Texas Gas Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 19, 1962

136 N.L.R.B. 355 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 355
it will be ordered as a necessary and appropriate remedy that Respondent offer her
immediate and full reinstatement to a position substantially equivalent to her
former position, without prejudice to her rights, and make her whole for any loss of
pay suffered as a result of her discharge on June 8, 1961, by payment to her of a
sum of money equal to that which she would have earned from that date to the
date of Respondent 's offer of such position less net interim earnings to be com-
puted on a quarterly basis in the manner estabilshed by the Board in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289. In view of the fact that Mayme Hess' production
of defective catheters appears to have been substantial, I believe that sound policy
precludes compulsory reinstatement in her former position of dipper. Her admitted
nervousness under Respondent's hostility can only mean a serious threat not only to
Respondent's production but to public safety.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By discharging Mayme Hess for the reason that she engaged in concerted
activities looking to the mutual aid and protection of herself and of fellow em-
ployees and to collective bargaining, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices under Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act as alleged herein.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Texas Gas Corporation and Oil , Chemical and Atomic `York-
ers International Union, Local 4-243. Case No. 23-CA-1240-
March 19, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 17, 1961, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. The Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report, together with a supporting brief. A limited
exception was filed by the Charging Party, together with a brief in
support of the Intermediate Report.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record,' and
1 The Charging Party's sole exception relates to one sentence of the Intermediate Report,
which the Charging Party contends varies from the evidence in the record. We find no
material variance and deny the Charging Party's exception
Respondent's request for oral argument is denied, as the record and briefs fully set
forth the issues and positions of the parties.
136 NLRB No. 38.
641795-63-voI 136-24
.356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.3
ORDER
The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.'
MEMBER RODGERS took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
3 We have carefully considered the contentious made by the parties in this case, and
are of the opinion that the Trial Examiner has thouglittully and correctly resolved the
difficult issues presented We therefore adopt the Intermediate Report in its entirety
9 As Texas has a "right-to-work" law, we delete the icierences in the Recommended
Order and notice to union -security agreements authorized by Section 8(a) (3). In addi-
tion, the following sentence shall be added to the notice "Employees may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office (650 M & Al Building, 1 Alain Street, Houston,
Texas; Telephone Number Capital 2-7201, Extension 041) if they have any question con-
cerning this notice or compliance with its provisions."
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding , with all the parties represented , was heard before Paul Bisgyer,
the duly designated Trial Examiner, in Beaumont , Texas, on August 29 through
September 1, 1961, on the amended complaint of the General Counsel and the
amended answer of the Respondent . In substance , the amended complaint alleges
that Texas Gas Corporation , herein called the Respondent , violated Section 8(a) (1),
(3), and ( 5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to reinstate striking
employees on the unconditional application of their certified bargaining representative,
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 4-243 , herein called
the Union , unless the Union agreed to certain unlawful conditions imposed by the
Respondent on May 3, 1961 , which it later revised on May 30, and although the
Union accepted the May 30 conditions on or about June 17. The complaint further
alleges that the Respondent also violated the same provisions of the Act by directly
and individually bargaining with named striking employees , in disregard of their ex-
clusive representative , with respect to their reinstatement on condition that they agree
to continue working in the event the picket lines were reestablished, and by soliciting
another striker , whom it promised benefits, to abandon the strike and return to work.
In its amended answer, the Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor
practices . Affirmatively , the amended answer alleges, in effect, that the strikers lost
their protected status because their strike was in breach of contract ; that their rein-
statement application was not unconditional or made in good faith; and that the con-
ditions the Respondent imposed were necessary to protect its rights . The Respondent
also denies that it engaged in individual bargaining with strikers but asserts that it
simply offered reinstatement to the named employees on fundamentally the same basis
as that offered the Union when these individuals voluntarily applied for their jobs.
At the close of the hearing , the parties were given an opportunity to argue their
positions orally. Thereafter , on October 9, the parties filed briefs which were care-
fully considered.
Upon the entire record,' and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Texas corporation, is engaged at its plant in Winnie , Texas, in
the business of processing and refining natural gas . At its terminal in Port Neches,
Texas, the Respondent is engaged in the business of loading, unloading , storing, and
transporting condensates and refined petroleum products. During the past 12 months
i On September 29, 1961, the Respondent filed a motion , copies of which it duly served
on all the parties, to correct the official transcript of testimony herein in various indicated
respects No opposition having been received, the motion is hereby granted, and the
transcript is hereby deemed corrected as stated in the moving papers.
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 357
it sold and shipped from these facilities products valued in excess of $50,00'0 to
points outside Texas.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is conceded, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
,of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The evidence
The alleged unfair labor practices herein arose out of the Respondent's temporary
lockout of its striking employees who sought to return to work-but not on the Re-
spondent's terms-following their unsuccessful strike to force the Respondent to
restore several jobs eliminated by automation. The relevant facts are recited below .2
1. Origin of the underlying labor dispute; the strike
Since the Union's certification in 1949, the Respondent and the Union have main-
tained contractual relations covering the Respondent's production, operating and
maintenance employees at its Winnie and Port Neches, Texas, facilities .3 Their last
.contract, which was in effect at the times material herein, was executed on September
22, 1960, for a term of 1 year beginning September 16, 1960, until September 16, 1961,
and thereafter from year to year subject to amendment and termination on 60 days'
notice. At the time this contract was being negotiated the Respondent contemplated
installing automatic equipment. Recognizing the inevitable displacement of em-
ployees by such technological improvement and the likelihood of disputes arising as
a result, the parties provided in article XXX of their contract that:
... the Company may lay off . . . such number of employees as, in its judg-
ment, have been rendered unnecessary thereby. If, at that time, the Union de-
sires to discuss with the Company the number of employees assigned to the
classifications directly pertaining to the automatic equipment referred to above,
the Company agrees to meet for that purpose. If an agreement cannot be reached
between the Company and the Union on said issue, the Union may, by giving a
60-day written notice to the Company, strike after the expiration of said 60 days
to enforce its position thereon. It is understood, however, that negotiations will
continue during said 60-day notice period. It is further understood that any
disagreement on said issue will not be the subject of arbitration or grievance
procedure of this contract. For all other purposes Article XXI, pertaining to
strike and lock-out and Article XIX, pertaining to grievance and arbitration,
shall be and continue in full force and effect.
As anticipated, the Respondent thereafter installed some automatic equipment and
on December 16, 1960, when the equipment became operational, notified the Union
that on January 8, 1961,4 it was laying off 11 named employees, selected on the basis
of plant seniority, whose jobs were thereby abolished.5 On January 18, the Union
served written notice on the Respondent pursuant to article XXX of their agreement
that it desired to negotiate the number of employees required to operate the new
2 The findings that follow are based on substantially uncontradicted testimony , except
where otherwise indicated Although there is a variance in testimony concerning certain
details and the sequence of events at particular meetings , such variance relates to matters
not particularly significant to the determination of the controlling issues in the case and
therefore need not be resolved
3 More accurately described , the conceded appropriate unit consists of
All production , operating, and maintenance employees at the Respondent 's Winnie,
Texas, plant , and all operating and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Port
Neches , Texas, dock, excluding all plant protection employees , professional emplo^ees,
maintenance pipefitters , their leadmen and helpers , pipefitting welders, their leadmen
and helpers , maintenance electricians , their leadmen and helpers , instrumentmen, their
leadmen and helpers, office and clerical employees , administrative and executive em-
ployees, foiemen , and supervisory and confidential employees
'All dates , unless otherwise indicated , relate to 1961.
5 Actually , the layoff memorandum listed 12 employees , although the testimony referred
to 11.
358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
equipment . In addition , the Union gave the Respondent 60 days' notice of its in-
tention to exercise its right to strike under that contractual provision in the event no
agreement was reached.6 Thereafter, between January 31 and March 16, the parties
held a series of 6 meetings 7 at which the layoff of the 11 employees, the effectiveness
of the new equipment, and the personnel required to operate it were thoroughly dis-
cussed. However, these negotiations produced no agreement. The Respondent was
firmly convinced that it did not need any more men to operate the new equipment
while the Union asserted with equal certainty that the new equipment displaced 2 em-
ployees at the most and that there was a point of compromise between 0 and 11 as to,
the number of laid-off employees who should be reemployed. It is noted that the Re-
spondent's good faith in these negotiations is not impugned; nor, for that matter, is
there any evidence that the Union performed its bargaining obligation other than
properly in furtherance of the interests of its constituents.
