The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 15, 1969

180 N.L.R.B. 190 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and Association of National Baseball League
Umpires, Petitioner . Case I-RC-10414
December 15, 1969
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF
ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a
hearing was held before Hearing Officer Francis V.
Paone. The Hearing Officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are
hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, including the
briefs,' the National Labor Relations Board finds:
1. The Petitioner seeks an election in a unit of
umpires employed by the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs (hereinafter called the
Employer or the League). The Employer, while
conceding the Board's constitutional and statutory
power to exercise jurisdiction herein, nevertheless
urges the Board, as a matter of policy, not to assert
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 14(c) of the Act.
The Employer is a nonprofit membership
association consisting of 12 member clubs located in
10 states and the District of Columbia. Operating
pursuant to a constitution adopted and executed by
the 12 member clubs, the Employer is engaged in
the business of staging baseball exhibitions and, with
its counterpart the National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, constitutes what is commonly
known as "major league baseball." The Employer
currently employs, among other persons, the 24
umpires requested herein, and one umpire-in-chief.
The Employer stipulated the following commerce
data for the year 1968:
(1) The business of the Employer was conducted
substantially in interstate commerce.
(2) The Employer's net share of the revenue
derived from the national radio and television
contracts of Major League Baseball
(Game-of-the-Week, World Series and All-Star
Game) was a sum in excess of $3,000,000.
(3) Employer's member clubs derived revenue
from gate receipts ranging from over $1,000,000 to
over $2,250,000; and the League office's share of
such total receipts was a sum in excess of
$1,000,000.
The Petitioner and the Employer filed briefs Amicus briefs generally
supporting the Petitioner were received from baseball , football, hockey,
and basketball players' associations , and from the AFL-CIO Amicus
briefs supporting the Employer were received from The National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, and the National Hockey League, and the
Employer filed 2 reply briefs All have been carefully considered, The
Major League Baseball Players Association's request for a Board hearing
on certain factual matters alleged in the briefs is hereby denied, as the
Board has not relied on such disputed factual allegations in reaching its
decision herein
(4) The Employer expended a sum in excess of
$500,000 in maintaining its staff of umpires, such
sum including umpires' salaries, travel and other
expenses.
(5) The average revenue derived by each member
club of the Employer from local radio and television
contracts was a sum in excess of $900,000.
(6) The total revenue derived by the Employer
from concession sales was a sum in excess of
$500,000, a substantial portion of which resulted
from interstate purchases.
(7) The total amount expended by the Employer
for equipment and supplies was a sum in excess of
$500,000, a substantial portion of which was made
through interstate commerce.
(8) The total amount expended by the Employer
for travel (mostly interstate) was a sum in excess of
$500,000.
(9) In connection with working arrangements
between the Employer's member clubs and their
minor league affiliates, substantial portions of the
operating expenses of such affiliates were paid by
such clubs; and the total of all such payments was a
sum in excess of $1,000,000.
The Board's jurisdiction under the Act is based
upon the commerce clause of the Constitution, and
is coextensive with the reach of that clause.' In 1922
the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, although
characterizing baseball as a "business," ruled that it
was not interstate in nature, and therefore was
beyond the reach of the nation's antitrust laws.
