United Parcel Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 5, 2001

336 N.L.R.B. 1134 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1134
United Parcel Service and Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Auto Truck Drivers, Line Drivers, Car Haulers
and Helpers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County,
a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO. Case 32–CA–17468
December 5, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On April 25, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Freder-
ick C. Herzog issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
Charging Party also filed exceptions and a supporting
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent
with this Decision and Order.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to negotiate with the
Union over the effects of the relocation of the employee
parking lot. The judge, finding no violation, dismissed
the complaint in its entirety. For reasons discussed be-
low, we reverse.
I. FACTS
Since 1982 the Respondent has operated a facility at
the Oakland Airport where it engages in the business of
shipping and receiving packages. The Respondent owns
no real property at the site, but leases its facility from the
Port of Oakland (the Port).
Until April 1, 1999,1 the Respondent’s employees
parked in a lot that was owned and operated by the Port
for use by its tenants. The parking lot was no more than
a 5–minute walk from the Respondent’s facility.2
On or about March 10, the Port notified the Respon-
dent and its other tenants that it was closing the parking
lot on April 1 and was opening another lot located about
1-1/2 miles from the Respondent’s facility. The Port
operates a fleet of shuttle buses to transport employees to
and from this lot. The buses run on a fixed schedule at
15–20 minute intervals. It is undisputed that it takes the
Respondent’s employees an additional 20 minutes to
reach their jobsites from the new parking lot, increasing
their commuting time by at least 40 minutes per day.

1 All dates hereafter are in 1999 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s finding that the
walk between the parking lot and the Respondent’s facility required 2
to 10 minutes. We find merit in the General Counsel’s exception. The
record indicates that the walk took 5 minutes at most.
The Respondent subsequently notified the Union that
the parking lot was going to be relocated and that the
Respondent could do nothing to prevent the change. The
Respondent had no role in the Port’s decision to relocate
the lot.
In early February, having heard about the parking
change before receiving notification from the Respon-
dent, the Union filed a grievance alleging that the reloca-
tion of the lot was a violation of its collective-bargaining
agreement with the Respondent.3 The parties met to dis-
cuss the grievance on March 31. At the meeting, Union
Business Representative Marty Frates discussed the ad-
verse impact the parking change would have upon em-
ployees, and proposed that the Respondent move the
time clock to the parking lot. The Respondent summa-
rily rejected this proposal, but made no counterproposals.
The Union filed a formal request for bargaining over
the effects of the relocation of the lot on April 27. Prior
to the filing of the Union’s bargaining request, Craig
Turco, the division manager of the Respondent’s facility,
had a number of conversations with Frates concerning
the parking lot during which Frates offered proposals that
were also rejected by the Respondent.4 The Respondent
and the Union had no further discussions about the lot
after April 27.
A hearing on the Union’s grievance was held on May
3. After hearing presentations from both sides, a panel
denied the grievance and stated that the matter “raises
questions of bargaining obligations under Federal Labor
Law.” In a letter sent to the Union on May 11, the Re-
spondent replied to the Union’s bargaining request by
referring the Union to the minutes of the May 3 griev-
ance hearing. The Union subsequently filed a charge
alleging that the Respondent refused to bargain over the
effects of the relocation of the parking lot.
II. ANALYSIS
The judge correctly held that employee parking is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. See Dynatron/Bondo
Corp.5 The judge erred, however, by concluding that the
3 The effective term of the relevant collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Respondent is from August 1, 1997 to July
31, 2002.
4 The record contains no information specifying the number of con-
versations or the exact dates they occurred.
5 324 NLRB 572, 578 (1997), enf. denied 176 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.
1999). In Dynatron/Bondo, the Board found that the employer violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing its parking policy by assigning
employees designated parking spaces in its lot after previously allowing
them to park on first-come, first-served basis. The 11th Circuit, how-
ever, refused to enforce the Board’s order based upon its determination
that the policy change was not material. We continue to adhere to the
principle that a change in an employer’s parking policy is a mandatory
subject of bargaining where, as here, such a change significantly affects
the terms and conditions of employment.
336 NLRB No. 119
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1135
Respondent was relieved from bargaining over the ef-
fects of the relocation of the employee parking lot be-
cause the Respondent had no role in that decision.6
It is clear from the evidence here that the relocation of
the parking lot had a substantial impact upon the terms
and conditions of employment, requiring employees to
spend an additional 20 minutes getting between the park-
ing lot and the workplace, increasing their commuting
time by at least 40 minutes per day. Where employees
had previously been able to park their cars and walk to
the Respondent’s facility, they now have to adjust their
arrival time to conform to the schedule of the shuttle bus
that runs only at fixed intervals. These changes have
impacted on the employees’ ability to arrive at work on
time and related matters. Thus, we find that the reloca-
tion has resulted in material changes to the employees’
conditions of employment.
Furthermore, although the Respondent had no role in
the decision to relocate the parking lot, it did have the
ability to address the effects of that decision. See, e.g.,
Hanes Corp., 260 NLRB 557, 561–563 (1982) (employer
required to bargain over specific methods of complying
with OSHA regulation); Sheltering Pines Convalescent
Hospital, 255 NLRB 1195 (1981) (employer required to
bargain over distribution of funds, payment of which was
mandated by statute). Accordingly, contrary to the
judge, we find that the Respondent is obligated to bar-
gain over the effects of parking lot relocation.
We further find, contrary to the judge, that the Re-
spondent failed to comply with its statutory obligation to
bargain with the Union over this issue. The Respondent
and the Union had no discussions concerning the parking
lot after the Union made its bargaining request on April
27. The Respondent’s sole response to the Union’s re-
quest was its letter referring the Union to the notes of the
May 3 grievance hearing. We conclude that this reply by
the Respondent was insufficient to satisfy its bargaining
obligation.
Additionally, we find that neither the Respondent’s
discussions with the Union prior to the April 27 bargain-
ing request nor the Respondent’s participation in the
grievance procedure satisfied the Respondent’s statutory
bargaining obligation. It is well established that, absent a
waiver by the employees’ bargaining representative, an
employer’s obligation to bargain over mandatory terms
and conditions of employment is not met until the parties

