Pandel-Bradford, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 7, 1974

214 N.L.R.B. 736 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Styletek , Division of Pandel-Bradford, Inc., and
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Union Local No. 437 a/w International Brother-
hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America . Cases 1-CA-9148, 1-
CA-9266, and 1-RC-12848
November 7, 1974
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
JENKINS
On April 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Anne F. Schlezinger issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent-Em-
ployer filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
Part of the Administrative Law Judge's 8(a)(1)
findings, which serve as the basis for setting aside the
election of September 6, 1973,1 and from which our
colleague dissents, is based on the Respondent's Au-
gust 20, 1973, announcement of (1) a plan for a re-
structuring of its wage rates and job classifications,
(2) implementation of the plan, and (3) the possibility
of the establishment of an incentive program.
Concerning its conduct of August 20, the Respon-
dent contends that it would have been guilty of an
unfair labor practice if it had not granted the afore-
mentioned wage increases, and notes that a wage in-
crease had been promised to the employees before
the advent of the Union. However, the wage increase
which the Respondent had promised was a cost-of-
living raise which had been granted in the past to all
employees. Instead of merely continuing its policy by
granting such a raise, the Respondent departed from
the practice it had adhered to before the advent of
the Union and announced and implemented a re-
structuring of its job classifications and wage rates
which, in turn, resulted in varying wage increases
being granted to various employees during the crit-
ical preelection period. In these circumstances, we
reject the Respondent's argument that it would have
All dates hereinafter refer to 1973
been guilty of an unfair labor practice if it had not
granted the wage increases.
The Respondent also contends that if it had given
the raises to buy votes it would have given a general
increase across the board in equal amounts and
would not have omitted 25 to 30 maintenance and
machine shop employees. We reject this contention
since, from the timing and the overall effect of the
increases, it can be inferred that the Respondent's
conduct was designed to impress upon all employees
that the wage increases were forthcoming from the
Respondent without the necessity for union represen-
tation. In this regard we note that, as a result of the
implementation of the announced plan, the
Respondent's labor costs were increased by about 5
percent and that all employees, with the possible ex-
ception of one, either received wage increases or
maintained their existing salary under the new plan.
We further note that the Respondent's August 20 an-
nouncement and grant of wage increases occurred
during the critical preelection period between July 24
(when the Union filed its petition) and September 6
(when the election was held).
The Respondent further contends that it has come
forward with affirmative evidence of proper business
justification for its conduct of August 20, so that the
burden of proving union animus on the part of the
Respondent shifts to the General Counsel. Assuming
that job inequities and company growth are the
"business justifications" to which the Respondent is
referring, it should be noted that the Respondent did
not seek to remedy these "problems" until April
1973, when a new general manager was hired. By this
time, the Union's organizational effort at the
Respondent's plant had been in existence for 3
months. Employees were not notified of the fact that
the Respondent was working on the plan until a
month later, on June 29. Most importantly, the plan
was not formally announced or implemented until
August 20 (effective as of the pay period ending Au-
gust 25), so that the employees were promised and
were granted benefits by the Respondent during the
critical preelection period between July 24 (when the
Union filed its petition) and September 6 (when the
election was held). Based on the foregoing, and de-
spite the Respondent's contention that facts rather
than inferences should be the basis for the Board's
decision, we would find that inferences properly
drawn from the facts of this case support a conclu-
sion that the Respondent was motivated, at least in
part, by an antiunion purpose in announcing and
granting benefits within 2 weeks before the election.
Thus, even assuming that the burden of proof shifted
to the General Counsel, we would find that the Gen-
eral Counsel has met his burden of proof.
214 NLRB No. 90
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC.
Lastly, the Respondent contends that its August 20
announcement, that it was continuing to review the
possibility of an incentive program for its employees,
was simply a statement of fact and a reaffirmation of
its earlier announcements. In light of our foregoing
discussion concerning the Respondent's earlier an-
nouncements and in view of inferences which can be
reasonably drawn as to the overall adverse effect of
such an announcement, we reject the Respondent's
contention that its August 20 incentive program an-
nouncement did not constitute an unlawful promise
of benefit.
For the foregoing reasons, as more fully explicated
in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision herein,
we would find that the Respondent, by promising,
announcing, and granting benefits to unit employees
within the critical preelection period, violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act and substantially interfered
with the election of September 6, 1973, so that such
election should be set aside and a second election
should be conducted.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent-Employer, Styletek, Division
of Pandel-Bradford, Inc., Groveland, Massachusetts,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those allegations in the
complaint as to which no violations have been found
be, and they hereby are, dismissed.'
IT IS ALSO FURTHER ORDERED that the election held
on September 6, 1973, in Case 1-RC-12848, be, and
it hereby is, set aside, and that Case 1-RC-12848, be,
and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director
for purposes of conducting a new election.
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
CHAIRMAN MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
My dissent here is limited to disagreeing with the
Administrative Law Judge's findings adopted by the
majority that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act both by promising employees on June 29,
1973, a pay adjustment and an incentive plan, by
actually granting, on August 20, certain pay increas-
es, and by promising employees on that date further
2 In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt , pro forma, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's dismissal of allegations as to which she found no viola-
tions
737
pay increases. Consequently, I would not, as the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge recommends, set aside the
September 6, 1973, election , which the Union lost, on
the grounds that the August 20 pay increases and
promises of additional such benefits constituted ob-
jectionable preelection conduct.
A comprehensive look at the matter reveals a num-
ber of important aspects of the situation which, to be
sure , the Administrative Law Judge has noted in her
comprehensive discussion of the facts, but which, it
seems to me, have been improperly depreciated in
reaching the result here. First, it appears that in May
1972, or roughly a year before the Union came on
the scene, the Respondent promised its employees
that they would be subject to a pay increase the fol-
lowing May. This promise resulted in considerable
pressure upon management in the spring of 1973 to
do something about pay raises. Consequently, it is
clear that the Respondent's action with respect to
wages in the spring and summer of 1973 had its in-
ception, at least in part, at a time well before the
Union appeared on the scene.
Second-and I believe of more importance-is the
fact that Respondent's conduct complained of here
grew out of what were bona fide efforts to correct
certain glaring inequalities and inefficiencies that
had developed in its work force structure as a result
of extremely rapid, unguided growth over the year
preceding the changes. Thus from 1972 to 1973 the
Respondent expanded from an operation with about
50 employees to one employing around 315. This
rapid expansion resulted, as the Administrative Law
Judge has described, in various rather chaotic condi-
tions, such as some departments being on 8-hour
shifts, with others on 12-hour shifts, and weekly
schedules varying among departments. Also grade
structures were not uniform with the result that em-
ployees doing comparable work received different
pay. There is no dispute concerning the fact of this
burgeoning growth and its consequent problems.
In any event, in April the Respondent hired a new
plant manager, Foster, experienced in plant reorgani-
zations, for the purpose of reorganizing its opera-
tions. Foster undertook various studies to determine
what should be done. However, one of his first acts
was to cut back the 12-hour-shift, 4-day-a-week
schedule worked by certain employees to 3 days a
week, a change made in response to an accumulating
inventory of shoes. He also announced during the
April-May period that job descriptions were being
rewritten and that the whole plant was to be put on a
6-day week of three shifts a day. Both the actual and
proposed changes created considerable employee op-
position and concern because some of the employees
felt the changes would limit their free time and also
738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
result in a loss of overtime premium pay. Foster told
employees at one point that pay raises and incentives
were under study to make up for lost overtime. Then
on June 29, after various changes had been made, he
posted a notice stating that further changes were un-
der consideration, that there would be a continuing
review of job descriptions, labor grades, and incen-
tives, and that management hoped that its efforts
would "eliminate any inequities that presently exist."
In considering the reorganization up to July 1, if it
is assumed that the changes made and proposed were
intended to frustrate the Union's organizing efforts-
an assumption that seems to underlie the majority's
position-then the fact that Respondent selected a
number of changes, the prospects or institution of
which created considerable employee alarm and dis-
satisfaction, is wholly anamalous. If, however, as Re-
spondent contends, those changes were related not to
winning over employee support but to the effective
reorganization of the plant, there is, of course, no
such anomaly. To be sure , certain proposed wage
changes and a promise to look into the feasibility of
an incentive plan do seem to have been intended to
decrease employee concern, but it was a concern de-
riving in part from the promise of a year earlier to
consider pay increases and in part to make the need-
ed reorganization more acceptable-both being rea-
sonable and legal business reasons. In short, the
changes and promises made by the Respondent up
until at least July 1 seem to be related not to union
activity but to its need to reorganize its operations
because of the problems created by the unusual
growth over the previous year.