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
appear to proceed on the assumption that baseball,
like the other major professional sports, is now an
industry in or affecting interstate commerce, and
that baseball's current antitrust exemption has been
preserved merely as a matter of judicial stare
decisis.3 Thus, in both the Toolson4 and Radovichs
decisions the Supreme Court specifically stated that
baseball's antitrust status was a matter for Congress
to resolve, implying thereby that Congress has the
power under the commerce clause to regulate the
baseball industry. Since professional football6 and
boxing' have been held to be in interstate commerce
and thus subject to the antitrust laws, it can no
longer be seriously contended that the Court still
considers baseball alone to be outside of interstate
commerce. Congressional deliberations regarding the
relationship of baseball and other professional team
IN L R B v Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp . 301 U S I
'Cf Radovich v National Football League , 352 US 236, US v
International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. 348 US 236, US v
Shubert , 348 U S 222, Toolson v New York Yankees , Inc, 346 U S
356
'Toolson v New York Yankees. Inc, 346 U S 356
'Radovich v National Football League , 352 U S 236, wherein the Court
said at 452 "Of course, the doctrine of Toolson and Federal Baseball must
yield to any congressional action and continues only at its sufferance
.Supra, fn 5
'U S v International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. 348 U S. 236
180 NLRB No. 30
AM. LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS 191
sports to the antitrust laws likewise reflect a
Congressional assumption that such sports are
subject to regulation under the commerce clause.' It
is, incidentally, noteworthy that these deliberations
reveal Congressional concern for the rights of
employees such as players to bargain collectively
and engage in concerted activities.' Additionally,
legal scholars have agreed,10 and neither the parties
nor those participating as amici dispute, that
professional sports are in or affect interstate
commerce, and as such are subject to the Board's
jurisdiction." Therefore, on the basis of the above,
we find that professional baseball is an industry in
or affecting commerce, and as such is subject to
Board jurisdiction under the Act.
Section 14(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, permits the Board to decline
jurisdiction over labor disputes involving any "class
or category of employers, where, in the opinion of
the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on,
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant
the exercise of its jurisdiction...."'= The Employer
and other employers contend that because of
baseball's internal self-regulation, a labor dispute
involving The American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs is not likely to have any substantial
effect on interstate commerce; and that application
of the National Labor Relations Act to this
Employer is contrary to national labor policy
because Congress has sanctioned baseball's internal
self-regulation. The Employer also contends that
effective and uniform regulations of baseball's labor
relations problems is not possible through Board
processes because of the sport's international
aspects.
The Petitioner and other employee representatives
contend, on the other hand, that Section 14(c)
precludes the Board from declining jurisdiction, as
any labor dispute arising in this industry will
potentially affect millions of dollars of interstate
commerce and have nationwide impact. They assert
that baseball's self-regulation is controlled entirely
'See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciary , 82d Cong, 1st Sess (1951),
Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong , 1st Sess (1957)
'fd See also, HR 10378, which passed the House in 1958; and S 950,
which passed the Senate in 1965
"Cf Hoffman , Is the NLRB Going to Play the Ball Game , 20 Lab L
J 239 ( 1969), Krasnow and Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports,
51 Georgetown L J 749 (1963), Pierce, Organized Professional Team
Sports and the Anti- Trust Laws , 43 Cornell L. Q 566 (1958)
"Accord Musicians Union , Local No 6 v , Superior Court of Alameda
County, Charles 0 Finley and Company , Inc. 73 Cal. Rep 201, 447 P 2d
313 (1968)
"Section 14(c)(I) reads in full
The Board , in its discretion , may, by rule of decision or by published
rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category
of employers , where , in the opinion of the Board , the effect of such labor
dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction . Provided , That the Board shall not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August I, 1959
In no case involving professional baseball has jurisdiction been asserted by
the Board under the standards prevailing upon August I, 1959
by employers, and therefore has not and will not
prevent labor disputes from occurring in this
industry. Additionally, it is submitted that
Congressional intent does not preclude, and national
labor policy requires, Board jurisdiction - for
without a national forum for uniform resolution of
disputes, the industry might be subject to many
different labor laws depending upon the State in
which any particular dispute arises.
We have carefully considered the positions of the
parties , and the amicus briefs, and we find that it
will best effectuate the mandates of the Act, as well
as national labor policy, to assert jurisdiction over
this Employer. We reach this decision for the
following reasons.
Baseball 's system for internal self-regulation of
disputes involving umpires is made up of the
Uniform Umpires Contract, the Major League
Agreement, and the Major League Rules, which
provide, among other things, for final resolution of
disputes through arbitration by the Commissioner.
