United Buckingham Freight Lines

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 5, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 684 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Buckingham Freight Lines and General
Drivers & Helpers Union , Local 749, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America. Case
18-CA-2315
December 5, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On July 21, 1967, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mul-
lin issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner only to the extent con-
sistent herewith.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's
grant of certain benefits was not violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. There
is no exception to these findings. The Trial Ex-
aminer also found, and it is undisputed, that the
Union represented a majority in an appropriate unit
of the Respondent's clerical employees. Finally, the
Trial Examiner found that the Respondent refused
to bargain with the Union as the representative of
these employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. The Respondent excepts to this finding.
For the reasons set forth below, we find merit in
these exceptions.
The relevant facts are for the most part not in
dispute. They show that the Respondent is a com-
mon carrier engaged in the transportation of freight
throughout the United States. Its general adminis-
trative office is in Spokane, Washington, but the of-
fice clerical employees here involved are located at
the Respondent's systemwide and terminal opera-
tions offices in Rapid City, South Dakota. The
Union has been the contractual representative of
the Respondent's over-the-road drivers for a
number of years, and meets with the Respondent at
regional and area conferences as such representa-
tive.
In July 1966 the Union notified the Respondent's
Spokane office and its labor relations adviser in
Chicago, John Bridge, that it was seeking recogni-
tion as the representative of the clerical employees
in the Rapid City offices. In a letter of July 29
Bridge acknowledged this request and noted that
the Respondent would be required to negotiate a
contract if Board certification was obtained.
Thereafter, at several regional and area meetings at
which the Union discussed with motor carriers
covered by its contract, including the Respondent,
matters regarding other employee units, the Union
also raised with the Respondent the question of
recognition of the Union as the representative of
the Rapid City clerical unit, and proposed a card
check to resolve the question of majority status.
Although the Respondent indicated its willingness
to have a card check, no definite agreement was
reached at these meetings.
In a letter dated August 10, Weber, the union
business representative, again urged Bridge to agree
to a card check to determine the Union's represen-
tation of the Rapid City clerical employees. On Au-
gust 29, Weber held a telephone conversation with
Bridge and, in a follow-up letter of the same date,
indicated that there would be discussions of a con-
tract for these clerical employees at a meeting per-
taining to other unit employees scheduled to be held
in Chicago. In his reply letter to Weber, dated Sep-
tember 2, Bridge agreed to discuss the matter,
"subject, of course, to evidence by you indicating
that you have sufficient cards signed to authorize
such representation."
On September 20 and 21, during a quarterly con-
ference between the Union and various motor car-
riers in Chicago, the Union and the Respondent
again discussed representation for the Rapid City
clerical employees. In one such meeting Weber of-
fered a number of cards for examination, but Hen-
ry, the Respondent's vice president, refused to in-
spect them because he had no payroll list against
which the cards could be checked. In a later discus-
sion, Weber admitted to an associate of Bridge that
he did not know whether or not some of the cards
offered to show a majority in the Rapid City clerical
unit had been signed by watchmen, janitors, and
other employees who normally would be excluded
from such a unit. Finally, on September 21, Bridge
agreed to recommend to the Respondent that it start
negotiations if the Union's cards showed a majority
in the unit, and promised to get in touch with the
Union to schedule such a meeting. Bridge notified
one of his assistants to arrange such a meeting. Ap-
parently satisfied that such arrangements had been
made, the Respondent's representatives on Sep-
tember 22 went to the hotel room where the parties
168 NLRB No. 90
UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 685
had been regularly conferring, but the union
representatives had left Chicago, apparently
unaware that the meeting had been scheduled for
that time and place. The Trial Examiner attributes
the collapse of this meeting to a "breakdown of
communications."
In early October, the Union telephoned Bridge,
requested to meet and negotiate a contract, and was
assured by Bridge that the Respondent would be in-
formed and a meeting arranged. On October 19
Bridge informed the Union that the Respondent
wanted the question of representation resolved by
an election.
The Trial Examiner's conclusion that the
Respondent refused to bargain in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act is based in part on his finding
that there was a delay of many weeks during which
the Union was seeking recognition. The record
clearly shows, however, that this delay was ascriba-
ble in large part to the Union's practice of raising
the subject of recognition for the Rapid City clerical
employees while the parties were meeting in other
cities for other purposes, and when pertinent em-
ployee lists were not available.
The Trial Examiner further holds that the
Respondent at no time expressed any doubt as to
the Union's majority in the unit here involved. It is
apparent, however, from the entire record, that the
Respondent at all times conditioned recognition on
the Union's showing of its representative status by
cards or, finally, by an election.'
The Trial Examiner's Decision also points to the
fact that the union representatives failed to appear
at the meeting on September 22 because of a misun-
derstanding, and that, when the card check was not
accomplished on that date through no fault of the
Union, the Respondent "thereafter failed to take
the initiative to set another time and place for such
a meeting ...." There is no evidence, however,
and the Trial Examiner does not find, that the mis-
understanding as to the meeting was the fault of the
Respondent. Under the circumstances, we do not
agree with the Trial Examiner that the burden was
necessarily on the Respondent to seek another
meeting. Although the Union knew that Bridge
wanted, and had agreed to, a card check, it took no
steps after September 22 to arrange for another
meeting for a card check, but, instead, demanded a
meeting for the purpose of contract negotiations.
