Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 21, 1966

162 N.L.R.B. 303 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 303
All our employees are free to join, assist , or support the said Truck Drivers
Union or any other labor organization.
MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 881
U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building , 219 South Dearborn Street , Chicago,
Illinois 60604, Telephone 828-7570.
Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. and Truck Drivers Local Union No.
807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America . Case 29-CA-191. Decem-
ber 21, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 9, 1966, Trial Examiner Samuel Ross issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further
found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal
as to them. Thereafter the General Counsel filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.' The Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations' Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rul-
ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions and briefs, and the
entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein.
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Respondent by
the conduct of its foreman, J. Gimmi, and statements of its president,
' A letter adopting and relying upon the exceptions and brief of the General Counsel
was filed by the Charging Party.
162 NLRB No. 30.
304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Carroll, all fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, violated
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
2. We also agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the Gen-
eral Counsel failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the discharges of the Mastrangelo brothers were unlawfully
motivated.
3. The Trial Examiner also found that the General Counsel failed
to establish that Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union was
motivated either by a rejection of the collective- bargaining principle
or by a desire to gain time within which to dissipate the Union's
majority. With this finding we disagree.
As fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, the Union's
letter of March 18 requesting recognition was received by the
Respondent on March 22, 1965, together with a copy of the Union's
petition to the Board which had been filed on March 19, 1965.2
Although the Union did not represent a majority of the employees
on March 18, its demand, as the Trial Examiner correctly found, was
a continuing one, and by March 23, 1965, the Union did achieve
majority status.
The record shows that Respondent's foreman, Gimmi, upon being
shown the Union's letter, immediately commenced interrogating
employees on March 22 and 23, 1965. Gimmi on these 2 days inter-
viewed over one half of the employees in the plant. As to such inter-
rogations by the Respondent's only foreman, who had authority to
hire and fire employees without consultation with his supervisors,
the Trial Examiner found, and correctly so, that they were system-
atic in design and purpose so as to ascertain the employees' union
sympathies and were not casual in nature. Further, as the Trial
Examiner found in the light of an employee's complaint to Respond-
ent's vice president, D'Ambrosio, Gimmi's interrogations were inter-
preted by the employees as an attempt by him to discourage union
membership. While the record shows that several days after the
employee complaint to D'Ambrosio, Gimmi ceased his interrogations
upon instructions to do so, there is nothing in the record to show that
the Respondent ever openly disavowed to the employees Gimmi's
actions. Concurrent with Gimmi's interviews with the plant employ-
ees on March 22, 1965, Gimmi conducted a 2-hour interview with
employee Robert Pavone, at Pavone's home. Gimmi's interview,
accompanied by expressions of hostility to the Union, contained
threats of discharge to Pavone if the latter persisted in supporting
the Union. In addition, in the same interview, Gimmi threatened
that if the Union was successful, there would be layoffs of other
2 The Respondent, as the Trial Examiner found, never replied to the Union's demand.
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 305
employees at the plant by expanding Respondent's Puerto Rico
operation.
On March 26, 1965, Respondent's president, William J. Carroll,
signed a consent-election agreement at the Board's Regional Office
for an expedited election to be held on April 2; and later on the same
day, Carroll assembled all employees at the plant and delivered a
speech about the pending election. In this speech Carroll attempted
to place the onus upon the Union for Respondent's inability to grant
raises to the employees at that time. Further, Carroll stated that
another company he directs, Carroll-McCreery, after organization by
another Teamster Local, drastically reduced its complement of
employees. Carroll gave no explanation of the reason for the reduc-
tion, thus subtly implying, as found by the Trial Examiner, that a
like reduction in employment would occur in Respondent's plant if
the Union won the election.
It is our conclusion, on the basis of the foregoing and the entire
record, that the illegal acts which Foreman Gimmi engaged in,
immediately following receipt of the Union's recognition demand
and notice of its representation petition to the Board for an election,
had for their singular purpose the coercing of employees from enter-
ing into or adhering to union membership. Because Gimmi's coercive
interrogations of the employees clearly went beyond a simple effort
to verify the Union's majority, they cannot, contrary to the Trial
Examiner 's apparent view of them, furnish support for an inference
of good faith on the part of Respondent. Further, in our opinion, the
illegal acts of Gimmi on March 22 and 23, coupled with those of
Respondent's president, Carroll, which followed on March 26
immediately after Respondent signed a consent agreement to an
election to be held on April 2, clearly establish a purpose to under-
mine the Union by unlawful means so that the Union would lose
the election.3
Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the
Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union was motivated by a
rejection of the collective-bargaining principle and a desire to gain
time within which to dissipate the Union's membership, in violation
of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act 4 In these circumstances, only
- 3 We disagree with the Trial Examiner's apparent consideration of Gimmi's unlawful
conduct and that of Carroll as separate and unrelated for the purpose of determining
whether there was a violation of Section 8(a) (5). Such determination requires a consid-
eration of the Respondent 's entire course of conduct , as a whole , particularly where, as
here , the unlawful conduct of Gimmi and that of Carroll were not only'so close in time to
one another but also to the election.
4 Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263 , Bernel Foam Products Co , 146 NLRB 1277;
Irving Air Chute Company , 149 NLRB 627.
264-047-67-vol. 162-21
306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a bargaining order can adequately restore as nearly as possible the
situation which would have existed but for the Respondent's unfair
labor practices.5 Accordingly, we shall order Respondent, upon
request, to bargain with the Union in the unit herein found
appropriate.
