The Stride Rite Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 15, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 224 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Stride Rite Corporation and Lewiston -Auburn
Shoeworkers Protective Association . Cases 1-CA-
10550 and 1-RC-13670
February 15, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On September 28, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel
and the Charging Party filed a brief in support of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings,2 and
conclusions3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent's solicitation of grievances during the union
campaign was a continuation of past practices and
not an unlawful promise of benefits. The General
Counsel contends that Respondent's actions dui ing
the campaign differ significantly from past practices
and constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. We find merit in this exception.
When Respondent opened its plant in Auburn,
Maine, a letter was distributed to employees setting
forth, inter alia, a grievance procedure. Forms were
provided on which employees could request an
operation review. Problems could be discussed first
with the immediate supervisor, then with Plant
Manager Leseur, and, as a last resort, with Clarence
Nelson, vice president of Stride Rite Manufacturing.
Nelson, who operated from the corporation's princi-
pal office in Boston , Massachusetts, made a practice
of visiting all of Respondent's plants a few times a
year. On the opening of the Auburn plant, he
instructed his assistant, Barringer, Plant Manager
I The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent's unfair labor
practices came within the first category of unfair labor practices as defined
by the Supreme Court in N LR B v . Gissel Packing Co, Inc, 395 U S. 575
(1969) We find it unnecessary to determine whether the violations are within
the first category since we find that , even if the unfair labor practices do not
come within this category , they come within the second category and a
bargaining order is warranted under either finding
2 The Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain
credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F2d 362 (C.A 3,
228 NLRB No. 22
Leseur, and other supervisors to talk to employees
about production problems with a view toward
solving them. In the past, Nelson had visited the plant
and talked individually with a few employees, but no
formal employee meetings were held.
On January 15, 1976, the Union filed a representa-
tion petition. During the third and fourth weeks of
January, Nelson held a series of meetings to discuss
the union petition and to determine what sort of
problems existed in the plant. Employees were asked
to attend by department. The meetings were held in
the conference room of the plant. Nelson made a
speech from prepared notes and then asked for
comments. Employees complained about the unsani-
tary condition of one of the bathrooms, the high noise
level of a compressor, and the inconvenient location
of a conveyor. They also expressed a preference for a
plantwide vacation over the July 4 holiday, rather
than the staggered vacations suggested by manage-
ment. Nelson wrote down these complaints and
admitted that Respondent "took some of the sugges-
tions and capitalized on them." Shortly after the
meetings the bathroom was cleaned, the compressor
was muffled, and the location of the conveyor was
changed. About 2 weeks after the meetings, Respon-
dent distributed a ballot asking employees to indicate
their preference for either a 1-week paid vacation or a
2-week vacation with 1 week paid. Prior to the
election, it was announced that the plant would be
closed for the first 2 weeks of July.
The Administrative Law Judge found, and we
agree , that the meetings were for the purpose of
soliciting grievances. He concluded, however, that
since Respondent had in the past solicited grievances
it was merely continuing its former practice at the
January meetings and, therefore, its conduct on these
occasions did not constitute an unlawful promise of
benefit.
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we find
that the January meetings represent a major change
in Respondent's approach to grievances. Complaints
had previously been handled informally by local
officials in the plant manager's office or on the plant
floor. Prior to the union campaign, Nelson, a high-
ranking corporate official, had spoken with only a
few employees at the Auburn plant while carrying out
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
his findings
3 Chairman Murphy agrees that Respondent's remarks regarding plant
closure violated Sec 8(aXI) of the Act In the instant case, the repeated
reference to a 30 -day cancellation clause in the Company 's 2-year lease and
to the failure to sign a long-term lease suggests that options which are solely
within Respondent's control may be exercised to punish the employees
should they select the Union In contrast , the employer's remarks in
Honeywell, Inc, Photographic Products Division, 225 NLRB 617 (1976), which
Chairman Murphy there found unobjectionable , referred to possible effects
of unionization beyond the employer's control and did not in her view
suggest that the employer would take any adverse action toward the
employees should they select the union
STRIDE RITE CORP.
his practice of visiting all the Company 's plants a few
times a year . After the Union 's representation peti-
tion, he held group meetings twice in 1 month.
Further , these meetings were held in the conference
room-an area of the plant which had never before
been used for such purposes . The aura of formality
created by this special location of the meetings and
the recurrent appearance of a high -level corporate
officer stands in marked contrast to the casual
questioning of employees by local officials. By the
same token, the calling of mass meetings for all
departments differs significantly from the provision
for an individual grievance procedure . These changes
in practice , coupled with the immediate remedy of
several complaints raised at the meetings , undoubted-
ly conveyed to the employees the message that
Respondent, in its effort to defeat the Union, was
now willing to look much more favorably on any
request they might make .4 Accordingly, we find that
Respondent , by its actions in the January meetings,
impliedly promised benefits in an attempt to under-
mine the Union 's support in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. We further find that by its
subsequent granting of certain of these promised
benefits Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent , The Stride Rite Corporation , Auburn , Maine,
its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order,
as so modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(e) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(e) Promising and granting benefits and soliciting
the presentation of grievances and adjusting such
grievances , to discourage its employees ' designation
of a representative for the purposes of collective
bargaining."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case 1-
RC-13670 be , and the same hereby is, set aside, and
that the petition in Case 1-RC-13670 be dismissed.
APPENDIX
225
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act gives all
employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form , join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a repre-
sentative of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees with respect to
these rights.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are
engaging in surveillance of your union activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning your
union membership , activities , sympathies, or de-
sires.
WE WILL NOT promise and grant benefits and
solicit the presentation of grievances and adjust
such grievances , to discourage you in the designa-
tion of a representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with plant closing or
other reprisals if you select Lewiston-Auburn
Shoeworkers Protective Association, or any other
labor organization , as your collective -bargaining
representative , or engage in any other union
activities.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with the Lewiston -Auburn Shoeworkers Protec-
tive Association, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit
described below with respect to rates of pay,
wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, and, if an agreement is reached,
embody such understanding in a written signed
agreement . The bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part - time employees
of the Stride Rite Corporation at its Old
Hotel Road , Auburn , Maine , plant , exclud-
ing office clerical employees, guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the
' Eagle -Picher Industries , Inc, Electronics Division, Precision Products
Department, 171 NLRB 293,298-299 (1968)
226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
THE STRIDE RITE CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a
charge filed on March 31, 1975, by Lewiston-Auburn
Shoeworkers Protective Association (herein LASPA or the
Union), a complaint and amended complaint issued by the
Regional Director for Region 1 of the National Labor
Relations Board (herein the Board) on November 17, 1975,
and April 2, 1976, respectively,I and timely filed answers by
the Stride Rite Corporation (herein Respondent), a hearing
was held on April 20 through 24, 1976, in Auburn, Maine.
Consolidated for hearing with the complaint were Union-
filed objections to the conduct of an election conducted
among Respondent's employees on March 27, 1975.2 A
hearing upon these objections, which parallel certain
complaint allegations, was directed by the Board on August
4, 1975.
At issue herein was whether Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and interfered with the conduct of the
election by solicitmg grievances from its employees and
satisfying or promising to satisfy same in order to under-
mine the Union's organizational efforts, interrogating its
employees in regard to the union activity, creating the
impression of surveillance of union activities, and impliedly
threatening to close the plant if the Union won the
representation election. Further at issue was whether
Respondent, by the foregoing conduct and its refusal to
bargain collectively with the Union, rendered a free
election, impossible and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to argue orally.3 Comprehensive briefs,
which have been carefully considered, were filed by all
parties.
Upon the entire record, including my careful observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following:
1 A motion to further amend the complaint at the opening of heanng was
timely See Starkville, Inc., 219 NLRB 595 (1975)
2 The election was held pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon
Consent Election approved on February 7, 1975 Of approximately 112
eligible voters, 43 cast votes for, and 62 cast votes against, LASPA.
