Plaza Auto Center, Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 21, 2009

28-CA-022256 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 21, 2009)

JD(SF)-23-09
Yuma, AZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REGION 28
PLAZA AUTO CENTER, INC.
and Case 28-CA-22256
NICK AGUIRRE, an Individual
Joel C. Schochet, Atty., (Region 28) Las Vegas,
Nevada, Counsel for the General Counsel
Alicia Z. Aguirre, Atty., (Law Office of Alicia Z. Aguirre, PLC)
Yuma, AZ, Counsel for Respondent
DECISION
I. Statement of the Case
LANA PARKE, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to charges filed by Nick Aguirre
(Mr. Aguirre), an individual, the Regional Director of Region 28 of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing (the complaint) on January 30,
2009. The complaint alleges that Plaza Auto Center, Inc. (the Respondent) violated Sections
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). This matter was tried in Somerton, Arizona
on May 5, 2009.1
II. Issues
1. Did Respondent violate Sections 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Mr. Aguirre on
October 28?
2. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with
unspecified reprisals and by inviting them to quit their employment?
III. Jurisdiction
At all relevant times, the Respondent, an Arizona corporation, has been engaged in the
business of selling pre-owned automotive vehicles with an office and place of business in Yuma,
Arizona (the Respondent’s facility).2 In conducting its business operations during the 12-month
period ending December 1, the Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
purchased and purchased and received at its facility goods valued in excess of $50,000, directly
from points located outside the State of Arizona and from other enterprises located within the
State of Arizona, each of which had received the goods directly from points outside the State of
Arizona. I find Respondent has at all relevant times been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 All dates herein are 2008 unless otherwise specified.
2 Unless otherwise explained, findings of fact herein are based on party admissions, stipulations, and
uncontroverted testimony.
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IV. Statement of Facts
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I find the following
events occurred in the circumstances described below during the period relevant to these
proceedings:
The individuals named below, holding the stated positions with the Respondent, were
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and comprised the management
hierarchy of the Respondent:
Tony Plaza Sr. (Mr. Plaza) -- Owner
Juan Felix (Mr. Felix) -- Sales Manager
Gustavo MacGrew (Mr. MacGrew) -- Sales Manager
Barbara Montenegro (Ms. Montenegro) -- Office Manager
In its business, the Respondent utilized two shifts of sales personnel: 8:00 a.m. to
3:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The Respondent had no employee break policy.3
Periodically the Respondent held vehicle sales events at a Sears parking lot in Yuma (Sears
tent sale) over three-day weekends, commencing Friday and concluding Sunday. The
Respondent’s vehicle salespeople and supervisors staffed the Sears tent sales. The
Respondent compensated its salespeople by commission only.4 The Respondent maintained a
“Flat List” of vehicles for sale, i.e., vehicles that were hard to sell, for sale of which the
Respondent paid its sales personnel an incentive fee called a “flat commission.” The
Respondent commonly held sales staff meetings each Wednesday.
Mr. Aguirre began working for the Respondent at the end of August as a salesperson.
His first day of work coincided with a Sears tent sale. In the course of his first day, Mr. Aguirre
asked fellow salespeople what restroom facilities he was to use. Some laughed and pointed in
various directions. When Mr. Aguirre asked Mr. Felix the same question, Mr. Felix pointed to an
area across the street from the parking lot where the Sears store and a Circle K gas station
were located.5
On the following Wednesday, Mr. Aguirre attended a sales staff meeting at the
Respondent’s facility along with other salespeople and Mr. Felix and Mr. MacGrew. At the
meeting, Mr. Aguirre learned the company held the Sears tent sales every two weeks.
Mr. Aguirre asked if employees were entitled to a break and a meal during the Sears tent sales.
Mr. Felix said, “You’re always on a break, buddy…you just wait for customers all day.” Mr. Felix
also said that if Mr. Aguirre did not like the way the company operated, he was welcome to
leave at any time.
The Respondent held its next Sears tent sale in mid-September. At that sale,
Mr. Aguirre discussed the Respondent’s employee compensation system with other
salespeople. They told him that compensation was straight commission with no income floor,
i.e. a guaranteed minimum amount of compensation a salesperson earns within a specified time

3 However, according to Mr. Felix, employees could takes breaks “whenever they want to most likely.”
4 Sometime in 2009 after being contacted by the Industrial Commission of Arizona with regard to
minimum wage violations, the Respondent began compensating its salespeople with a minimum wage as
a draw against commissions.
5 Consequent to the Respondent’s rental of the Sears parking lot, the Respondent’s employees were
permitted to use the mall’s restrooms.
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period. During the course of the sale, Mr. Aguirre discussed with two other salespeople how to
alternate restroom breaks. Mr. Aguirre asked Mr. Felix if he could take a break to eat and use
the restroom. Mr. Felix refused, saying “If [Mr. Aguirre] didn’t like it that [he] could just [leave].”
Mr. Felix told Mr. Aguirre and salesmen, Oscar Martinez and Jimmy Pagan, who were also
present, that the sales staff was always on a break.
At the following sales staff meeting held at the Respondent’s facility, a salesperson other
than Mr. Aguirre asked how much employees would be paid. Mr. MacGrew answered that if the
sales staff did their jobs right, did the test rides, filled out the proper paperwork, followed the
procedures, and did not give the car away for free, they would make money.6
At some point prior to receiving his first paycheck, Mr. Aguirre sold a 1999 Suburban that
had been on the Respondent’s lot for several months. According to Mr. Aguirre, a vehicle of the
same description was listed on the Flat List with a commission rate of $1,000 to $2,000. When
Mr. Aguirre received his paycheck, he was surprised that the amount was only $150 gross.
Mr. Aguirre showed his paycheck to several fellow salespersons who agreed with him that the
amount was unfair. When Mr. Aguirre confronted Mr. Felix about his small paycheck, pointing
out he had sold the 1999 Suburban, Mr. Felix said the company had given the vehicle away
almost for free.
Over the weeks of his employment, Mr. Aguirre talked to other sales employees about
his concerns with the way the Respondent paid them, the lack of a restroom facility at the Sears
tent sales, and the inability to leave the work area by car to eat.
At one of the Respondent’s Wednesday sales meetings, date unspecified, Mr. Plaza
raised the following concerns: (1) scratches on the left rear panel of a vehicle for sale and
(2) employee negativity. As to the first issue, Mr. Plaza said if the employee responsible for the
damage to the vehicle did not come forward, he would deduct the repair cost from sales
employees’ paychecks. Mr. Aguirre objected, saying, “I believe that is unfair for you to do that
to us. We work hard for our money…if you’re going to deduct any kind of money from anyone’s
payroll, it would be fair to deduct from everyone who has access to this vehicle.” As to the
issue of employee negativity, Mr. Plaza said Respondent had a stack of applications from
hopeful job seekers whom they could easily hire.7 Mr. Plaza asked employees to speak about
employee morale. Salesman Oscar Martinez told Mr. Plaza the only problem he had was with
the breaks and meal periods and that Mr. Felix, in addressing those issues, was short with him
and disrespectful. Mr. Plaza answered that the company was trying to work out the meal and
break issue and that he would talk to Mr. Felix.