Finally, the Trial Examiner, on the basis of his
findings that the Respondent, on September 21,
agreed to a card check, and on October 19, repu-
diated this agreement and demanded an election,
concludes that "the Respondent's conduct sub-
sequent to September 21, 19,66, constituted a
refusal to bargain with the Union after the majority
status of the latter in an appropriate unit had been
established." The cases2 which the Trial Examiner
cites are clearly distinguishable, however, as card
checks had actually been made in those cases
establishing that the unions were the majority
representatives, and the employers thereafter repu-
diated the results of the card checks. In the present
case, on the other hand, a card check was never
made, the Union's majority status was never in fact
demonstrated to the Respondent, and the record
does not show that the failure to do so was at-
tributable to a rejection by the Respondent of the
collective-bargaining principle or a desire to gain
time to undermine the Union's representative
status. 3
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, par-
ticularly the fact that the Respondent has main-
tained a contractual bargaining relationship with the
Union for a number of years on behalf of other em-
ployees; the Respondent has continually indicated
its willingness to recognize the Union as the
representative of a unit of Rapid City clerical em-
ployees after its majority status was demonstrated;
the Union never in fact did demonstrate to the
Respondent its representative status; the Union's
demands for recognition were generally made at
other locations than the one involved; as the Union
had conceded, some of its cards might have been
signed by employees not includable in the unit; and
there is a complete absence of other unfair labor
practices by the Respondent, we conclude that the
General Counsel has failed to establish that the
Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union and its
insistence on a Board election were motivated by
bad faith.4 Accordingly, we find that the Respond-
ent has committed no violations of the Act, and we
shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
i The Respondent , in its brief, explains its shift from a demand for a
card check to one for an election on the ground that the Union had shifted
its position of seeking an opportunity to demonstrate its majority status to
demanding negotiations.
2 Snow & Sons, 134 N LRB 709, enfd. 308 F.2d 687 (C.A 9); Jem Mfg.
Inc., 156 NLRB 643; Kellogg's Mills, 147 NLRB 342, enfd. 347 F.2d
219 (C. A. 9).
3 John P. Serpa, 155 NLRB 99, reversed and remanded sub. nom.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179 v N.L R.B., 376 F.2d 186 (C.A. 9), con-
clusions of court adopted on remand, John P Serpa, Inc., 166 NLRB
336 The Trial Examiner's Decision refers to this case but holds it to be
distinguishable because the Respondent initially agreed to a card check
and subsequently repudiated this agreement We find, however, on the
basis of the considerations set forth above, that Serpa is clearly applica-
ble. See also Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732
(C.A.D.C.), cert, denied 341 U.S. 914; Aaron Brothers of California, 158
NLRB 1077
4 While an employer 's right to a Board election is not absolute, it has
long been established Board policy that an employer may refuse to bargain
and insist upon an election as proof of a union's majority unless its refusal
and insistence were not made with a good -faith doubt of the union's
majority. Aaron Brothers of California , supra.
686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT E. MULLIN, Trial Examiner: This case was
heard in Rapid City, South Dakota, on April 11, 1967,
pursuant to charges duly filed and served at various times
in 1966,1 and a complaint issued on December 19, 1966.
The complaint, as amended at the outset of the hearing,
presents questions as to whether the Respondent refused
to bargain collectively with the Charging Union (herein
called Teamsters, or Union), and whether it engaged in
various other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended. In its answer, the Respondent
conceded certain facts as to its business operations, but
it denied all allegations that it had committed any unfair
labor practices.
All parties appeared at the hearing, with counsel, and
were given full opportunity to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses , to introduce relevant evidence , to argue
orally at the close of the hearing, and to file briefs. The
parties waived oral argument. At the conclusion of the
hearing, a motion to dismiss the complaint, made by the
Respondent, was taken under advisement by the Trial
Examiner. It is disposed of as appears hereinafter in this
Decision. On May 31, 1967, the General Counsel and
the Respondent submitted thorough and comprehensive
briefs on the issues.
Upon the entire record in the case, including the briefs
of counsel, and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent , a common carrier engaged in the
transportation of freight throughout the United States,
has its general administrative office in Spokane , Washing-
ton. During a representative 12-month period it had gross
revenues in excess of $50 ,000 derived from the transpor-
tation of goods between various States of the United
States. Only the employees in its systemwide and ter-
minal operations located at Rapid City, South Dakota,
are involved in the present proceeding.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Respondent concedes,
and the Trial Examiner finds, that United Buckingham
Freight Lines is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent concedes, and the Trial Examiner
finds, that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
For a number of years the Respondent's drivers have
been represented by the Teamsters. In the spring of 1966,
the Union initiated an organizational campaign among the
clericals employed at the Respondent's offices in Rapid
City, South Dakota. In the latter part of July, it requested
recognition as the bargaining agent for a unit of office
clericals. Thereafter, the parties met several times to
discuss this request and engaged in an exchange of letters
and telephone calls on the question. On October 19,
1966, the Respondent informed the Union that it would
insist on an election before according recognition. The
General Counsel and the Union contend that the Respond-
ent's course of conduct constituted an unlawful refusal
to bargain. They further contend that a wage increase
granted in the latter part of June 1966, and a dental in-
surance plan announced to the employees in September
of that year constituted further violations of the Act. All
of these allegations are denied in their entirety by the
Respondent.
B. The Appropriate Unit
The General Counsel contends that all of the Respond-
ent's office clerical employees in its systemwide and ter-
minal operations at Rapid City constitute an appropriate
unit. In its answer, the Respondent entered a general
denial as to this allegation. At the hearing, however, it of-
fered no evidence to demonstrate that the above-
described unit was inappropriate. Nor did it make any ar-
gument to this effect either at the hearing or in its brief. In
the latter, the Respondent contended that certain in-
dividuals should properly be included within the forego-
ing unit and it also conceded that two other individuals, as
temporary employees, should be excluded. At no time in
its brief, however, did the Respondent attack the ap-
propriateness of the unit described in the complaint.
Under these circumstances, and in view of prior Board
holdings, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that all
office clericals in the Respondent's systemwide and ter-
minal operations at Rapid City, excluding all other em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within' the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act. Santa -Fe Trail Transportation Company, 119
NLRB 1302.
In their briefs, both the General Counsel and the
Respondent are in agreement that there were 84 em-
ployees in the unit during the week ending July 30, 1966.
Although an issue in this case is the precise date on which
the Union initially requested recognition, in a letter dated
July 29, 1966, the Respondent acknowledged receipt of
a demand for recognition by the Union as bargaining
agent for the office workers at Rapid City. For that
reason, for present purposes, and as counsel obviously
assumed in their briefs, the critical period with respect to
the issue of majority in an appropriate unit is the week of
July 24 to 30, 1966.
By stipulation of the parties, a payroll listing the office
workers for the week in question was received in
evidence. This had 85 names. Included on this list were
Cheryl Agostino and Sheryl Schneider. The General
Counsel contends that both were temporary employees,
hired only for the summer months. In its brief, the
Respondent concedes that this is correct and that both of
these individuals should be excluded. In view of the
foregoing facts, neither Cheryl Agostino nor Sheryl
Schneider will be counted as members of the unit.
