The Bell Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 2, 1979243 N.L.R.B. 977 (N.L.R.B. 1979) Copy Citation THE HtI.I. COMPANY. IN(C. The Bell Company, Inc., and its agent, Richard Bali- streiri; Paul Moskowitz as Receiver for The Bell Company, Inc; and Richard Balistreiri, d/b/a Endurall Products; and Floyd A. Hlarris as Receiver for Endurall Products' and United Brotherhood of Carpenters District Council of Milwaukee County and Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Case 30-CA 3220 August 2, 1979 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MIMB;RS JNKINS AND PN EI1) On June 30, 1976, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-enti- tied proceeding,2 in which it found that The Bell Company, Inc. (herein called Bell). and Endurall Products (herein called Endurall), as the alter ego of Bell, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of' the Act by refusing to bargain with United Brotherhood of Car- penters District Council of Milwaukee County and Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join- ers of America, AFL CIO (herein called the Union). as the collective-bargaining representative of Respon- dent's production, maintenance, and installation em- ployees; by dealing directly with their Union-repre- sented employees in an attempt to bypass the Union; by making threats and posing questions to employees in an attempt to undermine the Union's position as their bargaining agent; by unilaterally modifying and repudiating provisions of an outstanding collective- bargaining agreement; and by failing and refusing to execute and apply to employees in the aforesaid unit the contract concluded on or about August 5, 1974, between Bell and the Union. The Board also found that Bell and Endurall violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act by discharging nine employees in order to discourage their membership in and support of the Union and, finally, that Bell and Endurall violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with discharge if they engaged in protected concerted activities. To remedy these unfair labor practices, the Board ordered Respondents to cease and desist there- from, and to take certain affirmative action, including making the unlawfully discharged employees whole for whatever loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of having been terminated 'At the hearing. the Adrinnlstratsle law Judge granted the General (Counsel's requestl Io add the name of IFlosd A lHarrls. receiver r lir Indurall Prxoducts. to the captlion as a Respondent 225 NI.RB 474 'The Board also ordered [Indurall to recognlze and bargain with the Union as the collectlve-barglining representative if its production nd main Thereafter, on September 26. 1977. the ULniled States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit en- forced the Board's Order insofar as it concerned Bell. but declined to enforce the Order to the extent it per- tained to Endurall, on the ground that Endurall was not, as the Board found. an al/tr 'go of Bell.4 On June 12. 1978. the General Counsel issued a backpay specification and notice of hearing. alleging that Endurall was a successor to Bell. and that Bcll and Endurall were jointly and severall3 liable tor spe- cific amounts of backpay to the nine emploNees whom the Board and the court found to have been unlawfully discharged by Bell. Respondent Bell did not file an answer to the backpay specification, but Respondent Endurall did file an answer, gnerallk de- nying the allegations contained therein andi rai sing certain affirmative defenses. Subsequently. on October 26. 1978X. a hearing was held before Administrative law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden for the purpose of determining the backpa; due the discriminatees, but neither Bell nor Endurall appeared at the hearing. On January 31, 1979. the Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Sup- plemental Decision. Thereafter. the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(bh) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Supplemental Decision in light of the excep- tions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings. findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. Because Bell did not file an answer thereto. we deem true and correct the allegations of the backpay specification, including the sums of backpay which the General Counsel asserts to be due and owing each of the individual discriminatees, in respect to Bell.' The issue raised hb the General Counsel's exceptions tenance employees to execute and give effect to the terms and conditions ,it the collective-hargaining agreement concluded on or about August 5. 1974. between Bell and the Union, retroactive to July 7. 1975. to make whole employees employed bh Endurall since Jul5 7. 1975. fior and loss t' pas suffered by them because of Endurall's failure to obhserve the terms o the aforesaid contract; to pay to the appropriate trustees amounts due in pen- sion. health. welfare, or vacation henefits for all unit emplosees employed bh Endurall since July 7, 1975, and all nine discriminatoril1 discharged emplo- ees. under the terms of that conract: and t) offer the nine iliegall terml- nated emplosees immediate reinstatement to the positions thes held with Bell. or to substantially equls alent positins. 