West Penn Hat & Cap Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 543 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION
West Penn Hat & Cap Corporation and
United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers
International Union , AFL-CIO and
Grievance Committee. Case 6-CA-3688.
June 19,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On January 17, 1967, Trial Examiner George
A. Downing issued his Decision in the above-
entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support
thereof. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a brief in
support thereof and in answer to the Respondent's
exceptions. The Respondent then filed a brief in
answer to the General Counsel's cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the briefs, exceptions and
cross-exceptions, and the entire record in the case,
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Att, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, West Penn Hat
& Cap Corporation, Arnold, Pennsylvania, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
165 NLRB No. 66
' In rejecting the Respondent 's defense that the Union's
request for recognition was premature in view of a claimed future
expansion in operations , the Trial Examiner found that the
Respondent President Baran's self-serving "predictions of
expansion were highly speculative , [ and] without sound business
or evidentiary basis " The General Counsel has excepted,
however, to the Trial Examiner's failure specifically to find that
on July 19, 1966, when the Union made its demand for
recognition , the 48 employees then in the unit constituted a
substantial and representative complement We note that at the
time of the hearing on November 2, 1966, there were 85
543
employees in the unit, and that the number of job classifications
was the same then as on July 19, 1966 In General Extrusion
Company, Inc, 121 NLRB 1165, 1167, the Board said that "a
contract will bar an election only if at least 30 percent of the
complement employed at the time of the hearing had been
employed at the time the contract was executed, and 50 percent
of the job classifications in existence at the time of the hearing
were in existence at the time the contract was executed " Under
the General Extrusion rule, if the parties here had entered into a
contract on July 19, this contract would have barred a later filed
petition . In view of the foregoing , and the highly speculative
nature of the predicted expansion here, we find and conclude that
the Union's demand for recognition was made at a time when the
Respondent employed a substantial and representative
complement of employees Cf Meramec Mining Company, 134
NLRB 1675, 1679-80, General Electric Company, 81 NLRB 654,
655-656 Accordingly, we agree with the Trial Examiner that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it
refused to recognize and bargain with the Union
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE A. DOWNING, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, on November 2, 3, and 4, 1966,' pursuant to
due notice. The complaint which was issued on August 31,
on charges dated July 22 and August 2, alleged in
substance that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the
Act by (1) various specified acts of interference, restraint,
and coercion; (2) by dominating and by rendering unlawful
assistance to the Grievance Committee, a labor
organization; and (3) by refusing to bargain with the
Charging Union as the majority representative of its
employees in an appropriate unit on and after July 19.
Respondent answered, denying the unfair labor practices
as alleged.
The General Counsel's motion to correct the record,
filed with his brief, being unopposed, is hereby granted.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS; THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED
I conclude and find on facts alleged in the complaint and
admitted by answer that Respondent, a Pennsylvania
corporation with its principal place of business at Arnold,
Pennsylvania, and a plant at New Kensington, where it is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of hats and caps, is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act (through the purchase and receipt from
extrastate points and annually of goods valued in excess of
$50,000) and that the Charging Union (Hatters and Union
herein) is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.2
All events herein occurred in 1966
Findings concerning the status of the Grievance Committee
as a labor organization are made in section C, infra
165 NLRB No. 77
544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IT. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
Respondent began operations at its New Kensington
plant around April 6, and on May 18, Harry Fromkin,
International representative of the Union, appeared and
informed Respondent's President Max Baran that Hatters
intended to organize the plant. A formal organizing
campaign was begun in early June under the leadership of
Carmen Lucia, an International vice president, who was
assisted by Norman Schneider, and on July 19 they made
a demand for recognition, claiming majority status. The
demand was refused, and on July 22 a further demand was
made.
The General Counsel offered evidence that, during and
after the course of the organizational campaign,
Respondent engaged in a variety of unfair labor practices,
such as surveillance and suggestion of surveillance,
interrogations, and the promising and granting of benefits.
Evidence was also offered that Respondent formed,
dominated, and assisted the Grievance Committee, with
which it dealt as the representative of the employees.
Respondent rested its defense mainly on the testimony
of President Max Baran, though Baran made no denial of
some of the statements and conduct which were attributed
to him by the General Counsel's witnesses. Respondent
offered no denial of evidence concerning the conduct of
Supervisor Sandra Evans.
The chief issues herein involve various questions
surrounding the refusal to bargain. Respondent attacks
the majority showing of the Union and contends that in any
case the evidence supports its claim of good-faith doubt of
majority. Respondent also raises issues concerning the
appropriate unit, claiming that (1) employees classified by
it as "furriers" should be excluded, and (2) because the
unit was an expanding one, the Union's request for
recognition was premature.
B. The Oigantztng Campaign
The first contact between the Union and Respondent
was made on May 18, when Harry Fromkin, an
International representative, called on Respondent's
President Max Baran in company with Joseph Ivanusic,
staff representative of United Steelworkers, and
informed Baran that Hatters intended to organize the
plant. Fromkin testified that Baran became agitated and
abusive, and Ivanusic agreed that there was "a bit of
turmoil" and "a lot of name calling." When Fromkin
introduced Ivanusic as the representative of Steelworkers,
Baran responded that Steelworkers could have the shop
anytime they wanted it but that Hatters would never get
the shop and would never get him to sit down and sign a
contract because the Union had mistreated Baran's father
in New York. Baran also stated that he was in contact with
District 50 of United Mine Workers and was ready to sign
with any union except Hatters.
