Oklahoma Fixture Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1116 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1116
Oklahoma Fixture Company and United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local
Union No. 943, AFL–CIO. Cases 17–CA–18734
and 17–CA–19036
August 25, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND HURTGEN
On August 14, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Par-
gen Robertson issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the adminis-
trative law judge’s decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order, and
to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as modified and
set forth in full below.
We find, contrary to the judge and our dissenting col-
league, that the Respondent did not fail to bargain in
good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act during negotiations for a successor collective-
bargaining agreement covering a unit of employees
known as the “outside” unit. Rather, we find that the
Respondent utilized lawful bargaining pressure in an
effort to secure from the Union an agreement that met its
express goal in the negotiations, i.e., the elimination of
the contractual requirement to hire employees through
the Union’s hiring hall. The judge further found, and we
agree for the reasons set forth below, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by ceasing to
deduct permit fees from employees’ pay and by ceasing
to remit those sums to the Union, with respect to another
unit of employees known as the “inside” unit.
The Negotiations for a Successor Collective-Bargaining
Agreement for the “Outside” Unit
Through a series of bargaining meetings, telephone
discussions, and the exchange of written proposals, the
Respondent and the Union conducted negotiations for a
collective-bargaining agreement to replace the agreement
expiring on May 31, 1995.1 At the parties’ first meeting
on August 15, the Union presented a proposed agreement
that included, inter alia, a substantial wage increase. At
the next meeting on September 28, the Respondent sub-
mitted a counterproposal that called for a 19-percent re-
duction in wages; the elimination of health and welfare,
pension and apprenticeship fund contributions; the elimi-
nation of the union-security and hiring hall provisions;
and a contract duration of 1 rather than 3 years.

1 All dates are 1995 unless otherwise indicated.
The Union responded to the Respondent’s counterpro-
posal by mail on October 4. The new union proposal
called for wage increases of 4.5, 2.7, and 3.1 percent,
respectively, in the 3 years of the contract, and increased
the number of apprentices that could be supervised by a
single foreman. The Respondent, on November 10, in-
formed the Union that it would accept the Union’s pro-
posed wage increase if the requirement to staff projects
through the hiring hall were eliminated. The Respondent
explained that it feared that the Union could not provide
sufficient labor for future projects.
The Union did not accept the Respondent’s proposal.
Instead, on December 12 it proposed that the Respondent
have the option of staffing up to 40 percent of a project
through its own hiring, and that the new contract retain
the current provision authorizing the Respondent to hire
on its own if the Union did not furnish sufficient referrals
within 24 hours. On February 7, 1996, the Respondent
submitted a proposal permitting it to staff up to 70 per-
cent of a project through its own hiring; accepting the
Union’s proposed wage increases; and maintaining cur-
rent benefit fund contributions.
When the parties met on March 5, 1996, the Respon-
dent informed the Union that it would accept the Union’s
initial proposal of August 15, provided that the hiring
hall requirement not pertain to jobs performed for Dil-
lards’ stores. The Respondent expressed its concern that
the Union could not supply the labor needed for these
projects, and explained that Dillards had stated that it
would not agree to have fixture work performed under
union contracts. The Union, believing that the Dillards’
projects represented a large portion of the unit work, did
not accept that proposal, and the Respondent later with-
drew it.2
On May 28, 1996, the Union proposed a procedure by
which the parties would meet in advance to discuss pro-
jects requiring more than 10 employees and, if the Union
were unable to refer a sufficient number of employees
within 48 hours of the meeting, the Respondent would be
free to fill the remaining positions through other means.
This proposal was submitted in writing on May 31, 1996.
When the parties met next on July 19, 1996, the Re-
spondent submitted a counterproposal providing for a 1-
year agreement effective as of May 31, 1996; leaving the
use of the hiring hall to the Respondent’s discretion; and
eliminating the access and union-security provisions in-
cluded in the expired contract. On July 23, 1996, the
Union asked the Respondent whether another meeting
would be beneficial, and the Respondent indicated that it
did not think so. The Union made no subsequent re-
quests for bargaining with the Respondent.
2 On March 13, 1996, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the Respondent regarding the proposal to exclude the Dillards’
work from the hiring hall; however, the charge was subsequently with-
drawn based on the Union’s understanding that the Respondent would
withdraw its proposal concerning the Dillards’ work.
331 NLRB No. 145
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1117
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s July 19,
1996 proposal was onerous and calculated to frustrate the
Union so as to constitute bad-faith bargaining. Contrary
to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we do not find
that the record supports such a conclusion. Rather, we
find that the evidence shows only that the Respondent
engaged in lawful hard bargaining in an attempt to
achieve a collective-bargaining agreement with the Un-
ion that would be favorable to its objectives.
Applicable Legal Principles
Section 8(d) of the Act defines the nature and extent of
the obligation to bargain. That section provides:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the represen-
tative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or the negotiation of an agreement . . . but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
The good-faith bargaining requirement, included in the
Wagner Act through 8(5) prohibition against refusing to
bargain, demands that parties approach negotiations with
“a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement.”3 Sec-
tion 8(d) was added in the Taft-Hartley amendments,
however, as a result of Congressional concern that the
Board had “gone very far, in the guise of determining
whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in
setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an em-
ployer must make and of the proposals and counter-
proposals that he may or may not make.” NLRB v.
American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 403
(1952), citing H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1947). In accordance with Section 8(d), therefore,
“the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the sub-
stantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.”4
In H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), the Su-
preme Court again emphasized the strict limitations on
the Board’s role in assessing the bargaining between em-
ployers and unions. Citing assurances in the legislative
history that the Act neither required an employer to sign
any agreement with any union, nor permitted the Gov-
ernment to regulate the wages, hours, or working condi-
tions at any place of employment,5 the Court held that the
Board lacked authority to order agreement as to substan-
tive contract provisions. In the words of the Court:
[A]llowing the Board to compel agreement when the
parties themselves are unable to agree would violate

3 Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600 (1984), quoting NLRB v.
Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960).
4 American National Insurance, 343 U.S. at 404. In fact, the Court
noted that the Act “does not compel any agreement whatsoever be-
tween employees and employers.” Id. at 402.
5 Id. at 104.
the fundamental premise on which the Act is
based—private bargaining under governmental su-
pervision of the procedure alone, without any offi-
cial compulsion over the actual terms of the con-
tract.6
The Court acknowledged that some parties might not
reach agreement through bargaining at all, and might
need to resort to economic weapons.7
In determining whether a party has violated its statu-
tory duty to bargain in good faith, the Board examines
the totality of the party’s conduct, both at and away from
the bargaining table.8 Thus, “[f]rom the context of an
employer’s total conduct, it must be decided whether the
employer is lawfully engaging in hard bargaining to
achieve a contract that it considers desirable or is unlaw-
fully endeavoring to frustrate the possibility of arriving at
any agreement.”9 Conduct relevant to the issue of good-
faith bargaining includes, inter alia, delaying tactics, un-
reasonable bargaining demands,10 unilateral changes in
mandatory subjects of bargaining, efforts to bypass the
union through direct dealings with employees, failure to
designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority,
withdrawal of already agreed-upon provisions, arbitrary
scheduling of meetings, and refusal to provide informa-
tion requested by the union.11 Each of these actions, in
the circumstances of a particular case, might be insuffi-
cient to demonstrate a breach of the duty to bargain in
good faith.12 Cumulatively, however, a pattern of such
conduct may show an intent not to reach an agreement in
the circumstances of a particular case.
The Board, consistent with American National Insur-
ance and H. K. Porter, discussed supra, declines to make
subjective determinations regarding the content of bar-
gaining proposals, including whether the proposals are
acceptable or unacceptable to the other party.13 Instead,
the Board examines proposals only for the purpose of
evaluating whether they were “clearly designed to frus-
trate agreement on a collective-bargaining contract.”14
With respect specifically to the withdrawal of bargain-
ing proposals and tentative agreements, the Board has
6 Id. at 108.
7 Id. at 109.
8 Atlanta Hilton & Towers, 271 NLRB at 1603.
9 Id., quoting from West Coast Casket Co., 192 NLRB 624, 636
(1971), enfd. in relevant part 469 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1972).
10 Member Hurtgen cautions that the Board must refrain from evalu-
ating the “reasonableness” of a given proposal in bargaining. However,
he agrees that other evidence may suggest that a given proposal is
designed to frustrate bargaining and the prospects for agreement.