In view of our findings above, we shall modify the Trial Examin-
er's Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order to accord with such
findings.
The Trial Examiner's Conclusions of Law are modified as follows :
1. Conclusion of Law 3 is renumbered as 6.
Insert the following conclusions as numbered :
"3. All production, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees,
drivers, and mechanics employed by the Respondent at its Corona,
New York, plant, exclusive of all office clerical, professional and sales
employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in Section
2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act."
"4. On and at all times since March 23, 1965, Truck Drivers Local
Union No. 807, has been, and is now, the exclusive representative for
the purpose of collective bargaining of all employees in the appro-
priate unit described in 3 above, within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act."
"5. The Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of
the Act by the following conduct :
"(a) By refusing on March 23, 1965, and at all times since, to bar-
gain with Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807."
The Trial Examiner's Recommended Order is modified by renumber-
ing subparagraph (c) as (d) and by adding a new subparagraph (c)
to paragraph 1 to read as follows :
"(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with Truck Drivers Local
No. 807 as the collective-bargaining representative of all employees
in the appropriate unit."
Paragraph 2 is amended by adding a new subparagraph (a), and
renumbering subparagraphs (a) and (b) and (c), the new subpara-
graph (a) to read as follows:
"(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Truck Drivers Local
No. 807, as exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri-
ate unit with regard to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a sighed agreement."
5 Bernet Foam Products, Inc., supra; Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., supra . See also
Scobell Chemical Company v. N.L.R.B., 2G7 F.2d 922, 925 (C.A. 2).
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 307
The notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision as an Appen-
dix is amended by adding the following paragraph immediately
before the third paragraph of such notice :
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Truck Driv-
ers Local No. 807, as the exclusive representative of all employees
in the appropriate unit described below.
The following two paragraphs are added immediately before the
last paragraph of the said notice :
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the above-
named Union as exclusive representative of all employees in the
bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is :
All production, maintenance, shipping and receiving em-
ployees, drivers, and mechanics employed by us at our plant
in Corona, New York, excluding all office clerical, profes-
sional and sales employees, Watchmen, guards, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on March 24, 1965, and amended on April 9, 1965, by Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 807 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (herein called the Union ), the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on June 21,
1965, which alleges that Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. (herein called the Respondent
or the Company), engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5 ) and 2 ( 6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended . The Company filed an answer denying the commission of unfair labor
practices . A hearing was held in Brooklyn , New York, on August 16, 17, and 18,
1965, before Trial Examiner Samuel Ross . Upon the entire record in the case and my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor , and after due consideration of the
briefs filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the Company , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE
The Company , a New York corporation , is engaged at its principal place of busi-
ness at Corona , in the Borough of Queens , city and State of New York, in the
manufacture , sale, and distribution of iron bar supports for reinforced concrete.
During the past year, a representative period , the Company purchased and caused
to be delivered to its plant in New York from places outside the State , goods and
materials valued in excess of $50 , 000, and sold and delivered products valued in
excess of that amount from its plant in New York to places outside the said State.
Upon the foregoing admitted facts it is found that the Company is engaged in com-
merce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union's organization of Respondent's employees
At the times material to this proceeding the Respondent employed 20 persons in
the following unit which was stipulated by the parties as appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining:
All production, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees, drivers and
mechanics employed by the Respondent at its Corona plant, exclusive of all
office clerical, professional and sales employees, watchmen, guards, and super-
visors as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act.
At 7 a.m. on March 18, 1965,1 pursuant to prior arrangements made by two of
Respondent's employees,2 Union Organizer Louis Schneir visited the Company's
plant. At the time of Schneir's visit, seven employees were present in the plant,3
four of whom had been working on the night shift 4 which ends at 8 a.m. The night
shift stopped working while Schneir explained to the seven employees the benefits
to be derived from membership in the Union and answered their questions. All
seven then signed union authorization cards, Schneir left the plant, and the night
shift resumed working. None of Respondent's supervisors or officials were in the
plant during Schneir's visit.
Although the Union did not then represent a majority of the Respondent's
employees, upon leaving the plant, Schneir returned to his office and prepared and
mailed a letter to the Company which stated that the Respondent's "spot welders,
welders, machine operators, truckdrivers, shipping and receiving clerks and mechanics
are now members of this Local Union," that the employees had "designated
[the Union] as their bargaining representative in all matters pertaining to wages,
hours and working conditions," and requested "an opportunity to meet with
[Respondent] at [its] earliest convenience to discuss the subject matter." The
Respondent never replied to the letter. On the same day March 18, Schneir also
notified the Union's attorneys to file a petition with the Board for certification as
the representative of Respondent's employees in the unit described above. Such a
petition was filed by the Union on March 19 .5
On March 23, a second union meeting of Respondent's employees was held at
the home of Robert Pavone, the Company's only truckdriver. This meeting was
attended by about 15 employees. After an organizing talk by Union Agent Schneir
and a question-and-answer period, five more employees signed cards.6 In addition,
the cards of two additional employees which had been signed in the plant on
March 22 7 were delivered at the meeting by Pavone to Schneir. Thus, by March 23,
the Union had 14 signed authorization cards out of 20 employees in the stipulated
appropriate unit.
Thereafter, in the Board consent election on April 2, the Union received 7
votes, 10 votes were cast against the Union, and 3 ballots were challenged. On
April 9 the Union filed objections to the Respondent's conduct affecting the
results of the election. On June 17 the Regional Director issued his Report on
Objections finding merit in at least some of the objections and set aside the elec-
tion. However, in view of the instant pending case, a new election was not directed.
