M&M Affordable Plumbing, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 4, 2015

362 NLRB No. 159 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

362 NLRB No. 159
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
M & M Affordable Plumbing, Inc. and Jeffery Ceren.
Case 13–CA–121459
August 4, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS HIROZAWA, JOHNSON, AND MCFERRAN
On November 19, 2014, Administrative Law Judge
Melissa M. Olivero issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a
reply brief. The General Counsel filed an answering
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, M & M Affordable Plumb-
ing, Incorporated, Rockdale, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(c) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
“(c) Compensate Jeffery Ceren for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file a report with the Social Security Admin-
istration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar quarters.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged employee Jeffery Ceren, we do not rely on NLRB v. Erie Resis-
tor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963), and the judge’s statement that the
Respondent’s termination of Ceren because he was a union member
was inherently destructive of Sec. 7 rights.
2 We shall modify the judge's recommended Order to reflect the
Board's tax compensation and Social Security Administration reporting
remedies in language consistent with Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas
Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10 (2014). We shall substitute a new
notice to conform to the modified Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 4, 2015
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Harry I. Johnson, III, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any employee for engaging in union or other
concerted activities protected under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
offer Jeffery Ceren full reinstatement to his former job
or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Jeffery Ceren whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge,
less any net interim earnings, plus interest compounded
daily.
WE WILL compensate Jeffery Ceren for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
award, and WE WILL file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay award to the ap-
propriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful dis-
charge of Jeffery Ceren, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
and that the discharge will not be used against him in any
way.
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/13–CA–121459 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Brigid Garrity, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joshua Feagans, Esq. and Patrick M. Griffin, Esq., for the Re-
spondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELISSA M. OLIVERO, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Chicago, Illinois, on June 5, 2014. Jeffery Ceren,
an Individual, filed the charge on January 29, 2014, and the
General Counsel issued the complaint on March 28, 2014.1 (GC
Exh. 1(a), (b), (d).) The complaint alleges that M & M Afford-
able Plumbing, Inc., (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by discharging Charging Party Ceren and Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening not to rehire Ceren because of
his union or protected concerted activities. (GC Exh. 1(d).)
Respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint denying the
alleged violations of the Act and asserting six affirmative de-
fenses. (GC Exh. 1(h).) The parties were given a full oppor-
tunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. On the entire
record, including my own observation of the demeanor of the

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Br.” for Respondent’s Brief; and “GC Br.” for
the General Counsel’s Brief.
witnesses,2 and after considering the briefs filed by the General
Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, is a plumbing contractor provid-
ing service to both commercial and residential customers from
its facility in Rockdale, Illinois, where it annually purchases
and receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 from other
enterprises located within the State of Illinois, each of which
other enterprises had received these goods directly from points
outside the State of Illinois. Respondent admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that Chicago Journey-
men Plumbers Local Union 130, U.A. (Union) is a labor organ-
ization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operations and
Management Structure
Respondent is a residential and commercial plumbing con-
tractor. As of April 2014, Respondent employed seven union
members (GC Exh. 7; Tr. 38–39, 41.) Michael Malak is Re-
spondent’s owner.3 Respondent admits, and I find, that Malak
is a supervisor of Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act and an agent of Respondent within the mean-
ing of Section 2(13) of the Act.
B. Respondent’s Collective-Bargaining Relationship with
the Union
The undisputed testimony of Kenneth Turnquist, the Union’s
financial secretary/treasurer, and the uncontroverted documen-
tary evidence of record, establishes that Respondent is a mem-
ber of PCA (Plumbing Contractor’s Association) and
PAMCANI (Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors of Northern
Illinois) and has assigned these entities the authority to bargain
on its behalf with the Union. (GC Exhs. 2, 5; Tr. 22–23; 31–
32.) Through PCA and PAMCANI, Respondent has been sig-
natory to several collective-bargaining agreements with the
Union under Sec. 8(f) of the Act. Respondent has been signato-
ry to an agreement with PCA since 1995. (Tr. 22.) Respondent
was most recently signatory to an agreement with PCA in effect
from June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2013. (GC Exhs. 2, 3.)
This agreement was extended for 1 year on June 3, 2013. (GC
Exh. 4; Tr. 30.) The most recent PAMCANI agreement was
effective from June 1, 2012, through May 31, 2014. (GC Exh.
6; Tr. 33–34).
In January 2013, the Union merged with two other locals:
Local 93 and Local 501. (Tr. 21.) Following the merger be-
tween the Union and Locals 93 and 501, Respondent became

2 Although I have included citations to the record to highlight partic-
ular testimony or exhibits, my findings and conclusions are not based
solely on those specific record citations, but rather on my review and
consideration of the entire record for this case. I further note that my
findings of fact encompass the credible testimony and evidence pre-
sented at trial, as well as logical inferences drawn therefrom.
