RGC (USA) Mineral Sand

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 10, 2001

332 N.L.R.B. 1633 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1633
RGC (USA) Mineral Sands, Inc. and Calvin T. Coon
and Harold Knowles Jr. and International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
District Lodge 112, affiliated with International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL–CIO. Cases 12–CA–19258, 12–CA–
19499, and 12–CA–20101
January 10, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On November 5, 1999, Administrative Law Judge
Howard I. Grossman issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
The judge found, inter alia, that the Respondent’s em-
ployees engaged in an unfair labor practice strike in Au-
gust 1998. We agree. The record shows that in October
and December 1997, in response to a vote of its employ-
ees to reject its proposal to place all mechanics on a

1The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent also asserts that some of the judge’s credibility
findings demonstrate bias. On careful examination of the judge’s deci-
sion and the entire record, we are satisfied that the contention is without
merit.
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening an employee with legal
action because of his concerted activity, by telling employees it was
improper to make safety complaints, by interrogating an employee
about his filing an unfair labor practice charge, by creating an impres-
sion of surveillance of employees’ union activities, by preventing a
union steward from coming on to the Respondent’s property to investi-
gate potential grievances and working conditions, by conducting an
interview with an employee and refusing the employee’s request to
consult with a union representative, and by refusing to accept employee
grievances. In addition, no exceptions were filed to the judge’s find-
ings that the Respondent unlawfully issued disciplinary warnings to
employees Harold Knowles Jr. and Jeffrey Tillis, and that the Respon-
dent unlawfully suspended and terminated Knowles.
Member Hurtgen notes that although the Respondent excepted to the
judge’s decision not to defer to arbitration the issue of shift assign-
ments, its brief indicates present opposition to deferral, stating that such
deferral would only delay resolution of the issue.
rotating 24-hour shift roster without regard to the mechan-
ics’ seniority, the Respondent assigned certain of its mainte-
nance mechanics to a rotating 24-hour shift. In January
1998, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge con-
cerning the shift assignments.2
Thereafter, the shift-assignment issue continued to be a
source of concern for the employees. In May 1998,3 the
Respondent proposed a shift-assignment roster schedule
that included language requiring the Union to terminate
“all pending grievances and arbitration actions regarding
shift assignments.” On May 5, Union Steward Harold
Knowles informed the Respondent’s managers that the
Union was not willing to drop their grievances and unfair
labor practice charges. Also, by letter dated June 4, the
Union formally rejected the Respondent’s proposal, cit-
ing concerns that dropping these causes of action would
leave them “without resolution.”
In July and August, the Respondent and the Union
held about 18 sessions to negotiate a new collective-
bargaining agreement. These discussions included pro-
posals concerning the shift assignments. On August 24,
the Union held a membership meeting to discuss the Re-
spondent’s final offer. At the meeting, the employees
expressed concerns that the final offer did not include a
provision for shift assignments to be determined by sen-
iority. They also expressed their concern that the Un-
ion’s pending unfair labor practice charges over the dis-
criminatory assignments in October and December might
not resolve the shift-assignment issue to the employees’
satisfaction. At the following membership meeting on
August 27, the employees continued to discuss the Re-
spondent’s final offer—including the shift-assignment
proposal—and thereafter voted to strike.
It is well settled that if a strike is caused in part by an
employer’s unfair labor practice, the strike is an unfair
labor practice strike. E.g. Child Development Council of
Northeastern Pennsylvania, 316 NLRB 1145 (1995). An
unfair labor practice strike occurs even when the em-
ployer’s unfair labor practice is not the sole or major
cause or aggravating factor; it need only be a contribut-
ing factor. Teamsters Local 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719,
723 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Here, the record shows that the Respondent’s shift as-
signments of October and December 1997, which we
have found to be unfair labor practices, contributed to the
employees’ decision to strike. The chain of causation
actually began in the fall of 1997 with the Respondent’s
proposals over shift assignments without regard to sen-
2 We agree, for the reasons stated by the judge, that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by making these shift assign-
ments.
3 All dates hereafter are in 1998 unless stated otherwise.
332 NLRB No. 172
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1634
iority. The employees voted to reject these proposals. In
direct response to that vote, the Respondent made the
unlawful shift assignment in October and December.
This unlawful conduct remained unresolved and in dis-
pute when contract bargaining began in July. It was in-
extricably linked to, and indeed aggravated, the negotia-
tions over the Respondent’s shift-assignment proposal.
This causality is highlighted by the fact that the Respon-
dent’s shift-assignment proposal in May included lan-
guage requiring the withdrawal of any grievances or arbi-
tration actions filed over the 1997 assignments. In reject-
ing this proposal, the Union made clear that it was not
willing to drop any grievances or unfair labor practice
charges. The failure to reach agreement on this shift-
assignment issue contributed directly to a breakdown in
contract negotiations and to the employees’ decision to
strike. Also highlighting the causality, the pending unfair
labor practice charges were considered in conjunction
with the Respondent’s final offer at the August 24 mem-
bership meeting, and this discussion continued at the
August 27 meeting when the strike vote was taken.
Thus, it is clear that the Respondent’s discriminatory
shift assignments were integrally linked with the break-
down in negotiations and a contributing factor in the em-
ployees’ decision to strike.
We find no merit to the Respondent’s contention that
the shift assignments in October and December 1997
were too remote in time to be considered a cause of the
strike in August. The dispute over using seniority as a
factor in making the shift assignments, although contrac-
tual in nature, was significantly aggravated by and can-
not be separated from the Respondent’s discriminatory
assignments in 1997. The parties clearly understood that
resolution of the contractual issue required resolution of
the unfair labor practice charges as well. Thus, the Re-
spondent’s discriminatory assignments continued as a
point of dispute during the contractual negotiations in
July and August. In these circumstances, where the 1997
assignments were a continuing concern of the employees,
and where the Respondent’s unlawful conduct was con-
sidered together with the contractual proposals, it is clear
that not only were the unfair labor practices a contribut-
ing factor in the decision to strike, but there was a causal
connect between them. Thus the Respondent’s conduct
was not too remote in time to have been a cause of the
strike in August.
Accordingly, we adopt the judge’s findings that the
strike in August was an unfair labor practice strike. We
therefore also adopt the judge’s finding that the Respon-
dent’s refusal to reinstate the strikers on their uncondi-
tional offer to return violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act as alleged.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, RGC (USA) Mineral Sands,
Inc., Green Cove Springs, Florida, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order.

Evelyn Korschgen ,Esq., for the General Counsel..
Michael J. Bobroff, Esq. and Gail G. Renshaw, Esq. (Bobroff,
Hesse, Lindmark & Martone, Esq.), for the Respondent.
Bob Sapp, Grand Lodge Representative, for the Charging Party.
Calvin T. Coon, appearing pro se.
Harold Knowles Jr., appearing pro se.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD I. GROSSMAN, Administrative Law Judge. The
original charge in Case 12–CA–19258 was filed by Calvin T.
Coon, an individual (Coon) on January 23, 1998, and an
amended charge on February 3, 1999. The original charge in
Case12–CA–19499 was filed on May 26, 1998, by Harold
Knowles Jr., an individual (Knowles), a first amended charge
on June 15, 1998, a second amended charge on October 16,
1998, and a third amended charge on February 2, 1999. The
original charge in Case 12–CA–20101 was filed on April 29,
1999 by International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, District Lodge 112, affiliated with International As-
sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO (the
Union), and a first amended charge on May 17, 1999.
A consolidated complaint issued on May 7, 1999, and an
amendment thereto on May 17, 1999. The complaint as
amended alleges that RGC (USA) Mineral Sands, Inc. (Re-
spondent or the Company) interfered with, restrained, and co-
erced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by
engaging in the following acts and conduct:
(1) Threatening an employee with legal action because he
made a concerted safety complaint.
(2) Creating an impression of surveillance of its employees’
union activities.
(3) Interfering with its employees’ rights to make safety
complaints by stating that it was improper to make such com-
plaints.
(4) Interrogating employees about their making safety com-
plaints.
(5) Interrogating employees about the filing of an unfair la-
bor practice charge.
(6) Denying an employee’s request to consult with a union
representative prior to an interview with the employee which
the latter had reasonable cause to believe would result in disci-
plinary action against him.
(7) Preventing Charging Party Knowles from coming onto
Respondent’s facility and from talking to anybody in order to
perform his duties as the union steward.
The amended complaint further alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by engaging in the fol-
lowing acts and conduct:
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1635
(1) Threatening employees in October 1997, because of their
union activities with assignments to more onerous shifts, as-
signing eight employees1 in October 1997, to more onerous
shift assignments because they assisted the Union and engaged
in protected concerted activities, and to discourage employees
from engaging in such activities.
(2) Assigning six employees2 on December 17, 1997, to
more onerous shift assignments because they assisted the Union
and engaged in concerted activities, and to discourage employ-
ees from engaging in such activities.
(3) Refusing since April 26, 1999, to reinstate certain unfair
labor practice strikers3 who had made unconditional offers to
return to their former positions of employment.
(4) Refusing since May 3, 1999, to reinstate unfair labor
practice strikers Michael Padgett and Kyle Jackson who had
made unconditional offers to return to their former positions of
employment.
In addition, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act by giving disciplinary
warnings to employees Jeffrey A. Tillis and Harold Knowles
Jr., on May 6, 1998, by suspending Knowles on June 6, 1998,
and by terminating him on June 26, 1998, because Tillis and
Knowles engaged in union activities, because Knowles com-
plained about unsafe working conditions and Respondent be-
lieved that Tillis was involved in the same activity, because
Knowles and Tillis were named in the unfair labor practice
charge in Case 12–CA–19258, and because Knowles filed the
charge in Case 12–CA–19499.
A hearing on these matters was conducted before me in
Jacksonville, Florida, on May 24 through 27, 1999. Thereafter
the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging Union filed
briefs. Based on all the evidence of record, including my ob-
servation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the follow-
ing