3 Respondent contended that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C
Sec 552, as amended, 88 Stat 1563, entitled it to prehearing inspection of the
affidavits of witnesses General Counsel intended to call at the hearing and
that the General Counsel's failure to comply with its request for same
violated that act, denied Respondent due process of law, and rendered the
hearing herein void ab mrtio. As the Board has pointed out, Respondent
cannot raise the refusal to furnish documents as a defense in an unfair labor
practice proceeding See, e g, Mercy College, 219 NLRB 81 (1975). The
appropriate avenue for Freedom of Information Act contentions lies in the
first instance before the United States district courts, rather than an
Administrative Law Judge of the Board
Moreover, Respondent rested its FOIA contentions on certain decisions
rendered by various district courts favorable to its position The Board, with
all due respect, has not accepted the propriety of such decisions. Upon
appeal, decisions requiring that investigative affidavits be disclosed prior to
hearing pursuant to the FOIA have consistently been reversed See, for
example, Goodfriend Western Corp., d/b/a Wrangler Wranch v Fuchs, 535
F 2d 145 (C A I, 1976), Title Guarantee Co v. N L R B, 534 F 2d 484 (C A.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S
LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS-PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is engaged in
Auburn, Maine, in the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of shoes and footwear. Jurisdiction is not in issue. I find and
conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
I find and conclude that the Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
To the extent relevant herein, I find that the following
persons, at the times in question, comprised Respondent's
supervisory heirarchy: Myles Slosberg, vice president; C. T.
Nelson, director of manufacturing; Donald Leseur, plant
manager; Robert G. Lauzon, maintenance supervisor; Fred
Lawrence, cutting room foreman; Maurice Frechette,
cutting room foreman; and Al Gagne, packing room
foreman.
H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background-Stride Rite's Arrival and Union
Activity
The twin city area of Lewiston-Auburn, Maine, has
historically been a center for the manufacture of shoes. Like
other such areas in the northeast, it has, in recent years,
suffered attrition in the number of factories and concerns so
engaged. As the number of shoe factories declined, so too
did the membership of LASPA, one of the area's principal
unions. One of Auburn's factories to close in 1974 was
Moxee's, a reasonably new plant which had been built by
yet another shoe company, Belgrade. LASPA had repre-
sented the employees of both Belgrade and Moxee.
Prior to the acquisition of the Auburn plant, Respondent
had seven plants, four unionized. Around the fall of 1973,
because of a discerned need for increased production,
Respondent began seeking additional manufacturing facili-
ties. The former Moxee plant offered a relatively new
2, 1976), Climax Molybdenum Company v. N.L.R B, 539 F 2d 63 (C A 10,
1976)
Respondent further contended that it had been denied due process of law
by General Counsel's refusal to furnish it, for cross-examination purposes,
with the notes and memoranda of witness interviews, taken in the investiga-
tion from some witnesses in lieu of affidavits. (Where General Counsel had
affidavits of its witnesses , they were furnished) The Board's Rule, Sec
102.118, embodying the principles of Jencks v United States, 353 U S 657
(1957), is specific and requires only that "statements" be produced. The term
"statement" is narrowly defined to include- "(I) a written statement made by
said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him, or (2) a
stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
The fact that General Counsel chose not to take sworn affidavits from all
witnesses, but relied on notes of interviews of some in issuing the complaint
and preparing witnesses for hearing, does not render such notes "adopted or
approved" within the Board 's Rule, absent some evidence that the notes
were, in fact, "adopted or approved" by the witness or that they purported to
be substantially verbatim recitals of the witnesses ' statements . I find General
Counsel's refusal to furnish such notes warranted by the Board' s Rules
"Since the notes in issue did not have to be produced, the Respondent's
arguments that it was prejudiced by their unavailability are without meet "
American Rubber and Plastics Corporation, 200 NLRB 867, 868 (1972)
STRIDE RITE CORP.
physical plant and an available work force with skills in the
manufacture of shoes. Slosberg, president of Respondent's
manufacturing division, as well as corporate vice president,
investigated the plant and the Auburn area. He inquired
and was informed about the available labor force, the
prevailing wages, the extent of unionism, and the identity
and characteristics of LASPA.
Arrangements were made for Respondent to acquire the
Auburn plant through industrial revenue bond financing.
Under this financing plan, which required a municipal
referendum, the city of Auburn would purchase the plant
from its present owners with the proceeds of a municipal
bond offering and would lease it to Respondent for a term
of 15 years at a rental equal to the city's obligations on the
bond. At the end of the 15 years, Respondent would own
the plant and would have enjoyed the advantage of the
substantially lower municipal bond interest rate.
In August 1974, Respondent entered into a 2-year lease
for the plant. The lease provided, inter alia:
[P]rovided however that the Tenant shall have the right
to terminate this lease at any time by giving the
Landlord written notice, and said termination shall
become effective upon the 30th day following the
Landlord's receipt of said notice.4
Respondent's decision to locate in Auburn was an-
nounced during the summer of 1974 and an advertising
campaign, stressing the added jobs and improved tax base,
aimed at passage of the bond referendum, was undertaken.
The referendum was held in November 1974. It passed.
Even before the referendum, however, Respondent had
moved into the plant. Production began in late September
and employees were added to the work force as the various
steps in the assembly process were completed. In order to
open the plant, Respondent invested approximately
$200,000 in repair and renovation, much of which was
nonrecoverable.
In late December, the date of January 7, 1975, was
selected for closing on the revenue bond financing package
and Respondent's obligation thereunder. Approximately 2
or 3 days before January 7, Respondent's bond counsel
requested an indefinite postponement because of "technical
difficulties." The postponement was granted.
The Union's interest in the plant began when Respondent
commenced operations . Wallace Dixon, LASPA's business
agent, visited the plant on three or four occasions between
October and December 1974, met with Plant Manager
Donald Leseur, and indicated the Union's interest in
representing Respondent's employees. Many of Respon-
dent's employees had been LASPA members when previ-
ously employed in this and other shoe factories. Pursuant to
their requests , an initial organizing meeting , attended by six
or seven employees, was held on January 6, 1975 (all dates
hereinafter are 1975 unless otherwise specified). Authoriza-
tion cards were passed out. Additional union meetings were
held on January 13 and 20. On January 10, the Union made
4 Prior to the execution of this lease , in a letter to the building's owners,
Slosberg had indicated a willingness "to enter into a . . month -to-month
lease arrangement . . . with the understanding that we could ternunate on
short notice if the Revenue Bond financing package cannot be worked out to
our mutual satisfaction ." In testimony , Slosberg indicated that it also sought
227
a demand for recognition which was repeated on January
21 and on that date rejected. The Union also filed the
representation petition in Case 1 -RC-13670 on January 15.
On January 22, the Union filed a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, alleging problems with compressor noise,
lighting, an unsanitary restroom, and inadequate heat.
B. Stride Rite's Response to the Union Activity
1. Alleged solicitation and satisfaction of
grievances
It is not in dispute that, upon receipt of the petition,
Respondent undertook to convince its employees to vote
against union representation. In the third and fourth weeks
of January, Clarence Nelson, director of manufacturing
and vice president of the manufacturing division, conduct-
ed a series of meetings with the employees. He testified:
A petition for an election had been filed and I wanted to
find out what they knew about it, maybe we could set
up some kind of communication.
He further testified that the purpose of the meetings was to
find out what the problems were and to solve them. In these
meetings, Nelson introduced himself and Barringer, his
assistant, and, speaking from notes prepared for the
purposes, told the employees:
[W ]e had received the Petition from the NLRB for an
election and that I realized that there were problems
there and that we had been working on some of these
problems and we would continue to work on these
problems. I went back to the history of Auburn, the way
we came there in the first place; where we had been
looking for available skills in various cities and ... I
had determined through a survey that people were
available in Auburn-Lewiston area as well as some
other areas that we had done a similar survey in and we
had decided to come here primarily because of the
available labor and because of the available plant. We
expected startup problems. Every factory I know of has
startup problems and some of these problems I had
written down there, flow of work, equipment and lack
of some skills and I think we agreed that there was some
of this that existed there and that some people suggested
ways to get around some of these problems. But that
was later on. I continued talking about the economy in
general and in the shoe industry and I think ... that
there was an economic situation existing , unemploy-
ment in the country, unemployment in this community
and I cited some other shoe towns where unemploy-
ment had been a problem, such as Haverhill, Lynn and
Brockton, Massachusetts and I mentioned Moxee's
which had been in that plant and many of the people
there in these meetings had worked in Moxee's and
experienced this. So, it wasn't something that was
the short-term revocable commitment so that it could get out if business
turned down or the plant turned out to be unsuitable . The 2-year lease
contained no limitation on the reasons for which Respondent could give
notice and terminate.
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
secondhand or something. They knew it firsthand, these
problems. I said that the company did not want a
Union. I didn't feel it was necessary but that we had
some Unions and we operated with a Union if that's
what the people wanted, that we did operate with
Unions. We had some factories operating without
Unions and once we got our problems worked out in the
startup, that we felt we could come up with a viable
operation that was a good place for people to work.
