Raley's

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 28, 2001

336 N.L.R.B. 374 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 374
Raley’s and United Food and Commercial Workers’
Union, Local 588, United Food and Commercial
Workers, AFL–CIO. Cases 20–CA–24837 and
20–CA–25166
September 28, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND TRUESDALE
On October 22, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Jay
R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party each filed exceptions1
and supporting briefs,2 and the Respondent filed briefs in
opposition to the General Counsel’s and Charging
Party’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The General Counsel maintains that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
honor the terms of section 1.1 of its collective-bargaining
agreement with Local 588. The General Counsel con-
tends that this provision obligates the Respondent to rec-
ognize the Union as the bargaining representative for the
grocery employees at the Yuba City and Grass Valley
stores on the Union’s demonstration of majority support.
The judge found that the Respondent did not have any
obligation under the bargaining agreement to recognize
Local 588 at those stores in the absence of a Board-
conducted election and dismissed the complaint.
Having considered the judge’s decision in light of the
exceptions and briefs, we find, for the reasons discussed
below, that: (1) section 1.1 of the parties’ bargaining
agreement waives the Respondent’s right to insist on a
Board-conducted election; (2) the two disputed stores are
within the scope of section 1.1; and (3) the Respondent
was therefore obligated to recognize Local 588 on its
demonstration of majority support at those stores. Ac-
cordingly, we will remand this proceeding to the judge
for him to allow the parties to litigate the Union’s claim
of an authorization card majority at these two stores and
any other remaining issues relevant to Respondent’s ob-
ligation to recognize Local 588.

1 The General Counsel and the Charging Party have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy
is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined
the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 The Charging Party has requested oral argument. The request is
denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
I. FACTS
At all times relevant to this case the Respondent and
Local 588 were parties to a multiemployer, multiunion
collective-bargaining agreement known as the Master
Food Agreement. The agreement, which was effective
from March 1, 1992, until February 28, 1995, covered
the Respondent’s grocery employees and contained the
following provisions:

Section 1. RECOGNITION AND CONTRACT
COVERAGE
1.1 RECOGNITION: The Employer hereby recognizes
the Union as the sole collective bargaining agency for
an appropriate unit consisting of all employees working
in the Employer’s retail food stores within the geo-
graphical jurisdiction of the union covering Amador,
Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Glenn, Lassen,
Modoc, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Joa-
quin, Sierra, Stanislaus, Sutter, Shasta, Siskiyou, Te-
hama, Trinity, Tuolumne, Yolo and Yuba Counties,
California, Southwestern Washoe County, Nevada
(Tahoe Basin) and Northwestern Douglas County, Ne-
vada (Tahoe Basin), except meat department employ-
ees and supervisors within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.

1.13 NEW STORES AND REMODELS: During any
three (3) consecutive days preceding the reopening of
an old food market . . . persons not in the bargaining
unit may perform any work in such store.

Notwithstanding any language to the contrary con-
tained in this Agreement between the parties, it is
agreed this Agreement shall have no application what-
soever to any new food market or discount center until
fifteen (15) days following the opening to the public of
any such new establishment. Neither shall this Agree-
ment have any application whatsoever to any food
market or discount center which is reopened after it has
been closed for a period of more than thirty (30) days
until the fifteenth (15) day following the date of such
reopening to the public.

Local 588 and the Respondent have been parties to a
series of collective-bargaining agreements for over 30
years. The language of section 1.1 has been included in
every agreement since 1970 and has remained the same
through the 1995 agreement, except for the addition of
new territories whenever the geographic jurisdiction of
Local 588 expanded. The language of section 1.13 has
remained the same in every agreement since 1980.
336 NLRB No. 30
RALEY’S 375
In March 1989, Local 916 of the United Food and
Commercial Workers’ Union merged into Local 588.
This merger brought the Respondent’s existing stores in
Redding, Chico, Grass Valley, Yreka, and Yuba City,
California, which had previously been in the geographi-
cal jurisdiction of Local 916, into the geographical juris-
diction of Local 588. At the time of the merger these
stores were nonunion, except for meat department em-
ployees who were covered under a separate bargaining
agreement.
A new collective-bargaining agreement between the
Respondent and Local 588 went into effect on March 1,
1992. The Respondent continued to operate the grocery
departments of the above-mentioned stores on a nonun-
ion basis through mid-1992. In June of that year, Local
588 claimed that a majority of the grocery employees at
the Yreka store and the two Redding stores had signed
authorization cards, and Local 588 requested recognition
as representative of those employees. The parties met in
July to discuss the Union’s recognition demands and to
try to reach a settlement. Concurrently, the parties at-
tempted to negotiate a “global agreement” that would
cover any future demands for recognition by Local 588.
They subsequently signed two separate agreements under
which the Respondent recognized Local 588, pursuant to
a card check, as the representative of its employees at the
Yreka store and at one of the Redding stores. The Union
withdrew its request for recognition at the other Redding
store. However, the parties failed to reach agreement on
how to deal with future demands for recognition.
In July 1992, shortly after it had requested recognition
at the Yreka and Redding stores, the Union also re-
quested recognition at Yuba City, one of the two stores
involved here. Later, in November 1992 and again in
April and May 1993, the Union also requested recogni-
tion at Grass Valley, the other store involved here. The
Respondent refused these requests, notwithstanding that
both of the stores are located in counties identified by
section 1.1 of the 1992 collective-bargaining agreement
as being within the geographical jurisdiction of Local
588.3
II. DISCUSSION
The General Counsel contends that section 1.1 consti-
tutes a waiver of the Respondent’s right under the Act to
insist that the Union’s representative status be deter-
mined by a Board election, and that the Respondent is
therefore required to recognize Local 588 as the bargain-
ing representative for the grocery employees at Yuba
City and Grass Valley on the Union’s demonstration of

3 The Yuba City store is located in Sutter County, and the Grass Val-
ley store is located in Nevada County.
majority support. The Respondent disputes these conten-
tions. In addressing this dispute, the judge characterized
the issue as being whether the provision in dispute was
an “after acquired stores” clause, a term often used to
describe such voluntary recognition provisions. Although
the judge did not rule directly on the issue of whether
section 1.1 is an after acquired stores clause, he found
that even if it was such a clause, it did not apply to the
Yuba City and Grass Valley stores because they were
“preexisting” and not “after acquired” stores. In making
this finding, the judge relied on evidence that these stores
were in existence at the time that the 1992 collective-
bargaining agreement became effective. For the reasons
set forth below, we reverse.
A. The Legal Framework
The leading case in this area is Kroger Co., 219 NLRB
388 (1975). The parties in Kroger had included a recog-
nition clause in their collective-bargaining agreement
under which the employer agreed to recognize the union
as the bargaining agent of designated employees at all of
the employer’s stores in the State of Texas operated by
its Houston Division. A dispute arose as a result of the
employer’s administrative transfer of two of its stores
from the Dallas to the Houston Division. After the trans-
fer, the union obtained majority support from employees
at each store and then requested recognition as the bar-
gaining agent of the employees, offering authorization
cards as proof of its majority status. The employer re-
fused to grant the union’s request.
The Board interpreted the recognition provision to be
an agreement under which the employer had waived its
right to demand a Board-conducted election at the dis-
puted stores. Although the clause contained no specific
declaration that the employer had consented to such a
waiver, the Board found that:

Interpreting these clauses to mean that an em-
ployer can voluntarily recognize a union or demand
an election renders them totally meaningless and
without effect, for unions need no contract authori-
zation to establish their representation status in a
Board-conducted election. However, these clauses
can be read to require recognition upon proof of ma-
jority status by a union.