There remains for consideration the August 20 pay
raise and announcement of future increases . It is im-
portant to note that we do not have here an across-
the-board increase either in percentage or absolute
amounts such as would be expected if designed to
gain the support of all employees. Rather, it appears
one employee at least received no increase while
others received varying amounts, and the resultant
disparate treatment of the employees would seem,
predictably, to cause as much internal annoyance
and dissatisfaction as support. But this kind of wage
adjustment is wholly consistent with the require-
ments of the reorganization of Respondent's rate
structure and the reclassification of employees within
the structure for purposes unrelated to the union
campaign. And, of course, such is the Respondent's
asserted reason for the raises. There is evidence to
support that claim and none to undermine it-except
the question of timing.
With respect to the timing, the Administrative Law
Judge stated that the Respondent failed to show
"any adequate reason why the increases had to be
announced and granted" when they were. It may be
that there was no inescapable reason why the August
20 action could not have been delayed until Septem-
ber 20 or, for that matter, even longer. But the ques-
tion, in my view, is not whether the action could have
been taken at some other time-of course it could-
but rather whether it was improper and unlawful to
take it at the time it was taken. That conclusion can
be drawn only if Respondent's reasons for the timing
are not supported, and appear pretextual, so that the
timing must be deemed to have been for an unlawful
purpose.
On that point, the Respondent contends that it
completed its review and revisions of its rates and
wage categories in August and, thus, the time had
come in the overall reorganization for announcing
the new wage structure to go with such revisions. As
for promises of additional raises, they come down to
nothing more than an explanation of how the then
adopted "new structure" would operate and a state-
ment that the Company was still considering the pos-
sibility of an incentive plan-a matter it had first
mentioned to employees in April or May. There is
nothing implausible about the Respondent's posi-
tion. The time lapses between the beginning of the
reorganization and August 20 or between the June 29
announcement and August 20 were certainly not un-
reasonable or patently contrived in view of the many
changes taken into consideration, worked out, and
actually made. In these circumstances there is no re-
alistic basis for concluding that the timing of the Au-
gust 20 changes was based on the Union's organiza-
tional calendar rather than on the requirements of
Respondent's plant reorganization.
Thus, when the situation is viewed in its totality,
Respondent's conduct is, in my view, shown to have
been a response to the promise of a review of wages
made in May 1972 and to the mounting work force
problems created by its explosive 1972-73 growth. Its
conduct is fully and reasonably explained in such
terms; while an explanation in terms of an intent to
defeat the Union ignores those facts and leaps in-
stead at a conclusion which seems to me to be, essen-
tially, an assumption of guilt not proven in this re-
cord. I would find that the General Counsel has
failed to show that the changes complained of were
made for unlawful reasons and, thus, has not shown
that the Respondent in making such changes violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' Also in view of the fore-
going, I would find that the August 20 acts and con-
duct did not constitute objectionable preelection
conduct. Thus, I would certify the results of the elec-
tion.
3 Compare my partial dissent in Tommy's Spanish Foods, Inc, 187 NLRB
235 at 237 (1970)
DECISION
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ANNE F. SCHLEZINGER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges and amended charges filed in Case 1-CA-9148 on
June 14, July 2, July 16, and August 1, 1973.' and charges
filed in Case 1-CA-9266 on August 10, by Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local No.
437 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, referred to
herein as the Charging Party or the Union, the General
Counsel, by the Regional Director for Region I (Boston,
Massachusetts ), issued an Order Consolidating Cases,
Complaint and Notice of Hearing on October 3, and an
amendment thereto on November 9. The complaint as
amended alleges in substance that Styletek, Division of
Pandel-Bradford, Inc.,2 herein called the Respondent, by
named supervisors on specified dates, interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights by various acts and conduct including un-
lawful interrogation, surveillance of union activities, pro-
mulgation of an unlawful rule prohibiting union activities
at any time on company property, and promising and
granting benefits to induce employees to refrain from
union activities ; discriminatorily terminated employees
Parents and Cook on June 13 and August 8, respectively;
and by such conduct violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4)
of the Act. The Respondent, in its answer duly filed, ad-
mits some of the factual allegations of the complaint but
denies the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
The Acting Regional Director for Region I on Novem-
ber 9 issued a Report on Objections in Case 1-RC-12848,
in which he stated that certain objections filed by the
Union to an election held on September 6, pursuant to a
petition filed on July 24 and a Stipulation for Certification
Upon Consent Election, raised some of the same issues as
those involved in the unfair labor practice proceeding and
could best be resolved after a hearing. On November 23, he
issued a Further Order Consolidating Cases in which he
consolidated Case 1-RC-12848 with the above-numbered
complaint cases, and the Board, by Order dated December
3, directed that these objections be processed in accord
with the Further Order Consolidating Cases.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in this consolidat-
ed proceeding before the Administrative Law Judge at
Haverhill, Massachusetts, on January 22, 23, and 24, 1974.
All parties appeared at the hearing and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross- examine
witnesses , and to introduce relevant evidence. The parties
at the close of the hearing waived oral argument. Subse-
quent to the hearing, the General Counsel and the Respon-
dent, on or about February 25, 1974, filed briefs which
have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
I All dates hereinafter refer to 1973 unless otherwise indicated
2 The name of the Respondent -Employer appears as it was corrected at
the hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
739
The Respondent is, and at all times material herein has
been, a corporation duly organized under and existing by
virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Respondent maintains its principal office and place of
business in Groveland, Massachusetts, the only operation
of the Respondent involved in this proceeding, where it is
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of unit
soles and heels and platforms for shoes. In the course and
conduct of its business operations, the Respondent annual-
ly purchases and receives goods valued at more than
$50,000 from points and places outside the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, and sells and ships goods valued at more
than $50,000 to points and places outside the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. The complaint alleges, the Re-
spondent admits, and I find that the Respondent is en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
[I. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the Respondent in its answer ad-
mits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Principal Issues
The union organizing campaign among the
Respondent's employees began in late February. The peti-
tion for an election was filed on July 24, and the election
held on September 6. During this period, the operation of
the Respondent's plant, which had grown considerably,
was being extensively reorganized under the supervision of
Foster, who was employed by the Respondent as its gener-
al manager in April to take charge of this reorganization.
The principal issues herein are whether employee Cook
quit his job or was constructively discharged because of his
union activities; whether employee Parents, who quit his
job, was denied the opportunity to withdraw his resigna-
tion when he sought to do so because he demanded a par-
ticular job which was unavailable, or because he engaged
in protected concerted activities and filed charges; whether
or not the Respondent engaged in the incidents of interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion alleged in the complaint; and
whether or not the Respondent engaged in conduct that
warrants the setting aside of the election, which the Union
lost.
B. Employee Terminations
1. Harold Parents
Parents was employed by the Respondent on January
31, 1973, as a machine operator in the unit sole depart-
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment, which was at that time working two 12-hour shifts, 4
days a week. He was on the second shift which ran from 7
p.m. to 7 a.m. Parents was, as the Respondent states in its
brief, "a good worker," and within a few months received
two wage increases, which brought his rate from $2.75 to
$3.05 an hour. In addition, he was paid overtime for work
over 8 hours a day and a shift differential, and he occasion-
ally worked an additional shift when extra help was need-
ed.
On a date in early May, Parents and the approximately
19 employees on his shift were asked to stay after work.
Dodge, superintendent of the department, and Williamson,
personnel manager at that time, told the group about a
company plan to change from the 12-hour shift and 4-day
week to an 8-hour shift for 5 or 6 days a week, depending
on the amount of work available. Parents asked if there
would be a change in pay. Dodge said an incentive plan
was under study. The employees protested that they pre-
ferred their present schedule, many of them talking at the
same time, with Parents the most vocal one in the group.
Dodge suggested that the group elect a spokesman, and
Parents, the only one named by the employees, was elected
by voice vote.
