Mason & Hanger Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1984

270 N.L.R.B. 383 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

MASON & HANGER CO.
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. and Inter-
national Guards Union of America, Local 69.
Cases 28-CA-6944 and 28-CA-7255
30 April 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 30 December 1983 Administrative Law
Judge David G. Heilbrun issued the attached deci-
sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and the General Counsel and the
Charging Party filed briefs in answer to the Re-
spondent's exceptions. '
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by issuing a writ-
ten warning to employee Romero 7 May 1982 and
by discharging him 22 December 1982. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions to these findings. We find
merit in the Respondent's exceptions.
The pertinent facts, as more fully set forth by the
judge, are as follows. Prior to October 1981, guard
services at Los Alamos National Laboratories in
Los Alamos, New Mexico, were performed by
Federal employees working for the Department of
Energy. In October 1981, the Respondent took
over the guard function with a work force consist-
ing of former Federal employees and new hires.
Two months later, in December 1981, the Union
was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative for the Respondent's employees.
Employee Romero, one of the former Federal em-
ployees, was elected union vice president and sub-
sequently participated in virtually all of the negoti-
ation sessions which began in February 1982 and
concluded successfully in February 1983.
Romero worked on "Company C," or the C
shift, which began at 3 p.m. Pursuant to company
policy, employees had to line up "at formation" 6
minutes after the start of their shift. According to
Romero, employees started to pick up their weap-
ons and otherwise get ready for formation prior to
3 p.m. in order to be ready by 3:06 p.m. On 6 May
1982,2 just prior to the start of the C shift, Romero
I The Respondent's motion to strike the Charging Party's answering
brief as untimely filed is denied.
2 All dates refer to 1982 unless otherwise indicated.
270 NLRB No. 71
advised employees in the gunroom that they should
not be performing job tasks before 3 p.m. and
asked them to wait until 3 p.m. Romero repeated
this advice shortly before 3 p.m. in the parking lot
7 May. Apparently, a sufficient number of employ-
ees listened to Romero so as to result in formation
being delayed. On 7 May the Respondent issued a
written warning to Romero for "interference with
the work of others," which the Respondent repeat-
ed orally to Romero at a grievance meeting 19
May. The Respondent also issued warnings to at
least 10 other employees for being late to forma-
tion, but these were rescinded after the employees
agreed not to engage in such conduct again.
On 15 June the Union filed an amended charge
in Case 28-CA-6944 alleging, inter alia, that the
Respondent took disciplinary action against
Romero because he engaged in protected concert-
ed activities. An 8(a)(1) and (3) complaint based on
the warnings was issued 2 July. On 9 November,
pursuant to an informal settlement agreement ap-
proved by the Regional Director, the Respondent
notified Romero in writing that the 7 May warning
was being removed from its files.
On 5 December, which was the first of Romero's
2 days off that week, the Respondent needed two
employees to work overtime in order to have a full
complement on the C shift. About 2:20 p.m. the
Respondent's desk officer, Lieutenant Schmahl,
began making telephone calls to employees on the
"day off" list, starting from the top of the list.3
Romero, who was number seven on the list that
day, was the first one reached by Schmahl.
Schmahl told Romero that he was needed for over-
time, but Romero responded that he was leaving
for Colorado. Schmahl then asked Romero if he
was refusing to work overtime and Romero said,
"I guess I am refusing." On 7 December Romero
was called in to the Respondent's office where he
was asked why he had refused the overtime.
Romero explained that he had to go to Colorado to
help out a friend whose car had broken down. The
Respondent informed Romero that it would inves-
tigate the matter and, if it were determined that
Romero had been insubordinate, he would be ter-
minated. On 22 December, Romero was notified
that his reason for refusing the overtime was not
sufficient, and therefore he was being terminated
for willful disobedience and insubordination.
On 23 December the Union filed a charge in
Case 28-CA-7255, which was amended 9 February
1983, alleging, inter alia, that the Respondent vio-
3 Employees were listed on the day-off list by the amount of overtime
charged to their records, in descending order from the least amount to
the most amount charged.
