Retail Clerks, Locals 698 and 298

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 1966

160 N.L.R.B. 709 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 709
duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent , shall be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days
from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith 13
11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board this provision
shall he modified to lead "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Ordei, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees not to sign anything for the Union,
coercively question employees covering union matters, offer benefits to employ-
ees to induce them not to support the Union, or threaten employees with
wage cuts or other harmful consequences because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to engage in union or concerted
activities.
PORAY, INC,
Employer
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post-
ing, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881
U S Courthouse & Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago,
Illinois 60604, Telephone 828-7597
Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, and Locals
698 and 298, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO
( Skornian 's Inc. , and Skorman Bros ., d/b/a Skorman 's Miracle
Mart) and Anne Bates . Case 8-CB-977. An/ust 26. 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On .Jane 17, 1966, Trial Examiner George J. Bott issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondents, Retail
Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, and its Local 698, had
engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, andM Z71
recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
nflirinaftce action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that these respondents had
not engaged in other, and Local 298 had not engaged in any, unfair
labor practices, and reeomnlendecl that such allegations be clisnilssed.
160 NLRB No. 73.
710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thereafter , the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a brief in support thereof. The Respondents did
not file exceptions.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision , the General Counsel's exceptions and brief," and
the entire record in this case , and, hereby adopts the findings, con-
clusions , and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the fol-
lowing exceptions and additions.
The Trial Examiner , found, and we agree, that both Respondents,
by maintaining surveillance over the activities of a deauthorization
group, and that Respondent Local 698 , by questioning employees
about their deauthorization activities and threatening to keep them
under surveillance , violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. We find
merit, however , in the General Counsel's exception to the Trial Exam-
iner's failure to find that the Respondents , who induced an employee
to spy on a meeting held by the dissident group with a Board agent,
furnished this employee with a radio transmitting device, and parked
two cars with radio receiving equipment outside the home in which
the meeting was taking place, thereby interfered with Board proc-
esses, in further violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.2 We
shall modify the Trial Examiner 's Recommended Order accordingly.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner 's Recommended Order
with the following modifications :
[1. Substitute a semicolon for the period at the end of paragraph
1(a), and add the following:
[and interfering with Board processes by maintaining electronic
surveillance of a meeting of employees with a Board agent.
[2. Substitute a semicolon for the period at the end of the first
indented paragraph of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and add the following :
[or interfere with Board processes by maintaining electronic
surveillance of employee meetings with Board agents.]
[The Board dismissed the complaint insofar as it alleges unfair
labor practices not found herein.]
1 We find no merit in contentions by the General Counsel that various credibility findings
of the Trial Examinee are erroneous, as the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
does not demonstrate that the credibility findings are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Prod-
ucts, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (CA 3).
1 See Grand-Ccatral Chrysler, Inc , 155 NLRB 185.
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 69 8 AND 298 711
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF. THE CASE
Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed by Anne Bates against "Retail
Clerks Union , AFL-CIO" on October 4 , 1965, and an amended charge filed by
her against Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, and its Locals 698
and 298 ( herein collectively the Union), on November 5, 1965, the General Coun-
sel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hear-
ing dated November 19, 1965, alleging that Respondents had engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A ) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act , herein called the Act. Respondents filed an answer on November 27,
1965, admitting certain allegations of the complaint but denying others including
the commission of any unfair labor practices . The hearing in this matter was held
before Trial Examiner George J. Bott in Akron , Ohio, on January 24 and 25,
19661 Subsequent to the hearing , General ' Counsel and Attorney Shuff filed briefs
which I have carefully considered
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD
Skorman's Inc is an Ohio corporation engaged in the operation of seven retail
department stores under the name of Miracle Mart in various cities in the State
of Ohio. The annual gross sales of each of the seven stores exceed $ 500,000, and
the annual purchases of materials which . have their origin outside the State of
Ohio and which are shipped directly to a Skorman 's, Inc., warehouse in Ohio
exceed $9 million.
Skorman Bros is a partnership consisting of Albert, Milton, and Theodore
Skorman, operating a retail department store in Akron , Ohio. Its annual sales
exceed $500,000, and its purchases from outside the State of Ohio, approximately
$700,000.
I find that Skorman 's Inc and Skorman Bros. are employers engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act.2
1 In the answer filed on November 27, 1965 , over the signature of Attorney Robert E
Shuff, the first paragraph made it clear that the answer was filed on behalf of all three
Respondents , for it reads , "Now comes the Retail Clerks International Association, Local
698, and Local 298, AFL-CIO , hereinafter refeired to as the Union, and for answer to the
complaint filed In this case , avers and alleges as follows " At the commencement of the
hearing, however , Shuff stated that lie was appearing only on behalf of Respondent Local
698. No appearance was entered on behalf of Respondent International Union or Respond-
ent Local 298. The answer , which was filed for all three Respondents , denied that the
original charge was served upon "the Union" and that the amended charge was served
upon "the Union ," as alleged in the complaint It appears from the exhibits In evidence
that a copy of the original charge was sent by the Regional Office of the Board by registered
mail to Retail Clerks Union, AFL-CIO, at 2800 Euclid Avenue , Cleveland , Ohio, and the
return receipt is signed by one N. A. Efta . It also appears from the exhibits that the
amended charge was served by registered mail on Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO, Washington , D C , and upon the two Local Unions, and return receipts are at-
tached to an affidavit of service It was conceded that Local 698 was properly served, and
I find that there also was proper service upon Respondent International Union and Re-
spondent Local 298 . Assuming that the oiiginal charge , sent to Cleveland , Ohio, did not
reach the International in Washington , the amended charge was properly directed and was
well within the statute of limitation period in Section 10 ( b) of the Act In addition, since
the answer was filed on behalf of all three Respondents , it was proper to proceed with
the hearing under all the circumstances even though Local 298 and the International
Union were technically unrepresented, particularly because there was no explanation of
the shift in legal representation or request for time to secure other counsel I also note
in this connection that Donald Knapp , an International representative of the International
Union , testified in the hearing
s Findings based upon the testimony of Albert Skorman , treasurer and managing officer
of Skorman 's Inc , and partner in Skorman Bros , Board's Decision and Director of Elec-
tion in Case 8-RC-4052 and Regional Director ' s Decision and Direction of Election in
Case,8-UD-15.