4561 F.2d 1264 5 At twoi points in the Supplemental )ecision. the Admiilstratise I aw Judge inadvertentl cnfounded the identities 1,o Bell iand Indlur.ll I ls occurred throughout the second paragraph and in the inal entence ll the sixth paragraph ot the "cnclulsnons seclin Ihthe Sipplenlent.ll I)eclsin In lightl o our det:iled dlscnilssii hercil. it is not necessars to o,rrecl theme errors I Sec. 1t)2 54(.) Nallonal I.lhr Rel.t..nns Boaid Rules and Regulalton., Series . as amended 243 NLRB No. 152 977 I)(FCISIONS OF NA IIONAI I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARDI is whether the Administrative Law Judge correctly concluded that Endurall was not a successor to Bell, and therefore did not share joint and several liability with Bell for the amounts of backpay.7 The Adminis- trative Law Judge held that the court of appeals deci- sion denying enforcement to the Board's original Or- der as it concerned l-ndurall precluded him from finding Endurall liable as a successor to Bell in this backpay proceeding. In so deciding, the Administra- tive Law Judge relied mainly on the court's observa- tion that the absence of common ownership of Bell and Endurall relieved Endurall of any obligation to remedy unfair labor practices committed by Bell. Successorship Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, and in agreement with the General Counsel, we find that Endurall is a successor to Bell, that such a finding is not precluded by the court of appeals decision, and thus that Endurall is jointly and severally liable with Bell for the backpay owed to the nine employees whom Bell discharged in violation of the Act. We recognize that the court of appeals decision is final and binding regarding whether Endurall is an alter ego of Bell. But, as pointed out by the General Counsel, the court did not have before it, nor did it decide, whether Endurall was a successor to Bell within the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Golden Stale Bottling Co., Inc., e al. v. N.L.R.B.," and was therefore responsible with Bell for remedying Bell's unfair labor practices to the extent prescribed by that case. In Golden State (414 U.S. at 171, fn. 2), the Court directly approved the Board's holding in Perma Vinyl Corporation,9 that "one who acquires and operates a business of an employer found guilty of unfair labor practices in basically unchanged form under circumstances which charge him with notice of unfair labor practice charges against his predecessor should bc held responsible for remedying his prede- cessor's unlawful conduct." The subsequent employer need not be united with the predecessor by common ownership to fit within this definition of successor- ship.' ° Further, unlike an alter ego a Golden State successor is not required by the Board to "cease and desist" from the previous employer's unfair labor ' Inasmuch as Endurall did not appear at the hearing. no evidence was presented by it to contradict the (;eneral Counsel's computations concerning the amounts of backpay owed to the individual discriminatees and we Ihere- fore find that these sums accurately reflect the hackpa) to which each dis- cnminatee is entitled, notwithstanding the denials contained in indurall's answer to the backpa) specification '414 U.S. 168 (1973). v 164 NLRB 968. 969 (1967) enld. ub nm 'niri'd Staiei Ppc & Fiundn (, v N L. RB. 398 F 2d 544 (5th (ir. 1968) 1'414 S. at 176 177. practices,'' or to honor the predecessor's labor con- tract if there is one.' 2 Nor is it necessarily required to bargain with a union representing employees of the earlier employer." Generally, a Golden State succes- sor is held jointly and severally liable for backpay due employees as a consequence of the predecessor's un- fair labor practices. and is required to offer unlaw- fully discharged employees immediate reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions.' 4 We are now called upon to decide in this proceed- ing for the first time whether Endurall acquired and operated Bell's business "in basically unchanged form" with knowledge of the unfair labor practices committed by Bell. The facts, as found by the Board and the court of appeals, reveal that Bell was a small, family-owned and -operated corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and installing formica and laminated plastic countertops and cabinets. It was owned by four of the five Balistreiri brothers, James, Giuseppi, Dominic, and Anthony. The fifth brother, John, served as general manager of the Company until 1973, when his son, Richard, became president and principal managing agent of Bell. Richard continued in that capacity until June 1975, the month when Bell ceased operations. Bell and the Union had been parties to successive collective-bargaining contracts since 1956, covering Bell's production, maintenance, and installation em- ployees. Richard Balistreiri, as agent of Bell, person- ally committed most of the unfair labor practices, summarized at the beginning of this Decision, of which the Board found Bell guilty in the original pro- ceeding. Also, Richard Balistreiri was president of Bell on June 19. 