Parents testified that he was told there would be meet-
ings with management in about 2 weeks, that he should
make a list of employee complaints to discuss at such meet-
ings, and that nothing would be held against those making
complaints or their spokesman. Parents had a meeting with
his group, who took the position that they wanted to con-
tinue on their present schedule. When Parents had not
heard anything about a meeting after 2 weeks, he went to
see Williamson, who took him to the office of plant manag-
er Paterson. Dodge was called in also. Parents related what
the employees had indicated they wanted, and mentioned
specifically a list of holidays posted on the bulletin board
and continuation of the 12-hour shift schedule. Parents tes-
tified that Paterson said there was a problem of an accu-
mulated backlog of shoes so a change in shifts had to be
made; that Parents asked to have the company representa-
tives explain this to the employees rather than have him do
it; that they agreed, and asked Parents to have the employ-
ees stay after their shift; that he did so, and a meeting was
held, on a date he could not recall but thought was proba-
bly near the end of May; that Dodge explained the reasons
why the operation had to go on 3 days a week because of
the backlog of products, and later would have to go on an
8-hour day, and said a man was being brought in to set up
an incentive program; that Parents asked if the incentive
program and shift change would occur at the same time to
compensate for the loss of overtime pay; and that Dodge
replied that they would be in conjunction. When employ-
ees at the meeting asked if they would get advance notice
of any change in shift schedules, they were told they would.
Nevertheless, the next time they came in to work on Fri-
day, June 1, a notice was posted beside the timeclock that
they were on a 3-day week as of then. Parents testified that
he asked the employees what they wanted to do; that the
employees wanted to shut down their machines and meet
in the cafeteria for someone to give them some answers,
and did shut down about 9 p.m.; that he informed Booth-
royd, a foreman , who said he would ask a supervisor to talk
to them; that a night supervisor whose name Parents could
not recall came in and told them to go back to work and,
when they did not, called Dodge to come in from home;
and that the first thing Dodge said was that he had been
advised by Paterson that no one was to be discharged. Par-
ents also testified that Dodge said he would talk only to
Parents as the spokesman for that shift, but Parents re-
sponded that all of them had a right to know what was
going on and should stay, and there was no further com-
ment about this. Parents admitted that Dodge "explained a
lot of things"; that he did not remember the explanation
but Dodge might have said there was a big backlog of
completed work; that, "To be very blunt," Dodge also
"threatened us, that, if we didn't go back to work, we
didn't have to come back to work the next day"; that they
demanded to see Paterson, and Dodge called Paterson in
from home; that, when Paterson arrived, he had the em-
ployees assemble in his office, and explained that the back-
log of products required the shift change and that, if they
went back to work, he would arrange a meeting on Mon-
day with Foster, the general manager, who could not be
reached that night; and that Parents then asked the em-
ployees if they wanted to go back to work, they did, and
they resumed work after a shutdown of about 2 hours.
Parents testified that, although Paterson on Friday had
invited the entire group to meet with Foster on Monday,
June 4, only Parents and two other employees showed up,
and that both he and Foster said they were disappointed
that so few came. Parents also testified that Foster ex-
plained the change to 3 days because of the backlog of
shoes, said there would be a later change to an 8-hour day,
and said the Company was working on an incentive system
but did not say there would be a pay adjustment when the
change was made to an 8-hour day. He also testified that
the employees had not been told at this time about the
change to an 8-hour day, that only he and the two other
employees at the meeting with Foster knew of it, and that
he did not, after he was told, tell the others about it. Par-
ents was unhappy, as he testified, about the proposal of
12-hour shifts for 3 days as it would reduce his earnings
about $40 a week, and about the proposal of 8-hour shifts
for 5 or 6 days as this would give him less time to spend
with his family and also would reduce his earnings about
$40 a week, because of the loss of overtime pay, unless the
incentive program balanced this loss. He therefore an-
nounced that he would give notice he was quitting because
of the reduction in his earnings if the change was made to
either three 12-hour days or six 8-hour days without a
change in pay. On his next workday, about June 6, Parents
gave Boothroyd 2 weeks' notice that he was quitting.
Jones, who worked the same shift hours as Parents but
on different days, testified, as a witness for the General
Counsel, that his group also had meetings at which Dodge
explained the forthcoming shift changes; that Dodge men-
tioned changes in wage rates and an incentive program,
and suggested election of a representative to take com-
plaints to the office; that he was elected by secret ballot;
that his shift came in one day early in June to find another
group working because there had been a change with no
notice; that Dodge gave each of them the option of leaving
and getting 4 hours' pay or staying and working that shift;
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC
that , when they came in a few days later and found notice
of another shift change that evening, the entire area closed
down and went to the cafeteria for a meeting , and the shop
was closed down until about 11 : 30 that night ; that Dodge
came in and spoke to them, and set up a meeting with
Foster for the next morning ; and that the entire shift met
the next morning with Foster , who explained the changes
in shifts , said a pay raise and incentives were under study
to make up for lost overtime pay, and asserted , in answer-
ing employee questions , that the 6-day, 8 -hour week would
be mandatory , and that those who could not work 6 days
could not take a voluntary layoff but had to quit . Jones as
a spokesman discussed employee problems with Dodge
two or three times. He was also active in the union organiz-
ing campaign. When the change to an 8 -hour shift was
made in June , Jones went on the third shift.
Parents and other employees occasionally worked an ex-
tra shift when there was work available because of absen-
teeism . Parents did so on the day shift on June 8 with the
permission of Durkee , the day shift foreman , who had
cleared it with Dodge. On that date a memo from Foster to
the unit sole department announced that certain areas of
the plant would go on a 6-day 8-hour workweek , effective
Sunday, June 17, with the pay scale to be adjusted upwards
in stated amounts for the machine operators , and listing
the employee names for each of the three shifts. This memo
had been circulated previously and the employees polled
about their shift preferences . Parents testified that he was
not polled as he had submitted his resignation, that he no-
ticed the memo provided for a wage increase that would
"fully compensate" him for the change from a 12-hour to
an 8-hour day , and that after seeing this he decided to try
to withdraw his resignation . The polling as to employee
shift preferences had by then been completed.
Parents testified that he first spoke to Durkee 3 about
staying on the job , that Durkee said he would take it up
with Dodge , that Parents asked Durkee to see if Dodge
would talk to him, that Dodge came to his machine, and
that he told Dodge he gave his notice only because of the
pay difference and would like to stay as the rates were
being increased. Parents testified further that Dodge said
he "was not able to make that decision, he'd have to go and
check . He wasn 't authorized to hire anybody back who had
been laid off or fired . . . . He was supposed to have called
me . . . [t]he following day, before dinnertime ." Dodge ad-
mitted in his testimony that Durkee told him Parents
"wanted to change his mind about something to that effect,
that he wanted to talk to me about the shift change," but
then denied that Durkee said Parents "expressed a desire
to speak to" Dodge , that he spoke to Parents at his ma-
chine , and that there was any such conversation as Parents
described . Dodge asserted that he told Durkee there was
nothing he could do because Parents had given notice and
the matter had been turned over to personnel.' In later
conversations with Williamson , the personnel manager,
3 Durkee was not called as a witness
A notice had been sent to the personnel office notifying it that Parents
had voluntarily resigned and given 2 weeks ' notice , and an employee status
form to this effect was prepared and signed by Williamson , Dodge, and an
accounting employee
741
however , Williamson indicated he had to check with
Dodge , and there is evidence that other employees left
their jobs and were rehired by Dodge as well as by other
supervisory personnel.
Dodge testified that his next conversation about Parents
occurred when Williamson told him Parents wanted to re-
turn to work on a third -shift job; that he told Williamson
the only possible opening was on the first shift ; that Wil-
liamson later told him Parents rejected a job on the first
shift as he would lose too much money ; and that Wil-
liamson later asked if Parents should work out the remain-
der of the 2 weeks ' notice, and he replied that Parents
should.
As noted above , Parents testified that Dodge was sup-
posed to call him the next day. He also testified that, when
he did not hear from Dodge, he called the plant to talk to
Dodge ; that Dodge was not available but he spoke with
Williamson ; that he said he wanted to retract his resigna-
tion and return to work , and Williamson "was going to call
me and let me know what information he had got from Mr.
