Sigo Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 8, 1964

146 N.L.R.B. 1484 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

1484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees , technical employees , experimental and development employees , confiden-
tial employees , and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Local 824, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-
CIO, was on February 11, 1948, and at all times since has been the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in the above-described unit for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining.
5. By refusing on certain dates in February, March, and April, 1963, and at all
times thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of all the employees in the aforesaid unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor . practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By said acts the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced their
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a-)( I) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Sigo Corporation and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO. Cases [Vos. 94-CA-17.3'4, 24-CA-1794, and ^0/.-I?C-
2216. May 8, 19641
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS
OF ELECTION
On December 4, 1963, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De-
cision. He also found that the Respondent had interfered with an
election .held on July 3, 1963,- and recommended that it be set aside.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
these cases to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Leedom and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in- this proceeding, and, finding merit in the exceptions
of the Respondent, hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner only insofar as consistent with our
Decision and Order.
146 NLRB No. 171.
J
SIGO CORPORATION 1485
The facts herein, which were almost entirely stipulated, show that
the Union began organizing the Respondent's employees about the
middle of February 1963, and thereafter filed charges in Case No.
24-CA-1734, alleging violations of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the
Act. On May 8, 1963, the Respondent and the Union executed a
settlement agreement with respect to these charges, which was ap-
proved by the Regional Director. In it the Respondent, without ad-
mitting any violations of the Act, agreed that it would reinstate an
employee; that it would not discourage union membership, interrogate
employees concerning union membership, threaten reprisals against
employees or make promises of benefit to induce them to refrain from
engaging in union activities, or engage in surveillance of union activi-
ties; and that it would post a notice to this effect.
On June 5, 1963, the Union filed a representation petition, but with-
drew this petition on June 13. A notice of the withdrawal, dated that
same day, was sent to the Respondent, and was received by the Re-
spondent on June 17. At approximately 10:15 on the morning of
June 17, Olivari, the Respondent's general manager, in a speech to the
employees, announced the withdrawal of the Union's petition, said the
Respondent "was going to offer them a medical and insurance plan"
and that the plan was "already a fact," 1 and outlined the benefits
under this plan. Later that same day, the Union in Case No. 24-RC-
2216 filed a second representation petition.
On June 20, a representative of the insurance company, which had
contracted with the Respondent to provide the new insurance, called
the employees individually into Olivari's office, where they filled out
and signed insurance forms. On June 24, the Respondent distributed
to its employees a document prepared by the insurance company which
stated that an "Insurance and Hospital Plan" became effective on
Julie 20, and presented a brief description of the benefits under this
plan.
On June 24, the Respondent and the Union entered into a stipulation
for a consent election. On July 2, however, the Union filed charges in
Case No. 24--CA=1794, alleging that the Respondent by, among other
things, "making certain promises of benefit and the implementation
of an insurance plan," had violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The
Union lost the consent election, held on July 3, and filed timely objec-
tions. The Regional Director, on August 6, withdrew his approval
of the settlement agreement and revived the charges in Case No.
'The record shows that this was the phrase used by Olivarl , although the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision states that Olivari announced "that the plan was already in effect."
As the record does not show when the Respondent made Its arrangements with the in-
surance company , our dissenting colleague 's conclusion that the Respondent spoke "appar-
ently falsely " Is not established by the record.
1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
24-CA-1734, consolidated that case with Case No. 24-CA-1794, and,
on August 15, -consolidated both cases with the representation case
objections for hearing.
1. Cases Nos. 24-CA-1734 and 24-CA-1794
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act, in Case No. 24-CA-1794, by Olivari's June 17
speech announcing an insurance plan at a time when "organizational
activities had for some time been engaged in, to the Company's knowl-
edge," and by the June 24 distribution of information about the plan;
and, in addition, that the announcement. of the insurance plan was
a' breach of the provision in the settlement agreement, entered into
by the Respondent in Case No. 24-CA-1734, that the Respondent
would not make offers of benefit. The Trial Examiner, accordingly,
affirmed the. Regional Director's withdrawal of the approval of the set-
tlement agreement and found; on the basis of the charges in that case,
that the Respondent further violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by
threats, interrogation, and surveillance.