1 Calvin T. Coon, Dale C. Condos, Steven O. Lester, Charles
Jammes Sr., Jeffrey A. Tillis, Harold Knowles Jr., Allan T. Knowles,
and Eldon J. Robinson.
2 Calvin T. Coon, Dale C. Condos, Steven O. Lester, Charles
Jammes Sr., Jeffrey A. Tillis, and Harold Knowles Jr.
3 Fred L. Allen Theodore Allen Tony Ashby
Michael C. Bennett Markham D. Upton Bowman
Bowman
On September 30, 1997, Respondent issued a letter propos-
ing that all maintenance mechanics would be placed on the shift
roster.
Chris Campbell Antwan Coleman Dale Condos
Calvin T. Coon Jack Coon Jerry T. Coon
David Davidson Donald Davidson D. Everington
Michael Gale John Harthcock E. Havorka
Douglas Hilton C. Jammes Sr. C. Jammes Jr.
James Jones Allen Knowles C. Knowles
Harold Knowles Jr. Charles R. Lee Michael Lee
Steve Lester Gregory Looney Josh Looney
John Mikell Larry Murphy J. Newman
Henry Povich Fred Rhodes John E. Riley
E. Robinson John Robinson Tom Rozier
Dan W. Still Joe Sweat K. Sweat
Jeffrey Tillis Michael Weizant

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is incorporated and has its headquarters in Aus-
tralia. It is also incorporated in the State of Florida,4 where it is
engaged in mining operations principally involving titanium, at
Green Cove Springs, Florida. During the 12 months immedi-
ately preceding issuance of the consolidated complaint, Re-
spondent shipped from its Green Cove Springs facility goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State
of Florida. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6,) and (7) of the Act.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Local Lodge 1098, affiliated with International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO (the
Union), and International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge 112, affiliated with International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFL–CIO
(IAM District Lodge 112) are both labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE DISPUTE OVER SHIFT ASSIGNMENTS—
SEPTEMBER 1997
A. Summary of the Evidence
There are three primary production and maintenance compo-
nents at the Green Cove Springs facility—the wet mill, which is
the mining component, the dry mill, which processes the mate-
rial, and the maintenance shop, also called the “front shop.”
Maintenance mechanics and electricians worked in all three
components. The Union has represented the production and
maintenance employees for about 17 years, and was a party to a
collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent ending Au-
gust 30, 1998.5
Respondent had three shifts operating a total of 24 hours per
day. Prior to October 1996, the maintenance mechanics
worked only one shift out of three. Beginning October 10,
1996, Respondent instituted a 6-month trial program whereby
all mechanics and electricians except leadermen would be as-
signed to a rotating 24-hour “shift roster.” Shortly after the
institution of this program, the electricians were eliminated
from the roster.6 Soon after execution of the collective-
bargaining agreement, employee Richard Godfrey was assigned
to the shift roster. He filed a grievance based on the fact that he
was more senior than other mechanics were who were not as-
signed.
7 Harold Knowles Jr. testified that there was a union
meeting at which the membership rejected the Company’s pro-
posal, and the Company was so informed. In lieu thereof, the
Union expressed preference for assigning the least senior me-
chanics to the shift roster. The collective-bargaining agreement
4 Testimony of Graeme Sloan, U.S. general manager of operations
for Respondent.
5 GC Exh. 6.
6 Testimony of General Manager Sloan.
7 GC Exh. 5.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1636
provided for “bidding” on “promotion or new shift assignments
. . . . Years of service will be the determining factor to award
positions if similarly qualified employees bid on the position . .
. . If after the bidding process is completed and no one meets
the position requirements, the Company then has the right to
select anyone whom the Company deems is best qualified to fill
the position opening.”8 Respondent contends that the latter
provision gives it “the right to make shift assignments in any
way it wishes, and that there is no seniority.”9
Within days after the union vote, Respondent selected Calvin
Coon, Dale Condos, Steven Lester, Charles Jammes Sr., Jeffrey
Tillis, Harold Knowles Jr., Allan Knowles, and Eldon Robin-
son, all front shop mechanics, for placement on the shift roster.
Marvin Short, senior maintenance supervisor, met with front
shop mechanics a day or two after the Union had rejected the
Company’s proposal, and announced the foregoing employees
to be placed on the shift roster. Harold Knowles testified that
an employee asked how the eight employees were selected,
because there was “no structure” to the selections. According
to Knowles, Short threw a folder on a table, put his leg on a
bench, and said:

I’ll tell you how you were picked or why you’re going on be-
cause the bullshit that you went down there to the Union hall
and started the way you all voted. . . . Mr. Sloan was tired of
it, and that’s the reason we were on shift.

Calvin Coon testified about the same meeting. One em-
ployee asked whether the Company was doing this to “punish”
the employees. Short “slammed” his folder on a table, put his
foot on a bench, and said that “he was tired of the BS and be-
cause of that fucking vote that you all took at the Union hall.”
Charles Jammes testified about the same meeting. Short said
that the selected employees would be put on the shift roster
because of the vote at the union hall. General Manager Sloan
was also present, according to Jammes. He said that the em-
ployees had “browbeat” other employees to get the vote they
wanted, that they were “bloody bullies,” and that he knew how
the vote went. Dale Condos testified that an employee asked
why the persons selected were being punished. Short an-
swered, “because the man in the front office is tired of your
bullshit and because of the vote you took at the fucking Union
hall.”
Short testified that he had to evaluate the capabilities of his
employees to make sure that all shifts had capable mechanics.
He agreed that on September 30, 1997, General Manager Sloan
had signed an order requiring all maintenance mechanics to be
on the shift roster. After the union vote rejecting the Com-
pany’s original proposal, Sloan told Short that the wet mill and
dry mill mechanics were to be excluded from the shift roster,
leaving only the front shop mechanics. Short stated that he did
not consider seniority in making the assignments. He did not
recall making the remarks attributed to him by the General
Counsel’s witnesses, but did not specifically deny making those
remarks.