3 Malak did not testify at the hearing.
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC. 3
party to a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated jointly by
PCA and PAMCANI and the Union, effective June 1, 2014, to
May 31, 2017. (GC Exh. 27).
Since 2002, Respondent has been signatory to a participation
agreement with the Union. (GC Exh. 16; Tr. 66–67.) This
agreement authorizes Respondent to make payroll deductions
for various union benefits for Malak. (Id.)
The Union is a local of the United Association of Journey-
men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry
in the United States and Canada, AFL–CIO, CLC (the “UA”).
(GC Exhs. 9, 14.) The UA Constitution and Bylaws apply to
all members and they contain the criteria for receiving an hon-
orable withdrawal card. (GC Exh. 9, p. 106; Tr. 68.) A union
member may seek an honorable withdrawal card if he wishes to
go into business for himself or leaves the trade. (GC Exh. 9, p.
106.)
C. Jeffrey Ceren’s Pre-employment Discussions with
Mike Malak
Charging Party Jeffrey Ceren is a member of the Un-
ion. (Tr. 57, 88.) Ceren has worked in the plumbing in-
dustry since 1981. (Tr. 86.) He operated his own plumb-
ing company from 1994 until 2009. (Tr. 87.)
Ceren heard about an opening for an estimator with Re-
spondent through a friend. (Tr. 88.) Ceren called Malak to
inquire about this position on July 31, 2013,4 and left a message
with Malak’s secretary. (GC Exh. 24; Tr. 90.) Malak returned
Ceren’s call the next day. (GC Exh. 24; Tr. 91.) During their
lengthy telephone conversation, Malak told Ceren that he was
looking to expand his company and hire an estimator for resi-
dential and commercial plumbing work. (Tr. 91–92.) Malak
and Ceren agreed to talk again in a few days. (Tr. 94.)
Malak and Ceren had another lengthy telephone conversation
on August 3. (GC Exh. 24; Tr. 94–95.) They spoke more about
the estimator’s position. (Tr. 95.) Malak stated that union wag-
es for a plumber were $150,000 per year and that he could not
afford that amount. (Tr. 95.) Ceren indicated that he under-
stood. (Tr. 95.)
At this point, the subject of Ceren’s union membership arose.
Ceren brought up working under a participation agreement, but
Malak rejected this idea. (Tr. 97.) Ceren then raised the idea of
withdrawing from the Union in order to work on a salary, at a
rate less than union scale wages. (Tr. 98.) Ceren said he
brought up the idea of withdrawal to, “protect me from the
Union and to keep him [Malak] protected from the Union.” (Tr.
98–99.) According to Ceren, Malak stated that he “would be
okay with going that route.”5 (Tr. 99.) Ceren and Malak then
agreed to meet in Chicago on August 12. (Tr. 100.) At that
time, Ceren resided in Florida. (Tr. 90.)
D. Ceren’s Employment with Respondent
On August 12, Malak and Ceren met in a grocery store park-
ing lot, got in Malak’s truck, and drove to two of Respondent’s

4 All dates contained herein are in 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
5 I credit Ceren’s testimony regarding this conversation based upon
documentary evidence discussed elsewhere in this decision. (See GC
Exhs. 10, 11, 15, 15, 18, 20, and 24.)
remodeling jobs. (Tr. 102.) Ceren took notes on the jobs and
met the builders. (Id.) Malak and Ceren then returned to Ma-
lak’s office. (Id.) At Respondent’s office, Malak asked Ceren
to prepare estimates (also called “take offs”) for the two jobs
they had visited that morning. (Tr. 102–103.) Malak also asked
Ceren to return the next morning to look at blueprints. (Tr.
103.)
As requested, Ceren returned to Respondent’s office the next
day and prepared estimates. (GC Exhs. 17, 23; Tr. 104.) At the
end of the day, Malak and Ceren had a conversation regarding
Ceren’s employment status with Respondent. (Tr. 105.) Ceren
accepted Malak’s offer to perform estimating work for Re-
spondent. (Tr. 105.) Ceren agreed to a salary of $105,000 per
year, with Ceren paying his own benefits and being allowed to
leave work early on certain occasions. (Tr. 96, 109–110.) This
agreement was never reduced to writing. (Tr. 110.)
Ceren and Malak further made arrangements for Ceren to be
paid for his work on the previous 3 days. Ceren asked for
$3,000 for this work, but accepted Malak’s offer of $2,500. (Tr.
107.) Ceren was paid in cash. (Id.)
Ceren was told by Malak to start work at 7 a.m. each day.
(Tr. 110.) Ceren used his personal laptop and cell phone for his
work with Respondent, but he used Respondent’s office phone,
fax machine, and copier. (Tr. 110, 111.) Ceren also emailed
estimates he prepared to Malak’s assistant to be printed on
Respondent’s printer. (Tr. 114.) Malak set the prices for labor
and materials used by Ceren and told Ceren where to purchase
supplies. (Tr. 118–120; 126.) Malak also signed all of Ceren’s
estimates. (GC Exhs. 17, 23; Tr. 123.) Ceren did not sign any
contracts on behalf of Respondent. (Tr. 125.) Ceren did not
have a company credit card or access to Respondent’s payroll
information.6 (Tr. 126.)