Dodge . And then there began a sequence of telephone calls
" Williamson called Parents back , as Parents further
testified , and told me that I could come back to work, but
that I'd have to come back on the first shift . . . . I told
him that I'd be losing money coming on the first. And I
said that if I had to take first , that I would take it. But I
would prefer to go to third , and would he check and find
out if it would be possible for me to stay on the third."
Williamson said he would check with Dodge and call Par-
ents again.
Boothroyd testified that Parents asked whom to see
about withdrawing his resignation but, when it was sug-
gested that he see Dodge or Paterson , Parents said that was
too much bother. Parents denied any such conversation.
Boothroyd also testified that, at the time Parents asked to
withdraw his resignation , there were no vacancies on the
third shift, and Parents was so told. Parents admitted he
was offered a first-shift job but denied that he was ever
told there were no vacancies on the third shift Williamson
denied that Parents ever indicated a willingness to take a
first-shift job , and Dodge testified that Williamson never
told him Parents was willing to go on the first shift.
The General Counsel showed, from company records,
that there were changes in the composition of the third
shift as one man died, others were terminated , and there
were personnel transfers . The Respondent maintains that
the third shift was nevertheless overstaffed as some depart-
ments did not operate a third shift . Furthermore, many
employees desired this shift, as did Parents , because of the
pay differential. And the record does not show whether
some of the apparent vacancies were permanent or tempo-
rary, nor whether Parents had a better claim for the third-
shift jobs to which other employees were transferred during
this period.
Parents testified that Williamson , in one of their tele-
phone conversations , mentioned a problem with the Union
and asked Parents for his opinion , and that Parents replied
that he had no opinion , he had not worked for or against it,
and he had not brought it up to people on his shift. Wil-
liamson admitted that he told Parents the plant was having
union problems. He testified , however, that he did not con-
742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sider Parents involved in such problems , that he did not
ask about Parents' union views, that it was Parents who
asked if his failure to get a third-shift job was because
management believed him to be prounion , and that Wil-
liamson denied this was so and refused to discuss the sub-
ject further.
Parents also testified that , in one of the telephone con-
versations with Williamson , "I told him that , if I couldn't
go to third shift , go back to my third shift , that I was going
to go to the Labor Board and find out if I could do any-
thing.... He told me to do it, if that 's what I had to do,
to go ahead ." Parents then , as he further testified , "called
the State Labor Board and about three or four other places
and finally I ended up calling the shop steward on another
shift . And he in turn told me to get a hold of Bob . . .
DeRusha," the union representative . Parents did so, and
the charges that the Union had filed were amended, on or
about July 16, to allege that the Respondent , on or about
June 12 , refused to allow Parents' continued employment
because of his protected concerted activity of June 1.
At the end of the first week of Parents ' 2 weeks' notice,
he went in to pick up his check , 5 but was told by the recep-
tionist she did not have one for him . Parents testified that
he insisted he had been dismissed and wanted his check;
that he was directed to see Williamson ; that he told Wil-
liamson he was there to get his check ; that Williamson said
he did not know Parents gave a 2 weeks' notice ; and that
Williamson left the office and, when he came back, said
Parents should work out the second week of his notice and
also "said , let me see what I can do about having you
reinstated ." According to Parents ' further testimony, this
started another series of telephone calls until in one of
them Williamson finally "said, work out your notice, and
he said Guy Dodge had said he didn 't want the hassle of it
anymore , so dust work out my notice , and that was it... .
this was the last phone call that we had when I was dis-
charged-and he said that the reason that they were unable
to reinstate me was that they had received the charge from
the Labor Board , and I told him that that was no problem
because the charge was only there because I couldn't work
third shift . If I could work third shift , I would withdraw the
charge. . . . And he said , forget it , because Mr. Dodge
didn't want the hassle."
Williamson testified that when he told Parents the
charge had been received , he also told Parents it was in the
hands of the company attorney and there was nothing
more he could do in the matter . He denied any reference to
Dodge not wanting the "hassle."
On October 2, Barbara Coupe, then the personnel man-
ager of the Respondent , telephoned and sent a confirming
letter to Parents offering him "recall from lay off to your
job as Gesta Machine Operator , assigned to the third shift,
to commence as soon as you can, but no later than October
17, 1973." The Union wrote Coupe a letter , signed by Par-
ents, stating that the reference to his having been laid off
was "a gross misrepresentation of fact . As you know per
our conversation I was discharged, and charges have been
filed with the N .L.R.B. as a result of same . Also you did
5 Checks were distnbuted at the plant or employees could , as Parents
frequently did, come in and pick them up
not mention the part of our conversation regarding the
other aspects of my discharge , loss of pay , benefits , senior-
ity, as well as reinstatement."
The General Counsel's brief urges that , while it is not
contended that Parents engaged in union activity , the Re-
spondent refused to reinstate him because of his "militant
leadership role on behalf of the employees on his shift who
had selected him by acclamation as their spokesman, and,
for the further reason that he had filed a Charge with the
Board," and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the
Act. The Respondent contends that Parents insisted, after
submitting his resignation , that he be given a job on the
third shift , that he rejected the offer of a job on the first
shift, and that there were no jobs available on the third
shift at that time.
Concluding Findings as to Parents
It is undisputed that Parents had not engaged in any
union activity , and that he voluntarily announced he
would quit and submitted his resignation with 2 weeks'
notice . It is also undisputed that the Respondent was aware
of his selection as spokesman for his group . Dodge had
suggested that a spokesman be selected , and management
representatives were present when Parents was chosen
unanimously . Other departments, however , also had desig-
nated employee spokesmen in accord with a longstanding
practice in the Respondent 's plant. In his role as a spokes-
man, Parents met with his group , and he sought and was
granted a meeting with management representatives at
which he presented the views of his group . There was no
criticism of this action of Parents . When the reasons for
making shift changes were presented to Parents , he did not,
as a spokesman , in turn convey them to the employees, but
asked that they be presented to the employees directly.
Again the management representatives , without any criti-
cism , acceded to his request . At this meeting Parents, and
other employees also, expressed opinions and asked ques-
tions. When the employees came in and found the schedule
changed from 4 to 3 days without advance notice, they
agreed they would shut down , hold a meeting , and demand
some answers. There is no evidence that Parents urged this
course of conduct, or that the Respondent believed he did
so. When Dodge came in and said he would talk to Parents
as the spokesman for the group , Parents said all had a right
to know what was going on and should stay, and the sub-
ject of Parents acting as the group 's spokesman was
dropped . After Paterson came in and told the group Foster
was unavailable that evening but would meet with them on
Monday, all agreed to go back to work . There is no evi-
dence that Parents encouraged or discouraged their doing
so, or that the management representatives believed that he
did. Finally, at the meeting with Foster on Monday, at
which only three employees were present , both Parents and
Foster expressed disappointment at the absence of the
other employees who had been invited to attend. There is
no indication that Parents at this meeting was acting as the
spokesman of the group , nor that he or Foster considered
him to be the spokesman . It was at this meeting that he
announced he was going to quit because he understood the
shift changes would reduce his earnings . He did not cause
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC.
anyone else to quit, and there is no evidence that he at-
tempted to do so. I find, on the record as a whole, that,
while Parents was a more outspoken and articulate individ-
ual than some of the other employees , he did not exercise a
"militant leadership role on behalf of the employees on his
shift," that he served as a group spokesman and partici-
pated in protected concerted activities to no greater extent
than did some other employees , that the Respondent
showed no resentment of these activities , and that the alle-
gation that Parents was denied reemployment on this
ground is not supported by the evidence.
The General Counsel also contends that Parents, while
indicating he preferred the third shift because of the pay
differential, agreed to take the first shift if necessary. Par-
ents' own testimony shows, however , that Williamson, after
checking with Dodge, offered him a job on the first shift,
and that he urged Williamson to find out if he could "stay
on the third." Further, a first-shift job would have meant a
reduction in his earnings , which was what caused him to
resign in the first place . In view of Williamson 's offer of a
job on the first shift , the fact Williamson was checking with
Dodge on these questions , and all the relevant evidence, I
do not credit Parents' testimony that Dodge came to talk
to him at his machine before the termination of his notice
period and told him, in response to the request to withdraw
his resignation , that Dodge was not authorized to rehire
someone laid off or fired, but would call him the next day.
