R. H. Macy & Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 11, 1971

191 N.L.R.B. 58 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Davison-Paxon Company-Division of R. H. Macy &
Co. and Retail Clerks Local Union No. 1063. Case
10-CA-8628
June 11, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND KENNEDY
On March 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wil-
son issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion with supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re-
spondent, Davison-Paxon Company-Division of R.
H. Macy & Co., Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS S. WILSON, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge and
an amended charge filed respectively on October 7 and
November 16, 1970, by Retail Clerks Local Union No. 1063,
hereinafter referred to as the Charging Party of the Union,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
herein referred to as the General Counsel' and the Board,
respectively, by the Regional Director for Region 10, Atlanta,
Georgia, issued its complaint dated December 10, 1970,
against Davison-Paxon Company-Division of R. H. Macy
& Co., herein referred to as the Respondent.
' This term specifically includes the attorney appearing for the General
Counsel at the hearing.
The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, as
amended, herein referred to as the Act.
Respondent duly filed its answer admitting certain allega-
tions of the complaint but denying the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to a notice a hearing thereon was held before me
in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 14, 1971. All parties ap-
peared at the hearing, were represented by counsel, and were
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to produce and cross-
examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence material and
pertinent to the issues. At the conclusion of the hearing, oral
argument was waived. Briefs were received from General
Counsel and Respondent on March 1, 1971.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I, there-
fore, find:
Davison-Paxon Company-Division of R. H. Macy & Co.
is, and has been at all times material herein, a New York
corporation, licensed to do business in Georgia, where it is
engaged in the retail department store business with an an-
nual gross income in excess of $500,000. Respondent, during
the past calendar year, which period is representative of all
times material herein, purchased department store goods
valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to its
Georgia stores from outside the State of Georgia.
Accordingly, I find that Davison-Paxon Company-Divi-
sion of R. H. Macy & Co. is and has been at all times material
herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE UNION INVOLVED
Retail Clerks Local Union No. 1063 is a labor organization
admitting to membership employees of Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
There is only one issue presented in the case: Does a de-
partment store have the right to prohibit its salesclerks from
wearing union campaign buttons on the selling floor during
working hours and to discharge an employee for refusing to
obey such a prohibition.
Although there are a few differences in the testimony, there
is no conflict on any material matter.
On January 30, 1970, Barbara Raborn became a salesclerk
employed by Respondent in its art goods , needle work, and
piece goods department in its large Atlanta department store.
The Union had begun a campaign to organize the em-
ployees of the Respondent's store during the summer of 1968.
Soon after her employment began, Raborn became a union
member and an activist on behalf of the Union . About April,
Raborn, along with about 30 other of Respondent's em-
ployees, began wearing a union membership button on her
costume while at work. This was a small dark blue button
about half the size of a dime with the initials "R.C.I.A."
thereon . Respondent voiced no objection to the wearing of
this accessory by its salesclerks while at work.
On January 23 , 1970, the Union filed its second RC peti-
tion for certification as the bargaining agent for Respondent's
191 NLRB No. 10
DAVISON-PAXON COMPANY 59
employees.' Following a hearing, the Board on August 20,
1970, issued its Decision and Direction of Election among the
store employees.
On the afternoon of September 16, about 4 or 4:30 p.m.,
a number of union organizers' entered the store, fanned out
individually or in small groups throughout the six floors of
the store, and distributed to the employees yellow union cam-
paign buttons inscribed with the words in black letters "Vote
Yes Retail Clerks Union AFL-CIO."4
The following day, September 17, Melville Smiley, Re-
spondent's vice president of personnel, held a meeting of all
supervisors in the store regarding these yellow union buttons
and issued the following statement for the guidance of the
supervisors:
I am asking you to remove the large, gaudy yellow
button. It isn't in keeping with the tone and atmosphere
of Davison's and is, therefore, in violation of our dress
regulations requiring businesslike appearance.
You are within your rights to wear this button as long
as you are not in areas with customers.