8 GC Exh. 6, art. 7, sec. 2.
9 R. Br. at 5.
On December 17, 1997, Short assigned six of the employees
permanently to the shift roster.10
B. Factual and Legal Conclusions
I credit the generally consistent testimony of the General
Counsel’s witnesses that Short made the statements attributed
to him. They establish that the Company originally decided to
assign all mechanics to the shift roster, but then, after the Union
vote rejecting it, decided to assign only selected employees
from the front shop. I further conclude that, although a “grave-
yard” shift might be preferable to some employees, it is onerous
to others. Short’s announcement of the pending assignments
constituted an unlawful threat violative of Section 8(a)(1). The
General Counsel has established a prima face case that the as-
signments were disciminatorily motivated and violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3).11
Short’s testimony that the assignments were based on the
relative capabilities of the employees is too vague to offset the
evidence of his discriminatory motivation. Respondent’s ar-
gument that the shift assignments were allowed by the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement has no merit. The plain language of
the contract shows that it was intended to govern “bidding” by
employees for new jobs or new and presumably desirable
shifts, not attempts to assign employees to more onerous shifts
against their will—particularly, as here, where the employer
has in effect admitted that the assignments were made because
of the employees’ union activities. The Board has found such
assignments to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)12 and I
reach the same conclusion here.
The complaint allegation that Respondent on December 17,
1997, assigned six of the original employees to the shift roster
permanently is simply an extension of its original actions.
Business Manager Sloan testified that the Union recommended
that the Company post such positions. Union Chief Steward
Tony Ashby credibly denied that the Union made any such
recommendation. Respondent did not submit any bids, and I
conclude that there were none. Respondent’s unlawful motiva-
tion in its September assignments to the shift roster carried over
to its December permanent assignments. Accordingly, I con-
clude that these assignments also violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED IMPRESSION OF SURVEILLANCE —
SEPTEMBER 1997
The complaint also alleges that Respondent, by General
Manager Graeme Sloan, created an impression of surveillance
of its employees’ Union activities. I credit the uncontradicted
testimony of Charles Jammes that, at the shift roster meeting
described above, General Manager Sloan told employees that
10 Calvin T. Coon, Dale C. Condos, Steven O. Lester, Charles
Jammes Sr., Jeffrey A. Tillis, Harold Knowles Jr.
11 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1983).
12 The Independent, 319 NLRB 349, 373 (1995); MPG Transport,
315 NLRB 489, 492 (1994); Wellstream Corp., 313 NLRB 698, 706
(1994); Yale New Haven Hospital, 309 NLRB 363, 371 (1992); and
Central Broadcast Co., 280 NLRB 501, 534 fn. 55 (1986).
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1637
they browbeat other employees to get the vote they wanted, that
they were “bloody bullies,” and that he knew how the vote
went. Sloan did not say how he learned of this. Although Un-
ion officials may have informed him about the vote, nothing to
this effect was said to the rank-and-file union members. I con-
clude that Sloan’s statements created an impression of surveil-
lance of the employees’ union activities, and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
IV. RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH
EMPLOYEE SAFETY COMPLAINTS
A. The Alleged Threat of Legal Action—January 1998
The complaint alleges that Respondent threatened an em-
ployee with legal action because he made a safety complaint
and that Respondent told employees that it was improper to
make such complaints.13
Union Steward Harold Knowles testified that there was a
pontoon catwalk leading to the wet mill. It had a handrail
which was broken in several places. It if failed, employees
traversing it could fall into a pond, or be pushed onto a 13,800
volt cable. Knowles testified that he spoke about the matter for
a year with the maintenance planning coordinator, and with
several leadmen, but no action was taken. On January 14,
1998, Knowles filed a complaint with the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA).14 An inspector came out, and,
a short time later, a leadman handed a work order to employees
to reweld the handrail. The catwalk was temporarily shut down
at that time.
Knowles was called into Supervisor Marvin Short’s office.
The latter asked whether Knowles had called MSHA, and
Knowles agreed that he had done so. Short told him that this
was wrong, and that General Manager Sloan was “looking into
whatever legal action” he could take against Knowles.
Later the same day, Knowles was called into the office of
Business Manager Sloan. He told Knowles that the latter’s
action had made the whole mine look bad. Knowles replied
that he had tried to get supervisors to issue a work order to
repair the handrail, without success. Sloan replied that the
Company had internal procedures to handle matters like this,
and that Knowles should never have gone outside the Company
about the matter.
The next day, Supervisor Marvin Short held a safety meet-
ing. He said that everybody knew that the catwalk had been
closed, and stated that he felt as if his throat had been cut. “/I/t
took a chicken shit MF to do something like that,” Short told
the employees.
Knowles was a truthful witness and his testimony is credited.
B. The Overloaded Crane—April 1998
1. Summary of the evidence
On Saturday of the Easter weekend in 199815 Knowles and
Jeffrey Tillis observed a ladder sitting up against the dredge at
the wet mill. A huge pin had to be placed into the ladder,
which had to be raised. The Company brought in a 125-ton

13 GC Exh. 1(gg), par. 5(b).
14 GC Exh. 10.
15 I take administrative notice that this date was April 11, 1998.
crane for this job. However, when the crane operator picked up
the ladder, the front pads of the crane lifted to shoulder height,
and the operator discontinued the attempt. Next, the Company
placed the blade of a bulldozer as a counterweight on the side
of the crane which was being raised, in an attempt to prevent
this from happening. However, on the next attempt the bull-
dozer itself went up in the air. There were several employees
present, and some warned others to get out of the way. One of
them (Calvin Coon) said, “There goes 12 or 15 years of safety
right out the window.” That night, Knowles filed a complaint
with MSHA.
A day or two after these events, an inspector from MSHA
came out and talked with several employees, including
Knowles. On the same day business manager Sloan inter-
viewed five employees in his office, including Knowles and
Jeffrey Tillis. He first asked the employees whether they had
observed anything unsafe, according to Knowles and Tillis.
The latter two replied affirmatively while the other three em-
ployees denied seeing anything unsafe. Knowles and Tillis
testified that Sloan then asked whether anybody had called
MSHA. The other three employees denied it; Knowles stated
that he did not want to answer, and Tillis asked Sloan why he
wanted to know. He added that “if you call putting a bulldozer
on a crane unsafe,” then he did see something. Sloan then dis-
missed the other three employees, and continued questioning
Knowles and Tillis. According to the latter, Sloan repeatedly
asked whether it was Knowles or Tillis that called MSHA.
Tillis kept asking why he wanted to know, and Sloan “never
gave a straight answer.”
Sloan testified, and agreed that he questioned various indi-
viduals, but claimed that he did so individually. He denied
asking employees whether they had filed an MSHA complaint,
but, in the later meeting with Knowles and Tillis, acknowl-
edged asking them whether either had “reported.” Sloan was
asked on cross-examination: “Reported what?” He gave eva-
sive answers to this question, and essentially contended that he
could not remember his exact words. Sloan denied that his
questions had anything to do with the MSHA investigation—he
was simply trying to find out why employees felt it necessary to
call MSHA and what the problems were with the Company’s
“internal processes.”
MSHA later issued a citation stating that the Company put a
bulldozer blade on the crane and that the latter was being used
beyond its designed capacity. Respondent was fined $120.16
2. Factual conclusions
Knowles and Tillis were more truthful in demeanor than
Sloan, and were more consistent and probable. Sloan’s asser-
tion that he interviewed the employees individually is inconsis-
tent with the arrangement whereby three were dismissed, while
Knowles and Tillis were retained. I do not credit Sloan’s denial
that he asked the employees whether they had called MSHA,
and conclude that he simply evaded this issue at trial. Accord-
ingly, I credit Knowles’ and Tillis’ account of this meeting.
16 GC Exh. 11; testimony of Safety Administrator James Carter.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1638
C. Legal Conclusions
It is well settled that the expressions of concern about the
safety and the well-being of employees is conduct encompassed
within the meaning of “mutual aid or protection” as provided
by Section 7 of the Act. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,
370 U.S. 9 (1962); Daniel Construction Co., 277 NLRB 795
(1985). Appeals to appropriate governmental agencies to pro-
tect employees’ rights constitute protected activity. Eastex v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978) (Section 7 protects em-
ployee attempts to improve working conditions through resort
to administrative and judicial forums); Pete O’Dell & Sons
Steel, 277 NLRB 1358 (1985) (employee’s meeting with U.S.
Army Corps to discuss employer’s compliance with Davis-
Bacon Act is protected activity where union initiated the Corps’
investigation); Afro-Urban Transportation, 220 NLRB 1371
(employee effort to seek the aid of governmental agencies in
order to protect working conditions). I find that Knowles’
complaints to MSHA constituted protected activity.
It is equally clear that threats to institute legal action because
of an employee’s protected activity violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Braun Electric Co., 324 NLRB 1 (1997); Holy Cross
Hospital, 319 NLRB 1361, 1366 (1995). I find that Supervisor
Short’s statement to Knowles that General Manager Sloan was
“looking into whatever legal action” he could take against
Knowles because of the latter’s complaint to MSHA about the
defective handrail on the catwalk constituted a threat of legal
action based on Knowles’ protected activity, and was violative
of Section 8(a)(1). Sloan’s statement to Knowles that he should
not go outside the Company with matters like this constituted
an order that Knowles was not to engage in protected activity,
and also violated Section 8(a)(1).
Sloan’s repeated interrogation of employees as to which one
filed a complaint with MSHA about the bulldozer/crane inci-
dent constituted a further violation of Section 8(a)(1). Sloan
simply wanted to know the identity of the “reporting” em-
ployee—not what was wrong with his “internal processes.” I
conclude that these inquiries also violated Section 8(a)(1).
V. THE WARNINGS ISSUED TO HAROLD KNOWLES
AND
JEFFREY TILLIS—MAY 1998
A. Summary of the Evidence
The complaint alleges that Respondent gave unlawful disci-
plinary warnings to Harold Knowles and Jeffrey Tillis on May
6, 1998. The warnings related to a prior assignment on April
23. The employees were both on duty at about 1 a.m., when the
gear box of the third floor elevator at the dry mill broke down.
Knowles and Tillis were assigned to repair it. According to
Tillis, the shaft fell out, the tongue buckle broke, and every-
thing was coming apart.” The elevator had “sanded up,” and
the sand had to be removed. The temperature on the third floor
was 120 to 130 degrees. They needed “pullers” to get the bear-
ing off, but the ones they obtained first were too short and had
to be replaced. The bearing was so hot it had melded to the
shaft and had to be burned off with a torch. The employees
obtained fire extinguishers, and roped off the area. Supervisor
Lewis Rogers helped the employees get the gear box off the
shaft. When putting the gear box back in place, the belts of the
same size that had been on the box were too tight, and had to be
replaced. Tillis did most of the work on the box, while
Knowles was down in the store room on the first floor getting
parts. He testified that he had to use the computer to find the
location of the proper parts. Supervisor Rogers saw him doing
this, without objection.
Respondent’s warnings centered on the time it took to repair
the gear box. It took Knowles and Tillis 5.7 hours to complete
this job. Respondent submitted work records of other gear box
repairs. Supervisor Joey Carter testified that two employees,
with the assistance of one other, took 3 hours to replace a
smaller gear box where the only problem was a gear box and a
bearing.17 Another job also involved a smaller gear box, and
four employees required 2 hours to repair it.18 Carter testified
that, with four employees on a job, one of them could take a
break from the heat on the third floor, and that a repair job runs
more smoothly with additional employees.
Business Manager Short questioned Knowles the next day,
April 24, about the time that it took to complete the job. He did
not issue warnings until about 2 weeks later. According to
Short, he had to investigate the facts. He agreed that there were
no storeroom employees on the third shift, and that mechanics
had to find the parts themselves. He asked Supervisor Rogers
whether he had helped Knowles and Tillis remove the gear
shift. Rogers denied it according to Short—he had merely as-
sisted them in a “fire watch”. After much equivocation, Short
agreed that he had concluded his investigation not later than
April 29. In fact, he testified, “I basically had all I needed after
talking with Hal (Knowles) and Jeff Tillis one-on-one.”
There was an intervening event prior to the warnings.
Knowles testified that he was in the process of discussing shift
assignments with Campbell and Thornton. They proposed one
such assignment, and Knowles said he would consult with the
Union members. On May 5, he informed the managers that the
members were not willing to drop their grievances or unfair
labor practice charges.
On the next day, May 6, 1998, Short issued warnings to
Knowles and Tillis for taking 5 hours to replace the gear box.19
He agreed that no similar warnings had previously been issued.
B. Factual and Legal Conclusions
The General Counsel has established that Respondent unlaw-
fully transferred Knowles and Tillis (and other employees) to
more onerous assignments in October and December 1997, and
that it singled them out for interrogation concerning the com-
plaints to MSHA. These actions establish Respondent’s animus
against Knowles and Tillis as union activists. The General
Counsel has thus established a prima facie case that the warn-
ings issued to them were motivated by their union activities or
sympathies, and thus violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
The complaint also alleges that the warnings violated Section
8(a)(4). After Knowles was assigned to the shift roster, he told
Business Manager Sloan that he was a single parent with two

