Operating Engineers Local 101 (Hunt Midwest)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1991

304 N.L.R.B. 722 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

722
304 NLRB No. 91
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 We affirm the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act as alleged by preferring and processing union charges
against Production Superintendent Anthony McLaughlin, and by subsequently
fining him, for working for the Employer behind the Respondent’s picket line
on April 30 and May 1 and 2, 1990.
In affirming the judge’s conclusion, we find it unnecessary to pass on his
discussion of whether the Respondent’s discipline of McLaughlin might not
have violated the Act if it had been motivated by McLaughlin’s performance
of supervisory activities other than 8(b)(1)(B) activities. The record does not
establish, and the judge does not find, that McLaughlin was disciplined for
anything other or more particular than his performance of his regular produc-
tion superintendent duties (which were shown to normally and regularly in-
volve grievance adjusting) behind the Respondent’s picket line. In this regard,
there is no showing in the record that McLaughlin performed even a minimal
amount of bargaining unit work during the 3-day period for which he was dis-
ciplined. Indeed, McLaughlin’s testimony that he performed no bargaining unit
work at all during this time was uncontroverted. This case is therefore distin-
guishable from Operating Engineers Local 501 (Golden Nugget), 287 NLRB
674 (1987), enf. granted in part and denied in part sub nom. Rasmussen v.
NLRB, 875 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1989), on which the Respondent relies. We
also note that the Respondent failed to produce evidence that McLaughlin
spent more than a de minimis amount of time—if any at all—in training the
employee strike replacements, who were already working when the employer
selected McLaughlin as its superintendent with responsibility for workplace
grievance adjustment.
Member Cracraft notes that the finding of a violation in this case is con-
sistent with the finding of a violation, in which she specifically concurred, as
to the discipline of Project Manager Dennis Williamson in Sheet Metal Work-
ers Local 68 (DeMoss Co.), 298 NLRB 1000 (1990).
1 Unless stated otherwise, all dates occurred in 1990.
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–
CIO, Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101 and
Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. Case 17–CB–3872
August 27, 1991
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND OVIATT
On May 22, 1991, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam J. Pannier III issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision in light of
the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions1 and to
adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, International Union of Op-
erating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Hoisting and Portable
Local No. 101, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Richard C. Auslander, for the General Counsel.
James G. Walsh, Jr. (Jolley, Walsh & Hager), of Kansas
City, Missouri, for the Respondent.
Earl J. Engle (Stinson, Mag & Fizzell), of Kansas City, Mis-
souri, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in Mission, Kansas, on December 11, 1990.1
On June 20, the Regional Director for Region 17 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a complaint
and notice of hearing, based on an unfair labor practice
charge filed on May 15 and amended on November 30, al-
leging violations of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor
Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (the Act). All parties
have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to introduce
evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
file briefs.
Based on the entire record, on the briefs that were filed,
and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material, Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. (the Em-
ployer) has been a Delaware corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of mining limestone for crushed aggregate at two mines
in the Kansas City, Missouri area: one in Randolph, Mis-
souri, and the other in Fairview, Missouri. During 1990, the
year in which the alleged unfair labor practices occurred, the
Employer sold and shipped such material valued in excess of
$67,000 directly to a project of Neosho Construction Co. lo-
cated in the State of Kansas. Because the shipments of that
value establish legal jurisdiction and, further, satisfy the
Board’s discretionary direct outflow standard for nonretail
operations. I conclude that at all times material the Employer
has been an employer engaged in commerce and in a busi-
ness affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
At all times material, International Union of Operating En-
gineers, AFL–CIO, Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101
(Respondent) has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Findings of Fact
This case presents issues of whether Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by subjecting member Anthony
McLaughlin to internal union discipline for working as pro-
duction superintendent behind a picket line at the Employer’s
Randolph mine. Operations at the Employer’s two Missouri
mines are subject to the ultimate supervision of General
Manager John Hayes. Below him in the table of organization
is the general superintendent, who provides intermediate su-
pervision for operation at both mines. A production super-
intendent, one for each of the two mines, supplies immediate
supervision for employees working at each one. For example,
prior to April 1, Mark Skuban had been production super-
intendent at the Randolph mine.
723OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 101 (HUNT MIDWEST)
Historically, employees at, inter alia, the Randolph mine
have been represented by 3 labor organizations: 13 or 14
truckdrivers by a Teamsters’ local, 11 to 14 laborers by a
Laborer local, and 5 or 6 operators by Respondent. Those
labor organizations had been parties to separate collective-
bargaining contracts with the Employer. Each of the most re-
cent ones expired on April 1. When negotiations prior to that
date failed to generate agreement on the terms for new con-
tracts, the employees commenced a strike against the Em-
ployer on April 1.