Since the 60-day strike notice previously given by the Union was about to expire
at midnight, March 20, and there was no visible prospect of settling the dispute, the
Union, following its established policy, offered at the last prestrike meeting on
March 16 to assist the Respondent in shutting down its plant. The Respondent,
however, declined the offer, indicating that it planned to continue operations during
the strike. For this reason, George W. Cowart, the Union's International repre-
sentative and chief negotiator, informed the Respondent's representatives that, as.
a "courtesy," he will give the Respondent 15 minutes' notice after midnight,
March 20, within which to take over the operations before the employees went out on,
strike. In preparation for such contingency, the Respondent, during the latter part
of the negotiations, recruited a standby crew consisting of supervisors and other
personnel from its Houston and New Ulm installations and made other arrange-
ments for their room and board. There is conflicting testimony as to whether the
Respondent objected at the March 16 meeting to the shortness of the Union's
proffered 15 minutes' "courtesy" notice. Earl D. Elliott, the Respondent's attorney
and one of its conferees, testified, contrary to witnesses for the General Counsel,
that he did protest and asked for 24 hours to bring in the necessary personnel to run
the plant.8 In view of the fact that the Union did not fix a specific time when it
would strike after March 20, it seems to me to be only logical that the Respondent
would ask for more time within which to take over operations, whether or not-
it was legally entitled to it. Indeed, this is indicated by the undisputed testimony
that at this meeting Elliott advised the Union that under the law and as he inter-
preted article XXX of the parties' collective-bargaining contract, the Union, if it
strikes at all, was obligated to do so within 72 hours after the expiration of the
60-day notice, which he regarded was a reasonable time. Although the union rep-
resentatives disagreed with that statement, Elliott's position reveals, at least, that-
the Respondent desired to minimize the surprise and uncertainty aspect of the Union's
threatened strike action, as well as the expense necessarily involved in maintaining
a standby crew in continual readiness, and would therefore naturally request more
than the 15 minutes' "courtesy" notice.
Following the March 16 meeting, the results of the discussions were reported to
the employees who voted to strike. The timing of the strike was left to the decision
of the workmen's committee which had participated in the negotiations with Inter-
national Representative Cowart. Thereafter, on March 28 about 11 p.m, when the-
third shift normally reported for work,e International Representative Cowart tele-
phoned R. T. Neville, general superintendent of the Winnie plant, informed him
that the employees were going on strike, and gave him 15 minutes within which to
relieve the strikers of their jobs. Apparently, by prearranged signal, Neville was
able to muster enough men to enter the plant to continue plant operations. It is
not contended that the employees actually left the plant in an unattended, dangerous
condition or that they otherwise caused damage to the plant by their walkout,
although the potentially explosive nature of the plant operations must be conceded.
After the employees were relieved of their functions by the replacements, they left-
the plant and began picketing.
6 No question is raised concerning compliance with the notice requirements of Section
8(d) of the Act
7 January 31, February 1, 2, and 14, and March 15 and 16
8 J R Nicar, a member of the Union's workmen's committee and negotiating team, testi-
fied that during the 1960 contract negotiations the Respondent objected to the 15 minutes'
notice the Union also offered the Respondent at that time before striking because it was in-
sufficient to enable it to secure personnel to take over operations
9 The Respondent conducts its operations around the clock
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 359
2. The April 18 meeting
On April 18, while the strike was in progress, Federal Conciliator Ray Majure,
brought the parties together in the hope of reaching agreement on the displaced
employee issue. However, neither party showed any disposition to recede from
its prestrike position.
3. The Union's application for reinstatement of the strikers on May 3; strikers
attempt to return to work on May 4
With the Respondent continuing its operations unabated despite the strike, and
its picket line not being respected by truckdrivers, the Union and the strikers became
convinced after 5 weeks that their strike was ineffective. Consequently, on May 3
the strikers voted to return to work. Thereupon, they removed the picket line and
at 2:25 p.m. International Representative Cowart and the workmen's committee,
consisting of Chairman A. T. Miles and members J. R. Nicar, Robert Devillier, Wil-
liam Van Norstrand, and alternate member, O. W. Little, appeared at the plant
office. There they met Earl D. Elliott, the Respondent's attorney; R. T. Neville,
general plant superintendent; R. M. Woolfolk, Jr., manager of manufacturing; and
Jesse Cating, assistant personnel and safety director. Cowart informed the Re-
spondent's officials that he was reporting the men back to work and simultaneously
presented the following letter signed by himself.
This is to advise that I am ordering Texas Gas employees at your Winnie
and Port Neches plants to return to work starting at 2:30 p.m. this date. I am
taking this action with the hope that it will create a better climate for ne-
gotiating the existing dispute. I am also notifying the U.S. Conciliation and
Mediation Commissioner Ray Majure of this action and advising him that the
Union is ready to meet and discuss the existing problem at his and your
convenience.
It is sincerely hoped that through negotiations, we may permanently resolve
this problem, thus eliminating the necessity of any future strike action.
After conferring privately among themselves, the Respondent's officials expressed
to the union representatives their concern over the implication of the Union's letter
of a renewed strike after the employees resumed work and the parties could not
settle their differences over the 11 laid-off employees. Neville bluntly questioned
Cowart about his strike intentions. Although there is a variance in the testimony
as to the precise words Cowart used in reply, it is clear that, in substance, he stated
that he returned the strikers to work with the idea of negotiating their basic dispute
and that, if the parties could not reach agreement, in all probability he would again
call the employees out on strike.1e It appears that at this point Elliott asserted
that article XXX of the parties' contract, previously quoted herein, was a "one-shot
affair," that it did not sanction a second strike, and that, having struck on March 28,
the Union had thereby exhausted its right to future strike action under that pro-
vision. During this discussion, Cowart also refused to accede to the Respondent's
request that the Union forgo its asserted right to strike until September 16, the
expiration date of the then current agreement, which still had 4i/2 months to run.
It is further undisputed that in the course of the discussions the Respondent's
representatives proposed that consideration be given to the strike issue and inquired
whether the Union had changed its position. In response, Cowart repeated, as he
had done at prior meetings, that he was amenable to compromise the number of
men to be reinstated at a figure between 0 and 11. The Respondent also suggested
that the Union defer reporting the men until the following morning at 7 o'clock
and alluded to the fact that certain operational changes had been made during the
strike which would require training some of the strikers. Before the meeting closed,
the Respondent's representatives again consulted among themselves and arranged an
evening conference between the Union and the Respondent with Federal Conciliator
Majure in attendance. The Respondent's representatives returned to the meeting
and reported that such arrangements were made with the Federal conciliator and the
Union agreed to meet in the evening. The Respondent indicated that at the evening
10 Cowart candidly testified that to have answered otherwise would have undermined his
bargaining position. See N L R.B v Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO
(Prudential Ins. Co.), 361 II S 477, where the Supreme Court indicated that the strike
weapon is necessary for effective collective bargaining However, I doubt the accuracy of
the testimony that Cowart also stated that he had the right to take the men in and out
in a 24-hour period Obviously, such a statement would scarcely be prudent or serve the
interests of employees whose reinstatement he was attempting to secure
360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
session it would give its answer whether or not to reinstate the strikers , none of
whom admittedly was permanently replaced.
The parties reconvened in the evening , with Federal Conciliator Majure pre-
siding. At this meeting, the Respondent presented the Union with a letter setting
forth the terms under which it was willing to reinstate the strikers . In pertinent
part , this letter stated:
The Company is not denying to its employees an opportunity to return to their
jobs. Their jobs are available and we accept their return with the understand-
ing and on the condition that: 1) the issue over which the strike occurred is
settled for the duration of the term of the existing contract without re-
employment of any of the men laid off after the installation of the automatic
equipment ; 2) that the strike rights granted to the Union under Article XXX
of the existing contract have been exhausted and that Article XXI, Section 1,
of said contract 11 shall be in full force and effect on the employees ' resumption
of work.
The Respondent's attorney , Elliott, read this letter aloud to the assembled group
and discussion ensued. Although one of the conditions for reinstatement required
the Union's concession that the displaced employee dispute be deemed settled for the
duration of the contract , the Respondent , nevertheless , expressed its readiness to
resume negotiations on this issue and to review all the relevant information it had
concerning the operation of the new equipment . It is quite evident , however, that
the Respondent was not receding from its insistence on acceptance of its conditions
before reinstating the strikers . Cowart declined the invitation for the asserted
reason that he did not come prepared to consider the 11-man dispute and only
expected to work out schedules with the Respondent for the strikers ' return to work.
