United States Pipe & Foundry Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1969

180 N.L.R.B. 325 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

UNITED STATES PIPE & FOUNDRY CO.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co. and Local 155 of
the International Molders and Allied Workers
Union , AFL-CIO, CLC. Case lO-CA-6875
December 16, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA
On January 15, 1968, Trial Examiner Frederick
U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent, Charging Party, and
General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting
brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the
Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., Chattanooga, Tennessee, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order.
MEMBER ZAGORIA, dissenting:
Although the Trial Examiner's reasoning in this
case, adopted by my colleagues, has substantial logic
and appeal, in my view it falls short of resolving the
issue in this case in a manner best calculated to
serve the interests of the parties and the public. The
Employer here has had a long amicable relationship
with the Union, characterized throughout by
good-faith bargaining. In the bargaining sessions
preceding the events in this case, a bona fide
impasse was reached. Although not required to do
so, the Employer, with the Union's acquiescence,
put certain benefits, including a wage increase, into
effect pending agreement on a contract. Had he so
desired, having reached impasse , the Employer could
lawfully, as the Trial Examiner points out, have
locked out its employees pending the Union's
acceptance of the Employer's offer and agreement
on a contract. American Ship Building Company v.
N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, so holds. The Employer,
325
however, chose on December 19, 1966, to cancel the
temporary increase in benefits that were then in
effect, returning to the wage rates in effect under the
previous contract and to cancel certain benefits, e.g.,
paid holidays, jury duty pay, and premium pay,
until, and only until, agreement was reached on a
contract. The Company further indicated its
willingness to continue to bargain and, indeed,
further bargaining sessions resulted in agreement
between the parties, with terms somewhat more
favorable to the Union than had been offered by the
Employer at the time impasse was reached.'
The Employer's temporary reduction in employee
benefits, reasons the Trial Examiner, was unlawful
because it put pressure upon them while not at the
same time subjecting the Employer to the pressures
inherent in a full lockout; i.e., his employees'
absence from work and the consequent impediment
to his own operations. Furthermore, Trial Examiner
Reel points out, the employees wishing to protest
the temporary changes by striking against them
would be subject to replacement, and hence in a
worse position than had they been locked out. The
Trial Examiner does point out that "It may be
argued that had the employees stopped work
altogether to protest the loss of holiday pay, etc.,
the law would view them as protesting a partial
lockout and not as strikers vulnerable to
replacement." He concludes, however, that he
"know[s] of no authority to that effect," and that it
would be harsh "to expect such foresight from
employees. . . ." By the same token, of course, the
question whether a temporary reduction in benefits
instituted to help persuade employees to accept an
employer's offer is a violation has "no authority to
that effect." Since we are writing on a clean slate, I
feel free to consider the desirability of the various
approaches.
I find it preferable to permit an employer
temporarily to reduce benefits for the purpose of
putting economic pressure on employees in aid of
good-faith bargaining, and at the same time to give
the employees the choice of going on strike when
this happens without incurring the risk of
replacement. In effect, the employees who struck
would be constructively (though lawfully) locked
out. This approach would have several effects: First,
it permits the employer to use a form of economic
pressure much less drastic than a full lockout.
Second, it permits a continued production flow, thus
benefiting not only the general public, but also all
employees of other companies whose welfare is tied
to that of the company involved. Third, and most
significantly, it gives the employees the effective
choice of whether to continue to work with reduced
benefits, or to stop work, without the risk of
replacement, once the employer has fired the first
shot in the economic warfare. My colleagues' result
On January 31, 1967, the Employer locked out the 591 unit employees.
The lockout ended May 13, 1967, when the agreement was reached.
