In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litigation

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 537 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint. . Document

S.D.N.Y.March 13, 2019

i UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------------------------x IN RE: SSA BONDS ANTITRUST LITIGATION 1:16-cv-03711-ER This Document Relates To All Actions ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ------------------------------------------------------------------------x REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT AMANDEEP SINGH MANKU’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 1 of 16 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................1 I. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Highlights the Lack of Any Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction..........1 A. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Jurisdiction Under New York’s Long Arm Statute .........1 Section 302(a)(1) .........................................................................................2 Section 302(a)(2) .........................................................................................5 Section 302(a)(3) .........................................................................................7 B. Rule 4(k)(2) Is Not Available as an Alternative Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction ..7 II. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Manku Would Offend Due Process .....................................8 III. Plaintiffs’ Request for Jurisdictional Discovery Should Be Denied ..................................9 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................10 Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 2 of 16 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Cases 7 W. 57th St. Realty Co. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 13-cv-981, 2015 WL 1514539 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2015) ............................................ 6, 7, 8 American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 91 Civ. 1235, 1996 WL 304436 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1996) ................................................... 4 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................ 4 Beach v. Citigroup Alternative Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717, 2014 WL 904650 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) ................................................... 4 Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................................... 5 Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................................ 2 Biz2Credit, Inc. v. Kular, No. 14-cv-8223, 2015 WL 2445076 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) ................................................. 7 Bracken v. MH Pillars Inc., No. 15-CV-7302, 2016 WL 7496735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2016)................................................ 6 Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 4, 6, 8 Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................................ 4 Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 16-cv-6496, 2018 WL 6169313 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) ................................................. 9 In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16-cv-0696, 2017 WL 4217115 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) ........................................ 2, 4, 9 DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v. Park, 610, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ......................................................................................... 3 Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 3 of 16 iv Ehrenfield v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04-cv-9641, 2006 WL 1096816 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006) ............................................... 10 E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., No. 00-cv-8670, 2003 WL 22064259 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) ................................................. 5 Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 169 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2016) .......................................................................................... 4 Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-cv-3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) ...................................................... 2 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) ...................................................................................................... 6 Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Med. Taping Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ........................................................................................... 5 In re M/V MSC FLAMINIA, 107 F. Supp. 3d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ......................................................................................... 8 Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998) ........................................................................................................ 2 Sea Trade Mar. Corp. v. Coutsodontis, No. 09 CIV 488, 2012 WL 3594288 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) ................................................ 6 Segal v. Bitar, No. 11-cv-4521, 2012 WL 273609 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) .................................................... 4 Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ......................................................................................... 