Sheehy Enterprizes, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 30, 2009

353 N.L.R.B. 803 (N.L.R.B. 2009)

SHEEHY ENTERPRIZES
353 NLRB No. 84
803
Sheehy Enterprizes, Inc. and Laborers’ International
Union of North America, State of Indiana Dis-
trict Council, a/w Laborers’ International Union
of North America. Case 25–CA–30583
January 30, 2009
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On September 3, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Joel
P. Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed limited cross-exceptions and a
supporting brief.1 The General Counsel, the Union, and
the Respondent each filed answering briefs, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.2
The National Labor Relations Board3 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions as discussed below, and to adopt
the recommended Order as modified.4
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to adhere to, and repudiating,
the collective-bargaining agreement to which it agreed to
be bound on May 21, 2004. In so finding, the judge de-
termined that the terms of the “Acceptance of Working

1 The General Counsel's cross-exception requests that the Board's
current practice of awarding only simple interest on backpay and other
monetary awards be replaced with a practice of compounding interest
on a quarterly basis. Having duly considered the matter, we are not
prepared at this time to deviate from our current practice of assessing
simple interest. See Sawgrass Auto Mall, 353 NLRB No. 40 fn. 3
(2008).
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
3 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to add a provi-
sion requiring the Respondent to reimburse unit employees for any
expenses ensuing from its failure to make the required benefit fund
contributions. Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980),
enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition, we shall modify
the judge’s recommended Order to provide for interest on any amounts
due the employees, as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Employees shall be made whole in the man-
ner prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd.
444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971). Amounts due the funds shall be paid in
accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn.
7 (1979). We shall also substitute a new notice to conform with the
recommended Order as modified.
Agreement” and the collective-bargaining agreement
executed by the Respondent’s owner, James Sheehy,
were clear and unambiguous, and covered all of the Re-
spondent’s employees and work within the Union’s ju-
risdiction. The judge thus refused to consider parol evi-
dence, in the form of Sheehy’s hearing testimony, to de-
termine the scope of the agreement.
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding of the
violation, asserting that the judge erred in refusing to
consider Sheehy’s testimony that Sheehy believed, based
on the Union’s alleged misrepresentation regarding the
scope of the agreement, that the agreement bound him
for a single project. Citing 11 Williston on Contracts
569–570, Sec. 33:4 (4th Ed. 1999), the Respondent con-
tends that parol evidence is admissible in the event of
fraud, mutual mistake, or duress. Therefore, Sheehy’s
testimony should have been considered to show that
there was no meeting of the minds because of the Un-
ion’s misrepresentation concerning the scope of the
agreement. For the following reasons, we adopt the
judge’s finding of a violation and find the Respondent’s
exceptions without merit.5
The Respondent’s exception amounts to a defense that
the contract is void because of “fraud in the execution”—
a term the Respondent does not use but which fairly en-
capsulates its argument.6 In addressing the Respondent’s
exception, we find it unnecessary to resolve whether pa-
rol evidence is admissible under Board law to prove that
defense. Even if Sheehy’s testimony concerning the Un-
ion’s alleged misrepresentation of the scope of the
agreement were considered and credited, the Respondent
has not established “fraud in the execution” and is there-
fore bound by the agreement. Horizon Group, supra at
799 fn. 10.
Sheehy’s testimony does not establish that Union
Business Manager David Frye misrepresented to Sheehy
that he was signing an agreement covering a single pro-
ject. Sheehy claimed only that Frye did not say anything
“to the effect that by signing that Contract you were
bound [on] all your jobs,” and that Sheehy therefore
thought “we were talking about a job-specific Contract.”
Tr. 119–120. This testimony is insufficient to establish
“fraud in the execution.”
As set forth in Horizon Group, “‘[f]raud in the execu-
tion’ arises when a party executes an agreement ‘with

5 Member Schaumber finds it unnecessary to pass on the Respon-
dent’s exception based on Sec. 10(b) as the Respondent did not timely
raise that defense in either its answer to the complaint or at the hearing.