1975. when James Balistreiri an- nounced that Bell was closing down, resulting in the discharge of the nine employees represented by the Union on June 27, 1975. On July 7, 1975, 10 days after Bell went out of business, Richard Balistreiri opened Endurall, a con- cern engaged in basically the same business as Bell and in the manufacture of similar products, and be- came its principal managing agent. Bonny Austin, Richard Balistreiri's secretary at Bell, invested $5,000 in Endurall and was hired as its accountant. Also, Richard's father, John Balistreiri, allowed his life in- surance policy to be used as security for a $15,000 bank loan extended to Endurall. Endurall purchased Bell's equipment, inventory, and supplies fr use in the new business, and operated out of Bell's former premises for a month before moving to a new loca- Id at 177. In 4 'Id at 183 185 i Id at 184. In. 6. i1 Id at 171 172. 978 liIIIl II ( )\1 . I ( lion. It. li ll', btle ll c1hclt, Richird Ih1allteir[i wrolte to Bell's csltt.l ers lltolrilti thetil tlhat Bll w\s ooill, otut it hltlilleS. i iltd inllllin ihc ll.I to lse lndul-rall to meet tller oll llilcI leeds. Main otl ell's CUStOllleI'S Si)bsequtlllt? hi)CccLiIt c L'(It0IICl[N Illr- all, anld Inldtil;all complleted wolik On scer;ll prolects begun hb Bell. Most of Indurall's suppliers hid also been suppliers of Bell. [lmall. three of I ldlurall's seven production. maillcnlltlce. illI insl;ll;tlioL ellm- ployees had worked for 1Bell It is not hard to concllude Ilthit ndlr;lIl suCleleded to Bell's business with knowledge of the unfiir lalbor practices committed hy Bell. because Ricl;ard Ball s- treiri, the operating head of hoth ( oinipalnles, \ as himself responsible for the commission of lost of tl unfair practices and was certainl\ aware of thlet ;ll. Nor can there he genuine dispute that tIndurall con- tinued Bell's business in essenti;ally the same loorm. inasmuch as Endurall was managed by the same per- son as Bell; was engaged in virtualls the same tpe of business; received financial assistance from two per- sons associated with Bell: purchased Bell's equip- ment, inventory,. and supplies; serviced mamns of Bell's customers and utilized most of its suppliers: and hired three former Bell employees out of a complement of seven production, maintenance, and installation em- ployees. We find therefore that ndurall is a succes- sor to Bell as successorship is defined in (o/,ln Stale. and that Endurall and Bell are jointly and severall liable for the sums of backpay indicated below. We are fully aware that the General ('ounsel could have alleged, as an alternative theory, that Endurall was a Golden State successor to Bell in the original unfair labor practice proceeding. Indeed, we think it would have been better practice for the General Counsel to have done so. But we do not believe that the General Counsel's failure to advance Go,len State successorship as a separate theory of liabilit) in that proceeding forecloses him from asking the Board to determine Endurall's successorship status in this backpay case. Unlike Pevion Packing C(ompanv, Inc.," in which the Board refused to permit the Gen- eral Counsel to allege the same act as violations of different sections of the statute in separate proceed- ings, the General Counsel is merely seeking here to insure that the unfair labor practices fiund to have been committed by Bell are remedied to the fullest extent possible. To hold differently would be to de- prive wrongfully discharged employees of access to a potentially necessary and legitimate source of funds for satisfaction of their backpay claini. 6 11 129 NLRB 1358 119611. e Our dissenting colleague's concern for unnecessary harassment oi Re- spondents, which we share. is misplaced in this case. For. as the Adminlstra- tive Law Judge found in our original D)ecision. the relationship oI Bell to Ick lii l As PC 1''\t01 l\ lilc'(ll. \C Iilltd III Ilc lih H sb'li' tit ill\ \ Idl e t'11C I it' i lll l.i\. 11l1 1 Ie ( ilt t'.1 1 ( ( III. 'J' coIllatIlili Nw llt' t .ih lmoh w t o) Ic1 ).t kp1 \ \ Oce )to cach t Ihe Clllplhecc,, ille;lilx sl1cliaed x h l el ii. It'ti tl iild corect' SCI ill s. (1eptoilt hir 1ls I iiiCt'. is the l tie C'c sc illi ii lt siI h1Ic '. 'l iic 1,p eCi11 II11iL\ li tlill il'l lllllll. it' ' SI \OIl .\hi ;ii.i II1 ).t li I t 1lcl 1h 1l I ;tlctll ll Ral liIt() nil I.uichko\r sk (;a.' S1 cll edcl (i;Il! Schlc,.d - $i(.2 17.7 I, 1i)2 (,o t 1 77 S7 7 1 (1 . ) 's .4 i) 1).84 29(77. I1 fPurstta t ) Secti i 1It )I (t, Il i t i iliIl I .Ii ltui Relations \tl, a.s, ;arcle . h lie Naitnl;l I i) RCla- tions Board hereh orders t lhat the RcspOnl c ll I hce Bell Cotmnpanl'. Inc.. ,1in1 Its agent. Richa;rd Balis- treiri: Paull 'vioskowit/ ;as receiver fir he Bell ( om- pany, Inc.: and Richard Balistreiri. d/h/l'; l:nd urall Products: and Flovd A. ialrris as receiver tor Intlur- all Products, Milw aukee, Wisconsin, their otlicers agents. successors. and assigns. shall jointlI or ever- ally pa',y to the emplo ce \ htose nalilmes ;ppe;lr inl the section of' this Supp llllntall )ecision atlld ()Ordtler cIl- tied "Backpa" the sims tI itl htakpa slic, iin 1oppo- site their lnalles. witih -percent interest thIereltol. less ans tax ,.ithholdiig required hb las. MlMIR N I I (. dissentinIg il prt: I agree with my colleagues that 'The Bell (' nlpaul, Inc.. is liable for the sums of hackpas which thes have indicated. I do not agree that :induralll Products I.ndlurall presents a "tangled webh ro transa.itllls he celi Ihr dctllik I *ti ralirn o' ned bh the elder H.llslreirlns .anl the n, prprlt r ll ii hi thelJ hb thr scion o( one (o Bell's prilllcipal A broad blush s cII I i thlc .ctl l e ot he Balstrirls presenlts . pllre i '1 lridlxlual wn dsinilcl.ll.alt\ stripped a going cmicern o is lungile ssets and tell Is credito in-n seck uti :nd collect from isl debtor,, meanwhile pernltilng the pera;ling heard jol] the delunci (ompany (who acialulls dcrlscd Ihsi principal hs chnhl orn the nanulaclure and sale of cahnelt anid counterilops) to InlllirIC ti doI %0 under a different name and strle" (225 NlRB ;t 4781 We thereliore do not view the pplhcatioun to I nduralI ol ( ,Idemn Sttre's equitable consideralo in. nlnelk. he protcctiln ot lcilllt ied eliplio\ce. he harassMllen in all degree 'Il I, Plumbhing & H,,,r, (,. 18 N RB 71h il')-2) ('llsilCnt -lth Board pilics. we h.all I1it require ReCspolndcnl I 1 \ p1' 11rei nI1 i ccordrinti c lth ur decision tIlrida .Si/l ( -rnat.,i 21 Nl RB il 14 77). b-. cause ur origilii ()order is eitorced b the curt I appealc.s reqited the p.amenol o nterest onkly ;a, prescribed h tw. I) ( ISI()NS ()I NA I I()NAI I.ABO()R RII.A I IONS t()ARI) should he held jointly and severally responsible with Bell for this hackpay. As set forth more completely i the majority opiln- ion, the Board lfound in its original Decision that Bell had conimitted nuimerous unfair labor practices in- cluding the unlawful discharge of nine emnployees. D The Board also tounlld that Enduilrall was an alter uego of Bell, and therefore required both Bell and lindurall to remedy the unfair labor practices. owever, the court of appeals, contrary to the Board, decided that Endurall was not ell's alter ego, and enforced the Board's Order only to the extent that it applied to Bell.'" Subsequently, the General Counsel initiated the instant hackpay proceeding, seeking to hold Endurall, in addition to Bell, liable for designated amounts of backpay owed to the illegally terminated employees. he (;eneral Counsel predicates ndur- all's liability on its alleged status s a successor to Bell as defined in (;,,oldn Slate Bottling Co., In., et al v. N. L. R. B. 2" I do not quarrel with the majority conclusion that Endurall meets the (;olden State criteria for succes- sorship, because Endurall acquired and operated Bell's business in basically unchanged form with no- tice of Bell's unfair labor practices. If that were the only issue here, I would sign my colleagues' opinion. But I believe the overriding question confronting the Board is whether we should permit the General Counsel to divide his theories of Endurall's liability, advancing one, alter ego, in the original unfair labor practice proceeding, and saving a second, Golden State successorship, for another day. Not only were all the facts needed by the General Counsel to prove successorship available to him when he tried the first case, but they were found by the Board and the court. Indeed, all the evidence relied on by the majority as showing Endurall's successorship to Bell is taken from the original record: no new facts were developed at the backpay hearing. I find, and Board precedent holds, that sanctioning such conduct by the General Counsel is inconsistent with sound administrative practice and is unfair to Endurall. The General Counsel is, of course, correct, as a general rule, when he states in his brief that it is per- fectly proper to litigate Golden State successorship in a backpay proceeding. What he neglects to add, and what the majority fails to appreciate, is that such a backpay action is ordinarily the only opportunity which the General Counsel has to raise the successor- ship issue, because transfer of the business has usually not occurred at the time of the hearing on the prede- s 225 NLRB 474 (1976). ' 561 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1977). 20414 U.S. 168 (1973). cessor's unfair labor practices. 2' Hut where, as here. the successor has emerged before the issuance o1' the unfair labor practice complaint against the offcnding emplover, and where it has been named in the conm- plaint as an alter ego of the predecessor, there is no justification for giving General ('Counsel atntoher chance in a backpay hearing to litigate the liability of' the second employer. Although I have not found a case involviln aln identical set of f acts, I view Pe,on IPa(tcing, ( o'rinpa , /h,."22 as squarely controlling. lhe IBo ard in P'rlton Packing dismissed an 8(a)(5) complaint asserting that Respondent had unlawfully withheld a bonus in l)e- cember 1958, because the General ('ounsel had al- leged the withholding of the same bonus as a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act in an earlier proceeding. In refusing to countenance such relitiga- tion of the same conduct, the Board declared. "Gen- erally speaking, sound administrative practice, as well as flirness to respondents, requires the consolidatio n of all pending charges into one complaint. he same considerations dictate that, wherever practicable, there be but a single hearing on all outstanding viola- tions of the Act involving the same respondent. To Act otherwise results in the unnecessary harassment of respondents." 