At the time that the strike commenced, McLaughlin had
been employed for almost 20 years by the Employer as a
heavy equipment operator and equipment repairman. During
that entire time he had been a member in good standing of
Respondent, serving as its steward at the Randolph mine for
approximately 4 years prior to commencement of the strike.
He had favored commencement of that strike and had partici-
pated in the picketing that occurred on and after April 1.
Under article XII, section 1 of Respondent’s contract that
expired on April 1, if ‘‘any differences . . . between the em-
ployer and the labor organization . . . cannot be adjusted be-
tween the steward and the foreman, it shall be taken up be-
tween a representative of the Employer ad the Union rep-
resentative.’’ It is undisputed that, during his term as stew-
ard, McLaughlin and Skuban discussed grievances of em-
ployees represented by Respondent—ones such as assign-
ment of a laborer to work within Respondent’s jurisdiction
and, on another occasion, assigning Saturday work to less
senior operators—and resolved every one between them
without the need for resolution by a ‘‘representative of the
Employer and [Respondent’s] representative.’’
Following commencement of the strike, the Employer
hired replacements and continued operations. However, on
April 25 or 26, Skuban resigned as Randolph mine produc-
tion superintendent for personal reasons, unrelated to the on-
going labor dispute. General Manager Hayes felt that, to re-
place Skuban, he needed someone who was familiar with op-
erations at the Randolph mine so that the individual selected
‘‘could lead, guide and direct—instruct [the replacements]—
to bring them up to speed with the [Employer’s] former work
force.’’ Hayes decided that McLaughlin was such an indi-
vidual. He offered the position to McLaughlin with the spe-
cific understanding that the latter would be performing the
duties that Skuban had performed and would he fully in
charge of the employees whom he supervised.
McLaughlin readily accepted that offer, but wanted to get
a withdrawal from Respondent before crossing its picket line
to work as the Employer’s production superintendent. As a
result, he did not actually commence performing the duties
of that position until Monday, April 30. On April 27
McLaughlin sent a letter to Respondent ‘‘requesting a with-
drawal card . . . as I am going into a management posi-
tion.’’ There is no dispute that Respondent received this let-
ter.
After commencing work on April 30, McLaughlin contin-
ued working as Randolph mine production superintendent. In
addition to performing the normal supervisory duties of hir-
ing, firing, and directing the work of employees, he had oc-
casion to resolve grievances brought to him by employees.
For example, on May 1 an employee complained about being
assigned to work underground, after having been hired to
work a surface job. Inasmuch as he was one loader short, on
the following day McLaughlin worked out a rotation arrange-
ment with the operators that would allow each one of them
to work on the surface or in the stockpile area, as well as
underground. For prescribed periods. Moreover, in mid-May,
eight truckdrivers sought a wage increase, arguing that their
training period should be viewed as completed. McLaughlin
agreed and arranged with Hayes for each of the drivers to
receive an hourly increase in pay.
During the evening of May 1, a friend told McLaughlin
that during a meeting with the stickers earlier that same
evening, then-treasurer Roger Kaminska had announced that
the withdrawal card request would not be accepted and Re-
spondent ‘‘was going to fine’’ McLaughlin and ‘‘harass
[him] in any way they possibly could.’’ As a result,
McLaughlin prepared a letter resigning from membership in
Respondent. That letter was express-delivered to Respondent
during mid-afternoon on May 2.
Nonetheless, by letter dated May 8, Respondent notified
McLaughlin that its then-president and business manager,
Sam Long, had filed internal charges against the former for
‘‘work[ing] for [the Employer] behind a primary, lawful
picket placed on said employer pursuant to an economic
strike.’’ At a general membership meeting on May 17, ac-
cording to the minutes of that meeting, Kasminsha reported
that McLaughlin had.
crossed over the picket line and accepted a superintend-
ent’s job, resigned from the union and is now training
non-union people to operate the plant. Charges have
been filed on A.D. McLaughlin for breaking down
101’s working conditions.
Furthermore, the minutes of the general membership meeting
on June 21 recite that Long, ‘‘explained that Anthony
McLaughlin was breaking down union conditions by teach-
ing the strike breakers of [the Employer] to operate the
equipment and machinery,’’ with the result that the ‘‘strike
may have been a success without his help to the [Em-
ployer].’’ Following these remarks, a substantial majority of
those in attendance voted guilty and Long announced that a
$5000 fine would be imposed on McLaughlin.