Id. at 389. The Board concluded that the only way to save
the clause from meaninglessness was to read it as a waiver
of the employer’s right to an election, thereby requiring the
employer to recognize the union on a showing of majority
support. Consequently, the Board found that the employer
had violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to recognize the un-
ion as required by the clause in the agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 376
Unlike the judge and our dissenting colleague, we find
Kroger to be controlling here. The language of section
1.1, the recognition clause, is similar to that of the recog-
nition clause in Kroger in all essential respects. Here, as
in Kroger, the Respondent has agreed to recognize the
Union as the sole bargaining representative for all of its
employees working at its stores within a designated geo-
graphical territory, which in this case is the geographical
jurisdiction of Local 588.
Contrary to the judge’s finding, there is no factual ba-
sis for distinguishing Kroger from this case on the basis
that the two disputed stores here were preexisting. In-
deed, contrary to the judge’s finding that the stores in
Kroger were acquired after the date of the bargaining
agreement, the Kroger decision indicates that these stores
had merely been transferred from the employer’s Dallas
to the Houston Division. Thus, like here, the employer
in Kroger had been operating the stores prior to the
events at issue.
Contrary to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we
also do not find it significant that the stores in this case
were already within the Union’s geographical jurisdic-
tion prior to the 1992–1995 contract. It is true that this
was not the situation in Kroger. However, it is a differ-
ence without significance. As indicated above, Kroger
upheld the legality of these types of clauses, finding them
to be valid contractual waivers of an employer’s right to
demand a Board-conducted election at a particular store
on proof of majority status. There is nothing in Kroger
indicating that such clauses would become unlawful or
unenforceable if they were not construed as being limited
to “new” stores that were not previously within the un-
ion’s geographical jurisdiction. Nor do we perceive any
policy considerations compelling or warranting such a
finding.
We also find no basis in Kroger or other cases for the
weight the judge and our dissenting colleague give to the
terminology used in denominating contract clauses like
that involved here. As indicated above, the judge con-
cluded that a clause that can be characterized as an “after
acquired stores clause” cannot apply to preexisting
stores. However, the Board in Kroger characterized the
contractual provision in question as an “additional stores
clause,” rather than as an “after acquired stores clause.”
It is clear that the terms are essentially interchangeable.
In some cases, the Board uses “after acquired.” See Pall
Biomedical Products Corp., 331 NLRB 1674 (2000). In
other cases, the Board uses “additional.” See Goodless
Electric Co., 332 NLRB 1035, 1039 fn. 8 (2000). And in
some cases, the Board uses both. See S. B. Framingham,
Inc., 221 NLRB 506, 507 (1975). In short, “after ac-
quired” can also mean “additional,” and vice versa.4 And
regardless of which term is used, Kroger makes clear that
such clauses may apply to preexisting stores.
Our dissenting colleague contends that the term “addi-
tional stores clause” also cannot refer to a store that had
existed within the Union’s geographical jurisdiction prior
to the 1992–1995 contract. As indicated above, we find
no support for this interpretation in Kroger or other
cases. Nor is there any support for it in section 1.1 itself,
which by its terms states, without limitation, that the Re-
spondent recognizes the Union as representative of all
employees within the relevant geographical jurisdiction.
Nothing in the language of that section limits its applica-
tion to stores that are new to either the employer or the
geographical jurisdiction encompassed by the 1992–1995
contract. In effect, our colleague would rewrite the par-
ties’ agreement to impose such a limitation. We decline
to do so.
It is true, as our colleague notes, that the Respondent
contends that section 1.13 limits any waiver in section
1.1 to “new” or “remodeled” stores. However, our col-
league concedes that this argument is without merit, and
we also reject it for the reasons set forth below.
In support, the Respondent cites the Board’s holding in
Alpha Beta Co., 294 NLRB 228 (1989). Alpha Beta in-
volved a dispute over the application of the 1980–1983
Food Store Agreement, which, like the 1992–1995 Mas-
ter Food Agreement, was the product of multiemployer,
multiunion bargaining between the Food Employers
Council (of which the Respondent is a member) and the
United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union. Although
the Respondent and Local 588 were not parties to Alpha
Beta, the relevant language of sections 1.1 and 1.13 in
the 1980–1983 agreement was similar to that in the
1992–1995 agreement between the Respondent and Lo-
cal 588. The General Counsel contended that section
1.13, the “New Stores and Remodels” clause, required
the employer to grant recognition to the union at the
newly opened store in that case, and the Board agreed.
The Respondent argues that the Board’s finding in Alpha
Beta that section 1.13 is an additional stores clause appli-
cable to the newly opened store in that case precludes us
from now finding that section 1.1 has independent appli-
cability to the two preexisting stores in this case.
We reject the Respondent’s argument. There is noth-
ing on the face of section 1.13 indicating that it is a limi-
tation on the scope of section 1.1. We agree with the
General Counsel that section 1.13 is more appropriately
read as placing certain procedural limitations on section

4 For the sake of internal consistency, we will use the term “addi-
tional stores clause” to describe the provisions in dispute in this case.
RALEY’S 377
1.1 with respect to new or remodeled stores, rather than
as limiting the scope of section 1.1 generally. Further,
we find nothing in Alpha Beta suggesting otherwise. As
indicated, the General Counsel and the Board in that case
focused on section 1.13 because the store at issue was a
newly opened store and the provisions of section 1.13
clearly apply to “new” stores. However, in addressing
the employer’s obligation to recognize the union at the
new store, the Board also clearly recognized the applica-
bility of section 1.1. Indeed, a careful examination of
that decision indicates that the Board construed section
1.1, the recognition clause, as the foundation for section
1.13. Thus, the Board stated that:

Section 1.13 of the Food Store Agreement delays ap-
plication of the other provisions of the Food Store
Agreement, including section 1.1, the recognition
clause, to new stores for a period of 15 days after the
new store opens. We find that, after the 15-day window
period, the Respondent was contractually obligated to
recognize Local 1179 and extend the current collective-
bargaining agreement to the new Pinole store on Local
1179’s showing of majority status. [Emphasis added.]

Id. at 229. It is clear to us from this language that the Board
did not solely rely on section 1.13 in finding a waiver of the
employer’s right to demand an election, but rather found
that section 1.13 incorporated section 1.1 and applied it to
new stores only after they had been opened for 15 days.
Thus, we find that Alpha Beta supports the General Coun-
sel’s position in this case that section 1.1 has independent
applicability apart from section 1.13.
B. The Parole Evidence
In finding that the Respondent has waived its right to a
Board conducted election under section 1.1, we rely on
the clear and unambiguous language used in this section
of the agreement.5 However, we also find that the parole
evidence does not compel a different conclusion.
The record indicates that in 1983 the Respondent and
Local 588 were involved in several disputes concerning
bargaining units other than for the grocery employees.
As part of an agreement to settle these disputes, the Re-
spondent collaterally agreed to extend recognition to
Local 588 as the exclusive representative of the grocery
employees at its new stores once the Union proved it had
obtained a majority of authorization cards.6 Since that
time, the Respondent has recognized Local 588 as the