383
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by terminating
Romero. On 11 February 1983 the Regional Direc-
tor vacated his approval of the settlement agree-
ment in Case 28-CA-6944, set aside the settlement
agreement, and issued a consolidated complaint
based, inter alia, on the 7 May warning and the 22
December discharge.
The judge found with regard to the 7 May warn-
ing that the Respondent's conduct in disciplining
Romero for having advised employees not to per-
form work on their own time interfered with Ro-
mero's right to solicit protected group activity.
With regard to the 22 December discharge, the
judge found that the issue was close, but that on
balance he could not avoid inferring that the Re-
spondent discriminated against Romero because of
his support for the Union. In so finding, the judge
noted that Romero was a known union activist,
and he found that Romero's reason for declining
the overtime directive was "no less significant
than" other reasons which the Respondent had ac-
cepted as excuses from other employees, and that
Respondent's treatment of Romero was harsh. The
judge also relied on the Respondent's postdischarge
memo to its files about a blood donor decal on the
back of Romero's turned-in badge as "a final telling
indicator" of the Respondent's "obsessive desire to
single [Romero] out for retaliatory treatment."4
Contrary to the judge, we find the evidence in-
sufficient to establish that the Respondent dis-
charged Romero because of his support for the
Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3).5 Al-
though Romero's union activities were extensive,
and although the contract negotiations may have
been heated or even hostile at times, there is no
probative evidence of animus toward the Union or
toward Romero, except perhaps for the 7 May
warning. We note, however, that the warning was
issued over 7 months before the discharge and that
it was rescinded as part of the informal settlement
agreement entered into a month prior to the inci-
dent resulting in Romero's discharge.
We further find that the evidence adduced to
show disparate treatment in the application of the
Respondent's overtime policy is inconclusive. As
the judge himself found, the Respondent's overtime
policy was not precise, but rather varied depending
on the shift, the supervisor, the point in time, and
the acceptability of the excuse offered by the em-
ployee. In fact, the judge found that the policy was
"so poorly structured and little understood as to
lack . . . certainty" and that it was "suited only for
4 The Respondent's general security order No. 6, par. 5, states, "No
item may be attached to the badge proper except the clip."
I The judge found, and we agree, that Romero's discharge was not
violative of Sec. 8(aX4).
managerial discretion within generalized guide-
lines." Any evidence of alleged disparate treatment
must be viewed in the context of this unfixed and
changeable policy.
Turning to the evidence of alleged disparate
treatment, the record indicates that employee
Guthrie was excused from overtime in October
1982 because she was expecting company, but it
also appears that she was asked to volunteer for
overtime rather than being ordered to come in.
Similarly, although employee Northwang testified
that in December 1982 he told Schmahl that he
could not work overtime because he was babysit-
ting for his children, it appears that he was told to
stand by, but was not ordered to come in. The
record further indicates that two employees, Kasik
and Vigil, were excused from directed overtime be-
cause of illness or intoxication. In this regard, we
also note that employee Gonzales was discharged 6
December 1982 for refusal to work overtime 4 De-
cember. As found by the judge, the Respondent in-
vestigated Gonzales' medical excuse and found it
insufficient.
It is clear from the above evidence that there
was no uniformity in how the Respondent obtained
employees to work overtime, i.e., by requests to
volunteer or by directing employees to work over-
time, or in the reasons found by the Respondent to
excuse a refusal to work overtime. Although Ro-
mero's treatment by the Respondent may have
been harsher than that accorded to Kasik and
Vigil, for example, it was no less harsh than that
accorded to Gonzales around the same time. In any
event, it is not the Board's function to substitute its
own judgment for that of an employer as to what
constitutes reasonable grounds for discharge.6 In
these circumstances, while it may be concluded
that the Respondent's treatment of employee refus-
als to work overtime varied, there is insufficient
evidence that its treatment of Romero was dis-
criminatory.
