25. (UMF N0. 13.) Nothing in his testimony indicates that there was anything wrong with the Peterbilt truck. (|d.) Posadaspayes testified that on the date 0f the incident, the truck worked normally, with the brakes, lights and tires functioning properly. (UMF N0. 14.) He recalled that he was driving northbound 0n SR-25 from Hollister and there was n0 traffic in the northbound direction, but heavy traffic in the southbound direction. (UMF No. 15.) He had put 0n the cruise control for the speed limit for the route, about halfa mile into getting onto northbound SR-25, and disengaged it when he saw approximately three cars crossing from Bolsa Road onto southbound SR-25 like rabbits, coming one after the other. (|d.) At that point, he was about 50 Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVS 24420 Page 3 0f 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER meters away. (|d.) He testified that there was a gap after the three vehicles went through, and the third vehicle passed his truck before he saw the Jeep at the limit line 0n Bolsa Road. (|d.) He stepped 0n the break and attempted t0 engage the emergency break, however, by that time the Jeep was in the middle 0f the northbound lane and Posadaspayes could not stop the truck in time. (|d.) While the collision report indicates that Posadaspayes said that he steered the truck left to avoid a collision with the Jeep, he testified that this was not accurate, and that it was his belief that the impact with the Jeep forced him towards the Decedent s Prius approaching in the southbound lane. (|d.) Freedom, who had never been 0n Bolsa Road 0r SR-25 before the accident, testified that she did not stop her vehicle before trying t0 enter southbound SR-25. (UMF No. 18) She recalled seeing 5-6 vehicles in front of her 0n Bolsa before the accident and denied seeing them stop before crossing SR-25. (|d.) She did, however, testify that she saw a stop sign there, but could not recall a limit line. (|d.) She saw vehicles stopped traveling southbound on SR-25 and denied seeing the truck involved in the accident until it hit her. (|d.) 2. Jayleaf s Liability At the outset, it is undisputed that while Posadaspayes was at one time employed by defendant Jayleaf, he was n0 longer in its employ at the time 0f the accident. (UMF N0. 4.) Thus, there is n0 basis for liability against Jayleaf and Plaintiffs agree that it is properly dismissed from this action. The Court therefore DISMISSES Jayleaf from the action WITH PREJUDICE. 3. Defendants Bases for Liability According t0 the allegations of the Complaint, the bases of liability as t0 Defendants are vicarious, specifically respondeat superior, and essentially what amounts t0 a sort 0f negligent entrustment, i.e., that Defendants failed t0 due care in selecting a carrier and/or shipper for the delivery and/or transportation 0f goods and/or property. (Complaint, 33, 35.) Plaintiffs additionally allege that Defendants (Posadaspayes) drove in an unsafe manner, causing the Decedent s death. Under the doctrine 0f respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for an employee s (0r ostensible employee s) tortious acts committed within the scope 0f the employment. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. C0. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 960.) Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the subject incident, Posadaspayes was employed by Suprema, and not Defendants. (See Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support 0ftheir Opposition t0 Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, N0. 4.) Thus, there is n0 basis for vicarious liability against Defendants predicted on the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is also undisputed that the vehicle driven by Posadaspayes at the time of the accident was owned by PLC and leased by Coast, who subsequently rented it out t0 Suprema. (UMF Nos. 5, 20.) Given Plaintiffs allegation that Posadaspayes operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, causing the collision that resulted in the Decedent s death, they are seeking to impute his purported negligence t0 Defendants. The imputation 0f a driver s negligence against an owner 0f a motor vehicle may be appropriate in certain circumstances involving the permissive use 0r transfer 0f the vehicle. (See Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Ca|.4th 1148; Vehicle Code, 5602; Durbin v Fletcher (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 334.) The California Vehicle Code provides that a motor vehicle owner is liable and responsible for death 0r injury t0 a person 0r property resulting from a Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVS 2-1420 Page -l- 0f 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER negligent 0r wrongful act 0r omission in the operation 0f the motor vehicle, in the business 0f the owner 0r otherwise, by any person using 0r operating the same with the permission, express or implied, 0f the owner. (Veh. Code, 17150.) The California Legislature has placed statutory caps 0n the amount 0f liability that can be imposed based 0n the foregoing. (See Veh. Code, 17151.) Here, despite the foregoing language, Defendants maintain that federal law, particularly the so-called Graves Amendment, prevents the imputation 0f any negligence t0 them in the circumstances at bar. This amendment provides that an owner 0f a motor vehicle who rents 0r leases the vehicle t0 another will be protected and, shall not be liable under the law 0f any State , by reason 0f being the owner 0f the vehicle , for harm t0 persons 0r property that results 0r arises out of the use, operation, 0r possession of the vehicle during the period 0f the rental 0r lease, if (1) the owner is engaged in the trade 0r business 0f renting 0r leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is n0 negligence 0r criminal wrongdoing 0n the part 0f the 0wner[.] (49 U.S.C. 30106, subd. (a) [referred t0 subsequently as the preemption clause ].) Accordingly, a defendant truck owner 0r lessor faces liability only if (1) they are engaged in the trade 0r business of renting motor vehicles, and (2) they were independently negligent. (|d.) The evidence submitted by Defendants demonstrates that the accident was the