180 NLRB No. 61
326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
also permits the employees to strike without fear of
replacement, by making the temporary reduction an
unfair labor practice and hence a strike to protect it
an unfair labor practice strike. But none of the other
beneficial purposes of my proposal are achieved by
their solution, for once it is held, as it is by the
majority here, that the temporary reduction is
unlawful, and the employer has to reimburse the
employees pro tanto, that is the end of this
particular economic weapon. Complete lockout will
henceforth be the employer's only legitimate
weapon. Anything less will be banned. And both
sides will suffer. Indeed, under the majority view
employees will not even have a choice. Had the
employer here told his employees that he could lock
them out, but if they chose, would instead adopt the
lesser economic pressure of reducing benefits and
continuing in operation, that would obviously be
lawful. My suggestion would accomplish this. For
these reasons, I would dismiss the complaint.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner : This case,
originating with a charge filed March 13, 1967, and a
complaint issued the following September 15, was
submitted at Chattanooga , Tennessee , on November 21,
1967, on a record consisting of the formal papers plus a
stipulation of facts with attendant exhibits. At issue is (1)
whether Respondent , herein called the Company, violated
Section 8 (a)(1), (3), or (5) of the Act when, after
bargaining to an impasse with the Charging Party , herein
called the Union , the Company in an effort to compel
acceptance of its proposed contract instituted certain
temporary reductions in wages and related benefits below
those previously enjoyed by the employees or offered by
the Company , and (2) if so, whether the Company by
subsequently imposing a lockout for the same purpose
violated Section 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Upon the stipulated record , and after due consideration
of the briefs filed by each of the parties , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Company, a New Jersey corporation , engaged at
Chattanooga , Tennessee , in the manufacture and sale of
soil pipe and metal products , annually ships products
valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside Tennessee,
and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor
organization which at all times material herein has been
the collective-bargaining representative of a majority of
the Company's employees in an appropriate unit.'
'All production , shipping, and maintenance employees employed by
Respondent at its Chattanooga, Tennessee , plant, excluding clerical
employees, engineering and industrial engineering employees , tunekeepers,
storeroom attendants, first aid attendants , janitors, technical employees,
guards , and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background - The Bargaining Negotiations
For a number of years the Union enjoyed contractual
relations with the Company and with the latter's
predecessors in the operation of the plant. The last
contract executed prior to the negotiations here involved
was for 2 years and expired November 30, 1966.
Accordingly, the parties met in a series of 10 bargaining
conferences in October and November 1966, in an effort
to reach agreement on a new contract. During these
negotiations the Company offered, inter alia , an increase
in wage rates , which offer the Union rejected as
insufficient.
At the bargaining session of November 29, the day
preceding the expiration of the contract, the Union asked
the Company what terms would prevail if the employees
continued to work after the expiration date. The Company
proposed that the parties operate under the terms of the
latest company proposal while bargaining for a new
contract continued. During the course of negotiations the
Company made it clear that "economic" provisions in the
new contract (e.g., wage rates, holidays, vacations) would
not be retroactive to the expiration date of the old
contract. The Union on November 30 notified the
Company that the employees would continue to work
after the contract expired. On December 1, with the
Union's acquiescence, and with a mutual understanding
that bargaining would continue , the Company placed in
effect certain changes in the terms and conditions of
employment, including increased wage rates.
The union membership, at a meeting held some time
between November 29 and December 12, authorized its
negotiating committee to call a strike, but left the decision
whether to strike, and if so, when, in the hands of the
committee . The Company was aware of this development
at the time of the next bargaining meeting on December
12.
B. The Proposals of December 12
At the meeting of December 12, after a discussion of
the proposed new contract on which an impasse in
negotiations continued to exist, and after a discussion of
the strike authorization during which the union
representatives repeatedly stated that they had no plans to
strike the plant and did not want to do so, the Company
announced its intention to institute certain changes in
terms of employment to be effective 1 week later,
December 19, and to remain in effect as temporary terms
until the parties reached agreement on a contract. Among
the changes were the cancellation of the wage increases
put into effect on December 1 (i.e., a return to the wage
rates set in the last expired contract), and the cancellation
of many benefits which had been included in the last
contract, such as for example, paid holidays (including
Christmas Day and New Year's Day, then less than 3
weeks away), premium pay for Sundays, vacation pay,
reporting pay, and pay for jury duty. None of these "take
aways" was any part of the Company's proposed contract,
which the Company made clear remained open for
acceptance and immediate effectuation whenever the
Union so desired.