' The Union filed the onginal charge on October 25 , and an amended
charge on November 1
UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 687
Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 NLRB 611, 612; Brown-Forman
Distillers Corporation, 118 NLRB 454, 455.
The General Counsel contends that Jean Miller should
be included in the unit. Miller was an employee who was
hired in 1965. On June 27, 1966, she became ill and was
hospitalized for some time, eventually returning to work
on September 27, 1966. Her name does not appear on the
payroll list for the week in question. In its brief, the
Respondent contends that Miller should not be included
within the unit because she was on leave of absence
throughout July. The Respondent further contends that
it is not customary to hold an employee's job open while
she is on sick leave and that upon her recovery she is
rehired only if a position is available at that time. It was
conceded by Donald Agostino, secretary-treasurer of the
Company, that no termination notice was ever sent to
Miller and that during her absence she drew all the
hospitalization and sick benefits to which she was enti-
tled. Under these circumstances, and in view of the
foregoing facts, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner
that at the time in question Jean Miller was on a leave of
absence due to illness and that she should be considered
a member of the unit during the week ending July 30.
At the hearing, the General Counsel endeavored to
establish that William J. Aberle, another individual on the
payroll, had a supervisory status. The Respondent con-
tends that Aberle did not become a supervisor until Au-
gust 15 and that prior thereto he was no more than a rank-
and-file employee. In his brief, the General Counsel
makes no reference to Aberle and appears to have aban-
doned his contention, made at the hearing, that Aberle
was an acting supervisor for some while prior to his
promotion. In any event, on the record evidence as to
Aberle's duties, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner
that the Respondent is correct and that Aberle's name
should be included with the other employees in the ap-
propriate unit during the week ending July 30.
Leona Tomassi is the secretary to Donald Agostino. In
one of the exhibits received in evidence, she is listed as a
confidential secretary. At the hearing, however, Agostino
testified that he did not consider her duties of a con-
fidential nature, as that term is generally used, and that he
felt that she should be included within the unit. Since,
from his testimony, it is apparent that this individual per-
forms work of a routine secretarial character, it is my con-
clusion that Leona Tomassi should be included within the
unit.
With the addition of the name of Jean Miller and the
deletion of the names of Cheryl Agostino and Sheryl
Schneider, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that
there were 84 employees within the appropriate unit for
the week of July 24 to 30,1966.2
C. The Union 's Organizational Campaign and the
Majority Issue.
Early in June 1966,3 Jean M. Miller, coding clerk in the
rate audit department, contacted Clem Weber, business
representative for the Teamsters, and asked his assist-
ance in organizing the office clericals at the Respond-
ent's systemwide headquarters and terminal in Rapid
City. Thereafter, Weber supplied Miller with authoriza-
tion cards which she solicited her coworkers to sign.
Later, Donald E. Barbour and Shirley Ann Soucy, two of
her associates , joined in the campaign to organize the
clerical employees for the Union. On June 23, Business
Agent Weber held a meeting at the union hall for the
Respondent's employees and during the course of this
meeting he endeavored to secure their support by telling
those present that if enough of the employees signed
authorization cards the Company would have to negotiate
with the Teamsters immediately and no election would be
necessary.
The General Counsel offered in evidence the
authorization cards of 47 individuals who were employed
within the appropriate unit during the week of July 24 to
30, 1966.4 All of these cards were dated from June 8 to
July 22. The authorizations were in the conventional
form. The Respondent does not question the authenticity
of the signatures on 29 of these cards which were
identified at the hearing by the one who witnessed the
signing of the card, or, in a few instances by the signator
herself. These were the cards of: Marie Brauer, Sandra K
Cox, Norma Freeman, Gladys Hagemann, Kathleen
Hatcher, Dorothy Huff, Erma Kulhavy, Jean Mc-
Dermond, Edna Meyer, Jean M. Miller,5 Katherine
Parks, Beulah Roth, Jo Ann Holcomb, Frances M.
Malimanek, Dorothy Owens, Phillip Roth, Jr., Donald E.
Barbour, Marilyn M. Carlson, Anita B. Gorsuch, Terry
Hamaker, Noel C. Kingsbury, Rose J. Schlaffman, Betty
M. Sewell, John Hatzenbuhler, Sally Huber, Shirley A.
Soucy, Joyce E. Anderson, Charlene J. Kelly, and
George Whitaker.
The Respondent objects to the remaining 18 cards
which were received in evidence on the ground that no
proper foundation was laid for their introduction. These
were cards which were received after testimony was of-
fered as to the circumstances under which the employee
received the card and thereafter returned it to the solici-
tor. In each instance, however, the solicitor did not ac-
tually see the employee sign the card. Thus, Miller
testified that after she had given authorization cards to
the below-named employees, the individual returned the
card to her shortly thereafter, completely filled out and
signed: Marshall Brownlee, Bernice Clawson, Betty Lou
Gasseling, Janice Karlson, Rawleigh G. Mardis, Dale R.
Paulson, Diann H . Stanley, Gordon K. Stanley,6 Roxy
Ann Stevens, and Leona Tomassi. Similarly, Donald E.
Barbour testified that cards which he had given to the fol-
lowing named employees were returned by the individual
soon thereafter, or the next day, completed and bearing
the employee's signature: Dale J. Anderson, Odean
Deutsch, Gary B. Ferguson, Tyler C. Hooker, Vivian M.
Larsen, Esther E. McNabb, Betty Taylor, and Lanny J.
Tennyson.
The Respondent contends that these 18 cards should
s The names of these employees appear in the attached Appendix A.
All events here involved occurred in 1966 unless otherwise specifi-
cally noted.
' Two other authorization cards, those of Patricia Maslack and Jean
Trople, were rejected after the General Counsel conceded at the hearing
that both Maslack and Trople had left the Respondent's employ prior to
the week in question. The card of a third employee , that of Reymond T.
Kinstad, was also rejected after the General Counsel conceded that this
individual was a janitor and, therefore, not eligible for inclusion within the
unit.