5 An agreement to waive a statutory right must be expressed in a
manner that is explicit, clear, and unmistakable. See Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
6 The circumstances and terms of the 1983 agreement are set forth
more fully in the judge’s decision.
representative of employees at new stores after it con-
firmed the Union’s majority status by means of a card
check.
The Respondent cites this agreement and practice as
evidence that the parties understood the Respondent had
not separately waived its right to demand an election
under section 1.1 to preexisting stores. However, the
Respondent’s argument is undermined by statements it
made in an August 1992 memorandum to employees
suggesting that the Respondent had waived its right to an
election under the collective-bargaining agreement. The
memorandum was distributed to employees at three of
the Respondent’s preexisting stores, including Grass Val-
ley, as part of an antiunion campaign at those stores. In
referring to the card majorities obtained by Local 588 at
the Yreka and Redding stores, the Respondent told em-
ployees in the memo that “Under our contract with Local
588 elsewhere, this gives them the right to represent
those employees.” (Emphasis added.) The Respondent
further stated, “[S]igning an authorization card gives the
Union the right to represent you. IT HAS NO OTHER
PURPOSE. If you sign a card, you vote to go union.”
Unlike the judge, we do not dismiss these statements
as propaganda. Rather, we find that they clearly weigh
against the Respondent’s assertion that the parties did not
interpret section 1.1 to be an additional stores clause, and
undermine the inferences that the Respondent asks us to
draw from the separate 1983 agreements in which it
agreed to consider employee card majorities in new
stores.
The Respondent also contends that the July 1992
agreements regarding card checks at the Yreka and Red-
ding stores and the parties’ failed attempts to negotiate a
global agreement covering future recognition disputes
demonstrate that the parties understood that the Respon-
dent did not waive its right to an election under section
1.1. We disagree.
That the parties engaged in settlement negotiations in-
dicates nothing more than that they attempted to resolve
their disagreement over the meaning of section 1.1 with-
out litigation before the Board. Such settlement discus-
sions are commonplace, and the Board encourages them.
The unsuccessful attempt to reach a global agreement did
not alter the legal effect of the existing bargaining
agreement provisions. The record indicates that the par-
ties reserved their respective legal positions during the
settlement negotiations and that these negotiations were
intended to be “off the record” in the event they were
unsuccessful. Furthermore, the text of the agreements
does not indicate that Local 588 acknowledged that the
Respondent had no underlying contractual obligation to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 378
agree to a card check at Redding or Yreka. We will not
read such a provision into the agreements.
Accordingly, we find that by agreeing to the provisions
of section 1.1, the Respondent waived its right to demand
a Board-conducted election and is required to extend
recognition to Local 588 at all stores within the Union’s
geographical jurisdiction on a demonstration of majority
support, regardless of whether the stores are preexisting.
Further, because the list of counties in section 1.1 in-
cludes the counties in which both Grass Valley and Yuba
City are located, we find that those stores are within the
Union’s geographical jurisdiction and the voluntary rec-
ognition provisions in section 1.1 are therefore applicable
to those stores.
C. Proof of Majority Status
Although section 1.1 does not explicitly require Local
588 to prove it has the support of a majority of employ-
ees at a store before the Respondent extends recognition
to the Union for that particular store, as discussed above
the Board has read such a requirement into additional
stores provisions as a matter of law. See Kroger, 219
NLRB at 389.7 Consequently, Local 588 must prove that
it had majority status among the grocery employees at
Yuba City and Grass Valley before the Respondent can
be found to have violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
recognize the union as the exclusive representative of
those employees.
Local 588 maintains it had obtained authorization
cards from a majority of the grocery employees at both
stores at the time it made its demands for recognition.
The Respondent, however, contests the validity of the
cards and argues that the Union did not have majority
support when it made its recognition demands. Because
the judge found that the Respondent had not waived its
right to an election for those stores, he did not allow the
parties to litigate the issue of whether Local 588 had ma-
jority support. In the absence of factual findings on this
issue, we are unable to determine whether the Respon-
dent has engaged in the unlawful conduct alleged in the
complaint. We therefore remand this case to the judge for
further proceedings necessary to rule on the underlying
complaint allegations.8

7 It is well established that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to recognize a union as the representative of its employees when
only a minority of employees had authorized the union as its represen-
tative at the time of recognition. Ladies Garment Workers (Bernhard-
Altmann Texas Corp.) v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
8 This would also include other material issues raised by the parties.
For example, the judge noted that he also did not permit litigation of the
“timeliness” of Local 588’s demand at the Grass Valley store.
ORDER
This case is remanded to the judge for further consid-
eration consistent with this Decision and Order. Thereaf-
ter, pursuant to the applicable provisions of Section
102.45(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
judge shall prepare and issue a supplemental decision
containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommended Order as appropriate on remand. Follow-
ing service of this supplemental decision and Order on
the parties, the provisions of Section 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations shall be applicable.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting.
The issue here is whether the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize
Local 588, United Food and Commercial Workers’ Un-
ion (Local 588 or the Union) as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its grocery employees at two
of its stores, the Yuba City and the Grass Valley, Cali-
fornia stores, after the Union presented the Respondent
with authorization cards signed by a purported majority
of the unit employees at each store. The resolution of
this issue turns on whether section 1.1 of the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement, the recognition clause,
requires the Respondent to forgo a Board-conducted
election and to recognize the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees based
solely on a card showing of majority support.
Finding that section 1.1 of the parties’ contract did not
require the Respondent to recognize the Union based on
a purported card majority, the judge dismissed the com-
plaint without reaching the issue of whether the Union
had, in fact, such evidence of majority support. My col-
leagues reverse the judge and find that under section 1.1
the Respondent was obligated to recognize the Union as
the bargaining representative of the unit employees at
both the Yuba City and Grass Valley stores on presenta-
tion of majority support. Accordingly, they remand the
case to the judge for litigation of the issue of whether the
Union had, in fact, majority support when it demanded
recognition at the two stores. For the reasons set out
below, I would dismiss the complaint.
The facts, in brief, are as follows. The Respondent and
Local 588 have been parties to a series of collective-
bargaining agreements for over 30 years. The language
of section 1.1, the “Recognition” clause of the contract,
has remained unchanged since 1970, except for the addi-
tion of new territories whenever the geographic jurisdic-
tion of Local 588 expanded. Such an expansion occurred
in March 1989, during the term of the parties’ 1989–
1992 collective-bargaining agreement, when Local 916
of the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union
RALEY’S 379
merged into Local 588. This merger brought the Re-
spondent’s existing stores in Yuba City and Grass Valley
stores, the stores at issue here, as well as its stores in
Redding, Chico, and Yreka, California, all of which had
previously been in the jurisdiction of Local 916, into the
geographical jurisdiction of Local 588. As of the time of
the merger, these stores were nonunion, with the excep-
tion of the meat department employees who were cov-
ered under a separate contract.
Thus, the Yuba City and Grass Valley stores were al-
ready within the jurisdiction of Local 588 when the Re-
spondent and Local 588 became parties to a successor
agreement, which was effective from March 1, 1992,
until February 28, 1995. The counties in which these
stores were located, Sutter (the Yuba City store) and Ne-
vada (the Grass Valley store), were included in the juris-
dictional scope of the Union as defined in section 1.1 of
the 1992–1995 contract. Section 1.1 of the parties’
1992–1995 contract reads:

1.1. RECOGNITION: The Employer hereby recog-
nizes the Union as the sole collective bargaining
agency for an appropriate unit consisting of all employ-
ees working in the Employer’s retail food stores within
the geographical jurisdiction of the union covering
Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Glenn,
Lassen, Modoc, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento,
San Joaquin, Sierra, Stanislaus, Sutter, Shasta, Siski-
you, Tehama, Trinity, Tuolumne, Yolo and Yuba
Counties, California, Southwestern Washoe County,
Nevada (Tahoe Basin) and Northwestern Douglas
County, Nevada (Tahoe Basin), except meat depart-
ment employees and supervisors within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.1