6 “Fraud in the execution” occurs when a misrepresentation is made
that induces a party to believe that he is assenting to a contract entirely
different from the proposed contract. Horizon Group of New England,
347 NLRB 795, 797 (2006).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD804
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge of its character or its essential terms.’” Hori-
zon Group, supra at 797, citing Southwest Administrators
v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 479 U.S. 1065 (1987). In Horizon Group,
the Board found that “fraud in the execution” was not
established where the employer had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to read the agreement. See also Positive Electrical
Enterprises, 345 NLRB 915, 922 (2005) (no “fraud in
the execution” found where employer had the opportu-
nity to read the one-page letters of assent).
Here, as in those cases, the Respondent had a reason-
able opportunity to read and consider the agreement’s
character and essential terms. The Union did not deny
Sheehy the opportunity to review either of the “Accep-
tances of Working Agreement” or the underlying collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.7 Even assuming Sheehy did
not understand what he signed, the Respondent failed to
show that the Union prevented him from seeking advice
of counsel “to ascertain the true nature of the document
provided.” Positive Electrical Enterprises, supra at 922.
The one-page acceptance agreement signed by Sheehy
specifically incorporates the full collective-bargaining
agreement, which states expressly that it covers all of the
Respondent’s employees and work within the Union’s
jurisdiction. Because the Union did not deprive the Re-
spondent of the opportunity to ascertain the true nature of
the document, a finding of “fraud in the execution” is not
warranted.
Alternatively, and to the extent that the Respondent is
arguing that the contract should be rescinded because of
Sheehy’s mistake in signing it, we reject that defense, as
well. In Apache Powder, 223 NLRB 191 (1976), the
Board held that rescission for unilateral mistake is “a
carefully guarded remedy reserved for those instances
where the mistake is so obvious as to put the other party
on notice of an error.” In Contek International, 344
NLRB 879 (2005), presented with facts similar to those
in this case, the Board rejected the employer’s defense of
unilateral mistake because the employer had the oppor-
tunity to read the documents but did not do so. Here, as
in Contek, Sheehy testified that he did not read the col-
lective-bargaining agreement referenced in the Accep-
tance of Working Agreement. This is not the type of
obvious error that justifies rescission under Apache Pow-
der, supra.

7 Even if we were to credit Sheehy’s statement that he did not re-
ceive a copy of the full agreement at the time he signed the acceptance
agreement, nothing in Sheehy’s testimony indicates that the Union did
anything to prevent Sheehy from obtaining and reading a copy.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Sheehy
Enterprizes, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs.
“(b) Make whole the unit employees for any loss of
earnings and other benefits they may have suffered as a
result of the refusal to comply with the collective-
bargaining agreements, with interest, as set forth in the
remedy section of the judge’s decision as modified
above.
“(c) Make all contractually required benefit fund con-
tributions, if any, that have not been made on behalf of
unit employees, and reimburse unit employees for any
expenses ensuing from its failure to make the required
benefit fund payments, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the judge’s decision as modified
above.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Rebekah Ramirez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David Swider, Esq. (Bose, McKinney & Evans), for the Re-
spondent.
Neil Gath, Esq. (Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Towe, LLP),
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard by me on July 21, 2008, in Indianapolis, Indiana.
The complaint, which issued on April 30, 2008, and was based
on an unfair labor practice charge that was filed on January 24,
2008, by Laborers’ International Union of North America, State
of Indiana District Council, a/w Laborers’ International Union
of North America (the Union), alleges that Sheehy Enterprizes,
Inc. (the Respondent) granted recognition to, and entered into a
8(f) collective-bargaining agreement with, the Union, but sub-
sequently refused to adhere to, and repudiated the agreement
that it had agreed to be bound by, in violation of Section
8(a)(1)(5) of the Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union has been a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
SHEEHY ENTERPRIZES 805
III. THE FACTS
Respondent, a concrete construction company operating in
the Indianapolis, Indiana area, is owned by James Sheehy
(Sheehy), and his wife. While a majority of the jobs performed
by the Respondent are nonunion jobs, Respondent also con-
tracts to perform work on union and Davis-Bacon jobs. In Oc-
tober 2003, the Respondent was installing concrete curbs at a
job at Purdue University in Indianapolis, (the IUPUI jobsite).