To a large extent discussion centered about the Respondent 's demand that the
Union agree to refrain from striking for the remaining term of the existing contract
as a condition for reinstating the strikers . In substance , the Respondent argued that
such an agreement was necessary to maintain stability in its operations and was in
harmony with the sense of article XXX which sanctioned only one strike , which the
Union had already called, to enforce its demand for the reemployment of the dis-
placed employees . Cowart, on the other hand, denied that article XXX prohibited
it from striking again if further negotiations proved to be unproductive.12 The
Respondent , however , made it plain that it could not agree with the Union 's position
because it meant that it would be placed on 15 minutes' notice to bring in replace-
ments to operate the plant if the Union decided to strike again.13
In his criticism of the Respondent 's proposals , Cowart pointed out that the
Respondent unjustifiably presupposed that the Union intended to "yo-yo" the
Company by taking the men in and out . He expressly disavowed such an intention
and refused to sign the Respondent 's proposed reinstatement agreement Elliott,
in turn, sought to justify the Respondent 's demand for a no-strike assurance for
the duration of the contract by referring to information he had obtained that during
a strike at the Jefferson Chemical Company plant the previous year Cowart had
given that company written assurance that, while negotiations were in progress, he
would not resume the strike for 30 days after the employees returned to work.
Cowart denied that he ever signed such a commitment for any company but admitted
that he had orally agreed to a 30-day strike suspension . However, there is no evi-
dence that the Respondent requested the same assurance ; on the contrary , it appears
that the Respondent was determined not to reinstate the strikers on any terms
short of those contained in its letter . Although at some point in the discussions
Elliott suggested that the strikers return to work and familiarize themselves with
certain operational changes that were made during the strike and thus be in a
better position to negotiate the 11-man issue, it is clear that the Respondent did
"Article XXI, section 1, provided that "there shall be no strike, stoppage , or slowdown
on the part of the Union, or its members , and there shall be no lockout of the employees
by the Company."
12 For the reasons stated previously , I do not believe that Cowart at the evening meet-
ing also asserted the right to take employees in and out on strike as many times as he
desired
131 find , contrary to testimony of several witnesses for the General Counsel , that the
Respondent did bring up the subject of the 15-minute notice at least at this, if not also
at the earlier , meeting on May 3 Not only was this subject mentioned in the Respondent's
letter containing its proposed conditions for reinstatement but also the 15-minute notice
was indicated by the Union ' s past practice of granting the Respondent such "courtesy."
In fact , on cross-examination by the Respondent's counsel , A T M iles, the chairman of
the workmen ' s committee , corroborated the Respondent ' s testimony in this respect.
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 361
not intend to withdraw its conditions for reinstatement. The meeting closed with
Cowart rejecting the Respondent's terms for reinstatement and asserting that the
strikers were going to report to work the next morning.
The next morning (May 4), beginning about 7 o'clock and at various other times
during the day, the strikers reported for work in the clockroom of the plant. The
first group was met by Elliott who told them substantially the same thing as that
contained in the notice that the Respondent later posted on the door for the benefit
of other strikers seeking to return to work. This notice read:
Notice to striking O.C.A.W. employees of Texas Gas Corporation:
Your representatives have offered to return you to work on a basis that is
not acceptable to the company. The company feels that under all the circum-
stances it should have certain minimum protective assurances at the time you
resume work. While our representatives have been in negotiation with your
representatives, they have not seen fit to give us these assurances. Until they are
forthcoming, we feel compelled to continue our present arrangement for
operating our plant.
The strikers thereupon left the plant.
4. The May 10 meeting; resumption of picketing on May 16
On May 10 Federal Conciliator Majure brought the parties together for further
exploratory talks to settle the underlying displaced employee dispute. This was a
short and unproductive meeting where both sides exchanged previously held views,
with neither side receding from its position. The Respondent's attorney, Elliott,
also suggested, as he had done on an earlier occasion, that the strikers return
to work and thus acquire first-hand operational knowledge of the new equipment
which would be helpful in the negotiations However, the Respondent did not
indicate that it was no longer insisting on its previously imposed conditions for
reinstatement.
On May 16, picketing was resumed at the Respondent's premises with signs
announcing that the strikers were locked out.
5. Individual applications to return to work; filing of unfair labor practice
charges by the Union
On May 5, O. R. Shockley, a striking employee, applied for reinstatement on his
own initiative. Elliott, in the presence of General Plant Superintendent Neville and
Manager Woolfolk, informed Shockley, in substance, that the Respondent had
recently rejected the Union's offer to return the strikers to work because the Union
refused to agree to refrain from striking for the balance of the contract term. As a
condition for reinstating Shockley, the Respondent required him to agree in writing,
which he did, that "his return would be permanent and that he would continue to
work even if picket lines were reestablished." Although Shockley's commitment
is not expressly limited to the contract term, it is, however, implicit in the entire
document he signed. Shockley thereupon returned to work.
The same procedure was followed when striking employees G. R. Falke and
W. E. Meschke individually applied for reinstatement on May 13 and 15, respectively.
They, too, were reinstated only after signing a document similar to that signed
by Shockley.
Another employee, Maurice Shaver, who was on sick leave when the strike began
and continued in that status until May 15, visited the plant that day to arrange for
his return to work and was told to secure a medical release. After obtaining one,
Shaver telephoned General Plant Superintendent Neville, informed him of this fact,
and inquired when he could report to work. Neville told him that be could not
return unless he signed the same type of statement as that signed by Shockley and
Falke, promising to refrain from striking until September 16, which was the expira-
tion date of the contract, and to cross the picket line if one was reestablished. Shaver
declined to do so and thereupon joined the strike and engaged in picketing when
it was resumed on May 16.
On the latter date, the Union filed charges with the Board in which it alleged that
the Respondent unlawfully locked out the striking employees when they applied for
reinstatement, and thereafter permitted certain strikers to return to work while
denying others the same right.14
14 This charge was later amended on June 23 to particularize the respects in which the
Respondent allegedly violated the Act.
362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
v6. The Union's renewed application for reinstatement; the Respondent's May 30
revised condition for reinstatement; the June 2 and 13 meetings
On May 25, the Union sent the Respondent a letter, renewing its earlier request
-for the reinstatement of the strikers. In response, the Respondent, on May 30,
-wrote the Union as follows:
. .. We construe your offer as well as your previous offer of May 3, 1961,
as a conditional offer to return said employees to their former jobs which would
severely hamper the Company's operation.
While we take the position that your strike on March 28, 1961, was in viola-
tion of the contract, having occurred more than a reasonable time after the
maturing of your right to strike under Article XXX, and while we further
take the position that, having struck, the employees, upon their return to the
plant, would have exhausted their right to strike under Article XXX, we are
willing on the condition that we are not waiving the right to assert the foregoing
positions in any situation where they would be relevant, for the employees to
return to work provided you and the Committee agree that the employees will
not again go on a strike or strikes without giving us a minimum of five (5)
days' notice prior to the time the employees walk out each time a strike is called.
Following the Union's receipt of this latest proposal, the parties conferred on
-June 2. Elliott explained the import of the new proposal, the Respondent's desire
to negotiate, and its need for 5 days' advance notice to strike to enable it to make
-preparations to take over operations without interruption if resumed negotiations on
the 11-man issue failed. Although the 5-day strike notice proposal was acceptable
to the Union, International Representative Cowart expressed concern over the
language in the letter in which the Respondent reserved its position that the original
strike was in violation of contract and that article XXX did not sanction further
strikes.15 He expressed doubt whether his acceptance of the proposal in toto might
not be construed as agreement with the Respondent's position.16 For this reason,
Cowart deferred acceptance until he consulted the Union's counsel. It is also undis-
puted that at this meeting the Respondent indicated its desire to have the strikers
return to work and acquire familiarity with the new equipment, which, in turn, would
be valuable in the later negotiations.
The next meeting of the parties occurred on June 13. Cowart reported that he had
-not yet received from the Union's counsel a written opinion regarding the Respond-
ent's May 30 proposal and stated that he would notify the Respondent as soon as he
did. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to discuss the displaced employee dispute and
adjourned the meeting without reaching agreement on the subject.