In announcing these changes to the Union, the
Company repeatedly emphasized that they were
"proposed" changes, and the Company expressed a
willingness to discuss those items with the Union at any
UNITED STATES PIPE & FOUNDRY CO.
time and at any length. Also on December 12, after the
meeting with the Union, the Company posted a notice to
its employees advising them of the "temporary proposed
changes to become effective December 19, 1966," and
concluding with an expression of readiness "to meet with
the Union negotiators at any reasonable time to further
discuss the above proposed changes . The
Company's notice to the employees also advised them that
"the Company's latest contract proposal still stands and
will become effective when signed."
The avowed purpose of the reductions in benefits below
those contained in the old, and contemplated in the future,
contracts was to bring economic pressure upon the
employees to agree to the Company's proposals for a new
contract, rather than to continue work until the summer
busy season (the winter months are periods of low
demand) when a strike would be most disruptive of the
Company's business.' The Company also stated that the
threat of a strike made it impossible for the Company to
make long term commitments for contracts and hence to
bid on jobs.
C. Implementation of the Proposals: the Lockout: the
Contract
The Union at the meeting of December 12 protested the
proposed changes as "unfair," "sanctions," and "a club,"
but it did not discuss them in detail at that meeting, nor
did it do more than express its irritation over them at the
bargaining meeting on December 15, which was largely
devoted to proposed terms in the new contract.' The
Company, therefore, put the changes into effect on
December 19. Bargaining continued without agreement
being reached at a session on January 9, 1967. On
January 31 the Company locked out and laid off all the
employees (approximately 592) in the bargaining unit for
the purpose of compelling acceptance of the Employer's
proposed contract. After several more bargaining sessions
in March, April and May, a contract was signed effective
May 13, 1967,' and the lockout ended.
D. Concluding Findings
This case raises questions as to the scope and
applicability of the Supreme Court's holdings in N.L.R.B
v. Insurance Agents ' International Union , 361 U.S. 477,5
and American Ship Building Company v. N.L.R. B., 380
U.S. 300, in both of which the Court, reversing the Board,
'In its brief the Company candidly stated that one of the reasons for
reducing the benefits was that the Company "would rather risk a strike in
the winter rather than in the summer busy season ......
'During the discussion of a proposed termination date for the new
contract , the Union pointed out that the "sanctions" imposed by the
Company deprived the employees of holiday pay for Christmas Day and
New Year ' s Day , Also during this session the union representative stated.
"You have not bothered the people too much by putting these sanctions. It
is what they anticipated . They are not too happy about the fact that you
are going to deprive them of two holidays . You deprive them of
reporting pay...... Later in that session the union representative stated:
"I don't think it helps us get a contract what you did. I'm sure it doesn't
help you get a contract . I'm thinking it would have been much better if
you hadn 't proposed them . Nobody would have been under stress about the
thing . Because we would have been bargaining on what we can do to reach
an agreement ......
The ultimate contract was similar in content to that offered by the
Company early in the negotiations but ran for an additional year with a
higher wage rate for that year , and included improvements in vacation
benefits . The Union capitulated on the major issues which had divided the
parties.
327
admonished it against finding violations of the Act based
upon nothing more than the Board 's notions of how to
maintain fair economic balance between the competing
interests in a controversy over the terms of a new
collective agreement . Certainly a quick and easy answer to
this case is that the withdrawal of benefits on December
12 and 19 was a harassing tactic permitted under
Insurance Agents and the lockout of January 31 was
privileged under American Ship. And perhaps a Trial
Examiner, given a stipulated record, would be well advised
to say no more than that, speeding the case on its way to
reviewing authorities, administrative and judicial, to whom
questions of National labor policy are committed by law.