B. Analysis
In American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S.
411 (1978) (ABC), the Supreme Court confronted the issue
of ‘‘whether a labor union commits an unfair labor practice
when it disciplines a member who is a supervisory employee
for crossing the union’s picket line during a strike and per-
forming his regular supervisory duties, which include the ad-
justment of grievances.’’ (437 U.S. at 413.) A majority of the
Court answered that question in the affirmative. They
reached that conclusion despite the fact, pointed out by the
four dissenting justices, ‘‘that the union had no interest in re-
straining or coercing the employers in the selection of their
. . . grievance-adjustment representatives,’’ and despite the
further fact that the union’s ‘‘sole purpose was to enforce the
traditional kinds of rules that every union relies on to main-
tain its organization and solidarity in the face of the potential
hardship of a strike.’’ (437 U.S. at 440)
The majority’s conclusion in ABC squarely governs dis-
position of this case. One of the regular duties of the Em-
ployer’s production superintendents is grievance adjustment.
724 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In fact, McLaughlin did adjust some grievances after becom-
ing production superintendent. Moreover, so far as the evi-
dence shows, once a contract is negotiated between Respond-
ent and the Employer, McLaughlin will be the primary offi-
cial of the latter charged with trying to resolve ‘‘differences’’
arising under it, Sheet Metal Workers Local 68 (DeMoss
Co.), 298 NLRB 1000 (1990), just as Skuban had done when
he had served as the Employer’s Randolph mine production
superintendent. Further, although Respondent’s officials ex-
pressed discontent at membership meetings over
McLaughlin’s training of strike replacements, Long’s May 8
letter recites expressly that McLaughin was being generally
charged with ‘‘work[ing] . . . behind a primary, lawful pick-
et [line],’’ without specification of particular authority that he
was exercising, nor of activity in which he was engaging,
while doing so. Consequently, so far as the record discloses,
Respondent would have subjected McLaughlin to internal
discipline for working behind its picket line—performing du-
ties which included grievance adjusting—regardless of
whether he did or did not train replacements.
Respondent argues, with support in the record, that its in-
ternal discipline did not affect McLaughlin’s willingness to
continue serving as production superintendent. Yet, the reac-
tion of the disciplined supervisor-member is not the signifi-
cant fact under Section 8(b)(1)(B). ‘‘The statute itself reveals
that it is the employer, not the supervisor-member who is
protected from coercion by the statutory scheme.’’ NLRB v.
Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340 (Royal Electric), 481
U.S. 573, 594 (1978).
Although Hayes testified that, as general manager, the fact
that McLaughlin had been charged by Respondent did not
‘‘influence . . . having him be superintendent of the Ran-
dolph operation,’’ McLaughlin had already been selected and
was working as production superintendent by the time that
he was charged by Respondent. There is no evidence that,
at the time of selecting and offering that position to
McLaughlin, Hayes has foreseen that it would lead Respond-
ent to discipline McLaughlin. By contrast, at no point did
Respondent develop any testimony or adduce other evidence
that would support a conclusion that the Employer would re-
main unconcerned by the effect of union discipline on
McLaughlin’s continued authority to adjust grievances on its
behalf.
In ABC the Supreme Court pointed out the where a super-
visor-member is disciplined for performing regular duties
that include grievance adjusting, such discipline naturally
tends to tempt that supervisor-member,
to give the union side of a grievance a more favorable
slant while the threat of discipline remained, or while
his own appeal of a union sanction was pending. At the
very least, the employer could not be certain that a
fined [supervisor-member] would willingly answer the
employer’s call to duty during a subsequent work stop-
page. . . . [437 U.S. at 435.]
There is no evidence in this record supporting a conclusion
that, in the face of Respondent’s internal discipline, the Em-
ployer was so strong-willed that it would be unconcerned
about McLaughlin’s handling of grievances on its behalf in
the future.
