Vathsala Srinivasan, Complainant,v.Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 23, 2000
01986951 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 23, 2000)

01986951

03-23-2000

Vathsala Srinivasan, Complainant, v. Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,) Agency.


Vathsala Srinivasan v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

01986951

March 23, 2000

Vathsala Srinivasan, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01986951

) Agency No. 09400029LA

Ida L. Castro, )

Chairwoman, )

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,)

Agency. )

________________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from the final agency decision concerning her equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, which alleged discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. �2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. The appeal is accepted by the

Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.<1>

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether complainant has established that the

agency discriminated against her on the bases of color (brown), religion

(Hindu), sex (female), national origin (Asian/East Indian), age (42),

and physical disability (need for water after talking for long periods)

when she was not selected for the position of Investigator, GS-1810-5/7,

at the agency's Los Angeles District Office.

BACKGROUND

In a complaint dated December 22, 1993, complainant, then an applicant

for Federal employment, alleged that the agency discriminated against

her as delineated in the above-entitled statement "Issue Presented,"

based on both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories

of discrimination. The agency conducted an investigation, provided

complainant with a copy of the investigative report, and advised

complainant of her right to request either a hearing before an

Administrative Judge<2> (AJ) or an immediate final agency decision (FAD).

Complainant requested a hearing. Subsequently, both parties filed

motions for summary judgment.<3> The AJ granted the agency's motion,

and thereafter issued a recommended decision (RD), without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.<4> On August 12, 1998, the agency adopted

the finding in the RD and issued a FAD finding no discrimination.

It is from this decision that complainant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment Claim

In any proceeding, either administrative or judicial, involving an

allegation of discrimination, it is the burden of the complainant to

initially establish that there is some substance to his or her allegation.

In order to accomplish this burden the complainant must establish a

prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). This means that complainant herein must

present a body of evidence such that, were it not rebutted, the trier of

fact could conclude that unlawful discrimination did occur. The burden

then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

explanation for its action. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In this regard, the agency need only produce

evidence sufficient "to allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude"

that the agency's action was not based on unlawful discrimination. Id. at

257. Once the agency has articulated such a reason, the question becomes

whether the proffered explanation was the true reason for the agency's

action, or merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). Although the burden of production,

in other words, "going forward," may shift, the burden of persuasion,

by a preponderance of the evidence, remains at all times on complainant.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. This analysis, developed in the context of

Title VII proceedings, also applies to cases arising under the ADEA.

Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1981).

Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination as to

color, religion, sex, national origin, and age. The record reflects

that the four selectees for Investigator positions were a white female,

age 24; a black male, age 39; a white female, age 25; and a black female,

age 32, none of whom were of Asian/East Indian national origin.

Courts have adopted and applied the Title VII burdens of proof, see supra,

to disability discrimination. See Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th

Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).

In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was

treated differently than individuals not within her protected group,

or that the agency failed to make a needed reasonable accommodation,

resulting in adverse treatment of complainant. See Sisson v. Helms,

751 F.2d 991, 992-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).

As a threshold matter, appellant must establish that she is a "qualified

individual with disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.

The Act's implementing regulation defines "individual with disability"

as a person who has, has a record of, or is regarded as having a physical

or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of that

person's major life activities: self-care, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

29 C.F.R. ��1630.2(g)-(j).<5> The regulation defines a "qualified

individual with disability" as a person "who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in

question ...." 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(m).

Complainant has not established that she is an "individual with

disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. She identified

her putative disability as "need for water after talking long periods."

While speaking is considered a major life activity, see supra, there is

no evidence from which to conclude that the need to drink water after

talking for long periods constitutes a substantial impairment of her

ability to speak. Because complainant has not established that she is an

"individual with disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act, she is not entitled to the Act's protection, and the Commission

will not consider this portion of her complaint any further.

The burden now shifts to the agency to proffer a legitimate,

non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. The agency explained

that complainant was determined to possess the minimum qualifications

for the position, based upon complainant's education, background,

and "Administrative Careers with America" (ACWA) examination score.

Candidates were divided into a competitive list and a non-competitive

list, which included "Outstanding Scholar" candidates who had graduated

in the top 10 percent of his or her college graduating class or had a

3.5 or better grade-point average on a 4.0 scale. The agency noted

that complainant never submitted the necessary documentation to be

considered as an Outstanding Scholar. Her name ultimately was placed

on the competitive list.

A four-member panel, consisting of a Supervisory Investigator and

three Senior Investigators, interviewed 8 candidates from each list,

including complainant. All candidates were asked the same set of

questions, which were intended to assess the candidate's people skills,

knowledge, and experience to conduct effective investigations of EEO

charges. The summary rating of complainant's interview prepared by the

panelists was: "[B]elow average interview, no practical experience in

EEO laws other than personal research, excellent work history but little

relevance to EEOC." By contrast, of the selectees, one was selected

non-competitively as an Outstanding Scholar; and the others had either

prior investigative experience or experience with EEO law, or both.

This explanation is sufficient to meet the agency's burden.

At this point, the burden shifts back to complainant to establish

that the agency's explanation is a mere pretext for discrimination.