6 The complaint alleges only that the Respondent unlawfully failed
to bargain with the Union over the effects of the Port’s decision to
relocate the parking lot. To the extent the judge’s decision indicates
that the complaint also alleges that the Respondent unlawfully failed to
bargain with the Union over the Port’s decision to relocate the parking
lot, it is incorrect.
either reach an agreement or an impasse in negotiations.
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Here, we find
no evidence that the initial discussions or the grievance
procedure resulted in either an agreement between the
parties or impasse.7
In the course of the initial discussions prior to the for-
mal request for bargaining, the Union offered at least two
proposals. The Respondent, while willing to listen to the
Union’s suggestions, immediately rejected them and of-
fered no proposals of its own. There is no evidence that
at any time either party made a “final offer” or took a
position indicating that further discussions were futile.
Similarly, the grievance procedure failed to resolve the
conflict over the parking issue but left open the possibil-
ity of future negotiations.8 The grievance panel denied
the grievance, which had been brought under the provi-
sions of the collective-bargaining agreement, stating that
the relocation of the parking lot was a matter for collec-
tive bargaining. The Respondent, however, refused to
engage in further negotiations with the Union.
We therefore conclude that the Respondent has failed
to bargain with the Union over the effects of the reloca-
tion of the parking lot in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.9 Consequently, we shall order that the
Respondent, upon request by the Union, engage in bar-
gaining as required by the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, United Parcel Service, Oakland, California,
its officers, agents, successors, assigns, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain with the Union over the effects
of the relocation of the employee parking lot.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request by the Union, bargain collectively
over the effects of the relocation of the employee parking
lot.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Oakland, California facility copies of the attached
7 The parties do not argue that they were at impasse at any time rele-
vant to these proceedings.
8 The Respondent has not raised a deferral defense under Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
9 Chairman Hurtgen, in agreeing with this conclusion, notes that the
Union both requested effects bargaining and identified specific effects
about which it wished to bargain.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1136
notice marked “Appendix.”10 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 32,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since April 27, 1999.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY THE ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid and protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Auto Truck Drivers, Line
Drivers, Car Haulers and Helpers, Local 70 of Alameda
County, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO over the effects of the relocation of the em-
ployee parking lot.

