Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 11, 1975

216 N.L.R.B. 529 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

PACIFIC GRINDING WHEEL CO.
Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., Inc . and Marjorie M.
Ingram . Case 19-CA-7156
February 11, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY ACTING CHAIRMAN FANNING AND
MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO
On September 27, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
William J. Pannier III issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Rel4tions Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., Inc.,
Marysville, Washington , its officers , agents , succes-
sors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, except that the attached
notice is substituted for the Administrative Law
Judge's notice.
i Respondent excepts , inter aha, to the Administrative Law Judge's
consideration of General Counsel 's brief on grounds it allegedly never
received a copy thereof . The record establishes that the tendered issues and
General Counsel 's theory of the case were fully elucidated during the course
of the hearing . Moreover , Respondent has briefed to us its theory of the
case , and we have considered de novo the entire record and the relevant legal
precedents to the extent they are raised by Respondent's exceptions. Under
these circumstances , we find no prejudicial error could have resulted from
the Administrative Law Judge's consideration of the General Counsel's
brief.
Under the provisions of Sec . 102.45(b) of the Board 's Rules and
Regulations , Series 8, as amended , the record at this stage of the proceeding
does not include briefs filed with an Administrative Law Judge unless
resubmitted to us by the parties . However, in accordance with customary
practice, briefs filed by the parties with the Administrative Law Judge are
included in the formal file. We administratively note that the brief
submitted herein by General Counsel to the Administrative Law Judge,
found within the formal file, contains an attached "Certificate of Service"
which asserts that a copy of the brief was served on Respondent and on its
counsel , inter ahos, by "first-class United States mail , postage prepaid."
Such certificate of service constitutes proof of service under the laws of the
State of Washington (Rule 5(bX2), Washington , Civil Rules for Supehor
Court ( 1973)); and , for that reason , also constitutes proof of service before
the Board . Sec. 102 . 112, Rules and Regulations , Series 8, as amended.
Y In adopting the Administrative Law Judge 's conclusions we do so
solely on the grounds that Respondent discharged Ingram for refusing to
cross the picket line at Respondent 's place of business. To the extent
Respondent argues Ingram was replaced and not discharged, there is no
showing in the record that she was ever replaced.
APPENDIX
529
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
gives all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain as a group through a representa-
tive they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all such activity
except to the extent that the employees'
bargaining representative and employer
have a collective-bargaining agreement
which imposes a lawful requirement that
employees become union members.
WE WILL NOT discharge any employee for
assisting a union by refusing to work during a
lawful strike engaged in by our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any ' like or related manner
interfere with any of your rights set forth above
which are guaranteed by the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL offer Marjorie M. Ingram immediate
and full reinstatement to her former position,
dismissing, if necessary, anyone who may have
been hired or retained to perform the work which
she had been performing prior to the time that she
began respecting the Union's picket line on June
10 or, if her former position does not exist, to a
substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole for any loss of pay she may
have suffered as the result of our discrimination.
PACIFIC GRINDING
WHEEL CO., INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me at Seattle , Washington, on
August 20, 1974,1 pursuant to a complaint and notice of
hearing issued on July 30 by the Regional Director for
Region 19 of the National Labor Relations Board. The
complaint was based upon an unfair labor practice charge
i Unless otherwise stated , all dates occurred in 1974.
216 NLRB No. 91
530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
filed on June 24 and alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 151 et seq., herein called the Act.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to
appear, to introduce evidence , to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to file briefs . Based upon the entire
record , the brief of counsel for the General Counsel and
the letter submitted by Respondent in lieu of a brief,
arguments made during the hearing, and my observation of
the demeanor of the only witness called , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., Inc ., herein called Respon-
dent , is a Washington corporation with its principal offices
and headquarters at 13120 Highway 99, Marysville,
Washington , where it is engaged in the preparation and
manufacturing of abrasive grinding wheels and of related
abrasive products.
During the past calendar or fiscal year, a representative
period , Respondent purchased goods and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of
Washington ; purchased goods and material valued in
excess of $50,000 from firms within the State of Washing-
ton which , in turn , purchased those goods from outside the
State of Washington ; or made sales to , or performed
services for, customers located outside the State of
Washington valued in excess of $50,000.