Moreover, it is clear from the record that em-
ployees generally, including Romero, were aware
that a refusal to work overtime could have serious
consequences, including termination. In fact,
Romero testified that he "believed that [he] could
have been forced to come in on overtime," and
that he had seen a memo issued by management re-
garding mandatory overtime which indicated that
employees could be terminated for refusing to
work overtime. Finally, although the Respondent's
postdischarge memo concerning the blood donor
decal on Romero's badge arguably is suspicious, it
I Super Tire Stores, 236 NLRB 877 fn. I (1978); J. Ray McDermott A
Co., 233 NLRB 946, 952 (1977).
384
MASON & HANGER CO.
is well settled that mere suspicion cannot serve as a
basis for finding a violation.
Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that
the General Counsel has not proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the Respondent dis-
charged Romero in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1). Further, because the Respondent has not been
shown to have committed any unfair labor prac-
tices since the November 1982 settlement agree-
ment concerning the 7 May warning, we find it ap-
propriate to reinstate that settlement agreement. s
Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the al-
leged unlawful warning, we shall reinstate the set-
tlement agreement and dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed and the settlement
agreement in Case 28-CA-6944 is reinstated.
7 See., e.g., International Computaprint Corp., 261 NLRB 1106, 1107
(1982); Kings Terrace Nursing Home, 229 NLRB 1180 (1977).
a See, e.g., Eaton Corp., 262 NLRB 86, 97 (1982); Ann's-Schneider
Bakery, 259 NLRB 1151, 1160 (1982).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID G. HEILBRUN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried at Los Alamos, New Mexico, August 2-4,
1983, based on a consolidated complaint alleging that
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. (Respondent),
violated Section 8(aX1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act by certain acts and conduct.
On the entire record,' including my observation of
witness demeanor, and after consideration of briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Re-
spondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a West Virginia corporation, maintains its
principal office and place of business in Lexington, Ken-
tucky, while operating in various States including New
Jersey, New York, Nebraska, Iowa, and Texas. The only
facility involved in this proceeding is located in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, where Respondent provides secu-
rity service under contract with the University of Cali-
fornia's Los Alamos National Laboratories. During a
past representative 12-month period Respondent per-
formed services outside West Virginia in excess of
$50,000, while deriving total gross revenue in excess of
$100,000. Respondent admits and I find that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
t The transcript is corrected in the manner requested by the General
Counsel and Respondent in a brief (at p. 3) and separate motion, respec-
tively.
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that International
Guards Union of America, Local 69 (the Union), is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5).
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Case Background and Procedural History
As widely known, scientific research is conducted at
the Laboratories relative to national security of the
United States and pursuant to objectives of the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE). The facility consists of numer-
ous buildings ranging from those in a concentrated cen-
tral complex to separate structures at remote sites. Tradi-
tionally the guarding function was provided by Federal
employees attached to an appropriate regulatory agency,
most recently DOE. Private contracting out materialized
in late 1981 as Respondent, whose national operations in-
clude security service at a principal nuclear weapons
plant in Amarillo, Texas, assumed the security function
at this facility. In December 1981 the Union was certi-
fied as exclusive collective-bargaining representative for
guarding personnel, and a protracted course of bargain-
ing ensued. 2
Case 28-CA-6944 was filed in June, following which a
complaint issued in July alleging that Larry Romero,
vice president of the Union, was unlawfully warned,
both verbally and in writing, in regard to certain con-
certed activities in which he had engaged. This case was
informally settled in November, however, in December
Case 28-CA-7255 was filed, in consequence of which
during early 1983 the prior settlement agreement was va-
cated and both cases consolidated for purposes of this
hearing. The issues so consolidated included those origi-
nally involving Romero in May, plus the allegations that
during December both Demecio Gonzalez and Romero
were terminated in the context of Respondent's applica-
tion of and assertedly unilaterally changed overtime
policy, and in Romero's case because he had previously
filed a charge against Respondent and given testimony
under the Act.