712 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent Retail
Clerks International Association, Respondent Local 698, and Respondent Local
298 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The setting and the issues
Skorman's Inc.,,and Skorman Bros., d/b/a as Skorman's Miracle Mart, herein
called the Employer, have been parties to a collective-bargaining contract with
Respondent Local 298 and Respondent Local 698 since July 16, 1965, covering the
employees in their various retail stores in Ohio.3 The Employer's grant of statu-
tory recognition to the Respondents preceding the execution of the labor agree-
ment was pursuant to a check of union cards.
The contract between the Employer and the Union contains, in article III, a
union-security clause which is valid on its face. Briefly summarized, it provides
for maintenance of membership in the Union for present employee-members and
a requirement that nonmember employees and newly hired persons join the Union
not later than the 31st day following the effective date of the contract or their
beginning of employment as the case may be .4
Some of the employees covered by the contract were not members of the Union
when the contract was executed and did not join within the grace period provided
in the agreement and in the Act. It also appears that there was some employee
activity looking toward recision of the Union's union-security authority occurring
at or about the time the contract was signed, and this activity resulted in the filing
of a petition under Section 9(e) of the Act, on August 8, 1965, to revoke such
authority.5
On the',day the contract was executed, and again on September 11, 1965, admit-
ted agents of Respondents visited certain stores and sought, to sign nonmembers
for the unions. The complaint- alleges, and General Counsel contends, that during
these visits the Respondents threatened employees with loss of employment, loss
,of insurance benefits, and other reprisals because they had refused to join the
appropriate local union, "and or because they, had participated in the filing of the
union shop deauthorization petition." Respondents concede that their agents visited
the stores and talked with employees but contend, -in substance, that ,the Union
did only what it had a right to do under its valid agreement, that is, advise employ-
ees who had refused to abide by the terms of the agreement that they would be
discharged and lose benefits under the contract.
The complaint also contains an allegation that Respondents engaged in surveil-
lance of a meeting place and activities of employees of the Employer who were
engaged in concerted activities and who were at the time presenting evidence to
an agent of the National Labor Relations Board. The Union denies that the con-
,duct engaged in was coercive in the circumstances, and it also denied that 'one of
its agents interrogated an employee about the identities of other employees who
were engaged in concerted activities, as the complaint alleged.
B. Alleged threats of reprisal at the Employer's Warren, Ohio, store
On September 11, 1965, Donald Knapp, International representative of Respond-
ent International, and George Hennigin, organizing director of Respondent Local
698, visited the Warren store to talk with the approximately 18 employees who
had not joined the Union.6 What was said during their visit is in dispute.
Theresa Cartwright, an employee at the Warren store who was working in the
office at the time, testified that Hennigin came into the store, withdrew her time-
card from the rack and asked her where he could find Theresa Cartwright. She
3 The copy of the contract In evidence appears to be ' with Skorman ' s Inc ,' but it Is
693, that the emploveea of Skorman Bros are covered too . It also appears that Local
698, that the employees of Skorman Bros , are covered too. It also appears that Local
No 31 Is a party to the agreement , but that Local Is not, however, involved In this
proceeding.
4 Accoiding to section a, for the purpo.e of article ITT. the execution date of the agree-
ment shall be considered as its effective date. The record shows that the contract was
executed on July 16. -
6 Case 8-UD-15 - '
6It appears that there were about 60 persons employed at Warren and 300 in the
overall unit
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 713
asked him why he wanted her, and she said he replied that he came ". . . to fire
her." Cartwright said she thought the incident was "funny." According to Cart-
wright, Hennigin also said he had come "to fire" all employees whose names were
listed on a paper he had in his hand. Cartwright was not a member of the Union,
although she had been solicited previously by Hennigin. She said that she had no
intention of joining the Union or ". . . signing his hospitalization card or any other
card that he had in mind . . .," although she knew she had to be employed to be
insured. No representative of the Employer had ever told her that she was required
to join the Union, and Carl Leveto, manager of the Warren store, told her and
other employees, during Hennigin's appearance at the store, that the Union could
not "fire" them and that Hennigin's remarks were just "union talk."
Mary Cooley testified that Hennigin asked her ". . . if she had made up her mind
about signing . . ." and she replied that she had not. Then Hennigin told her that
"As of then I was fired. Technically I was fired." He also stated, she said, that her
insurance was expired as of . . ." then. Cooley had attended the meeting at
which the contract was ratified, and she conceded that she knew that she was
required to join the Union within 31 days as a condition of employment and had
been asked to do so previously by a union representative. She also agreed that Hen-
nigin reminded her of the expired grace period and stated that her insurance "was
terminated," because she ". . . would no longer be an employee "
James Elko, employed at the Warren store, said that Knapp told him that he
was fired ..." and that ". . . each day (he) came to work was a new day
of work ." for him. He also said that Knapp told him that the Union had filed
a law suit to enforce the contract and that Elko had no hospitalization insurance.
Elko had attended the contract ratification meeting and was aware that he was
required by the terms of the contract to join the Union as a condition of
employment.