And then I asked if there was any questions or any
comments that the people would like to make at that
point and there were some.5
As employees voiced various complaints, suggestions,
and questions, Nelson made written notes of them and
either described Respondent's policy on the particular
subject or indicated that he would look into the matter.
Among the complaints that were raised were such matters
as the allegedly dirty bathroom, ice on the parking lot, the
location of a conveyor, and noise from a compressor. One
complaint about a missing machine part caused Nelson to
take immediate action. According to Nelson's notes and his
recollections, someone commented that if LASPA was in
they would get the LASPA contract. Employees asked how
many plants Respondent had and how many were union-
ized. A comment was made that Moxee's had closed but
Stride Rite could not because the bond issue had been
approved and the lease signed. Nelson testified that he
made no comments about the latter statements.
A question was raised on Respondent's wage increase
policy, in response to which Nelson stated that there was no
set policy. He stated that wages could not be raised at that
time . He continued by describing Respondent's standard
hour-incentive system. An extended discussion arose over
the scheduling of vacations. Nelson stated, consistent with
the information new employees were given, that the
vacation period or schedule would be announced by May 1.
The question was asked when it would be. Nelson spoke of
his reservations about shutting the plant down for a
vacation period and his preference for staggered vacations.
This caused considerable consternation as plantwide vaca-
tion shutdowns over the July 4 holiday were customary in
the area.
Following these group meetings in January, according to
Nelson, Respondent "took some of the suggestions and
capitalized on them and used them." Some of the comp-
laints , such as the noisy compressor and the dirty bath-
room, had also been raised through OSHA. The compressor
was first muffled and ultimately moved outdoors. Nelson
looked into the bathroom situation and the complaints in
regard thereto ceased.6 A suggestion (or complaint) in
regard to the installation of a conveyor belt in a particular
area was followed up and done.
The record 7 reveals that from October through Decem-
ber 1974 Respondent gave 11 employees rate changes, in all
5 The foregoing does not purport to be a verbatim recital of Nelson's
statement to the employees in these meetings . His recollection of these
meetings is corroborated yb yy his notes and is more specific than recollections
of the employees who testified on this subject. Additionally, I note Nelson's
candid acknowledgment of the purpose of the meetings and his statements
concerning the Respondent's preference vis-a-vis unionization , which were
not specifically recalled by most of the employees . Accordingly , I credit
Nelson 's testimony , as set forth above.
but 1 case 25-cent-per-hour increases. From January 13
(the first raises after the start of the in-plant union activity)
until March 24 (the last raise before the election), there
were 32 such wage increase rate changes, varying in amount
from 10 to 25 cents per hour. There were no such wage
increases in the month following the election but 18
increases from the end of April through June.
About 2 weeks after the meetings, Respondent distribut-
ed a ballot asking employees for their preference of a 1-
week fully paid vacation or a 2-week vacation with I week
paid. Prior to the election, Respondent announced that the
plant would be closed for the first 2 weeks of July.
When Respondent opened the Auburn plant, and at least
until the advent of the Union, new employees received a
letter from Nelson describing company benefits. Included
therein was a grievance procedure, providing for steps
through the immediate supervisor, plant manager and
ultimately to Nelson. It further stated: "we will keep and
[sic ] open door policy so that all employees can talk freely
with all members of management." Respondent also had a
form on which employees could request an operation
review; the record reflects that it was used at least once
prior to the January 6 union meeting.
Although Nelson had not met with employees other than
individually prior to January, other supervisors had con-
ducted at least a few group sessions for employees to air
their gripes and suggestions. Leseur testified that both he
and Barringer met with groups of employees, from October
through December, where employee problems and comp-
laints were solicited and discussed. Employee Judith Hurd
recalled such a meeting in November or December with 12
to 15 employees and Barringer present. Jeanette Roy
recalled a meeting in the beginning of December with
Leseur, Barringer, and about five employees at which there
were complaints about the wages and Roy asked whether
they would be released early on Christmas eve. Although
Leseur indicated then that an early release would not be
feasible, the plant closed at 11 a.m. on the day before
Christmas. Gloria Targett also confirmed that such meet-
ings were being held during the period prior to any overt
union activity.
Other employees indicated that in the period before the
first union meeting, while they were able to voice comp-
laints to supervision, their individual complaints or griev-
ances received little or no favorable response. The record
does reflect changes in wage rates, machines, and proce-
dures during the period from the plant opening until the
start of the union activity.
The complaint alleged that by Nelson's meetings in
January Respondent solicited grievances from its employ-
ees, promised to remedy them, and did so, in order to
undermine the Union's campaign, in violation of Section
8(axl). The essence of such a violation is not the solicita-
tion of grievances itself; rather, it is the promise to correct
them, either express or inferred from the solicitation.
6 It appears that there was some turnover in the personnel responsible for
this service. I cannot conclude from the record before me that anyone was
hired to assume this task as a result of the complaints.
7 The point motion to introduce into evidence after the close of hearing a
summary of wage increases given by Respondent from October 1974 through
June 1975 is hereby granted.
STRIDE RITE CORP.
Campbell Soup Company, 225 NLRB 222 (1976); Uarco
Incorporated, 216 NLRB 1 (1974). In the instant case, there
being no express promise, it must be found by inference if
at all. In regard to the creation of such an inference, the
Board, in Reliance Electric Company, Madison Plant Me-
chanical Drives Division, 191 NLRB 44,46 (1971), stated the
principle succinctly:
Where, as here, an employer, who has not previously
had a practice of soliciting employee grievances or
complaints, adopts such a course when unions engage in
organizational campaigns seeking to represent employ-
ees, we think there is a compelling inference that he is
implicitly promising to correct those inequities he
discovers as a result of his inquiries and likewise urging
on his employees that the combined program of inquiry
and correction will make union representation unneces-
sary.
Such conduct is unlawful. Squire Shops, Inc., 218 NLRB
158 (1975); Texaco Inc. (Evansville, Indiana Bulk Station),
178 NLRB 434 (1969).
Respondent contends that Nelson's meetings were not for
the purpose of and did not constitute solicitation of
grievances. I must reject this contention. Nelson acknowl-
edged that the meetings were held "to set up some kind of
communication." Moreover, he admittedly invited ques-
tions and comments and a number of complaints naturally
were aired. Nelson listened to the complaints, made note of
them, indicated that they would be looked into, and took
corrective action on at least some of them. To this extent, at
least, the facts herein parallel those of Gold Circle Dept •t-
ment Stores, a Division of Federated Department Stores, Inc.,
207 NLRB 1005 (1973), wherein unlawful promises and
grants of benefits were found. See also Reliance Electric,
supra. The cases cited by Respondent in support of this
contention are inapposite. In Big G Supermarket, Inc.,
d/bla Town and Country Family Center, 219 NLRB 1078
(1975), the employer approached an employee and "said
that he wanted me to know that he was still deadly against
[the union] and that he couldn't ask me no questions or
how I felt about it, but he could listen to what I had to say."
This statement was far more ambiguous than Nelson's
calling of successive meetings, discussing the Company and
the problems in the plant, and asking for and noting
employee comments and suggestions. Similarly, in Orkin
Exterminating Company of Kansas, Inc., 136 NLRB 630
(1962), in a context wherein the employer was not aware of
any union activity, the employees were merely told that
they might discuss problems with management. No prom-
ise, express or implied, was made, and it was on that basis,
rather than on the ground that there had been no solicita-
tion of grievances, that the allegation was dismissed.
A more substantial question is presented by Respon-
dent's contention that, even assuming a solicitation of
grievances, no violation can be found where the employer
has a past practice of such solicitation of complaints and
grievances. In Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160
NLRB 1526, 1548-50 (1966), enfd. 389 F.2d 565 (C.A. 2,
229
1967), the employer had an established complaint proce-
dure. During a union campaign, and as a direct response to
it, there was a strengthening of that procedure and an
increased supervisory solicitousness toward employee
grievances outside of the procedure. The Trial Examiner
found no violation notwithstanding that the conduct may
have been intended to convince employees that they had
less reason for wanting a union to handle their grievances.