The system appears to have been designed almost
entirely by employers and owners, and the final
arbiter of internal disputes does not appear to be a
neutral third party freely chosen by both sides, but
rather an individual appointed solely by the member
club owners themselves. We do not believe that such
a system is likely either to prevent labor disputes
from arising in the future, or, having once arisen, to
resolve them in a manner susceptible or conductive
to voluntary compliance by all parties involved."
Moreover, it is patently contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Act for the Board to defer its
undoubted jurisdiction to decide unfair labor
practices to a disputes settlement system established
unilaterally by an employer or group of employers."
Finally, although the instant case involves only
umpires employed by the League, professional
baseball clubs employ, in addition to players,
clubhouse attendants, bat boys, watchmen, scouts,
ticket sellers, ushers, gatemen , trainers, janitors,
office clericals, batting practice pitchers, stilemen,
publicity, and advertising men, grounds keepers and
maintenance men. Congressional Hearings, supra,
footnote 8. As to these other categories, there is no
"self-regulation" at all. This consideration is of all
the more consequence for of those employees in
professional baseball whose interests are likely to
call the Board's processes into play, the great
majority are in the latter-named classifications.
"That major league baseball 's internal rules of self- regulation have not
prevented labor disputes from arising , and once arising produced amicable
settlement , is evident from the fact that charges involving this Employer
have been filed with the Board, and are currently pending disposition
before the Regional Director for Region I The charge in Case I-CA-6581
was filed by the Association of National Baseball League Umpires, the
Petitioner herein, on January 8 , 1969, alleging that the Employer
discharged 2 umpires because of their participation in union organizational
activities.
'The League argues that Board processes could be used to deprive the
Commissioner of the necessary power to discipline umpires and players
based upon mere suspicion of wrongdoing However , Board processes only
prohibit discipline based upon Section 7 considerations.
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We can find, neither in the statute nor in its
legislative history, any expression of a Congressional
intent that disputes between employers and
employees in this industry should be removed from
the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act.16
In 1935, 1947, and again in 1959, Congress
examined the nation's labor policy as reflected in
the National Labor Relations Act; and Congress has
consistently affirmed the Act's basic policy, as
expressed in Section 1, of encouraging collective
bargaining by "protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own
choosing." Nowhere in Congress' deliberations is
there any indication that these basic rights are not
to be extended to employees employed in
professional baseball or any other professional sport.
We do not agree that Congress, by refusing to pass
legislation subjecting the sport to the antitrust laws
when it considered the regulation of baseball and
other sports under the antitrust statutes , sanctioned
a governmentwide policy of "non-involvement" in
all matters pertaining to baseball. Indeed, to the
extent that Congressional deliberation on the
antitrust question has reference to the issue before
us, it indicates agreement that players ' rights to
bargain collectively and engage in concerted
activities are to be protected rather than limited."
There is persuasive reason to believe that future
labor disputes - should they arise in this industry
- will be national in scope, radiating their impact
far beyond individual State boundaries. As stated
above, the Employer and its members are located
and conduct business in 10 States and the District of
Columbia. The stipulated commerce data establishes
that millions of dollars of interstate commerce are
involved in its normal business operations. The
nature of the industry is such that great reliance is
placed upon interstate travel. Necessarily, then, we
are not here confronted with the sort of small,
primarily intrastate employer over which the Board
declines jurisdiction because of failure to meet its
prevailing monetary standards. Moreover, it is
apparent that the Employer, whose operations are
so clearly national in scope, ought not have its labor
relations problems subject to diverse state labor
"Compare the following cases in which the Board has asserted
jurisdiction over sports and entertainment enterprises : Celebrity Sports
Center, 169 NLRB No 29 ( sports centers); Harrah 's Club, 150 NLRB
1702, enfd. 362 F.2d 425 (C.A. 9), cert denied 386 U S. 915 (gambling
casinos ); Aspen Skiing Corp, 143 NLRB 707 (skiing facilities); Ray,
Davidson and Ray, 131 NLRB 433 (sight-seeing tours ); The League of
New York Theatres , 129 NLRB 1429 (theatres). Cf Walter A Kelley, 139
NLRB 744, wherein the Board declined jurisdiction over the horse racing
industry, mainly because "Horse racing as it now exists is a State created
monopoly, subject as such to extensive local regulations . Practically every
individual working at a track . must be licensed by the State regulatory
authorities Because of the important revenue derived from racing
activities , State governments have a strong interest in insuring
uninterrupted operations at race tracks. . Consequently, unless the
hands of State authorities are tied , no labor dispute in this industry is
likely to be permitted to last sufficiently long to interfere seriously with
interstate commerce " These principles clearly do not apply to baseball.