17 R. Exh. 12, order 74–0359.
18 R. Exh. 12, order 97–01457.
19 GC Exhs. 29, 39.
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1639
children at home, and would never have taken the job if he had
known that he would be transferred to the shift roster. On
January 23, 1998, Knowles was named as one of the discrimi-
natees in the original charge based on the shift assignments in
Case 12–CA–19258.20 On May 5, 1998, the day before the
warning issued to him, Knowles told the company managers
that the employees would not drop their unfair labor practice
charges or their grievances. I conclude that Knowles supported
the charge in Case 12–CA–19258.
Tillis testified that he was present at the meeting in 1997
when Short and Sloan discussed the shift roster. Tillis was also
one of the employees transferred to the roster at that time, and
was also named as a discriminatee in Case 12–CA–19258.
Tillis testified: “At the time Mr. Sloan was speaking, he was
staring straight at me like I was the one that coerced people to
vote the way I wanted them to vote.” I conclude that Respon-
dent believed that Tillis supported the charge in Case 12–CA–
19258.
The issue presented by the 8(a)(4) allegation is whether a
violation may be found where there is no filing of a charge or
testimony by the alleged discriminate but where the employee
supported or assisted such a charge filed by another employee.
On this issue, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
stated:

Section 8(a)(4) should be read broadly in favor of the em-
ployee, NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122, 92 S. Ct. 798,
801-802 (1972) . . . Scrivener held that Sec. 8(a)(4) protected
employees who gave sworn statements to a Board field exam-
iner investigating an unfair labor practice charge filed against
their employer, although they had neither personally “filed
charges” nor literally “given testimony” (citation). The Court
found this liberal approach justified by the congressional pur-
pose to allow “all persons with information about (unfair la-
bor) practices to be completely free from coercion against re-
porting them to the Board” (citation) and to protect the integ-
rity of all investigative stages of Board proceedings and an
employee’s participation in them, regardless of whether it
falls somewhere between an actual filing and formal testify-
ing. (citation).
The Scrivener rationale has led to the interpretation of
Section 8(a)(4) to protect an employee who merely threat-
ens to file charges with the Board (authority cited); who
refuses to testify on the employer’s behalf in relation to
charges filed with the Board (authority cited). National
Surface Cleaners v. NLRB, 54 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 1995).

In applying these criteria, the court in National Surface
Cleaners agreed with the Board that Section 8(a)(4) had been
violated where the employer believed that the employees in-
tended to support the charge in the form of corroborative state-
ments and testimony.21 In the case at bar, Respondent had rea-
son to believe that Knowles and Tillis would provide such sup-
port and assistance to the charge.
Respondent’s asserted reason for the warnings is not persua-
sive. The time that it took Knowles and Tillis to repair the gear

20 GC Exh. 1(a).
21 54 F.3d 35.
box on April 23 was not excessive, considering the difficulties
involved. Respondent’s records show that other employees had
easier jobs, or that more than two employees were involved.
These examples are not analogous to the problems Knowles
and Tillis faced.
The fact that Short delayed issuing warnings on the day after
the repair job, and again delayed issuing them well after the
date he had completed his so-called “investigation,” constitutes
evidence of discriminatory motivation. Rainbow Garment
Contracting, 314 NLRB 929, 938 (1994). This inference is
augmented by the fact that Knowles informed management the
day before his warning that the Union was not going to with-
draw its grievances or unfair labor practice charges. I conclude
that the warnings were issued because of Knowles’ and Tillis’
union activity and support of the charge in Case 12–CA–19258,
and were violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3),and (4) of the Act.
VI. RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED INTERVIEW WITH
KNOWLES, WHICH THE LATTER HAD REASONABLE
CAUSE TO BELIEVE WOULD RESULT IN
DISCIPLINARY ACTION, DESPITE ITS DENIAL OF
KNOWLES’ REQUEST FOR A SHOP STEWARD—JUNE
1998
A. Summary of the Evidence
Knowles was the steward on shift on June 3, 1998, and was
called to the office of Supervisor Marvin Short. Mining Man-
ager Elliott Mallard was present, together with Short. Mallard
told Knowles that employee Billy Carter, driving a truck, had
run into the back of another truck, and had been sent for a drug
test.
Knowles talked with Mallard the following morning, June 4,
asked him the location of the truck that had been hit, and stated
that he wanted to inspect it to determine whether it was on a
blind curve, whether the brakes were bad, or some other ex-
tenuating circumstances. Knowles’ shift started at 3 p.m. on
June 4. He punched in at 2:40 p.m., and discovered that the
truck had been brought to Respondent’s facility. He and Jef-
frey Tillis inspected it briefly, and then left the truck to begin
their shift. Knowles testified that he walked into the office to
get his work assignment about 30 seconds after 3 p.m.
Later that day, June 4, Knowles was called to the conference
room for a meeting with Business Manager Sloan and other
officials. Union Secretary Mike Bennett was present. Knowles
asked what the meeting was about, and Sloan said that he just
wanted to ask a few questions. He asked why Knowles dis-
obeyed a direct order, and what right he had to investigate the
truck. At that point, Knowles said that he wanted a shop stew-
ard. When Sloan replied that Mike Bennett was present,
Knowles observed that Bennett was the union secretary, not a
shop steward.
Another steward, Tony Ashby, was at the facility at this
time. He was called, and Knowles and Bennett were asked to
step out of the conference room into the lobby. Ashby passed
them and went into the conference room. After about 10 min-
utes, Knowles and Bennett were brought back into the confer-
ence room, where Ashby was present. Sloan began again to ask
questions, and Knowles stated that he would like to speak with
Ashby first. Sloan replied that Knowles could talk with Ashby
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1640
“in a little while,” and again started asking questions. Knowles
again stated that he wanted to talk with Ashby. Sloan re-
sponded that he could do so when Sloan was finished talking.
“You mean I can’t talk to my steward?” Knowles asked.
Ashby corroborated Knowles on this testimony. Sloan asked
additional questions, and Knowles answered him. Sloan asked
why Knowles investigated the truck and why he did not report
for work on time. Jeffrey Tillis corroborated Knowles, except
that he put their time of beginning work at about 3:05 p.m.,
instead of 30 seconds after 3.
Mining Manager Elliott Mallard testified, and agreed that he
had a conversation with Knowles on the morning of June 4. He
contended that he told Knowles that the Company was investi-
gating the accident, and that Knowles was not to inspect the
truck until he had received permission from his supervisor.
Mallard was asked whether this instruction prohibited Knowles
from inspecting the truck in the morning, prior to his shift.
Mallard first answered that this would not have been objection-
able. However, he contradicted himself immediately, and said
that there was nothing in the contract giving Knowles the right
to inspect the truck. Mallard also agreed that there was nothing
in the contract prohibiting such inspection.
Sloan asked Knowles his next scheduled day of work.
Knowles replied that he was off on June 5, a Friday, but was
scheduled to work Saturday and Sunday.
B. Factual and Legal Conclusions
The testimony of Knowles and Ashby concerning the details
of the interview with Sloan is uncontradicted, and is credited.
It establishes that Sloan insisted on demanding answers from
Knowles despite the latter’s protest that he first wanted to con-
sult with steward Ashby. Knowles had reason to believe that
the interview could result in disciplinary action, and, in fact,
such action did ensue within a few days. Knowles’ right to
such consultation was established in NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 25, (1075), and was reaffirmed by the Board in
Climax Molyodenum Co., 227 NLRB 1189 (1977), enf. denied
584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978);22 Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 262 NLRB 1048 (1982); System 99, 289 NLRB 723,
727 (1988); Postal Service, 303 NLRB 463 fn. 4 (1991).
I conclude that, by denying Knowles the right to prior con-
sultation with steward Ashby, Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
VII. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SLOAN AND
KNOWLES ON
JUNE 5, AND THE MEETING OF JUNE 8
At the conclusion of the disciplinary interview on June 4,
Sloan asked Knowles about his next scheduled day of work.
Knowles replied that the next day, September 5, a Friday, was
his day off, but that he was scheduled to work on Saturday and
Sunday. Sloan asserted that he asked Knowles to come in on
Friday, while Knowles contended that he merely promised to
communicate with Sloan. He gave Sloan his beeper number.
After unsuccessful efforts to reach Knowles by phone on Fri-
day, Sloan called by pager at about 3 p.m., and said that he