23 Ihe Board also noted that it "does not grant respondents second hearings to relitigate al- legations made against them because they may have mishandled their defense in the original presentation of the case," and that "the General Counsel is not a favored litigant and he is not entitled to any privi- leges not accorded any other litigant appearing bef'ore the Board."2 4 Two cases amplify the meaning of PrIon Packing. In one, Overnite Tranportation ('ompaulv, 25 the Board summarized Pevion Packing as holding that the same single act may not be litigated first as a violation of one section of the Act, and then litigated in a second proceeding as a violation of another section. 26 In the 21 For example, this was true in Golden State as well as in Perma Vinvl Corporation, Dade Plastics Co. and United States Pipe and Foundri Corpora- tion, 164 NLRB 968 (1967), enfd. sub. nom. United States Pipe & Found Or Co. v. N L R.B, 398 F.2d 544 (51h Cir. 1968). the leading Board case relied on by the Court in Golden State. 2 129 NLRB 1358 (1961). 2 1 d at 1360. 2 Id 25 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chaufeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, el al. (Overnile Transportation (ompanm., 130 NRB 1020 (1961). 26 The Board. however, found Peyton Packing inapplicable, because multi- ple, separate acts were involved in Overnile, none of which had been the subject of two proceedings. Interestingly, then-Member Fanning dissented, arguing that, even though different acts arising in different Regions were in issue, Petion Packing required the consolidation o the cases into one pro- ceeding. tie commented. "the General Counsel insured himself two bites at the apple by failing to consolidate. proceeding in the first case and. if unsuc- cessful. proceeding against Respondents on the same violation in the sec- ond." 130 NLRB at 1025. I II BII I ()MPANY, INC( other, Ncuht?/ll ros. Pac cr.v. Inc. ,2 we defined more exactly the scope of Pcvton Packing, indicating that separate litigation of rougly concurrent alleged viola- tions is permissible where "the alleged violations oc- curred after the complaint issued in the earlier case, were not known to the General Counsel at the time of' the earlier hearing, were independent acts, and were not the type of alleged violation commonly known or readily discoverable. even after an exhaustive investi- gation." More recently, Pevion 'Packing has often been cited with approval. 25 I do not think there is real room for doubt that the instant situation falls within the reach of' Pion Packing as measured by Nuhof B Rros. Thus. [ndurall succeeded to Bell's business befltre the (ineral Coun- sel issued the original complaint, the G(eneral Counsel was fully aware of the relationship between Bell and Endurall at that time and, indeed, named ndurall as a respondent and sought to make Endurall liable with Bell as an atirer ego. By direct analogy to Pevton Pack - ing itself, where the withholding of a bonus was liti- gated both as a violation of Section 8(a)( I) and Sec- tion 8(a)(5). the same set of facts describing Endurall's relationship with Bell has been the subject of two proceedings. But, offering a difference in place of a distinction, my colleagues say that Pevton Packing prohibits du- plicative litigation of facts giving rise to violations of separate sections of the statute, but does not prohibit duplicative litigation of facts giving rise to separate theories of liability. It need only be recalled that two considerations underlay Pevion Packing, (1) sound administrative practice, and (2) prevention of unnec- essary harassment of respondents, both of which are promoted by trying in a single proceeding all causes of action against a respondent born out of a common set of facts. The same considerations are present here, and dictate that the allegations of the backpay speci- fication which concern Endurall be dismissed. 2' 159 NLRB 1710. 1711 fn. (t966). enfd. in part 398 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1968). Accord, Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station and Platform Work- ers Union. Local No. 705. et al. (Gasoline Retailers Association of Metropolitan Chicago), 210 NLRB 210 (1974). 2 See, e.g., Jefferson Chemical Company, Inc.. 200 NLRB 992 (1972); Union Electric Company, 219 NLRB 1081 (1975). SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION SIATEMENT OF THE CASF ELBERT D. GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursu- ant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Rela- tions Board issued on June 30. 1976. in Case 30-CA-3220, directing the Bell Company, Inc. and its agents. Richard Balestreiri. and Paul Moskowitz, as receiver for the Bell Company, Inc.. and Richard Balestreiri (sometimes spelled Balislreiril. d/h/a Endurall Productls. Inc.. its successors or assigns, herein called Respondent. to make whole nine iden- tified discharged employees tir losses occasioned by Re- spondent's untair labor praclices in iola;lion o Section 8(a)(I) and (3) oft the National l.abor Relatiols Acl. ;ts ;I rmended-. ()n November 15. 