Therefore, I find, as admitted by the answer, that
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act,
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Chemical Workers Union , Local 614,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Issue
Whether Respondent discharged Marjorie M. Ingram,
on or about June 17, because she refused to cross a picket
line of the Union at Respondent's place of business, and, if
so, whether Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
B. The Events of June
For approximately 7 years Marjorie M. Ingram had
worked for Respondent as a cleaning lady in Respondent's
office and she was the only person employed by Respon-
dent to handle the lighter cleaning work in the office.
Heavier cleaning , such as vacuuming and shampooing
rugs, waxing and stripping the entryway, and washing
windows, was performed by someone other than Ingram
including, for at least part of the time , American Cleaning,
an outside commercial enterprise.
On June 10 the Union called a strike of Respondent's
plant employees and picketing commenced at Respon-
dent's facility . Ingram , who was neither a member of the
Union nor of the bargaining unit at Respondent 's facility,
but who was married to the managing editor of the Everett,
Washington, Labor Journal, telephoned the plant on that
same day prior to her 4 : 30 p.m. starting time . She spoke
with Gila Hinchcliff, an employee who answers the
telephone at Respondent 's facility . Ingram inquired if the
picket lines were up and Hinchcliff replied that they were.
Ingram then said that she could not come to work so long
as there were pickets since her "husband would put my,
fanny up on my shoulders" if she did so. Thereafter,
Ingram ceased reporting for work.
On June 17 Ingram received a telephone call from
Respondent's comptroller, Donald L. Tischer,2 who said
that he understood that Ingram had a problem. The latter
agreed, saying that her problem was that she could not go
through a picket line and Tischer replied that this was a
matter that was up to Ingram , but that Respondent needed
someone to do the cleaning since it had not been
performed for a week. Thus, continued Tischer, Respon-
dent was going to sign a contract for the full janitor service
to get things cleaned up in a lump sum. He then listed for
Ingram the cleaning services which would be covered
under that contract and when he had finished, Ingram said,
"Then, in other words, I am fired?" Tischer protested that
he would not say that and Ingram retorted that this had
been a polite way of saying so and that she didn't think
that the government would stand for such a thing . In reply,
Tischer said only: "Oh, I think so. We have a leg to stand
on. You are a salaried person."
Thereafter, by mail, Ingram received her paycheck
accompanied by a document on which the following was
handwritten:
2 The answer admits the allegation in the complaint that Tischer is a
supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2 ( l1) of the Act, and an agent of
Respondent within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) or the Act.
PACIFIC GRINDING WHEEL CO.
Marge Ingram - term. 6/17/74
1 Week Worked
2 " Severance Pay
3 " VAC
1 day Birthday
6/3 - 6/7 - 1974
325.00 Base
97-1/2 Hrs. Monthly
3.33 P/Hr.
22-1/2 Hrs. Worked 1 Week
45 " Severance Pay
67-1/2 " Vac. Pay
8 " Birthday
143 Hrs.
0 3.33
476.19
27.85 Fica
65.40 Fit
.20 W.C.
382.74
Marge . Will see u here.
Also could u turn in keys
Ingram testified that this represented a summary of the
money owed her and that this agreed with the amount in
her paycheck.
On June 24, Ingram filed the unfair labor practice charge
in this matter filling in that portion of the charge form
entitled "Basis of Charge" as follows:
Since on or about June 17, 1974, it by its officers,
agents, or representatives, discharged Marjorie M.
Ingram because of her having engaged in protected
activities and at all times since that date, it has refused
and does now refuse to employ the above named
employee.
The return receipt for the copy of the charge which was
served on Respondent bears the date June 26. On June 27,
Tischer sent a letter to Ingram stating:
We have received charges from the National Labor
Relations Board stating that you have been discharged
because of union activities.
This letter is to clarify our position. When you could
not cross the picket line because your husband would
not let you, we still needed someone to continue with
the cleaning ; and we were forced to hire someone. So,
you were not discharged because of any reason other
than you could not come to work.