7. The Union's acceptance of the May 30 reinstatement proposal; the
June 19 meeting and further revisions
After International Representative Cowart received the long-awaited legal opinion,
he called a meeting of the members who voted to accept the Respondent's May 30
reinstatement proposal. On June 16, Cowart notified the Respondent of this fact
but the Respondent asked for another conference.
On June 19, the parties met again with Federal Conciliator Ray Majure in attend-
ance. Cowart reported the Union's acceptance of the Respondent's May 30 condi-
tions for reinstatement. However, the Respondent's attorney, Elliott, stated that
certain changes had to be made in the Respondent's latest proposal because of infor-
mation he had received in the meantime that Cowart had told employees that he
intended to use the 5-day strike notice to harass the Respondent by serving the 5-day
strike notice and then either refrain from striking after the Respondent had made
necessary preparations to operate the plant with replacements or go out on strike
and return to work after a few hours. Cowart denied the charge 17 or that he had
any such intention, although he indicated that the Respondent's last proposal itself
permitted repeated strikes. However, he stated that if the Respondent desired to
make changes in its proposal to do so in writing and that he would then decide whether
15 As indicated previously, this was the Respondent's consistent position in its earlier
discussions with the Union. In addition, at the time of this meeting, the Union had already
filed charges in this case
le It is conceded that the Respondent's proposal actually did not impose such a condi-
tion for reinstatement of the strikers.
17 No evidence was produced as to the truth of the information.
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 363
to acecpt them. Thereupon, the parties recessed and Elliott drafted in longhand an
agreement interpreting the May 30 proposal, as follows:
(1) The striking employees of the Union [sic] agree to accept the Company's
proposal contained in said letter of May 30, 1961, to Mr. George W. Cowart.
(2) Pursuant to said agreement the Union agrees to give the Company a five
(5) day written notice prior to any strike called by the Union and that upon the
expiration of said five (5) days the Union shall immediately proceed to strike
unless an agreement has been reached between the parties.
(3) This offer is accepted with the understanding that the rights acquired
under it will be exercised in good faith for the purpose of notifying the Com-
pany of the intended occurrence of a strike in good faith called. It not being
accepted with the idea, nor will it be so used, of using said right for the purpose
of creating surprise, uncertainty, or to keep the Company off balance or for any
other form of harassment.
(4) If a strike should occur pursuant to such (5) day notice, the Company
reserves the right to take such action, if any, as it thinks justified under the cir-
cumstances if the Union seeks to return the employees to the plant without the
issue involved in the strike being completely resolved.
The Union found fault with paragraph No. 2 of this argeement because it required
the Union to strike once it gave the 5-day notice, despite the fact that the parties
might be on the verge of agreement on the 11-man dispute. Elliott replied that
realistically the parties could in such a case stipulate to cancel or extend the strike
notice. The Union also objected to paragraph No. 4 since, as drafted, it jeopardized
the employees' right to return to work if they exercised the right to strike under the
5-day notice. Eliliot explained that the purpose of that provision was to preserve
the rights the Respondent had previously asserted in the event employees went in
and out on strike. This meeting ended with nothing being settled respecting the
strikers' return to work.
The next day Elliott delivered a revised draft of the final proposed agreement in
which he changed paragraph No. 2 to the Union's satisfaction 18 but made no change
to overcome the Union's objection to paragraph No. 4.
8. Strikers return to work
No further action was taken on the Respondent's revised proposals. On June 30,
the Respondent wrote the Union that, in accordance with the Respondent's letter of
May 30, which the Union accepted on June 16, employees may return to work be-
ginning July 1, pursuant to attached schedules. The strikers thereupon returned to
work.
9. Solicitation of a striker to return to work
There is only one incident alleged where management solicited a striker to return
to work during the strike. According to the uncontradicted and credited testimony of
Howard M. Jones, a striking employee, during the latter part of April, General Plant
Superintendent Neville called 'him on the telephone and told him that he (Neville)
understood that Jones wanted to return to work. Jones replied that he was not inter-
ested in returning, that he had more respect for the Union, and, as a long-time mem-
ber, would not let it down. Apparently, in response, Neville stated that Jones was
not loyal to the Company if he did not come back and indicated that the Company
was furnishing food, clothing, and shelter to those working in the plant. In the
course of their conversation, Neville also told Jones that Shockley, another striker,
was going to visit Jones at his home. About a half hour later, Shockley arrived with
his wife. Despite Shockley's efforts to persuade Jones to return to work with him,
Jones was not persuaded to abandon the strike. As discussed earlier in the Inter-
mediate Report, Shockley returned to work on May 5.
B. Analysis-Conclusions
1. Contentions of the parties
The General Counsel and the Union contend that the foregoing evidence estab-
lishes that the Respondent unlawfully locked out its striking employees and there-
after individually bargained and reinstated some of them after rejecting the Union's
efforts to secure the reinstatement of the strikers as a group, and that such conduct
"Paragraph No 2 was changed to require the Union to strike "unless an apparent
good faith reason exists for not doing so 11
364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violated Section 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Specifically, they argue that, al-
though concededly the striking employees were not permanently replaced, the Re-
spondent unlawfully rejected their unconditional applications for reinstatement on
May 3 and at other times thereafter, but imposed, instead, conditions which were
neither warranted by the parties' contract nor by the existence of critical operational
problems or the hazard of unusual economic loss. In fact, they further argue, the
May 3 conditions were actually intended to force the Union to surrender its right to
engage in effective collective bargaining over the displaced employee issue rather than
to afford the Respondent reasonable advance notice to continue operations in the
event the Union decided to strike again after resumed negotiations failed. The
General Counsel and the Union also urge that the Respondent's 5-day strike proposal
was an unreasonable and unlawful condition for reinstatement, although the Union
had accepted it. Lastly, they contend that the Respondent's solicitation of Jones, a
striking employee, to return to work was independently violative of the Act.
The Respondent, on the other hand, denies that its refusal to reinstate the employ-
ees, except on its own terms, amounted to unfair labor practices. In support of its
position, the Respondent argues, in substance, that: (a) the Union's applications for
the reinstatement of the strikers were conditional and made in bad faith for the pur-
pose of regaining its surprise strike weapon to be used to compel the Respondent to
yield on the displaced employee issue; (b) the strikers lost protection of the Act be-
cause their strike on March 28 was in breach the contract in that it was called more
than 72 hours after the expiration of the Union's 60-day strike notice, and therefore
was not called within a reasonable time contemplated by article XXX of the contract;
(c) they similarly forfeited their employee status because they so timed their walkout
as to create the greatest hazards to life and property; and (d) the strikers were not en-
titled to reinstatement by reason of the Union's anticipatory breach of contract on
May 3, when it applied for their reinstatement, because the Union asserted, contrary to
the terms of article XXX, that it had a right, and intended to exercise it, to call a sec-
ond strike if further negotiations on the 11-man issue were unsuccessful. In addition,
the Respondent urges that the lockout was a permissible defensive measure taken for
legitimate operational and business reasons without union animus. In any event, it
further argues, it was justified, under the circumstance herein, in using the lockout
weapon to force the Union to accede to its position on the, 11 -man issue. Withrespect
to the individual reinstatements of the three striking employees (Shockley, Falke,
and Meschke) and the offer to a fourth employee (Shaver), the Respondent
maintains that no violation was committed as the terms for reinstatement were sub-
stantially the same as those offered the Union 19 and were made without discrimination
or intent to impngn the Union's representative status.
2. The Respondent's May 3 conditions for reinstatement as violations
of the Act
As indicated above, the employees engaged in an economic strike for mutual aid
and protection to enforce the Union's demand that the Respondent reemploy at least
some of the employees laid off as a result of the installation of automatic machinery.
As economic strikers, the striking employees, under settled law,20 retained their
status of employees entitled to reinstatement on their unconditional application,
unless they were permanently replaced or other reasons sufficient in law justified
rejecting their application. Since it is conceded that no striker was permanently
replaced, the threshold question to be decided is whether the Union's reinstatement
application on behalf of the strikers was unconditional.
It is clear from the Union's letter presented to the Respondent on May 3 and the
discussions that ensued that the Union was offering to return the strikers to work
without any qualification but with the "hope" of thereafter resuming negotiations on
the 11-man issue in a "better climate" and of resolving this problem without "the
necessity of [taking] any future strike action." Significantly, the Union did not
make its reinstatement offer contingent upon any event or concession. Rather, it
sought thereby to reestablish the situation existing before the inception of the strike.