6 The Respondent encouraged salespeople to fill out all proper documentation for the sale, including
customer references, identification, insurance, etc., to urge the customer to pay the purchase price rather
than pressuring the “desk” to lower the price, to avoid offering up to $500 cash-back incentives on select
vehicles, and to take potential buyers on test rides. At some unspecified time, Mr. Felix had told
Mr. Aguirre that if he did not offer incentives, he could make good money.
7 Mr. Plaza denied telling Mr. Aguirre at this meeting that if he did not like company procedures, he
didn’t have to work there or could leave. Mr. Plaza did not deny referring to multiple employment
applicants, and I find that employees could reasonably infer from his statements that they could seek
other employment if they were dissatisfied. Counsel for the General Counsel sought permission to
amend the complaint to allege Mr. Plaza’s statement as a violation of Section 8(a)(1), which I denied.
While not addressed herein as a violation, the exchange between Mr. Aguirre and Mr. Plaza is relevant to
animus.
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In October at a Sears tent sale, Mr. Aguirre told Mr. Felix , essentially, that he wanted to
know which cars would deliver good commissions upon sale because he thought the company
was stealing his money. Mr. Felix told Mr. Aguirre that if he didn’t trust the company or their
method of payment, he was welcome to go elsewhere.8
In late October, Mr. Aguirre contacted an Arizona agency with jurisdiction over wage and
hour issues9 about the Respondent’s sales compensation system. Thereafter, Mr. Aguirre told
fellow salespersons that the Labor Commission had said the employees should get minimum
wages as a draw against commissions. Mr. Aguirre told the others that when he got the full
facts from the Labor Commission he would inform Ms. Montenegro of his findings.10
On October 28, Mr. Aguirre approached Ms. Montenegro in her office and asked her if
the salespeople were entitled to minimum wage as a safety net toward future commissions.
Ms. Montenegro said the company did not pay minimum wage and if Mr. Aguirre wanted a
minimum wage job, the sales job was not the job for him. Mr. Aguirre told Ms. Montenegro he
had spoken to the Arizona Labor Board and that the salespeople were entitled to minimum-
wage compensation. He asked Ms. Montenegro if she could find the answer to his minimum
pay question, suggesting she ask Mr. Plaza.
Later that afternoon, Mr. Felix called Mr. Aguirre to his office for a meeting with Mr. Plaza
(the October 28 meeting). Just prior to the meeting, Mr. Felix told Mr. Plaza that Mr. Aguirre
complained about everything all the time, e.g., about not trusting the company’s calculation of
commissions and not knowing the vehicle cost. Mr. Plaza, Mr. Felix, and Mr. MacGrew were
present for the Respondent at the meeting. All four participants testified to what occurred there.
Because the sequence, as well as the substance, of statements made in the meeting is critical
to final determinations herein, a summary of each account follows:
Mr. Aguirre’s account: Mr. Aguirre initially testified that Mr. Plaza said, “Nick, you know, you’re
asking too many questions…we’re giving you an opportunity to work here and you’re just asking
all these questions about everything…about the price of the vehicles, you’re asking too much
information.11 You’re asking about the minimum wage. You are not following policy and
procedures…You’re being negative towards the pay…you don’t meet our criteria. You’re fired.”