' Baran 's testimony on direct examination was in accord that
the first demand for recognition after May 18 was made by Lucia
and Schneider on July 19, but he claimed on cross-examination
that they also demanded recognition during the June meeting and
testified that in refusing recognition he referred to the strike at his
father's plant in New York City and stated that if the Union would
do something for his father's plant, he would be willing to sit down
with Lucia and Schneider
Respondent attempts to ride in both directions with Baran, for
Ivanusic testified that he informed Baran that when
Steelworkers learned that Hatters was interested in
organizing Respondent's plant, it withdrew, and that on a
later occasion, on May 27, he informed Baran again that
Steelworkers was not interested.
Baran testified, and Fromkin denied, that Fromkin
made a demand for recognition, though not claiming a
majority, but Ivanusic was unable to recall whether
Fromkin made such a demand.
Fromkin remained in the area for approximately 10 days
after May 18, visiting employees, and was followed by
Carmen Lucia, who arrived on May 31. She was joined on
June 7 by Norman Schneider, who assisted her
intermittently until early August.
On or about June 9, Lucia and Schneider called on
Baran and informed him that the organizing campaign was
underway and they wanted to make it as friendly as
possible. Baran repeated his antagonism to the Union
because of its treatment of his father and referred to the
local in New York City as a "bunch of animals." Baran
also stated that Steelworkers and Amalgamated Clothing
Workers had indicated an interest in organizing the plant
and that he had told them to come in. Lucia responded
that when the other unions heard that Hatters had begun
its campaign, they were no longer interested. Baran
replied that there were still other unions who might be
interested and without his cooperation it would be
impossible for Lucia and Schneider to reach the girls.
A few authorization cards had been obtained from
employees prior to that meeting, and thereafter Lucia and
Schneider continued their efforts through July 18, mainly
through personal contacts with employees, with the
assistance of Sylvia Romano as in-plant solicitor.
On July 19 Lucia and Schneider made both oral and
written demands for recognition3 and followed with a
second written demand on July 22 as more fully set forth in
section D, infra, which covers the matters relating more
directly to the refusal-to-bargain issues. All other evidence
concerning Respondent's conduct as it occurred both
during and after the organizational campaign is
summarized in section C, next to follow.
C. Respondent's Countering Conduct
Barbara Wright testified, without denial, that around
mid-June Supervisor Sandra Evans discussed with her the
possibility of the Steelworkers Union coming into the
plant, informed her it was a better union than Hatters and
would give the employees more benefits, and requested
Wright to talk with the girls about not signing cards for
Hatters. Evans also asked whether anyone from Hatters
had visited Wright and told her that if they did so, she
should not sign a card for them because Hatters was not
the union which was wanted in the plant. Evans also asked
Wright to inquire of several of the girls whether they had
already signed cards for Hatters.
Shortly before July 4, Baran called the employees
together after working hours and informed them,
it argues at one point in its brief that the Union made no demand
for recognition prior to the end of June and at another point that it
demanded recognition both in mid-May and mid-June In any
event, the conflict here (as with Fromkin on May 18 ) concerns an
immaterial issue, for it goes only to the matter of Respondent's
knowledge that an organizing campaign was underway , a point on
which there is no doubt . It does not bear substantially on the issue
of good-faith doubt as will appear from the ensuing findings
WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION
according to cumulative and credited testimony of the
General Counsel's witnesses, that he knew a union was
contacting them; that the union was not the one they
wanted; that while he had not paid them for Memorial Day,
he would pay them for the Fourth of July and other legal
holidays; that he would also procure hospitalization
benefits for them; and that when certain production goals
were reached, he would put the employees on a piecework
plan which would benefit them through increased
earnings.
Baran's testimony was not in substantial conflict. He
testified, however, that his offers were not made for the
purpose of preventing the unionization of the employees,
but were pursuant to a promise he made in December 1965
to representatives of a community development group that
he would give his employees fringe benefits and paid
holidays as soon as he was financially able to do so.
Donald Beck, a community representative, corroborated
the latter testimony. Baran's further claim that
Respondent's financial condition had improved
sufficiently to warrant the granting of benefits was
disproved, however, by Schneider's testimony, not denied
by Baran, that on one occasion when Schneider and Lucia
were distributing leaflets, Baran told them of his financial
difficulties, stated that he needed money for the payroll,
and inquired whether he could borrow money from the
Union.
Baran acted promptly to make good on his promises,
paying the employees for July 4, and later for Labor Day.
Furthermore, he immediately contacted the office of the
Blue Cross hospitalization group and requested that a
representative call upon him, though the actual visit was
not made until July 14. On that date Francis Stewart met
with Baran, who explained that union organizational
activities were in progress and a meeting was to be held
that evening, and inquired how quickly Stewart could
establish the hospitalization program. Upon being
informed that it would be possible to have a group start by
August 1, if necessary applications were received, Baran
assembled the employees and had Stewart explain the
program and pass out application forms. The plan was
actually put into effect on August 1, with Respondent
paying the individual rate for each employee, while the
employee pays for any dependents included in the plan.
In the meantime Lucia and Schneider passed out union
leaflets from time to time in front of the plant. Lucia and
employee Elizabeth French testified that on such
occasions Baran stood near the exit door (where he
normally did not stand) as the employees left the plant.
French testified that on one occasion when she was
working overtime, Mrs. Baran came in and reported that
the "union people" were outside. Baran thereupon
directed French to leave by the side door. Lucia testified
that when she was passing out leaflets in July, Baran came
out and engaged her in a lengthy conversation. When
Lucia suggested he go inside for fear the girls might not
take the leaflets in his presence, Baran asked why she did
not come in. When Lucia inquired if she could pass out the
leaflets inside the plant, Baran replied that she could not
but that he wanted to get her away from there so that she
The evidence is in conflict as to how many times Baran
actually drove past the hall and whether he did so after talking
with Lucia Baran admitted that he circled the block once That
course would have taken him twice past the hall , as it was located
on the corner which Baran first approached Since the entire
evidence established , as hereinafter found , that Baran was
545
could not pass them out. Lucia later noticed that Baran
was looking out through the venetian blinds to see whether
anyone took a leaflet.