Employee Medve testified that Hennigin asked him whether he "... still refused
to sign up." When Medve said he did, Hennigin told him that ". . . as of that day
(he) was no longer employed by Skorman's " There was no other conversation,
according to Medve, and he walked away. He knew there was a contract in existence
because he had attended the ratification meeting.
Anna Ryder testified that Hennigin asked her if she would join the Union when
he visited the Warren store on September 11. She said that she asked Hennigin if
she had to join and he told her she did not. Ryder then said she would not join
and, according to her Hennigin laconically commented, "Well, you are dismissed."
She recalled no other significant remarks and was uncertain about the existence or
status of the union contract. No one from management had ever told her about her
obligations, and, after Hennigin told her that she was dismissed, she asked Leveto,
the store manager, if it were true, and he told her it was not.
Store Manager Leveto was present when Hennigin and Knapp talked with some
of the employees on September 11, 1965. Asked what he recalled having been said
to the employees, he replied, "The exact words of course I don't know. But the mean-
ing was this; that they were fired. They had no union hospitalization. And that as
(of) Monday following there would be a Court Order from Cleveland for their
dismissal." Some of the employees asked Leveto what they should do after Hen-
nigin talked with them and he told them to go back to work. Leveto was familiar
with the terms of the contract, of course, and he said he was instructed by higher
authority to follow its terms, but with respect to the union-security aspects of the
contract, however, he said, in effect, that management took a neutral position and
did not advise employees to join or not to join the Union.
The labor relations affairs of the Warren store would normally be attended to
by Hyman Jacobson, business representative of Local 298, but Jacobson was
unavailable, and Knapp asked Hennigin, of Local 698, to accompany him to the
Warren store on September 11, 1965. Knapp testified that he entered the store and
the first person he-met was Cartwright with whom he had a conversation about
holiday pay for employees. He then asked to see Carl Leveto, the store manager,
and was told by Cartwright that he was not there. According to Knapp, while he
was talking with Cartwright, Hennigin was talking with another employee and
explaining why the union representatives were there. He said that Hennigin stated
that they were present to explain to those who had not joined the Union why they
should sign an application card, a dues deduction authorization, and a certain
document related to the insurance program; and to give them an opportunity to
join the Union in case they had not been contacted by Jacobson. Hennigin also
told the employee that the Union intended to file a complaint under Section 301
714 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the Act for enforcement of the contract on the following Monday. According
to Knapp, while Hennigin was talking with the employee, Ann Bates, the Charging
Party in this case and Petitioner in Case 8-UD-15, appeared and entered into the
conversation. During the conversation, Bates asked that Leveto be summoned, and
he appeared in 5 or 10 minutes.
When Leveto arrived Knapp told him that the Union would file suit to enforce
its agreement on the following Monday and that he wished to talk with the employ-
ees who had not yet joined the Union to tell them about the contemplated legal
action, which would affect them directly, and to give them another opportunity to
become members of the Union. Knapp told Leveto that he did not know the
employees, but only had a list of their names, and he suggested that Leveto direct
him to the employees by department. Leveto objected to this proposal, and sug-
gested that employees be called from work to talk with Knapp and Hennigm.
Knapp testified that when he asked Leveto to arrange for him to see employees,
Bates stated that "They don't want the union," and Knapp told her to keep "her
mouth shut." He also said that, while Hennigin was talking with another employee
who had been summoned by Leveto, Bates again interrupted to state that the
employees did not have to talk with anyone and "did not have to join the Union."
Again Knapp told Bates to "restrain" herself and "shut up." 7
At some point during the discussions with employees there were six or seven
employees present and some confusion, according to Knapp. He said that, while he
was discussing the health and welfare provisions of the contract with another
employee and the consequences of his failure to join the Union, Bates told the
employee not to worry, because Skorman's would take care of him. Knapp said he
told Hennigin that they were wasting their time and left the store.
Knapp also testified that he had told Leveto that certain employees may not have
. had the opportunity to sign authorization-applications, dues checkoff or
insurance benefit applications . . ." and that he had come "to explain the union's
position." Asked if he did not tell Leveto that he intended to tell employees that
unless they were members they would not be eligible for insurance, he replied that
"this came up while I was talking to some of the people but not at the initial dis-
cussion with Mr. Leveto." Knapp also conceded that he told employees that since
the Union had ". . . no application from them, even insurance application, we
couldn't pay off because we wouldn't know who they were to begin with." He also
said that he told them that the ". . . way to become members (was) that they had
to sign a membership card, . . . the insurance card (and the checkoff card)."
George Hennigin, Local 698 representative who accompanied Knapp to the War-
ren store at his request, did not specifically deny any of the statements attributed to
him by the employee witnesses, but he did deny that his purpose in going to the
store "on that particular occasion stemmed from certain difficulties that the Union
was experiencing with respect to the UD petition . . ." filed by Anne Bates. He
conceded that, in talking with Leveto about why he wanted to talk with employees
who had not yet joined the Union, he stated that one of his reasons was that
. up to now they had only been getting advice from Belkin 8 and Bates."
Although I have no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the employee witnesses
that Knapp or Hennigin told one employee that they had come "to fire" her, another
that her insurance was "terminated" and another that he was "no longer employed"
and had no seniority or insurance, this was not the entire story, because I also find
that the union agent's remarks were not as bald at that, and I credit the substance
of Knapp's testimony. Even if the language used by Knapp and Hennigin to explain
the Union's position may not have been quite as formal or restrained as a quick
reading of his testimony would lead one to believe,9 I find on the basis of it, read
in the light of the employees' testimony and the whole labor relations situation
existing at the time, that the full meaning of Knapp's and Hennigin's statements to
employees was that the Union was filing a lawsuit seeking enforcement of its agree-
7 Knapp admitted that when he was explaining to Leveto why he wanted the employees
to hear the Union's position he stated that " . . the employees should be apprised of the
situation because they had heard so much boloney from Bates . " Bates seems to have
been present during Knapp's and Hennigin's conversations with Leveto and the employees,
but it is not clear whether she heard this remark She did not testify
6 Counsel for the Charging Party
O He conceded that there was confusion and "chaos" at the time As set out earlier, he
resented Bates' advice to employees, and according to Hennigin, when Leveto resisted
Knapp's request that he be permitted to talk with employees one at a time at their work
stations, Knapp and Leveto had a "vehement argument."