As discussed, the Yuba City and Grass Valley stores
came within the geographic jurisdiction of the Union
during the term of the 1989–1992 contract, and they were
within that jurisdiction when the successor contract
(1992–1995) was executed. However, the Union did not
request recognition as the exclusive representative of the
unit employees at the two stores until a time during the
1992–1995 contract. Thus, the stores remained nonunion

1 For purposes of this discussion, I agree with my colleagues that
sec. 1.1 of the contract is the relevant provision here in that it defines
the scope of the bargaining unit. I also agree with my colleagues that
sec. 1.13 of the contract, which concerns new stores and remodels,
places certain procedural limitations on the application of sec. 1.1 to
new stores and remodels, but that it does not limit the scope of sec. 1.1.
Accordingly, I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent’s argu-
ment, to the effect that sec. 1.13 is the recognition provision at issue
here, is without merit. Finally, since sec. 1.13 of the contract is not
relevant to the resolution of the issue presented, it is not further dis-
cussed here.
both before and after the effective date of the 1992–1995
contract. In July 1992, the Union requested recognition
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the Yuba City employees. In November 1992, and again
in April and May 1993, the Union requested a card check
and recognition at the Grass Valley store. The Respon-
dent denied recognition because of its concern that au-
thorization cards had been obtained by misrepresenta-
tion. It therefore believed that a Board-conducted elec-
tion would be a better way to determine whether the Un-
ion had achieved majority status at the two stores.
As explained above, the issue here is whether section
1.1 of the parties’ 1992–1995 collective-bargaining
agreement requires the Respondent to forgo a Board-
conducted election and to recognize the Union based on
evidence of a card majority. The resolution of this issue
turns on whether section 1.1 is an “after acquired stores
clause” or an “additional stores clause” within the mean-
ing of Kroger Co. (Kroger II), 219 NLRB 388 (1975),
and, if so, whether such a clause is applicable here. Ac-
cordingly, a brief overview of the Board’s decisions in
Kroger is required as background to the further discus-
sion below of the issue presented here.
In Kroger Co. (Kroger I), 208 NLRB 928 (1974), the
Board considered whether certain provisions in the em-
ployer’s contract with two unions constituted after ac-
quired stores clauses or additional stores clauses.
Kroger’s contract with Retail Clerks Local 455 stated
that:

A. The Union shall be the sole and exclusive bargain-
ing agent for all employees employed by the Houston
Division of Kroger Food Stores in stores operating in
the state of Texas, excluding all persons in the meat de-
partments.2

The contract between Kroger and the Meat Cutters Local
stated that:

A. The Employer recognizes Meat Cutters Local No.
408 as the exclusive and collective-bargaining agent for
all employees in the meat department in all of Em-
ployer’s retail stores located in the state of Texas oper-
ated by the Houston Division of the Kroger Co.

B. The parties agree that this contract shall cover and
the Union which is a party hereto shall have jurisdiction
over all meat department employees in retail stores that
are, or will be, owned leased or operated by the Em-
ployer.3

2 Id. (emphasis added).
3 Id. (emphasis added).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 380
The Board explained that:

Although there are obvious differences in lan-
guage between the two contracts, they both purport
to add after-acquired stores to the existing multistore
units of the Respondent’s Houston Division. We
shall characterize this type of clause as an addi-
tional-store clause.

In Kroger I, a dispute arose as to the application of
these clauses after the employer transferred two of its
stores from its Dallas division to its Houston division.
The clerks had been unrepresented at both stores and the
meatcutters had been unrepresented at one of them. Re-
lying on the contract language set out above, the respec-
tive unions demanded recognition from the employer at
the two stores. It was undisputed that the unions also
possessed cards signed by a majority of the employees at
the time of these demands. The employer rejected the
demands and petitioned the Board for separate elections
at the two stores. The unions then filed charges alleging
that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
recognize and bargain with them.
The Board found no violation. It reasoned that the ad-
ditional stores clause language set out above could not be
read as “tantamount to an advance agreement to honor a
card majority” because “the contract language omit[ted]
all reference to the question of majority support obtained
by any means.” Id. at 929. In the absence of such an
advance agreement to honor a card majority, the Board
found that “surely access to NLRB procedures cannot be
said to have been consciously waived.” Id. at 929 fn. 8.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the Board’s decision and re-
manded the case to the Board.4 On remand, the Board, in
Kroger II, supra, found that the employer had violated
Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with
the unions. In reaching this conclusion, the Board rea-
soned that:

Interpreting these clauses to mean that an em-
ployer can voluntarily recognize a union or demand
an election renders them totally meaningless and
without effect, for unions need no contract authoriza-
tion to establish their representation status in a Board-
conducted election. However, these clauses can be
read to require recognition upon proof of majority
status by a union. . . . [Thus,] there is no need to hold
these clauses totally invalid simply because they do
not contain an explicit condition that unions must rep-
resent a majority of the employees in a new store, in-

4 Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 802 (1975).
asmuch as the Board will impose such a condition as
a matter of law. Id. at 389.

Accordingly, after reconsideration, the Board adopted the
court’s view that the clauses at issue constituted a waiver
by Kroger of its right to demand an election. The Board
then summarized its position:

As we have interpreted them, these clauses are
contractual commitments by the Employer to forgo its
right to resort to the use of the Board’s election proc-
ess in determining the Union’s representation status in
the new stores. Id. at 389 [emphasis added].

In the present case, the judge found, as relevant here,
that even assuming section 1.1 were an “after acquired
stores clause” within the meaning of Kroger II, section 1.1
did not require the Respondent to recognize the Union
based on evidence of majority support at the Yuba City
and Grass Valley stores because those stores were not “af-
ter acquired,” but “preexisting” stores, i.e., they were al-
ready within the jurisdiction of Local 588 at the time that
the 1992–1995 contract went into effect. The judge rea-
soned that since the Union did not demand recognition at
the Yuba City and Grass Valley stores during the term of
the 1989–1992 contract when they came within the juris-
diction of Local 588, and since those stores remained non-
union when the 1992–1995 contract went into effect, those
stores could not be said to be “after acquired” within the
meaning of Kroger II when the union finally did request
recognition. Accordingly, the judge found that the em-
ployer had not waived its right to a Board-conducted elec-
tion and dismissed the complaint.
My colleagues reverse. Asserting that section 1.1 is an
after acquired stores clause, they find that Kroger II is
controlling here. Close scrutiny reveals the fallacy of my
colleagues’ argument.
The Kroger case represents a situation where there are
stores that are not within the geographical coverage of
the contract at the time of the execution of the contract.
The stores come into that geographical coverage during
the contract. This may occur by reason of the creation of
a new store, the acquisition of a store from another com-
pany, or the administrative transfer of a store from one
administrative-geographic division to another (e.g., in
Kroger, the stores were transferred from the employer’s
Dallas Division to the Houston Division where the con-
tract applied). In these circumstances, the contract clause
is referred to as an “after acquired” clause or an “addi-
tional stores” clause. The salient point is that these
stores are not in the geographic coverage of the contract
when the contract is signed. The parties essentially pro-
vide for a possible contingency that may arise during the
contract, i.e., additional stores. They agree that, if that
RALEY’S 381
contingency occurs, the stores will be covered by the
contract if majority status is shown.
By contrast, the stores in the instant case were within
the geographic coverage of the contract at the time when
the contract was signed. Indeed, my colleagues concede
that the stores here were “preexisting.” In no sense can it
be said that, during the contract, they became “after ac-
quired” or “additional.” Notwithstanding this, my col-
leagues equate the terms “after acquired” and “addi-
tional” with the term “preexisting.” Neither language
nor logic will support this verbal legerdemain. The only
change was that, during the contract, the Union allegedly
achieved majority status. However, that change does not
make the stores “after acquired” or “additional.” And,
under NLRA principles, that alleged change does not
mandate recognition; the Respondent is entitled to an
NLRB election.5
My colleagues accuse me of “rewrit[ing] the parties’
agreement” by imposing, on section 1.1, a limitation of
its application to stores that are new to either the Em-
ployer or the geographic jurisdiction encompassed by the
1992–1995 agreement. However, I am not the one who
has rewritten the contract. The agreement on its face is
incorrect. It states that the Respondent “recognizes” the
Union at stores within the Union’s jurisdiction. In fact,
there were stores within that jurisdiction (e.g., the two
involved herein) where recognition had not been granted.
Thus, I am not the one who is rewriting the contract.
If there is any rewriting, it is my colleagues’ rewriting
of Kroger. My colleagues engage in verbal revisionism
in their attempt to render nugatory the decisive fact of
Kroger II—and the fact which informs Kroger II’s ana-
lytical framework—i.e., that an employer’s contractual
waiver of its right to a Board-conducted election applies
only to stores that are newly added to the geographical
coverage of the contract during the term of the contract
in which the employer has agreed to such a waiver. Un-
able to reconcile the fact that Kroger II applies only to
newly added stores, whether termed “after acquired” or
“additional,” with the fact that the stores at issue here
were “preexisting” stores, my colleagues simply say that
this difference “is a difference without significance.” For
the reasons set out above, my colleagues’ analysis cannot
survive scrutiny.
Finally, at the very least, it is unclear whether the in-
stant clause, as applied, is essentially the same as the