8 Mr. Felix denied this statement, saying he told Mr. Aguirre that “nobody should be in a company if
they don’t believe in the company.” However, in his Board affidavit, Mr. Felix recounted, “I told
[Mr. Aguirre] that if he did not trust the company, that he should not work for the company,” and in redirect
examination, did not challenge the underlying fact assumption in Respondent counsel’s question, “[W]hy
did you make the comment to Aguirre that, if he didn’t trust the company, that he should not work for the
company?” I accept Mr. Aguirre’s account of the statement.
9 The parties did not identify the agency’s official title. In its post-hearing brief, the General Counsel
states the correct title is “Industrial Commission of Arizona.” References herein to the Labor Commission
or Arizona Labor Board are to the Arizona agency covering wage and hour issues.
10 Salesman, James Pagan, testified, essentially, that Mr. Aguirre told other employees he was
looking into the minimum wage question and that he was going to speak to the Arizona Labor Board.
Mr. Pagan denied that Mr. Aguirre spoke for him, saying, “If I had a problem with my workplace, I could
take care of it myself.”
11 Mr. Plaza did not specifically deny that he accused Mr. Aguirre of asking too many questions, and
his testimony that he told Mr. Aguirre he was “talking a lot of negative stuff” that would have a negative
impact on the sales force sends an equivalent message, i.e. that Mr. Aguirre was improperly questioning
company practices. I credit Mr. Aguirre’s testimony in this regard.
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Under further examination, Mr. Aguirre expanded the scope of the conversation: Mr. Plaza said
the cost of vehicles was for his eyes and his eyes only and that if Mr. Aguirre did not like it, he
was more than welcome to leave or to quit. Mr. Plaza said the company paid the salespeople
very well and asked why Mr. Aguirre did not complain when he received a check for seven or
eight hundred dollars to which Mr. Aguirre expressed concern about payment accuracy.
Mr. Aguirre protested Mr. Plaza’s charge that he did not meet the company’s criteria, saying he
took care of the customers with respect, did what he was told, moved cars back and forth, did
everything he could, and did the proper paperwork. Mr. Aguirre told Mr. Plaza he believed
Mr. Plaza was upset because he called the Labor Board.
Only after Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre he was fired, did Mr. Aguirre respond intemperately, saying
“How can you do this to somebody, especially somebody that works hard that just had a
baby12…this is what I get for trying to succeed.” Mr. Aguirre told Mr. Plaza he was an “F’ing
mother F’ing,” an “F’ing crook, and an a__hole .” He asked how Mr. Plaza could fire him just for
calling the Labor Board.
Mr. Aguirre asked for his pay since he was being fired. When Mr. Plaza told him he had up to
three days to provide the final check, Mr. Aguirre said, “You’ll get what’s coming to you if I don’t
get my check.”13
Mr. Plaza’s account: Mr. Plaza met with Mr. Aguirre because he understood from
Ms. Montenegro that Mr. Aguirre had raised minimum wage concerns with her and had
requested a meeting. Mr. Plaza had no intention of discharging Mr. Aguirre.
At the inception of the meeting, Mr. Plaza asked Mr. Aguirre what was going on, stating that he
was concerned because Mr. Aguirre was “talking a lot of negative stuff” that would have a
negative impact on the sales force. Mr. Aguirre said he had questions about vehicle costs,
sales commissions, and minimum wage. Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre he needed to follow
company policies and procedures, referring to the company’s pay structure, about which he
thought Mr. Aguirre should not be complaining.14 Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre it was a normal
practice in the car business for employees not to know the cost of vehicles. Mr. Plaza twice told
Mr. Aguirre that if he did not trust the company, he did not need to work there. Mr. Aguirre
became upset, arose from his chair, and said that Mr. Plaza was a f__ a__hole, that nobody
liked him, that he was f__ stupid, that he did not know what he was doing, that he did not know
everyone was talking about him, and that he thought he could fire anybody he wanted to.
Mr. Plaza believed Mr. Aguirre would have physically attacked him if the others had not been
there. Mr. Plaza asked Mr. Aguirre to “calm down, settle down, to quit saying what he was
saying.” When Mr. Aguirre did not comply, and after Mr. Aguirre called him a f__ a__hole for
the “tenth time,” Mr. Plaza told him, “you’re done, Nick.”
Mr. Aguirre asked, “You’re going to f__ fire me for calling the Labor Department?”
Mr. Plaza answered, “No, Nick. I’m firing you because you abused me verbally, almost
physically.”

12 Mr. Aguirre’s second child was born October 11. His first child had just turned two, and
Mr. Aguirre was the sole support of his family.
13 Mr. Aguirre testified that he only meant he would call the proper authorities or organizations to help
him get any money due him, but Mr. Aguirre did not in any way qualify his warning that Mr. Plaza would
get what was coming to him, and I conclude his statement was menacing.
14 According to Mr. Plaza, Mr. Aguirre was at that time making more than minimum wage.
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On October 28, following Mr. Aguirre’s discharge, Mr. Plaza wrote the following memo:
October 28, 2008
(Tuesday) I had a meeting with my managers, Juan & Gustavo with salesman
Nick Aguirre. He had asked to meet with me as soon as I came in and I also had
concerns about his attitude and negative influence to the rest of my employees.
He was always talking negative about work procedures and everything in
general. I also went over that if he could not follow policy and procedures
according to our policy manual, then he did not need to work here. I also told
him we would not let him know our investment in each of the vehicles and again
told him he did not have to work here. At this point he got really upset and every
sentence out of his mouth included the “F” word. I asked him to calm down but
he was out of control and after several uses of the “F” word I terminated him
immediately. We will not tolerate verbal abuse and in conclusion will never rehire
or refer Nick to anyone who calls for references.
Mr. Felix’s account:15 Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre they were meeting because Mr. Felix
and Ms. Montenegro had told him Mr. Aguirre wanted to speak to him about concerns
Mr. Aguirre had. Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre the Respondent had rules and policies like
every other company, and if an employee was not happy with the rules, they did not
need to work there. Mr. Aguirre said he had been doing everything he had been asked
to do. Mr. Aguirre told Mr. Plaza why he wanted to know the cost of the vehicles, and
Mr. Plaza said, “I am just telling you that, if you are not happy here, you don’t have to
work here.” At some point, Mr. Aguirre asked if he were going to be fired, a question he
repeated six or seven times during the meeting and to which Mr. Plaza invariably
answered, “No.”16
During the course of the meeting, Mr. Aguirre called Mr. Plaza f__ stupid and said that if
he got fired, Mr. Plaza was going to regret it.17 He said Mr. Plaza was f__ stupid
because he didn’t even know what people were saying about him outside the building.
As he was “cussing” Mr. Plaza, Mr. Aguirre stood up, “threw his chair,” and faced
Mr. Plaza. Believing Mr. Aguirre was going to hit Mr. Plaza, Mr. Felix stood also, as did
Mr. MacGrew. Mr. Plaza said, “You know what, that’s it, I don’t have to get all this from
you.” Mr. Plaza then told Mr. Aguirre he was done; he was fired. Mr. Felix and
Mr. MacGrew “invited” Mr. Aguirre to leave Mr. Felix’s office.
Mr. MacGrew’s account:18 At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre
that whether or not he liked working at the company, he needed to follow the company’s
procedures and policies. Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre that if he did not trust the company,