The Respondent contends, however, that, as to the June 17 speech
offering the insurance plan; a "question concerning representation did
not exist since. a few days earlier the Union had unequivocably [sic]
withdrawn its election petition . . . and that such withdrawal
amounted to .... disclaimer or interest by the petitioning Union." In
the circumstances of this case, we find merit in this contention. Thus,
the ' Respondent was notified, on June 17, that the Union had, on
June 13, withdrawn its petition, with no reason given for this action,
and no notice that the Union intended to continue its organizational
activity or to file another petition. There was, furthermore, no evi-
dence of any organizational activity since the withdrawal of the peti-
tion. Under these circumstances, the Respondent could assume, rea-
sonably, that the Union had lost interest in organizing the employees,
or that the organizing campaign was to be held in abeyance for the time
.being. As the Respondent was not informed as to the Union's inten-
tions, its assumption was, in these circumstances, at least as reasonable
as an assumption that the Union was about to file another petition. We
cannot base an unfair labor practice finding on the premise that the Re-
spondent should have drawn a different conclusion from the circum-
stances. Accordingly, we find that the General Counsel has not es-
tablished that the Respondent, by announcing the insurance plan on
.June 17, violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, as it was not shown that
such announcement was intended to interfere with the employees' Sec-
tion 7 rights? We find further that the Respondent's subsequent im-
2 Cf. N.L.R.B. v . Exchange Parts Company , 375 U.S. 405.
SIGO CORPORATION 1487.
plementation of the insurance plan, although occurring after the filing
of the Union's second petition, was not violative of Section 8 (a) (1)
as it was pursuant to and in furtherance of-the June 17 announcement
of the plan 3
We likewise find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the June 17
announcement of the insurance plan was not a breach of the settlement
agreement, which did not preclude the Respondent from making any
and all promises of benefit, but only promises of benefit "to induce
them [the employees] to refrain from joining or continuing their mem-
bership in or activities on behalf of the Union or other labor organi-
zation." Therefore, only -a promise of benefit which would be a
violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act- would be a breach of the
terms of the settlement agreement, and we have found that the Re-
spondent's announcement of the insurance plan was not a violation of
Section. 8(a) (1). ,
In'view of the foregoing findings, that.the Respondent has not vio-
lated Section 8(a) (1) or breached the settlement agreement, we shall
not, as the Trial Examiner did, go ,behind the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, we do not adopt the findings of the Trial Examiner,
based on the charges in Case No. 24-CA-1734, that the Respondent en-
gaged in threats, interrogation, and surveillance in violation of Section
8(a)(1)of the Aet4
Accordingly, as we have reversed each of the Trial Examiner's find-
ings of violations of the Act, we shall dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
2. Case No. 24-RC-2216
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's dissemination of
information on June 24 regarding its newly instituted insurance plan,
in addition to violating Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, interfered with
9 The dissenting opinion finds evidence of bad faith in the Respondent 's June 24 dis-
tribution of information regarding the newly instituted insurance plan on the ground
that the Respondent ' s "sole purpose " was "to emphasize the benefit it granted them. . . .
The record , however , does not indicate that the specific information which was made
available had been furnished to the employees prior to this time. In the present cir-
cumstances , we cannot agree that the furnishing of specific details concerning a plan
previously outlined would have the necessary or natural tendency to interfere with the
employees ' exercise of their Section 7 rights.
I Wooster Brass Company , 80 NLRB 1633, 1634.
The Trial Examiner ' s findings of threats, interrogation, and surveillance were based on
the alleged violations which were the subject of the May 8 settlement agreement. At the
hearing, however , the parties agreed , with the Trial Examiner 's approval , that they would
not litigate these alleged violations , and that, if the conduct regarding the insurance
plan was found to be unlawful , the Board 's Decision and Order could include remedial
provisions covering these alleged violations , without the Respondent admitting the allega-
tions. Apart from the fact that we have found that the Respondent 's postsettlement
conduct did not violate the Act, we find that the Trial Examiner was precluded by the
parties' agreement from finding the violations of the Act based on the presettlement
charges.
744-670-65-vol. 116=95
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the July 3 election, and he recommended that the election be set aside
on this ground. As we have found, however, that this conduct was not
violative of the Act, there is no basis for upsetting the election. As
the Union failed to secure a majority of the valid votes cast, we shall
certify the results of the election.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
[The Board certified that a majority of the valid votes in the elec-
tion in Case No. 24-RC-2216 was not cast for Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America , AFL-CIO, and that said labor organization is
not the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found
appropriate.]