During his tenure with Respondent, Ceren did not hire or fire
any employees. (Tr. 125, 127.) Ceren did not evaluate the per-
formance of Respondent’s employees. (Tr. 127.) He did not set
the hours of work for other employees. (Id.) Ceren did not
authorize time off for other employees. (Id.) He did not train,
assign work to, or direct Respondent’s employees (Tr. 125,
127.)7
In an effort to avoid any obligation to the Union by employ-
ing Ceren, Ceren and Malak hatched a scheme by which Ceren
was not paid directly by Respondent. Ceren’s wife owns a
travel agency called Travel Consultation and Mediation (TCM).

6 I reject Respondent’s affirmative defense that Ceren was not an
employee of Respondent. Sec. 2(3) of the Act encompasses a broad
definition of the word “employee”, and the Supreme Court has found
excluded from that definition only those explicitly so excluded in the
language of the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192
(1941). In determining the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, the Board applies
the common-law agency test and considers all the incidents of the indi-
vidual’s relationship to the employing entity. Roadway Package Sys-
tems, 326 NLRB 842, 850 (1998). Here Respondent offered no evi-
dence to refute Ceren’s status as an employee. Thus, I find that Ceren
was Respondent’s employee under Sec. 2(3) of the Act.
7 Respondent, upon whom the burden rests to establish Ceren’s al-
leged managerial or independent contractor status, offered no evidence
to counter Ceren’s recitation of his job duties and responsibilities.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
At Ceren’s invitation, Malak agreed to pay Ceren through
TCM. (Tr. 150.) TCM issued invoices for cruises to Malak and
Malak paid the invoices with Respondent’s checks.8 (GC Exh.
21; Tr. 151.) The amount owed for the “cruises” was in fact the
amount owed to Ceren for his work for Respondent. (Tr. 151.)
In addition to the fraudulent cruise invoices, Ceren was also
paid in cash, tires, and an airline ticket. (GC Exh. 22; Tr. 107,
156, 157, 218.) Ceren was also allowed to obtain gasoline free
of charge at Respondent’s pump. (Tr. 160–161.) Ceren was
never issued a W-2 or an IRS Form1099 for his income earned
while employed by Respondent. (Tr. 150.)
E. Ceren’s Efforts to Obtain an Honorable Withdrawal Card
On August 18, Ceren sent a letter to James Coyne, the Un-
ion’s business manager, seeking an honorable withdrawal card.
(GC Exh. 10; Tr. 128–129.) In this letter, Ceren stated he had
been offered a position with a union contractor performing non-
jurisdictional work, work which he described as “a manage-
ment position in [e]stimating.” (GC Exh. 10.) Ceren did not
indicate that he was already working for Respondent. At trial,
Ceren testified that his position was not managerial.
Ceren later sent a follow-up email message to Coyne. (GC
Exh. 11; Tr. 131.) In his email message, Ceren stated that he
had been trying to reach Coyne about, “a job offer as a manag-
er/estimator with a union/signatory contractor.” (GC Exh. 11.)
Ceren indicated that he had accepted the position, but again did
not indicate that he was already working for Respondent.
On September 9, Ceren received a letter from Hugh Arnold,
the Union’s attorney. (GC Exh. 12; Tr. 132–133.) Arnold
sought further information from Ceren, including the name of
Ceren’s employer and a clear description of Ceren’s work. (GC
Exh. 12.) Ceren consulted with Malak, who agreed that Ceren
could provide his [Malak’s] name to the Union. (Tr. 134.)
On September 10, Ceren sent a response to Arnold. (GC
Exh. 13; Tr. 135–136.) In his response, Ceren named Respond-
ent as his employer and gave Malak’s name as Respondent’s
owner. (GC Exh. 13.) Ceren also gave a lengthy description of
his alleged job duties, in which he attempted to portray himself
as a managerial employee of Respondent. (Id.)
Malak asked Ceren for a copy of all his correspondence with
the Union to show to the Union’s business agent. (GC Exh. 18;
Tr. 186.) Ceren provided this information by way of an email
message, to which he attached copies of all of his correspond-
ence with the Union. (GC Exh. 18; Tr. 136–137.)
On September 24, Ceren received a letter from Coyne deny-
ing his request for an honorable withdrawal card. (GC Exh. 14;
Tr. 139.) Coyne stated that much of the work described by
Malak was work traditionally performed by union members.
(GC Exh. 14.) Ceren showed Coyne’s letter to Malak the same
day. (Tr. 139.)
F. Respondent Discharges Ceren and Ceren Continues to Seek
an Honorable Withdrawal Card
After being shown Coyne’s letter, Malak discharged Ceren.