Moreover, the evidence convinces me that, prompted by the demonstrated ineffective-
ness of their strike, the striking employees were willing and ready to return to work
with a genuine desire to continue their former working relationship with the Re-
spondent and not for the purpose of securing a tactical advantage over the Re-
spondent to enable it to engage in a surprise strike in the future, as the Respondent
asserts It is true that International Representative Cowart stated durin'z his dis-
cussions with the Respondent concerning the Union's future strike intentions that,
1° Frcent the concession on the 11-may dispute to which only the Union could agree.
11 N.L R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co , 304 U S 333
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 365
if further negotiations after the employees' return to work failed to produce agree-
ment on the 11-man issue, in all probability the Union would strike again. However,
I do not regard Cowart's statement as reflecting upon the sincerity of the Union's
offer to return the strikers to work or that the offer was merely a token one designed
to interfere with the Respondent's operations. It appears to me that Cowart's candid
assertion was essentially an accepted bargaining technique which realistically recog-
nizes that the strike weapon is a necessary concomitant of collective bargaining.21
Moreover, whether or not the employees would actually authorize or support another
strike, and if one were called, who would support it, is highly speculative, particu-
larly in view of their prior unsuccessful strike venture. Accordingly, I find that the
Union's offer constituted an unconditional application for reinstatement within the
intendment of the Act and governing precedent.22
The Respondent, nevertheless, contends that the strikers were not entitled to
reinstatement, except on the terms embodied in its May 3 letter,23 because they lost
their statutory protection by going on strike more than 72 hours after the expiration
of the Union's 60-day strike notice in violation of article XXX of their then current
collective-bargaining agreement. I find no merit in this contention. I find nothing
in article XXX which either expressly or by implication places a 72-hour or other
time limit on the Union's right to strike 60 days after its notice. While a time
limitation would be to the obvious advantage of the Respondent and would spare
it the uncertainty of a possible strike and the expense of maintaining a standby
crew to take over operations during this period of uncertainty, no such limitation
was actually provided. Article XXX simply states that "the Union may, by giving a
60-day written notice to the Company, strike after the expiration of said 60 days
to enforce its position thereon." Indeed, there is no evidence, assuming, arguendo,
its admissibility to vary the express language of article XXX, that the parties actually
intended to limit the Union's strike rights when that provision was negotiated in
1960. On the contrary, that provision was the result of compromise and a last-
minute effort to avert a strike with no thought then being given to the problem
herein. It is axiomatic that restrictions on employees' right to strike for mutual
aid and protection-and the strategy of timing is undoubtedly an integral part of
this right-will not readily be inferred in the absence of clear and unequivocal
language. And this fundamental requirement was not satisfied here by the Re-
spondent's statement to the Union at their last prestrike meeting on March 16 that,
if the Union struck at all, the contract required it to do so within 72 hours after
the 60-day strike notice expired. Such a unilateral interpretation of the contract,
rejected as it was by the other contracting party, may not supplant the parties'
unqualified agreement. In view of the foregoing, I find no basis for concluding that
the strikers' walkout was in breach of contract.
Equally untenable is the Respondent's argument that the strikers forfeited their
protected status because they went on strike about 11:15 p.m. on March 28, when
there was the greatest likelihood of danger to life and property. In support of this
contention, the Respondent relies on the principle of the Marshall Car Wheel case 24
where the Board stated that employees' right to engage in concerted activities "is
limited by the duty to take reasonable precautions to protect the employer's physical
plant from such imminent damage as foreseeably would result from their sudden
cessation of work." I find that the strikers did not breach this duty. As discussed
n See, for example, N L.R B v Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO (Pru-
dential Ins Co ), 361 U S 477.
22 Lion Oil Company, 109 NLRB 680, enfd. as modified 245 F. 2d 376 (CA 8) ; James
Thompson & Co, Inc, 100 NLRB 456; Seven Up Bottling Company of Miame, Inc, 92
NLRB 1622, enfd as modified 196 F. 2d 424 (CA 5) ; Pecheur Lozenge Co, Inc, 98
NLRB 496, enfd as modified 209 F 2d 393 (CA. 2). The latter decision does not support
the Respondent's contention that the Union's application was conditional because It re-
served the right to resume negotiations on the matter over which it struck The Board
and the court in the cited case stated that the Union's reinstatement offer was uncondi-
tional because it indicated that the employees were willing to accept the existing condi-
tions of employment and forgo their unilaterally imposed term of employment, i.e.,
elimination of overtime. In the present case, however, the strikers sought to reestablish
the status quo See also Utah Oil Refining Company, 108 NLRB 1392, where implicit In
that decision is the holding that the union's reinstatement application was unconditional,
even though the union rejected the employer's "bare request for a limited no-strike assur-
ance" against a second strike after the employees' return to work
z3 As discussed hereinafter, these terms were later abandoned in Its May 30 letter and
a new one was Imposed.
2'Marshall Car Wheel and Foundry Co of Marshall, Texas, Inc, 107 NLRB 314, 315.
366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
above, when negotiations broke down at the last prestrike meeting on March 16,
the Union proffered its assistance to the Respondent to shut down the plant in an
orderly manner. This offer the Respondent declined. The Union, thereupon,
notified the Respondent that, after its 60-day strike notice expired on March 20, it
intended to give the Respondent 15 minutes' "courtesy" notice before striking in
order to enable the Respondent to bring in its standby crew to replace the strikers.
It is undisputed that on March 28 the Union served such notice on the Respondent
and the employees did not leave the plant until they were relieved by the Respondent's
standby personnel. While the Respondent was unquestionably inconvenienced by
the strike and under great pressure in rounding up its replacement forces, there is
no evidence that the striking employees left the plant in a dangerous condition or
that the Respondent was unable to cope with the situation created by the strike.
In view of the foregoing, I find that the strikers did not lose the protection the Act
affords economic strikers.25
Another ground urged by the Respondent in vindication of its refusal to reinstate
the striking employees, except on its terms, is that the Union was guilty of an
anticipatory breach of the parties' 1960 collective-bargaining contract. It bases its
contention on the fact that at the May 3 meetings International Representative
Cowart asserted that the Union had the right to, and in all probability would, strike
again after the employees returned to work, if further negotiations on the 11 -man
issue did not result in an agreement. The weakness of this argument is that it is
premised on too many unsubstantiated assumptions, not the least of which is the
assumption that, despite their earlier futile strike experience, all the employees
would authorize or join a second strike. It has long been established that proof of
individual wrongdoing is a prerequisite to disqualify a striker for reinstatement.26
Neither misconduct of other strikers nor mere suspicion of wrongdoing is sufficient
to deny employees this right. How much more vulnerable is the Respondent's
position here, where its suspicions rest only on the speculative possibilities that
further negotiations will not produce an agreement, that the employees will vote to
walk out again, and that all the employees will honor the strike call. Accordingly,
I find that the Union's alleged anticipatory breach of a no-strike contract may not
serve to deprive the strikers of their statutory right to reinstatement
Quite apart from the foregoing, I am unable to find any language in article XXX,
the relevant contractual provision, which precludes the Union from resuming the
strike under the circumstances indicated. On the contrary, article XXX, without
qualification, permits the Union to strike "to enforce its position" with respect to
a dispute occasioned by the installation of automatic equipment and expressly
exempts such action from the no-strike prohibitions of the contract. Significantly,
this unqualified reservation of the right to strike is consistent with the contractual
provision which bars the use of such peaceful and desirable methods as grievance
and arbitration procedures for the adjustment of disputes arising out of technological
improvement 27 but which are available only to other disputes subject to the no-
strike prohibitions.28
In these circumstances, and as the contract does not contain clear and unmis-
takable language to the contrary, the Union's assertion of a right to strike again
in the event resumed negotiations failed did not conflict with its contractual obliga-
tion and, for this reason, did not constitute an anticipatory breach of an agreement
entitling the Respondent to deny the strikers reinstatement.
25 In any event, the Respondent did not deny the strikers reemployment for such alleged
breach of duty or contract As later discussed, the strikers were denied reinstatement on
May 3 for the reason that the Union refused to accede to the Respondent's conditions that
it concede that the strike issue was settled for the duration of the contract and that it
agree to refrain from striking during that time
re N L R B. v. Marshall Car Wheel and Foundry Co of Marshall. Texas, Inc .
218 F. 2d
409, 418 (C A. 5) ; N L R B v International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL
(B V D Company, Ina) 237 F 2d 545 550 (C A.D C ).