MEMBER BROWN, dissenting :
On the facts herein and for the reasons stated in his Decision, I
would affirm the Trial Examiner and find that Respondent committed
the Section 8 (a) (1) violations alleged.
My colleagues find meritorious the Respondent's contention that the
Union's withdrawal of its petition on June , 13 constituted a disclaimer
of interest and, therefore , a question concerning representation did
not exist at the time of the Respondent 's June 17 speech promising
insurance benefits. I am not aware of any Board precedent to support
this equation of a withdrawal with a disclaimer . Nor is the existence
of a procedural "question concerning representation " a prerequisite
to a finding that promises of benefits in the midst of employee organi-
zational activities interfere with the employees ' Section 7 rights in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the-Act.
In my view , the fact that the Union involved withdrew its pending
petition does not.support an assumption on the part of the Employer
that his employees abandoned their organizational efforts. Indeed,
Respondent 's knowledge of the concerted activity of its employees
was not dependent upon or attributable to the filing of the petition
by the Union on June 5 , but preceded , such petition as evidenced by the
settlement agreement entered into by Respondent on May 8. Also there
are too many other possible reasons for such withdrawal to -permit
a conclusive presumption of abandonment of interest in representation,
as the majority , in effect, does, merely because no explanation. was
supplied in the announcement of withdrawal . Where, as here, an
employer, with knowledge of union activity, -announces an insurance
plan to its employees only 1 hour after, it has received notification
that the petition was withdrawn , the timing itself suggests that the
benefit is in the nature of a reward . In these circumstances , I would
not find persuasive Respondent 's assertion that it assumed .employee
interest in collective bargaining had ceased because it was not aware
of any organizational activity occurring within the last several days.
SIGO CORPORATION 1489
Had Respondent's purpose been so blameless ' as my colleagues are
willing to assume, it would have refrained on June 24 from distribut-
ing the announcement of the insurance benefits granted effective
June 20. For it unquestionably had direct knowledge of substantial
employee interest in representation at that time through the refiling
of the representation petition on June 17. Indeed, Respondent had,
that very day, entered into the stipulation for a consent election and
knew that an election was pending. The Respondent had announced,
apparently falsely, on June 17, that the insurance plan was already in
effect and the employees had no reason to believe otherwise. Whether
or not the June 17 announcement was false, the sole purpose to be
served by distributing the June 24 announcement after the petition
was refiled would be to emphasize the benefit it granted them when
the Union withdrew its prior petition.
When the Respondent made promises of benefits to employees on
June 17, it engaged in the very same type of conduct it had committed
itself not to pursue in the settlement agreement executed little more
than a month before. Under well-settled Board and court precedent's
this opens the Respondent's entire course of conduct to scrutiny.
In these circumstances, I would affirm the Trial Examiner's Decision,
find the violations, and set the election aside.
5 That settlement agreements must be given effect for a reasonable period of time if
they are to effectuate the purposes of the Act is well established . See The Wallace
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248, affg. 141 F . 2d 87 ( C.A. 4), enfg . 50 NLRB 138;
Poole Foundry and Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, enfd. 192 F . 2d. 740 (C.A. 4), cert.
denied 342 U.S. 954. See also Wooster Brass Co., footnote 4, supra, where -the time in-
volved was 10 months but the determining factor was the type of conduct engaged in
rather than the lapse of time.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
The complaint herein , as amended (issued August 6, 1963; charges filed Febru-
ary 28, March 27, and April 15, 1963, in 24-CA-1734, and on July 2, 1963, in
24-CA-1794), alleges that the Company has violated Section 8(a) (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by threats, interrogation , surveil-
lance, and promises of benefit; and that a settlement agreement was entered into but
thereafter violated (24-CA-1794) by further promises of benefit and by distribution
of an announcement of such benefits. The answer, as amended, denies the allega-
tions of violation, and alleges that the Regional Director's withdrawal of approval
of the settlement and his revival of the earlier charges were arbitrary and capricious
and contrary to the law and Board policy. As separate defenses, the Company al-
leges that it lawfully exercised its freedom of speech , that no question of representa-
tion existed when it announced and contracted for the medical and insurance plan
in question, and that present consideration of the presettlement allegations depends
on finding of postsettlement violation. By order of the Regional Director dated Au-
gust 15, 1963, the representation proceeding was consolidated with these cases for
hearing and decision said order reciting that the objections are based upon the same
conduct as is alleged to be violative in 24-CA-1794.