4-1/2 hrs. Per day
22-1/2 " Weekly
375.00 Adv
Bd. Will be on
6/30 check.
531
After the strike, we will see if there are any jobs
equivalent to what you have been doing, and we would
be glad to consider you for that job.
If you do not want to wait until we have an opening, we
would be glad to give you a recommendation to any
employer.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Section 7 protects the right of an employee to refuse to
cross a picket line established at his employer's place of
business by his fellow employees, since "An employee who
refuses to cross a picket line is in effect joining the strike
and engaging in concerted activities protected by the Act."
N.L.R.B. v. West Coast Casket Co., Inc., 205 F.2d 902, 905
(C.A. 9, 1953). It is not significant that such an employee is
not a member of the striking union, for "the employee,
even though he is not a member of the striking union, has
in effect plighted his troth with strikers, joined in their
common cause, and has thus become a striker himself."
N.L.R.B. v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Division of Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (C.A. 5, 1970).
Kellogg Company v. N.L.R.B., 457 F.2d 519 (C.A. 6, 1972).
While Ingram said that she was not coming to work
because, in effect, her husband would not approve of her
working behind a picket line, this does not affect the scope
of her protection under Section 7, as the "focal point of
532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
inquiry" in making the determination as to whether or not
an employee's refusal to cross a picket line is protected
activity, "must of course be the nature of the activity itself
rather than the employee's motives for engaging in the
activity." The Cooper Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB
502, 504 (1965). Indeed, it is clear from Ingram 's testimony
that her husband's attitude was based upon his sympathy
for striking employees and, in any event, the Board has
held an employee's refusal to work behind a picket line to
be protected where that employee was respecting her
husband's wishes in withholding her services . Nuodex
Division of Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 176 NLRB 611 (1967).
Consequently, I find that by respecting the picket line at
Respondent 's facility, Ingram became an economic striker
and, accordingly, was engaged in activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
The rights of employees where , as here , they have
respected a picket line established at their employers'
premises were set forth most cogently in N.L.R.B. v.
Southern Greyhound Lines, supra at 1301:
The basis of the protection against discharge afforded
an employee who refuses to cross a picket line at his
employer's business is his status as a striker . Such an
employee is therefore entitled to all the protections due
under the National Labor Relations Act to those
strikers with whom he has joined cause . Conversely, the
employer's right to discipline such an employee to
preserve the operation of his business is limited to those
measures which he could lawfully use against the
strikers.
It is axiomatic that it is not lawful to discharge an
economic striker. N.L.R.B. v. International Van Lines, 409
U.S. 48, 52 (1972). It is equally axiomatic that an employer
may retain permanent replacements for economic strikers
to preserve the operations of his business . Id, 409 U.S. at
50; N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379
(1967). Respondent denies that it did the former and urges
me to find that it did the latter.
If an employer is to rely on a defense that it permanently
replaced an economic striker, "the burden of proving
justification is on the employer." N.L.R.B. v. Southern
Greyhound Lines, ibid. at 1302. Accord: M/G Transport
Services, Inc., 204 NLRB 324 (1973); Di/co Laboratories,
Inc., 172 NLRB 2149, 2152 (1968). In the instant case,
Respondent has presented no evidence on this point. The
need to have Ingram 's cleaning work'performed might well
be inferred from the fact that she had been the only
employee performing such work in the office and,
obviously, the work which she had been doing was not
being performed in her absence . However, two factors
impede drawing such an inference under the circumstances
of this case . First, although there is a delineation of the
work which Ingram did not perform (vacuuming and
shampooing rugs, waxing and stripping the entryway, and
washing windows), at no point is there a similar listing of
the duties which she did perform normally. Thus, it is
difficult to infer that Respondent needed to replace Ingram,
assuming that it did replace her, to preserve the efficiency
of its operation when the role which Ingram performed in
Respondent 's operations has not been defined. Secondly,
there was a strike of Respondent 's plant employees and
although the office employees were not part of the Union's
bargaining unit , there has been no showing that office
operations were continuing normally and, thus, that
Ingram's duties would have had to be performed in the
normal fashion . Undoubtedly there was at least some
effect on operations in the office caused by the interruption
of Respondent 's normal plant operations . See General
Electric Company, 193 NLRB 372, 374 (1971); The Cooper
Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB 502, 504 (1965).
