Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 2, 2018

366 NLRB No. 147 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 147
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
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Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation and
Porfiria Vasquez. Case 31–CA–167294
August 2, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, MCFERRAN, AND KAPLAN
On November 2, 2016, Administrative Law Judge El-
eanor Laws issued the attached decision. The Respond-
ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.1
The judge found, applying the Board’s decisions in D.
R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in rele-
vant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied in relevant
part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act by maintaining its dispute resolution program, for-
mally titled the “Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitra-
tion Program,” that requires employees, as a condition of
employment, to waive their rights to pursue class or col-
lective actions involving employment-related claims in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), a consol-
idated proceeding that included review of court decisions
below in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 2016), Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d
975 (9th Cir. 2016), and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
supra. Epic Systems concerned the issue, common to all
three cases, whether employer-employee agreements that
contain class- and collective-action waivers and stipulate
that employment disputes are to be resolved by individu-
alized arbitration violate the National Labor Relations
Act. 138 S.Ct. at 1619–1621, 1632. The Supreme Court
held that such employment agreements do not violate this
Act and that the agreements must be enforced as written
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 1619,
1632.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs. In light of the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Epic Systems, which overrules
the Board’s holding in Murphy Oil, we conclude that the
complaint must be dismissed.2

1 Chairman Ring is recused and took no part in the consideration of
this case.
2 We therefore find no need to address other issues raised by the Re-
spondent’s exceptions.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 2, 2018
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rudy L. Fong Sandoval, for the General Counsel.
Thomas M. Stanek, Christopher J. Meister, for the Respondent.
Vida M. Holguin, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELEANOR LAWS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried by joint stipulation approved by Associate Chief Adminis-
trative Law Judge Gerald Etchingham on September 2, 2016,
and assigned to me for a decision.
Porfiria Vasquez (the Charging Party or Vasquez) filed the
charge through January 7, 2016. The General Counsel issued
the complaint on June 27, 2016. Northrup Grumman Systems
Corporation (the Respondent) filed a timely answer denying all
material allegations and setting forth defenses.
This is another case applying the Board’s decisions in D. R.
Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant
part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015). Specifically, the complaint alleges the Respondent vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by maintaining
and enforcing agreements requiring employees to resolve em-
ployment-related disputes through individual binding arbitra-
tion, unless prohibited on unspecified jurisdictional grounds.
On the entire record, and after considering the briefs filed by
the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent Northrup Grumman Sys-
tems Corporation, a Delaware corporation with a place of busi-
ness in Redondo Beach, California, has been engaged in aero-
space and defense contracting. The parties admit, and I find,
that at all material times, the Respondent has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
and (7) of the Act.
A. The Dispute Resolution Program
Since at least about September 15, 2006, the Respondent has
maintained a corporate procedure regarding an “Employee
Mediation/Binding Arbitration Program” (Jt. Exh. 2).1 The
Respondent amended its dispute resolution program (referred to
by the parties and herein as the “DRP”) on February 15, 2010.
(Jt. Exh. 3.)
The DRP reads in pertinent part:
By accepting or continuing employment, employees covered
by this Program agree to submit any covered claims to bind-
ing arbitration, rather than to have such claims heard by a
court, jury, or government agency.
. . .
Claims Covered: This Program does not apply to or cover
claims . . . [a]s to which an agreement to arbitrate such claims
is prohibited by law; [or that are] [c]overed under the National
Labor Relations Act and within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. . . .
. . .
Class Action Claims: To the extent it is permissible to do so in
the jurisdiction where the arbitration is held and (if applicable)
under the jurisdiction where the parties’ obligation to arbitrate
claims under this Program is enforced, both you and the
Company waive the right to bring any covered claim under
this Program as a class action. In jurisdictions where this is
permissible, the arbitrator will not have authority or jurisdic-
tion to consolidate claims of different employees into one
proceeding, nor shall the arbitrator have the authority or juris-
diction to hear the arbitration as a class action.
In any jurisdiction where the class action waiver described
above is not permitted by law or is not enforceable, the issue
of whether to certify any alleged or putative class for a class
action proceeding must be decided by a court of competent ju-
risdiction. The arbitrator will not have authority or jurisdic-
tion to decide class certification issues. Until any class certifi-
cation issues are decided by the court, all arbitration proceed-
ings shall be stayed, and the arbitrator shall take no action
with respect to the matter. However, once any issues regard-
ing class certification have been decided by the court, the arbi-
trator will have authority to decide the substantive claims on
an individual or a class basis, as may be determined and di-
rected by the court.
