Ray N. Capil, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 17, 2001
01983461 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 17, 2001)

01983461

07-17-2001

Ray N. Capil, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Ray N. Capil v. United States Postal Service

01983461

July 17, 2001

.

Ray N. Capil,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01983461

Agency No. 1F-941-0081-97

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that he was

discriminated against on the basis of disability (Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder (PTSD)) when: (1) between February and April 1997 he was

denied three weekends off; (2) he was denied reasonable accommodation

and a reassignment to Tour 2; (3) he was denied four consecutive weeks

of vacation; and (5) on March 10, 1997 he was rated unacceptable in his

mid-year merit review. For the following reasons, we affirm the agency's

final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Supervisor of Distribution Operations in the Automation Unit at the

agency's Processing and Distribution Center in San Francisco, California.

Complainant worked on Tour 1, commencing at 11:15 p.m. and ending at

8:00 a.m. Believing the agency discriminated against him as referenced

above, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on May 17, 1997. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. Complainant requested that the agency issue a final decision,

from which complainant now appeals.

As a threshold matter, complainant must establish that he is an

"individual with a disability." An individual with a disability is one

who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3)

is regarded as having such an impairment. Major life activities include,

but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching are also recognized as major

life activities. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With

Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

The determination as to whether an individual has an impairment which

substantially limits a major life activity is made on a case by case

basis. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Interpretive Guidance on

Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(j). An impairment is substantially limiting when it prevents an

individual from performing a major life activity or when it significantly

restricts the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can

perform a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j). The individual's

ability to perform the major life activity must be restricted as compared

to the ability of the average person in the general population to perform

the activity. Id. The Supreme Court has held that the determination

of whether a person is an "individual with a disability" must be based

on his or her condition at the time of the alleged discrimination.

The positive and negative effects of mitigating measures used by the

individual, such as medication or an assistive device, must be considered

when deciding if he or she has an impairment that substantially limits

a major life activity. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471

(1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).

Moreover, such limitations must be long-term or potentially long-term,

as opposed to temporary, in order to render one an individual with a

disability. See generally EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans

With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (March 25, 1997) at

question 10. However, "some conditions may be long-term, or potentially

long-term, in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is

expected to be at least several months. Such conditions, if severe,

may constitute disabilities." Id. at question 7.

In his affidavit, complainant stated that he has nightmares, feelings

of hopelessness, problems remembering things, and social isolation.

He reiterated these statements on appeal by submitting a declaration

wherein he contends that his major depression and PTSD significantly

restrict his ability to sleep, concentrate, and interact with others.

In his declaration, complainant describes himself as "intensely sad and

socially withdrawn." He states that he has "serious insomnia" and "severe

problems concentrating." However, the medical evidence in the record does

not support complainant's contentions concerning his ability to sleep,

concentrate and interact with others. The record contains: (1) a note

from his doctor dated April 11, 1994 stating that complainant cannot work

in the Automation Unit "because of his emotional condition" and that he

needs "a relatively stress free placement on either Tour 1 or Tour 2";

(2) a May 14, 1996 letter from a staff psychiatrist at the Department of

Veterans Affairs stating that complainant is being treated for depression

and needs to "be placed in a less stressful work environment"; (3) a

letter dated July 16, 1996 from the same psychiatrist stating, without

elaboration, that complainant's "functional capacity is impaired due

to his service connected conditions" and referring complainant to the

Department of Veterans Affairs' Vocational Rehabilitation Department for

vocational rehabilitation and retraining because "his current occupation

and work situation have exacerbated his symptoms due to the stress of

the position"; (4) a September 10, 1996 note from another Department of

Veterans Affairs psychiatrist explaining that complainant was unable to

work for a week due to "high levels of stress related to work"; and (5) a

medical record from a clinic dated April 14, 1997 stating that complainant

had "hypertension, worsened by situational stress" and PTSD.<2>

The Commission finds that the evidence in the record is insufficient

to establish that complainant is substantially limited in the major

life activities of sleeping, concentrating and interacting with others.

In spite of complainant's assertions, none of his physicians reference

these problems. Moreover, there is no evidence: (1) that complainant

was chronically late for work or had trouble staying awake while he was

at work; (2) to what degree his memory failed him; or (3) that he was

socially isolated from his subordinate employees and fellow supervisors.

We note that complainant's performance was evaluated as unacceptable,

which he attributed in part to being unable to keep up with the fast pace

of the Automation Unit, but the neither his own testimony nor the medical

evidence establishes a nexus between his stress induced performance

problems and the major life activities of sleeping, concentrating and

interacting with others.

Since the opinions of complainant's treating physicians suggest that

complainant could not work in his position due to a high level of

emotional stress and since we find that he is not substantially limited

in any other major life activity, we will consider whether complainant

is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. � 1630.2(j). To be substantially limited in

the major life activity of working, one must be precluded from more than

one type of job, a specialized job or a particular job of choice. Sutton

v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). The inability to perform

a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation

in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Rather, an impairment must substantially limit complainant's ability

to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes. Id. We find that the treating physicians' opinions do not

suggest that complainant is substantially limited from working in a

class of jobs or in a broad range of jobs in various classes, only that

complainant's impairment impeded his ability to perform his current job

on Tour 1. Nothing in the record shows that complainant is unable to

perform any job other than the one he is currently engaged. Accordingly,

complainant has failed to establish that his impairment substantially

limits his ability to work. See Webber v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Appeal No. 01980587 (March 2, 2001); Fernelius v United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05A00438 (June 29, 2000).

In addition, we find that the record fails to show that complainant

had a record of or was regarded by management as having a disability.

As a result, we find that the evidence of record is insufficient to

establish that complainant is an individual with a disability under the

Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, we affirm the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

July 17, 2001

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 This is the only reference in the record to the condition of

hypertension.