University of Great Falls

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1663 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

UNIVERSITY OF GREAT FALLS 1663
University of Great Falls and Montana Federation of
Teachers, AFT, AFL–CIO. Case 19–CA–26031
August 31, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
This case presents issues of first impression before the
Board: whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)1 applies to proceedings under the National La-
bor Relations Act, and if it does, whether the Board’s
assertion of jurisdiction over the Respondent would vio-
late RFRA. For the reasons set forth below, we find that
RFRA is applicable to Board proceedings and that the
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Respondent
does not conflict with RFRA.
The Respondent is a university that was founded in
1932 by the Catholic religious order of the Sisters of
Providence, St. Ignatius Province (the Order). In this
refusal-to-bargain proceeding, the Respondent challenges
the Board’s certification of the Union as the bargaining
representative of a unit of the Respondent’s faculty. Pur-
suant to a timely charge, the Acting General Counsel of
the Board issued a complaint on July 21, 1998, alleging
that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing the Un-
ion's request to bargain following the Union's certifica-
tion in Case 19–RC–13114. (Official notice is taken of
the "record" in the representation proceeding as defined
in the Board's Rules and Regulations, Secs. 102.68 and
102.69(g); Frontier Hotel, 265 NLRB 343 (1982).) The
Respondent filed an answer admitting in part and deny-
ing in part the allegations in the complaint.
On August 31, 1998, the Acting General Counsel filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 1,
1998, the Board issued an order transferring the proceed-
ing to the Board and a Notice to Show Cause why the
motion should not be granted. The Respondent filed a
response.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
In its answer to the complaint and its response to the
General Counsel’s motion, the Respondent admits its
refusal to bargain, but attacks the validity of the certifica-
tion, asserting that the Board’s unit determination was
erroneous and that the Board improperly asserted juris-
diction over the Respondent in the representation case.
Specifically, the Respondent reiterates its contentions,
raised and rejected in the underlying representation pro-
ceeding, that the unit is inappropriate both because the
Respondent’s faculty are not employees within the mean-
ing of the Act, but rather are managers under NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), and because the
unit does not include the eight faculty members who
serve as deans. Further, the Respondent renews its ar-
gument, rejected by the Regional Director and the Board
in the representation proceeding, that the Board lacks
jurisdiction over the Respondent because it is a relig-
iously operated institution that is not subject to the Act,
according to the principles of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Respondent also
renews its contention that, even assuming that Catholic
Bishop is no bar to the assertion of jurisdiction, requiring
it to engage in collective bargaining with the Union
would violate its rights under RFRA.

1 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb.
A. Application of RFRA to Board Proceedings
In its Decision on Review and Order in the underlying
representation case, the Board held that the question of
whether assertion of jurisdiction over the Respondent
would violate RFRA was moot, in light of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores, 519 U.S.
1088 (1997). In Flores, the Court held that Congress
lacked the authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose RFRA on state and local govern-
ments, and therefore RFRA was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to state and local law. In its response to the Notice
to Show Cause, the Respondent argues that the RFRA
issue is not moot as it pertains to this proceeding because
Flores did not address RFRA’s applicability to the fed-
eral government and federal laws.
In view of the Respondent’s assertions, the Board in-
vited the parties to file briefs on the question of whether
RFRA is applicable to Board proceedings. The General
Counsel and the Respondent timely filed briefs.2 Having
duly considered the briefs and the record in this case, we
find that we must assume that RFRA is constitutional as
it applies to the National Labor Relations Act and Board
proceedings. The Board has recognized that it is beyond
its authority, as an administrative agency, to adjudicate
the constitutionality of congressional enactments; that is
a matter left to the courts.3 Further, we note that in
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d
854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 811 (1998), the
Eighth Circuit held that Flores addressed only the consti-
tutionality of RFRA as applied to state law, and that
RFRA falls within Congress’s broad, substantive power
under Article I of the Constitution and therefore is con-
stitutional as applied to federal statutes.4
).