Smiley instructed the supervisors in effect that they were to
use this statement discreetly with any employee found wear-
ing the yellow button on the selling floor, but that they were
not to read the statement to all the employees.
On the afternoon of September 17, Raborn wore one of
these "large, gaudy yellow" (Respondent's description) but-
tons on her working costume. The button was the size of a
Kennedy half dollar.' It was yellow. It contained the words
in black letters either "Vote Retail Clerks Union AFL-CIO,"
or "Vote Yes Retail Clerks Union AFL-CIO." In the tes-
timony there was a dispute as to which wording appeared on
the button Raborn wore, Raborn testifying that it was the
former and Respondent's witnesses that it was the latter. As
both buttons were obviously union campaign buttons, this
conflict qualifies as a distinction without a difference and
hence need not be decided here.
Raborn had been wearing this button on the floor only a
few minutes when supervisor Elsa Daniel, assistant buyer,
noted it and requested Raborn to remove it on the grounds
that it was in violation of the Respondent's dress regulations.
Raborn promptly complied and removed both the member-
ship and the campaign button.
On the morning of September 18, Raborn appeared for
work wearing this same yellow campaign button. This time,
before she had gotten to her department, Floor Superinten-
dent (Lathroph) Oastler saw the button, inquired if Raborn
had not been asked to remove it the day before, and requested
again that it be removed. This time Raborn refused on the
grounds that she had received legal adivce that she had the
right to wear the button. Oastler then requested Raborn to
come with her to the personnel office, which Raborn did.
The Union had filed its first such petition on March 6, 1969, but subse-
quently withdrew that petition.
Respondent's testimony indicated that the number of organizers was
between 75 and 90 whereas the Union's representative at the hearing ac-
knowledged that there were 32 organizers engaged
In describing this incursion into the store, Respondent's witnesses
tended to describe it in such militaristic terms as invaded, war, mob scene,
groups, packs, marching, mobbed, campaigns, camps, and conflict among
others. Although these descriptions may well have been exaggerated, the
incursion of even the admitted 32 organizers might well have been the
subject of a meritorious 8(b)(1)(A) charge against the Union. Even prounion
employees might have resented it.
In its brief Respondent refers to the size of the button as "bigger than"
a half dollar whereas in his brief the General Counsel refers to it as "smaller
than." In fact a Kennedy half dollar exactly covers the button.
While Raborn sat in the outer office, Oastler explained the
problem to Personnel Manager Barbara Franze.
What happened next was described by Franze in her tes-
timony as follows:
A. I had just been told that Mrs. Raborn had removed
the button the day before when Miss Daniel had asked
her to do it. And so I called Mr. Smiley and told him of
the problem and asked his advice on the problem. And
he said we would give Mrs. Raborn every opportunity to
remove the button on the selling floor; and if she did not
comply it would mean dismissal, that we would have to
let her go. So with that I sent for Mrs. Raborn and told
her that I understood that she had been asked to remove
the yellow button and that she had refused to remove the
yellow button on the selling floor when Mrs. Oastler
asked her to remove it. And that she had complied with
another request the day before when Miss Daniel had
asked her to remove it. And she said that was so, that
she had removed the button for Miss Daniel out of re-
spect for Miss Daniel, out of respect for her. And I asked
Mrs. Raborn to remove the button in the selling areas,
and she said that she refused, that she had very strong
union feelings, and that she wanted to back her convic-
tions or something to that effect; and even if it meant her
dismissal that she would continue wearing the button.
And so I-I can't remember at exactly what point this
came in, but I asked her again to remove the button; and
I believe Mrs. Oastler, at that point, spoke up and said
something about that she had told Mrs. Raborn that she
could wear the button in other areas except on the selling
floor and then Mrs. Raborn said, "Well, it seems strange
that I can't wear the button because I wore my Carter,
button for three days and no one asked me to remove it."
And I said, "Well, they should have asked you to remove
it because its not compliant with the dress regulations."