5 Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.301 (1974). Contrary to the con-
tention of my colleagues, I am not saying that the clause here is unlaw-
ful under Kroger II. However, I am saying that it is unenforceable
under Kroger II, i.e., that it cannot waive the Respondent’s right to an
election.
clause in Kroger. Thus, my colleagues err when they say
that the clause is “clear and unambiguous.”
For these reasons, I would dismiss the complaint.

Boren Chertkov, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Patrick W. Jordan, Stephen N. Yang, and Neil O. Andrus, Esqs.
(Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro), of San Francisco,
California, for the Respondent.
Barry S. Jellison, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe), of San Fran-
cisco, California, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard these
cases in trial at San Francisco, Sacramento, Yuba City, and
Marysville, California, on various dates, between April 21 and
July 6, 1998. On August 19, 1992, United Food and Commercial
Workers’ Union, Local 588, United Food and Commercial
Workers, AFL–CIO (the Union) filed the charge in Case 20–CA–
24837 alleging that Raley’s (Respondent) committed certain
violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act). On October 2, 1992, the Regional Director
for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent. The charge
in Case 20–CA–25166 was filed by the Union on February 10,
1993. On August 16, 1995, the Regional Director issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing against Respondent alleging that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respon-
dent filed timely answers to the complaints, denying all wrongdo-
ing.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. On the entire record, from my observa-
tion of the demeanor of the witnesses,1 and having considered the
posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I.. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation with offices and a principal place
of business located in West Sacramento, California, where it is
engaged in the operation of over 60 retail grocery stores in Cali-
fornia and Nevada, including Yuba City and Grass Valley, Cali-
fornia. During the calendar year ending December 31, 1991,
Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000. Dur-
ing that same time period, Respondent purchased and received
goods and products valued in excess of $5000 directly from sell-
ers or suppliers located outside the State of California. Accord-
ingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
1 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review of
the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the logic of
probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings of NLRB v.
Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As to those witnesses testify-
ing in contradiction to the findings herein, their testimony has been
discredited, either as having been in conflict with credited documentary or
testimonial evidence or because it was in and of itself incredible and un-
worthy of belief.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 382
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union and Respondent have been parties to a series of
collective-bargaining agreements for over 30 years. Since 1970,
Respondent and the Union have been party to multiemployer,
multiunion bargaining between the Food Employers Council,
representing grocery chain employers in Northern California, and
a coalition of local unions of the United Food and Commercial
Workers’ International Union. The collective-bargaining agree-
ment at issue in this case is the 1992–1995 agreement, known as
the master food agreement, covering the grocery or food employ-
ees employed by Respondent.2 The complaints allege that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing
to grant recognition to the Union at its stores in Grass Valley and
Yuba City, California. The General Counsel and the Union con-
tend that the collective-bargaining agreement between Respon-
dent and the Union contains an “after-acquired stores clause”
waiving the Respondent’s right to insist on a Board-conducted
election when confronted with the Union’s documented claim of
majority status. Respondent contends that the after acquired
stores clause applies to new stores and remodels and does not
apply to stores such as Grass Valley and Yuba City which had
been nonunion stores for years prior to the execution of the last
contract. More specifically, Respondent contends that it had an
agreement with the Union which provided for voluntary authori-
zation card checks for new stores and, if a majority was estab-
lished, to include the new store in the multistore bargaining unit.
However, Respondent contends that the parties never were able
to reach an agreement as to historically nonunion stores which
came under the expanded jurisdiction of the Union when the
Union’s jurisdiction within the Food and Commercial Workers’
International Union expanded through mergers with other local
unions.
As mentioned above, the collective bargaining here was con-
ducted on a multiemployer, multiunion basis. However, after
agreement was reached, a bargaining agreement was signed by
the Food Employers Council with each local union. The 1992–
1995 agreement between the Food employers Council (including
Respondent) and the Union contains the following recognition
clause:

Section 1. Recognition and Contract Coverage
1.1 RECOGNITION: The Employer hereby recog-
nizes the Union as the sole collective bargaining agency
for an appropriate unit consisting of all employees work-
ing in the Employer’s retail food stores within the geo-
graphical jurisdiction of the Union covering Amador,
Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Glenn, Lassen, Mo-
doc, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Juaquin,
Sierra, Stanislaus, Sutter, Shasta, Siskiyou, Tehama, Trin-
ity, Tuolumne, Yolo and Yuba Counties, California,
Southwestern Washoe county, Nevada, (Tahoe Basin), and

2 There was a separate multiemployer, multiunion collective-bargaining
agreement for a bargaining unit of meat department employees between
the same employers and same unions. That agreement known as the “mas-
ter meat agreement” is not at issue in this case.
Northwestern Douglas County, Nevada (Tahoe Basin), ex-
cept meat department employees and supervisors within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.

The language of section 1.1 remained the same from 1970 to
1995. The only change was that the jurisdictional area of the
Union increased from time-to-time. Prior to March 1989, the
Union’s jurisdiction did not include Sutter County (the Yuba City
store) and Nevada County (the Grass Valley store). As noted
earlier, the General Counsel and the Union contend that section
1.1 of the agreement is an after acquired stores clause requiring
Respondent to agree to a card check, instead of a Board election,
when confronted with the Union’s documented claim of majority
status. Respondent claims. relying upon Alpha Beta Co., 294
NLRB 228 (1989), that section 1.13 of the bargaining agreement
is the effective after acquired stores clause. Section 1.13, entitled
NEW STORES AND REMODELS, reads in pertinent part as
follows:

Notwithstanding any language to the contrary con-
tained in this agreement between the parties, it is agreed
that this agreement shall have no application whatsoever
to any new food market or discount center until fifteen
(15) days following the opening to the public of any such
establishment. . . .
The Employer shall staff such new or reopened market
with a combination of both current employees and new
hires, in accordance with current industry practices of staff-
ing such stores with a cadre of current employees possessing
the necessary skills, ability and experience, plus sufficient
new hires to meet staffing requirements.