11 Id.; Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94 (1992), enfd. 987
F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993); Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB, 638
F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1981); and Golden Eagle Spotting Co. v. Brewery
Drivers & Helpers Local 133, 93 F.3d 468, 470–471 (8th Cir. 1996),
enfg. 319 NLRB 64 (1995).
12 NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1978), enfg. 220 NLRB 1389 (1975).
13 Reichhold Chemicals, 288 NLRB 69 (1988).
14 Id.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1118
followed the standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit
in Mead Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 1013, 1021 (1983). In
Mead, the court recognized that the employer’s conduct
must be considered in light of all the circumstances, add-
ing:
The withdrawal of previous proposals or tentative
agreements does not in and of itself establish the ab-
sence of good faith. [Citation omitted.] However,
withdrawal of a proposal by an employer without
good cause is evidence of a lack of good faith bar-
gaining by the employer in violation of Section
8(a)(5) where the proposal has been tentatively
agreed upon or acceptance by the Union appears to
be imminent. [Id. at 1022.]
Relying on Mead, the Board found in Driftwood Con-
valescent Hospital, 312 NLRB 247 (1993), that the em-
ployer bargained in bad faith with the intent of obstruct-
ing bargaining when it withdrew from tentative agree-
ments reached with the union and provided no explana-
tion for its action to the union or the Board. The Board
also found that, based on the totality of the circumstances
and particularly in the context of the employer’s reneging
on the parties’ tentative agreements, the employer also
engaged in bad-faith bargaining by its unexplained with-
drawal of other proposals and substitution of regressive
proposals.15
In contrast, the Board in White Cap, Inc., 325 NLRB
1166, 1167 (1998), enfd. 206 F.3d 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
found that the employer complied with its bargaining
obligation when it withdrew portions of its proposal, to
which the union had tentatively agreed, after the employ-
ees failed to ratify the proposal by the deadline specified
by the employer.16 In enforcing the Board’s decision, the
D.C. Circuit found that the employer, which had offered
favorable terms in order to obtain timely agreement con-
cerning the implementation of a new work schedule, had
good cause for withdrawing from its tentative agree-
ments when timely ratification did not occur.17
In some cases, the Board in finding bad faith has
noted, among other things, that the employer provided no
explanation for its withdrawal of bargaining proposals
and substitution of regressive proposals. For example, in
Central Management Co., 314 NLRB 763 (1994), the
Board found that the totality of the circumstances dem-
onstrated bad faith where the employer solicited employ-
ees to abandon the union, bypassed the union by making
direct offers to employees in exchange for their aban-

15 See also Homestead Nursing Center, 310 NLRB 678 (1993) (em-
ployer bargained in bad faith by withdrawing from tentative agreements
without good cause).
16 In White Cap, the Board did not pass on the continued viability of
the standard applied in Driftwood. Because the present case does not
involve tentative agreements or the imminent acceptance of proposals
by the Union, we find it unnecessary to pass on the Driftwood standard
here.
17 206 F.3d at 32.
donment of the union, failed to timely furnish informa-
tion to the union, threatened a striker with physical harm,
unilaterally ceased benefit fund contributions on behalf
of employees, and replaced its 5 bargaining proposals
with 43 proposals. The change in proposals was ex-
plained only by the negotiator’s testimony that he “had to
go back and make up additional proposals, which I hoped
later on I could trade off to some concessions by the un-
ion.”18
However, the Board has found it immaterial whether
the union, the General Counsel, or the administrative law
judge found the asserted reasons for making the regres-
sive proposals totally persuasive. “What is important is
whether they are ‘so illogical’ as to warrant the conclu-
sion that the Respondent by offering them demonstrated
an intent to frustrate the bargaining process and thereby
preclude the reaching of any agreement.”19
Discussion
Applying this precedent, we find that the record in this
proceeding does not support a conclusion that the Re-
spondent bargained in bad faith by submitting its July 19,
1996 proposal to the Union. Bad-faith bargaining allega-
tions, as discussed above, must be evaluated based on the
totality of conduct, both at and away from the bargaining
table. With respect to actual negotiations, the collective-
bargaining process must be viewed as a whole, not by
isolating single elements of it for scrutiny. Thus, regard-
less of whether one would find that the Union’s proposals
were more reasonable than the Respondent’s or that the
Union demonstrated a greater willingness to compromise,
neither of these considerations would warrant a finding of
a violation under the Act. Nor, in our view, does the to-
tality of the Respondent’s conduct in this case.
The Respondent took the position early in the parties’
negotiations that it wanted to eliminate the necessity to
obtain employees through the Union’s hiring hall. Ad-
hering to that position as negotiations progressed, the
Respondent explained that it feared the Union could not
furnish a sufficient number of employees for upcoming
projects. According to the uncontradicted testimony of
Ronnie Line, the Respondent’s president, the Union had
repeatedly been unable to supply adequate labor to the
Respondent for past projects. Thus, although the Re-
spondent’s bargaining position on this issue would
eliminate a common union role, it also reflects a valid
employer interest. Furthermore, the Respondent’s posi-
tion is not more restrictive than the positions regarding
management-rights clauses and union-security provisions
asserted in other cases in which no bad-faith bargaining
was found.20
18 314 NLRB at 771. See also Pacific Grinding Wheel, supra.
19 Barry-Wehmiller Co., 271 NLRB 471, 473 (1984), quoting Hick-
inbotham Bros. Ltd., 254 NLRB 96, 103 (1981).
20 See, e.g., American National Insurance, 343 U.S. at 398, 407–408
(broad management-rights proposal); H. K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 101
(employer refusal to agree to dues checkoff on ground that it was not
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1119
The Respondent, moreover, demonstrated a willing-
ness to make concessions in order to achieve this bar-
gaining objective. The Respondent’s initial proposal
included the elimination of the hiring hall and union-
security provisions of the expiring agreement, as well as
the health and welfare, pension, and apprentice fund
benefits, and a reduction in wages. On November 10,
however, the Respondent offered to provide the wage
increases proposed by the Union, in exchange for the
elimination of the hiring hall requirement. Under this
proposal, the Respondent would also apply the union-
security requirements to employees who worked for
more than 7 days. The Respondent also subsequently
offered to hire 30 percent of the employees for each pro-
ject through the hiring hall, to accept the Union’s pro-
posal on wages, and to maintain current benefit pro-
grams.21 The Union rejected these concessions, as was its
prerogative, and offered its own proposals, which were
unacceptable to the Respondent.
In its last proposal on July 19, 1996, with its attempts
at reaching an acceptable agreement regarding the hiring
hall unsuccessful, the Respondent returned to its original
position of eliminating both the hiring hall and union-
security provisions, and further deleted the provision for
union access. Nothing in the record suggests that the
Respondent’s last proposal was designed to avoid an
agreement with the Union. Rather, the facts indicate that
the Respondent returned to its earlier stance in order to
emphasize its resolve concerning the hiring hall issue and
to refocus the negotiations on that matter so that an
agreement would ultimately be possible.
There is no evidence establishing that the parties had
reached tentative agreements on union-security, access,
or any other issues, or were close to reaching an overall
agreement. In fact, the parties’ exchange of comprehen-
sive proposals in the form of complete contracts indicates
that all issues remained on the table, even though some
provisions varied little or not at all. The parties’ propos-
als reflected the typical bargaining pattern of concessions
in one area in return for more favorable terms in another.
Significantly, the Union had rejected the Respondent’s
previous proposal. Under these circumstances, the Board
cannot effectively preclude the Respondent from modify-
ing or withdrawing specific portions of its rejected pro-
posal, by concluding that withdrawal of proposed con-

going to aid the union); Reichhold Chemicals, 288 NLRB at 70 (broad
management-rights clause, narrow grievance definition, and compre-
hensive no-strike clause); National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324
NLRB 1031, 1042 (1997) (employer proposal allowing individual
employees to choose whether union membership will be a condition of
their employment).