Because the case was submitted to a Trial Examiner
rather than directly to the Board, however, and therefore
requires conventional treatment including a Recommended
Order, I deem it appropriate, and perhaps incumbent, to
set forth briefly the relevant considerations and the
relevant authorities as I see them, and to express, for
whatever it may be worth, my own assessment of the
issues.
1. The events of December 12 and 19
On December 12 when the Company proposed, and on
December 19 when it inaugurated, a program of reduced
benefits, the parties had reached an impasse in
negotiations for a new contract, and a lockout would have
been lawful under American Ship. It does not necessarily
follow however, that because a lockout would have been
lawful, the "lesser" action of withdrawing premium pay,
holiday pay, call-in pay, etc., was also lawful. Cf.
N.L.R.B. v. Gaynor News Co, Inc., 197 F.2d 719, 723
(C.A. 2), affd. 347 U.S. 17; see also Krambo Food Stores,
Inc., 106 NLRB 870. Just as a partial strike may not
enjoy the statutory protection accorded a full-fledged
strike, so it may be that a partial withholding of the
benefits of employment may transgress the statute
although a complete withholding of employment would
not. This is not to say that the "partial" character of the
withholding makes it unlawful (and a "partial" strike,
although unprotected is not necessarily a violation of the
Act), but merely to caution that the answer to this case
does not lie in an easy invocation of an axiom better
applied to geometry than to labor law. Cf. Oberer,
Lockouts and the Law, 51 Cornell L. Q. 193, 223.
Equally unhelpful is the Union's argument that because
unilateral action increasing wage rates is unlawful, the
decreases here are a fortiori violative of the Act. I am
none too impressed by the Company's contention that it
"proposed" these reductions and offered to bargain about
them. The avowed purpose behind the "proposals"
established that they were a weapon used in an effort to
compel acceptance of the Company's offer, and
"weapons," as distinguished from terms of employment,
are scarcely a fit subject for "bargaining." But, assuming
for the moment that the "harassing" tactics were
otherwise within the area permitted by Insurance Agents',
footnote 28 to that decision, 361 U.S. at 496, would seem
to put the quietus to any argument based on unilateral
action, for the employer proposals here, like the Union's
tactics there, were not intended to establish permanent
conditions of employment but merely to compel
'It is to be regretted that notwithstanding the Company 's open and early
reliance on Insurance Agents (See Exh. B attached to the stipulation )
neither General Counsel nor the Union refer to that case in their briefs, an
oversight which I trust will be rectified at later stages in this proceeding.
328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
acceptance of other terms.
Taken literally and to their logical extreme the
Supreme Court's statements in Insurance Agents' would
seem to privilege the harassing tactics of the Company
here. But the Court itself, and indeed "the life of the law"
teaches us to look to experience rather than to logic, and
to be wary in extending general propositions beyond the
facts which gave rise to their utterance. Certain
considerations present in this case seem to me to compel a
result at variance with that reached in Insurance Agents'.
The Employer's conduct in this case was frankly
calculated to provoke a strike. To be sure, the Company
wanted the Union to accept the Company's offer. But the
Company realized that a strike might well result from the
withdrawal of holiday pay and other benefits, and it took
the position that if a strike was in the offing, the
Company preferred to precipitate it now. Although the
Supreme Court held in Insurance Agents' that the Board
was not empowered to approve or disapprove of particular
economic weapons, and although the Court recognizes
that the statute contemplates and protects economic
warfare, nothing therein suggests that interdiction of
conduct deliberately calculated to promote a strike is
beyond the Board's powers. It would seem reasonable to
infer that when one party to the bargaining takes action
which has a work stoppage as at least one of its objects,
such conduct is inimical to the statutory purposes and
reveals a purpose inconsistent with good-faith bargaining.
It is no answer to say that the employer could have
resorted to the lockout at that time. Under a lockout, the
employees have not laid their jobs on the line; they are
ready to work and have a job right, superior to that of
others, when their employer resumes operations. See
Oberer, supra But if the employees go on strike, they are
subject to replacement and hence to loss of employment.