In the Alpha Beta case, involving sections 1.1 and 1.3 of the
1980–1983 multiemployer, multiunion bargaining agreement, the
administrative law judge found that there had been no after ac-
quired stores clause and no waiver of a Board election in the
collective-bargaining agreement. The Board reversed the judge
and found that section 1.13 did constitute a waiver of a Board
election. The Board concluded that the only reasonable interpre-
tation of the clause was that the parties had agreed to a card
check to establish union majority status at a new store and that
once majority was established, the new store would be an accre-
tion to the existing multistore bargaining unit. The Board found
that after the 15-day window period, Alpha Beta was contractu-
ally obligated to recognize the charging party union and to extend
the then current collective-bargaining agreement on a showing of
majority status.
The parties to the multiemployer, multiunion bargaining did
not discuss changing the language of either section 1.1 or sec-
tion 1.13 after 1980. Prior to 1980, whenever, Respondent
added a new store in the jurisdiction of the Union, Respondent
and the Union added the new store as an accretion to the exist-
ing multistore bargaining unit. In 1983, Respondent and the
Union were involved in several disputes involving other non-
food employee bargaining units. In an effort to avoid further
litigation and, expense, Patrick Jordan, Respondent’s attorney,
proposed to Wynn Plank, the Union’s president, that the Union
(1) withdraw as joint petitioner from the pending representation
proceeding; and (2) agree not to attempt to organize Raley’s
RALEY’S 383
Drug Center employees or office clerical employees in the fu-
ture. In return, Respondent would agree not to open nonunion
stores in Local 588’s jurisdiction and would apply the existing
collective-bargaining agreement to new stores on a showing of
a card majority.
In late summer or early fall of 1983, Plank agreed to the
compromise. Jordan requested that the agreement be memorial-
ized in writing but Plank, concerned about the possible political
ramifications from his agreement not to organize certain groups
of employees, insisted that the parties’ oral promises were suf-
ficient. Jordan agreed that a written document was not neces-
sary.
Prior to this agreement, it was Raley’s practice to voluntarily
grant recognition to Local 588 and apply the existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreement to the grocery department employees
at newly opened stores without a showing of majority status.
As a result of the 1983 agreement, the practice of automatic
accretion was discontinued, and voluntary recognition was only
granted after majority support for the Union had been verified
through a card check.
Pursuant to the 1983 agreement between Plank and Jordan,
the first card check with Local 588 was held in November 1983
involving the Lodi store. Subsequent card checks were held
with respect to stores in West Sacramento (Yolo County),
Woodland (Yolo County), Folsom (Sacramento County), Tur-
lock (Stanislaus County), Roseville 412 (Placer County), North
Highlands (Sacramento County), Roseville 227 (Placer
County), Manteca (San Joaquin), Elk Grove (Sacramento
County), and Loomis (Placer County). In each case, the store
was newly opened, and was within the Union’s jurisdiction at
the time the Jordan-Plank agreement was made.
Jack Loveall replaced Plank as President of Local 588 in De-
cember 1984. Sometime shortly after Loveall became president,
he had a conversation with Jordan in which he stated that Plank
had advised him of the agreement. Loveall requested Jordan to
convey to James Teel, then-vice president of Raley’s, that Local
588 would continue to adhere to the agreement during his presi-
dency of the Union.3
In 1988, Respondent was apparently involved in certain dis-
putes with other locals of the Food and Commercial Workers’
Union. Handbilling and leafletting, urging consumers not to shop
at Respondent’s stores, took place in the jurisdiction of the Un-
ion. In February 1988, Henry Telfian, an attorney representing
Respondent, called Jack Loveall, the Union’s president. Telfian
informed Loveall that Respondent believed it had a “peace pact”
with the Union. Telfian said that Respondent expected that pur-
suant to the peace pact the Union would not engage in, or assist,
any boycott of Raley’s within the Union’s jurisdiction. If the

3 My findings regarding the 1983 agreement for card checks is based
on the credited testimony of Patrick Jordan, Respondent’s counsel.
While the General Counsel and Union sought to challenge this testi-
mony, documentary evidence corroborates Jordan’s testimony. Further,
Loveall’s conversations with Henry Telfian in 1988 establish that an
agreement, consistent with Jordan’s testimony, existed prior to 1988.
Jordan’s testimony is the only credible explanation in the record for the
arrangement between the parties for the voluntary card checks by Re-
spondent and the agreement to refrain from organizing the two groups
of employees by the Union.
Union would continue with the peace pact and not seek to repre-
sent Respondent’s office employees nor seek to represent Re-
spondent’s drug center employees, Respondent would continue to
agree to card checks at new stores, particularly a new store in
Turlock, California which was scheduled to open in February
1988. Respondent agreed to continue to grant the Union access
to its new stores in order for the Union to solicit union authoriza-
tion cards. Loveall agreed to this arrangement with Telfian but
would not agree to put in writing that the Union would not seek
to represent the office or drug center employees. Telfian then
proposed that he write a letter to James Teel, a vice president of
Respondent, setting forth the understanding, with a copy to
Loveall. Telfian sent his letter to Teel setting forth the arrange-
ment with Loveall, with a copy to Loveall on March 8, 1988.
Loveall testified that Telfian’s letter was accurate and, therefore,
in 1988, he made no response to Telfian’s letter. Thereafter,
Respondent recognized the Union at the Turlock store, after a
card check, and extended the then existing multistore agreement
to the Turlock store. Respondent had no nonunion stores in the
geographic jurisdiction of the Union in February or March 1988.
Respondent did operate nonunion or “union-free stores” in
Redding, Chico, Grass Valley, Yreka, and Yuba City, Califor-
nia. These stores were in the geographic jurisdiction of Local
916 of the Food and Commercial Workers’ Union. When the
1989 agreement was negotiated these stores were not covered
by the multiemployer, multiunion agreement. Thereafter, in
March 1989, Local 916 merged into the Union and ceased to
exist. The nonunion stores in Redding, Chico, Grass Valley,
Yreka, and Yuba City, California, continued to operate their
grocery departments on a nonunion basis.4 The employees at
the nonunion stores did not receive the wages and benefits of
the collective-bargaining agreement. Rather, these employees
continued to receive a nonunion wage and benefit package
which differed from that provided under the bargaining agree-
ment.
When the 1992 multiemployer, multiunion negotiations con-
cluded, Respondent’s “union free” stores continued to operate
nonunion, notwithstanding the language of section 1.1 that the
Union represented all grocery employees at all stores within its
jurisdiction. However, after the 1992 agreement was reached,
the Union sought to use the new collective-bargaining agree-
ment as a tool to organize the previously nonunion grocery
departments.
In June 1992, the Union obtained what it believed was a card
majority at the Yreka store and at two stores in Redding. In
support of their case that Respondent had agreed to card checks
for both new and existing stores, the General Counsel and the
Union presented evidence that Respondent granted recognition
at two of these stores based on card checks and, with certain
addendum, added the stores to the existing multistore contract.
However, the evidence reveals that Respondent granted these
recognitions as part of an attempt to settle or compromise cur-
4 Local 916 represented the meat department employees at the Red-
ding, Yreka, Grass Valley, Chico, and Yuba City stores. After the
merger, Respondent recognized the Union as the bargaining representa-
tive of meat department employees formerly represented by Local 916.
The master meat agreement was applied to these employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 384
rent and future union demands for recognition at new and exist-
ing stores in the Union’s expanded jurisdiction and future ex-
pansions of the Union’s jurisdiction. The evidence establishes
that at a meeting, in July 1992, to settle claims at the Yreka
store, two Redding stores and future disputes, the parties agreed
to reserve their respective legal positions and attempt to reach a
settlement to cover existing and future disputes.
As a result of this meeting, three written agreements were
drafted. In the first agreement, Respondent agreed to a card
check at the Yreka store (although not included in the written
agreement was an agreement that the wages of southern Ore-
gon, rather than the wages of the master food agreement, would
apply). After recognition was granted, an addendum of lower
base wages but with the negotiated wage increases of the multi-
store agreement was executed. In the second agreement, Re-
spondent agreed to a card check with regard to one Redding
store and the Union agreed to withdraw its demand for recogni-
tion at the other Redding store. Respondent had suggested that
it could prove that the card majority had been obtained by mis-
representations. Without conceding wrongdoing, the Union
withdrew its demand for recognition at the second Redding
store. The written agreement recites no reason for this with-
drawal.5 The third document was a draft of an agreement, re-
ferred to as “the global agreement,” to cover future demands of
recognition by the Union in its original jurisdiction and in areas
of expanded jurisdiction (the 1989 expansion and future expan-
sions).
Patrick Jordan, Respondent’s attorney, drafted an agreement
reflecting what he believed was the settlement for future de-
mands involving stores in the Union’s expanded jurisdiction,
the “global agreement” reached at the June 1992 meeting. Ste-
ven Stemerman, the Union’s attorney, on August 5, 1992, wrote
back taking issue with Jordan’s understanding of their agree-
ment. On July 30, 1992, Lance Reginato, vice president of the
Union, and Ken Collings, on behalf of Respondent, executed a
copy of Jordan’s draft. However, Reginato and Collings indi-
cated that there were two areas of disagreement which needed
to be resolved by the parties and that the agreement they signed
was subject to approval by Jack Loveall, the Union’s president.
Loveall never did approve the agreement signed by Reginato.
Loveall testified that Jordan’s draft of the global agreement was
totally inconsistent with the agreement reached. The global
settlement negotiations broke down over disagreement as to
employer neutrality and union access for organizing.
Jordan testified that while the global agreement was not exe-
cuted, Respondent followed through with recognition at the
Yreka and Redding stores as a show of good faith.
Respondent does not contend that agreement was reached
but rather argues that this evidence reveals that Respondent did
not recognize the Union at these two stores pursuant to section
1.1 of the contract but rather as an attempt to settle an existing