The first formal meeting, scheduled for July 14, was
announced in a leaflet distribution on July 11.
Linda Cooper testified that prior to that meeting,
Supervisor Sandra Evans questioned her about whether
she was going to attend the meeting.
Shortly before the meeting began on July 14, Baran was
seen by some of the employees to drive past the union hall,
which was not located on any normal route which Baran
would follow in going to or from the plant or his home.
When Lucia was informed of the fact, she went out, waved
Baran down, and talked with him.4
Lucia testified that though the conversation proceeded
on a friendly basis (Baran's wife and child were in the car
with him), she accused him of driving around the hall for
the purpose of spying on the girls and stated that the
Board would interpret his conduct as surveillance. Baran
claimed he "just happened" to pass. Lucia disputed that
claim of coincidence because of his repeated passing
and also charged Baran with having timed the visit of the
Blue Cross representative that day so as to occur just
before the union meeting. Baran stated he had no choice
but to do so and that, "In view of all your activities, I have
to call him in."
Lucia also referred to rumors which Evans was
spreading that employees who joined the Union or who
went to the meeting would be fired and suggested that
Baran instruct Evans not to spread such rumors. Lucia
continued that foreladies, foremen, and executives were
not admitted to membership and that the Union wanted
only the production and maintenance workers. Baran
disclaimed knowledge of Evans' alleged conduct but
agreed to speak to her as requested. The conversation
ended on a friendly note, with Lucia playing with the child.
Baran admitted that he intentionally drove around the
block, knowing that a union meeting was scheduled, and
that he did so because he was "just curious." He admitted
also that Lucia charged him with timing the Blue Cross
meeting with the union meeting and that he replied that it
was a coincidence. (Stewart's testimony supported that
claim.) Lucia told him that he was not supposed to be at
the hall and he stated he would leave. However, Lucia
began playing with the child and talking with his wife and
the entire conversation lasted some 5 or 10 minutes.
To the extent that material conflicts exist between the
respective accounts of Lucia and Baran, I credit the
former, as I do also where other material conflicts
occurred.
Baran testified further that Evans informed him before
the union meeting that she was going to attend it but that
he directed her not to do so because, "They wouldn't let a
supervisor enter the hall." The evidence established,
however, that despite Baran's direction, Evans also went
to the meeting, arriving shortly after Baran left, and that
she was informed that she could not come in because
supervisors were not eligible.
Respondent's "curiosity" concerning organizational
activities did not end with the visits of Evans and Baran to
intentionally engaged in surveillance , it is immaterial how many
times he circled the block I find , however, on the entire evidence
that he went around more than once, for I credit the testimony of
the General Counsel 's witnesses that he drove past the hall again
after talking to Lucia
546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the union hall. Mary Grace DeAugustine (whom Baran
admitted seeing at the meeting) testified that on the
following morning as she punched in at the timeclock,
Baran inquired, "How many attended the meeting?"
DeAugustine replied, "Enough," and walked away.
Sylvia Romano testified that after she was made a
supervisor on July 19 Lucia passed out a leaflet which
stated that the Union had a majority. Baran procured a
copy of the leaflet, brought it over to Romano and Evans,
and commented to Evans that he knew the Union did not
have a majority because a lot of the people there were for
him. Baran told Romano that she did not have to answer
any of his questions but could do so if she wished to, and
referring to his visit to the union meeting, stated that he
saw six there. Romano did not reply, and Evans stated that
she saw eight.
Romano testified further that on July 21, after Baran
had received a further letter from the Union listing the
names of eight employees, Baran again referred to the
union meeting and stated that he knew there were at least
eight there because, "I saw six myself and Sandy said
there were eight." Baran inquired if there were more, and
when Romano did not answer him, he inquired if there
were less. Romano told him she did not know.
In the meantime Baran distributed among the
employees on July 18 a notice dated July 21, which stated
that management had found that a grievance committee
was the best way to solve most differences and problems
between the employees and management and they should
choose among themselves whoever would be best qualified
to bring their grievances to the attention of management.
Attached was a ballot form, withh spaces provided for
write-in votes for a chairman and two assistant chairmen,
and following that, a statement that the committee would
be in effect from August 1 to November 1, 1966.
Romano testified that either on July 18 or 19 a ballot box
was placed on top of the timeclock and thereafter Baran,
who had given her a copy of the notice, approached her
and stated, "Miss Lucia isn't going to like this, is she?" In
a later conversation the same day when Romano was
punching out her timecard, Baran shook the ballot box
and, not hearing anything, stated, "I don't understand.
Don't these girls know what they want? Can't they
understand their own company union can help them?"
When Romano commented that she thought a company
union was illegal, Baran replied, "No, it isn't."
Elizabeth French testified that on Tuesday (July 19), just
before she left the plant, Baran shook the ballot box and
commented that, "You girls don't know what you want."
The balloting ended on July 21, and on the following day
Romano saw Baran counting the ballots in his office.
When Romano asked who won, Baran told her and threw
the ballots (nor more than 8 or 10 in number) into the
wastepaper basket. Thereafter, Romano saw Baran post
on the bulletin board the names of those who had been
elected.
Romano testified further that last August, while she was
still a supervisor, Baran asked her if she would start a
petition that the girls did not want the Hatters Union and
that they wanted their own union or some other one
altogether. When Romano refused, Baran directed her to
ask Mary Grace DeAugustme and Beatrice Enciso if they
would start the petition.
Romano informed Enciso of Baran's request, and
Enciso testified that thereafter Baran asked her in
Romano's presence if she would pass around a petition
among the girls saying that they were against the Union
and did not want a union in the shop. When Enciso
refused, Baran asked if she were afraid of Miss Lucia, and
told Enciso she need not be afraid because Lucia was
"only a foreigner in this town."