(Tr. 139–140.) Malak stated that he could no longer keep
Ceren employed because their agreement was that Ceren was to

8 Malak never took these cruises. (Tr. 152.)
obtain an honorable withdrawal card in order to work for Re-
spondent. (Tr. 139–140.)
On October 2, Ceren filed an appeal with the General Presi-
dent of the UA regarding the denial of his application for an
honorable withdrawal card. (GC Exh. 15; Tr. 146.) Ceren sent
Malak an email indicating that he had filed an appeal with the
UA on October 9. (GC Exh. 20; Tr. 147–148.) As supported
by Ceren’s cell phone records, Malak and Ceren had a tele-
phone conversation regarding Ceren’s UA appeal on October
10. (GC Exh. 24; Tr. 148.)
According to Ceren, Malak became upset after learning of
Ceren’s appeal to the UA because of the “heat” that could be
brought upon Respondent by the Union regarding Ceren’s UA
appeal. (Tr. 148–149.) Ceren initially testified that Malak said
he “could no longer employ me--would no longer employ me.”
(Tr. 149.) A few minutes later, he said that Malak “would no
longer put me on as an estimator” (Tr. 150.) Thus, on direct
examination, Ceren never testified that Malak said he would
not “rehire” Ceren, as alleged in the complaint. Ceren required
considerable prompting from counsel for the General Counsel
to recall any details regarding this conversation with Malak.
Furthermore, I found his direct testimony regarding his conver-
sation with Malak to be disjointed and inconsistent.
For the first time on cross examination, Ceren testified that
Malak said he would never “rehire” Ceren. (Tr. 223.) Ceren
only used the word “rehire” after counsel for Respondent used
the word in one of his questions. Id.
G. Ceren’s Actions After his Discharge by Respondent
Following the telephone conversation of October 10, Ceren
continued to seek reinstatement by Respondent. Ceren’s des-
peration for reinstatement caused him to file charges with the
Board against the Union and Respondent prior to his filing of
the charge in the instant case. (GC Exh. 1(a); R. Exhs. 1, 2; Tr.
178, 184, 225.) In one charge, Ceren averred that the Union
“failed and refused to allow [him] to obtain a[n] Estimat-
ing/Management position at a company . . .” (R. Exh. 1.) In a
later charge, Ceren averred that Respondent, “discharged [him]
and thereby acquiesced in [the Union’s] arbitrary, discriminato-
ry, or bad faith refusal to allow [him] to withdraw from the
Union.” (R. Exh. 2.) Ceren’s statements to the Board in these
earlier charges were clearly false.
Discussion and Analysis
A. Witness Credibility
A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors,
including the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’
demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or
admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Double D Con-
struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi,
335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership
Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516
(D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings need not be all-or-
nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more common in all
kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all, of a
witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622. My
credibility findings are generally incorporated into the findings
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC. 5
of fact set forth above.
Only two witnesses testified at the hearing: Charging Party
Ceren and Union Financial Secretary-Treasurer Kenneth
Turnquist. The testimony of each witness did not contradict
that of the other.
Most of Turnquist’s testimony concerned the Union’s territo-
rial and occupational jurisdiction, the applicability of the UA
Constitution and Bylaws, and the Union’s collective-bargaining
agreements; all topics which fall squarely within his sphere of
knowledge as the Union’s financial secretary/treasurer. The
remainder of his testimony was devoted to establishing that the
Union received correspondence from Ceren seeking an honora-
ble withdrawal card and that the Union rejected Ceren’s re-
quests. I found Turnquist to be a credible witness. His testi-
mony was consistent with the documentary evidence presented
at the hearing. Turnquist testified in a direct and forthright
manner and his testimony did not waver on cross-examination.
Therefore, I credit Turnquist’s testimony.
This case is unusual, however, because Ceren, the General
Counsel’s primary witness, has admitted to engaging in dishon-
est behavior. In addition to Ceren’s testimony that he has been
untruthful to the Union, he admitted to two instances of making
willfully false charges to the Board and that his affidavits in
support of those charges contained false statements. (Tr. 238–
240.) The difficulty with the case arises because Respondent
offered no witnesses to contradict Ceren’s testimony.
My analysis cannot end with Ceren’s history of making false
statements and I cannot completely discount Ceren’s testimony
because he has been untruthful in the past. The Board has
found that it is insufficient for a judge to say that because a
witness has been untruthful in the past, and regardless of any
factors that may tend to support his testimony, he cannot be
credited in a later proceeding. Caesars Atlantic City, 344
NLRB 984 at fn. 1 (2005), citing Double D Construction
Group, 339 NLRB, 303, 306 (2003). Therefore, I have careful-
ly considered all of Ceren’s testimony and weighed it against
the other evidence in this case. The documentary evidence in
this case sustains Ceren’s testimony in all material respects
regarding his discharge. I have credited Ceren’s testimony
where it is supported by other evidence in this case or it is in-
herently probable and consistent with other evidence in this
case. However, Ceren gave contradictory statements regarding
what Malak said to him during their telephone conversation on
October 10 and I do not credit his testimony regarding this
conversation.