5 The Respondent 's sole objection to the inclusion of Miller's card has
been discussed earlier. Respondent had no objection to the authenticity of
the signature on Miller's card since this employee appeared as a witness
at the hearing.
6 Miller testified that in the case of Gordon and Diann Stanley , husband
and wife, respectively, Mrs. Stanley returned both her own and her
husband's card shortly after Miller had given them the cards.
688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not be counted on the ground that they had not been
properly authenticated. In its brief it cites Colson Cor-
poration v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 128, 134 (C.A. 8), for the
proposition than an authorization card should not be
received in evidence unless a witness at the hearing is
able to testify that he observed the execution of the card.
However, an examination of both the opinion of the court
in Colson and the Board decision in that case which the
court enforced (148 NLRB 827, 840, fn. 5) does not sup-
port the narrow construction of the court's opinion which
the Respondent would place upon it. In any event, there
is authority, more directly in point, which holds that the
foundation offered for the introduction of the 18 cards in
question was sufficient here. Thus, in N.L.R.B. v. Howell
Chevrolet Company, 204 F.2d 79 (C.A. 9), affirmed 346
U.S. 482, the court held that a card was properly received
where the signer handed the card to a fellow worker after
its execution and at the hearing only the latter employee
testified. The court there stated "no matter who wrote
. [his] name on the card ... [he] clearly adopted it as
his own signature." (Ibid, p. 86.)
Moreover, the Board has held that the act of giving a
signed card to an appropriate person is sufficient to per-
mit the introduction of the card as evidence of the em-
ployee's desire to have the union represent him. Don The
Beachcomber, 163 NLRB 275 fn. 2 (petition to review
pending in Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit); Dolores,
Inc., 98 NLRB 550, 554. Finally, and of equal sig-
nificance here, it has been held that authorization cards
were properly received in evidence when the witness on
the stand concededly had not been present at their execu-
tion, but had received them through the mail and it was
established that at the time there were corresponding
names on the employer's payroll. N.L.R.B. v. Hunter En-
gineering Company, 215 F.2d 916, 922, 923 (C.A. 8).
In view of the foregoing authority, and the facts present
here, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the 18
cards received in evidence upon the testimony of Miller
and Barbour must be counted along with the other 29 as
to which there was no dispute. The Union, therefore, had
authorization cards from 47 of the 84 employees in the
appropriate unit during the last week of July when it first
sought recognition from the Respondent. With cards from
approximately 56 percent of the employees in the unit,
the Union plainly had a majority.
was the statement of counsel for the Respondent, made
at the hearing, that a diligent search of the files in the cor-
porate headquarters had failed to locate the original of the
letter to Manlowe. According to John Bridge, labor rela-
tions advisor for the Respondent, during the week prior
to July 29 he had telephone conversations with either
Clem Weber or Jack Mcllvenna, both business agents for
the Union, in which recognition for Local 749 was
discussed. Bridge testified that thereafter he wrote the
letter of July 29 to Weber. This read as follows:
July 29, 1966
Mr. Clem Weber
Local 749
Box 1533
Rapid City, South Dakota
Dear Clem:
We recognize the fact that United Buckingham office
workers at the general office in Rapid City may exer-
cise their right to become members of the union and
that you have the right to represent them if you are
the union of their choice. Further if NLRB certifica-
tion is obtained the company will be required to
negotiate a contract arrived at through free and col-
lective bargaining.
You must be aware that the company presently has
a new terminal and general office quarters that have
been under construction for the past year in Spokane
which they expect to be ready for occupancy by this
October. Also, in the negotiation of any office
worker contracts we have always reserved the right
to include a provision providing for the centralization
of any accounting and general office administration
that is more efficiently handled from such location.
We wish to point out that these conditions have ex-
isted and have been a matter of record for the past
two years. Therefore, any future office workers con-
tract which could be negotiated would specifically in-
corporate an article which would preserve com-
pany's rights as outlined herein.
D. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain
There was no dispute that at some time during the latter
part of July 1966 the Union sought recognition from the
Respondent as the bargaining agent for a unit composed
of the clericals at the Rapid City office and terminal. By
letter dated July 29, the Respondent acknowledged that
a demand for recognition on behalf of such a unit had
been made and that if the Union represented a majority of
the office clericals the Company would be required to
negotiate a contract. On the other hand, neither the
General Counsel nor the Union ever established precise-
ly when it was, prior to July 29, that the Union first made
such a demand for recognition.
Business Representative Weber testified that during
"the last part of July" he mailed a request for recognition
letter to John Manlowe, president of the Respondent, at
the corporate headquarters in Spokane, Washington.
Weber was completely credible in his testimony in this re-
gard. However, he was unable to produce a carbon copy
of the letter about which he testified. Equally credible
Yours truly,
MOTOR CARRIER
LABOR ADV ISORY
COUNCIL
JOHN BRIDGE, Execu-
tive Chairman
JB:
John Manlowe
Don Manlowe
H. Buckingham
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, most particu-
larly the letter to the Union from Bridge, the Trial Ex-
aminer concludes and finds that, nothwithstanding the
lack of documentation as to the exact date when the
UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 689
Union made a demand for recognition, it is clear that such
a request was made on behalf of the office clericals at
Rapid City and that this demand was made at some point
shortly before July 29, the date when the Respondent
mailed the foregoing response to the Union's request.
During the week of July 24 to 30, as found earlier herein,
the Union had a majority within the appropriate unit.
On several occasions subsequent to July 29, the union
and company representatives discussed recognition and
bargaining for the unit here involved. Since the Union had
a contract with the Respondent which covered the over-
the-road drivers, the parties were accustomed to meeting
at various area and regional conferences in connection
with grievance matters and other issues arising out of that
collective-bargaining relationship. While at two of these
meetings the Union pressed its claim for recognition and
bargaining as to the proposed unit of office clericals at
Rapid City.