Aside from evidence relating to the refusal to bargain
issues, set forth in section D, infra, there remains the
following evidence concerning the Grievance Committee
and the manner in which it functioned:
On September 2, Respondent filed with the Board its
RM petition in Case 6-RM-3065 in which it listed the
Grievance Committee, along with the Hatters Union, as an
organization which claimed recognition and as known to
have a representative interest in the employees in the unit
On November 1 (the day before the hearing opened),
Baran and Shireen Adams, a supervisor acting at Baran's
direction, distributed among the employees a second
notice of election to the Grievance Committee which bore
the date October 12, together with a ballot in the same
form as before and a statement that the committee would
be in effect from November 2 to January 2, 1967.
There was no dispute concerning the manner in which
the committee functioned since July 21, and none
concerning the nature of its dealings with Baran. The
committee has no constitution or bylaws, no treasury, no
secretary, and it keeps no records of its meetings or
proceedings. There are no membership requirements and
the committee makes no use of any materials, such as
paper, pens, or ink. It deals only with Baran, not with any
lesser supervisors. Its only meetings are its regular weekly
ones with Baran in his office, after working hours, at which
they discuss with him any employee problems, any
suggestions which may have been put in the suggestion
box, and any matters which Baran wishes them to take up
with the employees. Pursuant to one suggestion in the box,
the committee had the box removed from its location near
Baran's office, and pursuant to another one, it procured
smoking trays for the girls restroom.
The committee also participated in the processing of
two disciplinary matters. In one case the employee had
taken directly to Baran the matter of a reprimand from
Evans about talking on the job. Baran called the
committee in and after discussing the matter with Baran
and the employee, the committee told the employee she
was not supposed to talk while at her machine and that she
should "keep it down." The other matter involved one
Nancy Stone, concerning whom Baran complained to the
committee about excessive absenteeism. The committee
discussed the matter with Baran, decided that it would
have nothing to do with her discharge, but it would suggest
to Stone that she not be absent so often.
In addition to the foregoing, Cindy Franczak testified
that about a week before the hearing, Baran informed her
that he had submitted to the committee a grievance on her
behalf to the effect that because of Franczak's high
production, it would benefit Franczak and the entire plant
to be put on piecework. Franczak was not called to any
meeting of the committee concerning the matter and was
without knowledge as to the manner in which Baran may
have presented the matter to it.
' The Regional Director dismissed that petition on September 5
because of the pendency of the present case, and on October 4
the Board denied Respondent 's appeal from that dismissal
WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION
CONCLUDING FINDINGS
1. Interference, restraint, and coercion
It was plain from the time of the Union's first contact in
May that Baran had a deep-seated antagonism to the
Hatters Union, that he preferred any other union to it, that
he intended to keep it from organizing the employees, and
that he felt he was capable of doing so. Indeed, Baran did
not bother to deny testimony which attributed to him
specific utterances to the foregoing effect.
Respondent's subsequent conduct as summarized
above was manifestly directed to achievement of its end,
i.e., preventing Hatters from organizing the employees. As
early as mid-June and shortly after Baran was notified that
the Union had started its formal organizational campaign,
Supervisor Evans interrogated Wright about her
knowledge of Hatters activities, asked her not to sign a
card for it, and to ascertain whether other girls had done
so. Also despite two prior specific disclaimers of interest
by Steelworkers, Evans sought to invoke Wright's interest
in that union as the representative of the employees.
Baran, though less explicit, pursued the same theme in his
meeting with the employees in late June by telling them
that he was aware that a union was contacting them but
that it was not the one they wanted. Baran's denial that his
promises of benefits were not for the purpose of
preventing unionization were refuted by that statement, by
his earlier utterances to Lucia, Schneider, and Fromkin,
by his explanation to Stewart concerning the need for
speed in putting the hospitalization program into effect,
and by his statement to Lucia at the union hall that the
organizational activities had forced him to bring in
Stewart.
Baran also took advantage of his opportunities to engage
in surveillance of the organizational activities outside the
plant. Indeed by placing himself at the exit door (not his
normal station ), he was able at least to effectively create
the impression of surveillance and to discourage
employees from taking leaflets while he was watching.
That such was his intention was further demonstrated by
his direction to Elizabeth French to leave by a side door so
as to avoid Lucia, who was passing out leaflets at the
normal exit.
Furthermore, when opportunities for surveillance were
not immediately available, Baran sought them out as
established by his visit to the union hall and his repeated
driving around the block. That trip had been preceeded by
Evans' interrogation of an employee as to her intention to
attend and was followed by Baran's interrogation of
DeAugustine concerning the number at the meeting and
by his repeated attempts to interrogate Romano about the
meeting after the latter became a supervisor.
Finally in late August, despite the pendency of the
charges herein, Baran sought to inspire the circulation of
an employee petition aimed at disavowing Hatters and,
both directly and through his supervisors, solicited the
assistance of employees for that purpose.
6 The latter finding is not based on any interrogation of Romano
after she was made a supervisor on July 19, though that evidence
is directly relevant on the point that Baran and Evans
intentionally engaged in surveillance of the union meeting
7 Though the complaint contained no specific allegation
concerning that conduct , it was fully litigated at the hearing and
was fully established by the mutually corroborative testimony of
Enciso and Romano , the latter of whom was acting as
Respondent 's supervisor and agent at the time the conduct was
engaged in
547
I conclude and find in the light of the foregoing that
Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act by the following conduct:
1. The interrogation of employees by Evans and Baran
concerning the union activities and concerning attendance
at union meetings.t'
2. Evans' solicitation of Wright to ascertain the union
membership of other employees.
3. The surveillance by Baran and Evans of the union
meeting on July 14, and Baran's conduct in engaging in
surveillance of union activities outside the plant and in
creating the impression of surveillance.