7 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) ................................................................................................................ 9 Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................................ 9 In re Western States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1566, 2010 WL 4386951 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 2010) ..................................................... 3 Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 4 of 16 v Statutes N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 ............................................................................................................... passim Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(k)(2) .................................................................................................. 7, 8, 10 Secondary Sources Siegel, N.Y. Prac. (6th ed.) ............................................................................................................. 5 Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 5 of 16 1 Once again, Plaintiffs’ opposition relies on rhetoric and misdirection to mask fatal deficiencies in their theory of personal jurisdiction as it relates to Amandeep Singh Manku. Plaintiffs’ failure to meaningfully respond, much less rebut, Manku’s arguments in support of dismissing him from the fourth iteration of their complaint only underscores what has been apparent from the outset: Manku, a London resident who did not trade with any Named Plaintiff- in New York or elsewhere-is not subject to personal jurisdiction on Plaintiffs’ claim. Even under Plaintiffs’ implausible theory that every step taken by Manku in relation to the USD SSA bond market over eight years and across three different banks is tainted by the purported conspiracy, Manku cannot be subject to jurisdiction in this forum where he did not trade with any of the Named Plaintiffs, and their claim does not arise from any purposeful contacts with either New York or the United States that can be imputed to him. Because Plaintiffs offer no valid basis to ground jurisdiction over Manku, the claim against him must be dismissed.1 ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs’ Opposition Highlights the Lack of Any Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction Plaintiffs acknowledge that they must allege a valid statutory basis to obtain personal jurisdiction over Manku, see Pls.’ Consol. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Dkt. 579) (“PJ Opp’n”) at 22, yet fail to do so by the only potential means available: New York’s long-arm statute. A. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Jurisdiction Under New York’s Long-Arm Statute In opposing dismissal, Plaintiffs never directly address arguments Manku has raised on three separate occasions for why he is not subject to jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm 1 Manku joins in the arguments set forth in the Dealer Defendants’ reply memoranda in support of their pending motions to dismiss and, consistent with his opening memorandum, continues to challenge the conspiracy allegations directed at him. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def. Amandeep Singh Manku’s Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 538) (“Manku Br.”) at 20-22. At no point has Manku waived this challenge, as Plaintiffs disingenuously imply. See Pls.’ Consol. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. 578) at 131. Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 6 of 16 Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 7 of 16 3 This allegation does not rebut the conclusion apparent from the Complaint itself - namely, that the “center of gravity” of the trades among other London-based traders and Named Plaintiffs located in Alaska and Pennsylvania was “indisputably outside New York.” DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v. Park, 610, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 405, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). In opposing dismissal on these grounds, Plaintiffs argue that they need not allege specific transactions with Manku because their But Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support the conclusion , and so the Court should reject this facially-incredible and self-serving description of the USD SSA bond market as a basis for jurisdiction. Moreover, it does not follow that Plaintiffs’ claim arises from those particular acts. This Court should “not go so far as to hold that any forum-related act [alleged to be] in furtherance of a conspiracy will suffice to support specific personal jurisdiction, as it cannot be said that a particular plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen but for each and every act in furtherance of a conspiracy.” In re Western States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1566, 2010 WL 4386951, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 2010). Plaintiffs also wrongly seek to ground jurisdiction on trades between Manku and absent class members and otherwise impute business conducted by the various Dealer Defendants to him. As to absent class members, courts in this District and elsewhere have consistently held that personal jurisdiction must be premised on “a defendant’s contacts with the forum state and actions giving rise to the named plaintiffs’ causes of action.” Beach v. Citigroup Alternative Invs. LLC, Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 8 of 16 4 No. 12 Civ. 7717, 2014 WL 904650, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014); see also In re Dental Supplies, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (“The constitutional requirements of due process do[] not wax and wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class.”). Contacts