Consequently , without at least some idea of Ingram's
precise duties and given the fact that the interruption of
normal plant operations would have some effect on office
operations, it would be improvident for me to infer valid
justification for replacement solely from the fact that
Ingram was the only person who did her work in the office
under normal circumstances . Indeed, to draw such an
inference in these circumstances, without more, would
render illusory Ingram's right to engage in the protected
activity of respecting the picket line of the plant employees.
An even more fatal defect in Respondent 's defense is
created by the absence of evidence that Ingram was, in
fact, replaced . No evidence was presented by Respondent
to establish that there was a replacement . Tischer did tell
Ingram on June 17 that Respondent intended to sign a
contract consolidating Ingram 's cleaning duties with
cleaning duties which she did not normally perform and
that all cleaning duties would then be subcontracted, but
Respondent did not establish that this contract had been
signed and the replacement effected by the time that the
paycheck was mailed to Ingram with the accompanying
note stating that she was terminated on June 17. In fact,
there is evidence that such a replacement by a subcontrac-
tor never occurred , since in his letter of June 27 Tischer
stated that when Ingram failed to report , Respondent was
forced "to hire someone ." Assuming that a replacement
was hired , instead of the work being contracted, there is no
showing that this step had been taken by or on June 17.
Moreover, I cannot rely on Tischer 's statements to Ingram
as evidence of the facts asserted, since his statements were
self-serving and such evidence would be hearsay . Further-
more , his statement on June 27 contradicts that of June 17.
Consequently, in the circumstances presented in this
case , I find that Respondent has failed to establish that it
replaced Ingram and that if it did so, it has failed to show
that its actions were undertaken to preserve the operation
of its business.
Finally , I find that the record amply supports the
General Counsel 's contention that Ingram was discharged
on June 17. First , as found above, the evidence does not
support Respondent 's assertion that Ingram had been
replaced and, accordingly, this is not a situation where
Respondent replaced Ingram , but rather is a situation
where Respondent simply terminated her, without so far as
the record discloses having hired anyone to replace her.
Southern Greyhound Lines, Division of Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 169 NLRB 627, enfd. 426 F.2d 1299 (C.A. 5, 1970);
Lenkurt Electric Co., Inc., 177 NLRB 259, 262 (1969); M/G
Transport Services, Inc., 204 NLRB 324 (1973). Secondly,
as an economic striker, Ingram 's status as an employee
would continue until she obtained "other regular and
PACIFIC GRINDING WHEEL CO. 533
substantially equivalent employment ," without regard to
whether her job was not available at a particular moment
in time . N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S.
375, 381 (1967). Nonetheless, the document which accom-
panied Ingram 's check was headed by the phrase "Marge
Ingram-term . 6/17/74" and clearly listed figures for items
which showed that Respondent was treating the matter as
the conclusion of Ingram 's employment relationship with
Respondent . Cf. Hanley Dawson Chevrolet, Inc., 168 NLRB
944, 946 (1967). Third, during the telephone conversation
of June 17, when Ingram challenged Respondent's right to
take action regarding her job by saying that the Govern-
ment would not stand for it, Tischer made no reference to
replacement in response , but instead retorted "We have a
leg to stand on. You are a salaried person ." It is thus clear
that at this point in time Respondent was relying on the
fact that Ingram was salaried (and, implicitly, not a part of
the Union's bargaining unit) to support her termination. In
fact , of course, this is not a valid justification. Lenkurt
Electric Co., supra, 177 NLRB at 260-261. Finally, any
contention that Respondent 's action did not constitute a
discharge is dispelled by Tischer's letter of June 27,
obviously sent in response to the allegation in Ingram's
unfair labor practice charge that Respondent had "dis-
charged Marjorie M. Ingram because of her having
engaged in protected activities ." In his letter, Tischer
states : "So, you were not discharged because of any reason
other than you could not come to work." Thus, Tischer did
not contest Ingram's assertion that she was discharged (in
fact , he clearly concedes that this was the fact), but instead
takes issue only with the reason which Ingram asserted
motivated the discharge . Moreover, Tischer goes on to
state in his letter that Ingram will be "considered" for "jobs
equivalent to what you have been doing" once the strike
culminated . Yet, it is quite clear that as an economic striker
Ingram is entitled not simply to "consideration" for
employment in jobs for which she is qualified. She is
entitled to reinstatement to such jobs once she has
abandoned the service . N.LR.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,
supra, 389 U.S. at 381 . Consequently, this portion of
Tischer's letter further demonstrates that without regard to
the status of the strike , as far as Respondent was
concerned, it was Ingram 's employment that had culminat-
ed.