4. The promising and the granting of employee benefits
for the purpose of interfering with and restraining the
organizational campaign.
5. The solicitation of employee assistance to circulate a
petition to disavow the Union. Big Ben Department Stores
Inc., 160 NLRB 1925.7
2. Assistance and domination
The evidence surrounding the creation and functioning
of the Grievance Committee plainly established in its
entirety that the committee was an "organization"; Baran
was its sole inspiration and was solely responsible for its
creation; he alone determined the form and structure of
the committee, the method of election, and the term of
office; it constituted the forming of a "company union"
among the --mplc lees (so explicitly acknowledged to
Romano); it was a device by which he hoped to avoid
recognizing Hatters; and he specifically recognized its
claim of representative interest among the employees (as
in his RM petition).
The record is devoid of any indicia of employee control
save for the limited, minority participation of employees in
the first election, all details of which were prescribed and
handled by Baran, including fixing the term of office.
Whether the second election was actually held is not
shown by the evidence, but it was plain again that all the
arrangements were made by Baran, who this time chose to
fix the term of office at 2 months rather than 3. Thus the
committee existed solely as a creature which Baran
conceived, and it functioned without membership and
without assets, being wholly dependent for subsistence on
the support which Baran gave it.
It was also plain from the evidence that the committee
dealt with Baran and he dealt with it concerning employee
grievances and other matters involving working
conditions. I therefore conclude and find that the
Grievance Committee was a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and that Respondent
dominated it, interfered with its formation and
administration, and contributed assistance and support to
it.
By such conduct Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 122 NLRB 13 8
There was, on the other hand, no evidence which supports a
complaint allegation that Evans made threats concerning the
closing of the plant
" Since I am finding derivatively a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
resulting from unlawful conduct directly proscribed by Section
8(a)(2), I do not consider it necessary to find a further specific
violation of the former section through Baran's conduct in seeking
to induce employee participation in the election as testified to by
Romano and French
548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. The Refusal to Bargain
1. The unit issues
a. The furriers
Respondent's RM petition, filed on September 2,
though specifying a production and maintenance unit,
sought the exclusion of "furriers," a term which under the
testimony of Beatrice Ann Enciso, Baran first applied to
the operation near the end of August. Though considerable
time was devoted at the hearing to the issue whether the
furriers belong in the unit , Respondent's brief not only
omits argument but fails to state a position on the issue.
Though presumably it has abandoned its contention, I
shall summarize briefly the more important factors,
established by the credited testimony of Romano and
Enciso which require the finding, here made, that the
furriers belonged in the unit of production and
maintenance employees in which the Union sought
representation.
The furriers were an intergal part of Respondent's
production line and were located geographically in the
center of the production area. Respondent's operations
consisted of cutting pieces of cloth and leather into
prescribed shapes and, through various separate
operations, sewing them together to form a trooper's cap.
The job clssifications involved were as follows: (1) lining
makers, (2) cover makers, (3) sweat sewers, (4) furriers,
(5) setup girls on bands, (6) setup girls on linings, (7) front
makers, (8) finishers, (9) blockers, and (10) packers. The
exterior of the cap is leather and the leather visor and ear
covering are covered with a fake fur called "plush." The
furriers sew the plush onto the leather while the other
production employees are engaged in cutting the material,
sewing together the leather pieces that form the crown of
the cap, the cloth pieces that form the lining, sewing the
lining into the crown, sewing the ear covering and visor to
the crown, and sizing and packing the final product. The
furriers receive the same wages and fringe benefits as the
other production employees, have the same supervision,
and work the same hours. The machines which they
operate differ from the other sewing machines only in that
they are operated by a pedal and have a small spindle.
There is no formal training or apprenticeship program
within the plant and new employees are hired without
prior training to fill any vacancies in the position of
furriers. Indeed, the degree of extra skill required of a
furrier is minimal , for Romano testified she learned the
operation in about a half an hour and Enciso testified she
achieved a high degree of skill by working at the job for
about 2 months.
I therefore conclude and find that the work done by the
furriers cannot be considered as craft work and that the
furriers do not qualify as craftsmen within the purview of
Board holdings. Furthermore, since it was stipulated that
no other union is seeking to represent the furriers
separately, they are properly to be included in a
production and maintenance unit even assuming arguendo
that they are craft employees. Finally, it is to be noted that
aside from the question whether they are craftsmen, the
furriers share a community of interest with the other
employees in the plant and are thus appropriately to be
included in the production and maintenance unit.'
b. The expanding unit issue
Further defending its refusal to bargain, Respondent
contends that the Union's request for recognition was
premature, in view of the expanding nature of its
operations. It argues that the request was made shortly
after the plant began production, at a time when there was
considerable turnover as Respondent attempted to staff
the plant with competent employees, and before there was
a substantial and representative work force employed. It
seeks to justify its own filing of an RM petition a few weeks
later on the ground that by then it had hired sufficient
additional employees to make the work force truly
substantial and representative of the ultimate force which
Respondent anticipated.
Respondent's contention concerning the expanding unit
is based almost entirely on Baran's self-serving,
undocumented testimony in which he sought to forecast a
projected expansion of the plant. His testimony may be
summarized as follows:
Plant operations began on April 6 and the first trooper's
cap came off the production line on April 27. By May
production was fully established, and by that time all 10
job classifications necessary for production had been
established.
Baran testified he "expected" to employ 100 employees
by the end of 1966, "expected" to employ up to 150 by the
end of April 1967, and "anticipated" a peak of 200
employees by the end of 1967. Baran proposed to finance
the expected expansions solely through the revenues of
the business, though at the same time disclaiming that
profits had necessarily increased. ("There is more of a
turnover than money.")
