Southeastern Michigan Gas Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 7, 1972

198 N.L.R.B. 1221 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN GAS COMPANY 1221
Southeastern Michigan Gas Company and Utility
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO. Case
7-CA-9183
September 7, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On May 10, 1972, Trial Examiner Henry L. Jalette
issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an
answering brief to Respondent's exceptions and in
support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,[ and
conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herem.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders
that Respondent, Southeastern Michigan Gas Com-
pany, Port Huron, Michigan, its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a
Trial Examiner 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear
preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing his findings
2 We agree with the Trial Examiner for the reasons stated by him that
Respondent at no time prior to the actual termination of its wage increase
and boot purchase benefits , and the policies such benefits represented, gave
sufficient notice of such changes in working conditions to commence tolling
the 10(b) period. Thus, the 10(b) period did not begin to run until the
discontinuance of these benefits became evident, in the case of the wage
increase benefit, on June 28 , when Gerald Buckley was due for a work
performance review and a wage increase and did not receive either, and in
the case of the boot purchase benefit , in July, when the Respondent did not
purchase boots for the unit employees contra to its practice of the past 10
years These changes in working conditions constituted clear notice to all as
of those dates that Respondent had discontinued its wage increase and boot
purchase policies and benefits Accordingly, like the Trial Examiner, we
find that Respondent discontinued these benefits to unit employees within
the 10(b) period and therefore 10(b) does not bar the complaint Because of
these findings , we do not find it necessary to reach or pass on the Trial
Examiner's further findings that in the absence of an open and actual
change in working conditions, the 10(b) period can not be said to run until
notice is given to the Union as the employees' bargaining representative.
Chairman Miller finds the present case distinguishable on its facts from
General Motors Acceptance Corporation , 196 NLRB No 13, in which he and
Member Kennedy dissented . In the view of the dissent in that case, the
employer's freeze on merit increases clearly occurred in September 1968,
over a year prior to the commencement of the 10 (b) period and continued to
October 1970, i e , 3 to 4 months after the filing of the charge on June 10,
1970
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE, Trial Examiner : This case involves
allegations that Respondent violated Section 8 (a)(1) and
(5) of the Act by making changes in working conditions
without notice to or consultation with the above-named
Union which had been certified as the bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent's employees in an appropriate
unit . The charge was filed on December 23, 1971, and
pursuant thereto complaint issued on January 28, 1972.
Hearing was held in Port Huron , Michigan , on March 6,
1972.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses , and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
General Counsel and Respondent , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE FACTS
Respondent is a public utility with its principal office
and place of business in Port Huron , Michigan.[ It
employs about 290 employees, about 110 of whom have
been represented for some period of time by the Union.
This group of employees is not involved herein. The group
of employees involved herein is a unit of meter readers who
were not represented by a labor organization before June
25, 1971.2 On that date, pursuant to a petition filed by the
Union on May 18, and an election on June 17, the Union
was certified.
For a period of about 10 years, Respondent had the
practice of providing boots for its meter readers twice a
year , in January and July , at a cost to the employees of $8
a pair.3
For about 20 years, Respondent had also followed the
policy of reviewing the work performance of each
employee 6 months from the anniversary date of his
employment and every 6 months thereafter . It has been
Respondent 's policy upon making such a review to grant to
employees a wage increase of 5 percent . 4 No employee in
the unit, who was deemed to be performing his work
satisfactorily and who was retained in employment, was
ever denied the standard increase at the time of such
review.
About June 3 or 10, meter reader Gerald Buckley asked
his supervisor , Lester Nevins , whether they were going to
i Jurisdiction is not in issue . The complaint alleges, the answer admits,
and I find that Respondent meets the Board's standards for the assertion of
jurisdiction
2 Unless otherwise indicated , all dates appearing hereinafter are in 1971.
3 The employees purchased the boots at a shoe store specified by
Respondent and Respondent was billed for the boots They cost about $35,
but Respondent would bill employees only $8
4 For several years the wage increase was $5. but a few years ago the
policy was changed to give a wage increase of 12 to 13 cents per hour or 5
percent depending on which was greater.