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 715
ment with the Employer which would effect the discharge of those who had not
joined the Union, that, as far as the Union was concerned, those employees were
no longer employees and had no seniority, and, because they were not employees,
they were not covered by the health and welfare provisions of the contract. I also
find that Knapp and Hennigin forcefully reminded the employees that all such dire
consequences flowed from their failure to join the Union io But even if the language
used by Hennigin and Knapp was forceful, intimidatory, or even coercive," I find
that, in the circumstances of this case, it did not constitute a violation of Section 8(b)
.(1) (A) of the Act for the following reasons:
It must be stressed that the Union and the Employer were parties to a valid
union-security agreement under which all employees were required to join the
Union within the statutory grace period. Obviously, the Employer was not cooper-
ating with the Union in enforcing the contract, and the grace period had long
expired, and everyone knew it, when Knapp and Hennigin spoke with employees.
No one contends that the Union's civil action to enforce its agreement under Sec-
tion 301 of the Act violated Section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act, no one argues that it
would be improper for the Union to inform the delinquent employees that it was
seeking their discharge, and General Counsel concedes that it would have been
proper for the Union to attempt ". . . by proper and lawful means, and at proper
times and proper places . to persuade nonmembers to join." 12 The existence of
a contractual right, the failure to honor it, due regard for the right of unions and
employers to freely and in good faith express and explain their legal positions, lead
me to conclude, however, particularly in the absence of cases to the contrary, that
the Union's threat to do or have done that which would have been legally permis-
sible if effected is not the kind of conduct outlawed by the Act.
I have suggested that there are no cases that require a contrary result. Cases
like Gunble Brothers, Inc,13 are not actually in point and, it seems, to me, do not
help solve the problem of adequately protecting and fairly balancing the contrac-
tual rights of the parties to a valid agreement and the rights of employees to use
the provisions of Section 9(e) of the Act or otherwise dissent from the policies of
the incumbent, because in Gimble Brothers there existed no contractual provision
requiring membership in the union. In that case, the respondent union put on what
was referred to as a "blitz" to force employees to join the union or prevent them
from working because they wished to refrain from assisting the union. Physical
force was also involved, and the situation was otherwise unlike the occurrences in
the present case. But the basic legal difference in the cases is the presence here of
the union-security provision, because, in Gimble and cases like it the right of
employees under Section 7 of the Act to refrain from assisting the union was vir-
tually unrestricted, while here, because of the existence of the valid union-security
provision in the agreement, their right to remain nonmembers of the Union is cir-
cumscribed by the Act itself,14 and this fact must not be disregarded in determining
10 Employee testimony supports this finding crediting Knapp in the following respects:
Cartwright admitted that she knew she must be employed to be insured and that she had
no intention of signing anything at any time Cooley said Hennigin told her that "techni-
cally" she was fired and that her insurance "was terminated" because she "would no longer
be an employee " Elko knew he was not fired, because he was told that "each day lie came
to work was a new day of work for him," meaning his seniority was gone in the Union's
view, as it would have been if he were actually discharged He also admitted being told
about the suit to enforce the agreement.
11 Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act does not interdict all acts or statements by labor
organizations which "restrain or coerce" employees, but only those which restrain or coerce
them in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
12 General Counsel's brief.
13 Uimble Brothers, Inc, 100 NLRB 870, in Dora Corporation, 153 NLRB 592, the union
had no majority and the union-security provision was illegal It violated Section S(b)
(1) (A), therefore, by threatening employees with loss of employment unless they signed
glues checkoff authorization cards.
14 Supra.
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
SEC 7 Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3)
716 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what statutory right of employees, if any, was infringed on by the conduct of the
Respondents in this case.
Implicit in what I have said about balancing the rights of nonmember employees
with those of the Union and evaluating what was said and done in the Warren
store on September 11, 1965, in the light of the whole Act, is my determination
that the Union does have the right, regardless of the existence of the deauthoriza-
tion movement under Section 9(e) of the Act, to insist on full compliance with
the union-security provisions of its contract, at least until certification to the Union
and the Employer of the results of an election under the Act, and I reject the con-
tention to the contrary in General Counsel's brief that, if I read it correctly, the
Union had no right to prevent the employees from working ". . . if they chose to
refrain from joining until the questions raised by the `UD' petition had been
resolved." 15 No case is cited which holds that a valid union-security provision is
suspended pending processing of a petition to deauthorize the union's authority, and
the cases construing Section 9(e) of the Act clearly point the other way, in my
opinion.16 In the Andoi and Monsanto cases, the Board held that ". . if employ-
ees cast an affirmative deauthorization vote, it shall be taken to mean that the effec-
tiveness of the union-security clause in the contract between the Union and the
Employer shall be suspended immediately upon certification of the results of the
election to the Union and the Employer." 17 In the Penn Cork case, the Board com-
mented that ". . . the deauthorization election, however, had the effect, when certi-
fied by the Regional Director, of immediately suspending the union shop provision
of the contract (and) after that it was no longer necessary for any employee in the
unit to remain a member of the Union as a condition of employment." The Board
concluded "when there has been an affirmative deauthorization vote, outstanding
checkoff authorizations originally executed while a union-security provision is in
effect become vulnerable to revocation . . . ... It is the certification by the Board,
therefore, that gives employees the right to resign from the union and cease paying
dues.