Baran testified that he had ordered additional machines
from the Singer Company for the expected expansion, but
it developed on cross-examination that he did not know
when the machines would or could be delivered because
the war in Viet Nam made delivery of such civilian goods
from Singer very uncertain. Furthermore, the machines on
order were no different from those currently used for
production in the plant.
Though a nylon hat went into production in October,
Baran admitted that it did not require the addition of any
new job classification or any significant change in
operations, and he testified that in fact he could produce
additional items such as ear muffs within a day on his
present machines without substantial varying existing
operations. Baran testified further that he contemplated
starting a new line, a spring "roller" hat, in the near future
and that new machines would be required for it, but he
admitted on cross-examination that the existing
production facilities would be used for the new line, only
one machine, a steaming machine, would be added, and he
had not yet ordered either the new machine or any
material for the new line.
Baran made no claim of commitments or contracts with
Goverment agencies or other customers and none either of
fiscal or budget allocations for the expansion.
It is also to be noted that on July 19 Respondent
employed 70 percent as many employees as it did on
September 2 (i.e., 48 versus 68) when Respondent argues
that the work force reached the point where it was truly
substantial and representative of the force which would be
' The foregoing conclusions are in full accord with the 387 , E. I DuPont de Nemours and Company, 162 NLRB 413; and
principles adopted by the Board for craft severance cases as Holmberg, Inc., 162 NLRB 407
recently announced in Malltnckrodt Chemical Works, 162 NLRB
WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION 549
ultimately employed. Or measured against the 85
employed at the time of the hearing, there were 55 percent
as many employees on the payroll on July 19, all of whom
were employed in the same job classifications.
Bearing on the bona fides with which the present
contention is advanced are the following facts:
Although Baran claimed that prior recognition demands
were made in mid-May and mid-June, he neither then or on
July 19 objected that the request was premature. Indeed,
Baran made it clear to Fromkin on May 18 that he stood
ready to sign a contract with any union except Hatters,
and he testified that in the June meeting with Lucia and
Schneider he informed them he was willing to sit down
with them provided the Union would do something for his
father in New York City. Furthermore, Baran sought
actively before that time to enlist the interest of other
unions in representing the employees. Indeed, the present
contention was advanced for the first time during the
examination of witnesses at the hearing. 10
I therefore conclude and find that Baran's predictions of
expansion were highly speculative, without sound
business or evidentiary basis, and that Respondent
therefore failed to establish its defense that the Union's
request was prematurely made. Cf. Chrysler Corporation,
104 NLRB 606; Ryan Aeronautical Co., 120 NLRB 1291;
Meramec Mining Company, 134 NLRB 1675.
2. The majority issue; the validity of the authorizations
The parties stipulated to the identities of 40 employees
who were in the unit as of July 19 and stipulated also on
the identities of 13 college students who were to be
excluded from the unit. Left in issue were some seven
"furriers" (whose status was determined in section 1,
supra), and the status of Sylvania Romano as a supervisor.
I find on Romano's credited testimony that though she
was made a supervisor on July 19, it was after the union
representatives made their first demand for recognition. I
therefore find that Romano was within the unit on July 19
but was not within it on July 22 when the second demand
was made. I find further that between July 19 and 22,
Respondent hired two new employees, Sandra Johnson
and Diana Negley, who were in the unit. Thus, there were
48 employees in the unit on July 19 and 49 on July 22.
As of both of said dates, the Union was in possession of
authorization cards signed by some 31 employees" which
bore dates from June 4 through July 15, and sometime
during the last week of July it obtained an additional card
from Shelia Merryweather Witcher. Though the dates
were, with some exceptions, not entered on the cards by
the signatories, the testimony of Lucia, Schneider,
Romano, and of some of the employees' signers
established, and I find, that the signatures were obtained
on or about the dates which appeared on the cards.' z
The authorization cards bore the caption, in large
letters, "Application for membership," and contained the
following unambiguous designation of a collective-
bargaining agent:
I hereby authorize the United Hatters, Cap and
Millinery Workers International Union, its agents or
representatives, to act for me as a collective
bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment.
Because Respondent contends that none of the cards
should be accepted as valid proof of the Union's majority
status, it is necessary to review the testimony concerning
the representations made by the Union's representatives
in obtaining the signatures.
Lucia testified that after explaining the benefits of
unionization, she showed the employees two cards, one the
union membership card and another which authorized a
checkoff of dues. She explained that the membership card
was for the purpose of choosing a collective-bargaining
agent if the employees wanted the Union to represent
them for the purposes of collective bargaining and that the
other card would not be used until recognition was
obtained; that the first step was to ask Baran to recognize
the Union on the basis of the cards to be checked by a
third party, but that if Baran refused, then the Union
would go to an election provided there were no charges
pending.
Romano's testimony was to similar effect.
Conceding that Lucia testified that the employees were
told that the cards would be used either to obtain
recognition or for an election, Respondent argues that
Schneider virtually conceded that the employees were
informed that the cards would be used only to obtain an
election, citing the following testimony:
TRIAL EXAMINER: Specifically, what did you say
to them about the cards?
THE WITNESS: To sign the card so that we can
use these in the event we have to go to an election
through the National Labor Relations Board. This
is what the purpose of the card was, to indicate
membership in our union , to designate us as their
legal bargaining agent.
By Mr. O'Reilly:
Q. Do you recall if anything else was said?
A. Well, we explained the check-off card after we
explained about the membership card.
Q. Do you recall anything further about the
membership cards?
A. In the strictest confidence, not shown to the
employer, and to be used only if we had to go to an
election.
Q. Did you tell anything about its purpose?
10 Respondent 's counsel made no opening statement though
given an opportunity to do so at the conclusion of the General
Counsel's.