1977. the Linited State Court ofr Ap- peals for the Seventh (ircuit entered judgment enorcing the hackpay order of the Board. A controvers) having arisen over the amolintl of hackpa\ due under the terms of the Board's ()rder. tli Resional Director of the National Labor Relations Board Ior Region 30, issued this hackpay specification and notice of' hearing on July 24. 1978. alleging the amniounl t i Ihe hackp;ly due under the Board's Order. By request of Respondent dated June 15. 1978. the hear- ing was rescheduled for October 26. 1978, and on June 30. 1978. Respondent filed an answer del.'vng.' that it purchased alld operates the business ;is hasically unchanged ram the former operator, Bell: that E.ndurall, with notice of Bell's unfair labor practices purchased and operates the husiness ais tormerly operated by Bell: that Endurall is a successor to Bell within the meaning of Board law and the Board's Or- tier: that it is obligated as a successor to Bell. to remed 3 the hbackpay Order for unlawful conduct committed by Bell. and most particularly. the amounts of backpay owing to the nine discharges ;is computed by the Board and set forth in paragraphs 8 through 12 in the hackpay specifications and notice of hearing. A hearing in the above matter was held befbre me at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on October 26. 1978. Counsel for the General Cousnel introduced an affidavit of service (G.C. Exh. No. I(d)), as evidence that Respondent, the Bell Company and Endurall Products, Inc.. were served with notice of the hackpay specifications and notice of hearing on June 13. 1978. Respondent, as above-named, made no appearance in this proceeding. and counsel for the General (ounsel introduced documentary evidence ((i.(C. xh. 2 a c) that on July 27. 1978. Respondent had undergone an assignment for the benefit of creditors and the appointment of a receiver, that a receivership had been accepted: and that a court order had appointed a receiver, in the person of Floyd A. Harris, Esquire, upon whom and by whom, ser- vice of a copy of the backpay specifications and notice of hearing had been acknowledged (G.C. Exh. No. I(j)). Upon motion by counsel for the General Counsel. the backpay specifications and notice of hearing was amended to allege that Floyd A. Harris, Esquire, as receiver for Re- spondent, is a party in interest and therefor stands in the shoes of Respondent. The General Counsel also introduced a letter (G.C. Exh. 2(a)) as evidence that a letter from Respondent's attorney Stanley S. Jaspan, also notified the Regional Director for Region 30 and receiver Floyd A. Harris o the hearing herein scheduled for October 26, 1978. The letter further advised that Jaspan no longer represented Endurall Prod- ucts, Inc. Steven Abraham was employed by Respondent the Bell Company, on and prior to June 1975. and was discharged Name of Charging Parts amended at hearing 1)1( ISI()NS ()I NI)NAI I.AH()R RI.lAII()NS B()ARI) from Bell in June of 1978. In the iourll quarte (of 1')75 Abraham testified thai he incurred expenses in the course tfI seeking emplymnient which were docImunlnled in (;eer;al ('ounsel's xhhit 4. Such expenses inclutded mileage and parking fees when he visited thle nemlployllIent compensa- tion departmlent. The General ('ounsel proceeded lo explain how the hack- pay earnings foir dischargee Robert Ilafenilanl was ncoil- puted in accordance with the Board's olirmlla for comput- ing hackpay for the period Januar -March 1975. 1 ind that the hackpay earnings of dischargee Robert lalcneman was computed in accordance with the Board's foirmil; as ex- plained by counsel for the General Counsel. Although Re- spondent denied that the computations were correct, it did not support its denial with any evidence or reasons for its position, as it is required to do by Sections 102.54(b) (c) and 102.57 of the Board's Rules and Regulations. C'ounsel for the General Counsel further represented that the earn- ing computations for all of the other eight dischargees were prepared in accordance with the same reasonable formula established by the Board for computing backpay earnings, as was utilized in computing the earnings in Robert Ilafe- man's case. The General ('ounsel further explained that the earnings records used to compute the backpay owing to Steven Abraham and David Feller are both records of the EIm- ployer Bell and Endurall, as opposed to social security rec- ords. However, in computing the backpay earnings of' the other dischargees the actual earnings records of said em- ployees were used, except for dischargee Hanrahan, fr which counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the computation for the fourth quarter of 1975, during which period Hanrahan was unable to work, and which correctly requires a reduction in the alleged backpay for $3,133.24 by $2,124.63. which when carried through the entire formula for computing backpay, results in a corrected backpay owing to Hanrahan of $615.77. Argument Counsel for the General Counsel argues that Endurall is a Perma Vinyl-Golden State successor who is obligated to remedy the unfair labor practices of the predecessor, the Bell Company. He cites in support of this contention the court's decision, as