David Frye, business manager for the Union, testified that on
October 15, 2003, he observed employees of the Respondent
performing concrete work at the IUPUI jobsite. He spoke to
Danny Arnold, the superintendent for Wilhelm Construction,
which is a signatory to its contract, to inform him that the Re-
spondent was a nonunion contractor and therefore Wilhelm was
in violation of the agreement which prohibits subcontracting
work to nonunion companies. Arnold told Frye to give him a
day to talk to Sheehy. On the following day, Frye returned to
the IUPUI jobsite and Arnold told him that Sheehy was willing
to talk to him about signing an agreement. Frye met with
Sheehy who questioned him about the work that he had that
was ongoing at the time. Frye told him that any work that was
ongoing or had been bid on prior to October 16, 2003, “would
not be a concern [of the Union],” but any work from that day
forward would be under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Sheehy then signed the acceptance of working agreement, ef-
fective from April 1, 1999, to March 31, 2004, which states:
The undersigned has read and hereby approves the Contrac-
tors-Laborers’ Working Agreement by and between the State
of Indiana District Council of the Laborers’ International Un-
ion of North America and the Labor Relations Division of the
Indiana Constructors, Inc. operating in the State of Indiana
and herewith accepts same and becomes one of the Parties
thereto. Any deletions, exceptions or alterations to this Accep-
tance will be void and of no force or effect.
Sheehy signed the acceptance agreement as president of the
Respondent, listing the Respondent’s office address and tele-
phone number. Frye gave Sheehy a copy of the signed accep-
tance, as well as a copy of the current contract between Indiana
Constructors, Inc., Labor Relations Division, (the Association),
and Local Unions of Laborers’ International Union of North
America, State of Indiana District Council, herein the District
Council, effective from April 1, 1999, to March 31, 2004. Af-
ter Sheehy signed the acceptance agreement Frye went to some
of the Respondent’s employees who signed to join the Union
and its health and welfare plan.
Sheehy testified that while the Respondent was working at
the IUPUI jobsite he was told by Frye that he needed to sign up
with the Union or leave the job. Frye gave him an acceptance of
working agreement and he signed it on October 16, 2003. He
testified1: “I thought we were talking about a job-specific con-

1 At the hearing, I allowed testimony from Sheehy about his impres-
sion of the Respondent’s obligation upon signing this and the later
acceptance agreement. As will be discussed, infra, because the accep-
tance agreements and the collective-bargaining agreements that he
agreed to be bound by are unambiguous, this parol evidence will not be
considered.
tract,” and that nothing that Frye said indicated to him that by
signing the Respondent was bound to the Union contract for all
its jobs. He also testified that Frye told him that work that he
had previously bid would not be covered by the contract. Frye
testified that the Union does not allow employers to sign one-
job only contracts.
On May 21, 2004, Sheehy signed an acceptance of working
agreement that is identical to the one that he signed on October
16, 2003, except the latter one is effective from April 1, 2004,
through March 31, 2009, as is the agreement that the accep-
tance agreement provides that he is bound to. He testified that
he believed that this was another “job-specific contract,” rather
than an agreement binding him for all jobs performed by the
Respondent. He further testified that, although he signed the
acceptance agreements in 2003 and 2004, he does not believe
that he ever received the contracts that these acceptance agree-
ments bound him to honor. In fact, he testified that at the time
of the hearing he had not read the latest contract. He also testi-
fied that in July or August 2004, after he had completed the
IUPUI job, he was called on a number of occasions by Frye
saying that he wanted to help the Respondent on their projects.
When Sheehy asked what he was getting at, “That’s when he
informed me or made me aware of the fact that . . . we were
obligated as a union contractor to pay union dues on whatever
project that we are working on.” Sheehy told Frye that he
would be happy to do that on union jobs, but he could not af-
ford to do it on his nonunion jobs.
The Respondent paid to the Union’s Fringe Benefit Fund Of-
fice for a period beginning in November 30, 2003. At that time
the Respondent paid $1565 for three employees; for the period
ending December 31, 2003, the Respondent paid $206 for one
employee; for the period ending May 31, 2004, the Respondent
paid $868 for three employees and for the period ending July
30, 2004, it paid $4000 for four employees. That was the last
payment that the Respondent made to any of the Union’s funds.
In addition, in May and July 2004 these four employees exe-
cuted checkoff authorizations and welfare fund beneficiary
designation forms.
Frye testified that on November 1, 2007, he received a tele-
phone call from Union Business Agent Dwight Smith telling
him that he saw Respondent’s employees performing concrete
curb work at a Walmart construction site at 4600 Lafayette
Road in Indianapolis. Frye told Smith that the Respondent had
a contract with the Union and he should sign up any of the Re-
spondent’s employees who was not already a union member.