22 In Climax Molybdenum, the request for the presence of a steward
was made by the union, not the employees, unlike the case at bar.
wanted Knowles back at the plant for a meeting. Knowles said
the he could be back by 5 or 5:30 p.m., and Sloan replied that
this was not soon enough. Knowles and Sloan had another
dispute over this matter at the end of the day. Sloan told
Knowles not to report for work on Saturday or Sunday, but to
return on Monday, June 8.
A meeting took place at noon on June 8. Present for the
Company were Management Representatives Ed Campbell,
Marvin Short, Joanne Thornton, and Jimmy Scott. Sloan was
elsewhere on business. Present for the Union were Union
President Steven Hernandez, Knowles, and two other union
members. Hernandez testified that they had the impression that
some form of discipline of Knowles would take place. Three
main topics were discussed—Knowles’ alleged failure to show
up for a meeting on Friday, insubordination by failing to report
to a supervisor, and doing union business on company time.
Regarding Knowles’ alleged failure to report to his supervisor
before inspecting the truck, Hernandez, reading from notes,
said that nobody could figure out what Mallard had said. He
asked the Company to put Knowles back to work, and they
replied that they did not have that authority. Another meeting
was scheduled for June 16.
VIII. RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED PREVENTION OF
HAROLD KNOWLES FROM PERFORMING HIS DUTIES
AS UNION STEWARD—JUNE 1998
A. Summary of the Evidence
The complaint alleges that Respondent on June 10, 1998,
prohibited Harold Knowles from coming onto Respondent’s
property and thus prevented him from performing his duties as
a steward.
On June 10, following the meeting on June 8, Knowles re-
turned to the plant and, as the union steward, attempted to de-
liver some grievances concerning the truck incident to Human
Resources Manager Joanne Thornton. She refused to accept
the grievances. Knowles told her that he was also there to in-
spect the truck, and Thornton referred him to planning coordi-
nator Joey Carter.
Knowles told Carter that he was there to inspect the truck,
and the following exchange took place according to Knowles:

He (Carter) said You can’t inspect the truck. I said Why? He
said you’re not supposed to be here. I said, “Well, I’m not
here to report to work. They told me not to report to work.
I’m here to inspect the truck.” He said “No, you can’t inspect
the truck. You’re not even supposed to be on the property.
You’re suspended.”
And I told him, “Joey, nobody has said in the past that
I was suspended. It was just not to report to work. I’m
here in my official union capacity as a shop steward to
look at the truck.” And he said, “No, you can’t even be
around the property.”
B. Factual and Legal Conclusions
Knowles’ testimony is uncontradicted and is credited. An-
other employee had damaged a truck, and faced the possibility
of discipline because of it. Although Respondent finally agreed
that Knowles was suspended on June 6, its original position
was that this did not take place until June 12 (See sec. IX, in-
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1641
fra). In any event, whether an off-duty employee or a steward,
Knowles had the right to enter the employer’s premises in order
to engage in union business. Harvey’s Resort Hotel, 236
NLRB 1670 fn. 2 (1978). Citing Harvey’s the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has agreed with the Board that an em-
ployer’s ejection of union representatives engaged in union
business violated Section 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Unbelievable, Inc.,
71 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1995), enfg. 309 NLRB 761 (1992).
The functions of a steward are activities protected by Section 7
of the Act. Freeman Decorating Co., 288 NLRB 1235, 1239
(1988).
The language of the complaint, read literally, alleges that Re-
spondent prevented Knowles from coming onto its property,
and thus prevented him from performing his duties as a stew-
ard. Knowles in fact did come onto the property, but supervisor
Carter said he had no right to be there, and prevented him from
inspecting the truck. It was Respondent’s refusal to permit this
inspection which the parties were litigating. I conclude that by
refusing to allow Knowles to do this Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1).
The same rationale applies to Human Resources Manager
Thornton’s refusal to accept the grievances from Knowles. The
collective-bargaining agreement provided for participation of
the union steward in the grievance procedure, and empowered
him to submit grievances.23 I conclude that Respondent’s re-
fusal to accept the grievances from Knowles was also a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1).
IX. KNOWLES’ DISCHARGE
A. The Meeting on June 16
Sloan was back for the meeting on June 16. He asserted that
Knowles had inspected the truck without permission, and
Knowles denied it. He also wanted to know why Knowles had
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Company
(Knowles had filed the original charge in Case 12–CA–19499
on May 26, and an amended charge on June 15). I conclude
that Sloan’s question was an unlawful interrogation. Sloan also
told Knowles that he was suspended and was not to return to
the property. By this act Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by preventing Knowles from acting as the union’s steward.
The Meeting on June 19
The parties met again on June 19. General Manager Sloan
was present. He presented Knowles with a document entitled
“Discipline Review/Duty Status.” It placed Knowles on sus-
pension from June 12 to 19, 1998,24 placed him “at the “Final
Written Warning Step,” required him to maintain a “clean re-
cord” for 12 months, and ordered him to return for his first
scheduled work after June 19, 1998. One provision stated that
all parties had reviewed and “accepted” the discipline.25
Knowles and Hernandez caucused, and returned to state that
they could not accept the provision stating that Knowles ac-
cepted the discipline as this would preclude them from filing a
grievance. They also protested that Knowles had been sus-