Similarly, in Mt. Ida Footwear Company, A Division of
Munro Company, Inc., 217 NLRB 1011 (1975), the Board
found no violation where, during an organizational cam-
paign, the employer: (1) continued its practice of giving its
employees questionnaries asking, inter alia, how earnings
and working conditions could be improved and what
benefits they would like to see added; (2) referred to the
questionnaires in its campaign speeches and indicated that
it was working on the problems; and (3) reminded
employees of its open-door policy permitting them to bring
problems to management. The Board found that the
foregoing was insufficient to establish that the employer
unlawfully solicited and promised to redress employee
grievances. It stated that "[t]he timing of the circulation to
occur during an organizational drive does not itself
establish an ulterior motive" and pointed out that the
evidence suggested that the employer, rather than promis-
ing to redress grievances, was merely indicating that it
would follow established management policies. Finally, in
this regard, I would note that as the essence of the alleged
violation is the promise and grant of benefits (Uarco, supra)
and as an employer is obligated during an organizational
campaign to continue its benefits program as if the union
were not on the scene (Gold Circle Department Stores, supra
at 1014; The Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB 95 (1970)),
there would appear to be nothing unlawful in employer
promises to continue existing practices. Logic would dictate
that its obligation to continue existing practices would
apply with equal force to a practice of soliciting grievances
as to a practice of wage increases.
As I have found herein that Respondent had a grievance
procedure, a practice of soliciting employee complaints,
suggestions, and grievances, and a history, since its recent
inception, of making changes in various aspects of its
operation, I conclude that Nelson's solicitation of grievanc-
es at his January meetings did not constitute an unlawful
promise of benefit. I further find that evidence is insuffi-
cient to establish that the changes instituted and actions
taken by Respondent, particularly in regard to wage rates,
vacations, the cleaning of bathrooms, relocation or im-
provement of machinery, and similar matters, constituted
grants of benefits unlawful as attempts to undermine the
Union's support.
2. Alleged interrogation, surveillance, and
threatened loss of benefits
Employee Jeanette Roy testified that on the day that the
authorization cards were brought into the plant (January 7)
the packingroom foreman , Al Gagne,8 asked if she had
heard that the Union was trying to get in . She told him that
8 Gagne's supervisory status was admitted.
230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
she had seen the business agent at the plant about a week
earlier. Gagne stated : "That's not what I mean.... Has
anyone approached you about the union?" Roy said no and
Gagne walked away . Jeanette Roy's demeanor, the manner
in which she held firm to her testimony in the face of
leading questions by both General Counsel and Respon-
dent, and her candor as reflected in her testimony acknowl-
edging facts adverse to the Union's cause , all establish her
as a thoroughly credible witness . Gagne was not called to
contradict her testimony.
Similarly, employee Paul Bechard testified credibly and
without contradiction that in the week prior to the election
Cutting Room Foreman Fred Lawrence9 approached his
bench and asked if he was for or against the Union.
Bechard told him that it was none of Lawrence 's business.
Interrogation as to the union activities of the questioned
employee and others, as reflected by the foregoing testimo-
ny, is inherently coercive even in the absence of accompa-
nying threats. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 225 NLRB
911 (1976); P.B. and S. Chemical Company, 224 NLRB 1
(1976). Even assuming arguendo that the law excuses some
casual interrogations, the record herein fails to reflect that
the foregoing interrogations were so casual or innocuous as
to warrant dismissal.
Gloria Targett testified credibly and without contradic-
tion that the cuttingroom foreman, Maurice Frechette,10
told her, during January , when she had been passing out
cards, that she had better watch her step because Leseur,
the plant manager, knew what she was doing . Frechette,
however, wished her success in the union campaign and
indicated that he did not care as he was leaving . Notwith-
standing Frechette 's good wishes, I find that his statement
interfered with Targett's Section 7 rights . As the Board
stated in Florida Steel Corporation, 224 NLRB 45 ( 1976):
It has long been recognized that the test of interference,
restraint, and coercion under Section 8(axl) of the Act
does not turn on a respondent's motive, courtesy, or
gentleness, or on whether the coercion succeeded or
failed . It also does not turn on whether the supervisor
and employee involved are on friendly or unfriendly
terms. Rather, the test is whether the supervisor's
conduct reasonably tended to interfere with the free
exercise of the employee's rights under the Act.
Telling an employee who is engaged in authorization card
distribution that she should watch her step as the plant
manager was aware of her activities cannot fail to inhibit
those activities , regardless of the immediate supervisor's
union proclivities.
Accordingly , I fmd that by the foregoing impression of
surveillance , interrogations , and threats Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
In the week prior to the election , Maintenance Supervisor
Robert Lauzon (supervisory status admitted) spoke with
employees Marion Tarr and Louise Bennett, at Bennett's
work station, while he was passing out campaign literature.
In the course of a discussion about the Union, precipitated
by the distribution but initiated by the employees , Lauzon
mentioned the employees ' health insurance coverage.
According to Bennett, Lauzon told them , "If the Union
comes in , you won't have your Blue Cross-Blue Shield. It
would be taken away."" Lauzon testified that he was
distributing two pieces of literature, one, dated March 25
and liven to all the employees on or about that date,
described the state of the shoe industry in New England
and listed shoe factories which had closed . The other, he
alleged, was a leaflet entitled " 10 Reasons Why You Should
Keep The Union Out," dated March 18, which had earlier
been distributed to employees in other departments and
which he had been asked to distribute in the packingroom
at this time because there was no supervisor there. In the
last-described leaflet was a statement about bargaining. It
stated : "Bargaining is trading . . . . In order to get this
provision [union shop] , the Union could trade away any of
your present benefits , including insurance . . . ." Lauzon
testified that this piece of literature prompted Tarr to ask
what "bargaining" meant, he read the description of
bargaining from the literature , Tarr asked what could be
bargained away , and he asked what assets they had. There
was a mention of Blue Cross-Blue Shield and he said that
could be a bargaining issue . He denied saying that they
would lose their insurance . Bennett denied that Lauzon
distributed more than one piece of literature on the day of
her conversation with him.
The foregoing evidence is attended with inconsistencies
on all sides . On balance, I conclude that Lauzon's recollec-
tion is more complete than either Bennett's or Tarr's. I also
deem Lauzon's version less implausible than that of the
employees . The threat, as alleged by the employees , did not
fit into the context of the conversation as they related it. It
may well be that Lauzon made the statement substantially
as he recalled it and that Bennett and Tarr, as employees
concerned with possible loss of benefits , understood it as
they related . Accordingly , I shall recommend that this
allegation be dismissed.
3. Alleged implied threats of plant closure
General Counsel contends that Respondent's campaign,
by specific statements in literature and speeches and by its
total impact , contained implied threats to close the plant in
the event of unionization. Respondent denied that its
statements threatened plant closure and asserted that its
statements were factually and legally correct , made with
sufficient time for the Union to respond thereto, were in
response to subjects interjected in the campaign by the
Union, dealt with such legitimate campaign subjects as
economic conditions and job security , and were privileged
as predictions based on objective fact.
As noted, the Union's in-plant campaign was initiated on
January 7 . Nelson's meetings with employees in mid - to late
January were the first formal communications , by either
party, to the employees . In those meetings, Nelson made
reference to adverse economic conditions and high levels of
unemployment in the Nation, the community , and the shoe
9 Lawrence was not employed by Respondent at the time of the hearing . that Lauzon said that if the Union did get in , "we might lose our Blue Cross
io Frechette was not employed by Respondent at the time of the hearing. and Blue Shield." On cross-examination , she phrased the alleged threat more
ii Tarr, who was unable to recall the conversation without the aid of a positively, that Respondent would take away some benefits , such as the
question suggesting the topic of discussion , testified on direct examination health insurance.
STRIDE RITE CORP. 231
industry and referred back to the history of the plant. In
this context, he told the employees that Respondent did not
want a union but operated elsewhere with unions and
would do so here if the employees wanted. Among the
comments made by individual employees were statements
about employees getting the LASPA contract if unionized
and Respondent's obligation to remain in Auburn because
of the lease.
The Union responded to Nelson's meetings by a letter to
employees dated January 28. Neither that letter, nor the
union campaign literature of February 7 and 27, or March
6, made any reference to specific benefits LASPA promised
to secure or to Respondent's obligation to remain in this
plant under its lease.
On March 6, Respondent and representatives of the city
of Auburn executed an agreement extending the date for
completion of the real estate transaction to May 28. On
March 7, Nelson sent Respondent's employees its first
written communication in the campaign. That letter con-
tained, inter alia, the following:
On Thursday, March 27, 1975, you will decide whether
or not to let the LASPA Union get in your plant. This is
a very important decision for you to make, for it directly
involves your job, your future, and the very future of
your plant.
Your Company sincerely believes that it is not in your
best interests to let the union get into your plant. This
union has not done anything for anyone, and many of
you in this plant today know that first hand.