B. Respondent Unlawfully Terminates Ceren’s Employment
Under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, an employer may not dis-
criminate with regard to hire, tenure, or any term or condition
of employment in order to encourage or discourage member-
ship in a labor organization. Nichols Aluminum, 361 NLRB No.
22, slip op. at 3 (2014). A discharge is unlawful if it is in direct
response to protected activity. Santa Fe Tortilla Co., 360
NLRB No. 130 slip op. at 2 (2014); see also UPS Supply Chain
Solutions, 357 NLRB No. 106 slip op. at 3 (2011) (upholding
judge’s finding that discharge for protected activity violated the
Act without need to make Wright Line analysis). No evidence
has been adduced or argument made that Ceren was discharged
for any sort of misconduct.
It is undisputed that Ceren engaged in protected union activi-
ty by maintaining union membership and later by requesting a
withdrawal card and by appealing the Union’s denial of his
request. (GC Exhs. 10, 11, 13, 15.) Further, the documentary
evidence supports my finding that Respondent, through Malak,
was aware of this activity. (GC Exhs. 18, 20.) I have found that
Ceren was discharged because he was unable to obtain a union
withdrawal card and, therefore, because he was a union mem-
ber. I have found no other reason for Ceren’s discharge aside
from his union membership. Respondent, for its part, has put
forth no alternate reason for Ceren’s discharge.
In a single-motive case, where there is no dispute as to the
activity for which discipline was imposed, the dual-motive
analysis set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd.
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982),
is not applicable or appropriate. See, e.g., Nor-Cal Beverage
Co., 330 NLRB 610, 611 (2000); Aluminum Co. of America,
338 NLRB 20, 22 (2002) (judge erred in applying dual-motive
analysis where there was a causal connection between alleged
protected activity and resulting discipline).
In this case, Respondent’s actions were inherently destruc-
tive of employee rights. When specific evidence of a subjective
intent to discriminate or discourage union membership is
shown, many otherwise innocent or ambiguous actions which
are normally incident to the conduct of a business may, without
more, be converted into unfair labor practices. NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963). Such proof itself is
normally sufficient to destroy the employer’s claim of a legiti-
mate business purpose, if one is made, and provides strong
support to a finding of that union membership will be discour-
aged. Id. The uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes
that Ceren was discharged because he did not withdraw from
union membership. Stated another way, Ceren was discharged
because of his membership in the Union. Respondent has of-
fered no business justification for its action in discharging
Ceren. Under these circumstances, I conclude that Respond-
ent’s termination of Ceren because he is a union member is
inherently destructive of employee Section 7 rights and, on its
face, constitutes unlawful retaliation against him for his union
membership in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 227–228; Phelps Dodge Corp
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (“It is no longer disputed that
workers cannot be dismissed from employment because of their
union affiliations.”).9
Respondent’s discharge of Ceren because he did not with-
draw from union membership also violates the plain language
of the Act. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibits an employer
from discrimination that encourages or discourages union
membership. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). The Board has long held
that conditioning employment on promise to refrain from union
membership or protected activity is unlawful. Nichols Alumi-
num, 361 NLRB No. 22 slip op. at 4 fn. 10 (2014), citing Pratt

9 Both the General Counsel and respondent analyzed the facts of this
case using the burden shifting framework of Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980), enfd. on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
Towers, Inc., 338 NLRB 61, 64 (2002) (refusal to hire employ-
ees unless they renounced their union membership found viola-
tive); see also Mastronardi Mason Materials, 336 NLRB 1296,
1296 (2001) (finding violation where respondent conditioned
employment of employees on withdrawal from union member-
ship and acceptance of nonunion terms and conditions of em-
ployment). Refusing to hire an employee in order to avoid their
union wage scale has also been held violative of the Act. Sierra
Realty, 317 NLRB 832, 833 (1995). Respondent here terminat-
ed Ceren’s employment because he could not withdraw from
union membership. In the instant case, I find that Respondent’s
discharge of Ceren because of his union membership violates
the language of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
In agreement with the General Counsel, I further find that
conditioning Ceren’s employment on withdrawal from the Un-
ion required him to enter into an unlawful yellow dog con-
tract.10 Since the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29
U.S.C. §101 et seq.) in 1932, all variations of the yellow dog
contract have been deemed invalid and unenforceable, includ-
ing “[a]ny promise by a statutory employee to refrain from
union activity.” Barrow Utilities & Electric, 308 NLRB 4, 11
fn. 5 (1992). They were also a factor which Congress consid-
ered when passing the Wagner Act (the 1935 predecessor to the
National Labor Relations Act). First Legal Support Services,
342 NLRB 350, 362 (2004). Section 7 of the Wagner Act for
the first time gave employees the specific right to engage in
union activity, making it an unfair labor practice to condition
employment on the relinquishment of that right. Id. Thus, de
facto in 1935, the yellow dog contract became and has re-
mained illegal as a violation of Section 8(1), and as of 1947,
Section 8(a)(1). Id. Similarly, insistence upon such a contract
became a hire and tenure violation under Section 8(3), now
Section 8(a)(3). First Legal Support Services, 342 NLRB at
362–363 (2004). In this case, Respondent required Ceren to
enter into a yellow dog contract by conditioning Ceren’s em-
ployment upon his withdrawal from union membership. When
Ceren was unable to withdraw from union membership, Re-
spondent discharged him. Respondent’s requirement that
Ceren enter into a yellow dog contract, and its discharge of
Ceren for failing to do so, violate Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
Moreover, even if I were to apply these facts to the burden
shifting framework of Wright Line as the parties have done in
their briefs, I would find that Respondent violated the Act.