23 GC Exh. 6, art. 9.
24 The Company later changed the beginning date to June 6, 1998.
25 GC Exh. 13, par. 5.
pended since June 6, not June 12, and that his return to work
should be “on” not “after” June 19.
Knowles asked what would happen if he refused to accept
this discipline. Sloan replied that he would have to resign.
Knowles responded that he would not resign because he had
“done nothing wrong.” According to Knowles, Sloan said that
he would be terminated, that the Company would get the “pa-
perwork” drawn up, and “get a hold” of Knowles. Sloan con-
tended that it was agreed that further communication with
Knowles would be through Union President Hernandez. The
latter denied any agreement to serve as a conduit for such
communications.
C. The Revised Discipline
By letter dated June 19, 1995, the Company sent Knowles a
revision of its previous discipline. The beginning date of the
suspension was changed to June 6, and Knowles was instructed
to return to work on his “first scheduled shift” on June 22,
1998. The language about his “acceptance” of the discipline
was eliminated.26
This letter was sent by certified mail. Knowles testified that
he received it at 4:30 p.m. on June 23. The record contains
copies of certified mail documents showing that Respondent
mailed them to Knowles. The dates are June 23, 24, and 25,
1998.27 Knowles testified that this letter was the first notice he
received about the revised discipline.
On June 20, the day following the June 19 meeting with
management, Union President Hernandez received an unsigned
draft copy of the revised discipline, together with a letter from
Management Accountant Ed Campbell.28 Hernandez then left
messages on Knowles’ voice recorder on June 20, 21, 23, and
24, without receiving a reply. Hernandez testified without con-
tradiction that Campbell called him on June 22 and asked
whether he had received the draft copy. Hernandez acknowl-
edged receipt, and asked whether anybody from Respondent
had notified Knowles. Campbell replied that Knowles would
be notified.
On June 22, Campbell sent Hernandez a signed copy of the
revised discipline, together with a cover letter inviting any
grievance.29 Hernandez responded with a grievance via facsim-
ile denying any wrongdoing by Knowles.30
On June 24, Campbell sent Hernandez a communication via
facsimile as follows:

Per our previous discussion, RGC (the Company) will enforce
all aspects of the discipline outlined in our correspondence of
June 19, 1998. The conditions of this discipline action al-
lowed Mr. Knowles to return to active duty on June 22, 1998,
as of his next scheduled shift as reference in Item 4 of this
Discipline Review/Duty Status Summary. Mr. Knowles has
failed to complete assigned shifts on the 22nd and 23rd of
June and his next scheduled shift is Friday June 26. RGC will
maintain all aspects of Mr. Knowles’ discipline as detailed in
26 GC Exh. 12.
27 GC Exh. 30.
28 GC Exh. 34.
29 GC Exh. 35.
30 GC Exh. 36.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1642
the June 19 summary and the General Manager will respond
to your grievance summary.31

Hernandez also had three telephone conversations with Camp-
bell on June 24. In the first one, Campbell observed that
Knowles had not appeared for his June 22 and 23 shifts. Her-
nandez asked whether anybody from the Company had notified
Knowles, and Campbell replied that the Company had sent him
a letter. In his second conversation with Campbell, Hernandez
asked when Knowles could return to work. Campbell replied
that he would have to get back in touch with Hernandez. He
did so, and informed Hernandez that Knowles was to return to
work on June 26. Hernandez’ testimony is again uncontra-
dicted and credited.
On June 25, Management Representative Jimmy Scott32
called Hernandez and asked whether the latter knew anything
about Knowles’ return to work on June 26. According to Her-
nandez, he recited to Scott his conversations with Campbell,
and that the latter had said Knowles would be notified. Scott
replied that he would get back with Hernandez, and did so. He
declared that Knowles was to report for work on June 26. Scott
did not testify, and Hernandez’ testimony is credited.
Knowles testified that he called the Company on June 25,
and left a voice mail for Campbell. The latter returned the call,
and told Knowles to report for work the next day, June 26, at
his regularly scheduled shift. Knowles’ uncontradicted testi-
mony is credited.
D. Knowles’ Discharge
Knowles clocked in on June 26 prior to his starting time of 7
a.m., and worked for about 2 hours. He was then called to the
conference room, waited there for about 2 hours, and was then
brought into a conference room with Sloan, Campbell, and
Union Steward Tony Ashby. Sloan handed Knowles a letter
stating that he was being terminated for violating his “proba-
tion,” in that he was absent and had failed to call in on June 22
and 23.33
Sloan argued that, although Knowles did not receive the cer-
tified letter until 4:30 p.m. on June 23, he could still have re-
ported prior to the beginning of his shift which on that date was
midnight. Asked why the Company did not send Knowles
notice by facsimile of the revised discipline, Sloan said that the
Company could not rely on Knowles and needed the assurance
of a certified letter. Knowles testified that he did not go to
work on midnight of the June 24 because he had worked all
day, and had made no provision for his children. In addition,
the reporting date in the letter was June 22, which had already
passed. Instead, Knowles called the Company on June 25 and,
as indicated, was told by Campbell to report for work on June
26.
E. Factual and Legal Conclusions
The General Counsel has established proof of animus against
Respondent—its unlawful transfer of Knowles (and others) to

31 GC Exh. 37.
32 Scott was one of the company representatives at the June 8 meet-
ing.
33 GC Exh. 31.
the shift roster, the unlawful interrogation of Knowles concern-
ing the complaint filed with MSHA, the unlawful warning fol-
lowing the repair involving the job on the gear shift, the unlaw-
ful interview with Knowles involving probable disciplinary
action, and Respondent’s refusal to permit Knowles, as shop
steward, to examine a truck damaged by another employee, or
to submit grievances.
Respondent’s asserted reasons for discharging Knowles are
contradictory and improbable. Knowles was told at the June 19
meeting that the Company would “get a hold” of him. He
heard nothing until the afternoon of June 23. The letter which
he received on that date was ambiguous in that it simultane-
ously asserted that June 22 was still the reporting date, but that
Knowles’ next reporting date was June 26. The revised offer
was tardy, and gave Knowles inadequate time to comply with
it. In addition to the ambiguities of the revision, Knowles had
children and other matters to take care of, and it was unreason-
able for Respondent to anticipate that he would report by mid-
night on the June 24. Respondent has given no credible reason
for failing to send Knowles notice via facsimile of the revised
discipline, with its June 22 reporting date, followed by a certi-
fied letter if Respondent so desired.
Finally, Campbell’s statements to Knowles and Hernandez,
supported by Scott’s statements to the union president, were
unequivocal—Knowles could report for work on June 26 and
would be notified. I conclude that the Company’s reason for
discharging Knowles was pretextual and that the real reason
was his union activities, his support of the charge in Case 12–
CA–19258, and his own charge in Case 12–CA–19499 filed on
May 26, 1999. Accordingly his suspension and discharge vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
X. RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REINSTATE
ALL UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE STRIKERS TO THEIR
FORMER POSITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT—APRIL 1999
A. The Strike, August 30, 1998
1. The evidence
The complaint alleges that on April 26, 1999, Respondent re-
fused to reinstate all employees who engaged in a strike on
August 30, 1998, caused by Respondent’s unfair labor prac-
tices.
The parties held 18 bargaining sessions from July 6 to Au-
gust 23, 1998. According to union negotiating committeeman
Dale Condos, the Union continued throughout the negotiations
to raise the issue that assignment to the shift roster should be
based on seniority. The Union’s proposal provided that shift
assignments would first be filled by volunteers, with the most
senior employee having the first option. If there were no
volunteers, the assignment would go to the least senior em-
ployee.34 Business Manager Sloan testified that the Company’s
position throughout the 1998 negotiations was that the Com-
pany did not have to use seniority in making shift assignments;
the positions of the parties remained the same.
The Company delivered its final proposal to the Union on
August 23, 1998. Union President Hernandez held a 10-hour
34 GC Exh. 33, proposal 25, art. 7.
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1643
session the following day at which the employees gave their
opinions on the company proposal. Hernandez testified that, as
a result of these discussions, he realized that what he had been
told by the negotiating committee was correct—although there
were other concerns, seniority, as it related to shift assignments
and promotions, was the most important issue in the minds of
the employees. Calvin Coon testified that the employees were
concerned with whether the Board’s handling of the unfair
labor practice charges concerning the previous assignments to
the shift roster would solve the problem. One employee said
“If they’ll do it to the senior mechanics the way they have, they
will do it to anybody.”
A second union session was held on August 27, and the em-
ployees voted with the same result—more than two-thirds
voted to go on strike. They also asked Hernandez to ask for a
1-week extension of the contract. He did, the request was re-
jected, the contract expired at 7 a.m. on August 30, and the
Union went on strike at 7:01 a.m.
2. Factual and legal conclusions
It is settled law that a strike is an unfair labor practice strike
if one of the causes is the employer’s unfair labor practice, even
though economic factors are present.35 It is not necessary to
conclude that the strike would not have occurred but for com-
mission of the unfair labor practices. Northern Wire Corp. v.
NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1989). I have previously found
that the assignments to the shift roster in 1997 were discrimina-
torily motivated and unlawful. In 1998, the employees went on
strike against this continuing practice by the Company. I con-
clude that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike.
B. The Employees’ Offer to Return to Work
1. Summary of the evidence
On April 21 and May 3, 1999, the Union notified the Com-
pany by letter that 46 employees were making an unconditional
offer to return to work.36
By letter via facsimile dated April 26, 1999, Respondent in-
formed the Union that it considered the strikers to be economic
strikers, that it would place them on a preferential hiring list