Thus an employer would derive a most substantial
advantage by forcing his employees to strike rather than
by locking them out. Conduct which has as one of its
purposes forcing the employees to strike is thus far more
inimical to fundamental employee rights than an outright
lockout.
If the employer is within the law in withdrawing such
benefits as holiday pay, he would seem equally within the
law in cutting back wages, at least to the statutory
minimum. Such a penalty on an employee because his
union adhered to its bargaining demand would seem
equivalent to a constructive discharge. But the right to
lockout, and even the right to harass, would not seem to
extend to the right to discharge. Such a discharge would
seem to violate Section 8(a)(1), if not also Section 8(a)(3),
as a reprisal for engaging in union activity. Nothing in
Insurance Agents' militates against such a reading of the
statute, for that case is concerned only with Section
8(b)(3), and by implication with Section 8(a)(5), not with
Section 8(a)(l) or (3).
It may be argued that under American Ship to penalize
employees because of their union' s bargaining position in
an effort to compel submission to the employer's terms is
not violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). But when the
argument is based, not on Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) as in
Insurance Agents', but on American Ship, then some of
the consequences which the Supreme Court held were
insufficient to establish violations of Section 8(b)(3) may
appropriately be reexamined in terms of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3). Thus, a lockout is privileged under Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) because an employer need not await the union's
strike but may shut down at his own time to encourage
acceptance of his terms. But here the Employer did not
shut down; on the contrary his tactic imposed hardship on
the employees while enabling him to continue operations
without impediment, and indeed at lower labor costs than
under the last expired contract. Moreover, as a direct
result of the employees' statutorily protected activity in
rejecting the Employer's contract proposal, and in
adhering to their Union's demands, the employees were
driven to the alternative of stopping work altogether (at
the risk of replacement) or of working under terms
inferior to those recently enjoyed although aware that
their Employer had offered increases, not reductions, in
pay.
These consequences, I repeat, do not establish a refusal
to bargain in good faith; so much is held by Insurance
Agents'. But they lack some of the "economic
justification" of the lockout in American Ship (for the
employer here did not shut down to avert a strike at an
unpropitious time), and as they constitute consequences
visited on employees for adhering to their Union they are
"inherently . .. prejudicial to union interests." American
Ship. 380 U.S. at 311.6
Perhaps it may be said that all I demonstrate here is an
aversion to carrying American Ship to its logical next
step. Perhaps the charge is justified. I cannot believe that
American Ship leaves the employer an unlimited choice of
weapons for use in his economic war. Can he discharge all
the employees, or can he pick them off one by one and
day by day (in some "non-discriminatory" order,
alphabetically, perhaps), until the Union capitulates? Can
he virtually compel a strike, and resultant replacement, by
cutting away all the benefits of employment above the
statutory minimum wage? I believe that American Ship
should be limited to privileging the conventional lockout,'
and that the tactics here employed constitute unlawful
interference with employee rights under Section 7 as well
as discrimination for engaging in union activity.' Hence I
find violations of Section 8(a)(l) and (3), and - as noted
above a violation of Section 8(a)(5) in that a
bargaining tactic designed to provoke a strike cannot be
characterized as bargaining in good faith.
2. The lockout on January 31
But for the illegality I have found in the reprisals
announced December 12 and effective December 19, there
would be no doubt that the lockout of January 31 would
be lawful under American Ship. The record seems to me
to establish that, illegal though it was, the Company's
action had no effect on the bargaining. It failed to
provoke a strike or to bring about capitulation. Nothing
in the record suggests that it "backfired" into stiffening
the Union's attitude or prevented either side from
modifying its approach to the issues on which they were
apart. Bargaining continued with only casual references to
the Company 's action . Under these circumstances I find
that the impasse which continued through the time of the
IN L R B v. Great Falls Employers' Council, 277 F.2d 772 (C A. 9), not
cited in the briefs, would seem distinguishable in that the employer' s tactics
there were in support of a lawful lockout.