Respondent's hierarchy is Donald Harwick, contract
manager, Tommy Hook, administrative manager, Robert
Everhart, chief of security, and subordinate shift com-
manders, with assisting desk officers, all titled lieutenant.
Operations consist of Company A, B, C, and D, these
being midnight, day, and swing, plus a special 7 a.m. to 6
p.m. shift, respectively. Romero has worked continuous-
ly as a security inspector at Los Alamos since 1973 and
transfered with seniority to Respondent. Gonzalez had
begun his employment with the takeover, and both these
employees worked C shift. In early May Romero ad-
vised various other security inspectors of C shift that a 6-
minute formation time was inadequate, and they should
not perform job related tasks before 3 p.m. without com-
pensation. This 6-minute period was one in which au-
thenticator codes were obtained, vehicle assignments
picked up, and weapons donned for the shift. The result-
ant disruption caused Respondent to issue a written rep-
All dates and named months hereafter are in 1982, unless shown oth-
erwise.
385
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rimand to Romero on May 7 for interfering with work
of others. Romero grieved this action and during a meet-
ing of May 19 on the subject, Hardwick cautioned him
about a continuation of what Respondent viewed as mis-
conduct.
In May and again in September Everhart authored
memos to shift commanders and to Bonifacio Vasquez,
union president, respectively, which read:
Station Manning
Under no circumstances will a station be closed
due to shortage of personnel.
In the event it is not possible to obtain personnel
for voluntary overtime, either from the concerned
Company's call list or doubling from the preceding
company, the junior Inspector from the concerned
Company will be called and directed to work.
Refusal to work directed overtime may have the
most serious consequences, to and including termi-
nation.
DIRECTED OVERTIME
Meeting with Bonifacio Vasquez, IGUA 69.
Hardwick, Hook, Everhart for Company.
Problem of directing Junior Inspector to work
necessary overtime could result in Junior Inspector
on respective Company to work all of their days
off.
Advised we would direct Shift Commanders to
institute procedure whereby the Junior Inspector of
the concerned Company would be required to nec-
essary to direct overtime the following day, the
next Junior Inspector on first day off would be di-
rected to work.
On December 4 Respondent sought to have Gonzalez
double over from his C shift. This arose by telephone
contact from A Shift Supervisor Paul Moore shortly
after 11 p.m., and was augmented when Gonzalez pro-
tested to Frank Valdez, his own superior. Gonzalez de-
scribed being ill and also intending to simply resign if the
mandatory overtime was pressed. Valdez dissuaded him
from resigning, and the following Monday Gonzalez met
with Hook and Everhart. Upon a review of circum-
stances, including Gonzalez' conceded part-time employ-
ment doing typewriter repair, Respondent discharged
him for refusing to work directed overtime.
December 5 was Romero's scheduled day off. As the
C shift of that date was about to commence, Francis
Schmahl, desk officer, was attempting to fill two open-
ings by overtime. He telephoned all personnel on the day
off roster, reaching only Romero at 2:26 p.m. Schmahl
stated his need with Romero answering that he was leav-
ing shortly for Colorado. Schmahl asked if this was a re-
fusal to work overtime and Romero answered that it
might be taken that way. On December 7 Romero met
with Hook and Everhart, who asked him to elaborate on
his unwillingness to work as Schmahl had requested.
Romero explained that the circumstances related to com-
pleting assistance for a friend whose car had broken
down in a remote area. An investigation of more details
ensued, and other supervisors were canvassed as to how
they would have reacted. When these steps concluded
Respondent elected to discharge Romero, which it did
on December 22 for willful disobedience of the overtime
work directive.
B. Further Relevant Evidence
Homero had been vocal during late 1981 with respect
to comparability of supplies and equipment to be fur-
nished security inspectors in connection with Respond-
ent's takeover. Following his election to union office
shortly after the representation election, he participated
extensively in the numerous negotiating sessions that
commenced in February. The parties had jointly execut-
ed an elaborate Memorandum of Understanding with
regard to bargaining procedure; however, sessions were
occasionally heated with Romero and Hardwick arguing
loudly on at least two early occasions.