2 The Association of Southern Baptist Colleges and Schools and Ameri-
can Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities filed
an amicus curiae brief in support of the Respondent, and Pacific Union
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, North Pacific Union Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, Church State Council, Adventist Health, Loma
Linda University, and Loma Linda University Medical Center filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of the Respondent.
3 See Handy Andy, 228 NLRB 447, 452 (1977); Local 1149,
Carpenters, 221 NLRB 456, 461 (1975
4 In addition, in Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192
F.3d 826 (1999), the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Flores did not invalidate RFRA as applied to federal law. Two
331 NLRB No. 188
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1664
B. Legality under RFRA of the Assertion of Jurisdiction
in this Case
RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability,” unless “it dem-
onstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1. Thus, the
threshold issue which we must address under RFRA is
whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the Respondent
here would result in a “substantial burden” on the Respon-
dent’s free exercise of its religious tenets.
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court had held that a state
does not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment by enforcing a neutral law of general
application against religiously motivated conduct. In
particular, the Court rejected a contention that such an
application of law was unconstitutional absent a showing
of compelling governmental interest. In RFRA, Con-
gress sought to restore the “compelling interest” standard
which had been employed in pre-Smith First Amendment
decisions, but it did not eliminate the rule that one who
challenges a governmental action must show that it con-
stitutes a “substantial burden” on religious practices in
order to make out a free exercise claim. Instead, it is
clear from the legislative history of RFRA that Congress
intended that courts would “look to free exercise cases
prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether the
exercise of religion has been substantially burdened.”5
The pre-Smith decision that guides the Board when
free exercise claims are raised is the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Catholic Bishop, supra. In Catholic Bishop,
the Supreme Court held that the Board could not assert
jurisdiction with respect to lay teachers in church-
operated schools because to do so would create a “sig-
nificant risk” that First Amendment rights would be in-
fringed. 440 U.S. at 507. The Court found that Congress
had not expressed an affirmative intention that teachers
in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act,
and, in the absence of such an affirmative intention, it
was advisable to avoid the serious constitutional ques-
tions that would be posed by the Board’s assertion of
jurisdiction over those schools. Id. at 501. Catholic
Bishop involved schools directly operated by the Catho-

other federal Appeals Courts have assumed, without deciding, that
RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law. Adams v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) and Alamo v.
Clay, 137 F.3d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5 S. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1993). The House Re-
port echoes this intention: “This bill is not a codification of any prior
free exercise [of religion] decision, but rather the restoration of the
legal standard that was applied in those [court] decisions.” H.R. Rep.
No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. fn. 11, at 7 (1993).
lic Bishop of Chicago and the Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend, Indiana, which, in addition to their secular
purposes, had religious missions, including the religious
instruction of students who had demonstrated a potential
for the priesthood or for Christian leadership.
In finding that Board jurisdiction over lay teachers in
schools directly operated by churches would necessarily
involve a significant risk of infringement of First
Amendment rights, the Court noted the “critical and
unique role” of teachers in fulfilling the “religious mis-
sion” of church-operated schools. Id. at 501. The Court
held that the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over
church-operated schools for a unit of lay teachers could
impact on religious exercise in two ways. First, the
Board might impinge on constitutional rights by inquir-
ing into the good faith of assertions by clergy-
administrators that actions alleged to be unfair labor
practices were mandated by the school’s religious creed.
Id. at 502. Second, the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction
would require the Board to determine what are the terms
and conditions of teachers’ employment, in order to de-
fine the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining for
the church-operated school. The Court reasoned that the
resulting collective-bargaining obligation would neces-
sarily encroach on the position of management regarding
issues that, for a school of substantially religious charac-
ter, inevitably implicate First Amendment concerns. Id.
at 502–503. The Court noted its observation in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), that parochial schools
involve “substantial religious activity and purpose” and
that their religious character necessarily gives rise to re-
ligious entanglements of the type the Constitution seeks
to avoid. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 503.
Accordingly, the Court in Catholic Bishop found that it
was “not compelled to determine whether the entangle-
ment [with religion] is excessive” under constitutional
standards because, even if it was not, the Board should
not exercise jurisdiction over a school with “substantial
religious character” and thereby create a “serious risk
that the First Amendment will be infringed” absent clear
Congressional intent to regulate such schools.