Parents did not indicate why Dodge was to call him; Par-
ents had not been laid off or fired; the record indicates that
Dodge did have and had exercised authority to rehire;
Dodge denied that any such conversation occurred; and,
when Parents later called the plant, as he testified, Wil-
liamson "was going to call me and let me know what infor-
mation he had got from Mr. Dodge ." Moreover , while the
General Counsel showed that there were changes in per-
sonnel on the third shift , some of those changes were due
to transfers of department personnel, and there is no show-
ing that Parents was entitled to the particular job in prefer-
ence to any of the employees transferred. In addition, the
Respondent maintains , and the record indicates, that it was
for some time overstaffed on the third shift as some depart-
ments did not operate a third shift, and many employees
sought jobs on that shift because of the pay differential. I
find , on all the relevant evidence , that Parents did not indi-
cate willingness to work on the first shift, and that the
Respondent did not refuse to give him a first -shift job.
I find further that the evidence does not establish that
Parents was denied reinstatement because he had filed a
charge with the Board. It was after he told Williamson he
would file a charge and went in to get his check that Wil-
liamson, as Parents testified, said he would see what he
could do about getting Parents reinstated. The evidence
indicates rather , and I find , that Parents was using the
charge as a lever to force the Respondent not only to take
him back but to give him a job on the third shift .6 As
Parents testified, "I told him [Williamson] that, if I
couldn't go to third shift, go back to my third shift, that I
was going to go to the Labor Board and find out if I could
6 See Independent Printing Company, Inc, 206 NLRB 170 (1973)
743
do anything." and that, in "the last phone call that we had
when I was discharged-and he said that the reason that
they were unable to reinstate me was that they had re-
ceived the charge from the Labor Board, and I told him
that that was no problem because the charge was only
there because I couldn't work third shift. If I could work
third shift, I would withdraw the charge." I find further
that Williamson 's position was not that the Respondent
would rehire Parents had he not filed a charge, but that the
matter was in the hands of the Respondent 's attorney and
would have to be determined by someone other than Wil-
liamson .' Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has
not established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Respondent discriminatonly failed and refused to re-
hire Parents . I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the
allegations of the complaint that the Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act.
2. Richard Cook
Cook was employed by the Respondent on December 2,
1972, as a machine operator on the first shift . He initiated
the union organizing campaign at the Respondent 's plant
in late February 1973, and was thereafter openly active in
the campaign . He wore a union button , and he distributed
union cards and campaign literature in the plant before
and after work and during his lunch and break periods.
The following notice, dated March 1 and addressed to
all employees, was posted by the Respondent on the plant
bulletin boards:
We have heard that a union is trying to get you to sign
cards. It is our feeling that a union is not in your best
interest , and that they may try to use these authoriza-
tion cards to force recognition without a National La-
bor Relations Board election.
Be extremely cautious. If you read the card carefully,
you will notice you are authorizing the union to act for
you as signed . This card is not a request for an election
as the union has deliberately misrepresented it to be.
If you sign, you just may find yourself as part of this
group against your will and better judgement [sic].
Cook testified that Dodge passed this notice out to the
employees and later asked employees to sign a copy show-
ing they had read and understood it. No other employee
testified that the notice was distributed or that he was
asked to sign it . Dodge denied that he circulated the notice
and that employees were asked to sign it, and asserted that
the only notice employees were asked to sign was one cir-
culated by a foreman about 2 months earlier pertaining to
plant cleanliness , which notice was placed in evidence by
the Respondent.
Cook testified that on or about March 2 Dodge asked
him if he was the one passing out union literature; that,
when he admitted it, Dodge asked if he had the union
cards; that he said he did and that, in fact, some of these
7 Cf New Vision Display, Inc, 208 NLRB 127 (1974).
744 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cards were at the time protruding out of a back pocket;
that Dodge then said he should not be passing out these
cards on company property ; that he replied that he thought
he should be able to do so on coffeebreaks and lunch hour;
and that he did not remember whether Dodge said any-
thing further . Dodge denied that he told Cook not to dis-
tribute union materials on company property, and main-
tained that he told Cook only that he should not do so on
company time . Cook continued his distribution and other
activity on behalf of the Union, and admitted that neither
Dodge nor any other supervisor ever spoke to him again
about his distribution of union cards.
In March or April, Dodge called Cook to Paterson's of-
fice, and brought in coffee for all three . Cook was offered
an opportunity to be an assistant foreman and to train to
become a foreman. Cook accepted the job, which meant an
increase in grade and salary. He continued to work on the
first shift . He also continued his union organizing activi-
ties.
On or about May 7, Cook was asked if he wanted to
transfer temporarily to the chlorination department on the
second shift to replace the foreman , Panneton , who was ill.
Cook accepted . There was no increase in his wage rate, but
his earnings increased because of the shift differential.
Cook testified that during this period he possessed and ex-
ercised supervisory authority. Cook continued his activities
on behalf of the Union while holding this position.
During this period, Cook testified, he attended a union
meeting on June 15 which was announced by a notice post-
ed on the bulletin board in the cafeteria and by handbilling
outside the plant He testified that just before that date he
had gone to see Kamberelis , a foreman , about an
employee's pay, and saw a handwritten note on Kamberel-
is' desk in the personnel office instructing Kamberelis to go
to the union hall to see who was there and how many.
Cook also testified that he and a number of other employ-
ees saw Kamberelis drive by the union hall before the
meeting that night ; that Dodge the following day asked
him who was there and how successful he thought the
Union would be in organizing the plant, to which Cook
replied it was up to those who were at the meeting to iden-
tify themselves, and that he did not know what would hap-
pen; and that the next evening Kamberelis asked him the
same questions as Dodge had. Cook also testified that, af-
ter a union meeting on June 23, Kamberelis asked him how
many attended, who they were, and from which depart-
ments, to which Cook responded only that they were from
different departments.
Cook admitted he had a poor memory for dates, and was
able to describe when meetings were held only after being
shown the dates set forth in his pretrial affidavit . He also
had a poor memory for other matters apparently, and, af-
ter being shown his affidavit, changed his testimony to
state that both Dodge and Kamberelis asked him not who
attended the June 15 meeting but how many, and whether
Cook thought the Union would get in. Further, Kamberelis
denied that he ever received a note such as the one Cook
testified was on Kamberelis ' desk , denied that he had a
desk, and denied that he had access to a desk in the person-
nel office , which was kept locked at night. He also testified
that his route to work on the second shift took him every
day past the Elks Hall, where the union meetings were
held.
The plant closed for vacation the first 2 weeks in July.
Panneton returned to work on or about July 16 , when the
plant resumed operations . Cook was then told by Dodge
and Williamson , the personnel manager , that he could go
back to his job as an assistant foreman and setup man in
the molding department on the second shift , which would
result in a reduction in his pay, or on the third shift, which
with the shift differential would result in the same wage
rate. Cook chose the third shift . Shortly after his return to
this position , Cook was out sick for about a week. He re-
turned on a Monday in late July. The third-shift operation
was unusually busy at this time, as well as shorthanded
because of absences , and problems had arisen with ma-
chines breaking down and work products of unsatisfactory
quality. Boothroyd was the foreman of this operation.
Cook, Cote, and Beauregard were classified as assistant
foremen and setup men. There were also machine opera-
tors and two floorboys . The duties of an assistant foreman
and set up man are to take care of the repair and mainte-
nance of machines . The operators operate the machines.
The floorboys do the sweeping and keep the machines
filled with materials. Among those absent at this time was
one of the two floorboys. Cook admitted that the work
requires two floorboys , and that someone had to fill in for
the one who was absent . Cook also testified that the usual
practice would have been for a machine operator to be
assigned to floorboy duties and an assistant foreman to be
assigned to operate machines , but that in this situation he
was designated by Boothroyd to do floorboy work each
night. Cook was indefinite as to how many nights this con-
tinued but the record indicates it was four nights.
Boothroyd, Cote, and Beauregard testified , as witnesses
for the Respondent , that, during the chaotic situation of
the four nights in question, Boothroyd filled in wherever
needed , including some floorboy duties ; that Cote, as the
senior assistant foreman , continued to perform setup work;
that Beauregard , who had a little less seniority than Cook,
worked as a machine operator ; and that Cook was given a
choice each of the four nights of working as a machine
operator or floorboy , and Beauregard would have had to
serve in whichever of these jobs was then available, but
Cook each night chose the floorboy work on the ground
that it was easier than operating a machine . Boothroyd
could not recall , however, that he asked the machine oper-
ators to do floorboy work before assigning it to Cook.