A. Charging Party’s Actions and Litigation
The parties stipulated to the following facts concerning
Charging Party Porfiria Vasquez:
Vasquez worked for the Respondent from about 2004 until
her employment ended on or about October 25, 2012. (Jt. Mot.
¶5(g).)

1 “Jt. Exh.” stands for joint exhibit; “Jt. Mot.” stands for joint mo-
tion. Though I have made certain specific citations, I have considered
the entire record in rendering this decision.
In or about October 2006, the Respondent required Vasquez
to acknowledge that compliance with the DRP was a condition
of employment. Vasquez acknowledged acceptance and com-
pliance with the DRP on about October 2006 and again on
about February 2010 as a condition of employment. (Jt. Mot.
¶5(h).)
On or about August 5, 2015, Vasquez filed a complaint for
damages and injunctive relief against the Respondent captioned
Porfiria Vasquez v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation,
Does 1-50, case 2:15-CV-05926-AB-AFM (United States Dis-
trict Court, Central District of California) (the Federal lawsuit).
(Jt. Mot. ¶5(i); Jt. Exh. 4.)
On or about October 6, 2015, Vasquez filed a first amended
complaint in the Federal lawsuit. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(j); Jt. Exh. 5.)
On or about December 17, 2015, the Respondent filed a mo-
tion to compel binding arbitration (motion to compel) in the
Federal lawsuit. The Respondent’s motion to compel was filed
concurrently with declarations of Lori Ullmer-McCallum, Gina
Piellush, Monica Krause, Alexis Goubran, Lizbeth Aleman,
James Carpenter and Taraneh Fard. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(k); Jt. Exh. 6.)
On or about January 4, 2016, Vasquez filed an Opposition to
the Respondent’s motion to compel. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(l); Jt. Ex. 7.)
On or about March 4, 2016, the Court granted the Respond-
ent’s motion to compel binding arbitration in the Federal law-
suit. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(m); Jt. Exh. 8.)
Vasquez is pursuing her claims against the Respondent in an
arbitral forum and an arbitration hearing is scheduled to begin
on April 24, 2017. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(n); Jt. Exh. 9.)
Vasquez has identified both current and former employees of
Respondent as witnesses she intends to use to support her
claims at the arbitration hearing. (Jt. Mot. ¶5(o); Jt. Exh. 19.)
Respondent did not discipline Vasquez or terminate her em-
ployment for filing a class, collective, or joint action or com-
plaint, nor has Respondent disciplined, or terminated the em-
ployment of, any other current or former employee, for filing a
class, collective, or joint action or complaint. (Jt. Mot. ¶ 5(p).)
II. DECISION AND ANALYSIS
A. Maintenance of the DRP
The complaint alleges that the Respondent has violated the
Act by maintaining the DRP, which require employees to waive
their right to resolution of employment-related disputes by
collective or class action, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.2
Under Section 8(a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The
rights Section 7 guarantee include the right “to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . .”

2 Both the Respondent and the Charging Party point to provisions in
the DRP regarding Board proceedings. As the General Counsel points
out, there is no allegation in the complaint regarding the DRP and
Board charges, and no party contends the underlying claims in
Vasquez’ lawsuit fall within the Board’s jurisdiction to decide.
NORTHROP GRUMAN SYSTEMS CORP. 3
When evaluating whether a rule, including an arbitration
agreement, violates Section 8(a)(1), the Board applies the test
set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004). See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375, 377
(2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); D. R. Hor-
ton, supra. Under Lutheran Heritage, the first inquiry is
whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Sec-
tion 7. If it does, the rule is unlawful. If it does not “the viola-
tion is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1)
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit
Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to
union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 rights.” Lutheran Heritage at 647.
Because the DRP explicitly prohibits employees from pursu-
ing employment-related claims on a class or collective basis “to
the extent it is permissible to do so in the jurisdiction where the
arbitration is held” or enforced, I find it violates Section
8(a)(1). The right to pursue concerted legal action, including
class complaints, addressing wages, hours, and working condi-
tions falls within Section 7’s protections. See, e.g., Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., supra; D. R. Horton, supra;3 see also Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978)(Sec. 7 protects employee
efforts seeking “to improve working conditions through resort
to administrative and judicial forums”); Spandsco Oil & Royal-
ty Co., 42 NLRB 942, 948–949 (1942); Salt River Valley Water
Users Assn., 99 NLRB 849, 853–854 (1952), enfd. 206 F.2d
325 (9th Cir. 1953); Brady v. National Football League, 644
F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) (“lawsuit filed in good faith by a
group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or condi-
tions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ under §7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.”); Trinity Trucking & Materials
Corp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1977) (mem. disp.), cert.
denied 438 U.S. 914 (1978). Accordingly, an employer rule or
policy that interferes with such actions violates Section 8(a)(1).