*
A. So then I asked Mrs. Raborn again to remove the
button. She refused. I said, "I must now order you, then
to remove the button," And she declined. And I said,
"Do you realize that it will mean your dismissal if you
don't?" And she said, "Yes." And I said I would have
to do that. I sent Mrs. Oastler down to pick up the
papers.
Then the Franze testimony continued as follows:
Q. During that conversation, Mrs. Franze, did you tell
Mrs. Raborn that the button could be worn in non-
selling areas?
A. Yes, uh huh.
Q. And I believe you also stated that Mrs. Oastler told
her it could be worn in non-selling areas, is that correct?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Did you inform Mrs. Raborn that the wearing of
that button was against the store policy?
A. Yes, I did, I explained to Mrs. Raborn that it was
not considered to be in dress regulations and that we felt
that it was-would antagonize customers-the custom-
ers may not go along with the opinion expressed on the
button.'
Georgia's successful gubernatorial candidate in 1970.
There is conflict of sorts between the witnesses as to whether Raborn
was told that she could wear the yellow button in the nonselling areas of the
store. It is clear from the testimony of all the witnesses that the Smiley
statement quoted supra, was not read to Raborn. Franze told the true
version of the interview in her own description thereof, to wit, that Raborn
was told that she could not wear the button "on the selling floor," and thus,
by implication, that she could wear the button elsewhere. I interpret her
(Cont.)
60 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Raborn was thus discharged and has not since been rein-
stated.
B. Conclusions
The decision in this case is really dictated by the Board's
recent decision in the matter of Eckerd's Market, Inc., 183
NLRB No. 40, where the employer gave its salesgirls the
option of removing their union buttons or being discharged.
The Board in reviewing the Trial Examiner and finding
8(a)(1) and (3) violations said:
We basically agree with the Trial Examiner's exposi-
tion of the applicable law in this area. As we said in
Consolidated Casinos Corp., 164 NLRB 950:
The right of employees to wear union insignia at work
has long been recognized as a protected concerted ac-
tivity. Further, as the Board held in Floridan Hotel of
Tampa, Inc. [137 NLRB 1484, enfd. as modified 318
F.2d 545 (C.A. 5)], in the circumstances of that case,
"the fact that the employees involved come in contact
with hotel customers does not consititute such `special
circumstances' as to deprive them of their right, under
the Act. to wear union buttons at work." Here, as in
Floridan Hotel, there was no strike nor union animosity
between groups of employees; the buttons were incon-
spicuous and the legends on them were in no way
provacative; and there was no substantial evidence that
they affected Respondent's business or that the prohibi-
tion against wearing them was necessary to maintain
employee discipline. [Emphasis supplied and footnotes
omitted.]
The general rule is that employees have the right to wear
union insignia while at work "in the absence of special cir-
cumstances."
The only "special circumstances" in the instant case, which
are new and different from the claimed special circumstances
in the cited cases where the Board and the courts have already
ruled adversely to Respondent's contentions here, is Re-
spondent's "dress code" for its sales personnel. It was Ra-
born's insistence on her right to wear her union insignia at
work on the selling floor which resulted in her discharge by
Respondent.
The only "special circumstances" which might justify Re-
spondent in prohibiting the wearing of the union insignia by
employees on the selling floor in the instant matter and which
has not specifically been held to be insufficient in the prior
Board and court decisions cited above was, as Raborn was
told at the time of her discharge, that having this "large,
gaudy yellow button" attached to her costume violated Re-
spondent's "dress regulations" for salesclerks on the selling
floor.
While in training in January for her sales job, Raborn was
given a one page memorandum on dress regulations by the
Respondent's training department. According to Raborn,
this memo contained some eight rules regarding proper dress.
Apparently these rules were inapplicable in the instant case
because neither the General Counsel nor Respondent offered
the document in evidence.
Personnel Manager Franze in the following excerpt from
her testimony on direct examination gave a succinct and clear
description of Respondent's dress regulations:
answer to counsel's subsequent leading question as meaning no more, par-
ticularly as she was not asked to give the actual words used.
At this point I would like to say that I found the witnesses who testified
here to be a rather exceptionally truthful group of witnesses.