15 Mr. Felix described the meeting both on direct and cross examination. His two accounts vary in
certain details and order but are otherwise consistent.
16 Counsel for the General Counsel argues that Mr. Felix’ testimony regarding the number of times
Mr. Aguirre asked if he were going to be fired was so hyperbolic that it destroyed Mr. Felix’ credibility.
While it seems unlikely Mr. Aguirre made the inquiry as often as Mr. Felix estimated, the apparent
exaggeration does not destroy Mr. Felix’ credibility, and I credit Mr. Felix’ testimony that Mr. Plaza denied
any intent to fire Mr. Aguirre.
17 As noted earlier, Mr. Aguirre admitted to a similar statement (that Mr. Plaza would “get what’s
coming to” him) but placed the threat after the discharge and in connection with a question about his final
paycheck.
18 Mr. MacGrew’s account, as set forth herein, is an amalgamation of his direct and cross-
examination testimony.
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he did not have to work there. Immediately Mr. Aguirre began telling Mr. Plaza he was
stupid, did not know people were talking about him behind his back, was an a__hole,
and f__Mr. Plaza. In the course of the meeting, Mr. Aguirre repeatedly asked if
Mr. Plaza was going to fire him. Toward the end of the meeting, Mr. Aguirre stood up,
and Mr. Felix and Mr. MacGrew told him that was enough and that it was time to go.
Mr. Plaza also stood and said, “You know, I don’t need to hear this; you’re done.”
Mr. Felix occasionally used obscene language, including the “F” word, when directing
employees, but Mr. Aguirre had never heard him do so in Mr. Plaza’s presence. In 2008 the
Respondent fired salesman, Eddie Yemes, because he was “abusive with foul language” to
Mr. Felix while working at a tent sales event when he told Mr. Felix to f__ himself.
V. Discussion
A. Underlying Legal Principles
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that employees have the right to
engage in union activities and, in pertinent part, “the right to … engage in … concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ….” The protection
afforded by Section 7 extends to employee efforts to improve terms and conditions of
employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”
To enjoy Section 7 safeguards, employee activity must be both “concerted” and
“protected,” which a propounding party may prove by showing the activity (1) involves a work-
related complaint or grievance; (2) furthers some group interest; (3) seeks a specific remedy or
result; and (4) is not unlawful or otherwise improper. NLRB v. Robertson Industries, 560 F.2d
396, 398 (9th Cir. 1976), cited with approval by the Board in Northeast Beverage Corporation,
349 NLRB 1166 FN 9 (2007). To be concerted, employee activity must be engaged in with or on
the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.
Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984). Concerted activity includes individual activity
that seeks to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as individual employees
bringing group complaints to the attention of management. Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882
(1986). Employees do not have to accept the individual's call for group action before the
invitation itself is considered concerted. Cibao Meat Products, 338 NLRB 934 (2003); Whittaker
Corp., 289 NLRB 933, 934 (1988); El Gran Combo, 284 NLRB 1115 (1987).
“[C]oncertedness…can be established even though the individual [speaking] was not ‘specifically
authorized’…to act as a group spokesperson for group complaints.” Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 287
NLRB 1356, 1360 (1988). Concerted activity includes concerns that are a “logical outgrowth” of
group concerns. Salisbury Hotel, 283 NLRB 685, 687 (1987); Compuware Corporation, 320 NLRB
101 (1995). Work-related complaints or grievances include terms and conditions of
employment19 and concerted complaints to governmental agencies.20
In cases turning on employer motivation, the Board applies an analytical framework that
assigns the General Counsel the initial burden of showing protected concerted activity was a
motivating or substantial factor in an adverse employment action. The elements commonly
required to support such a showing are protected activity by the employee, employer knowledge

19 Valley Hospital Medical Center, 351 NLRB No. 88, slip op. at 3 (2007)
20 Delta Health Center, Inc., 310 NLRB 26 (1993).
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of that activity, and animus on the part of the employer. The burden then shifts to the employer
to prove, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action even in the
absence of the employee's protected activity. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd.
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Alton H. Piester, LLC, 353
NLRB No. 33 (2008).
Even when an employee is engaged in protected activity, he or she may lose the
protection of the Act by egregious behavior, including displaying “an opprobrious or abusive
manner.” Verizon Wireless, 349 NLRB 640, 646 (2007). In assessing employee behavior
asserted to be egregious, the Board considers four factors: (1) the place of the discussion;
(2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee's outburst; and
(4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by the employer's unfair labor practices.
Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 814, 816 (1979).21
B. Mr. Aguirre’s Concerted Protected Activities
1. Mr. Aguirre’s Concerns about Breaks and Restroom Facilities
Mr. Aguirre’s first day of employment coincided with a Sears tent sale, where Mr. Aguirre
discussed availability of restroom facilities with fellow salespeople. A few days later, during a
sales staff meeting with management, Mr. Aguirre asked about employee entitlement to breaks
and meal periods during the Sears tent sales. In this concern, Mr. Aguirre was joined by
another salesman who, at a later sales meeting, expressed dissatisfaction with the
Respondent’s breaks and meals arrangements. Mr. Aguirre continued to raise this and related
concerns with other employees in the ensuing weeks: discussing alternating restroom breaks,
talking about the lack of a restroom facility at the Sears tent sales, and complaining about the
inability to leave the work area by car for meals.
Employee breaks and availability of restroom facilities are employment terms and
conditions of general application to employees. Mr. Aguirre raised those issues with
management during a sales meeting, as did another employee in a later meeting. From those
circumstances, as well as Mr. Aguirre’s ongoing related discussions with fellow sales personnel,
it is clear that Mr. Aguirre’s complaints about breaks and restroom facilities were both protected
and concerted. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, Inc., 343 NLRB 1423 (2004) (complaint about
paycheck not compensating for lost benefits to management in the presence of coworkers);
Cibao Meat Products, at 934 (“activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow
employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much ‘concerted activity’ as is ordinary group
activity.” Such individual action is concerted as long as it is “engaged in with the object of
initiating or inducing … group action ….” Citations omitted.) NLRB v. Caval Tool Division, 262
F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (enforcing Board order finding employee complaint about working
conditions made in group meeting was protected concerted conduct on behalf of the group);
Phillips Petroleum Company, 339 NLRB 916 (2003); Avery Leasing, 315 NLRB 576, 580 fn. 5
(1994) (finding concerted activity where an employee, in the presence of other employees,
complained to management concerning wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment).