21Article XXX states. In part, that "lilt is further understood that any disagreement
on said [automation) Issue will not be the subject of the arbitration and grievance pro-
cedure of this contract "
28 Section 4 of article XXI entitled "Strike and Lockout" provides that "The parties to
this Agreement agree that this contract provides a method for settling disputes and griev-
ances arising in connection therewith, and they agree to follow the grievance and/or
arbitration procedure set forth herein in the settlement of all disputes arising hereunder "
This provision reflects the common industrial practice of exchanging the right to strike
for a grievance or arbitration procedure for the settlement of labor disputes
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 367
Notwithstanding the normal right of economic strikers to reinstatement, the Re-
spondent contends that it was privileged to lock out its employees temporarily
because the Union refused to agree to forgo bargaining over the reemployment of
the 11 displaced employees and to refrain from striking for the duration of the
contract. While these conditions are clearly interrelated and involved an abandon-
ment of statutory rights, they also required the Union to surrender rights it claimed,
and which I have already found existed, under the contract. These conditions for
reinstatement, the Respondent urges, were imposed, not because of union animus,
but solely in furtherance of legitimate operational and business objectives which
were necessary in order to avoid the uncertainty, standby expense, and incon-
venience of a surprise strike dangerous to its volatile operations, which the Respond-
ent had previously experienced on March 28, when the employees first went on
strike. As shown earlier in this report, the strike was called on 15 minutes' notice
near midnight, 8 days after the Union's 60-day strike notice had expired. Although
the Respondent had the undisputed right to operate its plant during the strike,29 it
is equally clear that the Union, with responsible regard for its obligations, did offer
to assist the Respondent in shutting down the plant in an orderly and safe manner,
and exercised its statutory and contractual right to strike only after the Respondent
had rejected its offer. Indeed, no evidence was adduced that the employees even
left the plant before they were relieved by the replacements.
I do not doubt that the lockout was not prompted by a specific desire on the part
of the Respondent to subvert the Union or to interfere with the employees' rights
which the Act guarantees to them. However, subjective intent to commit an unfair
labor practice is not essential to a finding of a violation under the Act where the
necessary effect of the Respondent's conduct is to discriminate against employees as
to encourage or discourage union membership or otherwise to interfere with em-
ployees' statutory rights.30 It is also clear that the Union's acceptance of the
Respondent's conditions of reinstatement would undoubtedly serve the Respondent's
interests. But the fact remains that these conditions did interfere with the employees'
right to reinstatement which they otherwise had and the right to resume bargaining
over the 11-man issue in a more propitious atmosphere, striking, if necessary, when
negotiations failed. As indicated above these contingencies were highly proble-
matical. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that on May 3 circustances had not so
changed as a result of the intervening strike that further bargaining was then futile 31
Indeed, the Respondent itself recognized its bargaining obligation by offering to
negotiate the 11-man issue on May 3, and by actually negotiating thereafter on the
subject, although adhering to its refusal to reinstate the employees in the interim.
Furthermore, the Respondent suggested at meetings with the Union that the em-
ployees return to work, albeit on its terms, and thereby familiarize themselves with
new operational changes that were made during the strike.
In the final analysis, a critical and delicate question is here presented whether
special circumstances existed on May 3 which justified the measures taken by the
Respondent to safeguard its interests to the detriment of the employees' rights.32
The Board, with court approval, has recognized that the right of employees to engage
in collective bargaining and to strike in support of their legitimate economic demands
is not absolute. These rights in many instances must be balanced against the
employer's right to protect his business interests against loss. Accordingly, the
Board has held that an employer may temporarily lock out his employees, even
even though such conduct impinges on legitimate employee rights, as a protective
measure to guard against unusual operative problems or hazards or economic loss
likely to follow from a threatened or imminent strike 33 Ordinary business inter-
=" N L R B v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co , 304 U S 333
" The Radio Officers Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL (A H Bull
Steamship Company) v. N L R B , 347 U S 17; Republic Aviation Corporation v. N L R.B.,
324 U , S. 793; N L R B v Illinois Toot Works, 153 F 2d 811 (C A 7).
n N L R B. v United States Cold Storage Corporation, 203 F. 2d 924, 928 (C A. 5),
enfg 96 NLRB 1108
32 In other contexts, the Board and courts have held that an employer's economic con-
cern does not justify conduct otherwise violative of the Act. See e g, N L R B v Hudson
Motor Car Company, 128 F 2d 528, 532-533 (C A 6) ; and NLRB v Gluck Brewing
Company and Bach Transfer and Storage Company, 144 F. 2d 847, 853-854 (CA 8),
cited with apparent approval in Cusano d/b/a American Shuffleboard Co. v N L R B , 190 F.
2d 898, 903, footnote 7 (CA. 3).
31 Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation, 121 NLRB 334, enfd. 270 F 2d 40 (CA 3),
cert. denied 361 U S 917; American Brake Shoe Company, Ramapo Aar Division, 116
NLRB 820, set aside 244 F. 2d 489 (CA. 7), on disagreement with the Board's application
368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ruptions or loss normally incident to a strike are insufficient to invoke a lockout.
Plainly, each case must rest on its own facts.
Although the lockout problem generally arises in the context of a plant shutdown,
the principles noted above are equally appropriate to the situation here involved.34
Tested by these principles, I find that the Respondent was not justified in locking out
its striking employees because the Union refused to waive bargaining on the dis-
placed employee issue or to forgo its right to strike for the duration of the contract.
In my opinion, the Respondent's insistence on the bargainig waiver cannot conceiv-
ably be viewed as a necessary defensive measure to safeguard against unusual opera-
tive problems or hazards or economic loss. On the contrary, it reveals a determi-
nation to utilize the lockout as an offensive weapon to force the Union to accept
its bargaining position for the duration of the contract.35 Nor do I find that the strike
waiver demanded by the Respondent was essential for the protection of its plant
against danger of a sudden surprise strike. It appears to me that if the safety of its
plant were the Respondent's sole concern, it could at least have asked the Union
for reasonable advance strike notice, as it thereafter did on May 30, which would
enable it to take the necessary preparatory steps to continue the operations in the
event the Union struck again 36 However, it is quite clear that until May 30 the Re-
spondent was not interested in anything short of a union waiver of its right to bargain
and strike for the duration of the contract. Finally, it is idle to claim that the ex-
pense that the Respondent might incur in maintaining a standby crew is an unusual
business consideration justifying a lockout. Such expense was plainly for the bene-
fit of the Respondent in its desire to operate the plant.
Granting that it was motivated in locking out its employees on May 3 in order
to force acceptance of its bargaining position on the 11-man dispute, the Respondent
contends that it did not thereby violate the Act. I find no merit in this contention.
As discussed above, the employees went out on strike on March 28 after an impasse
was reached in negotiations. Following 37 days of striking, the strikers became
convinced of the futility of their efforts and therefore decided to return to work on
May 3 and continue negotiations in a peaceful setting. However, the Respondent de-
clined their unconditional offer to return unless they first surrendered on the 11-man
issue for the duration of the contract.
In these circumstances, I find that a sufficient change in the bargaining picture
resulted from the strike and its later abandonment which obligated the Respondent
to explore with the Union the possibilities of settling their dispute. Indeed, as in-
dicated previously, the Respondent recognized this obligation and expressed a will-
ingness to negotiate, although it refused to do so if it permitted the employees to
return to work. In addition, the Respondent stated at a subsequent meeting that it
had made operational changes during the strike and urged the employees to return to
work-although again on its terms-and thus familiarize themselves with the new
operations and be better equipped to negotiate the disputed automation problem.
The net effect of the Respondents' position was that it was willing to negotiate with-
out the reinstatement of the strikers but insisted that the Union accept its bargaining
demand as the price of reinstatement. In my opinion, this bartering of employee
rights exceeded the limits of the legitimate use of the lockout. Moreover, the Board
has already held, in Morand and Davis Furniture cases,37 that, even in the face of a
bargaining impasse, the Act does not permit an employer temporarily to lock out his
employees to advance his bargaining position. The Board there pointed out that the
right of an employer to lock out is not a necessary corollary of the right of employees
to strike and concluded that the Act prohibited the employer from bringing economic
pressure on the Union and its supporters for the purpose of breaking the bargaining
impasse.
of controlling principles ; Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., et at, 96 NLRB 268 ; International
Shoe Company, 93 NLRB 907; Duluth Bottling Association, et al.. 48 NLRB 1315; see
also N L R B. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 443, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL (Buffalo Linen Supply
Co ), 353 U S 87
as International Shoe Company, supra.