Shortly, thereafter, Smith called him to say that Sheehy did not
agree that he was a union contractor, and Frye asked to speak to
Sheehy and Smith put him on the phone. Sheehy asked him
what was going on and Frye said that he had a contract with the
Union. Sheehy said that they did not have a contract, they only
had a one-job agreement for the IUPUI job and Frye said no,
the Union never signs one-job agreements; they had a favored
nations clause in the contract that does not allow for one-job
agreements. They “bickered” for a few minutes about the sub-
ject and Sheehy said that he would not comply with the con-
tract, but was willing to work something out on that job for
Power and Son, a union contractor. Frye told him that there was
nothing to work out, they had a contract and, as far as he was
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD806
concerned, it was worked out. Frye then told him that he had
two choices: he could file a grievance or he could turn the issue
over to his attorney. Sheehy said that since he had no contract
with the Union he had nothing to abide by and, because of what
Sheehy said, Frye decided that the best course would be to turn
it over to his attorney. By letter dated November 7, 2007, Neil
Gath, counsel for the Union, wrote to Sheehy stating that on
May 21, 2004, he agreed to be bound to the Union’s contract,
but that he had recently repudiated that contractual obligation.
Counsel concluded by saying that unless Respondent agreed to
follow the contract, the Union would file an unfair labor prac-
tice charge. There is no evidence of a response from Sheehy,
and a charge was filed with the Board on January 24, 2008.
Sheehy testified that when he met Smith at the Walmart job-
site on November 1, 2007, Smith “was pretty emphatic about
signing up all our guys.” Sheehy told him that he was not to do
that and Smith called Frye and gave the phone to Sheehy. Frye
told Sheehy that he was bound to their contract for all his jobs
and that he was obligated to pay union dues and benefits for all
his jobs going back to May 2004. He replied that he didn’t feel
that he was bound to it, but that he was willing to work out
something for the Walmart job.
Respondent produced testimony to establish that from the
mid 2004 to November 2007 it was operating as it normally
does, out in the open without making any attempt to conceal its
operations. Frye testified that for the period May 2004 through
November 1, 2007, he was not aware of any jobs that the Re-
spondent was performing in the Union’s jurisdiction in the
Indianapolis, Indiana area. Beginning in July 2006, the Union
received fringe benefit update reports which did not list any
contributions made by the Respondent, but Frye did not take
any action against the Respondent based on these reports. Frye
testified that it was not until Smith saw Respondent at the
Walmart jobsite on November 1, 2007, that he was aware that
they were working in the area. Sheehy testified that the Re-
spondent owns six trucks and five job trailers, and each has the
Respondent’s name and telephone number on both sides of the
vehicles. He has never tried to hide the fact that he is working
on particular jobs: “No and just the opposite, we’re trying to let
people know we are there. Repeat business is pretty pivotal to
our growth.”
The 1999 and 2004 contracts are identical in their relevant
provisions. The work covered provision includes all work
within the recognized jurisdiction of the International Union in
highway construction, heavy construction and railroad contract-
ing, utility construction and related work, and it covers all con-
struction labor employees of the signatory employers, with the
exception of warehouse or yard employees, superintendents,
master mechanics, mechanics, job foremen, civil engineers, or
clerks. Article III, bargaining agent, states:
For the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, the Em-
ployer recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive bar-
gaining agent of all his Employees in a unit consisting of con-
struction laborers who are employed by the Employer on all
work and classifications set forth in this Agreement.
Article IV, union security, states, inter alia:
The Contractor, or Employer, recognizes and acknowledges
that the Laborers’ International Union of North America,
State of Indiana District Council, is the sole representative of
all Employees in the classification of all work under its juris-
diction covered by this Agreement for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining.
IV. ANALYSIS
The agreements executed by the Respondent in 2003 and
2004 were 8(f) agreements and, prior to John Deklawa & Sons,
282 NLRB 1375 (1987), such agreements could be repudiated
by either party and could not be enforced under Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act. Deklawa changed that by declaring that permissi-
ble 8(f) agreements were enforceable, could not be repudiated
prior to their termination dates and were enforceable under
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Whether it is fair to bind the Re-
spondent and his employees to such an agreement, as counsel
for the Respondent argued at the hearing and in his brief, is
irrelevant. The Respondent signed two 8(f) agreements and is
bound to their provisions. P & C Lighting Center, Inc., 301
NLRB 828 (1991). As the Board stated in Cedar Valley Corp.,
302 NLRB 823 (1991): “A party may not lawfully repudiate an
8(f) agreement during its term.”