Indeed, even were it to be shown that this particular em-
ployer would not have been concerned about a grievance ad-
justor’s attitude following internal discipline, that does not
resolve the general issue of the natural effect of such dis-
cipline on future representation in collective bargaining and
grievance adjusting. Just as with other actions prescribed by
the Act, such as those encompassed by Section 8(a)(1), the
subjective reaction of the employer under Section 8(b)(1)(B)
should not determine whether a violation occurs. Otherwise
a single prohibition would be applied differently to different
people solely on the basis of their emotional strength in with-
standing or succumbing to the proscribed action. In fact, the
test of coercion under Section 8(b)(1)(B), as under other sub-
sections of 8 of the Act, is ‘‘necessarily a matter of prob-
abilities, and its resolution depends much on what experience
would suggest are the justifiable inferences from the known
facts.’’ ABC, supra at 432. Consequently, whether the Em-
ployer is an emotional rough old cob or, conversely, an emo-
tional wilting violet, the adverse effect of intraunion dis-
cipline is evaluated by a single natural tendency: ‘‘[T]o in-
sure having satisfactory collective-bargaining and grievance-
adjustment services would require [the employer to make] a
change in . . . representative.’’ ABC, supra at 435.
Respondent argues that there is no decided authority ap-
plying Section 8(b)(1)(B) to a situation where, as here, an
employer promotes a striking employee during the course of
a strike. That is, points out Respondent, all decided cases
have involved fines imposed on individuals who occupied
grievance adjustor positions prior to commencement of the
strikes involved. Yet, Section 8(b)(1)(B) specified precisely
that it protects ‘‘the selection of [the employer’s] representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining and grievance
adjustment.’’ Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Work-
ers, 417 U.S. 790, 804 (1974). Nothing in the express words
of that subsection, nor in the legislative history underlying its
enactment, qualifies its application. There is no evidence that
the Employer’s selection of McLaughlin as production super-
intendent had been motivated by an effort to undermine the
strike against. it. Accordingly, there is no basis for depriving
an employer from protection under Section 8(b)(1)(B) for
representative selections made during, as opposed to before
a strike.
Finally, Respondent argues that, imposing discipline on
McLaughlin, it had not been motivated specifically by any
grievance adjustments that he made or was likely to have
made on the Employer’s behalf. In the context of a different
record this might have been a more persuasive argument. As
pointed out above, the Supreme Court specifically held in
ABC that union discipline violates the Act when imposed on
a supervisor-member whose regular duties include adjustment
of grievances. However, in footnote 8 of its later opinion in
Royal Electric the Court modified the seeming breadth of
that holding:
insofar as dictum in ABC suggests that a union may not
discipline Supervisor members for acts or omissions
that occur while the supervisor-member is engaged in
supervisory activities other than Section 8(b)(1)(B) ac-
tivities, the dictum is inconsistent with Florida Power,
and we disavow it.
725OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 101 (HUNT MIDWEST)
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
At first blush it might appear that by this disavowal, the
Court imposed an affirmative burden of showing that internal
union discipline was targeted at collective-bargaining or
grievance adjustment activity before a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) could be established. That is, it does not suffice
to establish a violation to show merely that supervisor with
grievance adjustment responsibilities has been subjected to
intraunion discipline. However, such a conclusion is not war-
ranted.
By the very words used, the Court in Royal Electric dis-
avowed the dictum—not the holding—of ABC. At no point
in Royal Electric did the Court hold that Section 8(b)(1)(B)
is not violated when discipline is imposed on a supervisor-
member whose regular duties include adjustment of griev-
ances. As a result it would appear that, because it did not
reverse the ABC holding, footnote 8 of Royal Electric pro-
vides an affirmative defense to a prima facie showing that
a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) has been made out under
the holding enunciated in ABC. That is, once the General
Counsel shows that a supervisor-member whose regular du-
ties include collective bargaining or grievance adjustment has
been disciplined for crossing a picket line and reporting for
normally performed work, labor organizations can rebut the
showing by going forward with evidence that that discipline
had been motivated by ‘‘supervisory activities other than
Section 8(b)(1)(B) activities.’’
Such an interpretation gives continued meaning to both the
holding in ABC and to the disavowal of Royal Electric. It
also is consistent with the methodology utilized to determine
whether other subsections of Section 8 of the Act have been
violated. See, e.g., Wright Line, 252 NLRB 1083 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). In fact, it is consistent with the
overall approach of imposing on a party whose motivation is
at issue the burden of gaining forward with the evidence of
lawful motivation, once a prima facie showing of unlawful
motivation and conduct has been made out.
In this case, however, Respondent failed to avail itself of
whatever avenue of escape was created by the disavowal lan-
guage of Royal Electric. Most particularly, to the extent that
its motivation is a pivotal factor, Respondent ‘‘alone is re-
sponsible for its conduct and it alone bears the burden of ex-
plaining the motivation for its actions.’’ Inland Steel Co.,
257 NLRB 65 (1981). Yet, Respondent produced no wit-
nesses—such as Long or Kaminska—to testify specifically
that it had charged, tried, and fined McLaughlin for engaging
in ‘‘supervisory activities other than Section 8(b)(1)(B) ac-
tivities.’’ Nor do the remarks reproduced in minutes of Re-
spondent’s May 17 and June 21 membership meetings suf-
fice to supply inferential evidence of such a lawful motive.