10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Auto Truck Drivers, Line
Drivers, Car Haulers and Helpers, Local 70 of Alameda
County, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO over the effects of the relocation of the em-
ployee parking lot.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE

Valerie Hardy-Mahoney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jerrold C. Schaefer and W. Daniel Clinton, Esqs. (Hanson,
Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy, LLP), of San Francisco,
California, for the Respondent.
David A. Rosenfeld and William Sokol, Esqs. (Van Bourg,
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), of Oakland, California, for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FREDERICK C. HERZOG, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was heard by me in Oakland, California, on August
14, 2000, and is based on a charge filed by Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Auto Truck Drivers, Line Drivers, Car Haulers and
Helpers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County, a/w International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the Union), on May 20,
1999, alleging generally that United Parcel Service (Respon-
dent), committed certain violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act. On August 25, 1999, the
Regional Director for Region 32 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (the Board) issued a complaint and notice of hear-
ing alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Respondent thereafter filed a timely answer to the allegations
contained within the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.
All parties appeared at the hearing, and were given full op-
portunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and file
briefs. Based on the record, my consideration of the briefs filed
by counsel for the General Counsel (as joined in by counsel for
the Charging Party/Union) and counsel for Respondent, and my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Re-
spondent is a California corporation, with an office and place of
business in Oakland, California, where at all times material
herein it has been engaged in the business of operating a pack-
age delivery service; that during the 12 months preceding the
issuance of the complaint, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness operations, it provided services valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Cali-
fornia.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1137
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent is now,
and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the
Union is now, and at all times material has been, a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
The primary airport in the area of Oakland, California, is
known as the Oakland International Airport. It, together with
its parking areas, is operated by, and located on property owned
by, the political subdivision known as the Port of Oakland.
Since 1982 Respondent has leased space from the Port of
Oakland, and has operated a facility located therein at the Oak-
land Airport, where it has engaged in its business of receiving,
sorting, and shipping packages. It employs about 300–350
employees at this facility. They are represented by the Union
through agreements such as the National Master Freight
Agreement with the Teamsters International Union and various
local affiliates. One such affiliate is Teamsters Local 70, the
Charging Party, covering the local operations, including those
at the Oakland Airport. The current collective-bargaining
agreement between the Union and Respondent has a term of
August 1, 1997, through July 31, 2002. Without belaboring all
the minutia contained in the various documents submitted by
the parties, it suffices to say that the Union represents a unit of
Respondent’s employees which can be described as:

All full-time and regular part-time employees, employed by
Respondent at its Oakland International Airport, Oakland,
California facility, excluding all other employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