D. R. Horton, supra; Murphy Oil, supra; see also, e.g., Chesa-
peake Energy Corp., 362 NLRB No. 80 (2015); Cellular Sales
of Missouri, 362 NLRB No. 27 (2015); Neiman Marcus Group,
Inc., 362 NLRB No. 157 (2015); Countrywide Financial Corp.,
362 NLRB No. 165 (2015); Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 362
NLRB No. 184 (2015); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., Case No.
15–2997 (7th Cir., May 26, 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young, ,
Case No. 13–16599 (9th Cir., August 22, 2016).
The Respondent argues that the Board’s interpretation in D.
R. Horton and Murphy Oil fails to comply with the FAA. This
argument has been repeatedly rejected by the Board, as articu-
lated in the cases cited above, among others.4 The Respond-
ent’s argument that the Board’s caselaw is inconsistent with the
Rules Enabling Act has likewise been rejected by the Board.
See MasTec Services Co., 363 NLRB No. 81, slip op. at 2 fn. 3
(2015). The Board has also repeatedly and consistently reject-
ed the Respondent’s argument that D. R. Horton and Murphy
Oil conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.

3 The Board in Murphy Oil reexamined D. R. Horton, and deter-
mined that its reasoning and results were correct.
4 The Board has fully addressed the relationship between the FAA
and both the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
(“[T]he substantive Sec. 7 right to pursue employment-related
claims collectively, without employer interference or restraint,
is distinct from the procedural governing class certification.”)
The Respondent argues that nothing in the DRP penalizes
employees for attempting to pursue collective or class litiga-
tion. This does not withstand even cursory scrutiny. An em-
ployee cannot meaningfully pursue something she has been
required to contract away. The DRP is the epitome of employ-
er interference with the right to pursue, in a manner that is not
futile, employment-related claims as a class. It is one thing for
a court or other tribunal to deny class certification, collective
proceedings, joinder, consolidation, or other means of hearing
claims of more than one individual at a time, based on failure to
meet the criteria under governing rules and procedures of the
deciding forum. It is quite another for an employer to require
employees to agree to forego this determination as a condition
of employment.
The language about permitting class collective arbitration in
jurisdictions where it is unlawful to preclude it does not save
the DRP. The Board’s clear position is that collective and class
claims about wages, hours, and working conditions are protect-
ed by the Act, without regard to independent jurisdictional
“permission” or even lack of preclusion. The Respondent’s
attempt to restrict this by way of nonspecific jurisdictional lan-
guage that is not readily discernible by a layperson is unavail-
ing.5 See Allied Mechanical, 349 NLRB 1077, 1084 (2007).
Considering that ambiguities must be construed against the
drafter of the DRP, which is the Respondent, I find the DRP
violates Section 8(a)(1) because employees would reasonably
believe the DRP requires arbitration of class or collective em-
ployment-related claims covered by the Act, at least in some
unidentified areas. See Aroostook County Regional Ophthal-
mology Center, 317 NLRB 218 (1995).
The Respondent propounds numerous other arguments as to
why D. R. Horton and its progeny should be overturned.6 I am,
however, required to follow Board precedent, unless and until it
is overruled by the United States Supreme Court. See Gas
Spring Co., 296 NLRB 84, 97 (1989) (citing, inter alia, Insur-
ance Agents International Union, 119 NLRB 768 (1957), revd.
260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd. 361 U.S. 477 (1960)),
enfd. 908 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1084
(1991). Any arguments regarding the legal integrity of Board
precedent are therefore properly addressed to the Board.
B. Enforcement of the Agreement
The complaint further alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by enforcing the DRP, as detailed
above.
The Board in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil held that an em-

5 Obviously, highly trained lawyers and judges disagree over
whether some sort of jurisdictional “permission” to bring collective
actions is requisite anywhere; otherwise the current complaint and the
many akin to it would not exist.
6 Many of these arguments are in line with the dissents in D. R. Hor-
ton and Murphy Oil. Numerous Board and ALJ decisions have ad-
dressed the specific arguments raised by the Respondent and there is
nothing I can add in this decision that has not already been addressed
repeatedly.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
ployer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it enforces an
unlawful arbitration provision through a motion to compel arbi-
tration to prevent employees’ collective claims. Murphy Oil,
361 NLRB 774, 792–794. Here, it is undisputed that the Re-
spondent enforced the DRP by filing a motion to compel arbi-
tration in Vasquez’ lawsuit. The Respondent contends, howev-
er, that removing Vasquez’ individual complaint to arbitration
did not restrict her in the exercise of her Section 7 rights.