5 The testimony of Respondent’s counsel and the Union’s counsel
reveals that the Union proposed that Respondent agree to a card check
and recognition at one Redding store and that the Union agree to with-
draw its demand for recognition at the other Redding store. Respon-
dent agreed to this offer of a compromise.
dispute at three stores and to settle future disputes at other
stores.
In July 1992, the Union requested recognition as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the grocery employees at the
Yuba City store. In November 1992, and again in April and
May 1993, the Union requested a card check and recognition
for the grocery employees at the Grass Valley store. Respon-
dent denied recognition at these stores on the ground that it had
concerns that the authorization cards were obtained through
misrepresentations and that a Board election would be a better
means for determining the Union’s majority status.
The Yuba City store opened in August 1983 and the Grass
Valley store opened in April 1988. Both stores were in the
geographic jurisdiction of Local 916 until March 1989 when
Local 916 merged into the Union. Both stores have operated
on a “union free” basis during their entire existence. As stated
earlier, the issue is whether Respondent waived its right to a
Board conducted election at these stores.
The Union and the General Counsel argue that Respondent
has admitted on numerous occasions, in communications to its
employees, that if a majority of a store’s employees signed
union authorization cards, Respondent is required by contract to
recognize the Union and extend the master food agreement to
their store.
To support this argument, the General Counsel presented
evidence that in 1984, Respondent stated in a document entitled
“Raley’s Answers Your Questions About The Union”:

We expect that in the near future the Retail Clerks Un-
ion will make an effort to get you to sign authorization
cards. The Union might tell you to believe that the only
purpose of an authorization card is to obtain a vote to de-
termine whether you want the Union to be your represen-
tative. But, the fact is that in Northern California the Re-
tail Clerks have refused to allow employees to vote for
themselves. Rather, they use the authorization cards to
force the company to recognize the Union without a vote.
No matter what the Union tells you, these cards can be
used to obtain recognition without there ever being a vote.

By letter dated October 4, 1991, to its employees at a Red-
ding, California store, Respondent stated the following:

It is our understanding that UFCW Local 588 is asking
you to sign union authorization cards. By signing such a
card, you are choosing the Union to represent you.
If a majority of the supermarket employees (excluding
meat) in this store sign such cards, we fully expect that the
Union will demand that Raley’s recognize the Union with-
out an election. We also expect that the Union would de-
mand that Raley’s apply the existing union contract to
you.
You should also be aware that you will no longer be
able to deal with the company as an individual. The Un-
ion will be your representative, and the company must
deal with the Union.

In a letter dated October 7, 1991, Respondent stated:

Because the UFCW already has a contract with
Raley’s at some stores, the union might contend that
RALEY’S 385
Raley’s is required to recognize it without a government
conducted election. However, you should be aware that
by signing a union card you may be giving up your right to
vote. Otherwise, if the union gets enough cards, the union
contract might be applied to your store without an elec-
tion.

In August 1992, Respondent wrote to employees at Grass
Valley, Chico, and Redding stores:

If the Union obtains signed cards from a majority of
employees within your store, and the cards were signed by
the employee knowing the true purpose of the card, then
Raley’s must recognize Local 588 as your representative.
Contrary to what the Union is telling many employees, the
signing of a card does not merely signify an interest in the
Union. You are making a decision which means, among
other things, that you must pay union dues, your health
and welfare pension plans change, you will not be able to
make contributions to the Company’s 401(k) plan and you
will lose the fifty cent per hour retirement supplement.
This is precisely what happened at stores 246 and 247.6
For everyone’s information, and so there can be no
misunderstanding, signing an authorization card gives the
Union the right to represent you. IT HAS NO OTHER
PURPOSE! If you sign a card, you vote to go union.

In a memorandum dated September 29, 1992, to all Raley’s
nonunion employees, Respondent stated:

Unfortunately, the NLRB has interpreted the UFCW
contract to require Raley’s to recognize the UFCW in any
store where the Union obtains authorization cards from a
majority of the employees. Moreover, as you have seen at
Yreka and Redding, we are forced to apply the UFCW
contract service with Raley’s to the employees of those
stores, and lose the fifty cent an hour bonus, Raley’s pen-
sion plan, and the 401(k) plan.