21 As noted above, the Respondent also proposed that only jobs per-
formed for Dillards, which often required a large number of employees,
be excluded from the hiring hall requirement, but the Respondent with-
drew the proposal after the Union objected and filed an unfair labor
practice charge.
cessions constitutes bad-faith bargaining.22 Such a de-
termination is tantamount to compelling concessions and
regulating the content of the parties’ agreement, powers
clearly beyond the statutory authority of the Board.23
In addition, we do not agree with our dissenting col-
league that the Respondent has demonstrated bad faith by
failing to provide an explanation for the changes encom-
passed in its July 19 proposal. We find that the Respon-
dent adequately supplied an explanation for the changes
in its July 19 final proposal.24 The letter accompanying
that proposal states clearly that the main area of concern
continued to be the hiring hall requirement, the principal
issue of concern to the Respondent throughout the nego-
tiations. Although the Respondent’s brief cover letter
did not spell out that it withdrew its earlier proposal on
union access or returned to its original proposal on union
security in support of its hiring hall position, its brevity
does not provide a basis for inferring bad faith, particu-
larly where it clearly pinpointed the central issue and
where, as noted, the previous proposal had been rejected
by the Union.25
Nor do we agree with the dissent’s assertion that, by
expressing an unwillingness to continue to use the hiring
hall as the “sole source” of its labor, the Respondent pre-
sented an inaccurate explanation for the changes in its
final proposal that cast doubt on its good faith. It is un-
disputed that the Union had proposed procedures that
would allow the Respondent to hire from other sources
under certain circumstances, and that the expired contract
also permitted some outside hiring. The record is equally
clear, however, that the Union’s hiring hall had been the
required primary or initial source of employees, and that
the Respondent was intent on securing relief from that
requirement. Thus, we do not find that the Respondent’s
mere use of the term “sole source” with respect to the
hiring hall constitutes evidence of bad faith.
Finally, our dissenting colleague asserts that the Re-
spondent also demonstrated bad faith when the Union’s
counsel, Birmingham, telephoned the Respondent’s
counsel, Andrew, upon receiving the July 19, 1996 pro-
posal. Birmingham asked whether there would be any
benefit in having another meeting, and Andrew answered
that “he didn’t think so.” Although the dissent concludes
from this response that the Respondent was unwilling to
22 Golden Eagle Spotting Co., 93 F.3d at 471.
23 H. K. Porter, supra.
24 In view of our finding that an adequate explanation was given, we
find it unnecessary to address in this case whether the law required an
explanation in the instant circumstances.
25 Cf. Central Management, 314 NLRB at 771. There, among the
factors considered in determining that the employer bargained in bad
faith was its refusal to identify the real issues to the union. See also
Hyatt Regency Memphis, 296 NLRB 289, 314 (1989), in which the
Board found that the “reduction of a proposal is also not indicative of
bad faith where . . . the rejection of the earlier proposal by the Union
was likely.” In the present case, the Union had already rejected the
Respondent’s prior proposal.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1120
continue bargaining, we do not agree. Initially, we note
that the complaint does not allege that this exchange con-
stituted a refusal to bargain by the Respondent. Further,
the Union never actually requested to meet, and the Re-
spondent’s response did not indicate that such a request
would have been futile, i.e., that the Respondent would
have refused to meet and bargain in good faith. Nor does
the record otherwise suggest that the Respondent was
unwilling to negotiate further with the Union. As the
dissent acknowledges, the Respondent did not declare
impasse, and the record does not indicate that the Re-
spondent implemented its proposal. Further, Birming-
ham testified that the Union made no subsequent effort to
continue bargaining, but rather filed the charge in the
instant proceeding.
In sum, we find that the totality of the circumstances in
this proceeding does not demonstrate that the Respon-
dent acted to evade its statutory obligation to bargain
with the Union. The Respondent was not bound to retain
or improve upon its proposed concessions to the Union,
which had been rejected. The record, moreover, is de-
void of other contemporaneous conduct by the Respon-
dent indicative of bad faith, such as unilateral changes in
working conditions or direct dealing with employees in
disregard of the Union’s representative status. Therefore,
the only basis for the alleged violation is a view that the
Respondent was harsh both in the content of its proposals
and its hard bargaining in support of them. Section 8(d)
of the Act, as contemplated by Congress and interpreted
by the Supreme Court, clearly withholds from the Board
the authority to find unlawful conduct on this basis.
Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint allegation that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act during negotiations for a successor collective-
bargaining agreement covering the “outside” unit.
The Permit Fee Issue
For the following reasons, we adopt the judge’s find-
ing that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by ceasing to deduct permit fees from employ-
ees’ pay and by ceasing to remit those sums to the Union.
This issue involves a different unit of employees known
as the “inside” unit. The parties’ most recent collective-
bargaining agreement covering this unit, effective from
December 1, 1994, to November 30, 1997, contains the
following dues-checkoff provision:
The Company agrees to deduct from the pay of all
employees covered by this Agreement the dues of
the Union and agrees to remit to the Union all such
deductions, provided that the Union delivers to the
Company a written authorization, signed by each
employee to whom this provision applies, irrevoca-
ble for one year or the expiration of this Agreement,
whichever occurs sooner.
The Union has established a “permit fee” to be paid by
new employees in the “inside” unit during the second
and third months of their employment. The permit fee is
equal in amount to the dues the Union charges its mem-
bers.26 In 1989, the Respondent began the practice of
deducting permit fees from the paychecks of “inside”
unit employees who had signed checkoff authorization
forms and forwarding these fees to the Union.27 In Feb-
ruary 1997, however, the Respondent, without notice to
the Union, ceased its practice of deducting and remitting
permit fees.
It is well established that an “employer’s established
past practice can become an implied term of a collective
bargaining agreement.” Bonnell/Tredegar Industries v.
NLRB, 46 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 1995). Furthermore,
“such implied terms cannot be changed without the par-
ties’ mutual consent.” Id. Here, although the parties’
contract speaks in terms of deducting and remitting “the
dues” of the Union, the Respondent has a longtime prac-
tice of also deducting and remitting the Union’s “permit
fees.” Accordingly, we agree with the judge that this
established practice ripened into an implied term that the
Respondent could not modify without the Union’s con-
sent.
The Respondent does not dispute that it failed to obtain
the consent of the Union before discontinuing the deduc-
tion and remission of the permit fees. Rather, the Re-
spondent argued below and in its exceptions that its con-
duct was lawful because the remittance of such permit
fees is proscribed by Section 302 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. Section 302 generally prohibits em-
ployers from making payments to labor organizations
except in certain specified circumstances. Section
302(c)(4), however, excepts from this general rule pay-
ments
with respect to money deducted from the wages of
employees in payment of membership dues in a la-
bor organization: Provided, That the employer has
received from each employee, on whose account
such deductions are made, a written assignment
which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more
than one year.
As the judge found, it is undisputed that the 30–90 day
probationary employees voluntarily executed authoriza-
tions for the Respondent to withhold “an amount equal to
the . . . dues established by the Union,” even though
those probationary employees were not yet eligible for
union membership. The permit fees that the Respondent
was deducting from these employees’ paychecks in fact

26 Employees become eligible for union membership on their 91st
day of employment, following a 90-day probationary period.
27 The “Authorization for Deduction of Initiation Fees, Dues, Etc.”
form states in pertinent part as follows:
I hereby authorize my Employer or his successor to deduct
from my regular wages an amount equal to the initiation fee
and dues established by the Union and to remit such amounts
to the [Union] in the manner specified by my bargaining agent
recognized in the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement.
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1121
represent “an amount equal to . . . the dues established by
the Union.” The Respondent submits, however, that the
permit fees do not constitute “membership” dues within
the meaning of Section 302(c)(4), because they are de-
ducted from employees prior to the time that they be-
come members on their 91st day of employment. The
judge rejected the Respondent’s contention, stating that
“the NLRB has recognized that an employer may deduct
fees from employees that are not union members and
remit those funds to the union,” citing Rochester Mfg.
Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997), and California Saw & Knife
Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machin-
ists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied
sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 119 S.Ct. 47 (1998). In its
brief, the Respondent argues that the cases cited by the
judge are distinguishable, because they involve the de-
duction of fees from employees “who are not full-fledged
members but are required by a union security clause to
meet the ‘financial core obligations’ of membership,”
while the permit fee in issue here “is collected only from
employees who are not union members in any sense of
the word and are not required by the contract to be mem-
bers.” (Emphasis in original.)