198 NLRB No. 8
1222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
receive their boots in July. Since Buckley had received his
last raise under the work performance review policy in
January, he also asked Nevins whether he would be getting
a wage increase. Nevins told him, "They're going to be
held up until after the election so that it doesn't sway the
votes."
The election was held on June 17, and a day or two
thereafter Buckley spoke to Nevins about the matter again
and this time Nevins told him that the boots and the wage
increase would have to be bargained between the Union
and the Company across the table.
Employee Edward Glaza had been scheduled for an
increase on May 17, and apparently it had been decided to
grant it to him because his personnel record contains an
entry showing an increase of 17 cents per hour on May 17.
As was customary, Respondent had not advised Glaza he
was getting the increase. After the RC petition was filed,
Respondent revoked the increase . When Glaza did not
receive the increase in his June paycheck, he asked Nevins
about it and Nevins told him the same thing he had told
Buckley.
Glaza spoke to Nevins again after the election, but he
had so little understanding of Nevins' statement to him
about Respondent's position that he could not articulate at
the hearing what it was Nevins told him.
Nevins did not deny the statements attributed to him by
Buckley and Glaza. He testified that before the election,
because of the questions of employees about the boots and
wage increases, he asked Respondent's controller, Orville
Wilson, what the Company's position was and was
instructed to tell the employees that if the Company
granted any raises or privileges it could be interpreted as
an unfair labor practice. Nevins testified this was what he
told the employees.
After the election, it was not clear in Nevins' mind what
the Company's position was on these benefits and he spoke
to Wilson again and was told to tell the employees the
benefits were negotiable items. This was what Nevins told
the employees.
Since the conversation described above, Respondent has
not purchased boots for the meter readers,5 nor has it
conducted any work performance reviews for the meter
readers. Such reviews are still conducted for, and raises
granted to, nonrepresented employees.
The first negotiating session between the Union and
Respondent was held on September 21. The Union
presented a one-page list of demands which included a
request for a maintenance of standards, and which
requested that Respondent pick up the full cost of the
boots and that it negotiate new wage rates for meter
readers, with increases on a semiannual basis with a 4-year
progression from minimum to maximum rate. As of the
date of the hearing, no agreement on a contract had been
reached.
II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The gravamen of the complaint is that since June 25
Respondent discontinued the policies of purchasing boots
for its meter readers and of reviewing their work perform-
ance and granting wage increases , and that Respondent
did so without notice to or consultation with the Union,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The facts presented above are undisputed. It is clear that
Respondent did not notify or consult with the Union prior
to the discontinuance of the policies in question. It is
equally clear that such policies had been maintained in
effect by .Respondent for many years and that both policies
involved conditions of employment and were mandatory
subjects of bargaining . Respondent asserts what I construe
to be two defenses. One is that the wage increases here in
question were discretionary increases and that had it
granted wage increases during the preelection period it
could have been accused of violating Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act and had it granted wage increases after the election it
could have been accused of violating Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
As to its fears of violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
Respondent cites N.L.R.B. v. Dorn's Transportation Co.,
405 F.2d 706 (C.A. 2), and J. J. Newberry Company v.
N.L.R.B., 442 F.2d 897 (C.A. 2); as to its fears of violating
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, Respondent cites N.LR.B. v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736.
In my judgment , Respondent's defense is wholly lacking
in merit , because here , unlike the cases cited by Respon-
dent , the work performance review program and accompa-
nying wage increases were not truly discretionary . Respon-
dent's program has only the appearance of being discre-
tionary. Company policy called for a standard increase if
an employee was performing satisfactorily. The record
indicates that review of employee work performance is
conducted in a perfunctory manner and consists of hardly
anything more than an inquiry by controller Wilson of
Supervisor Nevins as to whether an employee is working
satisfactorily. The review is no perfunctory that no
employee in the unit who was retained as an employee was
ever denied the standard increase . It is so perfunctory that
the matter is not even discussed with the employee. Thus,
as in Glaza's case , the standard wage increase was granted
to him and an entry was made on his personnel record
without his even knowing of it . A work performance review
program administered in such a way cannot be found to be
discretionary. It is true that company policy allowed for
the grant of an increase greater or less than the standard,
but that is really not the issue here . The issue is not what
might have been done, but what had Respondent been
doing. As the court acknowledged in J. J. Newberry v.