'The court in American Ship also notes the employer's right to
"unilateral imposition of terms," but cites N.L.R.B. v. Tex-Tan, Inc.. 318
F.2d 472, 479-482 (C.A 5), which dealt with increases , not reprisals
'It may be argued that had the employees stopped work altogether to
protest the loss of holiday pay, etc., the law would view them as protesting
a partial lockout and not as strikers vulnerable to replacement. But I know
of no authority to that effect, and even if that should come to be the law,
it is a harsh application to expect such foresight from employees faced with
this novel tactic
UNITED STATES PIPE & FOUNDRY CO.
lockout was not affected by the illegal acts, and the
lockout was lawful. See Delhi-Taylor Refining Division,
167 NLRB No. 8; Union Carbide Corp, 165 NLRB No.
26; Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB No. 55.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By proposing and implementing reductions in
employee benefits, not as a permanent change in
conditions, but solely as a temporary weapon designed to
compel the Union either to capitulate to the Employer's
terms or to go on strike, the Company engaged in an
unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) and Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. By temporarily withdrawing employee benefits not in
dispute in the negotiations (such as paid holidays,
premium pay for Sundays, call-in pay, etc.), because the
employees rejected the Company's last proposal and
continued, through their Union, to press for more
favorable terms, the Company engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
3. The unfair labor practices described in the two
foregoing conclusions of law did not affect or contribute
to the impasse in bargaining, so that the lockout of
January 31, 1967, was not an unfair labor practice.
THE REMEDY
In addition to the customary cease-and-desist order, I
shall recommend that the Company reimburse its
employees (with interest at 6 percent per annum as in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716) for losses
suffered between December 19, 1966, and January 31,
1967, by the withdrawal of such benefits as holiday pay,
premium pay for Sundays, call-in pay, pay for jury duty,
and any similar losses resulting from the "temporary
changes" instituted on December 19, 1966. However, I do
not embrace within this recommendation any
reimbursement for the reduction of wage rates back to
those prevailing in the last existing contract. That
adjustment, in my opinion, the Company could lawfully
make as it imposed no penalty on the employees for
rejecting the Company's proposal and adhering to the
Union's demands. The Company was entitled to rescind
the wage increase it had instituted, and the employees and
the Union had no statutory right to have the Company
continue paying its new proposed wage scale unless and
until a new contract was agreed to.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record in this case, I recommend,
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the
following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent, United States Pipe & Foundry Co., its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from instituting "temporary"
cutbacks in employee benefits during the course of
bargaining for a new contract for the purpose of
compelling the employees either to accept the Company's
proposal or to go out on strike.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
329
(a) Reimburse its employees, in the manner and to the
extent described in the portion of the Trial Examiner's
Decision entitled "The Remedy," for losses they sustained
between December 19, 1966, and January 31, 1967, by
virtue of the Company's withholding holiday pay,
premium pay, and similar benefits
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plant at Chattanooga, Tennessee, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of
such notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional
Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by an
authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be
posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.' °
'in the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
The Company and your bargaining representative,
Local 155 of the International Molders and Allied
Workers Union , AFL-CIO CLC , submitted to the
National Labor Relations Board the question whether
the Company violated the National Labor Relations
Act by temporarily eliminating holiday pay, Sunday
premium pay , call-in pay, and similar items on and
after December 19, 1966 , and by the lockout of January
31, 1967.
It has been held that we violated the Act by the
reduction of benefits in December 1966, but not by the
January 1967 lockout
We will reimburse our employees for losses they
sustained as a result of our failure to give holiday pay,
premium pay , call-in pay, and similar compensation
during the period December 19, 1966, to January 31,
1967.
330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
UNITED STATES PIPE & from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
FOUNDRY Co. or covered by any other material.
(Employer) If employees have any question concerning this notice
Dated By or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
(Representative) (Title) directly with the Board's Regional Office, 730 Peachtree
Street, N.E., Room 701, Atlanta, Georgia 30308,
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days Telephone 526-5760.