21 Evidence of employer knowledge that activity is protected is not a necessary element
under Alliance Steel Products. The test is whether employer conduct would interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Alliance Steel
Products at 495.
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Mr. Aguirre’s actions with regard to employee breaks and restroom facilities, as described
herein, constituted concerted protected activity.
2. Mr. Aguirre’s Concerns about Sales Compensation
Early in his employment, Mr. Aguirre took issue with the Respondent’s commission-
only compensation of sales personnel and its calculation of commissions. Expression of his
concern included talking with other salespeople about the Respondent’s compensation system,
asking Mr. Felix for information as to which vehicles were likely to produce good commissions,
showing his unexpectedly low first commission to other employees who agreed the amount was
unfair, asking management about the basis of the commission, discussing with fellow
salespeople his plan to contact an Arizona state agency about the Respondent’s commission-
only policy, contacting the agency, thereafter sharing the information learned with fellow
employee, telling fellow employees he would inform management, and thereafter sharing his
findings with Ms. Montenegro.
Wages are clearly an employment term of prominent interest to employees and
employee attention to wages is protected. Although fellow salesman, James Pagan, denied that
Mr. Aguirre spoke for him in pursuing his wage inquiries, it is clear Mr. Aguirre attempted to
engage the interest of other sales employees, including Mr. Pagan, in his wage inquiries by
discussing with them perceived wage inequities, by telling them of his state agency information
quest, and by alerting them to his intended confrontation with management. It is equally clear
that the wage issues Mr. Aguirre addressed affected all sales employees and that the
resolutions Mr. Aguirre sought would impact all sales employees. In these circumstances,
Mr. Aguirre’s involvement with wage issues was concerted. See Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB
882 (1986) (individual employees bringing group concerns to the attention of management);
Cibao Meat Products, supra, (concerted action does not depend on employee acceptance of
individual's call for group involvement); Salisbury Hotel, supra, (concertedness includes concerns
that are a “logical outgrowth” of group concerns); Compuware Corporation, supra, (individual
employee complaint to state labor board, although unauthorized by group, was a continuation of
group efforts); JMC Transport, 272 NLRB 545, 546 FN.2 (1984), enfd. 776 F.2d 612 (6th Cir.
1985) (complaint about discrepancy in individual paycheck was a continuation of employees'
protected concerted activity in protesting, a month earlier, the company's change in the way
employee wage payments were calculated).
Mr. Aguirre’s actions with regard to sales employee compensation, as described herein,
constituted concerted protected activity.
C. Alleged Threats of Reprisal and Invitations to Quit Employment
The Complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when the
following supervisors on the following dates threatened employees by inviting them to quit their
employment:
Mr. Felix --- September 3 and October
Ms. Montenegro --- October 28
Mr. Plaza --- October 28
At a late August/early September sales staff meeting, when Mr. Aguirre asked about
employee breaks during Sears tent sales, Mr. Felix told him that if he did not like the way the
company operated, he was welcome to leave at any time. At a Sears tent sale in mid-
September, Mr. Aguirre discussed with other employees how to alternate restroom use. In the
presence of two other salesmen, Mr. Aguirre asked Mr. Felix for permission to take a meal
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break and use the restroom. Telling all three salesmen that the sales staff was always on a
break, Mr. Felix refused Mr. Aguirre’s request, saying that if Mr. Aguirre did not like it, he could
just leave.22 At another Sears tent sale held sometime in October, when Mr. Aguirre asked
Mr. Felix to identify cars whose sale would deliver good commissions, Mr. Felix replied that
employees who do not trust in the company should leave its employ.
On October 28, when Mr. Aguirre, after conferring with fellow employees, asked
Ms. Montenegro about the sales staff’s entitlement to a minimum wage draw against
commissions, Ms. Montenegro told him that if he wanted a minimum wage job, the sales job
was not the job for him. Later that same day, during the course of his meeting with Mr. Aguirre,
Mr. Plaza told Mr. Aguirre that if he did not like the company’s refusal to divulge vehicle costs,
he was more than welcome to leave or to quit, and Mr. Plaza twice told Mr. Aguirre that if he did
not trust the company, he did not need to work there.
An employer that responds to protected concerted protests of working conditions by
telling employees they can leave if they do not like the conditions coerces employees within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Inviting employees to quit their employment in such
circumstances interferes with the free exercise of employees’ Section 7 right to protest working
conditions. Alton H. Piester, LLC, 353 NLRB No. 33 (2008); House Calls, Inc., 304 NLRB 311,
313 (1991); Chinese Daily News, 346 NLRB 906 (2006); McDaniel Ford, Inc., 322 NLRB 956 FN 1
(1997) (“It is well settled that an employer's invitation to an employee to quit in response to
their exercise of protected concerted activity is coercive, because it conveys to employees
that…engaging in… concerted activities and their continued employment are not compatible, and
implicitly threatens discharge of the employees involved.”)
Mr. Felix, Ms. Montenegro, and Mr. Plaza’s suggestions to Mr. Aguirre that he cease
working for the Respondent if he did not like its terms and conditions of employment were made
in response to his protected concerted activities described above. As such, the suggestions
were coercive. Accordingly, the Respondent’s conduct in this regard violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act as alleged in the Complaint.
The Complaint further alleges the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when
Mr. Plaza threatened employees with unspecified reprisals. The basis for the allegation is
Mr. Plaza’s statement to Mr. Aguirre in the October 28 meeting that he was “asking too many
questions [about company policies].” The General Counsel argues this statement alone
impliedly threatened reprisals if Mr. Aguirre persisted in the protected activity of questioning
company practices. While Mr. Plaza expressed displeasure with Mr. Aguirre’s protected
inquiries and thereby evidenced animus toward those activities, it is too great a stretch to
categorize the statement as a threat. Accordingly, I will dismiss that allegation of the Complaint.
D. Discharge of Nick Aguirre
The General Counsel argues that the only reason the Respondent discharged
Mr. Aguirre was because of the negative influence Mr. Plaza believed Mr. Aguirre’s protected
activities had on other employees. The Respondent argues that the only reason the Respondent
terminated Mr. Aguirre was his physically intimidating and abusive behavior in the October 28