The administrative judge found that complainant had adduced no evidence

in support of a finding of pretext, only conclusory statements regarding

her belief that she had been discriminated against, which led him to

grant the agency's motion for summary judgment.

Complainant's main argument in support of pretext is that she "did very

well in the interview," noting that no adverse comments appear in the

interview notes. Complainant, however, overlooks the summary of her

interview included with those notes which, as set forth above, states,

"[B]elow average interview, no practical experience in EEO laws other than

personal research, excellent work history but little relevance to EEOC."

A second argument raised by complainant is that she should have been

considered under the Outstanding Scholar Program. The record, however,

reflects that complainant did not submit the necessary documentation for

such consideration.<6> The Commission finds that complainant has not

submitted evidence bearing on pretext sufficient to create a triable

issue of material fact, and that complainant has not established her

claim of disparate treatment discrimination.

Disparate Impact Theory

In order to establish disparate impact discrimination, complainant must

show that a facially neutral practice of the agency has a disproportionate

effect on a protected group of which she is a member. See, e.g.,

Stocker v. Dept. of the Interior, EEOC Petition No. 03970086 (May 7,

1998). In order to show that a challenged practice disproportionately

impacts members of a protected group, complainant must: (1) identify

the specific practice or practices being challenged; (2) show relevant

statistical disparities; and (3) show that the disparities are related

to the challenged practice. Id.

Complainant alleged that during the four years preceding October

31, 1995,<7> the agency's Los Angeles District Office hired several

candidates for the position of Investigator, none of whom were East

Indian and "a disproportionate higher number of blacks for the position."

The record reflects that during that time period, the agency's Los

Angeles District Office hired nine GS-7 Investigators: 3 white, 3

black, 1 Native American, 1 Asian/Pacific Islander, and 1 Hispanic.

As noted by the AJ, however, not only is the sample presented so

small as to be of little probative value, but complainant presented

no statistical evidence regarding the available qualified labor pool.

Further, complainant did not identify a facially neutral practice that

disparately affected members of her protected groups; for example,

an educational requirement for the position at issue. Accordingly,

her claim of disparate impact discrimination is not established.

The Commission notes that on appeal complainant has challenged the

qualifications and the fairness of the Administrative Judge assigned to

her case. First, the Commission notes that, contrary to complainant's

argument, Administrative Judges are not required to be members of the

Federal judiciary. Second, with regard to the allegation of bias,

substantial showing of personal bias on the part of the AJ is required

to obtain a ruling that the administrative hearing was unfair. Roberts

v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir. 1977); cert. denied sub nom.,

Roberts v. Andrus, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Pendleton v. FDIC, EEOC Appeal

No. 01940271 (August 9, 1994).

Complainant argued that the AJ "had a mental block because of his dogged

belief that cases are won because of the attorneys who are behind the

cases and not because of the strength of the facts in those cases[.]"

Complainant cites in support of her argument a comment allegedly uttered

by the AJ during a telephonic conference, during which complainant

asserts the AJ "insisted" that she retain counsel, referring to a famous

case and asking complainant whether she thought the individual involved

in that case would have prevailed without the assistance of counsel.

Complainant also accuses the AJ of "fraud and deceit" in that "[R]ather

than evaluating the facts in the original record objectively, the AJ

had chosen to simply copy down the agency's representative's arguments

in his decision."

Even assuming that the AJ did, in fact, encourage complainant to retain

counsel, it does not of necessity follow that he was biased against her

because she did not. Neither the evidence of record nor complainant's

arguments produces a substantial showing of personal bias.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the final agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 23, 2000

DATE Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________ __________________________

1In the instant matter, the EEOC is both the appellee agency and the

appellate arbiter. The Commission's appellate function is separate from,

and independent of, those offices responsible for processing and resolving

in-house discrimination complaints. Hereinafter, the appellate arbiter

will be referred to as "the Commission," and "the agency" will refer

to the EEOC in its capacity as the appellee agency. Chairwoman Ida

L. Castro has recused herself from participation in this decision.

2Where a hearing is requested, a case ordinarily is assigned to an

EEOC AJ. However, when the EEOC is the respondent agency, the case is

assigned to an AJ not employed by the EEOC.

3During the pendency of the motions, complainant alleged that the agency

further discriminated against her in reprisal for the complaint at bar

by failing to consider her for other Investigator positions at the Los

Angeles District Office. The AJ addressed this matter in his decision,

noting that no Investigator positions were filled at the Los Angeles

District Office subsequent to complainant filing the instant complaint.

4At the time this case was heard, the Commission's regulations provided

that the decision of an AJ was "recommended." On November 9, 1999,

revised regulations governing the EEOC's Federal sector complaint

process went into effect. These regulations apply to all Federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov. In relevant part, the revised

regulations provide that the decision of an AJ is binding on both parties,

subject to appeal to the Commission. 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37657 (1999),

to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(i).

5The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by Federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website at www.eeoc.gov.

6Such documentation does exist in the record, but was submitted by

complainant during the investigation, nearly two years after the

non-selection at issue.

7The significance of this date is not readily apparent.