N.L.R.B., the rule followed by the Board respecting an
employer's obligations when organizational activities are
pending is as follows:
An employer's legal duty in deciding whether to
grant benefits while a representation case is pending is
to determine that question precisely as he would if a
union were not in the picture. If the employer would
have granted the benefits because of economic circum-
stances unrelated to union organization, the grant of
those benefits will not violate the Act. On the other
hand, if the employer's course is altered by virtue of the
5 One employee purchased boots before Respondent knew the meter
readers were seeking an election.
SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN GAS COMPANY
union's presence, then the employer has violated the
Act, and this is true whether he confers benefits
because of the union or withholds them because of the
union. [McCormick Longmeadow Stone Co. 158 NLRB
1237, 1242.1
Because the court did not believe the rule was applied in
such a consistent manner that an employer could know
how to guide himself in his particular situation and
because it believed that he faced a "damned if you do,
damned if you don't" position, it declined enforcement of
the Board's order. 1, of course, am bound by the Board's
decisions both in J. J. Newberry and Dorn's Transportation,
supra. But apart from that consideration, in my opinion,
the court of appeals in N.L.R.B. v. Dothan Eagle, 434 F.2d
93, 98 (C.A. 5), exposed the fallacy of the assertion that the
employer faces such a dilemna about how to conduct
himself during an organizational period. As the court
stated,
At first glance it might appear that the employer is
caught between the proverbial "devil and the deep blue
sea." It is an unfair labor practice to grant a wage
increase during the campaign and bargaining periods,
but at the same time it may be an unfair labor practice
to refuse to grant an increase during this same period.
Indeed, the employer in this case has made just this sort
of an argument, claiming that it could not grant the
pressroom employees their normal progression raises
since to do so would have been an unfair labor
practice. We find little merit in such arguments. The
cases make it crystal clear that the vice involved in both
the unlawful increase situation and the unlawful refusal
to increase situation is that the employer has changed
the existing conditions of employment. It is this change
which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the
unfair labor practice charge.
That was the situation here. All that Respondent was
required to do was to grant the increases it had normally
granted before the advent of the Union. This it failed to do.
An essential element of Respondent's defense is that it
acted in good faith in suspending the policies in question.
The record does not support the assertion of good faith,
because even if the wage increases were discretionary,
there was no exercise of discretion involved in the boot
purchase policy. Nevertheless, that policy, as well as the
wage increase policy, was suspended. In my judgment,
Respondent's suspension of that policy belies its assertion
that it was acting in good faith to avoid committing an
unfair labor practice. For the foregoing reasons, I reject
Respondent's contention that it was justified in discontinu-
ing the wage increase and boot purchase policies.
Respondent's second defense is that it discontinued both
policies before the election on June 17, at a time when it
had no obligation to bargain and at a time exceeding the 6-
month period of limitation provided by Section 10(b) of
the Act.6 Interestingly enough, in its brief, Respondent
refers to the change respecting the two policies in question
as a discontinuance or suspension of policies. Of course,
there is a difference between the discontinuance of policies
and the suspension of policies, a difference too obvious to
6 "That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the
1223
require a definition here of the meaning of the two terms.
And the record only supports Respondent 's use of the term
"suspension ." Thus, before the election , employees were
told the boots and wage increases would be ". . . held up
until after the election so it doesn 't sway the vote." This
means a suspension of benefits until after the election, and
while the remark was silent about the status of the benefits
after the election , it is evident that the benefits would be
restored after the election if a majority of the employees
did not vote for the Union . Controller Wilson admitted, in
effect , that this was the situation when he testified , "If the
Union was voted down , then the practice would probably
be continued ." As Wilson testified further , "Now I tried to
make it clear to the union fellows that I didn ' t know what
would happen , because this type of conversation . . . I
ddn't tell them yes, we'd give them to them if the union
loses. I tried to specifically stay from anything that would
be a promise or the ...." Wilson 's meaning is clear; any
decision to discontinue the benefits in question was
dependent on the outcome of the election . If the employees
selected the Union as their bargaining representative, the
benefits were to be discontinued and made a subject of
negotiations; if the employees rejected union representa-
tion ; the benefits would be resumed. Under the circum-
stances , it cannot be held for purposes of barring the
complaint pursuant to Section 10(b) that Respondent
discontinued the benefits before the election . Rather,
benefits were suspended to abide the event of the election.