with “unnamed class members may not be used as a jurisdictional basis, especially before the class has been certified.” Beach, 2014 WL 904650, at *6; see also Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 169 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Specific personal jurisdiction can arise only from the claims of the named plaintiffs, not those of absent class members.”).3 Plaintiffs offer no authority to support a contrary outcome.4 Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of Section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction via agency principles likewise miss the mark. To establish an agency relationship for purposes of Section 302(a)(1), Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the purported agent “(1) engaged in purposeful activities in [New York] in relation to [the transaction involving plaintiff] (2) for the benefit of and (3) with the knowledge and consent of [the defendant] and (4) that [the defendant] exercised some control over [the agent] in the matter.” American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 91 Civ. 1235, 1996 WL 304436, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that suggest Manku directed and controlled the New York activities of the employees based at the U.S. affiliates. See Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 86 (2d Cir. 2018) (declining to impute contacts 3 Plaintiffs attempt to portray Beach as addressing only the narrow issue of whether named plaintiffs had consented to a forum selection clause that precluded them from seeking relief in federal court. PJ Opp’n at 37. But the key issue in dispute concerned whether the named plaintiffs could rely on unnamed class members who had not consented to the same forum selection clause (and thus could seek relief in federal court) to ground jurisdiction. The court unambiguously concluded that they could not. Beach, 2014 WL 904650, at *8. 4 Plaintiffs rely upon a trio of cases to support their position, see PJ Opp’n at 36, but none of these cases stand for the proposition that contacts with unnamed members of a putative class may be used to establish jurisdiction where the named plaintiff’s claim does not arise from a defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum. The first two, Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) and Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2002), did not even involve class actions. And the third, Segal v. Bitar, No. 11-cv- 4521, 2012 WL 273609, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012), only found jurisdiction where the cause of action arose from a transaction of business between the named plaintiff, a New York resident, and the defendant. While Plaintiffs make much of a passing observation by the court that the commercial activities of the defendant may have injured other New York residents, the court’s holding did not rely on this reasoning. Id. Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 9 of 16 5 of purported agent based on “bare” and “sparse” allegations that a defendant “controlled or otherwise directed or materially participated in the operations of [an in-forum actor], and reaped proceeds or other financial benefits [from such operations]”). Plaintiffs also fail to allege any facts indicating that their claim arises out of the purposeful conduct of any U.S. agent in New York or anywhere else in the United States. Nor may the Court impute the actions of other defendants to Manku as purported “co- conspirators” to satisfy Section 302(a)(1). As Manku has consistently argued, and as Plaintiffs do not seriously contest, the “conspiracy theory” of jurisdiction is not available under the “transacts business” prong of the long arm statute. See PJ Opp’n at 75 n.65; E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., No. 00-cv-8670, 2003 WL 22064259, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (stating “the ‘conspiracy theory’ of jurisdiction [is] ‘inapplicable’ under section 302(a)(1)”). Instead, Plaintiffs must “tie … out-of-state, allegedly conspiratorial acts of the individual defendants to some tortious act committed within New York,” as opposed to mere transactions of business. Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Med. Taping Sys., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“conspiracy-based jurisdiction is more properly based on § 302(a)(2), which authorizes personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act within the state,” rather than on section 302(a)(1)). As explained below, even under their implausible conspiracy theory, Plaintiffs do not adequately allege the commission of a tortious act attributable to Manku in New York. Section 302(a)(2): The Complaint fails to satisfy the “tortious acts” prong, which is reserved only for “the relatively clear-cut situation of a tort actually committed in New York.” Siegel, N.Y. Prac. § 87 (6th ed.); see also Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that Section 302(a)(2) requires a physical presence in New York). Although Plaintiffs purport to fault Manku for “disaggregat[ing]” their allegations, PJ Opp’n at 72, they fail Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 10 of 16 6 to identify a specific overt act attributable to Manku that occurred in New York and gave rise to Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Indeed, the thrust of Plaintiffs’ claim-an alleged conspiracy centered in London that purportedly harmed investment funds located in Alaska and Pennsylvania- suggests anything but the required “clear nexus” to New York. See Bracken v. MH Pillars Inc., No. 15-CV-7302, 2016 WL 7496735, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2016). Plaintiffs also cannot establish jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2) on the basis of their conspiracy theory. Even after Schwab, the “rule in this circuit is that the mere presence of one conspirator . . . does not confer personal jurisdiction over another alleged conspirator.” Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972); Schwab, 883 F.3d at 86 (citing Leasco with approval). Instead, Plaintiffs must show that Manku “had an awareness of the effects in New York of [his purported co-conspirator’s] activity,” such activity “was for [his] benefit,” and “[the co-conspirator] acted at the direction or under the control or at the request or on behalf of [Manku].” Sea Trade Mar. Corp. v. Coutsodontis, No. 09 CIV 488, 2012 WL 3594288, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (quotation marks omitted). In describing their sporadic transactions with other defendants, Plaintiffs do not specify how any purported co-conspirator acted in New York at Manku’s direction, under his control, and for his benefit with respect to the trades with the Named Plaintiffs. Without such allegations, the acts of other alleged co- conspirators simply cannot be attributed to Manku. See, e.g., 7 W. 57th St. Realty Co. v. Citigroup, Inc. (“7 W. 57th St. Realty”), No. 13-cv-981, 2015 WL 1514539, at *12 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2015).5 5 Plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction lies because the alleged conspiracy was for the benefit of all purported co- conspirators, even though the funds for specific transactions with other defendants “would have gone to the counterparty bank” rather than Manku (who never directly transacted with Plaintiffs), PJ Opp’n at 66. But New York’s long-arm statute requires more than an allegation that all co-conspirators generally “stood to benefit” merely by virtue of their alleged membership in the conspiracy. Cf. Sea Trade Mar. Corp., 2012 WL 3594288, at *8-9 (finding jurisdiction where it was alleged that the non-resident defendant “would directly profit” from the co-conspirator’s purported transaction in the forum). Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 11 of 16 7 Section 302(a)(3): Plaintiffs also fail to demonstrate how any alleged tort committed by Manku in London caused injury to them in New York, thereby foreclosing jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3). Because Manku engaged in no trades with Plaintiffs, he did not cause them injury anywhere, let alone in New York. Moreover, even if trades between other defendants and Plaintiffs could be attributed to Manku, jurisdiction would still not lie because the situs of “a nonphysical commercial injury [under Section 302(a)(3)] is the place where the critical events associated with the dispute took place”-in this case, allegedly London, where the purported price- fixing conspiracy was agreed-“and not where the resultant monetary loss occurred.” Biz2Credit, Inc. v. Kular, No. 14-cv-8223, 2015 WL 2445076, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Still more, even assuming Section 302(a)(3) could be satisfied by the mere occurrence of monetary loss in New York, it still would be of no assistance to Plaintiffs because the Complaint fails to identify any monetary loss that Named Plaintiffs suffered in New York. B. Rule 4(k)(2) Is Not Available as an Alternative Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction No other basis for statutory jurisdiction is available. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Clayton Act supports jurisdiction over Individual Defendants, and fail to satisfy Rule 4(k)(2) as an alternative to jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute. Rule 4(k)(2) is properly invoked only where, among other things, “the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any one state.” Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). District courts in the Second Circuit have time and again held that, consistent with a plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction over defendant, a plaintiff may invoke Rule 4(k)(2) only by certifying based on readily-available information that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any particular state forum. 7 W. 57th St. Realty, 2015 WL 1514539, at *13. Although certain courts appear to follow Plaintiffs’ suggested approach, see PJ Opp’n at 52, courts in this District have repeatedly declined to shift the burden to defendants, reasoning that Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 12 of 16 8 “[a] contrary holding would encourage similarly-situated plaintiffs-those suing foreign corporations and residents under federal law-to omit any allegations tying defendants to a specific state, in hopes of engaging the broader minimum contacts analysis of Rule 4(k)(2), which only requires contacts with the United States as a whole.” 7 West 57th Street Realty, 2015 WL 1514539, at *13. Plaintiffs also fail to address the policy concerns behind this rule and, by their own acknowledgement, invoke Rule 4(k)(2) without making the required certification even as to lack of jurisdiction in any state other than New York. PJ Opp’n at 54, 65 n.58. See In re M/V MSC FLAMINIA, 107 F. Supp. 3d 313, 322-323 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (after finding no jurisdiction under New York law, concluding that Rule 4(k)(2)’s requirements were not met where plaintiff “ha[d] not certified that [defendant] [wa]s not subject to jurisdiction in any other state”). Consequently, Rule 4(k)(2)’s requirements remain unsatisfied.6 II. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Manku Would Offend Due Process Irrespective of the statutory framework that is applied, Plaintiffs fail to show that the exercise of jurisdiction over Manku would comport with due process. Plaintiffs have not properly alleged that Manku had “purposeful contacts with the forum,” as well as a “causal relationship” between such contacts and the claims against him. Schwab, 883 F.3d at 84 (citations omitted). Indeed, whatever contacts Plaintiffs allege Manku had with the forum, they bear no causal relationship to the only transactions from which Plaintiffs’ claim could arise - namely the trades between other defendants, on one hand, and Plaintiffs in Alaska and Pennsylvania, on the other. Rather than identifying any actual link, Plaintiffs argue that Manku’s alleged decision not to compete “played a role in artificially pricing Plaintiffs’ deals.” PJ Opp’n at 34. But nebulous 6 As a fallback, Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Court should not address whether they may invoke Rule 4(k)(2) unless it has first decided that “foreign” defendants are not subject to jurisdiction under the Clayton Act or the New York long-arm statute. PJ Opp’n at 53-54. To the extent Plaintiffs are requesting leave to amend yet again, the Court should decline the invitation and dismiss Manku from the case with prejudice. See infra at 9-10. Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 13 of 16 9 references to “a role” fall far short of establishing the causal link due process requires. As it stands, the Complaint fails to allege the required “substantial connection” between contacts that Manku “himself create[d] with the forum” and the claim Plaintiffs assert against him. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014); see also In re Dental Supplies, 2017 WL 4217115, at *6.7 Unable to satisfy the purposeful availment test, Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that Manku is subject to jurisdiction under the “causal effects” test simply because the United States is a substantial market for SSA bonds. PJ Opp’n at 71. Yet courts routinely reject exactly this sort of argument, which attempts to premise jurisdiction on the mere “foreseeability of [an] effect of the [defendant’s] conduct” in the relevant forum. Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 16-cv-6496, 2018 WL 6169313, at *55 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (finding “allegations that the United States was a substantial market for BBSW-Based Derivatives” too “‘random, fortuitous, and attenuated’ to be a basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction….”) (quoting Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 331 (2d Cir. 2016)). Left with no means by which to subject Manku to jurisdiction for actions he himself took, Plaintiffs must rely on the acts of other defendants. As described above, however, the Complaint does not allege the necessary elements for jurisdiction on an agency theory, and the same pleading failure dooms Plaintiffs’ conspiracy theory of jurisdiction as well. III. Plaintiffs’ Request for Jurisdictional Discovery Should Be Denied In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs cite no case granting a request for 7 Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully attempt to distinguish Dental Supplies on the basis that the defendant there did not have, in Plaintiffs’ words, “any influence” over a third party’s sales in New York of items purchased initially from defendant. PJ Opp’n at 38-39 n.23. But Dental Supplies made clear that “[e]ven if [the Court] were to accept that [defendant’s] limited sales through [the third party] constituted the transaction of business … [there is] no basis for jurisdiction” where, among other things, “[defendant] did not make any sales to any named plaintiff in New York.” In re Dental Supplies, 2017 WL 4217115, at *6. Thus, the reasoning of Dental Supplies applies with full force here. Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 14 of 16 jurisdictional discovery where, as here, the plaintiff had already gained access to a "large volume" of '"smoking gun' evidence," Complaint ,r 5, yet still failed to make the necessary showing. Named Plaintiffs are already aware, and have conceded, that they did not trade with Manku. No information he could provide will change this dispositive fact. See Ehrenfield v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04-cv-9641, 2006 WL I 096816, at *6 (S.D.N. Y. Apr. 26, 2006) ( denying request for jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction) ( citation omitted). Nor do Plaintiffs contend that they require such discovery to make out a prima facie case for jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). See PJ Opp'n at 54 (stating that based on the information available to them, Plaintiffs would be able to "certify that the Foreign Dealer Defendants are not subject to jurisdiction in any other state court of general jurisdiction"). In sum, because any jurisdictional discovery directed at Manku would be futile, Plaintiffs' claim against him should be dismissed. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth in this reply and the memorandum oflaw in support of his motion to dismiss, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claim against Manku with prejudice. Dated: March 13, 2018 New York, New York IO KOBRE & KIM LLP By:u�� David McGill Clinton J. Dockery 800 Third A venue New York, New York 10022 (212) 488-1200 david.mcgill@kobrekim.com clinton.dockery@kobrekim.com Attorneys for Amandeep Singh Manku Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 15 of 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on March 13, 2019, I filed and therefore caused the foregoing document to be served in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Copies were emailed on all Defendants in the above-captioned matter. D2� :?If� Clinton J. Dockery 800 Third A venue New York, New York 10022 (212) 488-1200 david.mcgill@kobrekim.com clinton.dockery@kobrekim.com Attorneys for Amandeep Singh Manku Case 1:16-cv-03711-ER Document 597 Filed 03/13/19 Page 16 of 16