A threshold issue is thus whether Vasquez’ Federal lawsuit
amounts to concerted activity. Vasquez is the sole named
plaintiff in the lawsuit; neither the complaint nor the amended
complaint lists any other plaintiffs, and most of the claims in
Vasquez’ lawsuit seek only individual relief.
The General Counsel asserts that two of Vasquez’ causes of
action under California State law seek collective relief. The
sixth cause of action alleges failure to pay for meal and rest
breaks pursuant to the California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512,
and Wage Order No. 1, section 12, and Wage Order No. 9,
section 12. Some of the complaint paragraphs in the sixth
cause of action refer to other aggrieved employees. Specifical-
ly, paragraph 61 of the complaint states:
61. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
she and other nonexempt employees were not authorized or
permitted to take a 10 minute rest period every 4 hours of
work. As a result, defendants must pay each employee 1 hour
of pay at his regular rate of compensation.
Paragraphs 64 and 65of the complaint state:
64. By virtue of Defendants' unlawful failure to provide meal
and rest periods to Plaintiff and others, they each have suf-
fered, and will continue to suffer, damages in the amount
which is presently unknown to Plaintiff, but which will be as-
certained and established according to proof at a trial.
65. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based upon that in-
formation and belief alleges, that Defendants knew or should
have known that Plaintiff and other nonexempt employees
were entitled to meal periods and rest breaks but purposely
elected not to provide these mandated periods.
Finally, paragraph 67 states:
67. In performing that acts and practices herein alleged in vi-
olation of the labor laws, the Defendants acted and continue to
act intentionally, oppressively, and maliciously toward
Plaintiff, with a conscious disregard of his rights, or the con-
sequences to him or others, and with the intent of depriving
them of his property and legal rights and otherwise causing
Plaintiff and others injury in order to increase corporate prof-
its at the expense of Plaintiff and other nonexempt employees.
The ninth cause of action alleges violation of the Unfair
Business Practices Act, pursuant to the Business & Professions
Code §17200, et seq. Some of the complaint paragraphs in the
ninth cause of action refer to other aggrieved employees. Spe-
cifically, paragraphs 80–82 state:
80. As a result of Defendants' unfair business practices, De-
fendants have reaped unfair benefits and illegal profits at the
expense of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, as well as
members of the public. Defendants should be made to dis-
gorge their ill-gotten gains and to restore them to Plaintiff.
81. Defendants' unfair business practices entitles Plaintiff to
seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief including,
but not limited to, orders that Defendants account for, dis-
gorge and restore to Plaintiff and other nonexempt employees
the wages and other compensation unlawfully withheld from
her.
82. As a result of the above-alleged misconduct, Plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and similarly aggrieved employees, have
been deprived of lawful wages to which he/she or they were
entitled and Plaintiff and these similarly aggrieved employees
have suffered damages, in an amount to be determined ac-
cording to proof at trial, including interest and penalties there-
on.
In Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152 (2015), the Board found that
the plaintiff’s individual lawsuit brought on behalf of other
employees was concerted activity, and terminating him for
pursuing it was unlawful.7 Accordingly, I find counts 6 and 9
of Vasquez’ lawsuit, which seek relief on behalf of Vasquez
herself and other employees, are concerted.
Whether Vasquez’ lawsuit is concerted, however, is a sepa-
rate question from whether the Respondent violated the Act by
requiring that it be arbitrated rather than pursued in court. The
Respondent asserts that since Vasquez has not filed a class or
collective complaint, its motion to compel arbitration had no
impact on her Section 7 rights.
The General Counsel acknowledges the Respondent’s mo-
tion to compel arbitration does not specifically call for individ-
ual arbitration. Indeed, it does not invoke any of the language
in the DRP that restricts class or collective actions. The Gen-
eral Counsel argues, however, that the Respondent applied the
DRP’s class action waiver “to restrict those portions of
Vasquez’ lawsuit which . . . qualify as collective or class litiga-
tion.” Vasquez did not bring a class action complaint, howev-
er.8 Therefore, it is not surprising that the unlawful class action
waiver was not implicated in the Respondent’s motion to com-
pel arbitration, or in Vasquez’ response to it. There is no evi-
dence other employees sought to join Vasquez’ complaint,
sought to consolidate their complaints with hers, or sought to be
included in the litigation other than to testify as witnesses.