Since the nonmember unit employees were obligated by the agreement but had
failed to join the union and pay dues, the lunion could seek their discharge with
impunity and the employer could discharge them without legal liability, provided
that no union may seek an employee's discharge where his membership has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than failure to tender dues and initia-
tion fees, and no employer may discharge an employee for nonmembership in a
labor organization for reasons other than his refusal to pay dues and initiation
fees.18 If a discharge is attempted to be justified on the ground of nonpayment of
dues, but the record shows that it was based upon some other consideration, such
as the employee's exercise of a statutory right, for example, then the discharge is
"pretextual" and illegal even though the ostensible ground for discharge or request-
ing the discharge is a lawful one.19
General Counsel contends that Respondents' "true motive" in visiting the Warren
store and talking with the employees was to break ". . the backbone of the
deauthorization movement ." at the Warren store. This theory of violation is
stated in the complaint as being restraint and coercion of the employees of the
Employer ". . . in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
by threatening them with loss of insurance benefits and coverage, loss of employ-
ment and/or other reprisals if they refused to join Respondent Local 698, and/or
because they sought the assistance of the National Labor Relations Board, and/or
because they had participated in the filing of a union shop deauthorization petition."
The facts relied upon to support this theory and to reveal the Union's "true
motive" essentially are: the nature of the Union's conduct at the Warren store;
Knapp's statement that the employees had heard only the "baloney" of "UD" peti-
15 It may be that the contention actually is that the Union could take legal action, or
engage in "peaceful persuasion" to enforce its agreement but that its conduct in entering
the store in the circumstances was illegal.
16 Great Atlantic cC Pacific Tea Company, 100 NLRB 1494; Andor Company, Inc, 119
NLRB 925 ; Monsanto Chemical Company, 147 NLRB 49 , Penn Cork f Closures,
NLRB 411
156
17 Andor Company , supra, 929 , Monsanto Chemical, supra, 51
1s Section 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3) of the Act.
19 Radio Officers' Union ( A. H. Bull Steamship ) v. NLRB., 347 U.S. 17, 41, 42, 43;
NLRB. v. Mechanics Educational Society, 222 F.2d 429 (C.A. 6) ; Local Union No. 18,
Opeiating Engineeis (Earl D Creager, Inc ), 141 NLRB 512.
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 % 1"r
tioner Bates and the petitioner's lawyer; that Warren was the only store visited and
that Respondents believed it was the heart of the deauthorization movement.
Assuming the validity of the theory, I do not think the facts will support it, partic-
ularly because every fact is equally consistent with Respondents' avowed purpose of
seeking full compliance with its labor agreement and giving employees one last
opportunity to join the Union as with the theory that Respondents were seeking
the discharge of employees because they had joined together and petitioned the
Board for a deauthorization election. In the first place, contrary to General Coun-
sel's contention, I find nothing significant in the place and time of the Warren visit
to support the reprisal theory. Almost 60 days had passed since the contract was
executed, and a substantial group of employees were knowingly nonmembers of the
Union, contrary to the terms of the agreement. The Employer, it is clear, was not
cooperating with the Union in enforcing the agreement as is evident from Leveto's
reluctance to permit the interviews in the store and his testimony, in effect, that the
Employer took no position about the need to join the Union in conversation with
employees.20 The lapse of time since execution and lack of employer cooperation
are extenuating circumstances which must be considered in assessing the propriety
of the Union's trip to the store, if any extenuation is needed. In addition, the union
agent's statements and conduct at the Warren store are equivocal, and it does not
appear, as General Counsel contends, that they were designed to "harass" and
"humiliate" employees in -the "presence of other employees and customers." Knapp
first asked Leveto to permit him to talk with employees at their work stations, one
at a time. Leveto demurred, and it was then decided to talk with them in groups.
Some confusion obviously resulted, as Knapp readily admitted, but his 'testimony
that he was interrupted by advice from Bates' to employees that they did not have
to join the Union is undenied. I can not infer from the record that the visit was so
arranged that it disclosed a purpose to embarrass, intimidate, harass, and drive from
employment those who were supporting the deauthorization petition. I have also
found earlier that although Knapp's and Hennigin's explanations about the contract
and employee status were probably not so formal and low keyed as Knapp would
have it, neither were their remarks as bald, blunt, or laconic as the employees' first
indicated, and so I find nothing in the union agents' demeanor, conduct, or state-
ments as such on September 11 meaningfully pointing to an improper motive on
their part. And although I am in agreement with General Counsel that the appro-
priate test of unlawful conduct, especially 'threats to occasion loss of employment,
is whether the statements are reasonably calculated to have an effect on the listener
without regard to the union's ability to carry them out, it cannot be overlooked
that, so far as this record is concerned, no employee has been fired or otherwise
discriminated against. Leveto, who was acting as a buffer between the Union and
the nonmember employees, was present during all the interviews, as was apparently
Bates, the petitioner in the UD case. Leveto told the employees that the Respond-
ents' remarks were "just union talk" and to go back to work, and Bates told both
the union agents and employees that employees did not have to talk with them or
join the Union. When it is considered that the Respondents were present, talking
and acting at least under the color of right, namely, as the statutory representative
of employees, recognized as such by the Employer and a party to a valid labor
agreement containing a union-security clause, the actual impact of the Union's
conduct cannot be realistically ignored in considering its legal significance.
Finally, in the pretext area, Respondents' visit to the Warren store alone is not
especially significant. Although Bates, the UD petitioner, worked at Warren, and 17
or 18 other employees at that location had not joined the Union, Warren was the
only logical place for the Union to visit under its contentions, because all but 2
or 3 employees at other stores had joined the Union by that time. If the Union had
a right to have employees join the Union, it had a right to seek them out where
they were, it would seem. If it could not do so without its actions being evidence
against it, then it would have less than it was legally entitled to under its agreement.