These temporary shifts of assignments did not affect
Cook's wage rate , which had increased from his hire of
$2 44 an hour to $3 73 an hour at this time , his last increase
having been received on June 17
Cook complained to Jones, the employee spokesman re-
ferred to above, about his repeated assignments to floorboy
work. Jones, who testified that Cook was very upset, tried
to calm him down, and urged him to go back to work and
wait for the Union to organize the plant. Jones, however,
did not transmit Cook's complaint to any management
representative. Cook testified that he also complained to
Dodge, who told him these assignments were Boothroyd's
responsibility. Dodge denied that he had any such conver-
sation. Cook admittedly did not complain to Boothroyd
STYLETEK, DIV OF PANDEL -BRADFORD, INC.
about these floorboy assignments . Cook testified that these
duties were assigned to him the first night he returned at
the end of July; that "I worked on either one or two other
nights before I finally got sick of working floor and I
walked . . . . It was three or four nights that I was there
.... About four o'clock in the morning , the morning I
got down there-I think it was the third-I just got sick of
doing the floorboy's job while the other two assistant fore-
men were sitting down . One was running a machine. And I
went up and picked up my time card, punched it out, wrote
`self-terminated ' across it, and walked out of the building."
He put the card on Boothroyd 's desk while Boothroyd was
not there , and left the plant . When Boothroyd saw the card
on his desk , Cook had left. Cook told no one at the plant of
his intention to leave , and has never asked the Respondent
if he could return to his job.
The General Counsel contends that Cook was construc-
tively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act . The Respondent maintains that Cook chose the
floorboy work in preference to that of a machine operator,
and then quit voluntarily when he marked his timecard
"self-terminated" and walked out during a shift with no
notice to the Respondent.
Concluding Findings as to Cook
While Cook impressed me as a credible witness striving
to describe truthfully what had occurred as best he could
recall it, he had a poor memory for dates , as he admitted,
and for other specific details, as shown by his testimony. I
find that Cook's testimony and the record as a whole do
not sustain the General Counsel 's contention that the Re-
spondent promoted Cook to the position of assistant fore-
man as a maneuver to dissuade Cook from his union activi-
ties, of which the Respondent was at the time aware. There
is no evidence of any remark or action by the Respondent
to indicate this was its purpose . Moreover , although Cook
continued his activities on behalf of the Union after receiv-
ing this promotion , he was thereafter given the opportunity
to substitute for an absent foreman on the second shift,
with the supervisory authority of a foreman , and with his
pay increased as a result of the shift differential . Cook con-
tinued his union activities during the more than 2 months
he held this position . Nevertheless , when the absent fore-
man returned , Cook was offered a choice of returning to
his assistant foreman status on the second or third shift,
and chose the third because he would retain the same wage
rate as a result of the shift differential . I do not believe the
Respondent continued to offer these employment advan-
tages to Cook over a period of months to discourage his
union activities when in fact he continued those activities
after each change in his status.
With regard to Cook' s assignment to floorboy work on
the four nights that a floorboy was absent , I do not credit
the testimony of Boothroyd, Cote, and Beauregard that
Cook was given a choice each of the four nights and chose
the floorboy assignment . I found Boothroyd an evasive,
self-contradictory witness, and the testimony of the other
two unimpressive and contrived. Moreover , it appears un-
likely that Cook , an assistant foreman and setup man, who
had recently served for months as a foreman , a job on the
745
same level as that of Boothroyd, would voluntarily choose
on four consecutive nights to work as a floorboy , a position
two steps below that of an assistant foreman and one step
below that of a machine operator . I find , therefore, on the
basis of all the relevant evidence , that Cook was directed
on each of the four nights to do the floorboy work, and
that he found these assignments demeaning.
On the other hand , I find that the record as a whole
shows that the department was at that time in a state of
considerable confusion . Various individuals , including
Boothroyd , were performing other than their usual duties.
The record does not show that Boothroyd assigned the
floorboy duties to Cook because of Cook' s union activities
or for a reason totally unrelated to such activities . The re-
cord likewise does not show that the Respondent saw, in
the circumstance of a floorboy's absence on four consecu-
tive nights , an opportunity to force Cook to quit, or as-
signed the work to Cook in order to force him to quit, or
could reasonably have foreseen that Cook would quit if
given these assignments . Furthermore , Cook did not recall
how many nights he was assigned the floorboy work He
admitted that he did not complain to Boothroyd , who was
making the assignments , about the matter . He also admit-
ted that he did not tell Boothroyd or anyone else he was
quitting that night , but merely marked his card "self-termi-
nated" and walked out during his shift . Accordingly, on
the record as a whole , I find that the evidence does not
establish that the Respondent constructively discharged
Cook in violation of the Act , and I shall therefore recom-
mend dismissal of the allegations of the complaint that the
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.8
C. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
(1) Cook testified that Dodge, shortly after the union
activity was initiated by Cook , asked Cook if he was the
one distributing union materials and if he had union cards,
and, when Cook admitted this, said he should not be pass-
ing out union cards on company property, to which Cook
responded that he thought he could do so on his own time.
Dodge testified that the conversation did not occur as de-
scribed by Cook, that the only conversation about passing
out cards was when he saw cards sticking out of Cook's
pocket and "I told him he couldn't pass them out on com-
pany time. . . . Exact words, I think I told him, I said,
`you'll get in trouble if you pass them out on company
time .' " He also testified that nothing was said about Cook
passing them out on his own time on company property
He admitted that employees were engaging in union activi-
ties "during the breaks ," and that "The whole plant has the
break at the same time ." The record does not show that
Cook was engaging in any union activities on company
time , nor that other employees were doing so. The Respon-
dent at or about this time posted the notice warning em-
ployees about signing union cards.
As pointed out above , I found Cook an honest witness
but one whose memory was faulty, as he admitted and as
8 See The Lau Blower Company, 146 NLRB 1226, 1234 (1964) ( re Waggon-
er)
746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was demonstrated by his testimony. I note further that
there is no evidence that any other employee was prohib-
ited by Dodge or any other supervisor from engaging in
union activity in the plant,9 on his own or company time;
no evidence that Cook was warned about such activity by
Dodge or any other supervisor in the following months
during which Cook was openly active on behalf of the
Union; and no corroboration of Cook's testimony as to the
conversation in issue , which was denied by Dodge. I find,
on the basis of the record as a whole, that the evidence
presented by the General Counsel does not establish that
the Respondent promulgated an unlawful rule or otherwise
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by this Dodge-Cook
conversation. I also find no violation of the Act with re-
gard to the notice posted by the Respondent warning em-
ployees about signing union cards. Cook's testimony that
Dodge circulated the notice and had employees sign it was
uncorroborated and was denied by Dodge. And the state-
ments in the notice contain no threats or promises of bene-
fit, and are privileged under the free-speech proviso of the
Act.
I likewise find that the evidence does not establish a
violation by the Respondent of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
on the basis of Cook's testimony that he saw a note on
Kamberelis' desk directing Kamberelis to observe who was
attending a union meeting, and saw Kamberelis drive by
the hall where the union was meeting. Cook did not know
who wrote the note. Kamberelis, who was the plant super-
intendent of the second and third shifts, denied ever receiv-
ing such a note, having a desk, or using a desk in the per-
sonnel office. He admitted driving past the union meeting
place, but testified he did so every day on his route to
work. This incident allegedly occurred on June 15. The
union organizers had been holding frequent meetings at
the same place since February 28.
Cook also testified that both Dodge and Kamberelis
asked him after this meeting who attended, how many, and
what Cook thought of the Union's chance of success, to
which Cook gave noncommittal answers. He changed his
testimony on cross-examination when he admitted that nei-
ther Cook nor Kamberelis asked him who was present at
this meeting. He did not change his testimony that Kam-
berelis asked him, after a meeting on June 23, not only how
many attended but also who they were and from what de-
partments. Dodge and Kamberelis denied asking Cook any
of these questions. Cook was at this time an acting fore-
man, with supervisory status, under Kamberelis, a superin-
tendent, who testified that they had conversations every
evening. In view of Cook's inexact memory as to past con-
versations, the explicit denials by the company officials in
question, and Cook's supervisory status during the period
involved, I find that the General Counsel has not estab-
lished, by a preponderance of credible and probative evi-
dence, that the Respondent interrogated Cook and other-
wise violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the foregoing
conduct.10
9 There were other employees active in organizing the Union, and two
other employees were named as alleged discrimmnatees in the charges but
not in the complaint.