A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan at Ponce, Puerto Rico,
on August 26, 1963. Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, a brief has been filed
by the Company, the time to file briefs having been extended. Short and' to the
point, that brief has been carefully prepared , noting that this is a case of first
impression.
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
.Upon the entire record, in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
I. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was admitted and I find that the Company, a Puerto Rico corporation with
principal office and place of business in Yauco, Puerto Rico, is engaged in the manu-
facture of sweaters and shirts; that during the 12 months preceding issuance of the
complaint it purchased and had delivered to its plant in Yauco goods and materials
valued at more than $50,000, which originated at points outside the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico; and that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It was admitted and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Whatever prior activities had existed, the Union commenced its own organiza-
tional activities at the Company about the middle of February 1963. Thereafter
charges were filed in 24-CA-1734, alleging that the Company had violated the Act.
On May 8, the Company and the Union entered into a settlement agreement, which
was then approved by the Regional Director, all conditioned on observance of the
terms thereof and the Company's promise that it would not engage in violations sim-
ilar to those previously charged.
On June 5 the Union filed a representation petition which was thereafter with-
drawn, notice of such withdrawal being sent to the Company on or about June 13
and received on June 17. About 10: 15 on the morning of the latter date, Olivari,
the Company's general manager, addressing a meeting of the employees, told them
that the Union had withdrawn its election petition, that the Company was going to
offer them a medical and insurance plan, and that the plan was already in effect; and
he outlined to the employees the benefits under the plan. On the afternoon of the
same day, June 17, the Union filed another representation petition, that in the
proceeding before us. A stipulation for a consent election was entered into on
June 24 and approved the next day; the election was held on July 3; the Union lost
and filed the objections which are now.before us.
Under the plan, the insurance company required each employee to fill out and sign
a form of application for the group policy, and on June 20. the employees individually
filled out and signed the form in Olivari's office as they were called in by the insurance
company's representative. On the 24th the Company distributed to each of the em-
ployees a copy of a document which had been sent to it by. the insurance company for
such distribution. This document was to the effect that the Company had entered
into a contract with the insurance company, effective June 20, the contract providing
for employee benefits in event of certain contingencies, the extent of coverage being
therein set forth together with certain provisions concerning payments.
Olivari's speech of June 17 and the June 24 distribution are alleged in 24-CA-1794
to be breaches of the settlement agreement, violative of Section 8(a) (1), and basis
for recission of the agreement and for findings of the earlier violations as alleged in
24-CA-1734. Unless the plan were introduced during and with knowledge of or-
ganizational activities and tended to interfere with such activities, it might be lawful
for an employer to place a medical and insurance plan into effect after a petition
has been filed but where the plan was agreed upon before such filing. Thus the
Board might not want to deprive employees of the benefits of an insurance plan and
would presumably not hold that such plan be held in abeyance.' But here we have
the fact that, whether a petition was pending or not when the insurance contract
was agreed upon,2 the organizational activities had for some time been engaged in,
to the Company's knowledge.
The law is well settled that, with an election pending, an employer may not cam-
paign with such indicia of benefit. The natural effect of the distribution "was to
convince the employees that they did not need a union in order to obtain . . . im-
I Cf., in another situation, Salant & Salant, Inc., 88 NLRB 816, 821, and many similar
expressions.
2 We have noted supra, as stipulated, that 0livarl told the employees on June 17 that
the contract was in effect. But the document distributed to the employees and read into
.the record declares that the plan was effective on June 20.
SIGO CORPORATION 1491
provements in their conditions of employment." 3 To permit an employer under
such circumstances as here to contract for and announce an insurance plan would be
to condone interference by benefit or promise thereof with the employees' free choice
in organizational activities and with the laboratory conditions which the Board seeks=
to maintain. I find violation in Olivari's speech of June 17 and in the distribution
of June 24.
The violation thus found warrants withdrawal of approval of the settlement agree-
ment and revival of the earlier charges so that the prior events are now before us..
For this reason and on the basis of the stipulation entered into at the hearing that a=
remedy may be directed to cover the allegations of earlier violation (although these:
are not admitted) if the later violations be found, and that the Company's rights con-
cerning the latter violations are preserved, I find that the allegations of presettlement
violation have been sustained and that a remedial order with respect thereto should
be issued.