General Counsel also contends that Respondents, by their statements and con-
duct on September 11 in the Warren store, demonstrated that they ". . freely
intended to exact an unlawful condition precedent to honoring their obligations
under the insurance and welfare program, that is, the absolute requirement of
membership in good financial standing." He concludes that such conduct is pro-
hibited by Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, because welfare benefits may not be
administered on behalf of members only or curtailed as a reprisal against dissident
or "rebel" employee members. Here again , I am in agreement that the withholding
2D Employee Allison said Store Manager Battista's position was the same.
718 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
of welfare payments , or any other benefits due employees , on the basis of member-
ship as such is illegal, but , in my opinion , the contention misreads the records and
misapplies the cited cases. I have found earlier that Knapp 's and Hennigin's state-
ments, realistically viewed, meant , and were understood by employees to mean, that
they would lose their insurance benefits or seniority because they would no longer
be employed under the terms of the agreement . In Local 138, International Union
of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.2d 130 (C.A. 2), cited by
General Counsel , the court held that a restriction in a welfare fund's coverage to,
men who maintained their financial standing with the union discriminated against
nonmembers in violation of the Act, but in that case it appeared that the union was
operating a discriminatory hiring and referral system under which it also discrimi-
nated against a dissident member. Since it was not operating under a valid union-
security agreement , its discrimination with respect to welfare payments on the basis.
of membership as such was apparent . But the court also pointed out that, "Of
course where a valid union -security agreement is in effect and is enforced, the bene-
fits of a welfare fund are properly limited to those who alone may be employed
consistently with the agreement ." 21 It would seem therefore that, in determining the
legal effect of a reduction of benefits or loss of status , the existence of a union-
security agreement and the right of affected employees to be employed under the-
agreement and benefit from its provisions are relevant factors to be considered.
When employment is lost under a valid union -security contract it would appear
that benefits which flow from employment as such rather than membership may be
affected whether the employee is a member or not. In any case , whatever the state-
of the law, I find and conclude that, in the circumstances of this case , Respond-
ents' statements to employees about loss of insurance benefits, tied in as they were
with Respondents ' reliance upon its contract , which, if enforced , would result in
loss of employment , at least in the Union 's view, did not violate Section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the Act.22
C. Alleged violations of Section 8(b) (1) (A ) at the Akron store
The contract was executed on July 16, 1965, and on that day Paul Bowman and
James Sabo , business representatives of Respondent Local 698, went to the Employ-
er's Akron store # 8, in BowMan's words , for the purpose of signing employees for
the Union under the terms of the agreement. There is a dispute about what he and'
Sabo told employees about their obligations.
Employee Doris Dennis said Bowman told her she had to join the Union. She
stated that she protested that employees had a certain length of time in which to,
enroll, but Bowman told her he was "here today" and did not intend to return, so
she could either join then or be discharged . Dennis said she signed all the docu-
ments presented her after Bowman told her she need not bother to read them.-
21321 F 2d 130, footnote 6; similarly , in Indiana Gas & Chemical Corporation , 130 NLRB.
1488 and Northeast Coastal, Inc , 124 NLRB 441 , there existed no valid union -security
clause.
22 Article III, section 2 of the labor agreement contains a dues checkoff clause which is
valid on its face General Counsel contends in his brief , however, that Respondents violated
the Act by insisting that employees sign a dues checkoff authorization as a condition of
employment rather than pay dues voluntarily as the Act permits . I find that this issue is
not in the case and not ripe for decision First, there is no allegation in the complaint
that employees were threatened because they refused to sign checkoff authorization, al-
though the complaint specifically alleges threats because of refusal to join the Union. and
the matter was not actually litigated Second , if the issue is in the case by implication, the
facts show that it was never a real issue as far as the employees and the Union «eie con-
cerned and never jelled into a dispute clear enough for intelligent decision The Union
did insist upon an application card , a checkoff authorization and an insurance form being
executed , but no employee testified that his reluctance or refusal had anything to do with
the checkoff , and there is no way of determining what the Union 's position would have,
been about voluntary payments if the subject had been raised In this connection , I note,
that in the Union 's visit to the Akron store an employee was told that if she did not sign
a checkoff card she would have to pay her dues directly to the Union at the union office
Third , there may be some existing uncertainty in the state of the law relating to this
subject , which is an added reason for insisting upon a clear delineation in the pleadings
See Salant & Salant, Inc , 88 NLRB 816 ; American Screw Company, 122 NLRB 485, 489;-
General Motors Corporation, 134 NLRB 1107, 1117; Aristocrat Inns o f Amerioa, Inc, 146 ,
NLRB 1599, 1613.
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 719
Dennis attended the contract ratification meeting and was aware that employees had
31 days to join the Union.
Millie Allison testified that Bowman handed her three documents for her signa-
ture and, in a 15-minute conversation with her, explained certain union benefits.
She said that she too protested that George Hennigin, union agent, had told all
employees at the ratification meeting that they had 30 days to make up their minds
about the Union, but that Bowman replied, "sign . . . or be without a job within
24 hours." She said she signed all cards after she was given an opportunity to read
them.
June Smith signed all three documents given her by Bowman, but she said he
told her that this was the last time that he would be at the store and she could
either sign or be terminated. She asserted that Bowman did not tell her that she had
a grace period in which to join the Union, but she said she learned about it the
next day. She conceded, however, that she was present at the contract ratification
meeting, and she also agreed under cross-examination that Bowman also told her
that if she did not sign the application, dues checkoff, and insurance application at
that 'time she would have to go to the Union's office later to do so.