15 Whether the use of the lockout weapon for such a purpose is permissible will be later
discussed.
35 Whether or not the Respondent was at least entitled to a 60-day notice under its con-
tract if the Union called a second strike was not even raised by the parties in their
discussions
sz Morand Brothers Beverage Co., et al, 99 NLRB 1448, 1461-1466 ; Albert Leonard,
et al., d/b/a Davis Furniture Co, et at, 100 NLRB 1016, 1018-1021
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 369
The Respondent, however, cites the Supreme Court's decision in Insurance Agents' 38
as supporting its right to use the lockout weapon to force acceptance of its bargaining
position. I do not so read that decision. That case was solely concerned with the
question whether a union's harassing tactics, which the Act neither protected nor pro-
hibited, alone established bad-faith bargaining within the meaning of Section 8(b) (3).
Nothing in that case suggests that an employer may, with impunity, engage in acts
violative of other sections simply because they were done in a bargaining context.
Indeed, in the Truck Drivers case,39 which involved a lockout, the Supreme Court
deliberately refrained from "defin[ing] the limits of the legitimate use of the lock-
out" because it presented "delicate" problems requiring the "balancing of the con-
flicting legitimate interests" of the employees and the employer, which "Congress
committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board subject to limited judicial
review."
In sum, I conclude, on balancing the opposing interests of the employees and the
Respondent, that the Respondent was not justified in locking out its employees on
May 3 and thereafter because the Union refused to accede to the conditions for re-
instatement imposed by the Respondent. For this reason, I find that the Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to
bargain collectively and to strike in furtherance of their economic demands and
thereby violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. This conduct, I further find, consti-
tuted discrimination within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act since it neces-
sarily tended to discourage support of the Union and concerted activities for mutual
aid and protection. The fact that the Respondent did not have a specific intent to
undermine the Union and employee rights is not material. This is "but an appli-
cation of the common law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable conse-
quences of his conduct." 40 However, since the Respondent offered to bargain, and,
actually did bargain, with the Union, although still refusing to reinstate the employees,
I find that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by reason of the fore-
going conduct.
3. The Respondent's revised offer of reinstatement on May 30 as violations of the Act.
As fully discussed above, the Respondent adhered to its original conditions for re-
instatement until May 30 when it sent the Respondent its revised proposal. The only
condition it required the Union to agree to was that the Union give the Respondent-,, a minimum of five (5) days' notice prior to the time the employees walk out each
time a strike is called " In this letter, the Respondent also expressly reserved its
right to assert its positions regarding the Union's strike rights under their contract
"in any situation where they would be relevant." Apparently, the Respondent had the-
instant proceeding in mind since charges were then pending. Although the proposal
was generally agreeable to the Union, it was troubled by the Respondent's reservation
of rights clause and therefore deferred acceptance until it had secured a written
opinion from legal counsel. Upon receipt of a favorable opinion, the Union on
June 16 notified the Respondent that it accepted the revised proposal.
I find nothing unlawful in the Respondent's reservation of rights clause. Moreover,
I find , under all the circumstances in this case considered above, that the Respond-
ent's 5-day strike notice proposal was a reasonable protective measure to safeguard,
its plant against a sudden strike, as the Union's acceptance indicates. Accordingly, I
find that the Respondent's May 30 offer of reinstatement was not violative of the Act-
and shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint in this respect.41
4. The Respondent's further proposed revisions of its offer of reinstatement
on June 19 and 20 as violations of the Act
Notwithstanding the Union's acceptance on June 16 of the Respondent 's May 30,
proposal, the striking employees were not reinstated. Assertedly prompted by in,
89 N.L R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins Co ),
361 U.S. 477.
39 N L R B. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, International Brotherhood of Team-_
8ters, Chau f eurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , AFL (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.),
353 U S. 87, 93, 96.
40 The Radio Officers Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL (A H Bull-
Steamship Company) v. N L.R.B , 347 U.S 17, 45; see also Republic Aviation Corporation
v. N L R B, 324 U.S. 793; N L R B v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811 (C A 7).
41 Because the delay in reinstating employees on the basis of the Respondent 's May 3O
offer is attributable to the Union 's precautionary action In seeking legal advice , I shall
provide for abatement of backpay for this period In "The Remedy " section of this report.
370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
formation it had received after its latest offer that the Union intended to misuse the
5-day strike notice proposal to harass the Respondent , the Respondent requested the
Union to agree to act in good faith when it exercised that right . However, out of an
excess of caution , the Respondent also required the Union to agree to a clause per-
mitting the Respondent to take whatever action it saw fit with respect to the rein-
statement of employees who went out on strike pursuant to the prescribed 5-day strike
notice. This condition the Union resisted.
It is plain that the effect of this latter requirement was to nullify the employees'
right to strike to enforce their economic demands concerning the 11-man dispute,
which the original May 30 proposal purported to recognize . This, I find , amounted to
reimposing an unlawful condition for reinstatement in derogation of the rights of
-economic strikers . By reason of the foregoing , I find that the Respondent interfered
with , restrained , and coerced employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
and discriminated against them within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
5. Individual reinstatements as violations of the Act
As discussed earlier in this report , the Respondent rejected the Union's efforts to
secure the striking employees ' reinstatement because the Union refused to waive bar-
gaining on the 11-man issue and its strike rights for the duration of the contract.
Nevertheless , it permitted several employees to return to work, on their individual
application , when they accepted the Respondent 's condition that they "would con-
tinue to work even if picket lines were reestablished " for the balance of the contract
term. A similar condition was offered to another employee who declined to accept it.
In a comparable fact situation in Lion 011 ,42 the Board held that:
As this conduct required employees , as a condition of employment, to
give up their adherence to the Union as their bargaining representative in this
respect and to return after personal interview as individuals , and not as a group,
it constituted discrimination , coercion , restraint , and interference violative of
the Act, as to the strikers who continued to adhere to the lawful bargaining
position of their statutory representative.
Accordingly , I find that by the reason of the foregoing conduct the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the Act . I further find that the Respondent's
individual negotiations with employees concerning the terms of their reinstatement
while the Union was negotiating for the return of all the strikers as a group was in
derogation of the Union 's exclusive status to represent the employees in negotiations
concerning their return to work.43 This conduct I find also violated Section 8 (a) (5 )
of the Act
6. Solicitation of a striker to return to work as violations of the Act
I have heretofore found that the Respondent solicited one striking employee
{Jones ) to return to work during the strike . Under established law, this constituted
independent violations of Section 8(a) (1) and ( 5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and from like and related con-
duct and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I have found that the Respondent has discriminatorily denied reinstatement to the
striking employees on May 3 and thereafter , when the Union made unconditional
applications on their behalf.44 Since the Respondent has already reinstated these em-
42 Lion oil Company , 109 NLRB 680 , 687, enfd. with modification not here material in
245 F, 2d 376 ( CA 8), on remand from 352 U S 282
43Medo Photo Supply Corporation v N L It B , 321 U . S. 678 , 683-685
14 Attached to this report marked "Appendix A" is a stipulated list of striking employees
on whose behalf the Union sought reinstatement The parties further stipulated that em-
ployees Maurice Shaver and W. G Price included in this list, "and any other employee
who was on sick leave at the time the strike began on March 28, 1961, and who did not
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 371
ployees, I shall only recommend that they be reimbursed for any loss of pay suf-
fered by them as a result of the discrimination 45 I have also found that the Re-
spondent made a lawful offer of reinstatement by letter dated May 30, 1961, which
the Union received a day or two later and accepted on June 16. Furthermore, I
have found that this delay in acceptance was not attributable to the Respondent.
I shall therefore recommend that the employees' right to backpay be abated for the
period from the Union's receipt of the offer until its acceptance on June 16. How-
ever, on that date the Respondent did not reinstate the employees for reasons I have
heretofore found to be insufficient. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent's back-
pay liability revived and continued until it reinstated the employees.
Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the
Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294. To facilitate the
computation, I shall recommend that the Respondent make available to the Board,
upon request, payroll and other records necessary and appropriate for that purpose.
I shall also recommend that an appropriate notice, hereto attached marked "Ap-
pendix B," be posted by the Respondent.