Under Wright Line, to establish unlawful discrimination on
the basis of union activity, the General Counsel must make an
initial showing that antiunion animus was a substantial or mo-
tivating factor for the employer’s action by demonstrating
that: (1) the employee engaged in union activity; (2) the em-
ployer had knowledge of that union activity; and (3) the em-
ployer harbored antiunion animus. Nichols Aluminum, 361
NLRB No. 22, slip op. at 3 (2014), citing Amglo Kemlite La-
boratories, 360 NLRB No. 51, slip op. at 7 (2014). Proof of

10 A yellow dog contract is a private agreement between an employ-
ee and employer, where the employee promises not to join, become, or
remain a member of any labor organization. First Legal Support Ser-
vices, 342 NLRB 350, 362 (2004).
animus and discriminatory motivation may be based on direct
evidence or inferred from circumstantial evidence. Robert
Orr/Sysco Food Services, 343 NLRB 1183, 1184 (2004);
Ronin Shipbuilding, 330 NLRB 464, 464 (2000). If the Gen-
eral Counsel meets his burden, then the burden shifts to Re-
spondent to prove that it would have taken the same action
absent the employee’s protected conduct. Wright Line, 251
NLRB at 1089; NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983).
With respect to the General Counsel’s initial showing, it is
undisputed that Ceren engaged in several forms of union activi-
ty: first and foremost by maintaining union membership, and
then later by soliciting a withdrawal card and appealing the
Union’s denial of his solicitation. (GC Exhs. 10, 11, 13, 15.)
Furthermore, the documentary evidence supports my finding
that Respondent, through Malak, was aware of this activity.
(GC Exhs. 18, 20.) At issue in this case is whether counsel for
the General Counsel demonstrated that the Respondent har-
bored antiunion animus, thus meeting her initial burden. I find
she has.
The Board relies on both circumstantial and direct evidence
in determining whether the conduct in question was unlawfully
motivated. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 311 NLRB 498 (1993). Im-
proper motivation may be inferred from several factors, includ-
ing pretextual and shifting reasons given for an employee’s
discharge and the timing between an employee’s protected
activity and the discharge. Temp Masters, Inc., 344 NLRB
1188, 1193 (2005).
The timing of Ceren’s discharge supports a finding of im-
proper motivation. Ceren received a letter from the Union indi-
cating its refusal to grant the requested honorable withdrawal
card on about September 24. (GC Exh. 14.) Ceren was termi-
nated contemporaneously with his sharing of the Union’s re-
fusal to grant him an honorable withdrawal card with Malak.
(GC Exh. 14; Tr. 139.) Animus can be inferred from the rela-
tively close timing between an employee’s protected concerted
activities and his discipline. K-Air Corp., 360 NLRB No. 30,
slip op. at 2 (2014) (timing of discharge, within 1 day of learn-
ing of employee’s union affiliation, provides evidence of ani-
mus); see also La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 NLRB 1120
(2002) (timing of discipline imposed 4 months after service on
bargaining team and ULP hearing appearance suspect). Thus,
the timing of Ceren’s discharge shows that it was motivated by
his union activity.
Furthermore, Respondent’s multiple and shifting justifica-
tions for its termination of Ceren provide strong evidence of its
unlawful motive. When an employer is unable to maintain a
consistent explanation for its conduct, but rather resorts to shift-
ing defenses, “it raises the inference that the employer is
‘grasping for reasons to justify’ its unlawful conduct.” Meaden
Screw Products Co., 336 NLRB 298, 302 (2001), citing Royal
Development Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 372 (9th Cir. 1983).