"Supra , fn 8 and 9.
laws.'
The Employer's final contention, that Board
processes are unsuited to regulate effectively
baseball's international aspects, clearly lacks merit,
as many if not most of the industries subject to the
Act have similar international features.
Accordingly, we find that the effect on interstate
commerce of a labor dispute involving professional
baseball is not so insubstantial as to require
withholding assertion of the Board's jurisdiction,
under Section 14(c) of the Act, over Employers in
that industry, as a class . As the annual gross
revenues of this Employer are in excess of all of our
prevailing monetary standards, we find that the
Employer is engaged in an industry affecting
commerce," and that it will effectuate the policies of
the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
2. The Employer at the hearing denied that the
Petitioner was a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The record
shows, however, that the Petitioner is an
organization in which employees19 participate, and
which exists for the purpose of dealing with
employers concerning wages and other conditions of
employment. Accordingly, we find that the
Petitioner is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. A question affecting commerce exists
concerning the representation of certain employees
of the Employer within the meaning of Sections
9(c)(l) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.20
4. The Employer contends that the petition should
be dismissed on the ground that the umpires sought
to be represented are supervisors as defined in
Section 2(11) of the Act. It is not contended that
umpires have authority to hire, fire, transfer,
discharge, recall, promote, assign , or reward. We
think it equally apparent that umpires do not
"discipline" or "direct" the work force according to
the common meaning of those terms as used in the
Act.
The record indicates that an umpire's basic
responsibility is to insure that each baseball game is
played in conformance with the predetermined rules
of the game. Thus, the umpire does not discipline
except to the extent he may remove a participant
from the game for violation of these rules.
Testimony shows that after such a removal the
umpire merely reports the incident to his superiors,
"See Section 14(c)(2) of the Act. See also Krasnow and Levy, supra. fn
10 at 780 " Because of the interstate nature of such sports, it would seem
more desirable to have the labor relations of this industry regulated by one
federal law rather than a multitude of state laws and to have the disputes
and problems settled by one administrative agency regardless of where
these disputes arise "
"Cf. El Paso Country Club, 132 NLRB 942
"The Board has determined , infra. that umpires, members of the
Petitioner , are not supervisors
"The Employer' s Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the grounds that a
question concerning representation does not exist under Section 9(c) of the
Act because the Employer has already recognized and is bargaining with
the Petitioner , is hereby denied See General Box Company, 82 NLRB
678.
AM. LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS 193
and does not himself fine, suspend, or even
recommend such action. As the final arbiter on the
field, the umpire necessarily makes decisions which
may favor one team over another, and which may
determine to some extent the movements of various
players, managers, and other personnel on the ball
field. The umpire does not, however, direct the work
force in the same manner and for the same reasons
as a foreman in an industrial setting. As every fan is
aware, the umpire does not - through the use of
independent judgment - tell a player how to bat,
how to field, to work harder or exert more effort,
nor can he tell a manager which players to play or
where to play them. Thus, the umpire merely sees to
it that the game is played in compliance with the
rules. It is the manager and not the umpire who
directs the employees in their pursuit of victory.21
Accordingly, we find that the umpires are not
supervisors, and thus the Employer's motion to
dismiss on this ground is hereby denied. We further
find that the following employees of the Employer
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
All persons employed as umpires in the American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, but
excluding all other employees, office clerical
employees, guards, professional employees and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Direction of Election== omitted from publication.]