Consequently, I find that Respondent did discharge
Ingram for refusing to cross a picket line at Respondent's
place of business .3
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above , occurring
in connection with the Respondent's operations described
in section I above , have a close , intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade , traffic, and commerce among the
3 In reaching this conclusion , I am not relying on the principles
applicable to situations where employees refuse to perform that portion of
their duties which involve crossing a picket line at another employer 's place
of business . See Redwing Carriers, Inc and Rockana Carriers, Inc., 137
NLRB 1545 (1%2), enfd . sub. nom. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local
Union No . 79, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , etc. v . N L.R.B., 325
F.2d 1011 (C.A.D.C. 1%3), cert . denied 377 U.S. 905 ( 1964). Such situations
several States , and tend to lead, and have led, to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, it shall be recommended that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. With regard
to the latter , Respondent will be required to offer Marjorie
M. Ingram reinstatement to her former position or, if that
position no longer exists , to a substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to her seniority or other rights
and privileges , dismissing, if necessary, anyone who may
have been hired or retained to perform the work which she
had been performing prior to the time that she began
respecting the Union's picket line on June 10. Additionally,
Respondent will be required to make Marjorie M. Ingram
whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by
reason of her unlawful discharge with the backpay to be
computed on a quarterly basis, making deductions for
interim earnings , and with interest to be paid at the rate of
6 percent per annum . F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289 (1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962). In this regard , it is clear that Ingram is not entitled
to backpay while she was withholding her services even
though she was discharged during this time . Sea-Way
Distributing, Inc., 143 NLRB 460 (1963), and cases cited
therein at footnote 2. Thus, I find that the period for
computing her backpay will commence upon the earliest of
the following: (1) abandonment of the strike and applica-
tion for reinstatement by Ingram ; or (2) termination of the
strike by the Union without a prior offer by Respondent to
reinstate Ingram as set forth above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
-1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging and thereafter refusing to offer
reinstatement to Marjorie M. Ingram because she refused
to cross a picket line of the Union at Respondent's place of
business, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and
coerced her in the exercise of her rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act and has engaged in, and is engaging in,
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and entire record in this case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
are distinguishable from that presented by the instant case and this
distinction is well-established . The Cooper Thermometer Company, 154
NLRB 502, 505-506 (1%5); Southern Greyhound lanes, 169 NLRB 627,
628-629, enfd. 426 F.2d 1299 (C.A. 5, 1970); Difco Laboratories, Inc., 172
NLRB 2149, 2152-53, enfd. 427 F.2d 170 (C.A. 6, 1970); Lenkurt Electric
Co, 177 NLRB 259, 261 (1%9)
534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER4
Respondent, Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., Inc., its
officers , agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging any employee because he or she has
assisted a labor organization by refusing to work during a
lawful strike.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Marjorie M. Ingram immediate and full
reinstatement to her former position , dismissing, if neces-
sary, anyone who may have been hired or retained to
perform the work which she had been performing prior to
the time that she began respecting the Union 's picket line
on June 10, or, if her former position does not exist, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges , and make her whole
for any loss of pay she may have suffered as the result of
4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
the discrimination, in the manner set forth above in the
section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll and other records necessary to compute the
backpay and reinstatement rights as set forth in "The
Remedy" herein.
(c) Post at its Marysville, Washington, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
8 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."