Since Catholic Bishop, the Board has decided on a
case-by-case basis whether a religion-affiliated school
has a “substantial religious character” and therefore
whether the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction would
present a significant risk of infringing on that employer’s
First Amendment rights. The Board has not relied solely
on the employer’s affiliation with a religious organiza-
tion, but rather has evaluated the purpose of the em-
ployer’s operations, the role of the unit employees in
effectuating that purpose, and the potential effects if the
Board exercised jurisdiction. The Board considers such
factors as the involvement of the religious institution in
the daily operation of the school, the degree to which the
school has a religious mission and curriculum, and
whether religious criteria are used for the appointment
UNIVERSITY OF GREAT FALLS 1665
and evaluation of faculty. See Ecclesiastical Mainte-
nance Services, 325 NLRB 629, 630 (1998).
For example, in Jewish Day School of Greater Washing-
ton, 283 NLRB 757 (1987), the Board applied these factors
and concluded that it should not assert jurisdiction over a
school for a unit of its teachers, where there was “abundant
evidence” that the school’s purpose and function was the
propagation of a religious faith. The Board stressed that the
school effectuated its mission of promoting Jewish principles
“by the substantial suffusion of religion into the curriculum.”
Supra, at 761. The Board noted in Jewish Day School that
the Court’s analysis in Catholic Bishop repeatedly empha-
sized a school’s religious purpose rather than its affiliation
with a religious organization.
Similarly, in St. Joseph’s College, 282 NLRB 65 (1986),
the Board found that it lacked jurisdiction over the em-
ployer, which was founded by the Catholic Sisters of
Mercy, because it was church-operated within the meaning
of Catholic Bishop. The evidence demonstrated that the
Sisters of Mercy exercised administrative and financial con-
trol over the college, and that the college’s mission was
inextricably interwoven with the indisputably religious mis-
sion of the Order. In addition, the Board pointed to the reli-
gious requirements that were imposed on the college’s fac-
ulty as another factor militating against the assertion of ju-
risdiction. Thus, the Board concluded that the nature of the
college was likely to involve the Board in impermissible
inquiries into religious beliefs.
On the other hand, in Livingstone College, 286 NLRB
1308 (1987), the Board found that assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a college affiliated with the African Methodist
Episcopal (AME) Zion Church would not create the
same significant risk of entanglement between church
and state as that envisioned by the Court in Catholic
Bishop. The Board found that the purpose of the college
was primarily secular, that the college was not finan-
cially dependent on the Church, and that the Church was
not involved in the day-to-day administration of the col-
lege. The Board deemed it particularly significant that
the college’s faculty members were not required to con-
form to Church doctrine or promote the Church’s ideals,
nor were they prohibited from knowingly inculcating
ideas that are contrary to the Church’s position on mat-
ters of faith and morals. In sum, the Board held that
“[t]he absence of a religious mission, and the absence of
a requirement that the faculty propagate or conform to a
particular religious faith significantly diminishes any risk
of impermissible constitutional infringement posed by
asserting jurisdiction over the College.” Supra, at 1310.
Thus, in accord with the Supreme Court’s analysis, the
Board’s Catholic Bishop test requires the avoidance of
even a “substantial risk of infringement.” Necessarily,
therefore the Board’s test avoids creating an actual “sub-
stantial burden” on religious rights as defined by free
exercise cases prior to Smith and within the meaning of
RFRA. In applying the Catholic Bishop test, the Board
avoids imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion by asserting jurisdiction over religion-
affiliated schools only where that would present no sig-
nificant risk of infringement of religious rights. The fun-
damental policy interests underlying Catholic Bishop are
the same as those underlying RFRA, and when the Board
properly asserts jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop, it has
acted consistently with the requirements of RFRA by
insuring that the threshold level of “substantial burden”
under RFRA is never approached.