As the Respondent recognizes, the Department of Jus-
tice, the agency responsible for the enforcement of Sec-
tion 302, issued an influential opinion in 1948 construing
the term “membership dues” in Section 302(c)(4) as in-
cluding “initiation fees” and “assessments.”28 This con-
struction of Section 302 was followed by the Board in
Wm. Wolf Bakery, Inc., 122 NLRB 630 (1958). The is-
sue presented in Wolf was whether a checkoff provision
in a collective-bargaining agreement was illegal under
Section 302 because it required the checkoff of “dues,
initiation fees, etc.” In Wolf, the Board initially issued a
decision finding that a provision for checkoff of moneys
other than dues exceeded the “membership dues” limita-
tion of Section 302(c)(4). Upon reconsideration, how-
ever, the Board reversed itself, and deferring to the inter-
pretation given “membership dues” by the Department of
Justice, held that that term as used in Section 302 was

28 This opinion, reported at 22 LRRM 46 (1948), reads in pertinent
part as follows:
Does the term “membership dues” in Section 302(c) include
initiation fees and assessments as well as regular periodic dues,
particularly where the union constitution provides that such
fees and assessments are included in the term “membership
dues”?
This identical question was presented to the Criminal Divi-
sion as the result of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of the 1947 which contained a provision for the
checkoff of membership dues, including initiation fees and as-
sessments of the United Mine Workers of America and its
various subdivisions, as authorized and approved by the Inter-
national Union, UMWA. In a memorandum dated July 10,
1947, we furnished the Attorney General with our view on this
question, stating that initiation fees and assessments, being in-
cidents of membership, should be considered as falling within
the classification of “membership dues.” We are still of this
view.
broad enough “to include initiation fees and assess-
ments.” 122 NLRB at 631.
Three years later, in Florence Brooks, 131 NLRB 756,
770–773 (1961), enfd. as modified sub nom. NLRB v.
Food Fair Stores, 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1962), the Board
construed “membership dues” in Section 302 more
broadly than “periodic dues” in Section 8(a)(3). Thus,
the Board held in Florence Brooks that while the term
“membership dues” covers “assessments,” the term “pe-
riodic dues” does not.
The court of appeals agreed with the distinction drawn
by the Board, reasoning as follows:
In [acquiescing] in the interpretation by the Depart-
ment of Justice of Section 302 for the purpose of its
administration of that statute in its penal aspects the
Board did not bind itself to a similar construction in
the administration of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).
Two different policies are brought into play, the op-
erative effects of which create no conflict. Section
8(a)(3) prevents a union shop employer from dis-
charging an employee at the request of the union
unless he has reason to believe that only failure to
pay uniform “periodic dues” or “initiation fees” is
the sole cause of his lack of union membership,
while Section 302, under the interpretation of the
Department of Justice, permits an employer with a
valid union security contract to deduct assessments,
providing the employee has voluntarily signed an
authorization as prescribed in the section. The broad
construction granted in the administration of Section
302 by the Department of Justice is consistent with
the criminal character of the sanction it embodies.
The narrow construction applied by the Board to the
enforcement of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) is con-
sistent with the overall protection afforded by those
sections to employees and equally creates no incon-
sistency with the enforcement of Section 302 for it is
completely extrinsic thereto. [307 F.2d at 12.]
The instant case does not present the question whether
the Union’s “permit fees” fall within the narrow classifi-
cation of “periodic dues.” Rather, the issue before us is
whether the “permit fees” fall within the broader classifi-
cation of “membership dues.” In order to resolve that
issue, we turn for guidance to two court decisions inter-
preting Section 302 consistent with the Justice Depart-
ment’s 1948 opinion.
In Mine Workers Local 515 v. American Smelting Co.,
311 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth Circuit reversed
the District Court and held that “membership dues” as
used in Section 302(c)(4) included a special strike as-
sessment. The court agreed with the broad construction
given that statutory term by the Justice Department’s
opinion and the Third Circuit’s Food Fair decision.
American Smelting was cited with approval by the
Second Circuit in Schwartz v. Musicians Local 802, 340
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1122
F.2d 228 (1964). In the Musicians case, the court held
that “membership dues” included a 1.5-percent “tax” on
members’ salaries. The court reasoned that the tax was
“similar to membership dues in that it applied equally to
all members of the Union who secured employment.”
340 F.2d at 234. The fact that payment was contingent
upon employment did not disqualify the “tax” from being
treated as “membership dues.” Id.
Like the “tax” considered by the court in the Musicians
case, we find that the Union’s permit fee is “similar” to
“membership dues.” For one thing, the monthly permit
fee is equal in amount to the monthly dues the Union
charges its members. In addition, it is well established
that “membership dues” encompasses an “initiation fee,”
Wolf, supra, and the permit fee resembles such a fee be-
cause it represents an amount the employee must pay the
Union prior to becoming a member.29 Finally, although
the Respondent points out that the permit fees are paid by
probationary employees who, under the terms of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement, may be terminated during
their probationary period with or without just cause,
there is no contention that the probationary employees
are not part of the bargaining unit or that they are not
otherwise covered by the agreement. Therefore, the
permit fee can reasonably be viewed as a charge to fi-
nance the cost of representing the probationary employ-
ees, just as the Union charges dues to finance the cost of
representing the regular employees. Accordingly, for all
of the above reasons, we conclude that the Union’s
“permit fees” fall within the classification of “member-
ship dues,” as that statutory term has been broadly de-
fined.
In sum, the record shows, and we find, that employees
voluntarily signed a form authorizing the Respondent to
deduct from their pay and remit to the Union “an amount
equal to the . . . dues established by the Union,” that a
“permit fee” represents such an amount, that the Respon-
dent had an established practice of honoring such au-
thorizations, which became an implied term of the par-
ties’ collective-bargaining agreement, and that “member-
ship dues” as used in Section 302(c)(4) is broad enough
to encompass the Union’s “permit fees.” Accordingly,
we conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act when, during the term of the contract,
it ceased deducting and remitting permit fees without
obtaining the Union’s consent.

Respondent.

29 See Oklahoma Fixture Co., 305 NLRB 1077, 1078 (1992), de-
scribing the Union’s “dues and permit structure.” As the Respondent
notes, the union-security clause does not require payment of permit fees
as a condition of employment. However, the 302(c)(4) exception for
payment of “membership dues” is not limited to dues that are required
to be paid pursuant to a union-security clause. Thus, this fact has no
bearing on the question of whether the permit fees fall within the mem-
bership dues exception.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent, Oklahoma Fixture Company, Tulsa, Okla-
homa, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain with United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union No.
943, AFL–CIO as collective-bargaining representative of
its employees in the below described collective-
bargaining unit, by unilaterally changing terms and con-
ditions of employment by ceasing to deduct permit fees
from employees and remitting those fees authorized by
the respective employees to the Union:
All employees of the Respondent performing
carpentry and wood working functions at the
Respondent’s facility located at 2900 East Apache,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, which employees customarily and
regularly work on the fixtures manufactured by the
Respondent at its facility located at 2900 East
Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, but excluding all office
clerical employees, professional employees,
supervisors, guards, and any employees who apply
any finish, including paint, to any and all fixtures
manufactured by the
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Resume its practice of deducting permit fees from
30 to 90 employees on authorization by each respective
employee, and remitting those funds to the Union as ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
inside unit described above.
(b) Reimburse the Union for the permit fees the Re-
spondent unlawfully failed to deduct and remit, with in-
terest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amounts due under
the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its place of business in Tulsa, Oklahoma, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”30 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1123
Region 17, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respon-
dent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since February 1, 1997.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
This case involves regressive bargaining during nego-
tiations for a successor collective-bargaining agreement
covering the “outside” bargaining unit of employees.1 In
my view, substantial evidence establishes that the Re-
spondent’s regressive final offer was designed to frus-
trate the possibility of arriving at an agreement with the
Union. The Board is authorized to protect the process by
which employers and unions may reach agreement,2 and
in so doing it has “wide latitude to monitor the bargain-
ing process.”3 I would exercise that authority in this case
“to order the cessation of behavior which . . . reflects a
cast of mind against reaching agreement.”4 Therefore,
contrary to my colleagues and in agreement with the
judge, I would find that the Respondent failed to bargain
in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
I emphasize at the outset that my disagreement with
the majority is primarily factual and centers on two key
points. First, the record does not support the majority’s
finding that the Respondent adequately supplied an ex-
planation for the changes in its final offer. Second, the
record clearly establishes, contrary to the majority’s find-
ing, that although the parties were not at impasse, the
Respondent was unwilling to meet with the Union for
further negotiations after the Respondent presented its
final offer.