Jean Smith, also employed at Akron, testified that she was called to a desk in
the store where Bowman and Sabo were sitting, and Sabo asked her to sign certain
cards. She refused and told Sabo that she understood that employees had 31 days
to make a decision, but, according to her, Sabo answered, ". . . sign them today or
out the door you go." She asked if that mean "fired" and Sabo said "that is right"
and you "won't be back any more." She said she asked Sabo if she could read the
documents before she signed them, but that he told her that he saw "no sense in
reading them" because he could explain them to her. Smith also attended the con-
tract ratification meeting, and she also recalled that Hennigin told all employees at
that meeting that they had 31 days to join the Union.
Paul Bowman testified that he went to the store with a list of employees to
enroll them in the Union. The store manager provided him with a table and chairs,
and, employees were released from work to talk with him and Sabo. He told
employees that he was present to sign them for the Union under the labor agree-
ment, and he said he showed each one his business card and said that, as their
business representative, he would try to explain anything that was unclear to them.
He told all employees that they had 31 days under the contract to join the Union.
He also testified that he told them that he was present as a convenience to them,
and that if they refused to sign he must mark them on his list as "refused," but,
in that case, "At such time as they wanted to they could come down to the office-
and sign if they didn' t sign that day."
Bowman said he discussed with employees the meaning of the dues deduction
authorization card and the insurance card. He told them that they would have no,
dues deducted for July, but they would for August, and that the insurance enroll-
ment card was necessary because a copy,of it containing the name of the benefici-
ary designated by the employee was sent to the Union's insurance department.
Some f mployees asked Bowman what would happen to them if they did not
sign the cards, and he said he told them that, "Under the terms of the agreement
they wou d be terminated after 31 days ... ." He denied telling anyone that he
would be terminated if he did not sign immediately or that this was his last trip
to the stc 'i. He said, that, to the contrary, since he was their business representa-
tive, he g..ve them his card and told them to call his office if they had any
problems.
James Sabo testified that he explained the membership application, dues check-
off authorization, and insurance form to the employees he talked with on July 16.
He stated that some of the employees asked him if they had 31 days to join and
he told them they did. He remembered Jean Smith making a protest about signing
a card, and he told her she did not have to. According to him, Smith called him
a Communist. He admitted that he told some employees that this was his last trip
to the store and that, if they did not sign then, they would have to do so at the
union office later.23
I credit the testimony of Bowman and Sabo, and I find that no employee at the
Akron store was told by them that he had to join the Union immediately or be
discharged. The employees testified that they had attended the contract ratification
meeting, which had occurred only a day or so before, and that they were told by
13 The record shows that Sabo spends most of his time working for the Union's credit
union.
720 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Business Representative Hennigin at that time that there was a period of 31 days
before membership in the Union was required. That Bowman or Sabo would run
counter to this advice so soon is unlikely. In addition, June Smith, admitted that
she was told that if she did not sign that day she would be required to go to the
union office later, which is contrary to Dennis' testimony that Bowman told her
that she must sign immediately under pain of discharge. That Bowman would tell
one employee that she could sign at the union office and immediately tell another
something else is also unlikely. Dennis also said Bowman told her that she need not
bother to read the documents but just to sign them. Allison, on the other hand,
said Bowman spoke for 15 minutes with her, explaining the benefits to be derived
from signing, and that she had an opportunity to read the cards. These inconsist-
encies and the better recall of the union representatives are additional reasons for
crediting them.
The union-security provisions of the contract were effective by its terms on its
date of execution, which was July 16 provided the appropriate grace period required
by the Act 24 The incidents and conversations at the Akron store described above
occurred on the day the contract was executed and effective, as far as union security
and checkoff are involved, contrary to General Counsel's suggestion in his brief,
but, nevertheless, if the Union had insisted upon membership as a condition of
employment before the grace period in the contract and the Act had expired, it
would have violated Section 8 (b').(1) (A), as General Counsel contends.25 Since I
have found that such was not the case, I find and' conclude that Respondents did
not violate the Act on'July 16, 1965, at store #8 in Akron, Ohio, as alleged in the
complaint.
D. Allegations of surveillance in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act
The complaint alleges that Respondent Retail Clerks International and Respond-
ent Local 698 kept under surveillance the employees who were supporting the
deauthorization petition and presenting evidence to the Board; and that Respond-
ent Local 698 questioned employees about the identities of those who were support-
ing the deauthorization petition,. stated that it had kept their meeting under sur-
veillance and threatened to continue to do so. I find that these allegations were
established by a preponderance of the evidence.
It appears from the record that a meeting of employees who were supporting
the "UD" petition was scheduled for October 12, 1965, at the home of Mrs. Miller,
and that Respondents knew or believed that Miller and her step-daughter, Pat
Goudy, were supporters of the petition. Another employee, Joan Hereford, who had
originally supported the dissident group, had been won over to the Union a short
time before the meeting and had given the Union what information she had about
those who were for the deauthorization petition. Hereford Was invited to the meet-
ing at Miller's home and was told that Board Agent Enright would be present at
the meeting. Hereford told Ronald Marcoletti, agent of Respondent Local 698,
about the meeting, and she testified that she was told to make her own decision
about attending, but she also said that she felt that the union agents wanted her
to attend and actually asked her to try to discover who was paying the legal fees
of Attorney Belkin.
Hereford attended the meeting, and the Respondents gave her a radio trans-
mitter to take with her, allegedly for her protection. She stayed at the meeting
until around 10.30 p.m., and then left with Pat Goudy for a bar. Present at the
meeting were a group of employees and Enright, the Board agent.