Accordingly, RFRA does not require the Board to alter
the analysis that it has consistently undertaken under
Catholic Bishop in determining whether the Board’s as-
sertion of jurisdiction over an employer would involve a
significant risk of infringement of First Amendment
rights. Inasmuch as RFRA prohibits only those govern-
mental actions that “substantially burden” the free exer-
cise of religion, it follows that when the Board applies
Catholic Bishop and finds that the exercise of the
Board’s jurisdiction over an employer involves no sig-
nificant risk of infringement of religious rights, RFRA’s
purposes have been considered and satisfied, as well.6
Here, in the underlying representation case, the Board
upheld the Regional Director’s finding that the Respon-
dent is not a church-operated institution within the mean-
ing of Catholic Bishop. In making this finding, the Re-
gional Director examined and relied on a number of fac-
tors. The Regional Director found that neither the Order
nor the Catholic Church is involved directly in the day-
to-day administration of the University, including such
matters as hiring and firing of faculty, modifying the
curriculum, and purchasing educational supplies and
materials. In this regard, the Respondent’s board of trus-
tees, which is overwhelmingly composed of lay persons,7
possesses the final approval authority on such personnel
matters as faculty sabbaticals, tenure, and promotions, as
well as on financial, academic, and student affairs issues.
Further, the evidence shows that the Respondent is not
financially dependent on the Order or the Church.
Most significantly, the Regional Director found that
the propagation of a religious faith is not the primary
purpose of the Respondent, but rather that the Univer-
sity’s purpose and function are primarily secular. In so
finding, the Regional Director relied, among other things,
on the following: (1) the curriculum does not require the
Catholic faith to be emphasized, nor is there in fact a
particular emphasis on Catholicism; (2) the Respondent’s
board of trustees is not required to establish policies con-
sistent with the Catholic religion; (3) the University’s
president and other administrators are lay persons who

6 In fact, the Employer concedes that the Board’s Catholic Bishop
standard is a stricter test than that required by RFRA: “[Catholic
Bishop is] a doctrine requiring a higher evidentiary religious standard
than that called for by RFRA.” (page 31 of its Memorandum of Law).
7 Sixteen of the 19 members of the board are lay persons, and board
members are not required to be Catholic.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1666
need not be members of the Catholic faith; (4) faculty
members are not required to be Catholics, to teach
Church doctrine, or to support the Church or its teach-
ings; (5) students may come from any religious back-
ground, and no preference is given to applicants of the
Catholic faith; of approximately 1450 students, only
about 32 percent are Catholic; and (6) although under-
graduate students are required to take one course in reli-
gious studies, the course does not have to be one involv-
ing Catholicism.
Accordingly, unlike the factual situations presented in
Jewish Day School and St. Joseph’s College, the Re-
gional Director had ample grounds for his conclusion
that the Respondent does not have a “substantial reli-
gious character” as did the schools involved in Catholic
Bishop. The Board therefore agreed in the underlying
representation proceeding with the Regional Director
that, as in Livingstone College, the Respondent is not
involved with a religious institution in such a way that
the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction would even create a
significant risk that First Amendment rights will be in-
fringed. As explained above, it logically follows from
that finding that the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over
the Respondent would not “substantially burden” the free
exercise of religion, within the meaning of RFRA.
Accordingly, because the Respondent has not shown
that the Board’s certification of the Union as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the Respondent’s unit
employees would substantially burden its exercise of
religion, we need not address RFRA’s additional re-
quirements that any such burden further a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. Thus, we find that RFRA does
not bar the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Re-
spondent and our ability to order the Respondent to bar-
gain with the Union.