Q. Are you familiar with the dress regulations for the
store, Mrs. Franze?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Would you explain to us, basically, what that regu-
lation contends [contains]?
A. Yes, well, in essence, it's a list of regulations for the
effect of good taste, good judgment, fashionable attire,
anything that would not offend a customer or be con-
troversial.
Early in her career with Respondent, Raborn was spoken
to by her supervisors for wearing either a skirt and/or cu-
lottes which were more than 4 inches above the knee which,
as of that time, was considered to be in violation of the dress
regulations. On each occasion Raborn complied with the
request.
In addition to the Franze definition, the training depart-
ment from time to time would issue changes in Respondent's
dress regulations. The latest change in those regulations in
November 1969, and apparently in effect at the critical time
here, read in part as follows:
SUBJECT.- FALL DRESS STANDARDS
As a leading fashion store, Davison's customers look to
us as pacesetters in the fashion world for the very best
in good taste and style.
In order to portray the current fashion trends, we are
liberalizing certain business dress categories that bring
with them individual responsibilities.
Good judgement and good taste should govern ev-
ery purchase of clothing and accessories.
Each selection should reflect appropriateness for
daytime business wear in your department.
PANTDRESSING AT DAVISON'S
(Some guidelines from Fashion Director, Jonm Walker)
Pantdressing has become an inportant fashion-NOT
THE SPORTSWEAR LOOKS WE'VE KNOWN,
BUT "CITYPANTS", THAT IS, THE SMART
PANTSUITS AND WELL PUT TOGETHER
LOOKS THAT ARE ACCESSORIZED AS CARE-
FULLY AS IF THEY ARE REGULAR SUITS OR
COSTUMES... THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS
THAT THESE NEW ENSEMBLES HAVE PANTS
INSTEAD OF SKIRTS.
For those employees who would like to wear this new
fashion, here are some guidelines to help you select the
look that are FASHION-RIGHT, BECOMING, AND
APPROPRIATE TO WEAR TO WORK.
Then follows a few rather detailed "Do's," including the
length, width, and cut of the pants, and "Don'ts" which
included certain inappropriate materials. The "Don'ts" were
usually followed with a statement: "They are not in fashion"
or "Not a business fashion." The bulletin contains no men-
tion of color.
Interestingly enough the feminine part of this memoran-
dum ends as follows:
(20% discount will be allowed on pantsuits for daytime
business wear as stated above.)
Obviously, Respondent liked the idea of its employees dou-
bling both as customers and fashion models of Respondent's
merchandise which, of course, was only good business.
Thus Respondent's sales personnel were not uniformed but
were permitted to wear their own personal choice of "busi-
ness like, fashionable attire." The salespeople could also wear
their own personal choice of accessories. These included fra-
ternal pins, club membership pins, and, as found above, even
union membership pins to which Respondent had had no
DAVISON-PAXON COMPANY 61
objection from the time of their introduction as accessories in
April.
The Franze definition of the dress code above excluded
anything which would "offend a customer or be controver-
sial." These are both subjective with the individual and
speculative. What might offend one person might not offend
another. What might be controversial to one might not be
controversial to another. No doubt some people object to the
Eastern Star, the Elks, the Knights of Columbus, and even
the Community Chest pins. This standard is vague and uncer-
tain at best.
As an example of something "controversial," Franze cited
the wearing of a political campaign button. Raborn testified
that she had worn a campaign button for Sanders, a Georgia
gubernatorial candidate in the last election, for a period of 3
days on the selling floor without objection. Her supervisors
testified that they had not seen the button or they would have
ordered Raborn to remove it. That, of course, would have
within Respondent's discretion. Political campaign buttons
do not enjoy the protection of Section 7 of the Act as do union
insignia which the Board and the courts have found to be a
protected form of union activity. This is no doubt the reason
Respondent had permitted the 30 or so sales employees to
wear the dark blue R.C.I.A. membership buttons on the sell-
ing floor from April on.