I find it unnecessary to recommend an affirmative bargaining order since the Re-
spondent has been negotiating with the Union in performance of its statutory
obligation. Its unfair labor practice in dealing individually with several employees
regarding their reinstatement during the strike, in my opinion, will be adequately
remedied by the cease and desist provision in the Order recommended herein. I also
find no abiding disposition on the Respondents part to commit unfair labor
practices generally and, therefore, a broad cease-and-desist order will not be
recommended.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, 1 make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the em-
ployees named in Appendix A as to discourage membership in, and activities on
behalf of, the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. All production, operating and maintenance employees at the Respondent's
Winnie, Texas, plant, and all operating and maintenance employees at the Re-
spondent's Port Neches, Texas, dock, excluding all plant protection employees,
professional employees, maintenance pipefitters, their leadmen and helpers, pipe-
fitting welders, their leadmen and helpers, maintenance electricians, their leadmen
and helpers, instrumentmen, their leadmen and helpers, office and clerical employees,
administrative and executive employees, confidential employees, foremen, and other
supervisory employees as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. At all times material herein, the Union has been the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. By dealing with employees respecting their reinstatement, in derogation of the
exclusive representative status of the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
7. By reason of the foregoing conduct, and by soliciting an employee to return to
work during the strike, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
join the strike until after being released by their doctor, were not offered by the Union
to return to work until such doctor's release" As discussed earlier in this report, Shaver
sought to return to work on May 15 after obtaining his medical release but was denied
employment because he refused to agree to the Respondent's unlawful condition. Shaver
thereupon joined the strike and picketed Accordingly, I find that his right to be re-
imbursed for lost pay begins on May 15. The parties' stipulation also indicates that Cecil
K. Johnson resigned from his job on May 18 and hence his right to backpay terminated
on that day.
'5 It appears that O. It. Shockley, G. R. Falke, and W. E Meschke, were reinstated on
May 5, 13, and 15, 1961, respectively. Their right to backpay therefore terminated on
those respective dates. All other employees were reinstated on July 1, 1961, which will
also be the terminal date for their reimbursement.
641795-63-vol. 136-25
372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees in the exercise of their statutory rights within the meaning of Section
8-(a) (1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire
record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, Texas Gas Corporation, Winnie
and Port Neches, Texas, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of, Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, Local 4-243, by refusing to reinstate employ-
ees or by discriminating against them in any other manner in regard to their hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, except to the extent
that their rights in that regard may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(b) Dealing with employees in the appropriate unit described below in their
individual capacity with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment, in disregard of their above-named exclusive bargain-
ing representative. The appropriate unit is:
All production, operating, and maintenance employees at the Respondent's
Winnie, Texas, plant, and all operating and maintenance employees at the
Respondent's Port Neches, Texas, dock, excluding all plant protection employees,
professional employees, maintenance pipefitters, their leadmen and helpers, pipe-
fitting welders, their leadmen and helpers, maintenance electricians, their lead-
men and helpers, instrumentmen, their leadmen and helpers, office and clerical
employees, administrative and executive employees, confidential employees, fore-
men and other supervisory employees, as defined in the Act.
(c) Depriving employees of their right to reinstatement to their jobs because they
refuse to waive their right to engage in strike or other concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection.
(d) Soliciting employees to abandon their strike or other concerted activities
engaged in for their mutual aid or protection.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Make whole the employees listed in Appendix A for any loss of earnings
suffered by them by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth
in "The Remedy" section of the Intermediate Report.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of the Recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plant and terminal in Winnie and Port Neches, Texas, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix B." 46 Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region, shall, after having
46 In the event that these recommendations be adopted by the Board, the words "A Deci-
sion and Order" shall be substituted in the notice for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner " In the further event that the Board's order be enforced by a United
States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision
and Order "
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION 373
been duly signed by a representative of the Respondent , be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. The Respondent shall take reasonable steps to insure that
such notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region , in writing , within
20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.47
47 In the event that these recommendations be adopted by the Board, this provision shall
be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-third Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX A
Y. D. Allen Edward E. Galligan Martin Melancon
Willie Bertrand , Jr. W. M . Goodnight W. E. Meschke
A. Besch O . R. Hampton Albert T. Miles
B. W. Biddle Joseph Ray Henry Arnold Ovie Mitchell
J. Boudreaux M. F. Henry R. O. Mitchell
A. Bourque J. D. Holt H . E. Moffett
Farris L. Bourque Cecil K . Johnson J . R. Nicar
R. L. Bower Fred Johnson Ray A. Null
Wilburn Bragg Howard M . Jones W. G. Price
Ambrose Breaux E. E. Kahia Jack W. Reynolds
H. R. Briggs E. Keeler John E. Richardson
I. D. Buckley Dolen E . Keenon Carl Satcher
N. D. Cooper H. W. Keneson Bethley Shaver
L. P. Crosby Alvin G. Lassiter Maurice Shaver
Ernest A . Cryer, Jr. t1. L. Lindsey Olin R. Shockley
Kenneth Cryer O. W. Little, Jr. R. M . Spencer, Jr.
Melvin Cummings , Jr. C. W. Lowe Edgar I. Staggs
Robert Devillier A . F. Mack , Jr. L. A. Stengler
Robert N. DeYoung Buford B . Majors W. D. Taylor
Walter C. DeYoung W. W. Martin William Van Norstrand
Edgar B. Dressler Mark McAlpin R. G. Walters
J. R. Duhon Thomas L. McClure R . E. Wells
G. R. Falke T. J. McCormic Leslie Whiddon
David F. Fischer Elmo Melancon
J. A. Freeman Erasta Melancon
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in, or activities on behalf of, Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 4-243, by refusing
to reinstate our employees, or by discriminating against them in any other
manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment, except to the extent that their rights in that regard may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT deal with our employees in the appropriate unit described
below in their individual capacity with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment, in disregard of their
above-named exclusive bargaining representative. The appropriate unit is:
All production, operating, and maintenance employees at the Respondent's
Winnie, Texas, plant, and all operating and maintenance employees at the
Respondent's Port Neches, Texas, dock, excluding all plant protection
374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees, professional employees, maintenance pipefitters, their leadmen
and helpers, pipefitting welders, their leadmen and helpers, maintenance
electricians, their leadmen and helpers, instrumentmen, their leadmen and
helpers, office and clerical employees, administrative and executive em-
ployees, confidential employees, foremen, and other supervisory employees,
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT deprive our employees of their right to reinstatement to their
jobs because they refuse to waive their right to engage in strikes or other con-
certed activities for their mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to abandon their strike or other con-
certed activities engaged in for their mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT in like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 4-243, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, in conformity with Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act. -
WE WILL make our employees listed below whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them.
Y. D. Allen Edward E. Galligan Martin Melancon
Willie Bertrand, Jr. W. M. Goodnight W. E. Meschke
A. Besch O. R. Hampton Albert T. Miles
B. W. Biddle Joseph Ray Henry Arnold Ovie Mitchell
J. Boudreaux M. F. Henry R. O. Mitchell
A. Bourque J. D. Holt H. E. Moffett
Farris L. Bourque Cecil K. Johnson J. R. Nicar
R. L. Bower Fred Johnson Ray A. Null
Wilburn Bragg Howard M. Jones W. G. Price
Ambrose Breaux E. E. Kahla Jack W. Reynolds
H. R. Briggs E. Keeler John E. Richardson
I. D. Buckley Dolen E. Keenon Carl Satcher
N. D. Cooper H. W. Keneson Bethley Shaver
L. P. Crosby Alvin G. Lassiter Maurice Shaver
Ernest A. Cryer, Jr. J. L. Lindsey Olin R. Shockley
Kenneth Cryer O. W. Little, Jr. R. M. Spencer, Jr.
Melvin Cummings, Jr. C. W. Lowe Edgar I. Staggs
Robert Devillier A. F. Mack, Jr, L. A. Stengler
Robert N. DeYoung Buford B. Majors W. D. Taylor
Walter C. DeYoung W. W: Martin William Van Norstrand
Edgar B. Dressler Mark McAlpin R. G. Walters
J. R. Duhon Thomas L. McClure R. E. Wells
G. R. Falke T. J. McCormic Leslie Whiddon
David F. Fischer Elmo Melancon
J. A. Freeman Erasta Melancon
All our employees are free to become or to remain members of the above-
named Union, or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate against
any employee in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment because of membership in, or activity on behalf of, any labor
organization.
TEXAS GAS CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.