Shireen Adams Janice Jackson
Dolores Bargo Marilyn Jones
Jo Ann Beatty Regina Kaminski
Linda Ray Cooptr Jane Kowalkowski
Janet Crytzer Sandra Luzik
Nita D'Amico Sharyn Macarowich
Mary Grace DeAugustine Ethyl Newell
Beatrice Ann Enciso Darlene Peters
Paulette Faust Sylvia Romano
Darla Flemm Elizabeth Jean Ross
Jacqueline Flemm Frances Rozycki
Cindy Franczak Nancy Stone
Elizabeth French Janet Thompson
Sara Haertig Sandra L. Wegner
Shirley Houser Barbara Wright
Sally Johnson
12 Respondent made a strenuous but abortive attempt to
discredit the testimony of the union representatives as to the
periods during which they were engaged in procuring the
signatures by seeking to show that they were not in New
Kensington at times when they testified that they were proceeding
with the campaign. Ultimately, however, Respondent stipulated to
the correctness of the dates of their visits
299-352 0-70-36
550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MR. SCHEINHOLTZ: Objected to as leading.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: The purpose of the card was to
enlist those people who wanted to be members of
the union, to be a matter of record, to prove a
majority if such proof had to be used.
Though Schneider was obviously no model for clarity of
expression, it was apparent from his testimony that though
he told the employees the cards were to be used in the
event the Union found it necessary to go to a Board
election, he also informed them that the purpose of the
card was to indicate membership in the Union and to
designate it as their legal bargaining agent. Thus, his
testimony was in substantial accord with Lucia's and
Romano's, and there is no other evidence in the record
which supports Respondent's contention that the
employees were informed the cards would be used only to
obtain an election, nor is there any evidence which in any
manner contradicts the plain, simple, and unambiguous
designation of the Union as the collective-bargaining agent
of the signatory. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America [Hamburg Shirt Corporation] v. N.L.R.B., 371
F.2d 740 (C.A.D.C ).
I therefore conclude and find that the 32 cards which
were received in evidence all constituted valid
authorizations. As of July 19, the authorizations totalled 31
out of 48 employees. As of July 22, with Romano excluded
as a supervisor and with two new employees on the
payroll, the authorizations totalled 30 out of 49.1.3 Those
majorities were increased by one in the last week of July
by the authorization obtained from Witcher. Thus I
conclude and find that all times on and after July 19, the
Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit.
3. The request to bargain
Lucia and Schneider testified that they informed Baran
on July 19, that the Union represented a majority of the
production and maintenance workers, asked for
recognition, and offered to establish their majority claims
by submitting the cards to some third party, such as a
clergyman, to check the signatures thereon against
Respondent's payroll. Baran refused unless he could see
the cards. When Lucia inquired whether he did not trust a
clergyman, Baran replied that he did not and that he
wanted to see the cards himself. Baran also questioned the
Union's majority and asked why they did not go to an
election. He also began a tirade against the local in New
York City, but Lucia informed him that was a separate
union . At the conclusion of the discussion, Lucia handed
Baran a letter, stating that it was to verify what had been
said in person, but Baran did not open the letter before
they left.
The letter accorded substantially with what Lucia told
Baran orally though it did not specifically designate
production and maintenance employees. However, Lucia
wrote a further letter on July 22, which, in reiterating the
id It may also be noted that even were furriers excluded, the
majority on July 19 was 24 out of 41 employees , and on July 22 it
was 23 out of 42
request for recognition, designated a production and
maintenance unit.
Baran's testimony was not in substantial conflict with
Lucia's and Schneider's, except that he denied that there
was any discussion of the scope of the unit. I credit Lucia's
testimony to the contrary, noting here also Lucia's
credited testimony that she informed Baran at the union
hall on July 14 that the Union wanted only production and
maintenance workers, excluding foreladies, foremen, and
executives. Finally, it is to be noted that in any event the
letter of July 22 would have dispelled any doubt as to the
scope of the unit in which the Union was interested.
4. The refusal; the alleged good-faith doubt
On July 15 Lucia wrote Respondent listing the names of
eight employees who had signed union cards and who
attended the union meeting on July 14, and concluded with
a warning against any reprisals against the employees in
question. On July 22 Lucia wrote Baran listing the names
of five other employees who had signed cards and who had
attended a union meeting on July 21.14
Baran testified that when he met with Lucia and
Schneider on July 19, he did not believe that the Union
represented a majority because the letter of July 15 had
listed the names of only eight employees; Lucia refused to
permit him to see the cards or to tell him how many she
had; the second letter of July 22 listed only five other
employees as having signed; and the letters included the
names of two college girls who were not properly in the
unit.
Respondent also cites Romano's testimony that on the
day she was made a supervisor (July 19) Baran repeatedly
stated that he knew the Union did not have a majority. As
Romano's testimony showed, however, Baran rested his
conclusion in part on what he and Evans had seen during
their surveillance of the union meeting.
Of course, the foregoing evidence is not to be viewed as
standing alone for the question of good faith at the time of
the refusal is "one which of necessity must be determined
in the light of all relevant facts in the case, including any
unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events,
and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful
conduct." Joy Silk Mills, 85 NLRB 1263, 1264, enfd. 185
F.2d 732, 742, cert. denied 341 U.S. 914. Furthermore, it is
well established that one of the essential prerequisites for
a good-faith doubt defense is that it must not have been
raised in a context of illegal antiunion activity. Dayco
Corporation, 157 NLRB 1459; Irving Air Chute Company,
Inc., 149 NLRB 627, enfd. 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2).
