Local No. 14940, United SteelWorkers of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 19, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 840 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

840 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local No . 14940 , United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC (Voyager Emblems, Inc.) andShir-
ley Gleaton . Case 3-CB-2235
December 19, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
On August 28, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
John G. Gregg issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent
filed an answering brief in opposition to the exceptions
of the General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
i Member Fanning does not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's com-
ments with respect to Miranda Fuel Company, Inc., 140 NLRB 181 (1962),
for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in General Truck Drivers,
Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No 692, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers ofAmerica (Great West-
ern Unifreight System), 209 NLRB 446 (1974)
DECISION
JOHN G. GREGG, Administrative Law Judge: This case was
tried before me at Buffalo, New York, on July 8, 1974, based
on charges duly filed and complaint issued May 24, 1974. The
issue litigated was whether as alleged in the complaint the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act by certain acts hereinafter set
forth restraining and coercing employees of the employer in
their exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and
causing an employer to discriminate against employees with
respect to whom membership in a labor organization has been
denied on some ground other than their failure to tender the
periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquiring or retaining membership. The Respondent
in its answer denied the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices.
At the trial herein all parties appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testified, and careful consideration of
the briefs filed herein, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I JURISDICTION
The Employer, Voyager Emblems, Inc., is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
New York with principal office and place of business at 3707
Lockport Road, Sanborn, New York, herein called the San-
born plant, engaged in the business of the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of embroidered emblems and related pro-
ducts. During the past year, a representative period, the Em-
ployer in the course and conduct of its business operations
purchased, transferred, and delivered to its Sanborn plant
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were
transported to said plant directly from States other than the
State of New York. I find that at all times material , Voyager
Emblems, Inc., has been and is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Respondent, Local Union No. 14940, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges essentially that the Respondent, by
its officer and agent, Joseph Sparacio, caused the Employer
to discharge employee Shirley Gleaton because she refused to
tender an initiation fee to the Respondent during a period of
time in which she was a member in good standing of the
Respondent and such initiation fee was not required as a term
and condition of employment, all in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
A. The Facts
There is no serious dispute as to the essential facts herein
and the record establishes that Shirley Gleaton was employed
by the Employer on August 14, 1972. At that time the Em-
ployer and Union were parties to a current collective-bargain-
ing agreement containing a union shop provision requiring
employees to become members of the Union and to remain
members in good standing. About 6 weeks later on September
29, 1972, she signed a union authorization card becoming a
member of the Respondent Union. Following her execution
of the authorization card the Employer thereafter withheld
an initiation fee of $30 from her paychecks and withheld
union dues as required.
In September 1973 Gleaton advised the Company through
Plant Manager Bruns that she desired a leave of absence to
take care of her mother and father, both of whom were ill.
She was advised by Bruns she could not be granted a leave
of absence but would have to quit. She was at that time
advised that when she was ready and able to return to work
an opening would be available.
215 NLRB No. 103
LOCAL NO. 14940, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA 841
Gleaton quit her employment on September 14, 1973, then
returned to employment with the Employer on November 26,
1973, about 2 months later . Her employment terminated on
January 19 , 1974, under the circumstances more specifically
addressed hereinafter.
B. The Events Leading to Gleaton 's Termination
Shirley Gleaton testified that in September 1973 she talked
with Plant Manager Bruns about getting a leave of absence
to take care of her mother and father . According to Gleaton,
Bruns told her that with the marrow department overloaded
he would not grant her a leave of absence but that she would
have a job whenever she came back . Gleaton stated that she
did not seek the Union's assistance in obtaining a leave of
absence and did not inform Mane Di Paulo , the local union
president , concerning the leave of absence to the effect that
"oh what is the use, I don 't"intend to return to Voyager
Emblems anyway."
Gleaton testified that as a result of her quitting , her insur-
ance was canceled and she lost seniority.
Marie Di Paulo, the local union president , testified that
around September 14, 1973, she and Union Steward Betty
Schweitzer were aware that Gleaton had a problem, and
Schweitzer asked Gleaton to go to Bruns ' office with Di
Paulo to see if they could get the leave of absence for Gleaton.
According to Di Paulo at this time Gleaton said , "no, that
is all right , because I'd rather quit anyway."