result 0f Freedom s negligent operation 0f her Jeep, but not Defendants. There is n0 evidence that there was a defect 0r malfunction in the truck that contributed t0 the collision, and this is undisputed by Plaintiffs. (See Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of their Opposition t0 Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, Nos. 6, 7.) Thus, presuming the Graves Amendment applies, Defendants would appear t0 have met their initial burden by establishing that there is n0 basis to impose liability against them for the Decedent s death because they were not independently negligent. However, in their opposition, Plaintiffs challenge the applicability 0f the Graves Amendment, explaining that it contains a Savings Clause which provides as follows: (b) Financial Responsibility Laws- Nothing in this section supersedes the law 0f any State 0r political subdivision thereof- (1) imposing financial responsibility 0r insurance standards 0n the owner 0f a motor vehicle for the privilege 0f registering and operating a motor vehicle; 0r (2) imposing liability 0n business entities engaged in the trade 0r business 0r renting 0r leasing motor vehicles for failure t0 meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law. (49 U.s.c. 30106, subd. (b).) Plaintiffs explain that no California court has opined on whether or not Vehicle Code sections 17150 0r 17151 are financial responsibility laws subsumed within the forgoing savings clause and thus unaffected by the Graves Amendment. While this is indeed true, a review 0f authorities that have undertaken a similar question, i.e., how the term financial responsibility in the Graves Amendment is to be interpreted, suggests that Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 d0 not come within its scope. In Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242, for example, the court was tasked with determining whether claims asserted against a rental car company for wrongful death arising out of an accident involving its vehicle in Florida came within the Graves Amendment s preemption clause 0r savings clause. The claims were brought Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVSE-l-LZO Page 5 OfS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER against the rental company because 0f the so-called dangerous instrumentality doctrine; through that doctrine, Florida common law imposes strict vicarious liability 0n the owner 0f a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle t0 an individual whose negligent operation causes damage t0 another. (Aurbach v. Gallina (Fla. 2000) 753 So.2d 60, 62.) Similar t0 the California Legislature, the Florida state legislature imposed statutory caps on the amount 0f vicarious liability a rental car company could face under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. (Fla. Stat. 324.021, subd. (9)(b)(2).) Reviewing the language 0f its preemption clause, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the Graves Amendment takes aim precisely at the type 0f lawsuits involving the imposition 0f strict liability against those who rent vehicles for the negligent acts 0f its lessee, i.e., the wrongful death action before it. It then undertook a detailed analysis t0 ascertain the scope 0f the savings clause by defining the undefined term financial responsibility. After reviewing the pertinent laws 0f statutory interpretation, the Court concluded that Congress used the term financial responsibility law t0 denote state laws which impose insurance-Iike requirements 0n owners 0r operators 0f motor vehicles, but permit them t0 carry, in lieu 0f liability insurance per se, its financial equivalent, such as a bond 0r seIf-insurance. (Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1247.) It reached this conclusion because (1) statutory context and the noscitur a sociis canon suggested as much, with both provisions 0f the savings clause strongly implying that financial responsibility is closely linked t0 insurance requirements and (2) the most common legal usage 0f the term financial responsibility is t0 refer t0 state laws which require either liability insurance 0r a functionally equivalent financial arrangement. (|d.) The Court noted that Florida law was representative in providing that a vehicle owner may prove his 0r her financial responsibility by furnishing proof 0f liability insurance, posting a bond, furnishing a certificate showing a deposit of cash 0r securities, 0r furnishing a certificate of self-insurance. (|d., citing Fla. Stat. 324.031.) Such other financial arrangements, the Court explained, provide proof 0f ability t0 respond in damages 0n account 0f crashes arising out 0f the use 0f a motor vehicle, which is Florida law s definition 0f proof of financial responsibility. (|d., citing Fla. Stat. 324.021, subd. (7).) The Court continued that there was n0 reason t0 believe that Florida s definition 0f proof 0f financial responsibility was exceptional, noting that Black s Law Dictionary defined the term in a similar manner, i.e., associating the term with motor vehicle insurance requirements. (Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1248.) The Court concluded its analysis by stating that the import 0f the Graves Amendment was clear: [skates may require insurance 0r its equivalent as a condition 0f licensing 0r registration, 0r may impose such a requirement after an accident 0r unpaid judgment. 49 U.S.C. 30106(b)(1). They may suspend the license and registration of, or otherwise penalize, a car owner who fails t0 meet the requirement, 0r who fails t0 pay a judgment resulting from a collision. 49 U.S.C. 30106(b)(2). They simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based 0n the negligence 0f their lessees. 