well as the Board's underlying Decision, which found that the operation of Endurall utilized the same equipment, same customers, same suppliers, and was substantially the same enterprise, as found by the Adminis- trative Law Judge and affirmed by the Board in The Bell Company, Inc., 225 NLRB 474 (1976). The General Counsel further contends that the Board's Decision, was undisturbed by the court's decision that Richard Balistreiri was the president of the Bell Company and had distributed the discharge letters to the employees; that he thereafter became the founder of Endurall; that Respondent in its answer acknowledges that Balistreiri was both the president of Bell Company and the sole proprietor and/or president of the successor, Endurall. Consequently, the General Counsel contends Balistreiri's knowledge and participation in the unfair labor practices found by the Board, are actual, and are imputed to the successor, Endur- all. the (icnieral Counsel also conltends that while such knowledge by Balistreiri did not constitute knowledge of tile filing of the complaint, it nevertheless did constitute knowledge of the unfair labor practices which costNilitaes sullicient knowledge. In support of its position he cites .Stulih'lcrt lt:''e/lole ('. I. & .S'oteiellrtl E spandve/- tpe, Inc. 206 NI.RB 933(1973). particularly pages 951-954: at d -lstLi/' i- n'e1ing Home, a' , Jim. 11. Prt(, .e vce. 188 NlRB 235 (1971). Finally. the General (Counsel explained that , dcse ,iot t'eeA liill O ui, i'.il Elndlurall flir the unflir labor practices committed hby Bell because that issue was resolved by the Seventh (Circuit Court of Appeals. ilowever, to establish under the theory and reasons of (ol/den SliI andl Perill l'iirll. pr)lo. Endurall must remedy the unfair labor prac- tices to the extent that it can, in order to avoid or prevent effectuating the public interest of the polcies by pervading the Act. In the Bell Cn('Ollnpav. Inc. 225 NI.RB 474, the Adminis- trative l.aw Judge, as affirmed by the Board. lound that [Endurall utilized some if not most all of' Bell's equipment, purchased sonic of its supplies, completed some of its con- tracted work, and hired a minority of Bell's employees. By these acts, the Board held that Endurall was the alter ego of' Bell, aid as such. is obligated to remedy all of the unfair labor practices committed by Bell. and to honor the union contract which was in effect at the time Bell terminated its employees and closed its business operation. 'The Board fur- ther found that the new business (Endurall) herein is merely a disquised continuance of the old (Bell) business, which makes it an alter ego of the former enterprise (Bell), thereby, rendering ndurall bound by the contract entered into by its predecessor. Conclusions It is particularly observed that neither the Administrative l.aw Judge nor the Board in affirming. specifically found that Endurall was in fact a successor of Bell, which accord- ing to the Board's description of criteria for a successor, "results from a bona fide arm's length sale or transfer be- tween two totally separate principles engaged in the same employing enterprise, wherein the new enterprise employs a majority of the employees of its predecessor." Unlike counsel for the General Counsel contends, Re- spondent did not admit in its answer in the Bell case that Balistreiri was the sole proprietor of Endurall. However, Respondent Bell did admit in its answer that Richard Bali- streiri was president, treasurer, and director of Endurall, and was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and an agent acting on behalf of Endurall. Moreover, the United Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held that al- though Balistreiri was an officer and an agent of Endurall, such positions did not constitute ownership of Endurall by Balistreiri who served at the pleasure of the owners of Bell and could be terminated by them at any time. Conse- quently, Balistreiri was not in control of Bell and the evi- dence does not show that any of the prior owners of Bell owned, controlled, or benefited from the operation of Endurall. The Court said it found no authority to support a finding that Endurall is an alter ego of Bell under the cir- cumstances established. 982 TIlE BELl. COMPANY. INC. The (Court stated that: "If there is a bona fide discontinu- ance and true change in ownership. the new company is under neither remedial obligation by virtue of an NLRB order directed at its predecessor nor is the new company subject to the old collective bargaining contract." Soutlhport Petroleum Comnpany v. N.L. RB., 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942): N.L.R.B. v. Williams J. Burns International Securitl Ser- vices Inc.. 406. U.S. 272 (1972): and Howard Johnson Co. Inc. v. Hotel Emplovees. 417 U.S. 249. 