1 I join my colleagues in finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by ceasing to deduct permit fees from em-
ployees’ pay and by ceasing to remit those sums to the Union, with
respect to the “inside” bargaining unit of employees.
2 See Sea Bay Manor Home for Adults, 253 NLRB 739, 741 (1980),
enfd. mem. 685 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1982).
3 McClatchy Newspapers, v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1997), citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404
(1982).
4 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
Factual Background
Specifically, in its final offer, the Respondent changed
its position with respect to the following three significant
topics:
(1) Union Access to Jobsites. The Union’s initial
contract proposal presented on August 15, 1995,
provided that “[a]uthorized business representatives
shall have access to the projects provided they notify
the field superintendent.” The Respondent’s coun-
terproposal of September 28, 1995, contained pre-
cisely the same provision. The Respondent’s subse-
quent counterproposal of February 7, 1996, likewise
included the access provision, and the record estab-
lishes that the Respondent never raised any concern
regarding that issue. Nonetheless, the Respondent’s
final contract proposal of July 19, 1996, deleted the
access provision. The Respondent never provided
any explanation to the Union for doing so.
(2) Union Security. The Union’s initial contract
proposal included a union-security provision. The
Respondent’s initial proposal did not include a un-
ion-security provision, but its February 7, 1996
counterproposal did. The Respondent deleted the
union-security proposal from its final offer, how-
ever, and provided no explanation to the Union for
doing so.
(3) Use of the Union’s Hiring Hall. The Union’s
initial proposal retained the provision from the pre-
vious contract that the Respondent must initially
seek to obtain employees from the Union’s hiring
hall, but is free to hire from any source if the Union
is unable to provide workers within 24 hours of the
request. The Respondent’s counterproposal of Sep-
tember 28, 1995 proposed elimination of the hiring
hall requirement. The parties thereafter discussed
staffing needs. The Respondent stated that it felt the
hiring hall could not fully satisfy its anticipated per-
sonnel requirements.
The Union, on December 12, 1995, accordingly pro-
posed that the Respondent could, at its discretion, staff
up to 40 percent of any job’s work force without utilizing
the hiring hall. (The Union retained the provision addi-
tionally allowing the Respondent to hire from any source
if the Union failed to furnish requested employees within
24 hours.) The Respondent, on February 7, 1996, pro-
posed that, at its discretion, it could staff each of its job-
sites with up to 70 percent of the work force hired out-
side the union hiring hall.
On March 5, 1996, the parties met with a mediator
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The session focused on the Respondent’s concerns with
the Union’s hiring hall. The Respondent stated that it
would accept the Union’s original contract proposal in its
entirety if the Union would exclude from the hiring hall
requirement any work performed within its jurisdiction
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1124
by the Respondent for Dillards’ department stores. The
Respondent stated that Dillards would not permit work to
be performed under a union contract. On March 13,
1996, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with
respect to the proposed exclusion of the Dillards’ work.
The Respondent thereafter dropped its demand regarding
the Dillards’ work and on May 28, 1996, the Board’s
Regional Office approved the Union’s request to with-
draw the unfair labor practice charge. By letter dated
May 28, 1996, the Respondent informed the Union that it
was withdrawing its previous contract offer.
About May 28, 1996, the parties resumed negotiations.
The Respondent expressed its concern regarding the Un-
ion’s ability to satisfy the Respondent’s staffing needs
for large projects. The Union orally proposed that the
parties meet in a prejob conference to discuss the Re-
spondent’s anticipated need for workers for each project
involving more than 10 employees. Within 48 hours of
the meeting, the Union would advise how many workers
it could refer to the job and, if that number was less than
the anticipated needs, the Respondent would be free to
hire from any source. The Respondent’s counsel stated
that the oral proposal “was interesting and he would like
to see some language on that.” The record does not show
that the Respondent expressed any concern on any other
bargaining topic. The Union, as requested, submitted its
prejob conference proposal in writing to the Respondent
on May 31, 1996.
The judge found that despite requests from the Union
the Respondent did not thereafter reply to the Union’s
proposal for approximately 6 weeks. On July 19, 1996,
the Respondent submitted its final proposal, which
eliminated the hiring hall, the union-security, and access
provisions. The Respondent made no mention of the
prejob conference proposal, which it had asked the Un-
ion to reduce to writing, and indeed made no reference to
any provision other than the hiring hall. The Respon-
dent’s cover letter to its final proposal stated:
The main area of concern continues to be the source
of labor. Just because the Union has a hiring hall,
the company is not willing to continue to use it as its
sole source.
On July 23, 1996, union counsel telephoned the Re-
spondent’s counsel and stated that the Respondent’s final
proposal was a “complete departure” from the parties’
negotiations, and asked whether there would be any
benefit in having another meeting. The Respondent’s
counsel replied that he did not think so. Two days later,
the Union filed the instant unfair labor practice charge.
Discussion
Section 8(d) of the Act defines the duty to bargain col-
lectively as “the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment . . . but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession.” Good-faith bargaining “presupposes a
desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collec-
tive bargaining contract.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents,
361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
It is necessary to scrutinize a party’s overall conduct to
determine whether it has bargained in good faith. See,
e.g., Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600, 1603
(1984). Further, although the Board does not evaluate
whether particular proposals are acceptable or unaccept-
able, the Board will “examine proposals when appropri-
ate and consider whether, on the basis of objective fac-
tors, a demand is clearly designed to frustrate agreement
on a collective-bargaining contract.” Reichhold Chemi-
cals, 288 NLRB 69 (1988), affd. in relevant part 906
F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1053
(1991).
As recently summarized by the District of Columbia
Circuit, “the key issue in evaluating the propriety of re-
gressive bargaining is whether it is designed to ‘frustrate
the bargaining process’. . . . [This principle] is the pre-
dominant theme in the Board’s regressive bargaining
decisions.” Graphic Communications Local 458-3M v.
NLRB, 206 F.3d 22, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Thus, it is well
established that the withdrawal of a proposal by an em-
ployer without good cause is evidence of an intent to
frustrate the bargaining process where the proposal has
been tentatively agreed on, or when acceptance by the
union appears to be imminent. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v.
NLRB, 697 F.2d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1983); and Drift-
wood Convalescent Hospital, 312 NLRB 247 (1993).
Such an intent may also be inferred, even in the absence
of tentative agreements or imminent acceptance of pro-
posals by the union, when the employer fails to offer any
legitimate explanation or justification for its regressive
proposals. See, e.g., Pacific Grinding Wheel, 220 NLRB
1389, 1390 (1975), enfd. 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978);
Hyatt Regency Memphis, 296 NLRB 289, 314 (1989);
Central Management Co., 314 NLRB 763, 770–771
(1994); and O’Malley Lumber Co., 234 NLRB 1171,
1179 (1978).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, I
find, contrary to my colleagues, that the Respondent’s
final proposals, when viewed in the context of the par-
ties’ overall bargaining conduct, were designed to frus-
trate reaching an agreement.
As discussed, the Respondent’s July 19, 1996 final of-
fer backtracked on several significant issues. It deleted
the union-access provision included in prior proposals as
well as the union-security provision included in the Feb-
ruary 7, 1996 proposal. No explanation was offered for
the Respondent’s retreats on these topics. In my view,
this conduct is evidence of bad faith.
Furthermore, in its final offer, the Respondent sought
to eliminate the hiring hall provision entirely, thus, re-
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1125
verting back to the position it had taken in the negotia-
tions approximately 10 months earlier. By way of expla-
nation, the Respondent stated in its covering letter that it
was not willing to use the hiring hall as its “sole source”
of personnel. The Union, however, was not proposing
that the hiring hall be the “sole source.” Rather, the Un-
ion had proposed that the Respondent could, at its discre-
tion, staff up to 40 percent of any job’s work force with-
out utilizing the hiring hall, and the Union had never
withdrawn that proposal. Alternatively, the Union had
offered its prejob conference proposal under which, if the
Union was unable to refer sufficient workers to meet the
employer’s needs on a particular project, the Respondent
would be free to hire additional workers from other
sources, without limitation as to numbers. In other
words, the parties had advanced far beyond the “sole
source” concept, so that by asserting this quite inaccurate
explanation for its regressive proposal, on what was the
key issue in these negotiations, the Respondent cast seri-
ous doubt on whether it was bargaining in good faith,
with a sincere intent to reach agreement.5
The record belies the majority’s view that the Respon-
dent’s “sole source” explanation was simply a benign
expression signifying that the Respondent was intent on
securing relief from such a requirement. The Respon-
dent wholly ignored the Union’s prejob conference hir-
ing hall proposal, despite the fact that the Respondent
had specifically solicited that proposal, deemed it “inter-
esting,” and requested it in writing. It made no counter-
proposal or response whatsoever. Instead, without ex-
planation it abruptly reverted to its position of 10 months
earlier, elimination of the hiring hall, and thereby aban-
doned the parties’ ongoing mutual attempts to reach ac-
ceptable agreement on the hiring hall issue. Given this
conduct, the majority’s view, that the Respondent re-
turned to its original proposals only after “its attempts at
reaching an acceptable agreement regarding the hiring
hall [were] unsuccessful,”6 is totally at odds with the
facts.