After all, what did this Union do for its dues paying
members when Moxees closed this very same plant and
hundreds of you, your friends and relatives lost their
jobs? What did this Union do for its members when
Auburn Heel and Shapiro Bros . both closed? The
Union did nothing for them, absolutely nothing.
It described what Stride Rite had done to improve the plant
and pointed out that it, rather than the Union, was
responsible for providing the jobs, improving the plant, and
paying their wages. The employees were told:
This union has done nothing for you in the past, and it
cannot guarantee you anything in the future.
In these days of economic depression, mass unemploy-
ment, layoffs and plant closings, your jobs should not
be taken for granted nor should this plant be taken for
granted. Stride Rite does not own this building nor has
it signed a lease for it. Because of the economic
conditions we are faced with today, we are here on a
month-to-month basis, and if these economic condi-
tions force us to, we would have to close this plant.
Stride Rite has been in Auburn for only a short time.
Thus, we do not really know one another. But, we
believe that if we work together as a team, cooperate
with each other and trust and respect each other, we can
make this a successful plant. We ask only that you give
us a chance.
On March 11, Respondent distributed another flyer,
stating, in essence , that Respondent was the source of their
jobs, benefits, and livelihood, not the Union, and that "The
Union Can Guarantee You Absolutely Nothing."
On March 13, the Union responded with a letter from
Joseph Roy, secretary-treasurer, wherein he pointed out
what LASPA had done for its members. In regard to the
alleged month-to-month term of Respondent's presence,
Roy stated:
After bragging about all the money Stride Rite has
spent on improving the factory, Mr. Nelson mentions
that Stride Rite is only here on a month-to-month basis.
Do you believe this? Why would they have spent money
on improvements and machines if they intended to
leave? This is a desparation move by the company to
scare you into voting against the union. The company is
under a two year lease with the Maine Guarantee
Authority right now which expires August 13, 1976.
They have also agreed to sign a 25 year lease as soon as
the revenue bond sale goes through.
Between March 14 and 24, Respondent distributed what
may best be described as fairly typical, if somewhat heavy-
handed, campaign literature. The literature dwelt primarily
on the costs of unionism, the loss of control, the Union's
inability to guarantee improvements, the possibility of
strikes to enforce union demands, the Employer's right to
replace strikers, and the Union's right to require support of
a strike. General Counsel does not specifically allude to any
portion of this literature in support of its allegation of
implied threats and none will be quoted herein.12
In a March 20 letter, the Union again attempted to refute
Respondent's assertion that it was only present on a month-
to-month basis. The letter pointed to Respondent's public
utterances and assurances made in support of the bond
referendum. It reiterated that Respondent had a 2-year
lease and a commitment to sign a long-term lease and
asserted that Respondent had postponed the bond issue
because of the petition for campaign leverage. Finally, it
asserted the benefits of unionization, including wages and
fringe benefits "at least equal to those in other union
shops." Increased benefits was also the theme of union
12 General Counsel contended at hearing, but not on brief, that, pursuant
to the language of N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969),
statements about the Union, its leadership, its interests, and its propaganda
must be based on objective fact. The Gissel principle requiring support in
objective fact pertains only to employer predictions of the effect of unioniza-
tion, not to all campaign propaganda. Except to the extent that some
portions of this literature may contribute to employee belief as to the
inevitability of strikes or plant closure, it does not exceed the bounds of
legitimate campaign ropaganda. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted in N.L.R.B. v. Sumter Plywood Corporation, 535 F.2d 917 (1976), enfg.
215 NLRB 227 (1974):
Although the Board aspires to "laboratory conditions" in elections
we recognize that clinical aspesis is an unattainable goal in the real
world of union organizational efforts. On the contrary, it is often the
case that "exaggerations , hyperbole and appeals to emotions are the
stuff of which election campaigns are made ." ... Some degree of
puffing and propagandizing must be permitted, else the laboratory
would be found infected in every case
232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
literature of March 21 and 25. The latter, after setting forth
earnings of another LASPA-represented factory in the area,
stated:
LASPA is not promising `pie in the sky.' We are
promising that if you elect LASPA to represent you, you
will get AT LEAST what our other members in
Lewiston-Auburn get . In fact, our other contracts
forbid us to accept anything less. [Emphasis supplied.]
On March 25 , Respondent issued another letter to its
employees . It stated:
As you know, when Shapiro Bros ., Moxees and
Auburn Heel closed, hundreds of LASPA members lost
their jobs.
On March 13th 1975, LASPA distributed a letter
signed by Mr. Joseph P.R. Roy, in which they tried to
make you believe that the LASPA members who
worked at those plants when they closed , somehow
benefited from losing their jobs.
Well, Mr. Roy can talk about Unemployment
Compensation and lawsuits all he wants to, but one fact
remains above all others, and that is, Shapiro Bros.
Moxees and Auburn Heel did close, as many of you
working here know all too well. And , every single
member of LASPA who worked at those plants lost
their JOBS!
Standing in an unemployment line may be a benefit
to Mr . Roy. After all, he's entitled to his opinion . But, it
seems to me that if he was really interested in helping
people, he would concentrate more on JOB SECURI-
TY. Instead of coming around here to try to collect
union dues from you, Mr. Roy should be out trying to
help his out of work members find jobs . [Emphasis
supplied.]
The letter went on to label as "not true " what it contended
was Roy's March 13 assertion that Stride Rite was "not
here on a month -to-month basis, but must stay in Auburn,
no matter what happens , until August 13, 1976." It then
quoted the 30-day termination notice language of its lease
with Maine Guarantee Authority (supra) and reiterated that
"Stride Rite is here on a month -to-month basis only."
(Emphasis supplied .) It denied that Stide Rite had agreed to
a 25-year lease and said that, even though the bond sale had
been approved by the voters , "Stride Rite has delayed
signing a long-term lease ." The letter concludes:
As you can readily see, Mr. Joseph P. R. Roy and his
LASPA Union are not to be trusted. Do not put your
jobs, your future and the very future of your plant in
their hands.
Vote NO.
13 Nelson testified that he told the employees that he felt harassed by the
numerous inspections which had been conducted at the plant . Most of these
inspections were normal incidents of opening a new plant ; they dealt with
such matters as the electrical system , the boiler , and the cafeteria. One
inspection was by OSHA , on the Union 's complaint. Virtually all of the
inspections had occurred in the first few months of the plant's operation.
Moreover , Nelson called the March 25 meetings because of the election. The
inspections had nothing to do with the election . I therefore find it impossible
On the same date, Respondent distributed a flyer
containing newspaper articles dealing with plant closings
and financial difficulties in the shoe industry, under the
heading, "Do you seriously believe that the Union's
promises of 'job security' can change this sad picture." The
same flyer listed 486 shoe factories , "many with union
contracts," which had closed in 10 years. It asked, "What is
job security?"
Respondent's final preelection distribution, on March 26,
again was headed "What is job security?" and stated:
LASPA wants you to believe that job security is a
LASPA contract, and that no plant that has LASPA
can ever be closed.
That, of course, is simply not true.
The truth is, any Company can always close a plant for
economic reasons.
LASPA knows better than anyone that hundreds of its
members lost their jobs when, for economic reasons, the
following plants which were all "unionized" by LASPA
were forced to close.
It then pictured three named Auburn shoe factories with
the word "Closed" stamped across them . It asserted that
"True job security" came from making and selling a quality
product at a competitive price . It concluded:
AT STRIDE RITE, we have always attempted to
maintain production and give 52 pay checks a year. IF
LA SPA gets in and disrupts ourproduction or in any way
makes us non-competitive so we can't sell our product,
those pay checks will stop. [Emphasis supplied.]
THINK ! VOTE NO!
On or about March 25, Nelson held a final series of
meetings with the employees . According to Nelson's
testimony, he again told the employees the details of
Respondent's lease with Maine Guarantee Authority and
read them the portion containing the 30 -day termination
clause . He also told them that they could look at a copy of
the lease in the office. He compared the earnings shown in
one of the Union's leaflets with those at this plant and
stated that Stride Rite's would be as good or better if the
production problems were resolved. He then told the
employees that he felt that he was being harassed and was
not sure that they were wanted in the city of Auburn.