Following the incident of May regarding Company C
pre-formation time, Romero and Vasquez infiltrated a
meeting being held by Robert Pogna, assistant division
leader for lab security, in connection with preparations
for a possible strike by guards. This came to be viewed
by Respondent as an act of misrepresentation because
access to the meeting was obtained while off duty but by
use of official badges. Additionally Romero was warned
during the summer and fall months of 1982 for minor
lateness, for having entered a women's restroom under
strange circumstances, and for once having a cigarette in
his hand at the moment his shift formation whistle blew.
As to experiences of other rank-and-file security per-
sonnel under the overtime assignment policy, employee
Jo Guthrie testified that she was excused from overtime
in October because of expecting house guests, George
Vigil testified that he escaped discipline in October after
refusing an overtime directive by later explaining that he
had been drinking, and Troy Nothwang testified that in
late 1982 he had, without repercussion, routinely de-
clined overtime contacts from supervision because of
babysitting.
In a related vein, Security Inspector R. J. Romero was
suspended for 2 days in June because of absence from
work without acceptable reason, while in February Se-
curity Inspector John Martinez was officially warned for
inaccuracies in explaining an earlier instance of failure to
report for work as scheduled.
C. Analysis
The essential issues of this case arise from two separate
aspects of employment and the dynamics that associate
to each. Happenings in early May involved Romero's ob-
jecting to the limited form-up time allowed to guards
after strict commencement of their shift on the hour. The
terminations at issue involve Respondent's involuntary
overtime assignment policy, with subsidiary or related
questions being whether a unilateral change was made
without notice to, or consultation with, the Union, and
whether either employee was discharged for a pretextual
reason.
The larger and pervasive context of this fact situation
is the disputatious manner in which the parties dealt with
each other. This manifested not only in stiff formalisms
386
MASON & HANGER CO.
of how the negotiating process was to unfold, but also in
oral and written rhetoric in which peevish displays of
temperament clashed and critical characterizations were
exchanged. As one would expect, the confrontations re-
sulted in sporadic efforts by union functionaries to seize
advantage, and countervailingly determined intent by
management to maintain a tightly disciplined approach to
security at the facility.
The first skirmish was the matter of how working time
principles applied to shift formation ritual. This was cor-
rectly perceived by Romero as a legal point of "hours
worked" under applicable statute, and his actions of
early May unwittingly dealt directly with the interpre-
tive point of whether preparatory time may be deemed
"an integral and indispensable part of the employee's
principal activities." 29 CFR 785.25. It has been held
that the statutory basis for this subject requires payment
of wages to defense plant guards and firemen during a
lunch period in which their vigilance was not fully re-
lieved, as the 30-minute timespan was thus a continuation
of engagement in their principal work activity. Glenn L.
Martin Nebraska Co. v. Culkin, 197 F.2d 981 (8th Cir.
1952). However, the controlling question is whether, as
alleged, Romero was unlawfully disciplined for having
engaged in a protected concerted activity. His version of
how the entreaty to fellow employees unfolded on May
6 was uncontroverted, and it amounted to no more than
advice that a person's own time need not be used to un-
dertake requirements of the job. This was the essential
reason that Respondent reacted with discipline, and in
doing so interfered with Romero's right to solicit pro-
tected group activity. Red Ball Motor Freight, 253 NLRB
871 (1980).
With respect to overtime assignment necessitated by
unexpected vacancies on a shift, this subject is again an
instance of how "hours worked" principles can apply in
an employment situation and further was an arena in
which the parties strove for institutional advantage. The
fundamental approach to this aggravating problem of
covering all stations at all times was to obtain volunteers
where possible. This was the easy solution but not one
which was available in all instances. Under Respondent's
basic written criteria the sequence of contact was first to
day off personnel of the needful shift and then to the
guards about to leave for possible doubling over. If vol-
unteers did not so materialize, the process was retracked
with the objective of now directing a person to work.