Significantly, when the Union objected to the Respon-
dent’s final offer as a “complete departure” from the par-
ties’ negotiations and asked about an additional meeting,
the Respondent replied that there would be no benefit in
having another meeting. It, however, made no claim that
the parties were at impasse. Accordingly, the duty to

5 The Respondent argues in its exceptions that the Union “insisted”
upon its prejob conference proposal that “would require [the Respon-
dent] to look first to the hiring hall for employees.” The record estab-
lishes that the Union did not insist on this proposal, but rather submit-
ted it in writing upon the request of the Respondent.
6 There is no evidentiary support for the majority’s finding that the
Respondent justified its return to its earlier bargaining positions in
order to “emphasize its resolve concerning the hiring hall issue” and to
“refocus the negotiations on that matter so that an agreement would
ultimately be possible.” Upon introduction of its final offer, the Re-
spondent never expressed such a sentiment to the Union, verbally, in
writing, in negotiations, or otherwise.
meet and bargain continued. In my view, the Respon-
dent’s unwillingness to meet and discuss the regressive
proposals it had just made is strong evidence of a cast of
mind, not to reach, but rather to avoid reaching agree-
ment.7
Finally, as the judge found, the Union did nothing to
justify the regressive approach. It consistently made
offers that addressed the Respondent’s concerns and
demonstrated willingness to compromise. Accordingly,
under all of the circumstances, I can only conclude that
the Respondent’s final offer of July 19, 1996, was in-
tended to frustrate the possibility of arriving at any
agreement.
Contrary to the implications in the majority opinion,
my conclusion that the Respondent failed to bargain in
good faith is not premised on the “harsh” content of the
Respondent’s final proposal.8 I have examined the spe-
cific proposals, not to assess their reasonableness, but
simply to determine that in fact they were dramatically
regressive. I have looked, not just at the proposals them-
selves, but rather the entire bargaining process leading up
to and including the abrupt and unexplained retreat in the
July 19, 1996 final proposal. I have considered whether,
on the basis of objective factors, the final offer was
clearly designed to frustrate agreement. See Reichhold
Chemicals, 288 NLRB at 69. Based on this review, I
cannot join my colleagues’ characterization of the Re-
spondent’s conduct as lawful hard bargaining, or an
adamant refusal to recede from an announced position
advanced and maintained in good faith. This is rather a
case in which, after almost a year of negotiations, the
Respondent regressed in several significant respects in its
bargaining proposals, utterly failed to explain those
changes to the Union, and rebuffed the Union’s effort to
obtain a further meeting.
For all these reasons, I would adopt the judge’s con-
clusion that the Respondent bargained in bad faith in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7 The Union’s attorney testified that after receiving the Respondent’s
final offer he asked the Respondent’s attorney whether “would there be
any benefit in having another meeting. He said he didn’t think so” and
that the Respondent’s attorney “saw no basis for further discussion.”
Contrary to the view of the majority, this testimony fully supports a
finding that the Respondent was unwilling to meet further and that a
formal union request for such a meeting would be futile. It is well
established that a respondent’s unwillingness to meet with the union is
indicative of a lack of good faith. See Sparks Nugget v. NLRB, 968
F.2d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1992). The majority’s observation that the
complaint does not allege that “this exchange” constituted an unfair
labor practices is irrelevant. The theory of the complaint is that, “[b]y
its overall conduct,” the Respondent bargained in bad faith, and there is
no requirement that a complaint specifically list each and every indicia
of bad faith. In any event, the unwillingness-to-meet issue was fully
litigated at the hearing.
8 In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent failed to bargain in
good faith, I do not adopt his rationale that the Respondent was at-
tempting to terminate its bargaining obligation by dissipating the Un-
ion’s strength.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1126
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Un-
ion No. 943, AFL–CIO as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees in the below described collec-
tive-bargaining unit, by unilaterally changing terms and
conditions of employment by ceasing to deduct permit
fees from employees and remitting those fees authorized
by the respective employees to the Union:
All employees of ours performing carpentry and
wood working functions at our facility located at
2900 East Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, which em-
ployees customarily and regularly work on the fix-
tures manufactured by us at our facility located at
2900 East Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, but excluding
all office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, supervisors, guards, and any employees who
apply any finish, including paint, to any and all fix-
tures manufactured by us.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL resume our practice of deducting permit
fees from 30- to 90-day employees upon authorization by
each respective employee, and remitting those funds to
the Union as exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in the inside unit described above.
WE WILL reimburse the Union for the permit fees we
unlawfully failed to deduct and remit, with interest.

OKLAHOMA FIXTURE COMPANY

Francis A. Molenda, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Stephen L. Andrew, Esq., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Respon-
dent.
Thomas F. Birmingham, Esq., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge. This
matter was heard in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on June 2, 1997. The
charge in Case 17–CA–18734 was filed on July 25, 1996. The
charge in Case 17–CA–19036 was filed on February 24, 1997.
A consolidated complaint issued on April 11, 1997.
The Respondent, the Charging Party (the Union), and the
General Counsel were represented and were afforded full op-
portunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence. The Respondent, the Charging
Party, and the General Counsel filed briefs. On consideration
of the entire record and briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admitted that at material times it has been a cor-
poration with a place of business in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where it
has been engaged in the manufacturing, remodeling, and instal-
lation of store fixtures; that during the 12 months ending March
31, 1997, in conducting those business operations, it performed
services valued in excess of $50,000 in States other than Okla-
homa and it purchased and received goods and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside Oklahoma;
and that it has been an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act (Act).
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admitted that the Charging Party (Union) has
been a labor organization at material times within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGATIONS
A. Case 17–CA–18734
(a) The General Counsel argued that Respondent illegally of-
fered a final proposal to the Union during negotiations for its
outside bargaining unit, which was onerous and calculated to
frustrated the Union as to constitute bad-faith bargaining.
Respondent and the Union have a collective-bargaining his-
tory going back to the 1930s. The Union has represented ap-
proximately 500 inside production employees and in a separate
bargaining unit, the outside installing portion of the Company
(outside unit). Until the 1980s those contracts were contained
in one document. Since then they have become separate con-
tracts with separate expiration dates. The General Counsel’s
Exhibit 2 is a collective-bargaining agreement in effect from
February 26, 1993, through May 31, 1995, for the outside unit.
That unit is described as:
All employees engaged in field manufacturing, remodeling
and installation of fixtures and cabinetry, employed by the
Respondent in counties within the geographical jurisdic-
tion of the Union, which is Tulsa, Creek, Craig, Delaware,
Muskogee, Wagoner, Adair, Cherokee, McIntosh, Okmul-
gee, Okfuskee, Mayes, Rogers, Pittsburg, Latimer, Le-
Flore counties, that part of Osage County south of State
Highway 20, including all of the town of Hominy, and that
part of Pawnee County east of State Highway 99, and parts
of Haskell and Sequoyah Counties, and the north one-third
(1/3) of Pushmataha County, the north one-half (1/2) of
Atoka County, and the east one-half (1/2) of Coal County,
and the eastern two-thirds (2/3) of Osage County, but ex-
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1127
cluding plant production and maintenance employees, of-
fice clerical employees, professional employees, drivers,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees.