In concluding that the benefits in question were merely
suspended pending the outcome of the election, I am
rejecting the testimony of Controller Wilson that no
decision to discontinue the benefits was made after the
election . Such testimony is at odds with his testimony
described above of the probability of the resumption of the
benefits if the Union was rejected. Furthermore, if the
decision to discontinue the benefits was final, this was not
communicated to the employees . Even Nevins did not
understand and had to ask Wilson after the election what
was the status of the benefits . The 10(b) period cannot
have started to run, therefore , until some time after the
election.
General Counsel appears to be contending that the 10(b)
period does not begin to run until there has been notice to
the employees and implementation of the decision . I agree
with him that absent notice of a change in working
conditions the 10(b) period does not begin to run . Russell-
Newman Manufacturing, Inc., 167 NLRB 1112. However,
where clear notice of a decision affecting working
conditions has been given, the 10(b) period begins to run
even though the decision may not have been implemented.
Swift Service Stores, 169 NLRB 359 suggests otherwise, but
a careful reading of the decision indicates that Section
10(b) was deemed not to bar the complaint therein,
because the conduct in question involved the implementa-
tion within the 10(b) period of a company rule that was
discriminatory on its face (see fn . 8, p. 360). Nor does L C.
Cassidy & Son, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 134, support a finding
that there must be both clear notice of a decision to change
working conditions and implementation of the decision
Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such
charge is made. "
1224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
before 10(b) begins to run. True, the Trial Examiner made
a statement that appears to stand for such a proposition
when he stated,
Moreover, notwithstanding any prior intention to
discontinue these benefits in the future , the actual
alteration in the preexisting working conditions oc-
curred when Respondent refused to pay these benefits
in circumstances in which they had previously been
paid.
Significantly, he cited Swift Service Stores, supra, for this
proposition, which I find distinguishable herein; moreover,
it is clear that his rejection of the 10(b) defense was based
on a finding that there was no notice to the employees or
the Union of the change in working conditions until the
decision to discontinue benefits was actually implemented
within the 10(b) period.
In short, under certain circumstances, the actual imple-
mentation of a decision to change working conditions may
constitute the first and only notice to employees that a
decision has been made to change working conditions.
Under those circumstances, 10(b) does not begin to run
until the actual alteration of working conditions. But the
issue is still the same; namely, was there notice, and, if so,
when.
In this case, there is no question of notice by implemen-
tation of the postelection decision prior to June 23, the
10(b) date. The earliest the wage increase decision could
have been implemented was on June 28 when Gerry
Buckley was due for a work performance review and a
wage increase. As to the boots, new boots were not
scheduled until July. Accordingly, the 10(b) period can be
found to have started to run before June 23 only if between
June 17, the date of the election, and before June 23, when
Respondent gave clear notice of its decision.
General Counsel urges that I find that notice was not
given to the employees until Nevins spoke to them as a
group and that this occurred on or after June 23. Nevins
did not testify about the date of this communication, but
General Counsel contends it had to be after Buckley and
Glaza spoke to Nevins, or they would not have approached
Nevins. However, both Buckley and Glaza dated their
conversations as of 1 or 2 days after the election, which
would be June 18 or 19, and Nevins told them then that the
benefits were subject to negotiation. In my opinion, there is
no reason to believe that he waited until June 23 to tell the
remainder of the employees, and I find that his remarks to
the employees were made before June 23.
However, I find that the statements of Nevins were
insufficient to constitute notice of a change in conditions
of employment so as to start the running of the 10(b)
period. The remarks to the employees were ambiguous to
constitute notice. They were not told the benefits in
question had been discontinued; they were merely told
they were negotiable. Of course they were; as conditions of
employment, Respondent was free to inject them into the
negotiations and to try to bargain them away. Until then,
they continued in effect. As a matter of fact, to the extent
that employee Glaza had any understanding of Nevins'
remarks it was that while the benefits could be lost through
bargaining, they were not yet lost.