However, the very passage of minutes and changed cir-
cumstances as among those personnel at their homes
meant that the policy was haunted by an intrinsic imper-
fection. This fault was that the methodical approach
simply did not assure either that a volunteer would be
found or, more importantly, that time and circumstance
would permit a supervisor to even make a communica-
tion that some particular person cover a station on over-
time.
It was this defect that explains the varied perceptions
held by supervisors as to how to implement the involun-
tary phase. Some were more adroit at convincing a con-
tacted guard to stand by for further developments.
Others were impressed by relative seniority standing, and
still others were influenced by the extent to which a par-
ticular guard had once or recently covered for the solic-
iting shift. One of these approaches, actually the pre-
ferred one, invokes a yet further point of whether wage
and hour principles of Federal labor standards law are
triggered by the standby scenario. Thus 29 CFR 785.14
contemplates this very notion of "waiting time" by em-
phasis on "common sense and the general concept of
work or employment" in assessing when an individual is
"waiting to be engaged" versus the compensable status
of having been "engaged to wait." Nuances such as this
lead in turn to a divergence of views, with the Union
tacitly resentful of the entire system, preferring instead
that the employer simply hire more guards to expand
membership and dues revenue, and Respondent making
authorization forays with its day off or departing person-
nel for the objective of elevating job loyalties over per-
sonal preference.
What resulted was not a precise policy but rather a
purpose surrounded by discretionary techniques that
varied as between shifts, as between individual supervi-
sors, as between different points in time, as between per-
suasiveness of a particular authority figure, and as to the
variances in what were excusable reasons to decline
overtime. The upshot was a policy so poorly structured
and little understood as to lack the certainly that would
make it more than a mere day-to-day problem area suited
only for managerial discretion within generalized guide-
lines. It was not therefore a subject of such material, sub-
stantial, or significant impact that it constituted a term or
condition of employment susceptible of actionable unilat-
eral change by the employer nor, as the Charging Party
argues separately, unlawful on the theory of "manuda-
tory" bargaining subjects.
For this reason Gonzalez had the misfortune to have
received an unremitting order to work an overtime stint
and, absent a showing of animus toward this individual,
his refusal was done at peril. Respondent extended con-
sideration in his case to the point of additionally evaluat-
ing his medical excuse, but final confirmation of dis-
charge was done free of substantial proof that unlawful
purpose was in any way a motivating factor. However,
Respondent cannot have it both ways, and on the same
line of reasoning Romero was dealt with so harshly as to
warrant an inference of discrimination. He was singularly
known and viewed as an activist for the Union, and his
reason for declining Schmahl's overtime work directive
was no less significant than others which has passed. Re-
spondent has attempted to depict Romero as defiant in
his conversation with Schmahl, but that is an unfair char-
acterization, for his dismayed reaction was no more than
an expression of disgust. The issue is close; however, on
balance I cannot avoid inferring Respondent was resent-
ful enough that when the opportunity presented itself a
discriminatory discharge was visited on Romero. A part
of this evaluation is to accept, as the General Counsel
argues be done, that Everhart's written statement about
Romero showing further "disdain" for his job by odd
placement of a blood donor decal is a final telling indica-
tor of obsessive desire to single him out for retaliatory
treatment. I am satisfied with the validity of pertinent al-
legations to the extent that Romero's termination was be-
387
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause of his support for and identification with the
Union, but find insufficient evidence that Section 8(a)(4)
of the Act was violated.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. By discriminatorily discharging Larry Romero on
December 22 because of his support for the Union, Re-
spondent engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By discriminatorily issuing a written warning to
Larry Romero on May 7 Respondent has further violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
3. The General Counsel has failed to prove that Re-
spondent unlawfully discharged Demecio Gonzalez.
4. The General Counsel failed to prove that Respond-
ent unilaterally changed its established procedure for the
overtime manning of vacant posts.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it is necessary to order it to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate policies of the Act.
Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Larry
Romero, it must offer him reinstatement and make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, com-
puted on a quarterly basis from date of discharge to date
of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim
earnings, as prescribed in F. W Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in Florida
Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
388