B. The discharge of the Mastrangelo brothers
At the time of their discharge, Jack Mastrangelo had worked for Respondent for
12 years, and Nicholas for 4 years. As noted above, the two Mastrangelo brothers
signed union authorization cards in the plant on the morning of March 18.
1 All dates hereafter refer to 1965 unless otherwise specified.
2 Robert Pavone and Victor Babich
3 Robert Pavone, Anthony Pavone, Victor Babich, Attilio DiPilla, Germano Rubino,
Nicholas Mastrangelo, and Jack Mastrangelo.
* DiPilla, Rubino, and the two Mastrangelo brothers.
Case 29-RC-111.
e Frank A. Ciro, Patsy Colangelo, Henry Francis Benizzi, Jr., Antonio Tollis, and Ray-
mond Holbrook.
7 Nicholas P. Vittore and Andrew Tifinger.
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 309
At 8 a.m . on March 19 , upon finishing work on the night shift, these two
employees were notified by Jerry Gimmi , Respondent 's plant foreman , that they
were being discharged because "They are not satisfied with your work in this
office." According to Jack Mastrangelo , Foreman Gimmi also said on this occasion,
"Anyway we don't want a union." Foreman Gimmi denied that he made any refer-
ence to a union in his terminal conversation with these employees , and he also
denied that he had any knowledge of any union affiliation or interest on their part.
The issue of whether the Mastrangelo brothers were discharged to discourage
interest in the Union, or for cause , will be considered and determined infra.
C. The interrogation of employees by Foreman Gimmi
On March 22, Respondent received the Union's letter of March 18, and notice
of the filing of its petition to the Board for certification . The Union's letter was
read by Foreman Gimmi that morning. Thereupon, on that day and the day follow-
ing, Gimmi interrogated about half of the employees in the plant ( including his
three brothers) regarding their knowledge of the Union.
The only testimony in respect to this interrogation was adduced during the cross-
examination by the General Counsel of Foreman Gimmi after the latter had testi-
fied for the Respondent . Gimmi at first testified that he only asked the employees
"whether they had heard about the Union." However, he later admitted that "in
fact ," he asked the employees "whether the union represented them." For the most
part, Gimmi received responses to his inquiries , either that the employee knew
nothing about the Union , or "that they haven't signed up."
About March 23 or 24, employee Victor Babich complained to Respondent's
vice president , Ralph D'Ambrosio that Foreman Gimmi "was asking and trying to
discourage the men from joining the Union," and threatened "to protest to the
Labor Board." D'Ambrosio replied, "that he would check on it." A day or so later,
D'Ambrosio told Foreman Gimmi "to stop talking to the employees about the
Union," and the latter ceased doing so.
D. Further interrogation of and threats to employee Robert Pavone
by Foieman Gimmi
The Respondent's only truckdriver, Robert Pavone , is a brother-in-law of Fore-
man Gimmi . Prior to the events in issue herein , Pavone on occasion had experi-
enced difficulty in delivering Respondent 's products to construction sites which
employed union labor , and had been "chased" from such jobs by the union steward
when he was unable to produce "a union book ." As previously noted, Pavone was
one of the two employees who initiated the Union 's organizing drive at the Com-
pany's plant , and he signed an authorization card on March 18.
On March 22 after work Foreman Gimmi visited Pavone's house for the admitted
purpose of learning from Pavone what he knew about the Union and its letter of
March 18 Gimmi assumed that Pavone would know something about the letter
because it was from an organization which represented truckdrivers . Gimmi re-
mained at Pavone's house for about 2 hours, and concededly discussed the Uniox
with Pavone.
According to the mutually corroborative and credited testimony of Pavone and
his wife (who was present throughout the conversation ), Gimmi started the con-
versation by saying , "Bob, what's going on . with this union business. If you
think there is a union coming in , you are highly mistaken There are certain men in
the shop that I can get at ." Gimmi then successively mentioned by name 15 of the
Respondent's employees in the plant , commented regarding the union or antiunion
predilections of each , and about his ability to change the views of some of the pro-
union employees . For example , in respect to Henry Benizzi, Sr ., Gimmi stated that
although he was "a loud mouth [and ] makes a lot of protests , for money he will do
anything." Gimmi then said, "Bob, I am warning you that if the union comes in,
which I know it's [sic ] not, then we are going to lay off everyone in the shop You
know we have a plant in Puerto Rico. We have two men working there now We
will hire ten more men, because labor is very cheap out there, and make production
and ship it back here and still stay in business ." Gimmi then offered to permit Pav-
one alone "to join the union ," and to pay him the union rate of $3 . 10 and later
$3.20 per hour. He suggested that Pavone think about it. Gimmi also threatened, that
Pavone's "job was at stake ," that the Respondent would sell its truck and use Tony
Serio, an independent trucker who performed some of Respondent 's deliveries, to do
all its trucking work, and that "win or lose , if the Union comes in [Pavone] was
number 1 on the list to go."
310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gimmi left Pavone's home with the admonition that Pavone "think about" what
Gimmi had told him. He telephoned Pavone later that evening about 9:30 p.m. and
asked Pavone what he had decided. Pavone replied that he had already given Gimmi
his answer . Gimmi then said, "Now I know what I have to do." Pavone replied that
if Gimmi "endanger[ed]" his job in any way, Pavone would notify the "Labor
Department about this incident." s
In respect to the foregoing conversation with Pavone, Foreman Gimmi's version
conflicted substantially with that given by Pavone and his wife. For the reasons
hereinafter stated, Gimmi's testimony in this regard is considered as generally
unworthy of reliance and is credited only to the extent that it accords with that of
the Pavones, or is an admission against interest.
Gimmi's testimony was frequently evasive and lacking in candor. He quite appar-
ently was reluctant to admit anything which he regarded as possibly adverse to
Respondent's interest , and on several occasions it was necessary to confront him
with his affidavit, given before the hearing to a Board agent, before he would do
so. Gimmi's testimony on several occasions also was self-contradictory. These con-
clusions are based, inter alia, on the following examples of Gimmi's testimony:
(a) When asked whether he went to Pavone's house "to ask him about the
Union," Gimmi replied that he went for the "combination" purpose of discussing a
raise which Pavone had requested a few days earlier, and "to talk to him about the
Union." However, Gimmi earlier had testified that at 4 p.m. that same afternoon, he
had told Pavone in the plant that although he had tried, he had been unsuccessful
in his attempt to get a raise for Pavone. On further cross-examination, Gimmi
admitted that he had no further information regarding the requested raise to convey
to Pavone that evening. It is therefore quite obvious to me that contrary to Gimmi's
testimony regarding his "combination" purpose for visiting Pavone, his only real
purpose was to discuss the Union with him.
(b) Foreman Gimmi denied that in the conversation at Pavone's house, he offered
to permit Pavone alone to join the Union and to get him a raise. However, Gimmi
conceded that such an offer was made to Pavone "a few months back" in order to
eliminate the difficulties which had been experienced when Pavone attempted to
deliver Respondent's products to union construction sites. In the light of Pavone's
active participation in inviting the Union to organize Respondent's employees, it is
quite apparent that Pavone was not opposed to union membership, and would have
accepted Gimmi's earlier offer (if one had been made) in order to secure the raise
which he admittedly was seeking. Moreover, the earlier alleged offer of a raise to
Pavone is wholly inconsistent with Gimmi's asserted inability to get him one cur-
rently. Under the circumstances , Gimmi's testimony in this regard is regarded as
self-contradictory.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as the mutually corroborative and persuasive
testimony of the Pavones to the contrary, Gimmi's version of their conversation is
not credited.
E. Promises and threats by the Respondent's president
On March 26, after a conference at the Board's Regional Office in which Respond-
ent signed a consent-election agreement, its president, William J. Carroll assembled
all the employees in the plant at the end of the day shift, and delivered a speech
about the impending election .9 There is no serious conflict regarding what was said
by Carroll.
According to the credited testimony of employee Victor Babich, Carroll told the
employees that he had been notified that a petition for an election had been filed,
that he had visited the Board's office, and that he "was greatly embarrassed about
this." Carroll further stated that he had received information that some of the
employees were against the Union, and that others were not too sure regarding how
they stood on the question, and that he felt conscience bound to state the Company's
views. Carroll told the employees that he knew they were "dissatisfied," "that they
were up for raises," but that because of a "quirk" in the law, be was not at liberty
"to reveal them." 10 Carroll also admittedly said that "the Union makes a lot of
8 This obviously was an erroneous reference to the Board.
e At the outset, employees were told by Carroll that they were on their own time, and
that their attendance was not obligatory However, none of the employees left
10 In respect to wage raises, Foreman Gimmi admitted that Carroll said, "we were going
over the payroll and we were looking to give the employees a raise before all this [the union
demand and petition for election] did come up."
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 311
promises," but that "the only way they could be fulfilled was if the Company agreed
to them." Carroll further told the employees that the Carroll-McCreery Company,
of which he also is president, had over 30 employees before they were organized by
the Teamsters , but that since then , they only had 4 men working in the plant. He
concluded his speech by saying that the men were free to vote for or against the
Union, that the election would be secret, and that no one would know how they
voted.
F. Concluding findings
1. In respect to the discharge of the Mastrangelo brothers
As previously noted, Jack Mastrangelo had worked for Respondent for 12 years,
and Nicholas Mastrangelo for 4 years, at the time of their discharge one day after
they signed authorization cards for the Union. At the time of their dismissals, they
were told by Foreman Gimmi that the reason for their termination was their unsat-
isfactory work. According to Jack Mastrangelo, Gimmi also said, "Anyway we don't
want a union," a statement which Gimmi denied making. For the reasons herein-
after stated , Jack Mastrangelo 's testimony in this respect is not credited.
Jack Mastrangelo admitted that at the time of his discharge, he attached no sig-
nificance to Gimmi's statement quoted above. On the contrary, Jack Mastrangelo
ascribed his discharge and that of his brother to reprisal by the Respondent for their
mother's compensation claim against the Company, based on the death of their
father who also had worked for the Company. He so told his brother Nicholas at
that time. It is difficult to believe that if Gimmi had made the quoted statement
which clearly indicated that their dismissal was attributable partly to their union
membership , Mastrangelo would have attached no significance thereto.
Additional reasons exist for not crediting Jack Mastrangelo in this respect. There
is no testimony in the record from which an inference reasonably can be made that
Gimmi knew either that the Mastrangelo brothers had signed union cards, or even
that the Union was engaged in organizing Respondent's employees. As previously
noted , no supervisors were in the plant when the two brothers and the other five
employees signed union cards. Furthermore , there is no testimony that any of the
seven who signed , or anyone else, told Gimmi or any plant official that they had
done so.lt Finally, Gimmi's conduct on March 22 and 23, immediately after receiv-
ing notice of the Union's advent in the plant, of interrogating employees about the
Union, strongly suggests that he had no prior knowledge of union activity in the
plant . All of the foregoing compels the conclusion that Gimmi was not aware of
the Union's advent in the plant when the Mastrangelo brothers were discharged, and
that Jack Mastrangelo 's testimony regarding Gimmi's reference to a union in their
terminal conversation is not worthy of credence.
Foreman Gimmi testified that the Mastrangelo brothers had been unsatisfactory
employees for many years and that other employees had frequently complained
that they did not want to work with them . 12 Gimmi ascribed his failure to discharge
them prior to the date in question , to his respect for their father , a valued and
respected employee of the Company for many years, and to his sympathy for the
two brothers because of their father 's death . According to Gimmi , his decision to
discharge the Mastrangelo brothers when he did , was made because two skilled
employees , Attilio DiPilla and Germano Rubino, who worked with them on the night
shift , had complained on the morning of March 18 that they could no longer work
with them because they were not cooperating and bearing their share of the team
load. Both DiPilla and Rubino corroborated Gimmi's testimony that they had com-
plained on several occasions to Gimmi about working with the Mastrangelo broth-
ers. They testified in substance that the two brothers did not cooperate with them in
handling the output of the machines which each of them operated , and left the bur-
den of the work to them. They also testified that they had requested Gimmi to
"change" their "helpers." However, although quite obviously uncertain of the last
date when such complaint was made, both DiPilla and Rubino testified that it was
not on March 18, as Gimmi had testified, but several days before that.13
The General Counsel has the burden of establishing "by a preponderance of the
testimony" that the discharge of the Mastrangelo brothers was motivated by anti-
union considerations . Aside from the coincidence of the timing of their discharge
just after they signed cards for the Union , there is nothing in the record to support
11 Those employees who testified denied that they told Gimmi about signing cards.
12 The employees work in teams of two
13 In his affidavit to the Board , Rubino gave the date as "perhaps near March 10."
312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
such a conclusion. Neither of these two brothers had anything to do with the initia-
tion of the Union's organizing effort, and at best they were just two of seven employ-
ees who signed union cards. It is thus unlikely that they would have been selected
for discharge if discouragement of the union activities of its employees was Respond-
ent's motivation. However, most importantly, there is not a scintilla of evidence
upon which knowledge by the Respondent of the interest of these two employees in
the Union can either be found or reasonably inferred. Absent such evidence, a find-
ing that they were discharged for antiunion purposes cannot be supported, at least
not on the record herein.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the suspicions raised by the sudden discharge of two
long term employees one day after they signed cards for the Union, it is found that
the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof on this issue. It will
therefore be recommended the complaint in this respect be dismissed.
2. In respect to Gimmi's conversation with Pavone
Gimmi's inquiry at Pavone's house about the Union, accompanied as it was by
expressions of hostility to the Union and threats of economic reprisal to Pavone if
the latter persisted in supporting the Union's campaign, clearly was coercive and
constituted interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of the Act 14
Accordingly, it is found that thereby the Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In addition, Gimmi's threat that Respondent would lay off employees at its Corona
plant and expand the Company's operations in Puerto Rico if the Union came in,
his offer to let Pavone alone join the Union and give him a raise if he desisted from
assisting the Union, and his threats to Pavone, implicit in the statements that
Pavone's job was at stake, that all of Respondents deliveries would be performed by
an outside contractor, and that Pavone was number one to go whether the Union
won or lost, all quite clearly constituted interference with, and restraint and coer-
cion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. It is therefore
found that by such threats and promises of Gimmi, Respondent further engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.15
3. In respect to the general interrogation of employees by Foreman Gimmi
As previously noted, upon receipt of the Union's letter, Foreman Gimmi, on
March 22 and 23, asked about half of the employees in the plant "whether they had
heard about the Union," and "whether the Union represented them." Gimmi testi-
fied that he engaged in the said interrogation because the Union was a matter which
affected everyone in the shop, he wanted to know what was going on, and he didn't
believe that a majority of the employees had signed for the Union. According to
Gimmi, the employees whom he named as having so interrogated (none of whom
had yet signed cards for the Union) for the most part responded that they knew
nothing about the Union, or that they had not signed for the Union. However, as a
consequence of said interrogation, Gimmi, who prior thereto had no knowledge of
the Union's organizational efforts at the plant, was able to comment to his brother-
in-law Robert Pavone, regarding the prounion, antiunion, or neutral predilections of
15 named employees in the plant. Moreover, the said interrogation admittedly con-
tinued on March 23 after the coercive threats to Pavone of economic reprisals to
himself and other employees if the Union's campaign was successful. Moreover, the
interrogation provoked a complaint by employee Babich to Vice President D'Ambro-
sio that "Gimmi was asking and trying to discourage the men from joining the
Union."
The complaint alleges that by Gimmi's interrogation, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. Interrogation of employees by their employer about union mat-
ters is not per se a violation of the Act.16 Whether such interrogation tends to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational rights
depends on the facts of each case. Certain factors assist in determining whether or
not the interrogation is coercive and unlawful: (1) the background, particularly as
14 Cannon Electric Company , 151 NLRB 1465 ; Bourne Co v N L R B , 332 F 2d 47. 48
(C A. 2).
15 Id
16 Blue Flash Express , Inc , 109 NLRB 591
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 313
it relates to the employer's hostility to the union; (2) the nature of the information
sought, especially where it appears designed to permit ascertainment of the identity
of the employees and their support of the union; (3) the identity of the questioner;
(4) the place and method of interrogation; and (5) the truthfulness of the response.17
Viewed in the light of these factors, it is concluded that the interrogation was
coercive in nature. (1) In the light of the threats made by Foreman Gimmi to
Pavone of economic consequences to Pavone and other employees if the Union
won, the interrogation must be viewed as having occurred in a context of strong
antipathy by the Respondent toward the Union, which Respondent publicized to its
employees. (2) The interrogation was directed at ascertaining the union sympathies
of the employees who were interrogated, and in the light of Gimmi's statements to
Pavone, quite apparently succeeded in supplying Respondent with that information.18
(3) The management representative who engaged in the interrogation was the
Respondent's only foreman who had authority, without consultation with his superi-
ors, to hire and fire employees. (4) In view of the systematic design and purpose on
the part of Gimmi to ascertain the employees' union sympathies, the interrogations
cannot be regarded as of a casual nature. Moreover, in light of employee Babich's
complaint to Vice President D'Ambrosio, the interrogations were interpreted by the
employees as an attempt to discourage union membership. On the basis of the fore-
going evidence and considerations, it is concluded and found that the interrogation
of employees regarding the Union by Foreman Gimmi on March 22 and 23 consti-
tuted interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. In respect to President Carroll's speech
As found above, in a speech to the Respondent's employees assembled for the
purpose of hearing him, Carroll expressed his objection to the representation of the
employees by the Union, and told them inter alia that wage increases had been con-
templated, but because of a "quirk" in the law, he was not able to reveal what they
were. In the course of his speech Carroll also told the employees that another com-
pany, of which he also was president, had 35 employees before it was organized by
the Union, and now were down to 4 employees.
Carroll's statement in respect to wage raises which were contemplated but could
not be revealed because of the law, quite apparently referred to the alleged inability
of the Respondent to grant such increases during the pendency of the Union's peti-
tion. As such, whether or not legally correct, this statement constituted an attempt
to place the onus on the Union for Respondent's alleged inability to grant a raise,
and thereby to discourage the employees from supporting the Union in, the impend-
ing election. At the hearing, the General Counsel contended that this statement was
an implied promise of benefits. However, when his attention was directed to the
absence of an allegation in the complaint that Respondent had violated the Act by
promising benefits to discourage union affiliation, the General Counsel said, "I will
withdraw that part of it then." President Carroll was not specifically asked (when
he testified) if he made the above statement, and it therefore cannot be said that
the matter has been fully litigated. Accordingly, in the absence of any applicable
allegation in the complaint, no finding of violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
will be predicated on this statement.
Carroll's bare statement, that after organization by the Union, employment in
another company which he directs as drastically reduced, was in no way explained.
Thus, he did not say that the reduction in employment in the other company was
caused by inordinate union demands which rendered the other company noncom-
petitive, nor did he furnish any other explanation for the reduction in employment.
In view of the absence of elucidating explanation, the statement quite apparently
was a subtle threat that a like reduction in employment would occur in the
Respondent's plant should the Union win the election. The statement therefore
constituted interference, restraint, and coercion of the rights of employees guaran-
teed by the Act, and thereby the Respondent engaged in further unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(11).
17 Cannon Electric Company, supra ; Bourne v. N.L.It.B., supra.
1` In this regard it should also be noted that President Carroll in his speech to all the
employees , stated inter (ilia, that he had "received information regarding the men in the
plant . . . that some of them were against the union . . . [ and] others weren't too sure."
[Emphasis supplied.]
314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. In respect to the Respondent's alleged refusal in good faith to
recognize and bargain with the Union
The complaint alleges that since March 23, the Union has been the majority
representative of Respondent's employees in a unit appropriate for collective-
bargaining purposes, and that the Respondent has refused to recognize and bargain
with the Union as such representative. Relying on Board decisions such as Joy
Silk Mills, Inc.,19 Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc.,20 and Irving Air Chute Com-
pany, Inc.,21 the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's refusal to bargain
with the Union was not motivated by any good-faith doubt regarding the Union's
majority status, but on a "bad-faith" desire to gain time within which to undermine
the Union's support in the forthcoming election, "clearly shown by the [unlawful]
activities of its supervisor Gimmi and President Carroll's speech during the pre-
election period." The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that no violation of
Section 8(a)(5) has been proven because: (a) the Union's letter of March 18 "is
not a clear and unequivocal demand for bargaining by the Union, as is required";
(b) the Union did not represent a majority of the employees on the "crucial" date
when the Union's letter was received by Respondent on March 22; (c) the Union
never represented a majority of the employees; and (d) even if it did, the Respond-
ent's conduct "did not amount to a refusal to bargain." These contentions will be
considered seriatim.
a. The sufficiency of the Union's letter as a bargaining demand
The Board has said: 22
It is now well established that, absent special circumstances not present here,
a prerequisite to a finding of a refusal to bargain by an employer is a clear
and unequivocal demand for bargaining by the union.
In this case, the Union's letter stated that the Respondent's employees "are now
members of this Local Union," that the employees had "designated [the Union]
as their bargaining representative in all matters pertaining to wages, hours and
working conditions," and that the Union's representative would appreciate a meet-
ing at the Respondent's earliest convenience "to discuss the subject matter." In
context, "the subject matter" quite clearly referred to "the wages, hours and working
conditions" of the Respondent's employees. It is therefore found that the letter
constituted "a clear and unequivocal" request for bargaining by the Union.
b. The Union's majority status
On March 18, 7 of the Respondent's 20 employees in the stipulated appropriate
unit signed cards designating the Union as their representative. As found above,
two of the employees who signed cards were discharged by Respondent on
March 19, and these terminations were not shown to have been motivated by anti-
union considerations. Accordingly, on March 22 when Respondent received the
Union's demand for bargaining, the Union represented only 5 of the 18 remaining
employees in the unit, obviously not a majority. However, on the same day that
Respondent received the Union's bargaining demand, it also received notice that.the
Union had filed a petition with the Board for certification as the representative of
Respondent's employees. Under the circumstances, the Union's bargaining demand
quite obviously was, and was known by the Respondent to be, a continuing one.23
Moreover, by the following evening of March 23, seven more employees had signed
union cards, and thus the Union had' authorizations to represent 12 of the 18
employees in the unit. Accordingly, in the light of the continuing nature of the
19 85 NLRB 1263, enfd . as modified on other grounds 185 F 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert.
denied 341 U.S. 914
20146 NLRB 1277.
21149 NLRB 627.
22 Watford Cabinet Company , 95 NLRB 1407 , 1408-09
22 American Compressed Steel Corporation, 146 NLRB 1463 , 1470-71; Henry Spen e
Company, Inc., 150 NLRB 138; Benson Veneer Company , Inc, 156 NLRB 782; Seobell
Chemical Company , Inc v . 1' L R.B, 267 F.2d 922 (C.A. 2).
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 315
Union's bargaining demand, its lack of majority status on the "critical " date of
March 22 is not dispositive of the issue of whether the Respondent refused in
"bad faith" to recognize and bargain with the Union after March 23, the date
charged in the complaint.
The Respondent 's next contention , that the Union at no time represented a major-
ity of its employees , is based on its assertion that four of the cards "should not be
counted." Specifically the Respondent asserts that the cards of Patsy Colangelo,
Antonio Tollis , Germano Rubino , and Attilio DiPilla do not represent valid desig-
nations of the Union as their representative because , the three first named employ-
ees cannot read English , the cards were not read to them, all four of the cards were
partly filled out by other persons , and the testimony of these four employees
"showed a total confusion as to the meaning of the card."
All the cards used by the Union in this organizational campaign stated in bold
type at the top, "APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP." The front of the card
then provided space for the name and address of the person who was applying, his
date of birth , social security number, and the name and address of his employer.
The reverse side of the card read as follows:
Were you ever a member of Local Union 807 of the I. B. of T.-
I hereby agree that TRUCK DRIVERS UNION LOCAL No. 807
shall be my bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to wages, hours
and working conditions.
I hereby make application for membership in TRUCK DRIVERS
UNION LOCAL No. 807 and consent and agree, if elected, to be bound
by its laws, both general and local.
I further agree to make every effort to attend meetings and will pay
all dues and assessments levied in accordance with the I. B. of T. C. & H.
Laws. It is understood that should it be hereafter discovered I have made
any misstatements as to my qualification for membership that I be disbarred
from all benefits provided by this Union.
Initiation Forfeited If Not Paid In Full Within 30 Days
Sign Here
Date Application Signed
Patsy Colangelo, after admitting that he understood English "a little bit" testi-
fied without an interpreter. The nature of his responses disclosed that he compre-
hended the nature of the questions which were asked of him. Colangelo testified
that employee Pavone told him at the union meeting on March 23, "to sign this
card , present to the Labor Board , going to protect us in case the boss want to fire
us, somebody not get fired." The front side of the card was filled in for Colangelo
by Nick Vittore, a fellow employee. Colangelo denied that he understood that by
signing the card , he was "becoming a member of" the Union , but his denial is not
credited for the following reasons: Colangelo's affidavit, which admittedly was read
to him by the Board 's agent before Colangelo swore to it, states , "I voluntarily
and of my own free will signed a card to become a member of Local 807, IBT,
to have them represent me in collective bargaining." Moreover, Robert Pavone
credibly testified that he told Colangelo that "this was a card to join a Union." In
the light of this record it is found that no misrepresentation was made to secure
Colangelo's signature to the card, and that it was a valid designation of the Union
as his representative in collective bargaining.
Antonio Tollis also testified without an interpreter after he admitted that he
understood English "a little bit" and appeared to comprehend the questions put to
him. Tollis identified his signature to the Union's card, and testified that the other
information was put on the card by Andrew Tifinger, a fellow employee. Tollis
testified that he signed the card at the union meeting in Pavone's house (March 23).
He further testified that he was told by employees Pavone and Babich, "this card
was nothing. This no mean anything," but this testimony is not credited for the
following reasons: Tollis signed an affidavit for a Board agent written in Italian
which he admittedly can read and understand. According to the stipulated English
translation of his affidavit, Tollis stated, "I knew that I was signing a card to be a
member of the Union, and did it voluntarily." Moreover, according to the credited
testimony of Pavone, the latter told Tollis, "This is a card for joining a Union,"
316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and he denied that he told Tollis, either that the card did not mean anything, or
that it was only for the purpose of securing a Board election. In view of the above,
it is concluded that no misrepresentation was made to secure Tollis' signature to
his card, and that it was a valid designation of the Union as his representative for
collective-bargaining purposes.