22 Although the record shows this exchange to have occurred in mid-September, it fits within the time
parameters of complaint allegation 4(c) that such a threat was made “in or about October 2008.”
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meeting. Determining the Respondent’s motivation requires a Wright Line analysis. If the
Respondent’s argument is accepted, determining whether Mr. Aguirre’s behavior at the
October 28 meeting justified his discharge requires an Atlantic Steel analysis.23
Many of the facts surrounding Mr. Aguirre’s discharge are not disputed: On
October 28, Mr. Aguirre told Ms. Montenegro he had learned from an Arizona state
agency that the Respondent was improperly withholding minimum wage
compensation from its commissioned salespeople. Ms. Montenegro thereafter
arranged the October 28 meeting. Just prior to the meeting, Mr. Felix told Mr. Plaza that
Mr. Aguirre complained about everything all the time, e.g., about not trusting the company’s
calculation of commissions and not knowing the vehicle cost. At the meeting, Mr. Plaza
criticized Mr. Aguirre’s negative attitude toward company policies and procedures. Mr. Plaza
told Mr. Aguirre that if he did not trust the company, he did not need to work there. During the
course of the meeting, Mr. Aguirre became upset and, according to the various accounts, told
Mr. Plaza that he was a “F’ing mother F’ing,” a “F’ing crook,” and an a__hole, that he was
stupid, that nobody liked him, and that everyone was talking about him behind his back. At
some point in the meeting, Mr. Plaza fired Mr. Aguirre.
There remain two critical factual disputes as to what happened at the October 28
meeting: (1) At what point in the meeting did Mr. Plaza fire Mr. Aguirre? (2) What were the
circumstances and manner of Mr. Aguirre’s outburst? The General Counsel’s position is that
Mr. Plaza fired Mr. Aguirre before Mr. Aguirre verbally assailed Mr. Plaza and that, given the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct, Mr. Aguirre engaged in no unjustifiable behavior. The
Respondent’s position, on the other hand, is that Mr. Aguirre’s threatening and volatile verbal
attack both preceded and was the direct cause of Mr. Aguirre’s discharge.
I have carefully considered the testimonies of all witnesses to the October 28 meeting.
In doing so, I have taken into account the witnesses’ manner and demeanor while testifying, as
well as the circumstances surrounding the discharge. I give greater weight to the testimonies of
Mr. Plaza, Mr. Felix, and Mr. MacGrew. While discrepancies exist in each of their accounts, I
found the three management witnesses demonstrated efforts to convey honest, unbiased
recollections of the meeting. Mr. Aguirre’s testimony was not as believable. Mr. Aguirre initially
testified that at the October 28 meeting, Mr. Plaza bluntly itemized his displeasure with
Mr. Aguirre’s activities and abruptly fired him. Under further questioning, Mr. Aguirre
significantly expanded his account of what occurred at the meeting, including Mr. Plaza’s
statement that if Mr. Aguirre did not like being kept in ignorance of vehicle cost, he was more
than welcome to leave or to quit. Not only was Mr. Aguirre’s initial testimony not fully congruous
with his expanded version of the meeting, Mr. Plaza’s implicit invitation to Mr. Aguirre to accept
company policy or quit is incompatible with Mr. Aguirre’s earlier testimony of abrupt discharge.
Accordingly, I do not credit Mr. Aguirre’s account of the October 28 meeting where it conflicts
with the accounts of Mr. Plaza, Mr. Felix, and Mr. MacGrew.
Mr. Plaza testified he had no intention of firing Mr. Aguirre when he began the
October 28 meeting and, until the conclusion of the meeting, told Mr. Aguirre he was not being
fired. Consistent with the credibility assessments herein, I accept Mr. Plaza’s testimony.
Mr. Plaza, Mr. Felix, and Mr. MacGrew, whose testimonies I have credited, were consistent in
placing Mr. Aguirre’s verbal outburst before Mr. Plaza announced his discharge. Therefore, I