49 U.S.C. 30106(a). The majority of courts that have considered the issue are in accord. (See, e.g., Green v. Toyota Motor CreditCorp (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 605 F.Supp.2d 430; Pacho v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car C0. (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 572 F.Supp.2d 341; Johnson v. Agnant (D.D.C. 2006) 480 F.Supp.2d 1; Carlton v General Motors Acceptance Corp. (N.D. Iowa 2009) 639 F.Supp.2d 982.) California has similar statutory requirements t0 Florida, with all drivers and vehicle owners required to be able t0 establish financial responsibility. (Veh. Code, 16020.) The other financial arrangements permitted under Florida law t0 meet its similar requirement are also permitted under California law. (Veh. Code, 16021 [stating that financial responsibility of a driver 0r owner involved in an accident is establish if he 0r she is seIf-insured, is insured under a bond, 0r possesses liability insurance].) Plaintiffs nevertheless insist that Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 qualify as financial responsibility laws which are excluded from application 0f the Graves Amendment, and assert that a contrary conclusion would render the requirement for rental car companies t0 buy insurance moot given the State s statutory limitations 0n vicarious liability. (See, e.g., Veh. Code 16056.) But rental insurance companies still have an incentive t0 obtain insurance because they can be subject t0 liability for their own negligence under the Graves Amendment. Plaintiffs also maintain that the forgoing statutes are financial responsibility laws given dicta in various California cases that Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVS 2-1420 Page 6 0f 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER use the term financial responsibility interchangeably with Code 0f Civil Procedure section 3333.4, the latter of which prohibits uninsured motorists and drunk drivers from collecting noneconomic damages in any action arising out 0f the operation 0r use 0f a motor vehicle. This assertion is unpersuasive because none 0f these cases defined the term financial responsibility” within the context 0f the Graves Amendment and Code 0f Civil Procedure section 3333.4 is not akin to Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 as it specifically involves the issue 0f motor vehicle insurance requirements and what effect the absence 0f compliance with those requirements has 0n liability. Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 merely establish liability based 0n ownership and say nothing about insurance requirements 0r similar financial arrangements. Ultimately, the Court finds the statutory analysis in Garcia t0 be persuasive and, applying it t0 the circumstances at bar, concludes that the claims at issue are within the scope 0f the Graves Amendment s preemption clause, and that Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 are therefore not financial responsibility laws within the meaning 0f the Amendment s savings clause. Thus, Plaintiffs are barred from seeking liability against Defendants unless they were independently negligent and said negligence caused the accident. Here, there is n0 evidence that the subject incident was the result 0f any negligent conduct by PLC 0r Coast. In their opposition, Plaintiffs insist that Defendants were negligent per se because they permitted Posadaspayes to drive in violation of various federal statutes. In particular, they assert that Defendants violated section 391.11, subdivision (b), 0f title 49 0f the Code 0f Federal Regulations because Posadaspayes was under 21 and the statute provides that a truck driver engaged in interstate commerce be over the age 0f 21. They note that the agreement with Suprema required Defendants t0 preapprove drivers and required that all drivers be over 21, and that Defendants acknowledge failing t0 adhere t0 these provisions. Plaintiffs further contend that this violation, i.e., the failure t0 prevent alleged unsafe drivers from renting the truck, was the cause of the accident because drivers under 21 have been shown to drive less safely and they maintain Posadaspayes swerved t0 the left in an effort t0 avoid a collision with Freedom s Jeep when the law required him t0 g0 t0 the right. They also contend that he failed t0 keep sufficient distance in front 0f him, which would have enabled him t0 safely brake and avoid the collision entirely. In their reply, Defendants insist that there is no evidence that Posadaspayes age at the time 0f the accident- he was three weeks from turning 21- caused the collision t0 occur, arguing that any evidence proffered by Plaintiffs t0 the contrary (e.g., the report ofexpert Paul Herbert) is purely speculative. They further note that the requirement 0f a driver being over 21 years of age is only a requirement where Class A licenses are required t0 drive a particular truck interstate, not intrastate, as Posadaspayes was, and states are permitted t0 set lower age thresholds for intrastate drivers, as California has done. (See Veh. Code, 12515 [providing that a driver employed for the purpose of driving a vehicle on the highway must be 18 years 0f age].) Defendants explain that the truck required nothing more than a Class C license t0 operate it, which Posadaspayes possessed at the time 0f the accident. (Declaration 0f Elizabeth Rhodes in Support 0f Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication ( Rhodes Decl. ), 2, Exhibit 14.) The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence 0f a triable issue 0f material fact regarding whether any negligent conduct 0n their part caused the subject collision, and thus the Decedent s death, t0 occur. First, Plaintiffs have not established that the federal regulation Defendants are alleged t0 have violated applied t0 Posadaspayes when the accident occurred. Second, even if it did apply, Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence establishing that Posadaspayes bears any fault for the accident. The Traffic Report and witness statements all indicate that Freedom was at fault, and that Posadaspayes was unable t0 avoid colliding with her vehicle, which caused the truck t0 move left into the southbound lane and into the vehicle being driven by the Decedent. Any suggestion t0 the contrary by Plaintiffs is speculative. In Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVSE-l-LZO Page 7 OfS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER the absence 0f any negligence 0n the part 0f Defendants, there is n0 basis t0 impose liability against them for the Decedent s death. Accordingly, Defendants motion for summaryjudgment is GRANTED. Primfid: 11/19/2020 11/19/2020 Motion: Summary Judngm/Adiudication - ISCVS 2-1420 Page 8 0f 8