See also Master Security Services, 270 NLRB 543, 552 (1984)
(animus demonstrated where an employer used a multiplicity of
reasons to justify disciplinary action). Respondent advanced a
multitude of contradictory reasons for its actions in its answer
to the complaint and brief. Respondent has asserted: Ceren was
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC. 7
never hired, employed, or discharged by Respondent; Ceren
was employed by another employer (TCM); Ceren was an in-
dependent contractor; Ceren’s position was outside of the Un-
ion’s occupational jurisdiction; Ceren’s position was manageri-
al; and, Respondent would have taken the same action against
Ceren in the absence of any Union or protected activity on
Ceren’s part. Clearly Respondent’s last defense, that it would
have taken the same action against Ceren absent his union ac-
tivity, is wholly inconsistent with its first affirmative defense
that it never hired or employed Ceren. I find that Respondent’s
multiple and conflicting defenses provide evidence of its un-
lawful motive in terminating Ceren. Therefore, I find that the
General Counsel has met his initial burden of persuasion under
Wright Line.
As the General Counsel has made an initial showing of dis-
crimination, the burden shifts to Respondent to show, as an
affirmative defense, that it would have terminated Ceren in the
absence of his union activities. Respondent has made no such
showing. Respondent offered no evidence to rebut Ceren’s
testimony, as corroborated by his email messages, regarding
Malak’s knowledge of Ceren’s union activity and Malak’s reac-
tion to Ceren’s union activity. Thus, even under the burden
shifting analysis of Wright Line, I find that Respondent violated
Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act in discharging Ceren.
C. The General Counsel Did Not Establish by a Preponderance
of the Evidence that Respondent Unlawfully Threatened Not to
Rehire Ceren
Under Section 7 of the Act, employees have the right to en-
gage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer,
via statements or conduct, to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.
Mediplex of Danbury, 314 NLRB 470, 472 (1994). The test for
evaluating whether an employer’s conduct or statements violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is whether the statements or conduct
have a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
union or protected activities. KenMor Electric Co., 355 NLRB
1024, 1027 (2010) (noting that the employer’s subjective mo-
tive for its actions is irrelevant); Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant,
Inc., 330 NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3 (2000) (same); see also Park
N’ Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 140 (2007). The General Counsel
bears the burden of proving unlawful threats by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591,
591–592 (1954).
It cannot be disputed that Ceren had a telephone conversa-
tion with Malak on October 10. (GC Exh. 24.) However, I
cannot credit Ceren’s disjointed and inconsistent testimony
regarding the content of his conversation with Malak. Ceren
testified on direct examination that Malak said that he could not
employ Ceren, or that he would not employ Ceren, or that he
would not put him [Ceren] on as an estimator. He made these
three divergent statements within the course of a few minutes.
He also required considerable prompting by counsel for the
General Counsel to give any details about this conversation.
Thus, I do not credit Ceren’s testimony regarding what was said
by Malak during their conversation on October 10.
The complaint states that Respondent violated the Act by
threatening not to “rehire” Ceren. In fact, Ceren did not testify
that Malak threatened not to “rehire” him until cross-
examination, and then only in response to a question by Re-
spondent’s counsel that used the word “rehire.” Because I can-
not credit Ceren’s testimony regarding this conversation, I can-
not find that the General Counsel met it’s burden to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent threatened
“not to rehire” Ceren. Accordingly, I recommend that com-
plaint paragraph V be dismissed.
D. Respondent’s Affirmative Defenses
In making my findings of fact above, I have rejected Re-
spondent’s claim that it never hired, employed or discharged
Ceren. I have also rejected Respondent’s assertion that Ceren
was not an employee under the Act.
Respondent asserts that Ceren’s position was managerial in
nature or that Ceren was an independent contractor. Both of
these defenses are rejected. It is well-settled that the party as-
serting managerial status has the burden of proving it. George
Mee Memorial Hospital, 348 NLRB 327, 333 (2006). The defi-
nition of managerial employee has been construed narrowly
because, as with supervisory status those employees, who fall
within that category, are denied substantial statutory rights.
Curtis Industries, 218 NLRB 1447, 1448 (1975). Similarly, the
burden of proof as to independent contractor status lies with the
party asserting it. Community Bus Lines, 341 NLRB 474
(2004); BKN, Inc., 333 NLRB 143 (2001). The Board applies
the common-law agency principles set forth in the Restatement
2d, Agency §220(2) in determining independent contractor
status. Roadway Package Systems, 326 NLRB 842, 850 (1998).
Applying these principles to the instant case, I conclude that
Respondent has failed to meet its burden of proof that Ceren’s
position was managerial or, alternatively, that Ceren was an
independent contractor. The burden to establish managerial or
independent contractor status rests with the party asserting it.
George Mee Memorial Hospital, 348 NLRB 327, 333 (2006);
Community Bus Lines, 341 NLRB 474 (2004). Although, as
Respondent states in its brief, Ceren repeatedly advised the
Union that his position with Respondent was managerial in
nature, these statements do not make it so. Ceren admitted that
he described his position as managerial in order to obtain an
honorable withdrawal card from the Union. His description of
his actual duties at the hearing did not satisfy Respondent’s
burden in establishing that Ceren’s position was managerial.11
The burden is not on the General Counsel to establish that
Ceren was not an independent contractor or that Ceren’s posi-
tion was not managerial; the burden rests squarely on Respond-
ent to affirmatively establish that Ceren was either an inde-
pendent contractor or manager. Respondent has failed to do so.