The evidence here shows that the wearing of these blue
union buttons proved to be noncontroversial at least so far as
Respondent was concerned. Franze could recall only one
customer comment-she carefully testified that it was not a
"complaint"-regarding the button during the whole period,
and even in that incident, no loss of a sale.
On the other hand, Franze did testify that the wearing of
these blue union buttons had, in her opinion, increased "ten-
sion" in the store among the employees. She feared that the
wearing of the yellow union campaign buttons would increase
that tension and might cause incidents on the selling floor.
However, at this time, Respondent was also holding what
were called "We Care" meetings with its employees at which
Respondent expressed its opposition to having the employees
accept union representation at the scheduled Board election.
That also would increase tension among the employees. Fur-
thermore, the imminent approach of any election, political or
representation, tends to increase tension among the voters.
That is endemic to the American democratic process of decid-
ing matters by majority vote. It is the natural concomitant of
any election.' That tension would be both on and off the
selling floor regardless of where the buttons were worn. It is
also a matter which the Congress must have considered when
it provided for such representation elections in the Act.
The basis for Respondent's fears that the wearing of the
union campaign button would be "offensive or controversial"
to its customers must necessarily be that its customers dislike
unions. This base is not solid being subject to change with the
times similar to Respondent's dress code change of Novem-
ber 1969, when permission to wear "pantdressing" was first
extended to Respondent' s sales personnel.
The evidence shows that the wearing of the blue union
buttons created no disciplinary problems nor interfered with
the efficiency of the sales personnel. There is no indication
here that the wearing of the campaign buttons would have
created any more or different problems. Respondent's super-
visors expressed confidence that they could handle any prob-
lems created among its employees through the wearing of this
yellow button off the selling floor, and, in fact, the testimony
showed that no such problems arose off the selling floor to the
8 And may it long continue.
date of the election. The fears expressed, therefore, were not
only speculative, but, indeed, unwarranted in this case.
As the wearing of union insignia is not classified by the
Board or the courts as "solicitation,"' those rules are inappli-
cable here. Displaying one's convictions in this manner re-
quires no long conversations interfering with efficiency.
Hence under the rule of law explicated in the Eckhardt
Market case, there is no business, efficiency, or controversial
reason here to curtail the general right of salespeople to wear
union campaign buttons such as that Raborn was wearing
even on the selling floor.
In its brief Respondent acknowledges the rule of law ex-
plicated in the Floridan Hotel, supra, Harrah's Club, 143
NLRB 1356, enforcement denied on other grounds 337 F.2d
269 (C.A. 9), Consolidated Casinos, supra, and the Eckhardt
Market, supra, cases. But it then distinguishes those cases
from the instant one and, indeed, claims that those cases
constitute authority for Respondent's position here on the
ground that the union buttons approved in the above cases
were described as "about the size of a 5 cent piece" with the
legends thereon consisting only of the name of the labor
organization10 whereas in the instant matter the button was
the size of a Kennedy half dollar and, in addition to the union
name, contained the words "Vote" or "Vote Yes."
When general principles of labor law are determined by the
eighth or the quarter of an inch as measured by ruler or
caliper, then it will be time for "Bumble" to turn over in his
grave and repeat his famous observation, "the law is a Ass.""
The fact of the matter is that the Kennedy half dollar is not
"large." The button involved here is the same size as those
popularly worn by men and women on their business attire
during political campaigns . It is noticeable-but not con-
spicuous as being outsized or unusual in any way. The Board
has approved the wearing of much larger insignia.12
The button here is "controversial" but only in the sense
that all elections are "divisive" as a high political figure said
in effect recently after the 1970 elections. It is no more "offen-
sive" than any fraternal or club insignia would be as Re-
spondent tacitly acknowledged in permitting the blue buttons
to be worn on the selling floor.
The addition of the words "Vote" or "Vote Yes" does not
condemn the button worn here. These merely put into words
the clear and unmistakable implication derived from the
wearing of a button. Respondent could prohibit the wearing
of political buttons because they have no protection such as
Section 7 of the Act. Likewise, Respondent could, as it did,
prohibit the wearing of "see through" blouses for the same
reason . However, public reaction might differ in these last
two instances mentioned.