Thus, on August 4, in Omaha, Nebraska, at a meeting
held to consider contractual matters involving other em-
ployees, Weber and Mcllvenna met with John Bridge, his
son and associate, Frank Bridge, and James Henry, the
latter being a vice president of the Company. According
to Weber, at this meeting he told the company representa-
tives that the Union represented the office workers at
Rapid City and that because of a provision in the current
contract covering the drivers' any questions as to majori-
ty could be solved by a card check rather than by resort
to an election. Weber testified that at the close of their
discussion of this subject, John Bridge and the other com-
pany representatives present told him that they would be
involved in a card check on the office worker matter in
the near future. At the hearing John Bridge testified that
he could not recall any of the discussion on this subject at
the Omaha meeting. Frank Bridge did not appear as a wit-
ness at the hearing. Henry, who was called to the stand,
was not asked any questions about this conference.
In a letter dated August 10, addressed to John Bridge
and signed by Weber, the latter wrote, in relevant part:
Dear John:
Thank you for your letter of July 29, 1966 with
reference to United Buckingham office employees.
I am aware of the issues you point out in your letter
regarding the moving of the office elsewhere. I would
be willing to negotiate into an agreement, "provisions
for centralization of accounting, etc.," similar to all
other office contracts now in force and which are a
matter of record.
In accordance with Article II, Section 111, of the Na-
tional Motor Freight Agreement, this Local Union
is willing to participate in a card check by a party to
be agreed upon. I'm asking if United Buckingham is
willing to follow this agreement?
I can't emphasize the importance of your answer to
this question, of the company agreeing to a card
check, too much. I'm sure you are aware of the feel-
ing of this Local Union on this matter.
On August 29, Weber had a telephone conversation
with Frank Bridge. According to the business agent, he
and Bridge discussed the delay that he had encountered
in getting a date for the card check mentioned in the earli-
er correspondence. In a letter of that same date, ad-
dressed to John Bridge, Weber referred to this conversa-
tion and wrote as follows:
Dear John:
In reference to the Tele-con on August 29, 1966, re-
garding United Buckingham's office employees at
Rapid City, South Dakota. It was my understanding
from this conversation that we would be discussing
a contract for these people in Chicago at the J.A.C.
Meeting in the week of September 19th thru Sep-
tember 23, 1966.
Weber received a reply to this letter dated September
2. It was signed by Frank Bridge, as secretary-treasurer
of the Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council, and read
as follows:
Dear Clem:
Thank you for your letter of August 29th.
I agree to meet with you to review the possibilities of
recognizing Local #749 as the representative bar-
gaining agent for the United Buckingham office em-
ployees at Rapid City subject, of course, to evidence
to be furnished by you indicating that you have suffi-
cient cards signed to authorize such representation.
During the period from September 20 to 22, 1966,
representatives of the Teamsters and the motor carriers
met in Chicago at what was known as a Joint Area Com-
mittee Meeting. During the course of that week represent-
atives of the Union and of the Respondent held several
brief conferences to discuss the question of representa-
tion of the office clericals in Rapid City. In each of these
meetings the Union was represented by Weber and Mcli-
venna. The composition of the company delegation
varied somewhat, but at one or more of the meetings,
John Bridge, Frank Bridge, Gloria Bridge," and Henry
were present.
The first meeting was held on September 20 when the
union representatives met with Frank Bridge and Henry.
Weber testified that he opened the discussion at this con-
ference by asking Henry when a card check could be ar-
ranged, and that Henry answered him with the statement
that John Bridge would handle that matter. Weber further
testified that Henry then asked whether the Union had a
majority and that he answered in the affirmative. Accord-
ing to Weber, several times during the course of their
meetings that week he invited Henry to sit down with him
and examine the cards against a list of employees on the
payroll. Henry conceded that there was an exchange of
this character and that at a meeting on either September
This was a reference to a controversial provision in the National
Master Freight Agreement with respect to the manner in which recogm-
tion could be secured for units not specifically covered by the terms of
that contract
' Gloria Bridge, the wife of Frank Bridge, was also an official of the
Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council.
690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
21 or 22, Weber held in his hand a collection of cards and
suggested that Henry examine them. Henry testified that
he told Weber that he wanted to do this, but that he would
also want to check the signatures against the list of people
actually employed in the unit. According to Henry,
Weber then asked him whether he would also want an
election and when he (Henry) replied that he would not
forego any rights provided by Labor Board procedures,
Weber withdrew the cards and concluded the conversa-
tion with the statement "You are not going to see them
[the cards]."
On the morning of September 21, Weber and Mcllven-
na held a short discussion with Gloria Bridge as to the
composition of the unit involved and whether any of the
cards which the Union had were from janitors,
watchmen, and others who should be excluded. Accord-
ing to Mrs. Bridge, Weber told her that at that time he did
not know the answer to her question. Mrs. Bridge further
testified that she, in turn, told the union representatives
that she would be unable to determine the answer to that
question either since at that time she did not have a list ,of
the employees in the unit involved.9
The crucial meeting was a luncheon conference held on
September 21. In attendance were Weber and Mcllvenna
for the Union and John Bridge for the Company. Accord-
ing to Weber, early in the meeting he held up the
authorization cards which the Union had secured and told
Mr. Bridge "Here are the cards." Weber testified that
thereafter Mr. Bridge asked him "Clem, do you have a
majority?" and when he answered in the affirmative, the
latter commented "Clem, you never lied to me," and then
stated, "All right, if you have a majority I will recommend
to Buckingham to start negotiations with you." Accord-
ing to Weber, Mr. Bridge thereupon asked whether he
would come to Chicago for the collective-bargaining con-
ferences and after he agreed that he would, Bridge
promised that he would contact him with respect to the
date for such a meeting.
John Bridge testified at some length with respect to this
meeting. Much of his testimony was in accord with that
given by Weber. He stated that during the course of their
discussion he told the union representatives that if they
had a majority, subject to a check of the cards, he would
recommend that the Company waive an election. He also
testified, however, that at no time did he agree to
negotiate without checking the cards.
Gloria Bridge testified that subsequent to the luncheon
meeting which John Bridge had with the union represent-
atives, the latter instructed her to get in touch with
Henry so that she and Henry could meet with Weber and
Mcllvenna the next morning to check the union
authorization cards against the payroll records. She
further testified that, on the morning of September 22,
and pursuant to these instructions, she and Henry were
prepared for such a metting and stayed in the Respond-
ent's conference room for over an hour awaiting the ar-
rival of Weber and McIlvenna, but that the latter never
came.