The record in the present case establishes, as found in
section C, supra, that beginning in mid-June, upon notice
that the Union was proceeding with its campaign,
Respondent launched upon a course of conduct to prevent
Hatters from organizing the employees. That conduct
included the interrogations, the surveillance of union
activities and meeting, and the promising and granting of
benefits as found above, including the hasty presentation
and installation of the hospitalization program. The record
i" Lucia's testimony , corroborated by other witnesses , was that
she listed in the letters only the names of card signers who were
willing to have their names disclosed to Baran
WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION
showed further that having failed in his efforts to enlist the
interest of other unions," Baran was actively engaged at
the very moment of the request for recognition in the
creation of his own "company union," which he thereafter
dominated and assisted until the time of the hearing.
Furthermore, in late August he solicited employees to start
a petition to repudiate Hatters.
All the foregoing unlawful conduct was aimed directly at
defeating the Union's organizational efforts and
demonstrated that Baran was deadly serious in making
earlier statements that he would recognize any union but
Hatters, Hatters would never get the shop, and its
representatives could not even reach the employees
without his cooperation. Indeed, Baran's adamancy of
purpose was no whit abated by the filing of charges herein
on July 22, for he proceeded to put into effect the earlier
benefits as promised and to complete the creation of his
puppet organization which he actively continued to
support and control to the date of the hearing.
The RM petition added nothing as an indicium of good
faith for it was filed after Respondent was served with the
complaint herein on September 1. Indeed, the only
purpose which is suggested under the circumstances
shown by the record is that Respondent was seeking
thereby to becloud the appropriate unit issue by raising
(belatedly) a claim that furriers were to be excluded. But
even were it assumed that some doubt may have existed
concerning the appropriate unit , it is established law that
such doubt is not a defense to an otherwise meritorious
charge of refusal to bargain where the unit sought is, as
here, a proper one. Southland Paint Co., Inc., 156 NLRB
22, and cases cited; Vaughan-Hicks Buick Co., 161 NLRB
587.
I conclude and find from the entire evidence that the
course of conduct which Respondent engaged in from mid-
June to the date of the hearing was "an absolute refutation
of any good-faith doubt on the part of the Company,"
N.L.R.B. v. Overnite Transportation Co., 308 F.2d 279, 283
(C.A. 4); cf. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732,
742 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914; that its refusal
to bargain with the Union was not motivated by any such
doubt but by its rejection of the collective-bargaining
principle (at least vis-a-vis Hatters) and by its desire to gain
further time in which to continue its unlawful conduct to
undermine the Union and to dissipate its majority. JoySilk
Mills, supra; Dayco Corp., 157 NLRB 1459. I therefore
conclude and find that by refusing to bargain with the
Union on and after July 19, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By dominating and interfering with the formation and
administration of the Grievance Committee and by
15 Baran 's vague claims that other unions were interested in the
employees were wholly unsupported Steelworkers twice
disclaimed any interest in the face of Baran 's invitations to
Ivanusic, and there was no evidence that any other union made
any organizational attempt or signed up a single employee.
Indeed, Baran admitted that no other union demanded
551
contributing assistance and support to it, Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
3. All of Respondent's production and maintenance
employees, including all office clerical employees and
guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined
in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act
4. At all times on and after July 19, 1966, the Union has
been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
all of the employees in the aforesaid unit.
5. By refusing on and after July 19 and 22 to bargain
with the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action of the
type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as
provided in the Recommended Order below, which I find
to be necessary to remedy and to remove the effects of the
unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act. Because of Respondent's avowed antipathy to the
Union, its avowed intent never to recognize Hatters, and
the flagrancy of the conduct by which it sought to prevent
the unionization of its employees, I shall recommend a
broad cease-and-desist order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
West Penn Hat & Cap Corporation, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating coercively its employees concerning
union activities and attendance at union meetings.
(b) Soliciting employees to ascertain the union
membership of other employees.
(c) Engaging in surveillance of union activities and
meetings or in conduct which is calculated to create the
impression of surveillance.
(d) Promising and granting benefits to employees for
the purpose of interfering with or restraining union or
other concerted activities.
(e) Soliciting the assistance of employees to circulate
petitions to disavow the Union.
(f) Dominating, interfering with the formation and
administration of, and contributing assistance and support
to the Grievance Committee, or any other labor
organization of its employees.
(g) Refusing to bargain with the Union, upon request, as
the collective-bargaining representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit.
recognition and that Amalgamated Clothing Workers, for
example, "pulled out" when Hatters showed up. Finally, Evans'
solicitation of employee backing for Steelworkers despite
Ivanusic's repeated disclaimers further evidenced the hypocrisy
of asserted "rival claims
552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist United Hatters, Cap &
Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and
completely disestablish, the Grievance Committee, or any
successor thereto, as a bargaining representative of its
employees.
(b) Bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment of its employees in the
appropriate unit herein found and embody in a signed
agreement any agreement which may be reached.
(c) Post at its offices and plant at New Kensington,
Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."" Copies of said notice, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed
by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith."
i' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
i7 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to ascertain the
union membership of other employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of union
activities or meetings or engage in other conduct
which is calculated to create the impression of
surveillance.
WE WILL NOT promise or grant benefits to
employees for the purpose of interfering with or
restraining union or other concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT solicit the assistance of employees to
circulate a petition to disavow United Hatters, Cap &
Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization of our employees.
WE WILL NOT dominate, interfere with the
formation and administration of, or contribute
assistance and support to the Grievance Committee,
or any other labor organization of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL permanently withdraw and withhold all
recognition from the Grievance Committee, or any
successor thereto, and completely disestablish it as a
bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with
United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of our employees in the appropriate
unit concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment,
and will embody in a signed agreement any agreement
which may be reached. The appropriate unit is:
T4a All our production and maintenance employees,
excluding all office clerical employees and guards,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WEST PENN HAT& CAP
CORPORATION
(Employer)
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate coercively our employees
concerning their union activities or attendance at
union meetings.
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1536 Federal
Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
15222, Telephone 644-2969.