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting:
My colleagues advance as a reason for asserting
jurisdiction herein the absence of a Congressional
intent to resolve labor disputes in baseball in a
different manner from that established in the
NLRA. In my opinion, the question is not whether
Congress intended that disputes between employers
and employees in the professional baseball industry
should be resolved in the same or in a different
manner from that established for other industries
covered by the Act, but whether Congress, in
enacting the NLRA, intended to include such
disputes within the reach of the Board's jurisdiction
at all. If any inference is to be drawn from
"Cf. N.L R B. v, Security Guard Service , Inc., 384 F .2d 143 (C A 5),
where the court stated " If any authority over someone else, no matter how
insignificant or infrequent , made an employee a supervisor , our industrial
composite would be predominately supervisory . Every order-giver is not a
supervisor Even the traffic director tells the president of a company where
to park his car "
"In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their
addresses which may be used to communicate with them . Excelsior
Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236; N. L.R.B v Wyman -Gordon Company,
394 U.S. 759. Accordingly , it is hereby directed that an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be
filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region I within 7
days of the date of this Decision and Direction of Election . The Regional
Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election. No
extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director
except in extraordinary circumstances . Failure to comply with this
requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper
objections are filed.
Congressional silence on the matter, a very
compelling reason exists for nonassertion of
jurisdiction.
When the NLRA was first enacted in 1935,
professional baseball enjoyed a unique and favored
status in both the Nation's social and business
community. Such status is evident in the following
excerpts from the 1952 Congressional study devoted
exclusively to baseball:13
Baseball is commonly called America's national
pastime. Ever since its inception over 100 years
ago, the game has held a favored position among
the American people, both as a participant sport
and as a spectator amusement. Until 60 years
ago, baseball was the only team sport of any
consequence on the American scene. In the
intervening decades, other team sports such as
football, basketball, and hockey have risen to
importance but none have been able to supplant
the position baseball has secured in the hearts of
the public. Other sports flourish for a brief season
and then sink to the background to await a
rebirth of interest in the next season. Baseball,
however, remains of public interest both in season
and out. Whether it is June or December, the
public is interested in the national game.
Organized baseball has made important
contributions to the public welfare in both peace
and war . It has expended more than a million
dollars to assist the American Legion junior
baseball program . Each year the major leagues
admit from 2 to 2 1/2 million boys and girls to
games free of charge . Frequently, it plays
exhibition games , the entire proceeds of which go
to subsidize municipal recreation . During World
War II, the major leagues alone contributed
almost $2 million to the United Service
Organization , the American Red Cross, and other
service organizations. It also sponsored more than
a billion dollars of sales of Government bonds at
its parks and in special events , and sponsored
frequent exhibition games and star appearances at
Army and Navy camps.
In many respects, professional baseball typifies
the basic ideals of the American people . Fairness
and clean competition are the passwords of the
sport . It is the melting pot of men of all races,
religions, and creeds ....
The success of the individual player rests not on
who he is or where he came from or what he
believes. Rather it is measured by how he
performs . The Horatio Alger stories in baseball
have been many. Babe Ruth went from a
Baltimore orphanage to fame and fortune; Bob
Feller stepped from an Iowa farm to become one
of the most famous pitchers of all times ; Ty Cobb
came from an obscure town in Georgia to become
"H. R Rep 2002, 82d Cong , 2d Sess. 7, 9, 10
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a figure , honored and respected all across the
Nation.
Perhaps more pertinent to my views herein are
the following excerpts from the same study:"
. The basic assumption underlying our antitrust
laws is that free competition is the best possible
guaranty of an industry ' s progress and prosperity
and that the general public will be best served
thereby. To a large extent, that type of economic
competition in the baseball industry is foreclosed
by a comprehensive and reticulated system of
rules and regulations to which all segments of
organized baseball subscribe.
baseball is a unique industry . Of necessity,
the several clubs in each league must act as
partners as well as competitors. The history of
baseball has demonstrated that cooperation in
many of the details of the operation of the
baseball business is essential to the maintenance
of honest and vigorous competition on the playing
field . For this reason organized baseball has
adopted a system of rules and regulations that
would be entirely inappropriate in an ordinary
industry.