23 See Alton H. Piester, supra; Waste Management Of Arizona, Inc., 345 NLRB 1339 (2005).
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find that Mr. Aguirre’s denouncement of Mr. Plaza preceded Mr. Aguirre’s discharge. I further
find that Mr. Aguirre’s behavior in cursing and derogating Mr. Plaza was at least physically
aggressive if not menacing.24
A finding that Mr. Aguirre verbally attacked Mr. Plaza before rather than after Mr. Plaza
fired him on October 28, does not, of course, automatically resolve the issue of why the
Respondent fired Mr. Aguirre. The question remains whether the Respondent fired Mr. Aguirre
solely because he engaged in concerted protected activities, as Counsel for the General
Counsel contends, or whether, as the Respondent contends, the Respondent fired Mr. Aguirre
because he insulted Mr. Plaza. Since the existence of an arguably valid reason for discharge
cannot, in and of itself, expunge an unlawful reason, the Respondent’s motivation must be
determined by application of a Wright Line analysis.
The General Counsel has proven the elements required by Wright Line: the General
Counsel has shown that Mr. Aguirre engaged in concerted protected activity, that the
Respondent’s managers knew of the activity, and that the Respondent bore animus toward the
activity, as demonstrated by management’s repeated suggestions that unhappy employees
seek employment elsewhere. The General Counsel having met his initial burden, the burden of
proof shifts to the Respondent to prove it would have fired Mr. Aguirre even in the absence of
his protected activity.
The Respondent contends that irrespective of Mr. Aguirre’s protected activity, Mr. Plaza
would have fired him for his profane personal attack at the October 28 meeting. There is no
question that Mr. Aguirre’s behavior could reasonably be expected to provoke discharge.
However, “[a]n employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for its action but
must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would
have taken place even in the absence of the protected activity.” Yellow Ambulance
Service, 342 NLRB 804, 804 (2004), citations omitted. In 2008, Mr. Plaza directed
Mr. Felix to fire salesman Eddie Yemes because he told Mr. Felix to f___ himself. Considering
that Mr. Aguirre’s October 28 contumely was directed at Mr. Plaza himself and was more
extensive and opprobrious than Eddie Yemes’ outburst, it is reasonable to conclude that the
Respondent would have fired Mr. Aguirre for his verbal attack on Mr. Plaza regardless of the
Respondent’s animosity toward Mr. Aguirre’s protected activity. Accordingly, I find the
Respondent has met its shifted burden under Wright Line and has shown that it fired Mr. Aguirre
because he verbally abused Mr. Plaza.
A finding that the Respondent fired Mr. Aguirre because of his October 28 outburst does
not lay the discharge issue to rest. The purpose of the October 28 meeting was to address
Mr. Aguirre’s complaints about the Respondent’s sales compensation practices. Mr. Aguirre’s
participation in the meeting was a furtherance of his concerted, protected wage complaints. At
the meeting, Mr. Aguirre engaged in behavior the Respondent contends was opprobrious. “An
employer violates the Act by discharging an employee engaged in the protected concerted
activity of voicing a complaint about his employment terms unless, in the course of that protest,
the employee engages in opprobrious conduct, costing him the Act's protection.” Alton H.
Piester, LLC, at slip op. 6. Although I have found that the Respondent fired Mr. Aguirre because
of his contumacious behavior in the October 28 meeting, it must yet be determined whether
Mr. Aguirre’s behavior was so egregious as to lose the Act’s protection. See Verizon Wireless,
349 NLRB 640, 646 (2007).

24 In finding Mr. Aguirre’s behavior to be belligerent, I rely on credited testimony that in the course of
his outburst and prior to the discharge, Mr. Aguirre rose from his chair, pushed it aside and said that if he
was fired, Mr. Plaza would regret it. As noted earlier, Mr. Aguirre admitted to menacing language—“You’ll
get what’s coming to you”—although in a different context.
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In assessing employee behavior asserted to be egregious, the four factors enunciated in
Atlantic Steel25 must be considered: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of
the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in
any way, provoked by the employer's unfair labor practices.
Considering the first factor, Mr. Aguirre’s outburst occurred in the presence of
management only, and there is no evidence any unit employee overheard the confrontation. The
outburst, therefore, had no impact on workplace discipline, nor did Mr. Aguirre’s offensive
behavior undermine management authority. The place of the discussion, thus isolated from
other workers, argues against loss of protection.26 As to the second and fourth factors, the
discussion related wholly to Mr. Aguirre’s protected concerted activity. Further, Mr. Aguirre’s
outburst was contemporaneous with both the Respondent’s censure of Mr. Aguirre’s protected
activity as “a lot of negative stuff” that negatively impacted the sales force and the Respondent’s
coercive conduct in pointing out that Mr. Aguirre did not have to work for the Respondent if he
did not like or trust the company. Both statements are provocative, and the latter, as detailed
above, is an unfair labor practice. The subject matter of the discussion, intertwined as it was
with the Respondent’s intrinsically provocative unfair labor practice, also militates against loss of
protection.27 Accordingly, the first, second, and fourth Atlantic Steel factors weigh in favor of
protection.
The third factor, the nature of Mr. Aguirre’s outburst, is not so easily resolved. Board law
establishes that “employees are permitted some leeway for impulsive behavior when engaging in
concerted activity, subject to the employer’s right to maintain order and respect [citation
omitted].” Tampa Tribune, 351 NLRB 1324,1324-25 (2007), enforcement denied Media General
Operations, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 560 F. 3d 181 (4th Cir. 2009).28 The standard for determining
whether specified conduct is removed from the protection of the Act is whether the conduct is
“so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service.” St.
Margaret Merry Healthcare Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 204-205 (2007); Dreis Rump Mfg. v.
NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 324, (7th Cir. 1976). Insulting profanity alone is not so egregious as to