Weber denied that John Bridge had ever suggested at
9 Weber testified that before leaving Rapid City for Chicago he had
asked Leo Orner, comptroller of the Respondent, whether he had for-
warded a list of the employees on the payroll to the Company's labor rela-
their luncheon conference that he and Mcllvenna meet
the following day with Mrs. Bridge and Henry to conduct
a card check. Whereas John Bridge testified, credibly,
that he suggested that the union representatives should
meet with Frank or Gloria Bridge and Henry for the pur-
pose of checking the cards,1° he conceded that he could
not recall whether the actual arrangements for such a
meeting were ever settled during his luncheon with the
business agents. Vice President Henry testified that he
did not really know whether Weber had ever been
notified of the time and place for the meeting which he
and Gloria Bridge presumed that the union representa-
tives would attend. Similarly, Gloria Bridge conceded
that she did not see, or talk with, Weber between the time
on September 21 when John Bridge told her that she and
Henry should arrange to check cards the following morn-
ing.
From all of the foregoing and from the general
demeanor of the witnesses who testified with respect to
the events on September 21 and 22, it is the conclusion of
the Trial Examiner that Weber's testimony as to the
luncheon meeting was a substantially accurate account of
what occurred, except that, contrary to Weber, John
Bridge never waived the Respondent's right to have a
card check before the start of negotiations. On the other
hand, it is obvious that there was a misunderstanding as
to the time when such a card check would be had. From
the testimony of both John Bridge and Mcllvenna it is
clear that he suggested that a meeting with Gloria Bridge
and Henry be held. However, there is no evidence that
John Bridge asked the union representatives that they at-
tend such a meeting the following morning. John Bridge
apparently did tell Gloria Bridge that such a meeting was
to be held and she, in turn, arranged to have Henry in at-
tendance. However, neither Gloria Bridge nor Henry saw
the union representatives during the course of the follow-
ing hours of that day and no attempt was made to contact
them by telephone to confirm the arrangements. From all
of this, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the
nonappearance of the union representatives at the con-
ference proposed for the morning of September 22 arose
from a breakdown of communications for which the
Union was not at fault.
In fact, on the morning of September 22, both Weber
and Mcllvenna, oblivious of the fact that Gloria Bridge
and Henry planned to meet with them, left Chicago on the
return journey to South Dakota. Mcllvenna testified that
early in October not having heard any further word from
the Respondent, he telephoned John Bridge. According
to Mcllvenna, in this conversation he told Mr. Bridge that
the Union wanted to meet and negotiate with the Com-
pany as soon as possible and, that in response to his
request for action, Mr. Bridge assured him that he would
endeavor to arrange a meeting for the following week and
that in the meantime, he would keep in touch with them.
At the hearing, John Bridge conceded that he had had
such a telephone conversation with McIlvenna during
this period and that subsequent to his conversation with
McIlvenna he telephoned the corporate headquarters in
bons counsel in Chicago and that Orner assured him that this had been
done.
10 John Bridge 's testimony in this regard was corroborated by McIlven-
na.
UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES
Spokane on one or two occasions to remind them that the
matter had to be resolved."
On October 17, Weber received a telegram from John
Bridge requesting that he contact him by telephone on
October 19. On the latter date, Weber telephoned Bridge,
and at that time was informed that the Company would
ask for an election among the employees in the office cler-
ical unit. Weber concluded the conversation with the
declaration that the Union would file an unfair labor prac-
tice charge. At the time of the hearing there had been no
further contact between the parties with reference to the
unit in question.
CONCLUDING FINDINGS
In the event an employer has an honest doubt as to the
union's purported majority, or the unit which the Board
would find appropriate, it is well settled that he may insist
on a formal representation proceeding and a Board-con-
ducted election to resolve such doubt before being
obligated to bargain. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185
F.2d 732, 741-742 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S.
914; Hammond & Irving, Incorporated, 154 NLRB
1071, 1073. On the other hand, "There is no absolute
right vested in an employer to demand an election."
N.L.R.B. v. Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F.2d 206,209
(C.A. 9); United Mine Workers of America v. Arkansas
Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72.
It is clear that the Union here involved was, at all times
relevant, ready to demonstrate its majority status to the
Respondent's officials. From a time early in August, and
shortly after the initial demand for recognition, the union
representatives, on numerous occasions, offered to sub-
mit to a count of the authorization cards. John Bridge
conceded that subsequent to July 29, when he first
acknowledged the Union's request for recognition, both
Weber and McIlvenna "offered to show their cards to
anyone." Whereas there is some question as to whether
the Union proposed a card check within the first few days
after its initial request for recognition , in its letter to the
Company on August 10, it plainly set forth this proposal.
Later that month this request was renewed, and, in his
letter to Weber, dated September 2, Frank Bridge
acknowledged the Union's demand and stated that recog-
nition would be dependent on the "evidence to be
furnished ... indicating that you have sufficient cards
signed to authorize such representation."
Later, at their meeting on September 21, when Weber
and Mcllvenna conferred with John Bridge, the latter,
after questioning Weber as to whether the Union had a
majority and receiving an affirmative reply, volunteered
his own faith and confidence in the business agent's in-
tegrity with the statement that Weber had never lied to
him. Thereafter, according to Bridge's own testimony, he
assured the union representatives that, subject to a check
of the cards, he would recommend that the Company
begin negotiations. He further testified that he suggested
11 Thus , Mr. Bridge testified with respect to his conversations with Pres-
ident Manlowe during this period . " I talked to him with reference to the
advisability of commencing negotiations with the Teamsters at Rapid
City. At no time did we think in terms or discuss it in terms without a card
check, but I did suggest to him, and I repeat it , that I would recommend if
the cards were checked and found to be in a majority it might be advisable
to consider waiving the election."
Later , on cross-examination, Mr. Bridge stated that in connection with
these same conversations with the corporate headquarters "I suggested
that they take action on the matter."
691
that Weber and Mcllvenna meet with Gloria Bridge and
James Henry for the purpose of checking the cards. The
next day, according to the testimony of the latter wit-
nesses, they were prepared to conduct such a card check
on behalf of the Respondent, but were unable to do so
because neither Weber nor Mcllvenna ever appeared. It
is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner, as set forth earli-
er herein, that the nonappearance of the union representa-
tives resulted from the fact that they had never been
notified of the time and place for such a meeting, whereas
Gloria Bridge and Henry apparently assumed that this
had been done the day before by John Bridge. At the
hearing the Respondent endeavored to establish that, but
for the absence of the union representatives, a card check
could have been completed on September 22. On the
other hand, it is of some significance that no explanation
was offered as to why, when, through no fault of Weber
or McIlvenna, the card count was not accomplished on
the latter date, the Respondent thereafter failed to take
the initiative to set another time and place for such a
meeting that would be mutually convenient for the
parties.
From the foregoing sequence of events, the Trial Ex-
aminer finds that, after many weeks, during which the
Union sought recognition and offered to establish its
majority on the basis of a card check, on September 21,
John Bridge, on behalf of the Respondent, agreed to ac-
cept the results of a card count, and if the results bore out
Weber's claim to a majority, commence negotiations on
behalf of the Company. Nothwithstanding this
background, almost a month later, and with no explana-
tion, John Bridge informed Weber that the Respondent
would demand an election.
On this record it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex-
aminer that at no time, subsequent to the initial demand
for recognition, did the Respondent manifest any objec-
tions as to the appropriateness of the unit proposed by the
Union, or express any doubt as to the Union's majority.
It is the further conclusion of the Trial Examiner that at
the meeting in Chicago on September 21, the Company
agreed to a check of the signature cards. Thereafter, the
Respondent repudiated this agreement when, on October
19, it informed the Union that it would insist upon an
election after all, to resolve the issue as to the Union's
standing among the employees. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds
that the Respondent's conduct subsequent to September
21, 1966, constituted a refusal to bargain with the Union
after the majority status of the latter in an appropriate unit
had been established. By this course of action the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Fred Snow, Harold Snow and Tom Snow d/b/a Snow &
Sons, 134 NLRB 709, 710-711, enfd. 308 F.2d 687,
693-694 (C.A. 9); Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 NLRB 643,
644-645; Kellogg's, Inc. d/b/a Kellogg Mills, 147 NLRB
342, 346, enfd. 347 F.2d 219 (C.A. 9). Cf. H & W Con-
struction Company, Inc., 161 NLRB 852.12
12 The situation here involved differs from that in the Serpa case which
is discussed at length in the Respondent 's brief, John P Serpa, Inc., 155
N LRB 99, reversed and remanded sub nom. Retail Clerks' Union, Local
1179 v N L R.B., 376 F.2d 186 (C.A. 9); on remand, conclusions of the
court adopted by the Board , John P. Serpa, Inc, 166 NLRB 336
Since the Respondent here, after initially agreeing to a card check, sub-
sequently repudiated this agreement and sought a Board election, the
present case is governed by the Board decision in Snow & Sons, cited
above. See John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99, fn. 6.
336-845 0 - 70 - 45
692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. The Grant of Economic Benefits to the Employees;
Conclusions with Respect Thereto
1. The wage increase
In the latter part of June 1966 the Respondent an-
nounced that, effective July 1, its employees would
receive a 5-cent pay increase and that on January 1,
1967, an additional 5-cent raise would be granted. The
exact date that this increase was announced was never
established at the hearing. Two of the witnesses for the
General Counsel'3 testified that the announcement was
made in a memorandum given to the employees shortly
before the union meeting on June 23. Another witness,14
however, testified that the memorandum was given to the
employees after the union meeting. The memorandum it-
self was never offered in evidence. Nor was there any
evidence as to whether the raise was applicable only to
the employees in the office clerical unit here involved, or
to all of the unorganized employees of the Respondent.
Donald Agostino, secretary-treasurer of the Respond-
ent, testified that the pay raise in question had been
under consideration for several months, that it had been
discussed as early as the preceding February or March
and that the announcement had been delayed because
Harold Buckingham, the corporate official who handled
such personnel problems had been preoccupied with his
duties as a member of the South Dakota legislature and
had been unable to dispose of the pay increase matter
until late in June. The General Counsel contends that the
wage raise was granted for the purpose of interfering with
the Union's organizational campaign among the office
clerical employees and that, for this reason, its effectua-
tion constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
It is, of course, well established that a wage plan con-
ceived, or accelerated, to thwart an organizing campaign,
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange
Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405. Here, the announcement
of the wage raise coincided so closely with the date of the
union meeting for the Buckingham employees, that its
timing tends to support the General Counsel' s allegation.
On the other hand, even more crucial in establishing that
the Respondent violated the Act, as alleged in this
respect, is evidence that at the time the wage announce-
ment was made, the Respondent knew that the Union
was endeavoring to organize the office clericals. This,
however, was not established. Jean Miller, the most ac-
tive employee organizer for the Union, did not sign an
authorization card until June 8. Thereafter, and before
the union meeting was held she secured a substantial
number of signed authorization cards from her cowor-
kers. On the other hand, Donald Barbour, the other em-
ployee most active in the organizational campaign, did not
sign a card, or become active in his efforts to secure
signed cards, until the meeting on June 23. Whereas the
extent of employee organizational activity might, to some
extent, support an inference that the Respondent must
have known about the employee interest in the Union
during the middle of June, this record is barren of any af-
firmative evidence that the supervisory personnel or
management officials had actual knowledge of union ac-
tivity by the office clericals prior to the announcement of
the wage increase. Since this critical piece of evidence is
lacking, the Trial Examiner must and does conclude that
the Respondent 's decision to grant this benefit was based
upon lawful economic considerations . Accordingly, the
Trial Examiner further concludes that the complaint must
be dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the wage increase in
question . The Brearley Company, 163 NLRB 637, fn. 2;
Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300,
306; Derby Coal & Oil Co., Inc., et al., 139 NLRB 1485,
1486; True Temper Corporation, 127 NLRB 839,
842-844.