10 See Berton Kirshner, Inc, 209 NLRB 1081 (1974)
(2) Broderick testified that he worked for the Respon-
dent for about a month in June under the supervision of
Cook, who was at that time an acting foreman. Broderick
quit at one time , asked to come back and was rehired, and
quit again voluntarily. He testified that on June 11 he was
in the coffeeshop and heard Kamberelis ask a group of
employees why, if they wanted a union, they did not join a
millinery union, and that someone in the group called out
they did not want a company-owned union. Broderick,
who wore a union button, also testified that he handed a
union card to Kamberelis, which he expected Kamberelis
to sign; that Kamberelis asked where he got it, but he did
not answer; that Kamberelis returned the card to him a
few days later, and asked if he had attended the union
meeting held a few days previously; that, when he said he
did, Kamberelis asked who else attended, and whether
Cook did; and that he refused to answer these questions
but, when Kamberelis asked how many were there, told
him 25-30. It was after this that Broderick quit, was rein-
stated to the samejob on the same shift, and thereafter quit
again.
Kamberelis denied all the questions and comments
about the Union attributed to him by Broderick, and de-
nied further that he ever went into the coffeeshop as he got
free coffee in the office. None of the other employees who
were present testified about these incidents. Some of the
remarks to which Broderick testified, such as the reference
to a millinery union, have little meaning out of the context
of the entire conversation, and some were occasioned by
Broderick's handing Kamberelis a card which Kamberelis
had not requested. I find Broderick's testimony, in all the
relevant circumstances, not sufficient to establish that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the con-
duct attributed by Broderick to Kamberelis.
(3) I find further that the record as a whole fails to estab-
lish the allegations that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of the Act by suggesting selection
of employee spokesmen for some departments, including
the occasion when Parents was selected, or by attempting
to convey through such spokesmen information about shift
and operational changes. Selecting employee spokesmen
was a long-established practice at the Respondent's plant,
and it was suggested at some of the meetings with manage-
ment when matters could not be discussed because of the
many employees talking at the same time. Furthermore,
the spokesmen were not encouraged to present grievances
or complaints to be resolved by management in a manner
designed to convince employees they did not need a union.
In fact, as indicated by testimony of the General Counsel's
witnesses, the spokesmen were permitted but not encour-
aged by management to present employee grievances. 11
(4) Gloria Greathouse, during the period here involved,
was employed by the Respondent on the third shift under
the supervision of Holmes, the senior foreman in the heel
molding department. Holmes, who had supervision over all
three shifts, worked on the first, but came in generally as
the third shift was leaving to check production with the
third-shift foreman. Greathouse testified that, on or about
11 See Missouri Heel Company, 209 NLRB 481 (1974)
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC.
July 23, she and several other employees were completing
their shift when Holmes arrived, and asked Holmes if their
shift schedule, which ran from Monday through Friday
night, could be changed to run from Sunday through
Thursday night. All the employees in this group were wear-
ing union buttons. Greathouse testified that Holmes said
that, if they took off the buttons, he would see what he
could do, and there would be a bonus for them; that
Holmes grabbed at the union buttons worn by Jackson and
another employee who was Greathouse's sister; that
Holmes asked why the employees wanted the Union, and
she gave him a noncommittal answer; that as the group left
he said he had their names in a little black book; and that
the requested change in schedule was later put into effect.
Jackson, who also testified about this incident, corroborat-
ed Greathouse's description of what occurred, and added
that Holmes pointed at his union button and said "Here is
another name for my little black book." He also testified,
on cross-examination by the Respondent, that he was star-
tled and afraid when Holmes tried to pull his union button
off even though Holmes had a smile on his face when he
did so. None of the employees involved in this incident
removed their buttons at the time.
Holmes testified that he saw the employees in question
when he arrived at work; that he noticed them because
they were not in their work area but at his desk; that he
had never seen them around his desk before or since, but
did not ask why they were there; that all the employees in
this group were wearing union buttons and this was the
first day he saw employees with these buttons; that "I
walked over, I made the statement , `why don't you remove
those silly union buttons,' " and said this jokingly; and that
the conversation ended, and the group dispersed then, "But
nobody, you know, removed any union buttons." He de-
nied that he asked Greathouse if she was for the Union,
that he asked anyone else this question, that he tried to
remove anyone's union button, that he told employees he
would put their names in a little black book, and that he
had such a book. He also denied that there was any refer-
ence by the employees or by him to a change in schedule in
this conversation, that lasted "Less than five minutes... .
No, less-it was a matter of seconds, actually. I just made
that one statement." He testified that immediately after
making this one statement, he began discussing production
with his foreman.12 While Holmes admitted that these em-
ployees had asked if this particular schedule change could
be made, he also maintained that he had polled all the
employees affected about such a change and all of them
wanted it, that he discussed it with other management per-
sonnel, that the schedule was changed for efficiency rea-
sons, and that the decision was reached by Foster to make
this change, which went into effect on July 28. Foster also
testified about the efficiency considerations on which this
change was based.
I found Greathouse and Jackson more candid and forth-
right witnesses than Holmes, and credit their testimony as
to what occurred. I find, therefore, that, whatever the
Respondent's reasons for changing the work schedule of
12 The Respondent showed that the foreman in question was not available
to testify
747
these employees at the time, Holmes told them that he
would see what he could do about their request for such a
change, and that there would also be a bonus, if they re-
moved their union buttons; that he made an attempt to
remove the buttons of two of these employees; that he
asked why they wanted the Union; and that, whether or
not he had a little black book, he made reference to putting
their names in such a book. I find further that the Respon-
dent, by this conduct of Holmes, coercively interrogated
employees, and promised them benefits, to induce them to
surrender their rights under Section 7 of the Act, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.13
(5) As noted above, the Respondent was, during the peri-
od here involved, in the process of reorganizing its produc-
tion and administrative procedures. Foster, who had previ-
ously reorganized two other companies, became general
manager of the Respondent's plant on April 23 in order to
plan and carry out such a reorganization, and in the pro-
cess to straighten out the chaotic conditions that had devel-
oped as a result of the Respondent's expansion from an
operation with about 50 employees in 1972 to one with
about 315 employees in 1973, and a move to a different
building. Some departments were operating on 8-hour
shifts, others on 12-hour shifts, and the weekly schedules
also varied between departments. The grade structures
were not uniform, which resulted in disparate earnings by
employees doing comparable work in different depart-
ments.
Foster testified that Paterson had been in charge of the
plant for a few months before he took over; that Walker,
who is now with the Respondent in another capacity, was
general manager before Paterson;14 that Walker, while he
was general manager, gave the employees a general wage
increase on May 29, 1972; that Walker told Foster he had
promised the employees "they would be subject to another
increase in May '73 approximately one year later"; that
various employees asked Foster from time to time about
the promise Walker made; and that his answers to such
inquiries were along the line "that we were in the process of
doing a complete review of all jobs in Styletek, rewriting all
of the job descriptions, and that we were working on a
complete reevaluation system of all the people in the plant,
and that we were also working on incentive systems, and
that we would try to do a complete revision rather than just
a piecemeal job. That I felt at that time that there were
many inequities in thejobs that existed in Styletek, and the
record-keeping and so forth had been quite sloppy over a
period of time , with Styletek's explosive growth, and that,
once and for all, we wanted to realign all of the jobs, re-
evaluate all of the jobs , reevaluate all of the people, and
put them in their proper labor grades. We also wanted to
reduce from seven grades to three grades, because we felt it
would give us more flexibility, and we thought that it
would also give the employees more room within the
grades, as far as wage growth was concerned."