I find that these communications from Respondent to its em-
ployees were intended as propaganda in Respondent’s effort to
keep its nonunion stores “union free.” Respondent used the
Union’s expected or anticipated positions to campaign against
union solicitation of authorization cards. I do not find the cam-
paign materials to constitute an admission that section 1.1 of
the master food agreement was an after acquired stores clause
or that either section 1.1 or section 1.13 applied to Respon-
dent’s nonunion stores located in the geographic area that pre-
viously belonged to Local 916.
Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel and the Union contend that by describ-
ing the bargaining unit in terms of the Union’s jurisdiction, the
recognition clause of the contract is an after acquired stores
clause requiring Respondent to submit to a card check on the
Union’s demand. They further argue that the after acquired
stores clause applies to stores that existed prior to the execution
of the contract in addition to new stores and remodels. The
General Counsel and the Union argue that the Board in Alpha

6 Stores 246 and 247 are the Yreka and Redding stores at which the
Union was granted recognition in July 1992.
Beta, supra, did not find that section 1.1 the recognition clause,
was not an after acquired stores clause but, rather that section
1.13 was an after acquired stores clause. According to this
argument, once the Board reached that conclusion it had no
need to go further. The store in the Alpha Beta case was a new
store.
Respondent contends that the Board decided in Alpha Beta
that section 1.13 of the contract was the after acquired stores
clause. The Board emphasized that the clause applied to new
stores and remodels. The Board referred to section 1.1 as the
recognition clause which was triggered under section 1.13
when the conditions set forth in section 1.13 were met. Re-
spondent argues that the parties are bound by the Alpha Beta
case. Respondent’s strongest argument is that the parties had
an agreement as to card checks for new or after acquired stores
but were unable to reach agreement as to procedures for han-
dling preciously existing nonunion stores. That problem did
not arise until after the contract had been executed in 1992, and
the parties were never able to reach agreement. Thus, Respon-
dent argues that having never reached an agreement on card
checks for preexisting nonunion stores, it has not waived its
right, nor the rights of its store employees, to a Board election
in such stores.
In Kroger Co. (Kroger I), 208 NLRB 928 (1974), the retail
clerks contract clause at issue stated:

A. The Union shall be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
for all employees employed by the Houston Division of
Kroger Food Stores in stores operating in the State of Texas,
excluding all persons employed in the meat department.
[Emphasis supplied.]

The language in the meat cutters contract was as fol-
lows:

B. The Employer recognizes Meat Cutters Local No. 408 as
the exclusive and collective bargaining agent for all employ-
ees in the meat department, in all of Employer’s retail stores
located in the state of Texas operated by the Houston division
of the Kroger Co.

C. The parties agree that this contract shall cover and the Un-
ion which is a party hereto shall have jurisdiction over all
meat department employees in retail stores that are, or ill be,
owned, leased, or operated by the Employer. [Emphasis sup-
plied.]

Although there were obvious differences in language be-
tween the two contracts, the Board treated both clauses as after
acquired stores clauses. The dispute arose in the Kroger I case
after the employer transferred two of its stores from outside the
Houston Division into the Houston Division. This transfer
placed the two stores within the operation of the employer (the
Houston Division) for the first time. The stores had previously
been operated as nonunion stores. The unions demanded rec-
ognition under the after acquired stores clauses and accompa-
nied the demands with offers to prove majority status through
union authorization cards. The Board held that it did not view
these clauses as an advance agreement to honor a card majority.
However, in Kroger Co. (Kroger II), 219 NLRB 388 (1975),
after a remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 386
District of Columbia Circuit,7 the Board held that the only rea-
sonable interpretation, which saves after acquired store clauses
from meaninglessness, is a waiver of the employer’s right to a
Board-ordered election. Thus, the Board interpreted the clauses
in Kroger II to require, on proof of majority status by a union,
recognition and extension of the multistore contract to the new
operations. The Board also held that it would not permit the
parties to automatically incorporate a single store into the
multistore unit without a proper assessment of employee senti-
ment as to representation. Therefore, the Board required a card
check or other proof of majority notwithstanding that the after
acquired stores clauses made no mention of a card check.
In Alpha Beta, the administrative law judge found that the
contract did not contain a waiver of a Board election and that
specifically section 1.13 did not contain such a waiver. The
Board found that section 1.13 was a waiver of a Board election
as to new stores and remodels. The Board referred to section
1.1 as the recognition clause which, like the other provisions of
the contract, did not apply to new stores or remodels until 15
days after a new store or remodel opens. The question of exist-
ing stores was not an issue in the Alpha Beta case.
Turning to the instant case, if section 1.13 is the after ac-
quired stores clause, as found by the Board in Alpha Beta, the
clause would not apply to Grass Valley and Yuba City, the
stores at issue here. These stores were in existence prior to the
multiemployer, multiunion bargaining but were not covered by
the contract. When the Union’s jurisdiction expanded in 1989
to include the geographic areas in which the stores were lo-
cated, the stores were still not covered by the contract. No
demand was made to apply the new or after acquired stores
clause to these stores. Thereafter, when the 1992 agreement
was negotiated, no attempt was made to include these stores.8
When the Union finally made a demand for recognition for
these stores, the stores were no longer “new” or “after acquired
stores.” These stores had been “new” or “after acquired” for
collective-bargaining purposes when the Union’s jurisdiction
expanded and the stores fell within the language of the bargain-
ing unit. Logically, a new store can be “new” only once. Simi-
larly, a store is an “after acquired store” if it is acquired after
the contract becomes effective rather than before. The contract
language of the recognition clause which referred to all em-
ployees working in Respondent’s grocery stores did not apply
to the employees working in these pre-existing nonunion stores.
The contract did not apply to these employees prior to 1992 and
there was no request nor agreement to apply recognition or the
contract to these employees. When the contract was placed in
effect, the employees at the nonunion stores were not in the
bargaining unit and were not covered by the contract. The
Union negotiated for the 1992–1995 agreement without bar-
gaining for future inclusion of these stores. Without proof of
majority, the parties could not include the nonunion stores in

7 Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8 The language of secs. 1.1 and 1.13 has remained unchanged in
every bargaining agreement since 1980. When the parties negotiated
the 1992–1995 agreement, the Union knew that the Board had held in
Alpha Beta that sec. 1.13, New Stores and Remodels, was an after
acquired stores’ clause. However, there was no attempt to enlarge the
scope of either sec.1.1 or sec.1.13.
the multistore bargaining unit. See Alpha Beta, supra, and
Kroger II, supra.
Assuming arguendo, that section 1.1 was an after acquired
stores clause, it does not follow that the clause applies to previ-
ously existing stores. While the stores involved in Kroger were
previously existing stores, they were acquired after the effective
date of the bargaining agreement at issue in the case and thus,
were “new” to the bargaining unit at the time of the charging
party-unions’ demands for recognition. In the instant case, the
union free stores existed at the time the collective-bargaining
agreement was executed and, therefore were not acquired after
the agreement. Logically, they were not after acquired stores.
Further, the record does not support a finding that Respon-
dent agreed through section 1.1 or section 1.13 to card checks
for its existing nonunion stores. The nonunion stores continued
to operate on that basis after the contract was signed. The prior
practice of card checks concerned new stores and not stores
with a history of operating “union free.” It would be a fiction
to assume that Respondent agreed to allow its nonunion stores
to be organized without a Board election in the absence of any
evidence of such an agreement. Thus, even if section 1.1 is an
after-acquired stores clause, I would find such a clause does not
apply to stores which existed (in the geographic territory of the
Union) prior to the execution of the contract, were historically
nonunion and were not covered by the contract at the time the
multistore collective-bargaining agreement was executed.
Further, I find no evidence of any agreement, arrangement or
practice between the Union and Respondent to apply either
section 1.1 or section 1.13 to existing stores. The evidence
clearly establishes that Respondent agreed to card checks for
new stores in 1983. That agreement was reaffirmed in 1988.
When these agreements were reached in 1983 and in 1988,
there were no nonunion stores in the Union’s geographic juris-
diction. The question of recognition of previously existing
non-union stores in the Union’s jurisdiction was not raised until
1992, and at that time, the parties were unable to reach a final
agreement. I find no legal or factual basis to conclude that
Respondent has agreed to a card check for the Grass Valley and
Yuba City stores. Finally, I note that nothing in this decision
prejudices the Union’s right to file a petition with the Board to
represent the employees at the stores in issue here.
In view of these findings, I did not permit the parties to liti-
gate the issue of whether the Union had valid authorization
cards from a majority of the grocery unit employees at either of
the stores. Similarly, I did not permit litigation of the issue of
the timeliness of the Union’s demand at the Grass Valley store.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publica-
tion.]