Roy Miller Freight Lines, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 23, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1007 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

ROY MILLER FREIGHT LINES, INC. 1007
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.^.
Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illi-
nois , Telephone No. 828-7572, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Roy Miller Freight Lines, Inc. and Local Freight Drivers, Local
208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America . Case No. 21-CA-5540.
November 23, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 7, 1964, Trial Examiner David London issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Roy Miller Freight
Lines, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
1 The findings of the Trial Examiner are based on credibility resolutions which will not
be reversed unless clearly erroneous . Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
545, enfd. 188 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 3). No such conclusion is warranted here.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge filed September 9, 1963, and October 4,
1963, by Local Freight Drivers, Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Region 21 of the National Labor
149 NLRB No. 93.
1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board, herein called the Board, issued a complaint on February 12, 1964,
against Roy Miller Freight Lines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Respondent, alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. In its duly filed
answer, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was-held before Trial Examiner David London in Los
Angeles, California, on April 15 and 16, 1964. All parties were represented and
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral
argument, and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived, but briefs filed by Respond-
ent and the General Counsel have been duly considered.
Upon consideration of the entire record, the briefs, and upon my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses testifying before me, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a California corporation with its principal office and place of business
located in Los Angeles, California, where it is now, and'has been at all times material
herein, engaged in the hauling of freight by truck within the State of California. Dur-
ing the fiscal year commencing June 1, 1962, and ending on May 31, 1963, Respond-
ent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, furnished freight transporta-
tion within the State of California to a large number of enterprises each of whom is
engaged in interstate commerce. During said period, Respondent was paid the sum of
$52,628.31 by said enterprises for furnishing such freight transportation. Respondent
admits, and I find, that during all times material herein, Respondent was an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion
Between August 6 and 8, 1963,1 all of the five drivers then employed by Respond-
ent 2 signed cards designating the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
On Thursday, September 5, Respondent received a letter from the Union, dated
September 4, signed by W. B. Patton, Jr., its recording secretary, advising that the
Union had been so designated and requesting that a time and place be fixed for the
purpose of reaching an agreement between Respondent and the Union
During the morning of the following Monday, September 9, Wallace Miller, here-
after referred to as Wallace, son of Respondent's president, Roy Miller, and admittedly
a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, told employee Maxwell that Roy Miller,
hereafter referred to as Roy, wanted to see him. Maxwell went to the office where he
found Roy, Effie Miller, his wife and secretary of Respondent, and Wallace. After
some talk by the Millers that "the drivers were negotiating with the Union," Wallace
showed Maxwell the Union's letter aforementioned and accused him of being the
"instigator" or "ringleader" of the movement that was "getting the Union into the
Company." Maxwell denied the accusation and stated, "it was all the drivers [acting]
as a unit."
About 5 p.m. of the same day, September 9, a meeting was conducted in Respond-
ent's office with all the drivers and the three Millers aforementioned and another son,
Wiley Miller. Though the record fails to disclose with any degree of accuracy how
or who broached the subject, the testimony is conclusive that during the course of the
meeting Roy, Effie, or Wallace offered the drivers a raise of 5 cents an hour and an
agreement to pay half of a nebulous hospitalization insurance plan.
Floyd Clement, who began work for Respondent on that day,3 testified that during
the course of the meeting Roy stated that "if the Union came in he would close his
doors " Maxwell testified that either Roy or Wallace told the men "they could not
I All references to dates herein are to the year 1963, unless otherwise specified.
2 William J. Maxwell , James Stevens , John Paolina , Ernest Espinoza , and Norman
Whiteford.
8 The parties stipulated that Whiteford , who had signed a union designation card, was
discharged on September 5 and that Clement was hired on September 9.