Up until April 1, 1999, the Port of Oakland maintained a
parking lot for the use of tenants and their employees, including
Respondent and its employees. Like other tenants, Respondent
paid the Port of Oakland a monthly fee for each employee who
used the employee parking facilities. Respondent, however, did
not charge employees for their use of these parking facilities.
Until that time the parking facilities bordered the Oakland Air-
port, which permitted employees to park there and still be able
to walk from their vehicles to their workplaces, without the
necessity of using a shuttle bus. Such a walk required just 2 to
10 minutes.
However, in March 1999, the Port of Oakland issued a
document entitled “BULLETIN,” to its tenants. Therein it an-
nounced that it was closing its then-current employee parking
facility, and that it would open a new employee parking facility
effective April 1, 1999. The new facility, however, is not so
close to Respondent’s airport facilities, being somewhat over a
mile and a half distant. The Port of Oakland also announced
that the new parking facility would be served, still without cost
to the employees, by a fleet of shuttle buses, which would oper-
ate on a fixed schedule, at intervals of 15 minutes between 4:30
to 11 a.m., and at 20-minute intervals between 11 to 4:30 a.m.
The bus ride from the new parking facility to Respondent’s
facility requires approximately 6 minutes. The Port also raised
the fees it charged tenants for their employees to park in the
new facility by some 33 percent.
Thereafter, on March 17, 1999, Craig Turco, Respondent’s
Airport District Manager, notified Marty Frates, the Union’s
business agent, of the new developments, and sent him a copy
of the Port’s “BULLETIN.” He also advised that he had con-
tacted Respondent’s corporate liaison to the Port to see if there
was anything, which could be done to stop the change from
taking place. Within days, however, Turco had to further in-
form Frates that the corporate liaison’s answer was that Re-
spondent was powerless to stop the change from taking place.
During March 1999, Respondent and the Union discussed
the change, which was upcoming, including a grievance, which
was filed concerning the subject. Among other things, the Un-
ion proposed that Respondent move its timeclocks to the distant
parking lots, so as to allow employees to “clock in” upon reach-
ing their parking spots, rather than when they actually entered
Respondent’s facility at the airport. The Union’s rationale for
this request was that, due to the need to take a shuttle bus, it
would require an average of about an additional 20 minutes for
employees to reach their worksites, and, as a result, would re-
quire them to leave their homes for work at an earlier time. All
told, as a result of the change in the location of the parking
facility, the Union contends that employees now have to spend
an additional 40 to 60 minutes per day in getting to and from
work. Respondent does not challenge this estimate by the Un-
ion. Additionally, some employees reported to the Union that
they were now being caused to be late for work as a result of
the change, while others reported that they now sustained addi-
tional expenses for such things as child care. Suffice it to say
that Respondent did not agree with the Union’s request, assert-
ing that employees had never been paid based on when or
where they parked, or how long it took them to reach their
workplaces from their parking spaces, but only from the time
when they actually “clocked in” within Respondent’s facility.
(The collective-bargaining agreement seems to accord with this
assertion.) In mid-April, Frates sent a letter to the affected
employees stating in effect that in his view Respondent was not
concerned about the ill effects caused them as a result of the
change in the site of the parking.
On April 27, Frates made a written request of Respondent’s
district labor relations manager, Naddy, to bargain concerning
the effects of the change.
On April 29, a regular meeting to review outstanding griev-
ances was conducted, but the parking issue was not discussed
except to note that it would be discussed at the previously
scheduled May 3 grievance panel meeting.
At the May 3 meeting Frates explained how the change had
negatively impacted employees. Naddy spoke on behalf of
Respondent. Naddy responded to a question about whether a
request for effects bargaining had been made by saying that he
could not remember, but that the parties had bargained over the
matter when they’d previously agreed to section 17 of their
contract, which stipulated that work time began when employ-
ees are ordered to report to work and continued until they were
released from duty. (Many workers worked split shifts.) After
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1138
a question and answer period, the grievance panel met to con-
sider the matter, and then returned with the following decision,
as noted in the minutes of the meeting:

Based on the facts presented there was a motion made and
seconded that the grievance is denied on the grounds that it
raises questions of bargaining obligations under Federal La-
bor Law. That motion carried.