Respondent wrote the Union on January 13, 1995, with no-
tice that it was terminating the collective-bargaining agreement
set to expire on May 31, 1995. On January 20, the Union ad-
vised Respondent that it wished to reopen negotiations for a
collective-bargaining agreement. The parties eventually agreed
to meet for negotiations on August 15, 1995. The Union sub-
mitted a contract proposal. The parties met again on September
28, 1995. Respondent submitted a counterproposal that in-
cluded a 19-percent wage reduction and elimination of health
and welfare, pension and apprenticeship fund benefits. Re-
spondent’s proposal eliminated the hiring hall provision, which
had been included in prior contracts. It provided for a 1-year
contract instead of 3 years.
By an October 4, 1995 letter, the Union submitted another
proposal. Their proposal included a 4.5-percent pay increase in
the first year; 2.7-percent pay increase in the second year, and a
3-percent pay increase in the third year of the contract. The
union proposal provided Respondent economic relief by pro-
viding a change in the ratio of the journeymen and foremen.
On November 10 Respondent answered the Union’s pro-
posal. Respondent agreed to the proposed wage increase pro-
vided Respondent is allowed to staff any and all its projects
with its own employees. Respondent stated that it felt the Un-
ion could not man its upcoming jobs in the Tulsa area. Previ-
ously, under the expired contract, Respondent could man its
jobs from any source if the Union failed to provide requested
manpower within 24 hours. The expired contract provided that
any nonunion craftsman hired by Respondent would become a
union member if his employment exceeded 7 working days.
On December 12, 1995, the Union submitted another coun-
terproposal. In addition to its past proposal allowing Respon-
dent to man any job if the Union failed to furnish requested
employees within 24 hours, the proposal provided that Respon-
dent could at its discretion staff up to 40 percent of any job’s
work force without going through the Union’s hiring hall.
The Union did not receive a response from Respondent. On
January 26, 1996, the Union wrote Respondent asking to dis-
cuss the outside contract.
Respondent submitted a counterproposal on February 7,
1996. Respondent proposed that it could staff up to 70 percent
of any job’s work force. It agreed to the Union’s proposed
wage increases and to the old health, welfare, and pension
benefits.
On February 18, the Union faxed a request to meet and dis-
cuss Respondent’s February 7 counterproposal.
The parties met on March 5, 1996. Respondent proposed
that it would accept the Union’s August 15, 1995 proposal pro-
vided the Union agree to exclude all work Respondent per-
formed for Dillards’ department stores. Respondent expressed
fear that the Union could not man the Dillards’ jobs.
Respondent’s spokesperson stated that Dillards had said that
they were not going to allow any fixture company to do any
installation work under a union contract.
The Union felt that the Dillards’ work constituted a substan-
tial portion of Respondent’s work. According to testimony of
Tom Birmingham, a stipulation in the record of an ongoing
Board hearing, showed that Respondent did $55 million of
work in 1995 and that $45 million of that work was for Dil-
lards.
Around March 11 the parties discussed the negotiations dur-
ing a phone conference call. Respondent had not changed their
position of agreeing to a contract that excluded all Dillards’
work and the Union was unwilling to agree to that proposal.
The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge 2 days later.
The Union understood that Respondent was willing to drop its
demand that the Dillards’ work be excluded from the contract
and it withdrew the unfair labor practice charge.
On May 28, 1996, the parties met. The Union made another
counterproposal. The proposal involved a change in the hiring
hall provisions of the contract for all Respondent’s jobs that
involved more than 10 employees. The Union proposed hold-
ing conferences before the beginning of each respective job.
During the conference Respondent would inform the Union of
the demands for manning the upcoming job. Within 48 hours
the Union would declare whether it could man that job and it
would provide Respondent with a list of employees. If the
Union failed to provide sufficient employees then Respondent
could hire the remaining employees from any source. At Re-
spondent’s request the Union submitted its proposal in writing
on May 31, 1996.
Despite requests from the Union the Respondent did not re-
ply to the Union’s proposal until July 11, 1996. At that time
Respondent notified the Union that it would meet the Union.
However, there was confusion as to the meeting date and the
parties did not meet around that time.
On July 19, 1996, Respondent submitted a counterproposal.
The proposal was for a 1-year contract from May 31, 1996.
Article III provided that Respondent may use the Union’s hir-
ing hall at Respondent’s discretion. Respondent removed a
provision in the August 15, 1995 contract proposal providing
access to each job for the union business representative and
Respondent eliminated the union-security provisions.
On July 23 the Union asked Respondent if an additional
meeting would be beneficial and Respondent indicated it did
not think so. The parties have not engaged in further negotia-
tions.
Respondent President Ronnie Line testified that it expected
to perform installation work during two Dillards’ stores renova-
tion in Tulsa in 1995. Each of those two jobs would require
approximately 100 carpenters. Additionally Respondent antici-
pated a number of other jobs from various customers during
1995. Respondent was concerned the Union could not provide
sufficient manpower for those two jobs in part because of the
Union’s history of having difficulty supplying sufficient man-
power for Respondent’s inside bargaining unit.
Respondent President Line testified that Respondent has al-
ways reached agreement with the Union and it had no intention
of preventing the reaching of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Line testified that the Union had been unable to man
some of its jobs 3 or 4 years back.
Ray Hatten, Respondent’s human resource director, testified
that he has requested 30 employees from the Union during the
last several months to fill positions in the inside bargaining
unit. The Union was able to provide only two names and nei-
ther of those two actually showed up at the job. Hatten agreed
that the contract governing those employees is different from
the contract for the outside unit, which is relevant to this issue.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1128
Findings
Credibility
The parties do not dispute the evidence regarding contract
negotiations.
Conclusions
The General Counsel argued that Respondent’s negotiations
demonstrate an intent not to reach an agreement with the Union
and that where, as here, an employer’s conduct is calculated to
weaken the union rather than reach agreement the employer is
engaged in unlawful bargaining.
Respondent argued that the difference between bad-faith and
hard bargaining can only be inferred from the totality of the
conduct.
Respondent’s initial counterproposal was made on September
28, 1995. Respondent proposed, among other things, elimina-
tion of the hiring hall. On November 10, 1995, in its second
counterproposal, Respondent proposed that it be allowed to staff
its projects with employees of its own choosing. On February 7,
1996, Respondent submitted a proposal that it could staff 70
percent of any job’s work force. On March 5, 1996, Respondent
proposed that it could fully man all Dillards’ jobs. The evidence
showed that Dillards may constitute over 80 percent of Respon-
dent’s total outside work.
On July 19, 1996, Respondent proposed that it may use the
hiring hall at its discretion. Respondent suggested that an addi-
tional meeting after July 19 would not be helpful.
The Union submitted contract proposals on August 15, Octo-
ber 4, and December 12, 1995, and on May 28, 1996. On Feb-
ruary 7, 1996, Respondent agreed that it would accept the Un-
ion’s August 15, 1995 proposals if the Union agreed to permit
Respondent to man up to 70 percent of all jobs’ work forces.
That proposal tended to show that the Union’s August 15 pro-
posal was not unreasonable.
The Union’s October 4, 1995 proposal included an effort at
compromise. The Union proposed that Respondent could dou-
ble the ratio of journeymen to foremen on its jobs. That pro-
posal would provide Respondent with economic relief.
The Respondent expressed concern on November 10 as to
whether the Union could man all its jobs. On December 12,
1995, the Union addressed Respondent’s expressed concern.
The Union proposed that Respondent could staff up to 40 per-
cent of any job’s work force.
On May 28, 1996, the Union made another effort to address
Respondent’s expression of fear that the Union could not man
all its jobs. The Union proposed a prejob conference within 48
hours of which it would supply Respondent with the names of
all referred employees to the job. Respondent could thereafter
complete staffing on the job from any source.
The Union continuously offered compromise proposals in an
effort to satisfy Respondent’s expressions of concern. Respon-
dent expressed concern on November 10, 1995, regarding the
Union’s ability to man its jobs. On December 12, 1995, the
Union proposed a way of addressing that fear. On May 28,
1996, the Union made another proposal addressed to Respon-
dent’s concern about the Union manning its jobs. Respondent
never illustrated a willingness to pursue the Union’s counterpro-
posals beyond its counterproposal that it be permitted to staff 70
percent of all its jobs.
Respondent initiated a position in opposition to the Union
supplying its employees from the union hiring hall. Respondent
showed some flexibility in that position but it never agreed that
the Union could supply more than 30 percent of its work force
on any job. Then Respondent’s final position was a regressive
one. That offer called for the total elimination of the hiring hall.