ROY MILLER FREIGHT LINES, INC. 1009
afford to pay union wages and if the Union stepped in [Respondent] would close their
doors " Stevens testified that nothing was said at this time about closing the doors if
the Union came in but that sometime after the meeting, on the dock, he heard Wallace
say "they were going to have to probably close the doors before they could pay a
union scale." Paolina testified that during the meeting of September 9, before there
was any discussion of wages or insurance, Wallace told all the drivers that "if they
went union, [Respondent] would have to close up." Espinoza testified that after
Wallace stated that all that Respondent could afford was a 5-cent raise, Wallace told
the drivers "that if the Union came in, they would have to close the doors."
Wallace admitted he called Maxwell to the office during the morning of Septem-
ber 9, that he showed him the Union's letter aforementioned, and that he asked him
if he knew anything about it. Wallace did not deny the testimony of Clement, Max-
well, and Paolina that during the afternoon meeting of September 9 he had threatened
the employees that Respondent would close its doors if the Union became their col-
lective-bargaining representative. He admitted, however, that both he and his mother
told the drivers at that meeting that they "couldn't afford a union scale; that [they]
would have to close." Roy testified that his wife stated that they could afford a
5-cent raise but if they had to go above that, they "would have to close the doors."
Sometime after this meeting, but before September 27, Roy asked Espinoza who
"started this mess." Espinoza replied that he didn't know and that even if he did,
he wouldn't tell.
On the entire record, and my observation of the witnesses as they testified, I credit
the testimony of Clement, Paolina, and Espinoza that during the meeting of Septem-
ber 9, Wallace told the drivers, in substance, that if the Union became their collective-
bargaining representative Respondent would close its doors.4 By those threats,
Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I further conclude that Roy's inter-
rogation of Espinoza as to who "started this mess" had reference to the Union's
demand for recognition and was also violative of the same section of the Act.
B. The refusal to bargain
Having received no response to its letter of September 4, the Union, on Septem-
ber 12, again wrote Respondent asking whether it intended to recognize the Union as
collective-bargaining representative of its drivers and requesting that Respondent fix
a time for a meeting at which the Union was "prepared to submit proposals on behalf
of [Respondent's] employees." Shortly thereafter, pursuant to a call from Roy,
Patton, the Union's secretary, had a telephone conversation with Roy, during which
the latter stated he "was willing to talk with [Patton] as a representative of [Respond-
ent's] drivers," and asked that the meeting be arranged.
The parties met at Respondent's office on September 16. The Union was repre-
sented by Patton, Edwin Blackmar, and John Williams, the latter two being respec-
tively the Union's secretary-treasurer and business representative. Present in behalf
of Respondent were Roy, his wite, and his two sons. Patton told Roy "it was obvious
that he did not have a proper labor representative" to negotiate in behalf of Respond-
ent and that he was entitled to have such assistance He did, however, hand Roy a
copy of the "`prevalent" area Teamsters contract and told him that the Union was
asking for its equivalent terms plus a "wage differential of 10 cents above" the amount
specified in the contract.5 Roy stated that he "could not afford to go union" and that
one of the drivers had changed his mind about wanting a unions
Roy testified that after receiving the Union's letter of September 12, he called
Patton and told him that he was "ready to talk" to him about that letter, following
which the parties agreed to meet on Monday, September 16. He further testified that
at the meeting which took place on that date, he told the union representative that
until he got the Union's letter claiming to represent the employees, he knew nothing
about their desires and still did not "have any evidence that [the union representatives]
or anyone else has authority to represent them." He admitted, however, that after he
was handed a contract for examination, he told the union representatives he wanted
"time to contact somebody before [he signed] any contract with anybody, . . . [ and]
when [he] found counsel, [he] would let them know when [he] was ready to talk to
them."
41 also credit Maxwell's testimony that the foregoing threat was made by either Wallace
or Roy.
R Patton sought to justify this apparently unconscionable differential by the claim that
Respondent ' s "drivers had been working for years for less than the current [ Unionl scale."
e The findings in this paragraph are based on the testimony of Patton which I credit.