The collective portion of Vasquez’ complaint concerns rem-
edies to herself and other employees. Importantly, on this point
the DRP states, “[T]he arbitrator may award any remedy that
could be awarded by a court, including, for example, back pay,
compensatory damages, preliminary and/or permanent injunc-

7 The Board has also held that enlisting coworker support for a law-
suit involving a workplace concern—here wages—is concerted activity.
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB No. 12 (2014). As it
is undisputed Vasquez lined up coworker witnesses to support her
lawsuit, I find it was concerted activity.
8 Under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23, an individual must sue as a class repre-
sentative, which Vasquez did not do. There is no evidence she sought
class certification, and given the nature of her lawsuit, which requests a
hybrid of individual and collective relief, it is difficult to see a path to
certification, even if it was sought.
NORTHROP GRUMAN SYSTEMS CORP. 5
tive relief, and/or punitive damages.” As such, the Section 7
protected aspects of Vasquez’ claim remain intact notwith-
standing the impact of the motion to compel. Under the specif-
ic facts of this case, Vasquez’ right to pursue her claim, includ-
ing her requested relief, is no different in the arbitral forum
than in court. See D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB at 2289.
It is crucial to emphasize this case turns on the fact that the
Respondent did not rely on any of the alleged unlawful provi-
sions of the DRP in seeking to remove Vasquez’ lawsuit to
arbitration.9 If the Respondent sought to thwart any attempt by
Vasquez to seek class certification or otherwise proceed collec-
tively, or asserted the DRP in an effort to limit her requested
collective remedies, this would be unlawful enforcement of the
DRP. As the General Counsel has not presented evidence that
the DRP has been enforced to limit any collective claims or
remedies, I recommend dismissal of this complaint allegation.
C. Request to Stay
The Respondent requests a stay of the instant matter until the
Supreme Court rules on whether agreements like the DRP are
lawful under the Act. I decline to stay the proceedings, given
the uncertainty as to when the Supreme Court will take up and
decide the issue. Until that time, my role is to follow existing
Board precedent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) Respondent Northrup Grumman Systems Corporation, is
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7).
(2) The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining the Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration Pro-
gram that restricts employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in
class or collective litigation.
REMEDY
Having found the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order them to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
As I have concluded that the Employee Mediation/Binding
Arbitration Program is unlawful, the recommended order re-
quires that the Respondent revise or rescind it in all of forms to
make clear to employees that the Employee Mediation/Binding
Arbitration Program does not interfere with their right to main-
tain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions. The
Respondent shall notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign the Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitra-
tion Program agreement in any form that it has been rescinded
or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised
Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration Program agreement.
Because the Respondent utilized the Employee Media-
tion/Binding Arbitration Program on a corporate-wide basis,
the Respondent shall post a notice at all locations where the
Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration Program, or any por-

9 Only the class/collective partial waiver is challenged here. The
DRP’s lawful provisions could lawfully be used (and were used here)
to remove Vasquez’ individual age discrimination complaint to arbitra-
tion. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20
(1991).
tion of it restricting employees’ rights to engage in class or
collective action, was in effect. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of Cali-
fornia, supra, fn. 2 (2006); D. R. Horton, supra; Murphy Oil,
supra.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, Northrup Grumman Systems Corporation,
a Delaware corporation with a place of business in Redondo
Beach, California, their officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining an Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration
Program that restricts employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in
class or collective litigation.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:. (a) Rescind the Employee Media-
tion/Binding Arbitration Program in all forms, or revise it in all
forms to make clear to employees that the Employee Media-
tion/Binding Arbitration Program does not interfere with their
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective
actions.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who signed the
Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration Program agreement
in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised,
provide them a copy of the revised agreement(s).
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all fa-
cilities where it has maintained the arbitration agreements the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distribut-
ed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, a Respondent has gone out of business or closed any
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since August 25, 2013.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 2, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain an Employee Mediation/Binding Ar-
bitration Program that restricts employees’ rights to maintain
class or collective actions regarding employment-related dis-
putes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitra-
tion Program in all forms, or revise it in all forms, to make clear
that it does not restrict employees’ rights to maintain class or
collective actions.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who signed
the Employee Mediation/Binding Arbitration Program agree-
ment in any of its forms that it has been rescinded or revised
and, if revised, we will provide them a copy of the revised
agreement(s).
NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-167294 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-
1940.