To say that the Company's acts on June 20 and 24 were required by the insurance
company and therefore were not acts for which the Company should be held liable
is to overlook the fact that the Company is responsible for the arrangement which it
claims it entered into with the insurer on June 17. That arrangement was initiated
(even without stressing its consummation) . after the organizational activities had
commenced, and this brings us back to the ground already noted for finding violation.
Neither the rule nor the reasoning of the court in Exchange Parts,4 cited by counsel
for the Company, has been adopted by the Board, whose petition for certiorari in
that case has been granted. Nor need we here suggest that an employer must deny
to its employees any advantages which, in the absence of the organizational campaign,
would have been granted; there is no evidence before us that such advantages would
thus have been offered or even that they had earlier been contemplated.
All of this having been noted, another basis exists for finding the postsettlement
violations. Not only were the postsettlement acts violative for the reasons found
supra, but they also breached a condition of the settlement agreement. That agree-
ment, although entered into without admission or finding of earlier violation, imposed
upon the Company the obligation, among others, not to make promises of benefit
in connection with protected concerted activities. There had been an allegation of
prior violation by promises of benefit, and the settlement agreement provided that
compliance with its various provisions (including that relating to promises of benefit)
was a condition of the agreement. Thus aside from any finding of violation of
Section 8(a) (1) in the postsettlement acts, the terms of the settlement agreement and
its violation bring the earlier allegations before us; and violation may in this case
be found in the earlier acts because of the breach of the settlement agreement.
Under this alternative approach it would be necessary to take proof of the allegations
of earlier violation since the stipulation concerning them does not apply in the
absence of proof of the later allegations.
III. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
With respect to the objections 5 to the election; it was agreed that the decision is to
be limited to the distribution of June 24. While the Board in West Texas Equipment
Co,npany,5 cited by the General Counsel, restated its rule that objectionable conduct
on the day of the beginning of the critical period (June 1-7 here) would be considered
as a basis for setting aside an election, I am reluctant to ignore the stipulation which
limits us to the events of June 24. Although proof of facts may control in the face
of a contrary stipulation or agreement by counsel, the stipulations here concerning
the facts were entered into at the hearing after the stipulation which limited to one
allegation of the complaint the consideration and decision on the objections to the
8 Bonaait Teller, Inc., 96 NLRB 608, 609 . See.also Imperial Eastman Corporation, 139
NLRB 1255, 1259. The interference is to be found even though no strings were attached
to the offer or benefit. Indiana Metal Products Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 202 F. 2d 613,
620 (C.A. 7), enfg. 100 NLRB 1040, 1043.
4 AT.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 304 F. 2d 368 (C.A. 5).
51n its brief, the Company for the. first time makes the claim that the tally of ballots
"appears to be dated and furnished August 8, 1963," and that the Union's objections to
the election, filed on August 15, were not timely under the Board 's rules (Section 102.69).
It appears from the exhibit received (General Counsel's Exhibit 1-L), tally of ballots with
post office return receipt attached, that the tally was mailed to and received by the
Union on August 13. .
8142 NLRB 1358.
1492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
election. Aside from what the Board might generally consider equitable (the exercise
,of discretion which the Company's brief generously declares to be mine is in fact
the Board's), the earlier stipulation may be deemed to be at least partially the basis
of consideration for the later.
Respecting this limiting stipulation, I find that the interference of June 24 pre-
vented free choice by the employees and affected the result of the election. Here
again, quite aside from Exchange Parts and findings of postsettlement violation, the
objections can be sustained for the reason that the Company prevented the necessary
free election laboratory conditions even if its later acts did not constitute interference
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1). I therefore recommend that the objections
to the election be sustained, that the election of July 3, 1963, be set aside, and that
a new election be held at such time as the Regional Director deems that circum-
stances permit the free choice of a bargaining representative.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection
with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, commerce, and traffic among the several States, and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Company, by threats, interrogation, surveillance,
promises of benefit, and announcement of such benefits, interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. I shall there-
fore recommend that the Company cease and desist therefrom and from any like
or related conduct.
For the reasons stated in section III, I shall recommend that the Union's objections
to the election be sustained, that the election of July 3, 1963, be set aside, and that
a new election be held.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By threats, interrogation, surveillance, promises of benefit, and announcement of
such benefit, in connection with protected concerted activities, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Glass Bottle Blowers
Association of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.
Cases Nos. 11-CA-P151, 11-CA-2153, and 11-CA-2171. May 11,
1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 26, 1963, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
146 NLRB No. 173.