770-076-65-vol. 149-65
1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I do not credit Roy's testimony that he told the Union's representatives that he had
no evidence that the Union had authority to represent the employees Instead, I find
that all that Roy stated at that time was that one of he drivers had changed his mind
about wanting a union and from which it may reasonably be inferred that he had no
doubt about the remaining employees.
Two or three days after the meeting of September 16, Frank Selover, an officer of
the Southwestern Employers' Counsel, called Patton and arranged for a meeting on
September 26. The scheduled meeting was held at the office of the Council and was
attended only by Patton and Blackmar in behalf of the Union, and Selover. Selover
was asked whether he held power of attorney to negotiate for Respondent and upon
giving a negative reply, was told by Blackmar it would be a mere waste of time to
continue the conference When Selover said "that he disbelieved that the [Union]
represented a majority of the employes," 7 Patton replied that unless Respondent had
discharged the employees, the Union still represented all of them.
Because the Union had previously, on September 9, filed a petition with the Board
in Case No. 21-RC-8581 seeking to be certified as collective-bargaining representative
of Respondent's drivers, the parties to the conference on September 26 contacted the
Board agent in charge of that proceeding and arranged for an informal conference
with that agent to be held on October 1. The conference was held at the Board's
Regional Office as scheduled at which time a consent-election agreement was signed
providing for an election on October 10.8
Following the meeting at the Board's office on October 1, Patton returned to his
office to prepare a circular for Respondent's employees announcing the scheduled
election. About 5 p in on the same day, he went to the gate of Respondent's premises
for the purpose of distributing the circulars to the employees. While there, Roy
approached and Patton told him he was there to distribute the aforementioned
announcements . When Roy stated he did not have to join the Teamsters Patton
agreed, and added that the Union was only interested in his employees. Roy there-
upon told Patton that he "would close up, and [the employees] could have the Union if
they wanted it, that he could take his [sons] and start all over, if necessary."
It is Respondent's position that it "at all times had a good-faith doubt as to whether
the Union in fact represented a majority of its employees, that it did not engage in
any acts or conduct designed to undermine and dissipate the majority status of the
Union, and therefore, that it did not unlawfully refuse to bargain in good faith with
the Union." In its brief, Respondent contends that it was at the meeting of Septem-
ber 16 that Roy "put in issue that matter of whether or not the Union in fact repre-
sented the employees, . . . [that] he made it crystal clear that he did not have any
knowledge of his employees wanting a union or desiring representation by Patton's
union [and] by his words and conduct, invited the Union to support its claimed
majority status." The record fails to support these contentions.
When Respondent received the Union's letter of September 4 asserting that the
Union had been designated as bargaining representative by a majority of its employees,
Respondent made no attempt, as was its legal right, to ascertain from its employees
whether they had in fact so designated the Union. Wallace's characterization of
Maxwell on September 9, in the presence of Roy, as the instigator or ringleader
warrants the inference that Respondent either had knowledge, or assumed, that other
employees had been induced or led by Maxwell to designate the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative. In any event, Maxwell, though denying that he
.was the-leader, told Roy and Wallace that all the employees were working as a unit.
At 5 p in. of the same day, September 9, when all the drivers were called to the
office, Respondent still made no inquiry of them as to whether or not they had desig-
riated the Union as their representative. Instead, it embarked upon a campaign to
undermine the Union by offering the employees a raise of 5 cents an hour and an
agreement to pay one-half of a hospitalization insurance plan. Indeed, it went
'further and warned the men that "if the Union came in they would have to close the
doors."
7 When this testimony was elicited on direct examination of Patton by the General
Counsel, Respondent objected thereto on the ground "that Selover was not an agent of this
employer." The objection was later withdrawn. Selover did not testify.
8 The amended charge in the instant proceeding, alleging that Respondent -had refused
to bargain -with the Union, was filed on October 4. On October 7, the Board' s Regional
Director advised all the parties that he had postponed the scheduled election indefinitely
"pending investigation of charges" filed by the Union. It was stipulated before me that
on April 14, 1964, the Regional Director approved the Union's withdrawal of the petition
for that election in Case No . 21-RC-8581.