Of themselves, those remarks are no more than isolated
expressions of a reason for discontent with the effects of
McLaughlin’s return to work. On their face, those few scraps
of remarks made during those meetings do not show that
training of replacements had been the actual motive for
charging, trying, and finding McLaughlin—as opposed to
being a complaint regarding one consequence of
McLaughlin’s offense of failing to observe Respondent’s
picket line. Furthermore, any possible inference of motiva-
tion derived from remarks at membership meeting is obliter-
ated completely the actual reason for having charged
McLaughlin set forth by Long in the May 8 charge: for hav-
ing ‘‘worked for [the Employer] behind a primary, lawful
picket placed on said employer pursuant to an economic
strike.’’ Of course, as grievance adjustment is a regular com-
ponent of the duties of the Employer’s production super-
intendents, that is the very motivation for internal union dis-
cipline adjudged unlawful by the Supreme Court’s holding in
ABC.
It is well settled that, ‘‘mere existence of valid grounds for
[an action] is no defense to a charge that the [action] was
unlawful, unless [that action] is no defense to a charge that
the [action] was unlawful, unless [that action] was predicated
solely on those grounds.’’ NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328
F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964). Here, there may well have
been a lawful basis for internal union discipline on super-
visor-members, even ones possessing collective-bargaining
and grievance-adjustment authority. However to do so, re-
spondent unions must be prepared to show affirmatively that
internal discipline had been motivated by ‘‘supervisory ac-
tivities other than Section 8(b)(1)(B) activity,’’ in response
to the General Counsel’s showing that discipline has been
imposed on ‘‘a member who is a supervisory employee for
crossing the union’s picket line during a strike and per-
forming his regular supervisory duties, which include the ad-
justment of grievances.’’ ABC, supra. Respondent failed to
satisfy that burden.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO,
Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101 is a labor organization
which has committed unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce by preferring and processing a charge against Anthony
McLaughlin, by trying and finding McLaughlin guilty of that
charge, and by levying a fine against him on the basis of that
finding of guilt, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL–CIO, Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101 en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend
that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and, further,
that it be ordered to take certain affirmative action to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. With respect to the latter, it
shall be ordered to rescind the fine levied against Anthony
McLaughlin on June 21, 1990, and to expunge from its
records all documents relating to the internal union charge,
trial, and fine.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL–CIO, Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Restraining and coercing an employer, Hunt Midwest
Mining, Inc., in the selection of its representatives for the
726 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals,
the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
purposes of collective bargaining and the adjustment of
grievances by preferring and processing charges against An-
thony McLaughlin, by holding a trial and finding
McLaughlin guilty of such charges, and by levying a fine
against him.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. in the selection of representatives
for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fine levied against Anthony McLaughlin
on June 21, 1990, and expunge from its records all docu-
ments relating to the internal union charge, trial, and fine of
McLauhlin.
(b) Notify in writing both Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. and
Anthony McLaughlin that the foregoing action of paragraph
2(a) has been taken.
(c) Post at its business offices, hiring hall, and meeting
places in Kansas City, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 17, after being
signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO,
Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101 immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to members and
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that those notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Additional copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Ap-
pendix’’ shall be signed by an authorized representative of
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO,
Hoisting and Portable Local No. 101, and forthwith returned
to the Regional Director for Region 17 for posting by Hunt
Midwest Mining, Inc., it being willing, at its places of busi-
ness, where notices to its employees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT restrain and coerce an employer, Hunt Mid-
west Mining, Inc., in the selection of its representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining and the adjustment of
grievances by preforming and processing charges against An-
thony McLaughlin, by holding a trial and finding
McLaughlin guilty of such charges, and by levying a fine
against him.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or co-
erce Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. in the selection of represent-
atives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment of grievances.
WE WILL rescind the fine levied against Anthony
McLaughlin on June 21, 1990, and WE WILL expunge from
our records all documents relating to the internal union
charge, trial, and fine of McLaughlin.
WE WILL notify in writing both Hunt Midwest Mining,
Inc. and Anthony McLaughlin that we have taken the fore-
going action.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGI-
NEERS, AFL–CIO, HOISTING AND PORTABLE
LOCAL, NO. 101