Marcoletti told Hennigin, of Local 698, what Hereford had told him, and
arrangements were made for Hennigin, Marcoletti, Knapp, of Respondent Inter-
national, and Sylvester, another agent of 698, to park close to Miller's home dur-
ing the meeting in automobiles equipped with receivers which could pick up signals
from Hereford's transmitter.26
While the union representatives were parked near Miller's home during the
meeting, they were observed by employee Douglas McDonald who was attending
the meeting. Board Agent Enright, who was also attending the meeting, also
appeared, and asked the union representatives what they were doing there. Sylvester
iArticle III, section 3. The other terms of the agreement, such as wages and other
benefits, were effective as of July 19
15 Cadillac Wire Corp , 128 NLRB 1002, enfd. 290 F.2d 261 (C A. 2) ; compare Keller
Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 NLRB 583.
10 Hereford testified that she couldn 't get the "walkie talkie" to work until she got home
that night.
RETAIL CLERKS, LOCALS 698 AND 298 721
said he told Enright he was watching the home of a girl friend to see if she were
cheating on him. Hennigin said Enright also spoke to him and told him that his
conduct in keeping the meeting under surveillance was a clear violation of the Act.
Hennigin denied that such was his purpose, claimed that some one had asked them
to be present, and refused to leave. The men remained there in accord with previous
arrangements with Hereford to follow her when she left and met her and Goudy
in a bar. This they did, but they were unable to talk with Hereford until she
reached home that night when Hennigin telephoned her and arranged to have coffee
with her at some other place.
Respondents contend, and Hereford - testified, that they were present outside
Miller's home at Hereford's request, because she feared for her physical safety.
I discredit this testimony. Hereford wasn't convincing in her testimony on this
point, and she readily admitted that she had a "feeling" that the union agents
wanted her to attend. She conceded that she had no fear of Miller or of Goudy,
Miller's stepdaughter, and she knew a Government agent would be present. It also
appears undenied in the record that Marcoletti told employee McDonald, in early
November, that the Union had a "fink" at Miller's home that night and that there
would be a "fink" at the next meeting or any other meeting that the group held.
He also told Goudy that he was outside the house and asked her who was at the
meeting. Hennigin also admitted that Respondent Local 698 caused a tape record-
ing to be made of the November [October] 12 meeting of the "UD" group. All of
Hereford's and the paid union representatives' actions, as described, were consistent
with the allegation that they were keeping the "UD" group under surveillance, even
when they knew that they were consulting an agent of the Board
I find and conclude that Respondent International Union and Respondent 698
kept under surveillance the activities of the deauthorization group as alleged in the
complaint, and that Respondent Local 698 questioned employees about their
deauthorization activities and threatened to keep them under surveillance. By such
conduct Respondents violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.27
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-
CIO, and Local 698, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, have
engaged in the unfair labor practices set forth above, it will be recommended that
they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Skorman's Inc., and Skorman Bros., d/b/a Skorman's Miracle Mart is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By keeping under surveillance the meeting place, meeting, and activities of
employees who were engaging in concerted activities for their mutual aid or pro-
tection, Respondent Retail Clerks International and Respondent Local 698 engaged
in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the Act.
4. By questioning employees as to the identity of those employees who were
engaging in concerted activities-for their mutual aid or protection, by threatening
employees that it had engaged in surveillance of their meeting and meeting place
and by threatening that it would continue to do so, Respondent Local 698 engaged-in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(1)(A)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent Retail Clerks International and Respondent Local 698 engaged
in no other unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act,
and Respondent Local 298 engaged in none of the unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint.
97 See Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc., 155 NLRB 185; Checker Taxi Company; 131
NLRB 611.
257-551-67-vol. 160-47
722 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED, ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, it is recommended that Respondent Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, and Local 698 thereof, their officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
( a) Restraining and coercing employees of Skorman's Inc. and Skorman Bros.
by keeping under surveillance the meeting places, meetings, and activities of employ-
ees engaging in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection ; questioning
employees as to the identity of other employees who engaged in concerted activities
for their mutual aid or protection, and threatening employees that it had engaged
in surveillance of their meetings and would continue to do so.
(b) In any other like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by a valid agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places in the Respondent Retail Clerks International's
and Respondent Local 698's business offices, meeting halls, and places where notices
to their members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 28 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of each of these
Respondents, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by them for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Furnish to the Regional Director signed copies of the aforesaid notice for
posting by Skorman's Inc. and Skorman Bros., if willing, in places where notices
to employees in the unit covered by Respondents' labor contract are customarily
posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after being
signed by the Respondents, as indicated, shall be forthwith returned to the Regional
Director for disposition by him.
(c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of
receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondents' have taken to comply herewith 29
28 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Dec!-,
sion and Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree
of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court
of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order"
^ In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, In writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 698, RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF SKORMAN 'S INC. AND
SKORMAN BROS.
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by keeping under surveillance the meeting
places, meetings , and activities of employees engaging in concerted activities
for their mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT question employees as to the identity of other employees who
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection , or threaten
employees that we have engaged in surveillance of meetings and will continue
to do so.
PALMER ASBESTOS & RUBBER CORP. 723
WE WILL NOT in any other like or related manner restrain or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except
to the extent that such rights may be affected by a valid agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization.
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
LOCAL 698, RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 720
Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 4415, Telephone 621-4465.
Palmer Asbestos & Rubber Corporation and American Federa-
tion of Grain Millers , AFL-CIO, Local 33. Case 9-CA-3767.
August 26, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 3, 1966, Trial Examiner Max Rosenberg issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, Respondent's exceptions and its brief to the
Trial Examiner incorporated therein, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
i We find no merit in Respondent's contention that its letter to employees, setting forth
alleged company policy as to status of strikers and replacements, "refutes allegations of
statements made by Supervisor (Ferring)," as the letter was distributed before the state-
ments were made, and, In any event, contains no reference thereto
160 NLRB No. 50.