ROY MILLER FREIGHT LINES, INC. 1011
Respondent having failed to respond to the Union's letter of September 4 proclaim-
ing the latter's representative status, Patton, on September 12, again wrote Respondent,
specifically asking this time whether it intended to recognize the Union and that a date
be fixed for the submission of contract proposals. The testimony is undisputed;
indeed, Roy himself testified that following the receipt of that letter he called Patton
and told him that he was "ready to talk" to him and fixed the following Monday as the
time for that meeting. It is thus apparent that at that time no doubt existed in Roy's
mind that the Union had been designated as collective-bargaining representative of
Respondent's employees.
Nor did anything occur at the meeting on Monday, September 16, to indicate that
Respondent had any doubt about the Union's representative status. Had Respond-
ent entertained such doubt, it seems reasonable to assume that Roy would have
expressed it, and I have previously found that he did not do so. His failure to do so
warrants the inference that Respondent enteitained no such doubt. Tinley Park
Dairy Co., d3b/a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB 683; George Groh and Sons,
141 NLRB 931, 940, enfd. 329 F. 2d 265 (C.A. 10). Indeed, by engaging in a dis-
cussion of the Union's wage demands he affirmatively indicated that he had no such
doubt.
By reason of what has been concluded above, it is of no avail to Respondent that
Selover, on September 26, stated that he did not believe that the Union represented
a majority of Respondent's employees. "The fact as to whether an employer enter-
tained a genuine doubt that a union represents a majority of the employees is to be
determined as of the time the employer refused to recognize the union. Once it is
shown that the employer entertained no genuine doubt of this kind at the time it
refused to bargain, an unfair labor practice has been established. The fact that, [if]
later developed, there were grounds which might have created a genuine doubt at
that time is then immaterial." Fred Snow et al., d/b/a Snow & Sons v. N.L.R.B., 308
F. 2d 687, 694 (C.A 9).
In any event, and putting aside the question of whether or not Selover was an agent
authorized to speak in behalf of Respondent,9 it is not sufficient to justify an employ-
er's refusal of recognition to merely mouth a belief, timely or belated that the Union
had not been designated as representative by the employees. "The existence of good
faith in withholding recognition is not established merely by an employer's affirma-
tive assertion thereof, rather it is determined by the entire factual context in which
the claim is made and refused." Johnny's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB No. 98. The
uttered doubt must be a food-faith doubt, reasonably founded. Here, the record is
devoid of any evidence that Respondent, at any time, had reason to believe that the
Union had not in fact been so designated What it does reveal is that, after learning
of the Union's designation not only from the Union but also from Maxwell, Respond-
ent sought to undermine that status by promising benefits to its employees and threat-
ening them with the loss of employment if they continued their adherence to the
Union. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (CA.D.C.).
Respondent, in its brief, relies heavily on the Union's failure to volunteer a tender
of the union designation cards and seeks to equate that failure with the existence of
a good-faith doubt by Respondent of the Union's majority status. This inference
rests on a non sequitur. "There was no necessity for the Union to offer proof of
the genuineness of its majority claim absent a challenge by Respondent." N.L.R.B. v.
Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F. 2d 206, 210 (C.A. 9). Nor does the fact that the
Union filed a petition for a Board election lend any support to Respondent's con-
tention that it had a bona fide doubt of the Union's majority status. The election
machinery of the Board is not the only means by which that status may be estab-
lished. "An employer has no absolute right to insist upon such an election before
recognizing a union where, as here, the Union's claim of majority representation has
been established in a less formal manner and no reasonable basis exists for doubting
that claim. An employer's failure to recognize a union under such circumstances is
a failure to fulfill the bargaining requirements of the Act." Mitchell Concrete Prod-
ucts Co., Inc., 137 NLRB 504.
On the entire record of my observation of the witness I find that on and after
September 5, when the Union made its demands upon Respondent'for^recognition and
bargaining,,it,was the duly designated representatjve of Respondent 's employees in the
See footnote 7, supra.