259. Fn. 5 (1974). The court went on to point out that the cases relied upon by the Board have a common element. the continued control or ownership of the new business by the owners of the old company. The Court granted enforcement of the Board's Order against Bell, Richard Balistreiri as agent for Bell. and Paul Moskowitz as receiver for Bell, but it denied enforce- ment of the Order against Richard Balistreiri, doing businss as Endurall Products, Inc. Since the continuity in ownership in the Bell case was not litigated and established, and is not an issue before me. I agree with counsel for the General Cousenl when he stated that liability against Endurall is precluded by the above- cited court decision. However, the General ('ounsel never- theless argues that it seeks to establish under theory and reasons of Golden Sate Bottling Co. Inc. v. N.L. R.B., 414 U.S. 168 (1973) and Perma V'inYl Corporation, 164 NLRB 968 (1967). that Endurall must remedy the unfair labor practices to the extent that it can, in order to protect the public interest and avoid the policies of the Act being per- vaded. However, a reading of Golden State Bottling Co. Inc. supra, readily reveals that the Court was referring to a bona fide successor. In fact, in that case, both the predecessor and the successor remained in business, and the Court or- dered both firms jointly or separately to award backpay to the discriminatee involved. In the current case, the evidence is clear that the Bell Company terminated business opera- tions and it was not established that any of the new owner- ship of Endurall were previous owners of Bell. Hence, it would seem clear that Richard Balistreiri. d/b/a Endurall. cannot be held liable for backpay resulting from unfair la- bor practices by Bell. under either the theory or the reasons enunciated in Golden Slate or Perma Vinyl, supra, since in each of the aforecited cases, the common element of owner- ship prevailed in both the old and the new business con- cerns. Counsel for the General Counsel also cites Soulheastern Envelope Company. 206 NLRB 933 (1973), in support of its position that Endurall should be liable to some extent for the backpay owing to the unlawfully discharged employees. However, my reading of this case clearly conveys that the Board concluded that Southeastern Envelope of Georgia (successor) was in fact a successor to Southeastern Enve- lope Company, Inc. & Southeastern Expandvelope. Inc.. the latter of which, committed the unlawful discharges and subsequently started doing business as Diversified. By con- cluding that Southeastern Envelope of Georgia was a suc- cessorship the Board must have found a common element of ownership of the successor as well as the predecessor. In other words, being the successor of its predecessors. South- eastern Envelope Company of Georgia was correctly held liable for backpay to the discriminatorily discharged em- ployees of its predecessor. This significant factual finding distinguishes Southeastern l:nvelope ('omppan from the emergence of Richard Balistreiri d/bh/a Endurall, since Balistreiri was not shown to be the owner of Endurall but rather an employee of the latter. The evidence clearly established that Balistreiri wa an employee of- the predecessor Bell. C(onsequentl as the General Counsel stated, after its herein-before described ar- gument. that the issue of the liability of Endurall was re- solved b the Seventh Circuit (Court of Appeals. Hence. I find that the law of the case confines the lihilit for back- pay to the discriminatees to the Bell (omipansn . Richard Balistreiri as agent for Bell. and Paynl Moskos I as receiver for Bell. Appendix A to the complaint herein established that the total net backpay owing to the several unlawfulls dis- charged employees is as follows: Steven Abraham David Feller John lafeman Robert Hanrahan John Herman tHenry Lauscher Raymond Luchzkowski George Schmidt Garry Schroeder $6,237.71 7.402.96 1.302.66 (corrected) 615.77 873.0 4.989.28 4,529.84 1.261.56 2.977.15 Based on the foregoing credited evidence of' record, I thereupon conclude and find that the proper amount of backpay owing to the nine discharges herein before named is the amount set opposite their respective names, plus in- terest computed in accordance with the Board's formula in backpay cases.) Not only did Respondent not appear in this proceeding and present evidence to support its position, but the Union presented undisputed evidence that the dischargees were entitled to the amounts of backpay herein found. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section IO(c) of the Act I hereby issue the flloving recommended: OR[)ER' Pursuant to Section IO(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, the Respondent. The Bell Company. Balistreiri as agent for Bell. and Paul Moskowitz as receiver for Bell. of Brookfield. Wisconsin. their officers, agents. suc- cessors, and assigns. shall pay to the dischargees above- named, the amount of hbackpay set opposite their respective names, together with interest as computed in accordance with the formula prescribed in the Florida Soel (orpora- lion, supra. case. until all indebtedness has been discharged. 2 Flrrda Steel (rporariton. 231 NL.RB 651 (1977) In the event no excepilons are filed as proslded h Sec 02.46 oi the Rule, and Regulations of Ihe National L.abor Reltllons Board findings. con- clusions, and Recommended Order herein shall. s provs ided n Sec 102.48 ol the Rules and Regulations. he adopted by the Board and become its findings. conclusions. nd Order. and all objections there to shall he deemed .alved for a.ll purposes 983 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation