Steelworkers Local 7912 (U.S. Tsubaki)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 25, 2002

338 N.L.R.B. 29 (N.L.R.B. 2002)

STEELWORKERS LOCAL 7912 (U.S. TSUBAKI) 1
United Steelworkers of America AFL–CIO–CLC,
Local #7912 and U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., automotive
division. Case 1–CB–9680
September 25, 2002
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, COWEN, AND BARTLETT
On May 9, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Raymond
P. Green issued the attached decision. The Respondent
Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
Charging Party Employer filed a brief in support of the
administrative law judge’s decision and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief to the Respondent’s
exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions, as further explained below, and to
adopt the recommended Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act when it refused the Employer’s re-
quests, on and after June 20, 2000, to negotiate a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement for a unit of automotive divi-
sion employees at the Employer’s Chicopee, Massachu-
setts facility. The Employer had relocated these employ-
ees in 1996 from its Holyoke, Massachusetts facility,
where they had been represented by the Union as part of
a larger bargaining unit. Pursuant to a unit clarification
petition filed by the Employer, the Board found that the
relocated employees constituted a separate appropriate
unit in which the Union retained its representative status.
U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 331 NLRB 327 (2000).
The Board’s final determination reversed a May 1997
decision by the Board’s Regional Director for Region 1.
After the Regional Director’s decision, the parties exe-
cuted a new collective-bargaining agreement, effective
from October 1, 1997, to September 30, 2001, covering
the original Holyoke unit, including the relocated Chico-
pee employees. During these negotiations, the Respon-
dent refused the Employer’s requests to bargain for sepa-
rate units. The Employer therefore agreed to a single
contract for a single unit, but it communicated its refusal
to waive pursuit of its request for Board review and re-
versal of the Regional Director’s decision.
After the Board issued its Decision on Review, revers-
ing the Regional Director and clarifying the original unit
by finding a separate Chicopee plant unit appropriate, the
Employer again requested bargaining for a contract cov-
ering this separate unit. The Respondent refused. In
defense of this refusal, it has consistently maintained that
it had no obligation to bargain for a separate contract
covering the newly clarified Chicopee unit until the
1997–2001 contract expired.
For the reasons set forth below and in the judge’s deci-
sion, we find no merit in the Respondent’s exceptions.
We hold that when the Board finds a group of relocated
employees to be a separate appropriate unit, an existing
collective-bargaining agreement covering those employ-
ees in their original bargaining unit does not apply, ab-
sent explicit agreement by the employer and union that it
should continue to apply. There was no such agreement
here. Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s finding that the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) by refusing to bar-
gain for the new unit.
Although the Board has never addressed the precise is-
sue presented here, the result follows from precedent es-
tablishing and applying unit clarification principles in the
context of a group of employees relocated to another facil-
ity from an existing bargaining unit.1 In Gitano Distribu-
tion Center, 308 NLRB 1172 (1992), the Board held that
when an employer transfers some of its represented em-
ployees at one location to a new location, there is a rebut-
table presumption that the relocated employees constitute
a separate appropriate unit at their new facility.
In a footnote to Gitano (at 1175 fn. 21), the Board
stated, in relevant part:

The issue of whether an existing contract would
be applicable to the new facility is not before us in
the present case. However, if the new facility is a
separate unit, it would appear that the contract would
not apply, without an agreement that it would apply.
See Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975).

In Armco Steel Co., 312 NLRB 257 (1993), the Board
held that it would give full effect to the Gitano analysis
in unit clarification proceedings to determine what bar-
gaining unit or units exist after an employer’s reorganiza-
tion resulting in the relocation of employees. Accord-
ingly, the Board rejected the contention that Gitano lim-
ited unit clarification proceedings to a determination of
the inclusion or exclusion of relocated employees vis-à-
vis the historical unit from which they came. Instead, the
Board permitted the further determination of whether
relocated employees, together with any new employees,
would constitute a separate appropriate bargaining unit.
312 NLRB at 259.

1 This case is distinguishable from a situation where the employer re-
locates an entire store to a new location, rather than just a portion of the
employees. In the case of an entire store relocation, an employer must
apply an existing contract to a new facility if the operations are substan-
tially the same at the new location and the transferees from the old
facility constitute a substantial percentage of the employees at the new
facility. See King Soopers, Inc., 332 NLRB 32 (2000), enfd. 254 F.3d
738 (8th Cir. 2001).
338 NLRB No. 5
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2
In Armco, the Board expressly recognized the above-
quoted footnote from Gitano as relevant to its analysis. Id.
Thus, in both Gitano and Armco, although the Board did
not squarely face the issue of whether an existing contract
would apply to a new separate unit of relocated employ-
ees, it strongly suggested that it would not. Furthermore,
there is other precedent supporting the proposition that a
collective-bargaining agreement executed during the
pendency of a representational matter before the Board
may no longer apply when that issue is resolved. In RCA
Del Caribe, 262 NLRB 963 (1982), the Board determined
the obligations of parties who are negotiating for a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement when a rival union files a repre-
sentation petition seeking to oust the incumbent union.
The Board held that in such a situation the employer is
required to continue bargaining with the incumbent union
pending the outcome of the election, but that any contract
executed would become null and void in the event that the
incumbent union is displaced as representative of the bar-
gaining unit. 262 NLRB at 965. See also Wayne County
Neighborhood Legal Services, 333 NLRB 146, 148 fn. 10
(2001). The Board recognized that such continued recog-
nition promotes stability in industrial relations without
frustrating employee free choice. See RCA Del Caribe,
262 NLRB at 965.
In this case, the Employer’s decision to bargain with
the original unit while pursuing its request for review by
the Board was the option least disruptive to the bargain-
ing process. Upon the Union’s request for bargaining
following the Regional Director’s decision that the relo-
cated employees did not constitute a separate unit, the
Employer had three options: (1) refuse to bargain and
risk facing an unfair labor practice charge; (2) bargain
and abandon its position that the relocated employees
constituted a separate unit; or (3) bargain with the origi-
nal unit while preserving its right to request review. The
first choice would have delayed bargaining even as to the
undisputed continuing historical Holyoke unit until the
Board’s resolution of the unfair labor practice charge
and/or the Employer’s request for review. The second
option would have resulted in the Employer’s forfeiture
of its lawful, and ultimately successful, request for re-
view in the unit clarification case. Under these circum-
stances, we cannot fault the Employer for choosing the
third option—bargaining with the Union’s original unit
while pursuing its lawful appeal—as this option was cer-
tainly most beneficial to industrial relations. See Show
Industries, 326 NLRB 910, 912 (1998) (employer’s offer
to bargain only over effects of plant closure while chal-
lenging unit certification was not unlawful).
Our colleague asserts that there is no policy basis for
the result that we reach. We suggest that the policy basis
is Section 9 of the Act. The parties to a bargaining rela-
tionship are obligated to bargain in an appropriate unit.
As of June 2000, it was clear that Chicopee was a sepa-
rate appropriate unit. Thus, the Employer thereby ac-
quired a right to bargain in that unit. The issue is
whether the Employer intended to postpone the effectua-
tion of that right until the end of the contract. The only
showing of such an intent was the Employer’s contrac-
tual recognition of the Union in a two-plant unit. How-
ever, this contractual recognition was granted at a time
when the extant decision (of the Regional Director) ruled
that there was a two-plant unit. The Employer told the
Union that its agreement to the contract was not intended
as a waiver of its right to contest the Regional Director’s
decision. In these circumstances, it has not been shown
that the Employer intended to postpone, for any time, the
effectuation of its right to bargain in a separate Chicopee
unit, should it prevail before the Board.
We have no quarrel with our dissenting colleague’s
view that employees, through their union representative,
have the right to agree with an employer to a bargaining
unit that may not conform to the scope of the initially
certified or recognized unit. That is not what happened
in this case.
The Regional Director, by denying the Employer’s pe-
tition for clarification, effectively defined the two-plant
unit, including the relocated employees, as the estab-
lished unit. The Employer then filed a request for re-
view. From the Employer’s perspective, its best legal
alternative was to agree to the Union’s demand to bar-
gain in the two-plant unit unless and until the Board
ruled favorably on the request for review. From the Un-
ion’s perspective, it was continuing to bargain on behalf
of all employees in the initial unit. Consequently, the
parties’ new contract for a two-plant unit was not the
product of any voluntary mutual agreement to vary the
scope of the extant unit.
Such an agreement would have been manifest if the
parties had included in their new contract a provision
expressly agreeing to continue its coverage for the two-
plant unit even if the Board found that a separate
Chicopee unit was appropriate. They did not do so. To
the contrary, although we find it was not obligated to do
so, the Respondent clearly communicated that it would
seek bargaining in a separate Chicopee unit if, as ulti-
mately occurred, the Board found a separate unit appro-
priate.
White-Westinghouse, 229 NLRB 667, 672 (1977),
cited by the dissent, is distinguishable. In that case,
unlike here, the union and the predecessor employer mu-
tually agreed to merge separately certified single plant
units into a multiplant unit, effectively destroying the
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 7912 (U.S. TSUBAKI) 3
separate identity of the initial units. The respondent suc-
cessor agreed to continue the established unit by assum-
ing the existing multiplant agreement.
In sum, we cannot agree with the Respondent’s posi-
tion in this case. If we were to adopt the view that it had
no obligation to bargain about a new contract for the
Chicopee unit until the 1997–2001 contract for the Holy-
oke unit expired, we would undermine the utility of the
unit clarification process as a means for applying the
Gitano analysis. Indeed, for the duration of any extant
bargaining agreement in the historical unit, the Respon-
dent’s view would deny relocated employees in a newly-
clarified separate unit the full benefit of the separate col-
lective-bargaining representation to which they are enti-
tled, even if that agreement has years yet to run.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the statutory pol-
icy of maintaining labor relations stability is far better
served by requiring immediate bargaining, upon request,
for a collective-bargaining agreement in the newly clari-
fied separate Chicopee unit. We therefore affirm the
judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(3) by refusing the Employer’s request for such bar-
gaining.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO–CLC, Local #7912, Holyoke and
Chicopee, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting.
As the majority acknowledges, this case presents an is-
sue of first impression. I would frame that issue this way:
When a party seeking to clarify a two-plant bargaining
unit into separate units agrees to a collective-bargaining
agreement covering the original unit, will the Board give
effect to the agreement, after it subsequently clarifies the
unit as sought, resulting in two separate units?
“The object of the National Labor Relations Act is in-
dustrial peace and stability, fostered by collective-
bargaining agreements . . . .” Auciello Iron Works v.
NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996). Here, that object is
best promoted by giving effect to the parties’ agreement.
My colleagues apparently would agree, but only if the
agreement is clear and unequivocal in stating that it will
continue to apply, notwithstanding the Board’s subse-
quent unit clarification. I see no basis, either in the
Board’s earlier decisions or in the policies of the Act, for
imposing this requirement.
Facts
The essential facts are these: Originally, the Employer
operated two divisions (the roller chain division and the
automotive division) at a single facility in Holyoke, Mas-
sachusetts. Employees in both divisions were repre-
sented by the Union in a single bargaining unit, covered
by the same collective-bargaining agreement. In No-
vember 1996, the Employer moved the automotive divi-
sion to Chicopee, Massachusetts.
After the Union rejected the Company’s request to
bargain separately with respect to the two divisions, the
Employer filed a unit clarification petition with the
Board in February 1997. It sought to divide the bargain-
ing unit into two separate units, one covering the Holy-
oke employees and the other covering the Chicopee em-
ployees. In May 1997, the Board’s Regional Director
dismissed the petition. The Employer requested the
Board’s review.
While that request was pending, the Employer and the
Union reached a new collective-bargaining agreement,
effective from October 1997 through September 2001,
which covered both the Holyoke and the Chicopee em-
ployees (the original bargaining unit). The Employer
made clear during negotiations that it would continue to
pursue its appeal of the Regional Director’s decision on
unit clarification. But the new agreement did not provide
that it would become ineffective or would otherwise be
modified, if the Board ruled in the Employer’s favor.
In June 2000, during the term of the agreement, the
Board reversed the Regional Director. U.S. Tsubaki,
Inc., 331 NLRB 327 (2000). Applying Gitano Distribu-
tion Center, 308 NLRB 1172 (1992), the Board found, as
the Employer had requested, that two separate bargaining
units were appropriate. It also found that the Union con-
tinued to represent the employees in both units, because
the Chicopee employees were transferees from the origi-
nal unit. The Board’s decision did not address the con-
tinuing effect of the parties’ collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Following the Board’s decision, the Employer—who
viewed the decision as nullifying the parties’ agreement—
sought to bargain with the Union for a new contract cover-
ing the Chicopee employees. The Union refused, citing
the existing agreement. The Employer filed an unfair la-
bor practice charge, and these proceedings followed.
Analysis
The majority holds that “when the Board finds a group
of relocated employees to be a separate appropriate unit,
an existing collective-bargaining agreement covering
those employees in their original bargaining unit does not
apply, absent express agreement by the employer and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4
union that it should continue to apply.” Neither the doc-
trinal basis for this holding, nor the policies it serves, are
clear to me.
What does seem clear, in contrast, are its destabilizing
effects. The Board consistently has recognized the need
to avoid disrupting a bargaining relationship by clarify-
ing a bargaining unit during the term of a contract.1
Here, of course, the unit was clarified, and the issue is
when the clarification becomes operative. On balance,
industrial stability is better served by respecting the
agreement for its duration and by requiring bargaining
for a new agreement covering the clarified unit only af-
terwards. The majority identifies no persuasive, coun-
tervailing considerations. I address the majority’s argu-
ments in turn.
1. The majority argues that its holding follows, in part,
from the Board’s decisions in Gitano, supra, and Armco
Steel Co., 312 NLRB 257 (1993). As the majority ac-
knowledges, however, those decisions did not resolve the
issue presented here. Neither case involved the division
of a single bargaining unit into two separate units, each
comprising only employees who had always been union
represented.
In Gitano, the employer had transferred union-
represented employees to a new facility at which workers
were not represented. The union’s majority status thus
was an issue, and the Board was required to balance the
statutory rights of transferred employees and the rights of
employees already working at the new facility. The
Board held that (1) it would apply a rebuttable presump-
tion that the unit at the new facility was a separate ap-
propriate unit; and (2) if the presumption was not rebut-
ted, it would apply a “fact-based majority test” to deter-
mine whether the employer was required to recognize the
union. 308 NLRB at 175.
In Armco Steel, in turn, the union sought to clarify a
bargaining unit (the salaried employees unit) at one facil-
ity to include certain job classifications that had once
been within the unit, but which had since been moved to
a different facility, where employees historically had
been excluded from the unit. The Board held that, apply-
ing Gitano, a unit clarification proceeding was available
to decide not only whether the relocated employees could
be included in the salaried unit, but also whether some
other existing unit could include them. 312 NLRB at
259.
Citing a footnote in Gitano, which was then quoted in
Armco Steel, the majority observes that “although the
Board did not squarely face the issue of whether an exist-

1 See, e.g., Edison Sault Electric Co., 313 NLRB 753 (1994) (Board
will not entertain unit clarification petition during contract term, if
petitioner did not reserve right to file petition, during bargaining).
ing contract would apply to [a] separate unit of relocated
employees, it strongly suggested that it would not.” The
Gitano footnote states:

The issue of whether an existing contract would
be applicable to the new facility is not before us in
the present case. However, if the new facility is a
separate unit, it would appear that the contract would
not apply, without an agreement that it would apply.
See Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975).

308 NLRB at 1175 fn. 21 (emphasis added).2 As a review
of the decisions demonstrates, neither Gitano nor Armco
Steel provides guidance here. No issues concerning the
union’s majority status are implicated in this case. The un-
ion undisputedly had the authority to represent employees at
both the Holyoke and the Chicopee facilities. And the
agreement reached by the employer and the union undisput-
edly covered employees at both facilities. Read literally,
moreover, the Gitano footnote actually undercuts the major-
ity’s position: there was an agreement in this case that the
contract would apply to both facilities, which was reached
after the unit clarification issue had been joined. In any
case, the majority never explains how the principles applied
in Gitano or Armco Steel lead to the result reached here.
2. The majority’s position is not based solely on those
two decisions. It also cites RCA Del Caribe, 262 NLRB
963 (1982), which held that a contract executed with an
incumbent, when a rival union has filed a representation
petition, will become null and void if employees select
the rival. That rule was based on the policy of protecting
employee free choice. Clearly, this policy does not come
into play here, where the Union’s continued status as
bargaining representative was not challenged.3
In summarizing its holding, the majority asserts that
giving effect to the agreement “would deny relocated
employees in a newly clarified separate unit the full
benefit of the separate collective-bargaining representa-
tion to which they are entitled,” at least during the
agreement’s term. That assertion, however, ignores the
fact that the Chicopee employees were already repre-
sented by the Union in reaching the agreement. There is
no suggestion that the Union lacks majority support
among Chicopee employees or that it violated its duty of
2 The decision cited in the Gitano footnote, Kroger Co., involved a col-
lective-bargaining agreement in which the employer, a grocery store
chain, agreed to recognize the union as the representative of employees in
stores added to the division in which the union already represented em-
ployees. The Board enforced the agreement, after imposing the condition
that the union prove its majority status in a newly added store.
3 See Harte & Co., 278 NLRB 947, 950 (1986) (considerations ad-
dressed in RCA Del Caribe not applicable when employer and union
agree to extend collective-bargaining agreement to new facility that
represents relocation of existing operation).
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 7912 (U.S. TSUBAKI) 5
fair representation with respect to those employees. Nul-
lifying the agreement at the Employer’s request, and over
the Union’s objection, strikes me as a dubious way to
promote employees’ Section 7 rights.4 More important,
nullifying the agreement means that the Chicopee em-
ployees lose the “fruits of their collective activity,” a
factor the Board has weighed heavily in holding that an
employer must apply an existing contract to a relocated
plant in circumstances comparable to those here. Rock
Bottom Stores, 312 NLRB 400, 402 (1993). It cannot be
that employees’ statutory interests must be destroyed in
order to save them.
Insofar as it invokes the policies underlying Section 9
of the Act, moreover, my colleagues’ position is inter-
nally inconsistent in relying on both the purported right
of the Employer to bargain in separate units and the pur-
ported right of employees to representation in separate
units. If the right of employees is implicated here, then
the Employer’s willingness to postpone bargaining in
separate units until the end of the contract should not be
given effect—although my colleagues would do that, if
the parties’ intent were clear. In any case, it seems to me
that employees who have chosen a union as their bar-
gaining representative have delegated to the union the
authority to negotiate on their behalf, including to agree
to a bargaining unit that may not conform to the scope of
the initial unit. Accord: White-Westinghouse Corp., 229
NLRB 667, 672 (1977).5 Here, the Board’s unit clarifi-
cation decision did not state that Chicopee could not be
part of a larger, agreed-upon unit, at least for the duration
of the pending agreement.
3. Next, the majority seems to argue that because the
Employer’s course of conduct here—bargaining with the
original unit, while pursuing unit clarification before the
Board—avoided disruptions in bargaining at an earlier
point in time, it would be unfair to give effect to the col-
lective-bargaining agreement now.
The majority’s position is mistaken. Giving effect to
the agreement, for its duration, does not (indeed did not)
prevent the Employer from pursuing unit clarification
and from ultimately enjoying the benefit of the Board’s
ruling, when the agreement expires (as it apparently has).
Nor was the Employer foreclosed, as a legal matter,
from taking advantage of the unit clarification during the

4 See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works, supra, 517 U.S. at 791 (“The Board
is . . . entitled to suspicion when faced with an employer’s benevolence
as its workers’ champion against their certified union.”).
5 The majority contrasts White-Westinghouse, supra, to this case, by
arguing that here, there was no agreement to bargain in a two-plant
unit. Of course, there was such an agreement: the Employer signed a
collective-bargaining agreement after the separation of the business into
two facilities and after filing a unit clarification petition—that covered
both locations in a single bargaining unit.
term of the agreement—had it negotiated with the Union
to do so. The Employer could have insisted that the
agreement provide for the possibility that the Board
would clarify the unit, by (for example) including a re-
opener provision triggered by the Board’s ruling. Alter-
natively, the Employer could have insisted on an agree-
ment of shorter duration (as opposed to a 4-year term,
which insured that the Board’s decision would issue mid-
term). The Employer took neither step.
That executing the agreement when the Employer did
may have avoided economic disruption is not an argument
for inviting disruption later. The majority’s approach is
inconsistent with the “fundamental premise on which the
Act is based—private bargaining under governmental su-
pervision of the procedure alone, without any official
compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” H. K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
4. Finally, the majority suggests that permitting the
Union to refuse to bargain would “undermine the utility
of the unit clarification process.” I disagree. As I have
pointed out, the Employer here will enjoy the benefit of
the process; it is simply a matter of time. Here, it was
proper to entertain the Employer’s unit clarification peti-
tion, even during the life of the contract, because the
Employer clearly reserved its right to pursue unit clarifi-
cation. But it is quite another thing to allow the Em-
ployer to escape its agreement with the Union on the
basis of the subsequent unit clarification, when the
agreement itself contains no escape clause. In that situa-
tion, the employer has effectively agreed to the unit defi-
nition, for the duration of the contract.
For all of these reasons, I would hold the Employer to
its agreement, and I accordingly would find that the Un-
ion has not violated Section 8(b)(3) in refusing to bargain
separately in the Chicopee unit.

Tom Morrison Esq., for the General Counsel.
Warren Pyle, Esq., for the Union.
Martin P. Marta, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 16, 2001. The
charge and amended charges were filed on August 31, 2000,
and September 14, 2000. The complaint was issued on Janu-
ary 25, 2001, and alleged as follows:
1. That until November 1996 the Employer recognized the
Union in the following unit:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 821 Main Street, Holyoke, Massachusetts
location, but excluding office clerical employees, technical
and professional employees, guards, supervisors as defined in
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6
professional employees, guards, supervisors as defined in the
Act, and all other employees.

2. That in November 1996, the Employer moved its automo-
tive division from its Holyoke location to its Chicopee location.
3. That on June 13, 2000, the Board, at 331 NLRB 327, is-
sued an Order clarifying the unit described above by establish-
ing two separate units as follows:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 106 Longsack Drive, Chicopee, Massachu-
setts location, but excluding office clerical employees, techni-
cal and professional employees, guards, supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees (automotive division
unit.)

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 821 Main Street, Holyoke, Massachusetts lo-
cation, but excluding office clerical employees, technical and
professional employees, guards, supervisors as defined in the
Act, and all other employees (roller chain division unit.)

4. That the most recent collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the company and the Union has a term effective from
October 1, 1997, to September 30, 2001.
5. That since August 29, 2000, the Employer has requested
the Respondent to meet and bargain collectively with the Em-
ployer for a new collective-bargaining agreement for the auto-
motive division unit.
6. That since August 29, 2000, the Respondent Union has
failed and refused to bargain with the Employer for a new col-
lective-bargaining agreement for the automotive division unit.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The parties agree and I find that the Company is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The Union has represented employees in a plant in Holyoke,
Massachusetts, since about 1979 when the facility was owned
by Acme Chain Corporation. The present Employer, U.S. Tsu-
baki, purchased the assets of that facility in 1989 and continued
to employ the same employees. At the same time, it recognized
the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of these
employees.
U.S. Tsubaki is an Illinois corporation with facilities located
throughout the United States. At some point in 1990, it began
an automotive division at the Holyoke location whereby it pro-
duced timing chains for automakers. Although this was a dif-
ferent product, the employer and the Union covered this set of
employees within the overall Holyoke bargaining unit. As a
consequence, three successive collective-bargaining agreements
were executed which treated the employees of the two divisions
as a single bargaining unit covered by the same contract.
In November 1996, the Company moved the automotive di-
vision to Chicopee, Massachusetts, which was about 5 miles
away from the Holyoke plant. This move was made because of
increased automotive business. At the time, the Company re-
quested that the Union agree to sever the bargaining units and
to bargain regarding the moved automotive division as a sepa-
rate unit. The Union refused. At the time of the move, and the
request, the parties were in the midterm of a collective-
bargaining agreement that was effective from July 3, 1994, to
September 30, 1997.
On February 26, 1997, the Company filed a unit clarification
petition in Case 1–UC–710 which essentially sought to have the
Board modify the existing bargaining unit by severing the exist-
ing unit into two separate unit, one comprising the Holyoke
facility employees, and the other the automotive employees
located in Chicopee.
On May 23, 1997, the Regional Director for Region 1 issued
a Decision and Order which dismissed the petition. She con-
cluded that there was insufficient reason to disturb and modify
the existing collective-bargaining unit. The Company filed a
request for review with the Board seeking to reverse the Re-
gional Director’s decision.
In late spring or summer 1997, and while the request for re-
view was pending, the parties entered into negotiations for a
new collective-bargaining agreement. Once again the Com-
pany requested that that the Union bargain for two contracts
covering each set of employees separately. The Union refused
and notwithstanding the pending unit clarification proceeding,
the Company executed a new single contract covering both
plants. In this regard, the Company’s representative stated that
it entered into the new agreement, rather than waiting for the
Board to made a decision in the UC matter, because it did not
want to face a strike.1 Notwithstanding the fact that the Com-
pany executed a new contract covering both sets of employees,
it notified the Union orally and in writing, that it was not waiv-
ing or withdrawing its intention of pursuing relief via the unit
clarification petition. The new contract ran from October 1,
1997, to September 30, 2001.
On June 13, 2000, the Board issued a Decision and Order,
reversing the Regional Director. In essence, the Board ordered
that the preexisting unit be split into two separate units, one for
the Holyoke plant employees and the second for the automotive
division employees located in Chicopee, Massachusetts.
On June 20, 2000, Company Attorney Martin P. Marta called
Union Representative Lowell Alexander and asked for a meeting
to discuss the NLRB’s decision in the unit clarification case. In a
confirming letter, Marta stated that “in the meantime, and without
waiving any of the rights of the Company or either Division, the
Divisions have each decided to follow and abide by the existing
collective-bargaining agreement . . . until further notice.”
In July 2000, and again in August, Marta called Alexander in
an effort to set up a meeting to discuss the effect of the unit

1 Given the fact that the Regional Director had dismissed the com-
pany’s unit clarification petition, the Company would have run the risk
of (1) facing an 8(a)(5) complaint if it insisted on bargaining on a two
unit basis and (2) having any strike be adjudged an unfair labor practice
strike.
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 7912 (U.S. TSUBAKI) 7
clarification order. On August 8, 2000, the parties agreed to
meet on August 29.
On August 29, 2000, representatives of the Union met with
the Company. At this meeting, Marta stated that the Company
wanted to start bargaining for a new contract covering the
automotive division inasmuch as it was his opinion that the
Board’s unit clarification order essentially nullified the existing
contract insofar as the automotive division employees were
concerned. He also argued that when the parties commenced
such bargaining, the Company did not want the Union to ap-
point to its bargaining committee, employees who were em-
ployed at the Holyoke plant. The Union’s counsel, Warren
Pyle, responded that inasmuch as there was, in existence, a
collective-bargaining agreement covering the automotive divi-
sion employees, and since that agreement was not set to expire
until September 30, 2001, the Union had no obligation to bar-
gain for a new contract covering that unit. He did state that the
Union might consider voluntary bargaining for a new contract,
if the contract for both units was opened up, in which case, the
Union would be making new demands for both units. The
Company rejected this possibility. The bottom line, however,
as far as the Union was concerned was that it did not recognize
any obligation to bargain with respect to the Chicopee plant
until the extant contract expired.
The present charge was filed on August 31, 2000, and on
September 5, 2000, Marta wrote to the Union as follows:

As you know, the Company’s position is that the 1999-
2001 collective-bargaining agreement . . . is not biding on
the automotive division and the Company ahs filed an unfair
labor practice charge because the Union has refused to bar-
gain for a new agreement. This is to notify you that, in the
interest of maintaining a good working relationship with
your Union and in order to maintain stability and security
for employees and the company, the Company will continue
to apply the provisions of the Agreement at the automotive
division until further notice. In so doing, the Company is
not waiving any of its rights but, instead, is voluntarily
choosing to continue to apply the Agreement for an indefi-
nite time. In the event the Company intends to discontinue
applying all or any portion of the Agreement, it will give the
Union at least one week’s written notice . . . .

On January 9, 2001, soon after the Regional Director made a
decision to issue an 8(b)(3) complaint against the Union, Pyle
wrote to Marty as follows:

I have conferred with my clients and we are prepared
to meet with you and the U.S. Tsubaki representatives to
seek a resolution of the issues concerning the company’s
request that a new agreement be negotiated for the auto-
motive division in light of the determination of the Re-
gional Director to issue a complaint. Steelworkers is not
agreeing to bargain a new agreement and it maintains its
position that the current agreement remains in effect as
negotiated for its terms. But Steelworkers will meet with
the company and explore practical and creative ways to
satisfy the needs of the parties and to avoid litigation.

On January 12, 2001, Marta responded and rejected Pyle’s
suggestion as representing no difference from the Union’s posi-
tion back on August 29. The letter also advised that absent nego-
tiations, the Company reserved the right to make changes in the
terms and conditions of the automotive division employees.
Thereafter, on January 16, 2001, Union Attorney Pyle wrote
to Marta and stated inter alia,

United Steelworkers does not agree with the company’s con-
tention that the agreement covering both divisions, negotiated
and signed after the relocation of the automotive division, is
somehow null and void merely because the National Labor
Relations Board has ruled that the two divisions are separate
bargaining units. The union is willing to discuss the issues
arising out the clarification of certification, including the
company’s request for separate agreements to replace the cur-
rent agreement. But the union is not prepared to enter such
discussions on the basis that the current agreement is not ef-
fective in the automotive division. The union will take appro-
priate action if the company makes unilateral changes in the
terms and conditions of the agreement.

On January 17, 2001, Marta replied and reiterated the posi-
tions that the parties had taken from August 29, 2000, to the
date of the letter. The Company reasserted its view that the
Board’s decision clarifying the unit did, as a matter of law,
nullify the existing collective-bargaining agreement but only
insofar as the employees in the automotive division and that it
wanted to commence bargaining separately with the Union for
this unit.
As no meeting of the minds ever took place, the Regional
Director issued the instant complaint.2
III. ANALYSIS
In my opinion, this case is analogous to testing of certifica-
tion cases. That is, those cases where a union is certified after
an election and the employer wishes to test the validity of the
Board’s unit determination by refusing to bargain.
In the present case, the Employer, instead of engaging in
self-help by refusing to bargain, utilized the Board’s processes
in order to clarify the bargaining unit. Initially, the Regional
Director dismissed the Employer’s petition and the Employer
requested review. While that matter was pending, the existing
contract came up for negotiation and the Employer agreed to
the Union’s insistence that bargaining be conducted on the
existing two plant unit basis.
While, the Union asserts that the Employer’s bargaining was
consensual, this is not exactly the case. This is because the
Employer was, at the time, faced with the Regional Director’s
conclusion that the existing two plant unit was appropriate and
if it insisted, as a condition of reaching agreement, that the units
be severed, it would have run the risk of facing a refusal to
bargain complaint and a potential finding that any strike would

2 It is noted that the Union filed an 8(a)(5) charge against the Com-
pany alleging, in substance, that the Company was, in effect, abrogating
the existing contract insofar as the automotive division in Chicopee,
Massachusetts. That charge was neither dismissed nor withdrawn and
apparently is pending at the Advice Section of the General Counsel’s
office awaiting decision in the present case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8
have been an unfair labor practice strike. Thus, at the time of
bargaining, as the Board had not yet decided if it would accept
the request for review, the employer ran substantial legal and
practical risks if it placed its bets on what the Board might do in
the future.
There does not seem to be any statutory provision or case
law directly on point. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party rely on such cases as Gitano Distribution Center, 308
NLRB 1172 fn. 21 (1992); Armco Steel Co. 312 NLRB 257
(1993); and Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975). But as the
Respondent points out, none of these cases directly holds that
after a unit clarification petition, the existing contract, insofar
as any newly created unit, should be rendered nugatory.
The General Counsel analogizes this case to RCA Del
Caribe, 262 NLRB 963 (1982), where the Board held that in
the face of an election petition by a rival union, an employer is
still required to continue to bargain with an incumbent union,
but that any contract executed will become null and void in the
event that the incumbent union is displaced.3
The Respondent contends that notwithstanding the unit clari-
fication proceeding, the Employer voluntarily entered into a
contract for the historical two plant unit and that the Board has
no authority to vacate or nullify that contract during its term.
Citing H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 99 (1970); Machinists
Lodge 91 v. United Technologies Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 116, 134
(D.Conn. 2000), affd. 230 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2000); and NLRB
v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
In my opinion, the Board, when it clarified the unit by sepa-
rating the new plant from the old, the consequence should be to
nullify the negotiated contract insofar as the new unit was con-
cerned. The Board having determined that there should now be
two separate collective-bargaining units it would, in my opin-
ion, be anomalous to hold that notwithstanding such conclu-
sion, the Employer will not be allowed, for a substantial period
of time, (until the termination of the existing contract), to bar-
gain in the newly created appropriate collective-bargaining
unit. Such a conclusion, in my opinion, would serve to vitiate
the whole purpose of having a unit clarification procedure,
which is a mechanism to resolve bargaining unit issues in an
orderly manner instead of having them spill out into conten-
tious bargaining, attended by potential strikes or lockouts.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO–CLC, Local #7912, has violated Section 8(b)(3) by refus-
ing to bargain collectively with U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., automotive
division in the following described unit:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 106 Longsack Drive, Chicopee, Massachu-
setts location, but excluding office clerical employees, techni-

3 Sec. 8(d) of the Act provides inter alia, that the duty to abide by an
existing collective-bargaining agreement will cease to exist, when “the
labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has
been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees
subject to the provisions of section 9(a) . . . .”
cal and professional employees, guards, supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees.

2. The unfair labor practice found herein affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Charging Party requests that the Remedy include some
provision which would prevent the Union from designating
employees from the Holyoke unit from participating in the
negotiations for the Chicopee unit. This request is denied as
each side is entitled to choose its own representatives and in the
absence of unusual circumstances, neither party may refuse to
bargain with the representatives chosen by the other party. Vic-
toria Packing Corp., 332 NLRB 597 (2000).
ORDER
The Respondent, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO–CLC, Local #7912, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain with U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., automotive
division, in following described appropriate unit.

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 106 Longsack Drive, Chicopee, Massachu-
setts location, but excluding office clerical employees, techni-
cal and professional employees, guards, supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees.

(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Employer in the appropriate
unit described above, concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the un-
derstanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Auburn, Massachusetts, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 1 after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 7912 (U.S. TSUBAKI) 9
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since August 29, 2000.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with U.S. Tsubaki, Inc.,
automotive division, in following described appropriate unit.

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, group leaders, and watchmen employed at
the Employer’s 106 Longsack Drive, Chicopee, Massachu-
setts location, but excluding office clerical employees, techni-
cal and professional employees, guards, supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL on request, bargain with U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., automo-
tive division in the unit described above and, if an understanding
is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.

UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–
CIO–CLC, LOCAL #7912