Further, the Board and the courts have consistently refused
to allow a party to use parole evidence of an alleged oral
agreement to vary or contradict the terms of a written agree-
ment. The sole exception to this rule is that where there are
sufficient ambiguities or uncertainties in the written agreement,
parole evidence will be admissible to resolve these ambiguities
in order to determine the parties’ intent. Sansla, Inc., 323
NLRB 107, 109 (1997); Commonwealth Communications, Inc.,
335 NLRB 765 (2001), enf. denied 312 F.3d 465 (D.C. Cir.
2002). Therefore, the initial issue herein is whether there is any
ambiguity or uncertainty in the contracts regarding the scope
and the unit coverage of these contracts. I find none. Both the
acceptance of working agreements and the collective-
bargaining agreements which they refer to are crystal clear. The
contract specifically states that it covers all of the Respondent’s
employees and work within the Union’s jurisdiction. In Sansla,
supra, in addition to the employer’s name, address, and tele-
phone number, the agreement that the employer executed listed
the job that he was performing under: “Location of job.” That
created enough uncertainty to allow the employer to introduce
parole evidence to determine the parties’ intent regarding the
scope of the agreement. There is no such uncertainty here. The
terms and scope of the agreement are clearly and unambigu-
ously set forth. Finally, I find that the fact that it took the Union
3½ years to realize that the Respondent, which was conducting
its operations openly, was performing unit work in the area,
does not assist the Respondent in establishing that its agree-
ments with the Union were one-job contracts. Rather, it simply
establishes that the Union’s enforcement efforts were lax. I,
therefore, find that by refusing to recognize its obligations un-
der this agreement the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)(5)
of the Act.
SHEEHY ENTERPRIZES 807
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent has been an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing to adhere to, and by repudiating, the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement it agreed to be bound by on May 21,
2004, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)(5) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act. I recommend that the Re-
spondent be ordered to implement and adhere to the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement effective for the period
April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2009, and to make whole the
unit employees for any loss of wages or other benefits that they
sustained as a result of the Respondent’s repudiation of its re-
sponsibilities and obligations under this contract and the earlier
one. I also recommend that Respondent be ordered to pay to the
appropriate union funds all health, welfare, pension, and other
fringe benefits as provided for in these contracts.
On these findings of facts and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Sheehy Enterprizes, Inc., Indianapolis,
Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively with Labor-
ers’ Union of North America, State of Indiana District Council,
a/w Laborers’ International Union of North America, by refus-
ing to adhere to, and by repudiating, a collective-bargaining
agreement that it entered into with the Union, the agreement
being effective for the period April 1, 2004, through March 31,
2009.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Give effect to the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement effective for the period April 1, 2004, through
March 31, 2009, that it agreed to be bound by on May 21, 2004.
(b) Make whole its employees for any wages or other bene-
fits that they may have lost due to the Respondent’s failure to
abide by the terms of this, and the prior contract and make
whole the union funds for fringe benefits that were supposed to
be, but were not, paid by the Respondent pursuant to these
agreements.

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(c) On request, allow the Union, or its funds, to audit its
books and records to determine the amount owed to employees
and the funds.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Indianapolis, and at all of its jobsites, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since May 21, 2004.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this
Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to give effect to, or fully comply
with, the terms and conditions of employment set forth in the
contract we entered into with Laborers’ International Union of

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD808
North America, State of Indiana District Council (the Union)
that was effective for the period April 1, 2004, through March
31, 2009.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL give effect to the terms of the contract that we en-
tered into with the Union on May 21, 2004, which agreement is
effective from April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2009, WE WILL
make you whole for any loss that you suffered, plus interest,
due to our failure to apply the terms of our contracts with the
Union and WE WILL make the union funds whole for our failure
to pay the appropriate amount due to the funds pursuant to the
contract.
WE WILL, on request, allow the Union or its funds to audit
our books and records to determine the amount we owe to the
employees or the funds.
SHEEHY ENTERPRIZES, INC.