So far as the record shows, the grievance was not pursued
further.
On May 11 Naddy responded to Frates April 27 request,
merely referring him to the minutes just set forth.
Thus, no specific “effects bargaining” ensued thereafter, and
the instant charge followed shortly.
B. Discussion and Conclusions
The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, in that on or about April 1, 1999, Respondent, without
affording the Union an opportunity to collectively bargain,
changed the location of the parking facility in which its em-
ployees are allowed to park while at work, and that since Feb-
ruary 10 and April 27, 1999, Respondent has failed and refused
to negotiate with the Union over the effects of the change in the
parking facility.
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentative of its employees with respect to rates of pay, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. Such bar-
gaining has been required concerning a wide spectrum of mat-
ters that do not relate to the actual performance of work, such
as company housing, provision of meals, dues checkoff, group
health insurance, and pension plans. American Smelting &
Refining Co., 167 NLRB 204, 211 (1967).
Thus, an employer may not effect changes in mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, absent agreement with the employees’ bar-
gaining representative, an impasse in negotiations, or a waiver
by the bargaining representative. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
743 (1967); Rangaire Co., 309 NLRB 1043 (1992).
I accept the argument advanced by counsel for the General
Counsel that the parking rights of employees (at least those
which, as is clear and undisputed here, have become an estab-
lished term of employment), constitute a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Thus, an employer may not unilaterally make
changes in such rights. American Warehousing & Distribution
Services, 311 NLRB 371 (1993).
However, it is evident that no such unilateral change oc-
curred here. As a result, the first allegation in the complaint is
readily disposed of. For all the evidence in this case is to the
effect that it was the Port of Oakland, not Respondent, which
engaged in the action of effecting change in the parking facili-
ties to be used by the employees of Respondent and other ten-
ants of the property owned by the Port of Oakland. It is undis-
puted that the Port of Oakland has a contractual right to make
such changes under the terms of its leases with all its various
tenants at the airport, including that of Respondent. Thus,
though the bulletin mentioned above, the Port simply an-
nounced the change, never consulting or bargaining about it
with any of its tenants. So far as Respondent was concerned, it
was a fait accompli, as was confirmed when it unsuccessfully
sought to have the Port’s decision modified or rescinded.
Counsel for the General Counsel concedes as much on brief.
As a result, I find that the complaint’s allegation that Re-
spondent unilaterally changed the location of the parking facil-
ity is wholly lacking in merit, and must be dismissed.
Thus, I now turn to the complaint’s allegation that Respon-
dent, though duly requested on April 27 to do so by the Union,
has failed in an obligation to bargain concerning the effects of
the change made by the port of Oakland, as the complaint al-
leges.
Respondent disputes this allegation on two fronts. First, it
asserts that it had no legal obligation to negotiate the effects of
a change, which it had no part in planning, causing, or effectu-
ating. Second, arguendo, it asserts that it met any obligation
that may be found.
The General Counsel does not dispute that Respondent had
no role in the planning, causing, or effectuation of the change.
Still, it is the General Counsel’s argument that an employer has
an obligation to negotiate the effects of a change not caused by
the employer.
As explained on brief, the General Counsel’s argument is
that this case is analogous to authority where an employer’s
unilateral actions are excused or justified based on factors out-
side its control, wherein the obligation to bargain has been held
to remain. Counsel for the General Counsel cites National
Terminal Baking Corp., 190 NLRB 465 (1971), and Raskin
Packing Co., 246 NLRB 78 (1979).
I, however, cannot find sufficient support in those cases to
carry the day for counsel for the General Counsel. In my view,
neither compels the result argued for by counsel for the General
Counsel in this case.
National Terminal involved a situation where the parties
were already involved in negotiations, and where the financial
circumstances of the employer were, to say the least, precari-
ous. Thus, when, just in the midst of such negotiations, Re-
spondent sustained the further loss of having two of its trucks
stolen (termed by former Chief Judge Welles as a “calamitous
event”), it should come as no surprise that an order should have
been entered requiring bargaining regarding all the effects of
the changes effected by and upon the employer. No other result
could sensibly follow. Clearly, in that case, the parties and the
judge were doing their utmost to make the best of a “calami-
tous” situation, where Respondent was on the verge of going
out of business. In my opinion, that situation scarcely equates
to this, where employees may have to rise a few minutes earlier
or reach home a few minutes later each day, and where such
changes in their circumstances have not been caused, planned,
instigated, or implemented by their employer. To the contrary,
the facts are clear that any such change, and its “fallout” upon
the employer’s employees, was literally forced upon their em-
ployer.
Raskin involved an extremely serious and sudden financial
difficulty encountered by the employer, with the result coming
down to either closure of the plant, or its sale to a new em-
ployer. Considering all the circumstances, the Board rejected
the conclusion of Judge Wacknov that the union there was not
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 1139
interested in negotiating over the effects of these changes. That
is not the case here, and I reach no such conclusion.
I agree with the arguments advanced by Respondent to the
effect that the location of the parking lots to be used by em-
ployees of Respondent, militated by the Respondent’s landlord,
is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that the effects of
a change in such location not occasioned by Respondent does
not give rise to an obligation to bargain concerning its effects.
In this connection, I note that no change has been effected in
the time or place where employees are required to report for
work. As before, employees are not charged for parking in the
assigned slots. As an accommodation, employees are now pro-
vided with a cost-free shuttle bus from their assigned parking
spots to their workplaces. The time required by employees to
reach their places of employment from their bedrooms, re-
mains, as before, outside the control of Respondent. Employ-
ees are now, as before, free to choose to live close to or far
away from their workplaces, and to thereby control the length
of their commute.
Finally, I note that the Union filed a grievance concerning
this very subject. I also note that, following its meeting of May
3, 1999, the grievance panel denied the grievance. Thus, in
sum, I find and conclude that Respondent has already engaged
in appropriate collective-bargaining procedures concerning the
issue in this case.
Summarizing, I find and conclude that Respondent has not
violated the Act in any respect alleged in the complaint. Ac-
cordingly, the complaint shall be dismissed in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not violated the Act as alleged.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publica-
tion.]