It is evidence that Respondent continued to show an unwilling-
ness to permit the Union to provide anything near a majority of
any job’s work force and finally it removed even the offer ena-
bling the Union to provide some employees absent a request
from Respondent.
In its final contract offer on July 19, 1996, Respondent also
proposed elimination of union representatives’ access to its jobs
and elimination of the union-security provisions of the contract.
At the time of the final offer, the Union had demonstrated a
willingness to compromise. The Union had consistently made
offers that addressed Respondent’s expressions of concern. The
evidence failed to show that the Union did anything, other than
file an unfair labor practice charge in May 1996, which was
quickly withdrawn that justified the regressive counter-proposal
made by Respondent on July 19, 1996.
The evidence is not in dispute but the Respondent stated on
March 5, 1996, that Dillards was unwilling to allow any fixture
company to do its installation work under a union contract.
I am convinced that Respondent was “focused more intently
on the prospect of a termination of its bargaining obligation
through the Union’s loss of majority than on successful negotia-
tion of a collective-bargaining contract.” Radisson Plaza Min-
neapolis, 307 NLRB 94 (1992). Respondent’s actions demon-
strate an intent not to reach an agreement with the Union.
Horsehead Resource Development Co., 321 NLRB 1404 (1996);
Bethea Baptist Home, 310 NLRB 156 (1993); and Reichhold
Chemicals, 288 NLRB 69, 70 (1988). Respondent consistently
insisted on reducing the Union’s role in manning its jobs to sig-
nificantly less than 50 percent and it finally insisted on removing
the Union’s access to its jobs and removal of the union-security
provision.
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by
making a final collective-bargaining contract offer, which was
onerous and calculated to frustrate the Union.
B. Case 17–CA–19036:
(b) Respondent unilaterally changed a term and condition of
work for employees in its inside bargaining unit.
The second unfair labor practice case involves a different
bargaining unit. The inside unit of Respondent’s employees is
described as:
All employees of the Respondent performing carpentry
and wood working functions at the Respondent’s facility
located at 2900 East Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, which
employees customarily and regularly work on the fixtures
manufactured by the Respondent at its facility located at
2900 East Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, but excluding all of-
fice clerical employees, professional employees, supervi-
sors, guards and any employees who apply any finish, in-
cluding paint, to any and all fixtures manufactured by the
Respondent.
From 1989 until February 1997, Respondent has deducted
from employees’ pay and remitted to the Union permit fees for
those employed for 30 days who had signed authorization for
the deductions. The collective-bargaining agreement provided
for a 90-day probation period. Employees become eligible to
join the Union after their probationary period. In February
1997, Respondent unilaterally, without notice to the Union,
OKLAHOMA FIXTURE CO. 1129
ceased deducting and remitting permit fees to the Union for
employees employed over 30 days but less than 91 days. Re-
spondent made that change on advise of counsel that to con-
tinue making the deductions and payments to the Union would
subject the Respondent to charges for violation of Section 302
of the Act. (See GC Exhs. 29, 30, and 31.)
Findings
Credibility
Again there is no dispute as to the facts.
Conclusions
The General Counsel argued that permit fees deducted from
paychecks of unit employees after 30 days of employment con-
stitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. And that by estab-
lishing a practice of deducting those fees from 30-day employ-
ees since 1989 Respondent and the Union modified the 90-day
security provision of their collective-bargaining contract. Re-
spondent by unilaterally stopping those deductions breached its
duty to bargain.
It is not disputed that the 30- to 90-day probationary em-
ployees did execute authorizations for the Respondent to with-
hold permit fees. It is also not disputed that none of those pro-
bationary employees were union members.
Respondent and the Union were both well aware that permit
fees involved employees that were not union members. See
Oklahoma Fixture Co., 305 NLRB 1077 (1992).
The parties followed a dues and permit structure provided on
the Union’s letterhead shown as effective July 1990 and subse-
quently effective on January 1, 1997 (GC Exh. 29), stating that
Respondent was to deduct permit fees during the second and
third month of employment. The collective-bargaining agree-
ment provided that employees become eligible for union mem-
bership on the 91st day of employment.
Respondent followed the practice of deducting permit fees
from 30- to 90-day probationary employees in agreement with
the Union from 1989 until February 1997. I find on basis of the
full record that the parties did agree to modify the collective-
bargaining agreement by their actions regarding the permit fees
for probationary employees. Riverside Cement Co., 296 NLRB
840, 841 (1989), as cited in Smiths Industries, 316 NLRB 376
(1995).
Respondent argued that the permit fees do not constitute
membership dues under Section 302 of the Act. It argued that
the language of the collective-bargaining agreement union se-
curity clause demonstrates that employees are not required to
elect whether to become union members until the 91st day of
their employment. Permit fees were withheld from probation-
ary employees employed 30 or more days but not exceeding 90
days. Therefore the permit fees may not be considered union
dues but are fees charged to nonmembers of the Union for the
privilege of working. Respondent contends that it would vio-
late Section 302 of the Act by continuing to withhold permit
fees from probationary, nonunion, and employees’ pay.
Section 302 of the Act provides that an employer may not
make payment of funds to a labor organization except, among
other things, “money deducted from the wages of employees in
payment of membership dues” provided the respective em-
ployee authorizes that deduction in writing.
However, the Board has recognized that an employer may
deduct fees from employees that are not union members and
remit those funds to the union. See for example Rochester Mfg.
Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997); and California Saw & Knife
Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995). Here, the litigation did not
extend to the question of whether Respondent and the Union
advised the nonmember employees of their rights under Com-
munications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); and NLRB
v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
It is well established that negotiations regarding probationary
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Bethea Bap-
tist Home, 310 NLRB 156 (1993); Asociacion Hospital del
Maestro, 317 NLRB 485 (1995); and Comcraft, Inc., 317
NLRB 550 (1995).
Respondent cited Mine Workers Local 515 v. American
Smelting Co., 311 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963). However, the court
there determined that it must look to the parties intent in deter-
mining the meaning of membership dues. Here, it is clear by
the actions of Respondent in withholding permit fees from 1989
until 1997, that it and the Union agreed those fees should be
withheld upon authorization by the employees.
I find that Respondent engaged in conduct in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by unilaterally ceasing the deduction
and remission to the Union of permit fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Oklahoma Fixture Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local Union No. 943, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by making a final collective-bargaining con-
tract offer in the below described collective-bargaining unit that
is onerous and calculated to frustrate the Union, has engaged in
bad-faith bargaining violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act.
All employees engaged in field manufacturing, remodeling
and installation of fixtures and cabinetry, employed by the
Respondent in counties within the geographical jurisdiction
of the Union, which is Tulsa, Creek, Craig, Delaware, Mus-
kogee, Wagoner, Adair, Cherokee, McIntosh, Okmulgee,
Okfuskee, Mayes, Rogers, Pittsburg, Latimer, LeFlore
counties, that part of Osage County south of State Highway
20, including all of the town of Hominy, and that part of
Pawnee County east of State Highway 99, and parts of Has-
kell and Sequoyah Counties, and the north one-third (1/3) of
Pushmataha County, the north one-half (1/2) of Atoka
County, and the east one-half (1/2) of Coal County, and the
eastern two-thirds (2/3) of Osage County, but excluding
plant production and maintenance employees, office clerical
employees, professional employees, drivers, guards and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees.
4. Respondent by unilaterally changing terms and conditions
of employment in the below described collective-bargaining
unit, by ceasing to continue deducting permit fees and remitting
those funds to the Union; has engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act:
All employees of the Respondent performing carpentry and
wood working functions at the Respondent’s facility located
at 2900 East Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, which employees
customarily and regularly work on the fixtures manufac-
tured by the Respondent at its facility located at 2900 East
Apache, Tulsa, Oklahoma, but excluding all office clerical
employees, professional employees, supervisors, guards and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1130
any employees who apply any finish, including paint, to any
and all fixtures manufactured by the Respondent.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union, I shall recommend that it, upon re-
quest, bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the
representative of its employees in the outside unit and in the
event that an agreement is reached, to embody such understand-
ing in a written agreement, but, in any event, to negotiate in
good faith for a reasonable time from the commencement of
such negotiations. This reasonable time shall start at the time
negotiations begin again. Having found that Respondent uni-
laterally ceased deducting and remitting permit fees to the Un-
ion, I shall recommend that it immediately reinstate that prac-
tice.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]