Whether fortuitous or otherwise, professional
baseball ' s unique and favored status had already
gained judicial approval long before enactment of
the NLRA.25 It is irrefutable, therefore, that
Congress in 1935 harbored no intent to include the
labor relations of professional baseball within the
reach of the Board's jurisdiction. And while the
Supreme Court has since rejected the narrow
conception of commerce on which Federal Baseball
was premised , in large measure prior to any
amendments to the Act," my colleagues point to no
legislative history in the subsequent amendments to
the Act which would support a legislative intent
thereafter to include baseball 's labor relations within
the reach of the Act. Indeed, it would appear that in
the present posture , an amendment expressly
including the baseball industry within the Act would
be required to warrant the Board ' s assertion, of
jurisdiction.
My colleagues seek comfort for their decision
herein from the expressions of Congressional intent
favoring our assertion of jurisdiction contained in
the legislative hearings on the numerous bills dealing
with the antitrust aspects of baseball and other
professional team sports which have been introduced
in both branches of the Congress. The short answer,
of course , is that none of these bills has been
"H. R. Rep . 2002, supra at 228 , 229. These excerpts reflect the general
observations made at page three of the Report that professional baseball
has been for years a self-regulated industry and may be characterized in
many respects as a monopoly.
"See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v . National League of
Professional Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, holding that the business of professional
baseball was not commerce.
"See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association . 322 U.S.
533 and cases discussed in Pierce, "Organized Professional Team Sports
and the Anti-Trust Laws," supra at 566-569
enacted into law and they afford at best a very
tenuous basis for the assessment of Congressional
intent in 1935, or 1947, or 1959, particularly in the
light of the potential legal obstacles to the Board's
assertion of jurisdiction over baseball in the first
instance.
Even assuming in agreement with my colleagues
that professional baseball is subject to the Board's
jurisdiction, and further, that the Board has the
discretion under Section 14(c)(1) of the Act to assert
or decline jurisdiction,27 I am of the opinion that no
compelling reasons exist for exercising that
discretion to assert jurisdiction in the instant case.
There is no showing that this industry is wracked
with the kinds of labor disputes which are likely to
constitute a burden on commerce. Nor am I
satisfied that the majority's conclusion, that
baseball's "commissioner" system for internal
self-regulation of disputes is not likely to prevent
such burden or disruption of commerce, constitutes
a ground for our taking jurisdiction over the
industry. Indeed, I question the propriety of
prejudging baseball's arbitral system in this
representation proceeding, particularly in view of the
fact that the matter has not been litigated and in the
absence of an issue which calls for a close scrutiny
of the efficacy of that system based on facts spread
on the record. In any event, the pendency of a single
ULP charge , even assuming it arose as a direct
result of the failure of baseball's arbitral system, is
hardly ground for discrediting that system any more
than it is for rejecting arbitration procedures in any
industry. Moreover, my colleagues appear to shoot
wide of the mark when they note that other
employees, such as clubhouse attendants, bat boys,
watchmen , scouts, ticket sellers , ushers, gatemen,
trainers , janitors, grounds keepers and
maintenancemen , are not covered by baseball's
arbitral system. Unlike umpires, these employees
appear to be directly employed by the individual
baseball clubs and it appears that their labor
relations would be so handled. While baseball
players are likewise hired directly by the individual
clubs, the entire league has an interest in the
relations between the players and their employers
because of the very nature of the game and the need
to maintain competition . Thus, there is an urgent
need for ultimately settling problems dealing with
the players on a league level while no such need is
apparent in the case of stadium -oriented employees.
Furthermore , it appears from the record that some
of the latter employees are already represented by
labor organizations in single-employer units and
presumably have their own dispute settlement
procedures. Finally, there is no showing that any
labor disputes of national importance exist among
these employees.
For the foregoing reasons I would dismiss the
petition herein.
"I do not read my colleague 's decision as holding or implying that the
Board lacks such discretion.