2. The dental insurance plan
On or about August 1, 1966, the Respondent notified
all employees throughout its system who were not then in
organized bargaining units that, effective on September
1, 1966, they would be the beneficiaries of a dental in-
surance plan, the premium for which would be borne by
the Company. It was undenied that this employee benefit
was effectuated without notice to, or consultation with,
the Union. The General Counsel contends that this ac-
tion by the Respondent constituted a unilateral act, in
derogation of the Union's status as the bargaining agent
for the office clerical employees, and that, for this reason,
the institution of this plan constituted a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Secretary-Treasurer Agostino testified that the plan in
question had been under consideration for almost a year
prior to its effective date. According to Agostino, the
Respondent had, for many months, been in contact with
insurance companies and had under study various plans
that would provide an insurance benefit for those em-
ployees who were not then covered by the Teamsters
health and welfare program. Agostino could not recall
precisely when the decision had been made to put the pro-
gram into effect. He testified, however, that he was cer-
tain that it had been a considerable period prior to Sep-
tember 1, because the policy providing for the plan had a
clause requiring a waiting period so that it could not
become effective until 2 months after the Respondent and
the insurance carrier agreed on the final terms. Agostino
did not testify as to whether the latter date was July 1, an
earlier date, or a later date. A copy of the contract, or the
insurance policy providing for the dental plan in question,
was never offered in evidence by the General Counsel, or
by any other party. As a result, the record here is lacking
in a critical piece of documentation as to the precise time
when the Respondent made its decision to grant the em-
ployees a dental insurance benefit and executed an agree-
ment with the insurance company for the effectuation of
such a plan.
Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that
Agostino's testimony, which was credible, stands unde-
nied in the record, it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex-
aminer that the Respondent finalized its agreement for
the dental benefit to its employees on or about July 1,
1966. At that point, almost another month would elapse
before the Union would make its initial demand for recog-
nition. Thereafter, as found earlier herein, it was not until
September 21, that the Respondent's conduct with
respect to the Union's demand for recognition and bar-
gaining constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5). On the
present record, the Trial Examiner must conclude that a
plan to provide dental insurance was under active con-
13 Jean M. Miller and Shirley Ann Soucy. 11 Donald E. Barbour.
UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 693
sideration by the Respondent's management many
months before the Union began organizing the office cler-
icals and that final arrangements for the plan were
reached before the Union made its first demand for recog-
nition. In the light of these findings, which are compelled
by the present record, the Trial Examiner concludes that
the establishment of the dental insurance program by the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act. Cutter Boats, Inc., 127 NLRB 1576, 1585.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization, all within the meaning of
the Act.
2. All office clericals in the systemwide and terminal
operations of the Respondent in Rapid City, South
Dakota, excluding all other employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
3. At all times since July 29, 1966, the Union has been
the exclusive representative, for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act, of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit.
4. By refusing, since September 21, 1966, to bargain
collectively in good faith with the Union as the majority
representative of the aforesaid unit, the Respondent en-
gaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
5. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain with the Union,
the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
7. The General Counsel has not proved by a preponde-
rance of the evidence that the Respondent interfered
with, restrained, or coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights established by the Act, except by the specific
conduct found herein to have been violative.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, the Trial Examiner will recom-
mend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the
entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
the Trial Examiner hereby issues the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
United Buckingham Freight Lines, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith con-
cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with General Drivers & Helpers Union,
Local 749, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit: All office clericals in the system-
wide and terminal operations at Rapid City, South
Dakota, excluding all other employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-
named Union as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the appropriate unit, and embody in a signed
agreement any understanding reached.
(b) Post at its terminal in Rapid City, South Dakota,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B"15
Copies of the said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 18, after being duly signed by the
Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
where notices are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 18, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith. 16
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges any unfair labor practices
other than as herein specifically found.
APPENDIX A
Employees in appropriate unit during week of July 24
to 30, 1966
William J. Aberle Norma E. Freeman
Joyce E. Amerson Mary L. Fuqua
Carmel Anderson Betty Lou Gasseling
Dale J. Anderson Dominica C. Goc
Donald Barbour Connie J. Gurley
Marie J. Brauer Darla Haefs
Marshall J. Brownlee Gladys D. Hagemann
Noelle C. Brown Terry Hamaker
Helen M. Brubaker George E. Harrison
Anna L. Chastain Kathleen Hatcher
Bernice Clauson John D. Hatzenbuhler
Sandra K. Cox Jo Ann Holcomb
Laura M. Erickson Tyler C. Hooker
Sharon S. Ervin Frankie N. Hudnall
Gary B. Ferguson Sally Huber
Mary Ann Fernen Dorothy Huff
Irma E. Foster Daniel F. Irmen
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
'S In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith."
694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
James L. A. Johnson
Janice K. Just
Janice L. Karlson
Charlene J. Kelley
Noel C. Kingsbury
Ann M. Kinsella
Ruth A. Koopal
Erma Kulhavy
Marjorie V. Mahan
Rawleigh G. Mardis
Jeane McCermand
DeLaine McLaughlin
Esther E. McNabb
Edna Meyer
Jean Miller
Florence L. Mittelstaedt
Dorothy Owens
Katherine J. Parks
Dale Paulson
Diann Stanley
Glennita Reeves
Nancy L. Richards
Phillip Roth, Jr.
Beulah L. Roth
Marrylyn K. Russell
Tommye S. Santos
Betty M. Savoy
Rose Schlaffman
Donald P. Schmidt
Jeanne F. Schmidt
Bette M. Sewell
Janice Snow
Shirley A. Soucy
Roxy Ann Stevens
Linda J. Stuckey
Bette E. Taylor
Lanny Tennyson
Leona Tomassi
Dorothy Van Alstyne
Leona Van Schoonhoven
Donna Zens
George Whittaker
Carlene A. Beebe
Marilyn Carlson
Odean G. Deutsch
Anita Gorsuch
Vivian M. Larsen
Frances Malimanek
Jacqueline M. Moore
Gordon K. Stanley
APPENDIX B
Notice to All Employees
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with General
Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749, International
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as the exclu-
sive representative of all the employees in the bar-
gaining unit described below, with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment , and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement . The bar-
gaining unit is:
All office clericals in the systemwide and ter-
minal operations at our location in Rapid City,
South Dakota, excluding all other employees,
guards and supervisors.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their right of self-organization, to form, join,
or assist the above-named or any other labor or-
ganization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
UNITED BUCKINGHAM
FREIGHT LINES
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 316 Federal
Building, 110 South Fourth Street, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota 55401, Telephone 344-2611.