25 Atlantic Steel at 816.
26 Remarks made in private are less disruptive to workplace discipline than those made in the
presence of fellow employees. Stanford Hotel, 344 NLRB 558 (2005); Noble Metal Processing, 346 NLRB
795, 800 (2006) (place of discussion weighs in favor of protection where outburst occurred away from
employees' work area and did not disrupt the work process).
27 Care Initiatives, 321 NLRB at 152, (“[A]n employer may not rely on employee conduct that it has
unlawfully provoked as a basis for disciplining an employee [citation omitted]”); Datwyler Rubber &
Plastics supra. 350 NLRB 669, 669-70 (2007) (employee did not lose protection of the Act by
calling supervisor a devil whom Jesus Christ would punish for requiring a 7-day work week); Stanford
Hotel, supra (brief profanity protected where it was a response to unlawful threats).
28 The protections of Section 7 would be meaningless were the Board not to take into account the
realities of industrial life and the fact that disputes over wages, bonus, and working conditions are among
the disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses. Consumers Power Company, 282
NLRB 131, 132 (1986).
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justify loss of the Act's protection.29 However, repeated use of profanity in a loud ad hominem
attack on a supervisor may lose the Act’s protection. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 344 NLRB 312,
317-18 (2005).
The question is whether, in the instant circumstances, Mr. Aguirre retained
the Act’s protection in spite of his outburst or lost the Act’s protection because of
his outburst. In Daimler Chrysler Corp., supra, the behavior that cost an employee the Act’s
protection was the making of repeated, extensive, and personally derogatory statements to a
supervisor, behavior similar to Mr. Aguirre’s. However, Daimler differs from the instant situation
in that only one Atlantic Steel factor—subject matter—favored protection, while here three of the
four Atlantic Steel factors favor protection with only the nature of Mr. Aguirre’s outburst weighing
against protection.
Notwithstanding the fact that only one Atlantic steel factor disfavors Mr. Aguirre’s
protection in this case, the impact of that sole factor must not be minimized. It is clear the Board
carefully considers the form and scope of offensive language in opprobrious behavior cases.30
Upon court remand of Felix Industries31, the Board considered the question of whether the
nature of an employee’s outburst (factor three), by itself, may outweigh the other Atlantic Steel
factors. The Board stated that “the nature of [an employee’s] outburst must be given
considerable weight towards losing the Act's protection.” Felix Industries, 339 NLRB 195, 196
(2003). While the Board in Felix Industries decided that the other factors outweighed factor
three in that case, the Board emphasized that the supervisor involved, who was also the son of
the company’s president, directed “extremely hostile” remarks to the employee, provoking his
response that the supervisor was just a f__ing kid to whom the employee did not have to listen.
Id at 195, 196-197.
In applying the balancing test utilized by the Board in these kinds of cases, I have
particularly noted the following circumstances: Mr. Aguirre’s outburst was qualitatively and
quantitatively more opprobrious than that considered in Felix Industries. Without extreme
provocation from overt hostility or antagonism from Mr. Plaza, Mr. Aguirre repeatedly reviled
Mr. Plaza in obscene and personally denigrating terms accompanied by menacing conduct and

29 See Alcoa Inc., 352 NLRB No. 141 (2008), (referring to supervisor as “egoistical f__er”);
Tampa Tribune supra, (calling supervisor a “stupid f__ing moron.”); Union Carbide
Corporation, 331 NLRB 356, 359 (2000) (calling supervisor a “f__ing liar”); Burle Industries, 300
NLRB 498, 502, 504 (1990) (calling supervisor a “f__ing a__hole”); Thor Power Tool Co., 148
NLRB 1379, 1380 (1964), enfd. 351 F. 2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965), (referring to supervisor as a “horse's
ass”); U.S. Postal Service, 241 NLRB 384, 390 (1979) (Referring to acting supervisor as an
“a__hole”); NLRB v. Cement Transport Company, 490 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1974) (referring to
company president as a “son of a bitch”).
30 See, e.g., Alcoa, Inc., at 1226 (employee/union steward’s pejorative description of a
supervisor as an “egotistical f—er” was “a single verbal outburst of profane language, in a
disciplinary meeting…unaccompanied by physical contact or threat of physical harm,” which
did not destroy the Act’s protection); Beverly Health And Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 346 NLRB
1319, 1323 (2006) (employee conduct “consisted of a brief, verbal outburst of profane language
unaccompanied by insubordination, physical contact, or threat of physical harm); Trus Joist
Macmillan 341 NLRB 369, 371-72 (2004) (employee’s repetitious remarks that were
personal and highly offensive cost him the protection of the Act); Datwyler Rubber and
Plastics, Inc., supra, (employee outburst protected, as it was spontaneous, brief, and
unaccompanied by physical contact or threat of physical harm).
31 Felix Industries, 331 NLRB 144, 146 (2000), enf. den. and remanded 251 F.3d 1051(D.C. Cir.
2001).
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language. Considering these circumstances and the record as a whole, I find that Mr. Aguirre’s
behavior at the October 28 meeting was so egregious as to forfeit the protection of the Act.
Accordingly, I find the Respondent did not violate the Act when it discharged Mr. Aguirre.
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling employees they could quit or
leave the Respondent’s employ if they did not like company policies and/or procedures.
3. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended32
ORDER
Respondent, Plaza Auto Center, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees they can quit or leave the Respondent’s employ if they do not like
company policies and/or procedures.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Yuma, Arizona
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”33 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28 after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the

32 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
33 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the
notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall read
“POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
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pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facility involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by Respondent at any time since September 3, 2008.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated: July 21, 2009.
Lana H. Parke
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. More particularly,
WE WILL NOT tell employees they can quit or leave our employ if they do not like our company
policies and/or procedures
WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights listed above.
PLAZA AUTO CENTER, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85004-3099
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
602-640-2160.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 602-640-2146.