Apart from the foregoing, it appears to me that where an
employer had not communicated his intentions about
changes in working conditions by an open and actual
alteration in working conditions , 10(b) cannot be said to
run until he gives notice to the union . As bargaining
representative , it is the union that is entitled to notice and
not the employees.? Such notice was never given.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the charge was
timely filed and that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by making changes in working
conditions without notice to or consultation with the
Union.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section I,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed therein , have a close , intimate , and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As to Respondent's failure to conduct work performance
reviews and to grant wage increases , I shall recommend
that Respondent resume its work performance reviews,
that it grant wage increases in accordance with its past
practice, and that it make all employees whole by payment
of the amounts of wage increases they have been deprived
of by reason of Respondent's unlawful conduct, to which
shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum
in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
As to the boot purchase policy, I shall recommend that
Respondent resume the policy. At the time of the hearing,
it appeared that in light of Respondent's change in policy
employees had not been purchasing any boots, and
General Counsel urges that employees nevertheless be
reimbursed the dollar value of new boots, less $8 per pair,
on the theory that the boots provided by Respondent were
in the nature of wages. I find merit in this position. A
recommendation that Respondent resume its practice of
purchasing boots, without more, would permit Respondent
to profit from its own wrongdoing at the expense of its
employees who have been constrained to wear boots
which, as employee Glaza put it, were "starting to curl on
the ends" at the time of the hearing. Accordingly, I shall
recommend that Respondent make employees whole for
the value of the benefit of which they were unlawfully
deprived when Respondent discontinued its boot purchase
policy by paying them the dollar value of the boots
7 Although the Union was not certified until June 25, Respondent's the employees voted for the Union N L R B v Laney & Duke Co, 369 F 2d
obligation to recognize and deal with it arose on June 17 when a majority of 859, 866 (C A 5)
SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN GAS COMPANY
customarily purchased, less the $8 per pair customarily
paid by the employees, with interest at 6 percent per
annum . Cf. K-D Manufacturing Company, 169 NLRB 57.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Southeastern Michigan Gas Company is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, and
its affiliate Local 473, are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All meter readers employed by Respondent at its
Port Huron, Michigan, installation, exclusive of office
clerical employees, collectors, chief meter readers, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Local 473, Utility Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is
the exclusive representative of the employees of Respon-
dent in the above-described unit within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By discontinuing its work performance review and
wage increase policy and its boot purchase policy, without
notice to or consultation with the Union certified as the
exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate
unit, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and
(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 8
ORDER
Respondent, Southeastern Michigan Gas Company, Port
Huron, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with Local 473, Utility Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, by unilaterally changing condi-
tions of employment by discontinuing the work perform-
ance review program and wage increase policy and by
discontinuing the boot purchase policy.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the
above-named organization, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to
refrain from any or all activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local 473,
Utility Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the unit described above
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Resume the work performance review program and
wage increase policy and make whole all employees in the
1225
appropriate unit for all wage increases which they were
deprived of by reason of Respondent's unlawful discontin-
uance of the policy by payment to them of the amount of
the increases they would have received in accordance with
Respondent's established policy in accordance with the
recommendations set forth in the section of this decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Resume the boot purchase policy and make whole all
employees in the appropriate unit for any losses they have
suffered by reason of Respondent's unlawful discontin-
uance of the policy by paying to them the dollar value of
the boots customarily purchased, less the $8 per pair
customarily paid by the employees, in accordance with the
recommendations set forth in the section of this decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records relevant and
necessary for a determination of the amounts due
employees under the terms of this recommended Order.
(e) Post at its Port Huron, Michigan, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.10
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Board ' s Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , recommenda-
tions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided by Sec 02.48 of
said Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
10 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT change conditions of employment by
discontinuing our work performance review program
and wage increase policy and our boot purchase policy
without notification to, and bargaining with, Local 473,
Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO.
1226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL resume our work performance review
program and grant wage increases in accordance with
our past practice and WE WILL make all employees in
the appropriate unit whole for any wage increases
which they were unlawfully deprived of by paying them
the amounts of the increase due them.
WE WILL resume our boot purchase policy and WE
WILL pay all employees in the appropriate unit the
dollar value of the boots which they were unlawfully
deprived of, less the $8 per pair customarily paid by the
employees.
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, 500'
Book Building , 1249 Washington Boulevard , Detroit,
Michigan 48226 , Telephone 313-226-3200.
SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN
GAS COMPANY
(Employer)