35 Larand Leisurelies v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1975); NLRB
v. Pope Maintenance Corp., 573 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB
v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, 542 F.2d 691, 704 (7th Cir. 1976);
Massachusettes Coastal Seafoods, 293 NLRB 496 (1989); other cases
put the test in a variety of phrases, all meaning the same as the reason
set forth above: I. W. Corp., 239 NLRB 478; Newport News Shipbuld-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Wichita
Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 584 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364
U.S. 871 (1960); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 907
(9th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Milco, Inc., 388 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458 F.2d 398, 407 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 856 (1972); NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co. of
Georgia, 383 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 955
(1968); Carpenters Local 1780, 244 NLRB 277, 281 (1979); Bender
Ship Repair Co., 188 NLRB 615, 631 (1971); and Decker Coal Co.,
301 NLRB 729 (1991).
36 The April 21 letter inadvertently included the names of two em-
ployees who had already returned to work. GC Exh. 19. These were
deleted from the complaint. The May 3 letter added two employees
whose names had been omitted. Michael Padgett and Kyle Jackson.
GC Exh. 36.
and recall them as positions became available. However, the
communication stated, employee Jack Coon was to report to
work at 7 a.m. on April 28, 1999.37 On April 28, 1999, the
Company asserted that Union President Hernandez had left by
voice mail a statement that Coon would not be available until
May 3, 1999. The Company thereupon directed that he report
on that date.38 By letter on April 28, 1999, via facsimile, the
Union’s Grand Lodge notified Respondent that Coon was en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice strike, and that the Company
was not to continue attempting to return the employees to their
former positions in a “piecemeal” manner.39
The Company hired 44 striker replacements,40 and after one
transfer to a nonsalaried position, made them permanent striker
replacements prior to December 31, 1998.41 None of these
employees was discharged.
On five separate dates, Respondent offered reinstatement to
various employees—three on May 3, 1999,42 and nine on May
7.43 On May 11, 1999, by letter via facsimile, Respondent noti-
fied the Union that none of the foregoing nine employees had
reported for work, and that the Company therefore concluded
that they had rejected offers of reinstatement.44 In the same
communication, the Company offered reinstatement to eight
other employees.45 On May 17, 1999, the Company informed
the Union to have 17 strikers return to work 2 days later.46 On
May 20, 1999, Respondent repeated the instruction with respect
to five additional strikers.47
2. Legal conclusions
It is settled law that unfair labor practice strikers are entitled
to immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs, or to
substantially equivalent jobs if their original positions are no
longer available, upon their unconditional offer to return to
work. Super Glass Corp., 314 NLRB 596, 598 (1994), citing
Harowe Servo Controls, 250 NLRB 958, 1070 (1980); Capitol
Steel & Iron Co., 317 NLRB 809, 814 (1995). The Board,
however, has found that a 5-day period is a reasonable accom-
modation between the interests of the employees in returning to
work as quickly as possible, and the employer’s need to effec-
tuate the return in an orderly manner. Beard Industries, 311
37 GC Exh. 20.
38 GC Exh. 28.
39 GC Exh. 21.
40 GC Exh. 17.
41 GC Exh. 40.
42 Dyall (sic) Bowman, Chris Campbell, Ray Lee (GC Exh. 22).
43 Edward J. Hovorka, Dan W. Still, Michael T. Bennet, Calvin T.
Coon, Stephen O. Lester, Frederick Rhodes Jr., Charles J. Knowles Jr.,
Charles R. Lee, and Douglas Hilton (G.C. Exh. 24).
44 GC Exh. 25.
45 Ibid. John M. Hartcock, Gregory T. Looney, Alan T. Knowles,
Michael L. Weizant, Charles E. Jammes Sr., Larry J. Murphy, Tony L.
Ashby, and Jeffrey A. Tillus.
46 David H. Davidson, Dale C. Condos, Michael M. Padgett, Theo-
dore J. Allen, Fred I. Allen, Michael A. Gale Jr., Kenneth L. Sweat,
Markham D. Bowman, David E. Everington, John A. Robinson, Jerry
Coon, Donald H. Davidson, John J. Mikell, Antwan K. Coleman, Kyle
R. Jackson, James O. Newman, Josh G. Looney (GC Exh. 26).
47 Charles E. Jammes Jr., Joseph M. Sweat, Thomas E. Rozier,
James F. Jones, Henry H. Povlich (GC Exh. 27).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1644
NLRB 768, 771 (1993), citing Drug Packaging Co., 228 NLRB
108, 113 (1977), modified on other grounds 507 F.2d 1340 (8th
Cir. 1978). The 5-day period will not apply where an employer
ignores or rejects, or unduly delays its response to such an of-
fer, or attaches unlawful conditions to its offer of reinstatement.
Newport News Shipbuilding, 236 NLRB 1637, 1638 (1978),
enfd. 602 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1979).
It is also settled law that piecemeal reinstatement is not com-
pliance with the law after an unconditional application for
same. Orit Corp., 294 NLRB 695, 700 (1989); Dorsey Trail-
ers, 327 NLRB 835 (1999).
The fact that an employer has hired permanent replacements
does not eliminate the right of unfair labor practice strikers to
reinstatement. “Unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to
reinstatement even though the employer has hired permanent
replacements. The replacements must be terminated if neces-
sary to make room for the unfair labor practice strikers.” De-
troit Newspapers, 326 NLRB 700, 776 (1998).
In the case at bar, Respondent did not comply with the law as
above stated. It delayed 5 days after the offer to return to work,
and then offered reinstatement to only one employee. Thereaf-
ter, Respondent did that which the Board says it may not do—it
offered piecemeal reinstatement to strikers. I conclude that by
failing to offer full and immediate reinstatement to the strikers
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
XI. RESPONDENT’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Respondent argues that the charges in Case 12–CA–19258
(the shift assignments) and Case 12–CA–19499 (the warnings
to Harold Knowles Jr. and Jeffrey Tillis) should have been
deferred to arbitration under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.48
The Board has concluded that deferral to arbitration is inap-
propriate where the issues are intertwined with other issues
which remain and where a hearing on all issues has already
been held. International Harvester Co., 271 NLRB 647 (1984).
Deferral is inappropriate where the charges involve the issue of
violation of Section 8(a)(4); the Board rejected delegating to an
arbitrator issue involving access to the Board’s processes.49
The Board rejected deferral where a union agent was denied
access to plant premises in order to conduct union business, and
was threatened with bodily harm. 15th Avenue Iron Works, 301
NLRB 878 fn. 3, 882 (1991).50 I have found that steward
Knowles was denied access for the purpose of examining the
damaged truck, and was threatened with legal action for engag-
ing in protected activity. The Board will not defer to arbitration
cases where the employer took discriminatory actions against
employees, and harbored animosity toward the exercise of their
statutory rights. Ironton Publications, 313 NLRB 1208 (1994).
These factors are present in this case. I conclude that there are
compelling reasons under Board policy for refusing to defer
these proceedings to arbitration.