Various employees attributed to Nelson a statement that
the machines were not bolted down and they could pick up
and leave on 30 days' notice. 13
General Counsel contended that Respondent deliberately
postponed finalization of its long-term commitment for the
Auburn plant because of the employees' union activity, in
to credit Nelson's assertion that his reference to "harassment" and to not
feeling wanted related to the inspections which had been conducted
Additionally, Nelson testified that he did not believe he made the statement
about the machines not being bolted down ; however, he did not specifically
deny it . The statement was attributed to him by at least three employees,
Bennett , Tarr, and Clotiere , and I conclude that Nelson did, in fact, make
such a statement in this series of meetings.
STRIDE RITE CORP. 233
order to bolster its arguments among the employees that it
could leave Auburn on short notice and that such a
departure was a real possibility in the event of unionization.
Respondent asserted that the postponements were for
legitimate business reasons , unconnected with the union
activity. As motive is not the determinative factor as to the
presence or absence of a violation of Section 8(a)(1). (See
for example Florida Steel Corporation, supra.) I deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the postponements were
occasioned by the union activity or were fortuitously
coincident with it. If the postponements were for the best of
reasons but Respondent capitalized on them in its propa-
ganda in such a way as to imply that the plant would close
in the event of unionization , Respondent's conduct would
violate Section 8(a)(1) just as surely as if it had ordered the
postponements for that purpose. Conversely, if Respondent
postponed the execution of the long-term lease for the
suspected reasons, but said nothing which would reason-
ably give rise to an implied threat to close, then, as General
Counsel conceded, there would be no violation of the Act.14
The question thus becomes whether Respondent's oral
and written communications , taken singularly or as a
whole, impliedly threatened plant closing if the Union won
the election . Respondent asserted that its statements were
but opinions and predictions permissible under Section 8(c)
of the Act.
N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 617,
618 (1969), upon which all parties hereto rely, states, in
part:
Thus, Section 8(c) merely implements the First Amend-
ment by requiring that . . . the expression of "any
views, argument, or opinion" shall not be "evidence of
an unfair labor practice," so long as such expression
contains "no threat of reprisal or force of promise of
benefit" in violation of § 8(a)(1) .. .
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer
expression, of course, must be made in the context of its
labor relations setting. Thus, an employer's rights
cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to
associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and
protected by § 8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c). And
any balancing of those rights must take into account the
economic dependence of the employees on their em-
ployers, and the necessary tendency of the former,
because of that relationship, to pick up intended
implications of the latter that might be more readily
dismissed by a more disinterested ear.
The Court goes on to state, in oft-quoted language, that
an employer
... may even make a prediction as to the precise
effect he believes unionization will have on his compa-
ny. In such a case , however, the prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to
convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably proba-
ble consequences beyond his control or to convey a
management decision already arrived at to close the
plant in case of unionization . . . If there is any
implication that an employer may or may not take
action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated
to economic necessities and known only to him, the
statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on
available facts but a threat of retaliation based on
misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without
the protection of the First Amendment. We therefore
agree . . . that "conveyance of an employer's belief,
even though sincere , that unionization will or may result
in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact
unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of
closing is capable of proof."
In the instant case, from the very outset of its campaign,
Respondent repeatedly emphasized unemployment, plant
closings, the inability of unions to prevent such plant
closings, and its own ability to move on short notice. In
both the first distribution and again just 2 days before the
election, the employees were expressly told that the future
of their jobs and the plant were dependent on the results of
the election.
Respondent's statements do not , I find, come within the
Gissel definition of predictions based on objective fact.
Respondent may have been aware of LASPA's wage rates
in other contracts, but the record is barren of any indication
by the Employer to the employees that it was the wage rates
which caused it to repeatedly refer to plant closings or its
own right to close. The Employer presented no financial
data or cost comparisons to the employees to show that it
would be forced to take such drastic action if forced to meet
14 In order to avoid the delay of a potential remand in the event that I
have misread the significance of this contention , I shall resolve the difficult
factual question presented. According to Spita , Auburn 's assistant city
manager, as of December 30, 1974, the execution of the long-term lease was
scheduled for January 7. Approximately 2 or 3 days before January 7, and
hence before the onset of overt union activities, it was postponed for
"techmcal reasons." (Respondent referred in brief to a letter of June 12,
1975, to Stride Rite, Resp . Exh. 10, containing a reference to a letter
agreement of December 19, 1974, postponing the closing . That letter
agreement was never produced at hearing . I do not deem Resp . Exh. 10
probative of the existence of such agreement .) Both Slosberg and Wathen,
attorney for Maine Guarantee Authority, stated that the problem related to
the bankruptcy of the prior owner . Wathen testified that that problem was
resolved within a week of January 10. However, the postponement was
continued , on the request of Respondent's bond counsel , Allen, and Allen
explained to Wathen that the postponement was caused by "labor problems
or union ." The postponement was formalized on March 6 , the day before
Respondent began its written campaign . Respondent's March 7 letter to
employees refers to the short-term lease. The postponement was further
continued from May 28 to July 29, at which time the documents were
executed. Respondent asserted that the postponements were the result of its
continued questioning of the plant acquisition in light of business conditions.
In this regard, the production, sales, and shipments records are less than
definitive. They reveal increases in production, when compared to the same
month a year earlier, in June through October 1974, decreases in November
and December 1974 and February and March 1975, and increases in
January, April, May, and June. The cumulative production of 1974 exceeded
that of 1973, but from the start of the year 1975 through June was somewhat
lower than the same period in the prior year. Sales, both "at once" orders and
those for future delivery, were down (by relatively small percentages) from
August through November 1974. "At once" sales remained down in
December 1974 but shipments increased. "At once" sales and shipments
were up in January, February, May, and June 1975, but down in March and
April. Considering all of the foregoing, together with the oral and financial
commitments Respondent had made in acquiring and improving the plant, I
am constrained to conclude that while the initial postponement was caused
by problems unrelated to the Union's campaign, the subsequent delay in
executing the long- term lease documents was motivated, at least in part, by
that campaign.
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
area wage rates . Indeed, Respondent even indicated that
once it eliminated the production problems accompanying
startup , the employees would be able to equal or exceed the
earnings at LASPA-represented plants.15 Moreover, Re-
spondent's vague references to "economic conditions" and
"economic reasons" which might force them to close the
plant are not sufficient to bring its statements within the
ambit of lawful "prediction." Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc., 220
NLRB 982 (1975); Ludwig Motor Corp., 222 NLRB 635
(1976).
The instant case is essentially "on all fours" with Mohawk
Bedding Company, 204 NLRB 277 (1973), 216 NLRB 126
(1975). That campaign, like Respondent's, emphasized that
the same plant the employer then occupied had been
previously occupied by a unionized business and had
closed, referred to the high area unemployment rate, and
made repeated references to other unionized business that
had closed or moved from the area . The Board held that the
employer's letters and speeches , taken cumulatively, con-
veyed a threat of adverse economic consequences as the
inevitable result of the employees' selection of a union as
their bargaining representative . It stated:
Through the Employer's repeated reference to the
Union causing other plants to close and the high
unemployment situation locally, the employees could
reasonably infer that their employment would be
jeopardized if they supported the Union and that the
Employer was willing to use its economic power to
make the threat an actuality.
See also Ludwig Motor Corp., supra, Marathon LeTourneou
Company, Gulf Marine Division of Marathon Manufacturing
Company, 208 NLRB 213 (1974).
Respondent asserted that Nelson's assurance, in the
January meeting, that Respondent would deal with the
Union if that is what the employees wanted , mitigated the
effect of the subsequent threats . The short answer to this
contention is found in the Board's literary allusion in
Ludwig Motor Corp., supra:
We have long recognized that threats of closing or
moving are among those to which employees are the
most acutely sensitive . Indeed, as with the fabled
princess and the pea , the possibility of such a reprisal
can be felt by employees even after assurances are piled
upon assurances that an apparent threat was not
intended as such.
As noted, Respondent did not pile the assurances on top of
the threat ; the threats were piled atop the single assurance.
In reaching my conclusions, I have not ignored the cases
cited by Respondent . However, I deem them distinguish-
able and inapposite . The situations cited involve isolated
statements of legal rights (for example, Oxford Pickles,
Division of John E. Cain Co., 190 NLRB 109 (1971), and
Texas Boot Manufacturing Company, Inc., 143 NLRB 264
(1963), justifiable emotional outbursts in reaction to ad
hominem attacks (May Department Stores Company, d/b/a
The M. O'Neil Company, 211 NLRB 150 (1974)), and
predictions based on objective fact (Leboe Tire and Rubber
Company, d/b/a Mission Tire and Rubber Company, 208
NLRB 84 (1974); Birdsall Construction Company, 198
NLRB 163 (1972)).