Foster and his assistants made an extensive study of
plant operations and of reorganizational plans designed to
increase efficiency. In June, supervisors polled employees
13 See Blazers Wholesale Drug Company, Inc, 209 NLRB 1152 (1974)
14 Neither Paterson nor Walker was called as a witness
748 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about their shift preferences as noted above , a notice was
posted and distributed to employees on June 8 indicating
the changes to be made and listing the employee shift as-
signments , and the plant went on a three -shift operation of
6 8-hour days. On June 29, dust before the vacation shut-
down, Foster posted the following notice addressed to all
employees:
The rapid growth of business at Styletek has tended to
create some inequities in the labor grade and rate
structure of some of the jobs at the Styletek factory.
For this reason, we are presently reviewing all jobs
with an eye toward correcting any inequities in these
grades and broadening the wage categories.
You have seen the beginning of this effort with the
realignment of the unitsole department along with the
installation of the incentive system for this area.
We will continue reviewing all job descriptions, labor
grades, and the possibility of incentive programs in as
many areas as possible.
We hope this will eliminate any inequities that pres-
ently exist.
This was, Foster testified, the first written notice to the
employees of a wage increase.
Foster testified that he hired Coupe, a plant engineer, in
May in order to speed up the preparation of job descrip-
tions, that they both worked on this through the July vaca-
tion period, but that they did not finish until early August.
On August 20 Foster posted the following notice:
As we reported to you last June 29th, we have been
reviewing all jobs with an eye to correcting inequities
in our rate structure and broadening the wage catego-
ries. This has been a difficult and time consumingjob
because it has involved reviewing all job descriptions
and labor grades and then slotting in each individual
at the appropriate step and hourly rate in his or her
labor grade.
As demonstrated by the copy of the new wage struc-
ture posted herewith, we have reduced the number of
grades from seven to three and have substantially
raised the maximum for each job.
The new structure sets minimum amounts which an
employee must receive after 30 day's employment in a
particular labor grade and again after an additional 90
days of employment in the grade. No one will receive
less than these minimums, but he or she may receive
more.
Raises after the 120 day increase will be based upon
merit up to the maximum for each job.
Your supervisors will talk to each of you in the next
day or two and furnish you with a copy of your job
description, tell you your new rate of pay and answer
any questions . The new rate will be reflected in your
pay envelope this coming pay day.
We are continuing to review the possibility of incen-
tive programs in as many areas as possible on a basis
which would guarantee that no employee would re-
ceive less than he now receives but which would earn
him additional money for greater productivity.
Foster testified that, as indicated in the above document,
he continued to work on further incentive programs and
was still doing so at the time of the hearing . He also testi-
fied that all employees, with the possible exception of one,
received a wage increase at this time , and that the increases
in cost to the Respondent was about 5 percent.
The record shows, therefore, that Foster came to the
plant in April to reorganize its operations, and Walker's
commitment to the employees of a wage review in a year
was made on May 29, 1972. The first announcement to the
employees of a planned wage review and incentive system,
however , was not made until June 29, 1973. This was about
4 months after the Union began organizing the
Respondent's employees and 1 month before the Union
filed its petition for an election. The actual wage increases
were announced on August 20, to become effective on the
next payday, and the announcement referred to the possi-
bility of additional increases based on incentive programs
under study. This announcement of wage increases, the
effective date of the increases , and the promise of addition-
al increases , occurred during the critical preelection period,
and only about 2 weeks before the election was held. The
Respondent has not, in my opinion, shown any adequate
reason why the increases had to be announced and grant-
ed, and additional increases promised, at this particular
time.
I am convinced, and find, that the timing and all the
other circumstances of this conduct warrant "an inference
that it was designed to defuse the employees' union activi-
ty, particularly in the absence of evidence of any legitimate
economic reason for the timing of the change" 15 and that
the Respondent 's "series of specially timed announcements
. were designed to, and did, interfere materially with the
organizational rights of its employees." 16 I find that these
promises and grants of benefits were manifestly designed,
in view particularly of their timing, to impress upon all the
employees that such benefits were forthcoming from the
Respondent without the intercession of a union representa-
tive. As the Supreme Court has held: "The danger inherent
in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist
inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the
inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also
the source from which future benefits must flow and which
may dry up if it is not obliged." 17 I find, in conclusion, that
the Respondent announced and granted benefits to its em-
ployees, and promised further benefits, in order to discour-
age membership in and activities on behalf of the Union,
15 American National Stores, Inc, 195 NLRB 127 (1972)
16 Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1529 (1966), Bally
Case and Cooler, Inc, 172 NLRB 1127, 1128 (1968).
17 N L R B v Exchange Parts Co, 375 U S 405 (1964)
STYLETEK, DIV. OF PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC
and that the Respondent thereby interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.18
IV. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
A petition for an election was filed by the Union in Case
1-RC-12848 on July 24, and an election pursuant to a
Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election was
held on September 6, 1973.19 The unresolved issues raised
by certain of the Union's objections to the election that
were consolidated with the issues in the complaint cases
therefore involve conduct that occurred between July 24
and September 6. One of these objections alleges that "The
company granted wage increases just before the election in
an unusual manner and at a time so as to interfere with the
free choice of the employees." It is found above that the
Respondent announced and granted general wage increas-
es, and promised additional increases , on or about August
20, about 2 weeks before the election, in circumstances that
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I find
that such conduct, occurring during the critical preelection
period, precluded the employees from exercising their free-
dom of choice in selecting or rejecting the Union, and con-
stitutes substantial interference with the election.20 I shall
therefore recommend that the election of September 6,
1973, in Case 1-RC-12848, be set aside, and that the case
be remanded to the Regional Director for Region I for the
purpose of conducting a new election at such time as he
deems the circumstances permit the free choice of a bar-
gaining representative.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and from infringing in
any like or related manner upon its employees' Section 7
rights, and that it take certain affirmative action designed
18 N L V Casino Corp d/b/a Silver Nugget, 174 NLRB 42, 48 (1969), Gem
Knits, Inc, 174 NLRB 449, 452 (1969), Forbes Pavilion Nursing Home, Inc,
198 NLRB 802 (1972); Royal Aluminum Foundry, Inc, 208 NLRB 102
(1974), cf Heckethorn Manufacturing Co, 208 NLRB 302 (1974)
19
The tally of ballots showed 68 votes for and 90 against the Union, and
10 challenged ballots which were not sufficient in number to affect the
result of the election
20 Wilkinson Manufacturing Company v N L R D, 456 F 2d 298 (C A. 8,
1972), Bally Case and Cooler, Inc, supra, Forbes Pavilion Nursing Home,
Inc, supra, Royal Aluminum Foundry, Inc, supra, VCA Sterling, Inc, 209
NLRB 127 (1974)
749
to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall also recommend
that nothing contained in the recommended Order shall be
construed as requiring the Respondent to revoke any wage
increases or other employee benefits previously promised
or granted.21
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record in this proceeding, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Styletek, Division of Pandel-Brad-
ford, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Local Union No. 437, a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees, and by prom-
ising, announcing, and granting benefits, in order to dis-
courage membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following rec-
ommended:
ORDER 22
The Respondent, Styletek, Division of Pandel-Bradford,
Inc., Groveland, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees, and from prom-
ising, announcing, and granting benefits, in order to dis-
courage membership in and activities on behalf of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local
No. 437 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or
any other labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except that noth-
ing contained herein shall be construed as requiring the
Respondent to revoke any wage increases or other benefits
previously promised or granted.
2 Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
2' Exchange Parts Co, supra, Yale Rubber Manufacturing Company. 193
NLRB 141 (1971), Forbes Pavilion Nursing Home, Inc, supra
22 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102
48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
750 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Groveland, Massachusetts, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 23 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, be dismissed insofar as it alleges viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act, and of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act other than as specifically found herein.
IT IS ALSO FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the election con-
ducted on September 6, 1973, in Case 1-RC-12848, be set
aside, and that said case be remanded to the Regional Di-
rector for Region I to conduct a new election at such time
as he deems the circumstances permit the free choice of a
bargaining representative.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees, or
promise, announce, or grant benefits, in order to dis-
courage membership in or activities on behalf of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Union Local No. 437 a/w International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, or any other labor organization, ex-
cept that nothing contained herein shall be construed
as requiring us to revoke any wage increases or other
employee benefits previously promised or granted.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
STYLETEK, DIVISION OF
PANDEL-BRADFORD, INC.
23 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board