Accordingly, this Trial Examiner can see "no special cir-
cumstances" here which would justify Respondent's prohibi-
tion of the wearing of the yellow button on its selling floor.
Hence Respondent's prohibition of this button violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Since the Board and the courts have ruled that the wearing
of such union insignia is a form of union activity protected
by Section 7 of the Act, and, as there is and can be no question
but that Respondent discharged Raborn for engaging in such
union activity, it necessarily follows that Respondent dis-
' Fabrt-Tek Incorporated 148 NLRB 1623, reversed 352 F.2d 577 (C.A.
8). But see Serv-Airr. Inc. v. N..L.R.B., 395 F.2d 557 (C.A 10, 1968), for
discussion and citation of authority
10 Unfortunately for Respondent none of the above cases referred to the
color of the buttons.
" "Oliver Twist" by Charles Dickens, chapter LI.
" See the compendium of such cases compiles by Trial Examiner Sidney
Goldberg in Fabri-Tek, Incorporated, 148 NLRB 1623.
62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
charged Raborn on September 18, 1970, for engaging in ORDER
union activity and thus violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act. I so find.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with its operations described in sec-
tion I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation-
ship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that Respondent cease
and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminated in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of Barbara Raborn by
discharging her on September 18, 1970, I will recommend
that Respondent offer her immediate and full reinstatement
to her former position, or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole
for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of said
discrimination against her by payment to her of a sum of
money equal to that which she would have earned from the
date of the discrimination against her to the date of her
reinstatement less her net earnings during such period in
accordance with the formula set forth in F W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 percent
per annum.
Because of the type of unfair practices engaged in by Re-
spondent, I sense an opposition by Respondent to policies of
the Act and I deem it necessary to order Respondent to cease
and desist from in any like or related manner interfering upon
the rights guaranteed its employees in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Retail Clerks Local Union No. 1063 is, and has been at
all times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of em-
ployment of Barbara Raborn by discharging her on Septem-
ber 18, 1970, because of her activities on behalf of the Union,
and in order to discourage such union membership and activi-
ties, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By refusing to permit its sales personnel to wear union
campaign buttons on its selling floor while at work, Respond-
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and upon the entire record in this case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol-
lowing recommended:"
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
Respondent, Davison-Paxon Company-Division of R. H.
Macy & Co., Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment or of any term or condi-
tion of employment of its employees because of their member-
ship in and activities on behalf of the Union herein or any
other labor organization of their choice.
(b) Refusing to allow its sales personnel to wear union
insignia or campaign buttons on its selling floor while at work
or in any other like or related manner interfering, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Barbara Raborn immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges and make her whole
for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of
the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy," with interest
thereon at 6 percent per annum.
(b) Notify its sales personnel that they have the right to
wear union insignia while at work on the selling floor of
Respondent's store.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(d) Post at its store in Atlanta, Georgia, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10,
after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith."
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, unless the Respond-
ent notify said Regional Director within 20 days from the
receipt hereof that it will take the action here recommended,
the Board issue an order directing Rsespondent to take the
action here recommended.
become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
1d In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
DAVISON-PAXON COMPANY
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL offer to Barbara Raborn her former job or,
if that job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges, and we will pay her for any loss of
pay she may have suffered by reason of our discrimina-
tion against her together with interest thereon at 6 per-
cent per annum.
WE WILL allow any or all of our employees to wear
union buttons even on the selling floor of our store.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate in
regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment of our employees because of
their membership in and activities on behalf of the Union
herein or of any other labor organization of their choice.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with , restrain,
or-coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization , to form , join , or assist labor organiza-
63
tions, including the Union herein, to bargain collectively
through a bargaining agent chosen by our employees, to
engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any such activities.
Dated By
DAMSON-PAXON
COMPANY-DIVISION
OF R. H. MACY & Co.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Peachtree
Building, Room 701, 730 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta,
Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760.