All other representation issues raised by the Respon-
dent were or could have been litigated in the prior repre-
sentation proceeding. The Respondent does not offer to
adduce at a hearing any newly discovered and previously
unavailable evidence, nor does it allege any special cir-
cumstances that would require the Board to reexamine
the decision made in the representation proceeding. We
therefore find that the Respondent has not raised any
representation issue that is properly litigable in this un-
fair labor practice proceeding. See Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941). Accord-
ingly, we grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.8
On the entire record, the Board makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent, a State of Mon-
tana corporation, with an office and place of business in

8 The Respondent’s cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Great Falls, Montana, is engaged in the operation of a
private nonprofit university. During the 12-month period
preceding issuance of the complaint, the Respondent in
conducting its business operations described above, de-
rived gross revenues in excess of $1 million, and pur-
chased and received at its Great Falls, Montana facility,
products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers outside the State of Mon-
tana. We find that the Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Certification
Following the mail ballot election held between March 8
and March 29, 1996, the Union was certified on January 8,
1998, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time faculty including professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors and associ-
ate faculty and all part-time associate faculty employed
by University of Great Falls in Great Falls, Montana,
but excluding part-time adjunct faculty, deans, nonpro-
fessional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
The Union continues to be the exclusive representative
under Section 9(a) of the Act.
B. Refusal to Bargain
Since on about April 15, 1998, the Union has re-
quested the Respondent to bargain, and, since April 15,
1998, the Respondent has refused. We find that this re-
fusal constitutes an unlawful refusal to bargain in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By refusing on and after April 15, 1998, to bargain
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the appropriate unit, the
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and
desist, to bargain on request with the Union, and, if an
understanding is reached, to embody the understanding
in a signed agreement.
To ensure that the employees are accorded the services of
their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by
the law, we shall construe the initial period of the certifica-
tion as beginning the date the Respondent begins to bargain
in good faith with the Union. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136
NLRB 785 (1962); Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229
(1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379
UNIVERSITY OF GREAT FALLS 1667
U.S. 817 (1964); Burnett Construction Co., 149 NLRB
1419, 1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, University of Great Falls, Great Falls, Mon-
tana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain with Montana Federation of
Teachers, AFT, AFL–CIO, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate unit on terms and conditions of employment, and if
an understanding is reached, embody the understanding
in a signed agreement:
All full-time faculty including professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors and associ-
ate faculty and all part-time associate faculty employed
by University of Great Falls in Great Falls, Montana,
but excluding part-time adjunct faculty, deans, nonpro-
fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Great Falls, Montana, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19,
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since April 15, 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring.
I do not agree with my colleagues that the Board has
no authority to pass on the constitutionality of Congres-
sional enactments. As a federal official in a quasi-
judicial role, I believe that I have the authority, and in-
deed the obligation, to take cognizance of all law of the
land. Clearly, the U.S. Constitution is a part of that law.
Indeed, it is the supreme law of the land. Thus, I must
consider that law.
In doing so, I will follow the prudent policy of seeking
to construe Congressional legislation in a manner that
will avoid a “significant risk” of conflict with the Consti-
tution.10 However, in instances where that construction
is not “fairly possible,” there is no way to avoid the con-
stitutional issue.11 In such cases, I must confront the
constitutional issue. In doing so, I will presume that
Congress acted in a constitutional manner, and thus I will
place the burden on the party who challenges the consti-
tutionality of the legislation.
In the instant case, I agree with my colleagues that as-
sertion of jurisdiction over the Respondent will not create
a “significant risk” of conflict with the Constitution.
Thus, there is no need to construe the word “Employer”
in Section 2(2) of the Act to exclude the Respondent.
Phrased differently, Section 2(2) is constitutional as ap-
plied to the Respondent.
I also agree with my colleagues that RFRA is constitu-
tional as applied to federal law, and that the Respondent
has not met the threshold burden of showing that asser-
tion of jurisdiction would “substantially burden” the Re-
spondent’s First Amendment rights.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Montana Fed-
eration of Teachers, AFT, AFL–CIO, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union and put
in writing and sign any agreement reached on terms and
conditions of employment for our employees in the bar-
gaining unit:
10 Edward J. DeBartolo v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 157 (1983); NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500-501 (1979).
11 Edward J. DeBartolo, ibid.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1668
All full-time faculty including professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors and associ-
ate faculty and all part-time associate faculty employed
by us in Great Falls, Montana, but excluding part-time
adjunct faculty, deans, nonprofessional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act.
UNIVERSITY OF GREAT FALLS