I further reject Respondent’s claim that Ceren was an em-
ployee of TCM. Ceren’s uncontroverted testimony, supported
by the cruise invoices produced at trial, establishes that Ceren’s

11 I do not accept Respondent’s argument that Ceren’s failure to list
his experience with Respondent on his LinkedIn page establishes that
Ceren was not an employee of Respondent. (R Exh. 3.) Rather, I find it
more plausible that Ceren did not list his experience with Respondent
given that it seems unlikely that Malak would provide Ceren with a
positive reference.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
wife issued the cruise invoices to Respondent as a subterfuge
for Malak to pay Ceren using Respondent’s business checks.
Ceren testified against his pecuniary interest, and that of his
wife, by admitting that this arrangement was a sham meant to
hide Ceren’s wages from the Union. Ceren further testified
against his pecuniary interest that he never received tax forms
related to these payments. Respondent could have easily refut-
ed the evidence concerning the cruise invoices and company
checks. However, Respondent chose to present no evidence to
support this affirmative defense and I find that it has no merit.
Additionally, I reject Respondent’s defense that Ceren’s po-
sition was outside of the occupational jurisdiction of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. A great deal of testimony was ad-
duced at the hearing concerning whether an estimator’s position
was within the bargaining units contained in Respondent’s
collective-bargaining agreements with PCA and PAMCANI.
However, in reviewing the record, I find that this has no bear-
ing on whether or not Respondent committed an unfair labor
practice. As I have found, Ceren was engaged in protected
activity by maintaining his union membership. In addition, I
have found that Respondent discharged Ceren because of his
union membership. Whether or not Ceren’s work for Respond-
ent was bargaining unit work is not material to my findings.
Instead, the fact that Ceren’s discharge was a direct result of his
status as a union member is what is relevant here. Therefore, I
reject this affirmative defense.
Additionally, Respondent’s defense that it would have taken
the same action against Ceren in the absence of any protected
activity is both contrary to its other defenses and has no merit.
Respondent has presented no evidence as to why it took its
action discharging Ceren. As such, Respondent has failed to
establish that it would have taken the same action against Ceren
in the absence of his protected concerted activity.
While I do not condone the untruthfulness of Ceren in deal-
ing with the Union and the Board, I also cannot condone the
actions of Malak. The credible evidence in this case clearly
demonstrates that Malak was a willing participant in Ceren’s
design. Malak participated in a joint scheme, avoiding his ob-
ligations to the Union and to the government, by paying Ceren
through TCM and through various other untraceable means.
Furthermore, although Ceren initially agreed to withdraw from
the Union, it was Malak who fired him when he failed to do so.
Respondent should not be rewarded for this behavior. Fur-
thermore, the Board has held that the equitable unclean hands
doctrine does not operate against a charging party because
Board proceedings are not conducted for the vindication of
private rights, but are brought in the public interest and to effect
statutory policy. California Gas Transport, 347 NLRB 1314,
1326 fn. 36 (2006).
In sum, none of Respondent’s affirmative defenses has merit
under the facts as I have found them. Therefore, I find that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by dis-
charging Ceren because of his union and protected activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers Local Union 130, U.A.
(Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it discharged Ceren.
4. Respondent did not otherwise violate the Act as alleged in
the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
The Respondent, having discriminatorily discharged Jeffrey
Ceren, must offer him reinstatement and make him whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be com-
puted in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289
(1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Ad-
ministration allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar
quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Jeffrey Ceren for
the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more
lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year.
Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No.
10 (2014).
Further, Respondent shall be required to remove from the
personnel file of Jeffery Ceren any reference to his unlawful
termination, and advise him in writing that this has been done.
In addition, Respondent shall be required to cease and desist
from engaging in unlawful discriminatory conduct and to post
an appropriate notice, attached hereto as an “Appendix.”
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, M & M Affordable Plumbing, Inc., Rock-
dale, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for engaging in union or other protected, concerted ac-
tivity.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
Jeffery Ceren full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
(b) Make Jeffery Ceren whole for any loss of earnings and

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC. 9
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Jeffery Ceren, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writ-
ing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be
used against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Rockdale, Illinois copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since September 24, 2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 19, 2014
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT terminate any employee for engaging in union
or other concerted activities protected under Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Jeffery Ceren full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Jeffery Ceren whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net
interim earnings, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administra-
tion allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL compensate Jeffery Ceren for the adverse tax con-
sequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay
awards covering periods longer than 1 year.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge of Jef-
fery Ceren, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not
be used against him in any way.
M & M AFFORDABLE PLUMBING, INC.