48 R. Br. at 48; R. Answer, GC Exh 1(nn), par. 4.
49 Filmation Associates, 227 NLRB 1721 (1977); McKinley Trans-
port, 219 NLRB 1148 (1975); and Kansas Meat Packers, 198 NLRB
543 (1972).
50 See also Clarkson Industries, 312 NLRB 349 (1993).
Respondent further argues that the Region delayed investi-
gating the charge in Case 12–CA–19258, and that if the Region
had acted more promptly, Respondent could have changed its
shift assignments in some manner, or could have avoided or
delayed hiring permanent replacements.51 Respondent’s argu-
ment appears to be the disingenuous position that it was the
Board’s conduct which caused the Company to commit unfair
labor practices. However, Respondent’s counsel admitted at
hearing that his client did not lose any evidence or witnesses
because of the claimed delay. Laches is not available as a de-
fense against the General Counsel for asserted negligent delay
Consolidated Casinos Corp., 266 NLRB 988, 992 (1983).
The Company also argues that the Regional Director’s al-
leged failure to engage in prompt investigation of the charge
violated the Board’s Casehandling Manual. The Manual con-
tains “guidance, not rules.”52
In accordance with my findings above, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent RGC (USA) Mineral Sands, Inc. is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Local Lodge 1098, affiliated with International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO and
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, District Lodge 112, affiliated with International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO are both
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by en-
gaging the following conduct:
(a) Threatening employees with more onerous work assign-
ments because of their union activities.
(b) Threatening an employee with legal action because he
made a concerted safety complaint.
(c) Telling employees that it was improper to make safety
complaints.
(d) Interrogating employees about their safety complaints
and concerted activity.
(e) Interrogating an employee about his filing an unfair labor
practice charge.
(f) Creating an impression of surveillance of its employees’
union activities.
(g) Preventing a union steward from coming onto the prop-
erty to investigate potential grievances and working conditions.
(h) Conducting an interview with an employee at which the
latter had reasonable cause to believe that disciplinary action
would be taken against him, despite Respondent’s refusal to
grant the employee’s request to consult with a union representa-
tive.
(i) Refusing to accept employee grievances.
4. On August 30, 1998, certain employees of Respondent
ceased work concertedly and engaged in a strike caused by
Respondent’s unfair labor practices.
51 R. Br. at 47.
52 Superior Industries, 289 NLRB 834 fn. 13 (1988).
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1645
5. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by engaging in the following conduct:
(a) On October 8, 1997, assigning the eight employees listed
in paragraph 9(a) of the consolidated complaint dated May 7,
1999,53 and, on December 17, 1997, assigning the six employ-
ees listed in paragraph 9(b) of the complaint, to more onerous
shifts because they assisted the Union and engaged in concerted
activities.
(b) Since April 26, 1999, failing and refusing to reinstate
immediately the 44 unfair labor practice strikers listed in para-
graph 14 of the consolidated complaint dated May 7, 1999.54
(c) Since May 3, 1999, failing and refusing to reinstate im-
mediately the two unfair labor practice strikers listed in para-
graph 14(c) of the amendment to consolidated complaint.55
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by engag-
ing in the following conduct:
(a) Issuing disciplinary warnings to Jeffrey A. Tillis and
Harold Knowles Jr. on May 6, 1998, because they assisted the
Union, because they were named in the unfair labor practice
charge in Case 12–CA–19258, because Knowles claimed that
working conditions were unsafe and Respondent believed that
Tillis had made similar complaints, and to discourage employ-
ees from engaging in protected concerted activity.
(b) Suspending Harold Knowles Jr. on June 6, 1998, and
terminating him on June 26, 1998, because he engaged in the
activities described above, was named in the unfair labor prac-
tice charge in Case 12–CA–19258, and filed the charge in Case
12–CA–19499.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has committed cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that Respondent unlawfully refused to
grant immediate reinstatement on April 26, 1999, to 44 unfair
labor practice strikers, and similarly refused to grant such rein-
statement to two unfair labor practices strikers on May 3, 1999,
I shall recommend that Respondent be required to offer them
full and immediate reinstatement to their former jobs, or if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, discharging, if necessary, any replacements hired after
the start of the strike, and make such employees whole, with
interest for any loss of earnings or benefits he may have suf-
fered.56 Any such employee for whom employment is not im-
mediately available shall be placed on a preferential hiring list
for employment as positions become available, and before other
persons are hired for such work. Priority for placement on such
a list shall be determined by seniority or some other non-
discriminatory test. Since Respondent has unduly delayed the
employees’ unconditional offers to return to work, no useful

53 GC Exh. 1(gg).
54 Ibid.
55 GC Exh. 1(11).
56 Backpay is to be computed in accordance with the Board’s deci-
sion in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and New Horizons
for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
purpose will be served by granting a 5-day period before com-
mencement of Respondent’s backpay obligations; such obliga-
tion began upon the dates of the unconditional offers to return
to work. Frontier Hotel & Casino, 323 NLRB 815, 822 fn. 21
(1997).
As I have found that Respondent unlawfully suspended Har-
old Knowles Jr., on June 6, 1998, and discharged him on June
26, 1998, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to
offer him reinstatement to his former job, or, if that job no
longer exists, a substantially equivalent job, and that he be
made whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered since
his unlawful suspension on June 6, 1998, by paying him a sum
of money which he would have earned absent the discrimina-
tion against him, less net interim earnings, with interest as de-
scribed above. I shall also recommend expungement of all
references to his discipline, including his unlawful warning, in
Respondent’s records. I shall further recommend that Respon-
dent be required to expunge from its records all references to its
unlawful warning issued to Jeffrey Tillis.
I shall further recommend that Respondent be required to re-
turn to their former shifts those employees who were unlaw-
fully transferred to more onerous shifts in 1997.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record I issue the following, recommended57
ORDER
The Respondent, RGC (USA) Mineral Sands, Inc., Green
Cove Springs, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with more onerous work assign-
ments because of their union activities.
(b) Threatening any employee with legal action because he
made a concerted safety complaint.
(c) Telling employees that it is improper to make safety com-
plaints.
(d) Interrogating employees about their safety complaints
and concerted activity.
(e) Interrogating employees about their filing unfair labor
practice charges.
(f) Creating an impression of surveillance of its employees’
union activities.
(g) Preventing union stewards from coming onto its property
in order to investigate potential grievances and working condi-
tions.
(h) Conducting interviews with employees which the latter
reasonably believe will result in Respondent’s engaging in
disciplinary action against him, despite Respondent’s failure to
grant the employees’ request to consult a union representative.
(i) Assigning employees to more onerous work because they
assist the Union or engage in protected activities.
(j) Refusing to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers imme-
diately upon their unconditional application to return to work.
57 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1646
(k) Warning, suspending, or discharging employees because
of their Union or other protected activities, or because they had
filed charges or given testimony under the Act, or because Re-
spondent believes that other employees will support such
charges or testimony.
(l) Refusing to accept employee grievances.
(m) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from service of this Order, offer the fol-
lowing employees immediate reinstatement to their former jobs
or to substantially equivalent jobs, discharging, if necessary,
any replacements hired after the start of the strike:

Fred L. Allen Theodore Allen Tony Ashby
Michael C. Bennett Markham D. UptonD.Bowman
Bowman
Chris Campbell Antwan Coleman Dale Condos
Calvin T. Coon Jack Coon Jerry T. Coon
David Davidson Donald Davidson D.Ever ington
Michael Gale John Harthcock E. Havorka
Douglas Hilton C. Jammes, Sr. C. Jammes ,Jr.
James Jones Allen Knowles C. Knowles
Harold Knowles Jr. Charles R. Lee Michael Lee
Steve Leste Gregory Looney Josh Looney
John Mikell Larry Murphy J. Newman
Henry Povich Fred Rhodes John E. Riley
E. Robinson John Robinson Tom Rozier
Dan W. Still Joe Sweat K. Sweat
Jeffrey Tillis Michael Weizant M. Padgett
Kyle Jackson

In the event any such job is not immediately available, Re-
spondent shall take the action set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(b) Make the foregoing employees whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision. The beginning backpay peri-
ods for Michael Padgett and Kyle Jackson begin on May 3,
1999, and the backpay periods for the remaining employees
begin on April 26, 1999.
(c) Within 14 days from service of this Order, offer Harold
Knowles Jr., reinstatement to his former position or, if such
position does not exist, to a substantially equivalent position,
dismissing if necessary any employee hired to fill the position.
(d) Make Harold Knowles Jr. whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits he may have suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(e) Within 14 days from service of this Order, remove from
its files all references to its unlawful warnings to Harold
Knowles Jr. and Jeffrey Tillis and its suspension and discharge
of Knowles, and within 3 days thereafter notify each of them in
writing that this has been done, and that these actions will not
be used against them in any way.
(f) Within 14 days from service of this Order, assign all em-
ployees which it transferred to its shift roster and to different
shifts in 1997 back to their original shifts, unless any such em-
ployee elects to remain on the shift to which he is assigned.
(g) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, and
all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Green Cove Springs, Florida, facility, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”58 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 12, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(i) Within 21 days after service of this Order, file with the
Regional Director for Region 12 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten employees with more onerous
work assignments because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten any employee with legal action be-
cause he made a concerted safety complaint.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that it is improper to make
safety complaints.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their safety
complaints and concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their filing un-
fair labor practice charges.

58 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC. 1647
WE WILL NOT create an impression of surveillance of our
employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT prevent union stewards from coming onto
our property in order to investigate potential grievances and
working conditions.
WE WILL NOT conduct interviews with employees which
the latter have reasonable cause to believe will result in disci-
plinary action where we have failed to grant his request to con-
sult with a union representative.
WE WILL NOT assign employees to more onerous work be-
cause they assist the Union or engage in protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse immediate reinstatement to unfair la-
bor practice strikers on their application for same.
WE WILL NOT Warn, suspend, or discharge employees for
engaging in protected activities, or because they filed charges
or gave testimony under the Act, or because we believed that
they did so.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer immediate reinstatement to the unfair labor
practice strikers who applied for same, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings, with interest, which they may have
suffered.
WE WILL offer Harold Knowles Jr. reinstatement to his for-
mer or an equivalent position, and make him whole for any loss
of earnings he may have suffered, with interest, because of the
discrimination against him.
WE WILL remove from our files all references to the warn-
ings issued to Harold Knowles Jr. and Jeffrey Tillis and to the
suspension and discharge of Knowles, and tell them in writing
that this has been done and that these actions will not be used
against them in any way.
WE WILL assign all employees which we transferred to the
shift roster and to different shifts in 1997 back to their original
shifts.

RGC (USA) MINERAL SANDS, INC.