Accordingly, I conclude that to the ear of an employee,
economically dependent on the employer , Respondent's
campaign taken in its entirety conveyed the unmistakable
message that selection of the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative would result in the Employer's
termination of its Auburn plant. By this implied threat of
plant closing, Respondent has violated Section 8 (a)(1) of
the Act.
C. The Refusal To Bargain
1. The unit
The Respondent admitted that the following unit was
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining:
All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Old Hotel Road, Auburn,
Maine, plant, exclusive of office clerical employees,
guards, and all supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of
the Act.
2. The demand and refusal
The Union demanded recognition as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the appropriate
unit on January 10 and 21. It was stipulated that Respon-
dent denied the Union's request on January 21.
3. Majority status
As of the January 18 payroll, there were 107 employees in
the appropriate unit and 110 in the week ending January 25.
The Excelsior list, dated February 14, lists 120 employees.
The Union secured signed unambiguous authorizations for
representation from 76 employees, 67 prior to January 21
and 9 more between the date and February 14. Respondent
contested the authenticity of 21 cards on the basis that they
had not been properly authenticated . Each of those cards
had been introduced on the testimony of the person to
whom the signatory had returned the signed card . In each
case , the individual through whom the card had been
introduced had not actually seen the act of signing. It was
on that basis that Respondent objected to their admission
and authenticity . Respondent's objection to the authentica-
tion of these cards in this manner is without merit . The act
of an employee in returning a signed card for transmission
to the Union evidences the signer 's selection of the Union
as definitively as does the act of signing itself. Verlin L.
Pulley and Carols Pulley d/b/a Capitol-Varsity Cleaning
Co., 163 NLRB 1057, 1061 (1967) (card of Marjorie
Maynor), enfd. in pertinent part 395 F.2d 870 (C.A. 6,
1968). As the Board stated in McEwen Manufacturing
Company, 172 NLRB 990,992 (1968):
The Board has long held that an authorization card may
be properly authenticated by a person other than the
15 In this regard , I note that Respondent continued its retail division for
several years after inception before it finally turned a profit
STRIDE RITE CORP. 235
signer and that the latter's absence as a witness need not
be accounted for. . . . The Board will . . . accept as
authentic any authorization cards which were returned
by the signatory to the person soliciting them even
though the solicitor did not witness the actual act of
signing.
Respondent further contested the authenticity of those
cards, contending that the testimony of the authenticators
was not credible. I reject Respondent's blanket contention
that the witnesses could not conceivably recall the individu-
als from whom they had received the signed cards after 15
months, in the absence of some written record, and that any
testimony to the contrary must be "discredited automati-
cally." The record reveals that the employees were well
acquainted with each other, the solicitations were conduct-
ed within the solicitors' departments or carpools and each
employees' solicitations were limited in number. From such
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to expect that the
solicitors would be able to remember from whom they
received cards. 16
Respondent contested specific cards based on the testi-
mony of the solicitors. Thus, it was contended that the
cards signed by Florence Jones and Emile Michel were
invalid because Michelin Beaudoin, the solicitor, indicated
some confusion in regard to who returned cards to her.
Beaudoin testified that she was the only employee soliciting
signatures in the stitching room and recalled Jones and
Michel working in close proximity to her. She did not
attempt to identify cards signed by persons of whom she
was less sure. I am satisfied that Beaudoin's testimony, that
she received the cards from Jones and Michel, was honest
and accurate.
Similarly, Respondent contested the cards signed by
Victoria Martin and Mary Owens, authenticated by Doris
LaVoie. LaVoie was a credible witness who did not attempt
to claim recollection of facts beyond the scope of her actual
present memory. She specifically recalled receiving the
cards of Martin and Owens.17
Respondent contested the five cards authenticated by
Marion Tarr, contending that Tarr was an incredible
witness . Tarr's recollection of the five employees (Bennett,
Harvey, Nadeau, Pray, and Tessier) and of receipt of the
cards from them was both specific and credible. I find no
basis for rejecting those cards.18
Gloria Targett authenticated nine cards in addition to her
own; Raymond Cloutier, Greaton, Lassard, Pelletier, Rene,
Simoneau , Turcotte, Turmenne, and Keaton. Contrary to
Respondent's contention, I deem her testimony in this
regard credible. In so concluding, I note that she did not
16 I note, further, in this regard, that Respondent had possession of the
authorization cards for a period of time prior to the hearing and adduced no
evidence or employee witnesses to dispute either the authenticity of the cards
or the intentions of the signatories.
17 LaVoie's inability to recall meeting with an NLRB investigating
attorney (not a denial of such a meeting, as characterized by Respondent),
her lack of knowledge about the Union's $1 initiation fee (again, not a denial
that such a fee existed), her error as to when she received a wage increase (2
months, rather than a couple of weeks, prior to the election), and her inability
to recall how many other cards she passed out are not such flaws in her
testimony that her specific recollection regarding the cards of Martin and
Owens must be rejected.
is In an apparent stenographic error, the record shows Pray's name as
"Craig." Tarr had identified the card signed by Pray, and this error is no
attempt to claim credit for cards of which she had no
specific recall and she candidly acknowledged facts adverse
to the Union's cause . She did not, as asserted by Respon-
dent, contradict her own testimony regarding her atten-
dance at meetings held in the plant. Neither was she an
evasive witness. While she testified, "I can't remember" a
number of times on cross-examination, many of such
answers were given to the same question asked several
times by Respondent's counsel or were to such trivial
questions as what another employee was wearing when she
gave her the card, 15 months earlier. Contrary to Respon-
dent's contention, Targett's explanation that she could
remember receiving these nine cards because she knew the
individuals is a valid and satisfactory explanation for her
memory.19
Liette LaChance testified that she received a card from
someone she believed to be Gloria Targett. After she signed
it, she changed her mind and asked that it be returned or
destroyed. Neither occurred, as she later teamed. Based on
the foregoing, I conclude that LaChance's attempted
retrieval invalidates that card. However, I do not find that,
because Targett failed to return LaChance's card on
request (she explained her failure to LaChance), the other
cards authenticated by Targett must be rejected. There is
no evidence that any other employees similarly sought to
retrieve their cards.
Respondent contended that the card signed by Con-
stance Ackerley, and others signed by employees who, like
Ackerley, received their cards from LaVoie, was not
properly authenticated. While not entirely clear, Ackerley's
testimony indicates that LaVoie asked her and several
others if they wanted a union. According to Ackerley, there
was a discussion among the employees in which it was said
that the initiation fee would be $10 if they signed immedi-
ately, but $25 if they waited. This statement she attributed
to LaVoie. LaVoie credibly denied making such a state-
ment. Ackerley also responded affirmatively to a leading
question as to whether she was told the card was only for an
election. It appeared from the record that if either of these
statements were made, they were made by the employees,
themselves, in the course of discussing the union cards, and
were not made by the person soliciting signatures on those
cards. Moreover, even assuming that someone told Acker-
ley that the card was only for an election, it is clear that the
card was given to her in the context of determining whether
or not she wanted union representation. Accordingly, I find
that the card executed by Ackerley, and those executed by
other employees who signed in the same group, were valid
designations of representative. See Gissel, supra at 606-607;
basis for discrediting Tarr. Neither is her poor eyesight in the absence of
glasses or the thoroughly inconsequential difference on an unrelated matter
between her testimony and her affidavit. While Tarr's apparent upset over
her interrogation and her reluctance to undergo cross-examination while a
newspaper reporter was present is troubling, I deem it ambiguous conduct,
subject to any number of explanations, and not necessarily an indication of
incredibility. I note that, on cross-examination , Tarr was a firm and
forthright witness who appeared to be testifying to the best of her
recollection.
19 While I am satisfied by the authentication of the authorization cards in
the manner described above, much of the contentious litigation on card
authentication could be eliminated by the simple expedient of having card
solicitors sign or initial cards executed at their request.
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc., 197
NLRB 489,493 (1972).
Respondent contested cards of Romeo and Lillian
Picard, because when they signed they were intending to
quit their employment . They were still employees who, if
the election had been held on that date, would have been
eligible to vote . Their cards are not invalid because they
contemplated severing their employment . Indeed, I note
from the Excelsior list that both were still employed on the
date of the election , March 27.