1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
appropriate unit for which it sought recognition 10 I further find that Respondent's
refusal thereafter to recognize or negotiate with the Union was not occasioned by any
good-faith doubt that the latter in fact represented these employees, and conclude
that by such refusal Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection
with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
recommend that it be required to cease and desist thereform and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having determined that Respondent refused '- to recognize and negotiate with the
Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and ( 1) of the Act, I recommend that Respond-
ent be required , upon request, to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect
to rates of pay, wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of employment , and, if
an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local Freight Drivers, Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By interrogating its employees concerning their union activities, and by threaten-
ing them with economic reprisals if they continued their adherence to the Union,
Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
3. All of Respondent's truckdrivers, excluding all other employees, office clerical
employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times on and after August 8, 1963, the above-named Union has been, and
still is, the exclusive representative of all the employees within the aforestated appro-
priate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as such exclu-
sive representative at all times on and after September 16, 1963, Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. "`i`'
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the . foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that Respondent Roy Miller Freight Lines,
Inc., its officers agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1., Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning union affiliation or activities in a manner
constituting interference , restraint , or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the
Act.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of employment , or other sanctions or repri-
sals, to discourage union affiliation or adherence.,
'0 The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that all Respondent 's. truck-
drivers, excluding all other employees , office clerical employees , guards, professional. em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined In the Act , constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
ROY MILLER FREIGHT LINES, INC. 1013
(c) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with Local Freight Drivers,
Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of all its truckdrivers, excluding all
other employees, office clerical employees, guaids, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act, concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to join or assist the above-
named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
engaging in such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named Union as the exclu-
sive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit described above, con-
cerning rates of pay, hours of employment, grievances, and other conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) Post at its office and terminal at Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 11 Copies of the notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 25, shall be posted immediately upon their receipt after being
duly signed by a representative of Respondent. They shall remain posted for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) File with the Regional Director for Region 21 within 20 days of the date of the
service of this Trial Examiner's Decision and Recommended Order, a written state-
ment setting forth the manner and form in which it has complied with this Recom-
mended Order.12
11 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "the recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the notice shall be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision
and Order."
12 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 10 days from the
date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with Local Freight
Drivers, Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and, if an
agreement is reached, embody it in a signed contract. The bargaining unit is:
All truckdrivers at our Los Angeles, California, office and terminal,
excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union affiliation or
activities in a manner constituting interference, restrain, or coercion in a man-
ner violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of employment, or other sanc-
tions or reprisals, to discourage union affiliation or adherence
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
assist the above-named or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection , or to refrain from any or all such activities.
RoY MILLER FREIGHT LINES, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 South
Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. Richmond 9-4711, Extension
1031, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Local Unions Nos. 32, 40, 82, 175, 358 , 549, 598 , 631, and 695 of
the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and
Canada; and Washington State Association of the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada
and Cascade Natural Gas Corporation , Charging Party and
International Chemical Workers Union Local 121, Party to
Contract. Case No. 19-CD-85. November 23, 1964
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
This is a proceeding pursuant to Section 10(k) of the National
Labor Relations Act, following a charge filed on March 25, 1964, by
the Employer, Cascade Natural Gas Corporation, herein called Cas-
cade, alleging that the above-named locals of the United Association
of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, and its affiliated Wash-
ington State Association, herein called the Plumbers, had violated
Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act. A duly scheduled hearing was held
before Hearing Officer Patrick H. Walker on April 30 and 31, and
May 4 and 5, 1964. All parties appearing were afforded full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to ad-
duce evidence bearing on the issues. The rulings made at the hear-
ing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Briefs
were filed by the Employer, the Plumbers, and the International
Chemical Workers Union Local 121, herein called Chemical Workers,
all of whom appeared at the hearing as parties to the dispute.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board I makes the follow-
ing findings :
'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act , the Board ling delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [Members Fanning , Brown,
and Jenkins].
149 NLRB No. 86.