In view of the above findings, the Union had 10 valid cards on March 23 out of
a unit of 18 employees, even without considering the Respondent's contentions in
respect to the alleged invalidity of the cards of DiPilla and Rubino.24 It is therefore
concluded and found, contrary to the Respondent's contention, that on and after
March 23 the Union represented a majority of the Respondent's employees in the
stipulated unit.
c. The alleged "bad-faith" refusal of Respondent to bargain with the Union
In view of the findings above, there remains for determination the question of
whether the Respondent's failure and refusal to bargain with the Union was moti-
vated by unlawful considerations. In regard to this issue, the Board, in a recent
decision, reiterated the governing principles, as follows: 25
The Board has long held that an employer may insist upon a Board election
as proof of a union's majority if it has a reasonable basis for a bona fide
doubt as to the union's representative status in an appropriate unit. If, how-
ever, the employer has no such good-faith doubt, but refuses to bargain with
the majority representative of its employees because it rejects the collective-
bargaining principle or desires to gain time within which to undermine the
union and dissipate its majority, such conduct constitutes a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. In determining whether the employer's action was taken
to achieve either of the said invalid purposes, the Board considers all the sur-
rounding circumstances as well as direct evidence of motivation. Absent such
direct evidence, where extensive violations of the Act accompany the refusal
to grant recognition, they evidence the employer's unlawful motive and an
inference of bad faith is justified. . . . While unfair labor practices committed
at or about the time of an employer's refusal to bargain often demonstrates
the bad faith of the respondent's position, not every act of misconduct neces-
sarily vitiates -the respondent's good faith. For, there are some situations in
which the violations of the Act are not truly inconsistent with a good-faith
doubt that the union represents a majority of the employees. Whether the con-
duct involved reflects on the good faith of the employer, requires an evalua-
tion of the facts of each case.
In the instant case, when the Respondent received the Union's bargaining demand
on March 22, the Union was not the majority representative of the employees, a
fact which the Respondent undoubtedly learned as a consequence of Foreman
Gimmi's interrogation of about half of the employees in the plant.26 This interro-
gation, while unlawful, was not so flagrant that it must necessarily have had as an
object the destruction of the Union's majority status. Notwithstanding, the said
interrogation, and Foreman Gimmi's unlawful threats to Pavone, the Union
achieved majority status on the night of March 23. However, that fact was never,
at any time thereafter, brought to the knowledge of Respondent, and no further
demand by the Union for bargaining was ever made. Moreover, on the complaint
of employee Babich, Foreman Gimmi was instructed by his supervisor, Vice Presi-
dent D'Ambrosio, to desist from speaking further to the employees about the Union,
and he complied with that instruction and committed no further unfair labor prac-
tices. Thereafter Respondent promptly signed a consent-election agreement,27 and
except for the single statement in President Carroll's speech hereinbefore found to
be coercive, committed no further unfair labor practices. I do not regard that single
violation of the Act after the Respondent's agreement to an expedited consent elec-
tion, to be either inconsistent with a good-faith doubt by the Respondent that the
24 A ccordingly , although I am persuaded by the record that the cards of DiPilla and
Rubino likewise were valid designations of the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative , the reasons for that conclusion are regarded as unnecessary.
25 Hammond & Irving, Incorporated , 154 NLRB 1071, 1073.
20 See footnote 18, supra
27 Harvard Coated Products Co , 156 NLRB 162.
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP. 317
Union was the majority representative of its employees, or as sufficient to establish
that the Respondent's refusal to bargain was motivated by a rejection of the
collective-bargaining principle of the Act.
To establish a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act on the basis of a card
showing, the General Counsel has the burden of proving, not only that a majority
of the employees in the appropriate unit signed cards, but also that the employer in
bad faith declined to recognize and bargain with the union.28 On the record in this
case, the General Counsel has not established that the Respondent's refusal to bar-
gain was motivated either by a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle, or to
gain time within which to dissipate the Union's majority. Accordingly it will be
recommended that the complaint in this respect be dismissed.29
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LADOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By threatening employees with discharge, layoff, and other economic reprisals
to discourage union affiliation and/or support, and by coercively interrogating
employees regarding their union sympathies, Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, and
has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record in this case, I recommend that the Respondent, Sylgab
Steel & Wire Corp., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with loss of employment, economic sanctions, or
other reprisals to discourage union activities or adherence.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees in regard to their union membership,
activities, or sympathies.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
or any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging
in such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
28 John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99.
21 Cf. Hammond & Irving, Inc, supra; Harvard Coated Products Co., supra.
318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Corona, Long Island, New York, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 30 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Re-
gional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be
posted by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply
herewith 31
I also recommend the dismissal of the complaint insofar as it alleges that by
discharging Jack Mastrangelo and Nicholas Mastrangelo the Respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act. I further recommend the dismissal of the complaint insofar as it alleges that
the Respondent engaged in a refusal to bargain with the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
° In the event that this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" In the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
31 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of employment, economic
sanctions, or other reprisals to discourage union activities or adherence.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees regarding their union mem-
bership, activities, or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain or to refrain from becoming or
remaining members of Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization.
SYLGAB STEEL & WIRE CORP.,
Employer.
Dated -------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 16 Court
Street, Fourth Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11201, Telephone 596-3535.