The cards of the Picards, Bellefleur, Thurlow, Hurd,
Devlin , and Irish were further challenged because of
statements by the solicitors of said cards pertaining to their
purpose of being "only for an election." In resolving this
question, the Supreme Court's language , in Gissel, supra at
606-607, must be borne in mind:
[E ]mployees should be bound by the clear language of
what they sign unless that language is deliberately and
clearly canceled by a union adherent with words
calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget
the language above his signature . There is nothing
inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says
the signer authorizes the union to represent him and
then telling him that the card will probably be used first
to get an election ... .
We agree , however, with the Board's own warnings in
Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB [732] ... n. 7 (1968),
that in hearing testimony concerning a card challenge,
trial examiners should not neglect their obligation to
ensure employee free choice by a too easy application of
the Cumberland rule.
The Board , in Levi Strauss, supra to which the Court
referred , pointed out that it was not the presence or absence
of "magic words" which controlled , but the totality of
circumstances surrounding the card solicitation . Consider-
ing all of those circumstances , I deem the cards executed by
the aforementioned employees , except that of Cheryl
Devlin, to be valid designations of representative. In so
concluding, I note that each of these employees , except
Irish, had previously been union members . I note also
Romeo Pichard's testimony, when questioned by the
Administrative Law Judge , that Targett told him, "The
purpose of the card was to get enough cards to get the
Union to have the right to come in and have a vote," and
his wife's testimony that he asked her whether she wanted
to go into the Union , before he signed both of their cards.
Bellefleur testified that he was not sure what he was told,
but knew what the card meant . Hurd testified that she was
told the card was to get an election to get the Union in, that
most of the employees had previously belonged to the
Union and knew all about it . Thurlow testified that she read
the card , but was told that it did not mean anything. She
was also told that she could fill it out or not , as she wanted.
Linda Irish did not read the card , but was told that it was
for the Union and that it was good.
Devlin's testimony, however, places her card within the
rule of Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268
(1963). It was her recollection that she was told "that it was
just for the election of the Union-that this didn't have
anything to do with our jobs one way or the other, it was
just to hold an election to see if the Union would be coming
in or not. That's all."
Devlin's card, I conclude, is invalid.
Accordingly, I find that, of the 76 signed authorization
cards proffered by the Union, 74 remain valid. Of the valid
cards, 65 were executed prior to the Union's demand and
Respondent's rejection thereof on January 21.20 Therefore,
at all times material herein, I conclude that the Union
represented a majority of Respondent's employees in the
appropriate collective-bargaining unit.
4. Whether a bargaining order is warranted
The starting point for consideration of whether the
unlawful conduct found herein , interrogation, impression
of surveillance, and threats of plant closing, and other
reprisal, warrant or require a bargaining order is Gissel
Packing Co., supra at 614. Therein, the Supreme Court held
that such an order would be an appropriate remedy for: (1)
" `exceptional' cases marked by `outrageous ' and 'perva-
sive' unfair labor practices . . . of 'such a nature that their
coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of
traditional remedies , with the result that a fair and reliable
election cannot be had,' " and , (2) "less extraordinary cases
marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still
have the tendency to undermine majority strength and
impede the election process ." The Court went on to point
out that the Board, "[i]n fashioning a remedy" could
"properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an
employer's unfair labor practices in terms of their past
effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their
recurrence in the future ." Considering the instant case
pursuant to these standards , as the Board has applied them,
I concude that a bargaining order is required to protect the
free expression of employee sentiment, as demonstrated by
the signed authorization cards.
The Board has had repeated occasion to consider
whether threats of plant closure meet the aforesaid Gissel
bargaining order standards. In Milgo Industrial, Inc., 203
NLRB 1196, 1200-01(1973), it stated:
[T]hreats of plant closure and job loss in the event of the
Union's advent are plainly actions which in and of
themselves are egregious enough under the rule of Gissel
to come within the first category there specified, of
"unfair labor practices of such a nature that their
coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application
of traditional remedies . . ." In any event, these threats
together with the other conduct described supra surely
bring this case within the second category defined in
Gissel... .
In that case, while other unfair labor practices were
directed at all unit employees, the threats of plant closure
and job loss were directed at only a minority of such
employees . In the instant case , these threats were made to
all employees.
20 Beaudoin terminated her employment on January 17, 1975, after the
Union's first demand but prior to the second.
STRIDE RITE CORP. 237
In Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc., supra, the Board, in finding a
bargaining order appropriate upon conduct which included
threats of plant closure, demonstrated the irremedial effect
of the employer's conduct on the employees' free expression
by reference to the fact that, while the union had valid
authorizations from 13 of 20 unit employees, it secured only
5 votes in the election. In the instant case, the Union had
valid authorizations from approximately 74 employees, in a
unit of 112, but lost the election 43 to 62. I note also that, of
those who had signed cards, 48 had previously been union
members.
In Automated Business Systems, a Division of Litton
Business Systems, Inc., 205 NLRB 532, 536 (1973), the
Board stated:
It needs no extended discussion or lengthy list of
authorities to demonstrate that threats of probable
plant closings are among the most serious and most
flagrant interferences with the right of employees to
decide for themselves the question of union representa-
tion.
In that case, the Board compared threats of total or partial
plant moving to threats of closure and found them to be
essentially equally coercive. It pointed out that such threats
might have been the most coercive to the employees
involved because the employees knew that the employer
had the capacity to carry them out. Similarly, in the instant
case, Respondent's repeated reference to its short-term
lease made its threat that much more believable 21
Considering the instant case pursuant to the standards of
Gissel, supra, as applied by the Board, I conclude that a
bargaining order is required to protect the free expression
of employee sentiment , as demonstrated by the authoriza-
tion cards signed by a majority of Respondent's employees
at the critical time . Respondent's unfair labor practices, I
find, were so coercive and pervasive that they not only
undermined the Union's majority but precluded a fair
election from being conducted on March 27. I further find
that by this conduct Respondent has made slight the
possibility of erasing the effects of these unfair labor
practices, and of insuring a fair election in the near future,
by the use of traditional remedies . I therefore recommend
the issuance of an order requiring Respondent to recognize
and bargain with the Union upon request.
III. CONDUCT AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF THE
MARCH 27 ELECTION
As previously stated herein, the Union's objections to the
election paralleled the unfair labor practices. As I have
found that certain conduct of Respondent, committed
between the filing of the petition on January 15 and the
election on March 27, constituted interference, restraint,
and coercion violative of Section 8(a)(1), I further find that
such conduct also interfered with the exercise of a free and
21 That Respondent has now executed a long-term lease, however, has
little, if any , miti gating effect on its coercive actions as the Board has
consistently found bargaining orders warranted upon threats of plant closure
without consideration of whether such a closure would have entailed great
financial loss to the employer.
22 Gagne's interrogation of Roy and Frechette 's statement and implied
threat to Targett, occurring before the filing of the petition, are not
objectionable conduct.
untrammeled choice in that election . See Flight Safety, Inc.,
197 NLRB 223 (1972). Accordingly, I recommend that the
election held in Case 1-RC-13670 be set aside.22
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All full-time and regular part-time employees of
Respondent at its Old Hotel Road, Auburn, Maine, plant,
excluding office clerical employees, guards, and all supervi-
sors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. At all times since January 21, 1975, the Union has
been and is now the exclusive representative of the
employees in said unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, by creating the impression that it was engaging in
surveillance of those union activities, by threatening
employees regarding their union activities, and by threaten-
ing employees with plant closure in the event that they
selected the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, and has interfered with the conduct of the
election conducted on March 27 in Case 1-RC-13670.
4. By refusing, since January 21, 1975, and at all times
thereafter, to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate
unit set out above, Respondent has engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. Except as found above, Respondent has not engaged
in the other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 23
The Respondent, The Stride Rite Corporation, Auburn,
Maine, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees regarding their union
activity.
(b) Creating the impression that the employees' union
activities are under surveillance by the employer.
(c) Threatening employees regarding their union activi-
ties.
(d) Threatening employees that the plant will close in the
event that they designate or select the Lewiston-Auburn
Shoeworkers Protective Association, or any other labor
organization, as their collective-bargaining representative.
(e) Refusing to bargain collectively with the* above-
named Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
23 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for purposes.
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the employees in the appropriate collective -bargaining unit,
as previously set forth herein.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them under Section 7 of the Act.24
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request , recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit
which the parties have previously stipulated to be appropri-
ate with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment , and, if an under-
standing is reached , embody such understanding in a
written signed agreement.
(b) Post at its place of business in Auburn, Maine, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
24 A broad order is warranted herein by the serious unfair labor practices Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
found. Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc, 220 NLRB 982 (1975). to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
25 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a the National Labor Relations Board."
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by