Between the versions provided by Gleaton and Di Paulo,
based on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses as
they testified, I credit the version of Di Paulo who impressed
me with her sincerity . She responded promptly and without
contrivance and, indeed, in testifying concerning her actions
in waiving an initiation fee for another employee under cir-
cumstances involving a transfer from another employer and
local union , Di Paulo testified candidly to her own detriment.
On the other hand , Gleaton appeared preoccupied with what
she viewed as unfair treatment by the Union and her tes-
timony appeared somewhat strained . Crediting Di Paulo, I
find that the Union indeed offered to help Gleaton with her
leave of absence problem but that Gleaton rejected the offer
and made it clear that she would rather quit anyway.
The record discloses through Gleaton 's testimony that
when Gleaton was rehired on November 26, 1973, she heard
that other girls who were being rehired were being required
to pay the $25 initiation fee. Gleaton queried Steward Pear-
son and was advised she would have to pay . Gleaton then
contacted Union President Sparacio , contacted the Interna-
tional headquarters in Buffalo, and after some discussion was
finally advised by Sparacio that she had to pay the $25 initia-
tion fee . In these discussions the provisions of the union
constitution were discussed and Gleaton claimed she was not
required to pay the fee Gleaton finally advised Sparacio that
if someone showed her where she had to pay the fee she would
pay it.
Gleaton then refused to sign a new authorization card but
tendered her dues for the month and $1 for each month she
was off work . The tender was returned.
Gleaton subsequently attended a union meeting where she
brought the matter up . Both Sparacio and Di Paulo were
present . Gleaton focused on another employee Corsaro who
had been permitted to transfer from another local union and
another job , and who was not required to pay an initiation fee.
She was finally advised that she would pay the fee or her
employment would be terminated . She was subsequently ter-
minated by the Company on January 17, 1974, on the written
notification by the Union to the Employer advising the Com-
pany that Gleaton "is not a member in good standing because
she has failed to comply with payment of the initiation fee in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the present con-
tract."
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends essentially that Gleaton
was a member of the Union in good standing at the time she
quit her job on September 23, 1973, and that pursuant to the
Respondent 's constitution , article XII , section 6 , Gleaton
remained a member in good standing for a period of 4 months
since she last paid dues; that Gleaton was a member of the
Union at the time she quit and since she had not resigned
from the Union or lost her membership through any act of
commission or omission she was a member when rehired 2
months later, hence not amenable to the payment of an initia-
tion fee.
The constitution of the International Union provides in
pertinent portions as follows:
Article XII
Local Unions , How Formed and Governed
Section 2 : When an applicant for membership makes his
application and signs the check-off authorization he
shall be regarded as a member in good standing but will
be required to continue to pay his dues and assessments
beginning with the month he starts to work and the
remainder of the initiation fee . . . .
Section 6 : Any member becoming four months in arrears
for dues or assessments shall forfeit his membership.
Section 8: Retired members and disabled members re-
ceiving aid and those receiving state workmen's compen-
sation payments , also members temporarily unemployed
through no fault of their own shall pay one dollar per
month dues to be forwarded by the Local Union to the
International Secretary-Treasurer with a record of all
such members.
The collective-bargaining agreement between the Com-
pany and the Union herein provides in the pertinent provision
on seniority that an employee loses his seniority and is auto-
matically terminated on the day on which he quits , and that
if an employee is rehired after he has lost his seniority under
this section he shall be treated in all respects as a new hire.
It is clear from the record herein that Shirley Gleaton quit
her job for personal reasons on September 24, 1973. She
consequently lost her seniority and was automatically ter-
minated on that date , and, under the provisions of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement when she was rehired on Novem-
ber 26, 1973, she was in all respects a new hire.
The General Counsel contends that Gleaton did not cease
being a member of the Union from the time she quit and for
842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 months of nonemployment, and thus was not required to
pay an initiation fee when she returned, arguing that if during
the 4-month period Gleaton had breached some internal
union rule or policy the Union could have argued that she
was still a member for internal discipline purposes because
she had not effectively resigned . As stated by the Supreme
Court in pertinent part in N.L.R.B. v. Granite State Joint
Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), "We have here no problem of
construing a union's constitution or by laws defining or limit-
ing the circumstances under which a member may resign
from the union. We have, therefore, only to apply the law
which normally is reflected in our free institutions-the right
of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he
sees fit . . . Communications Workers v. N.L.R.B., 215 F.2d
835, 838 (1954)."
As I view it, having voluntarily joined the Union herein,
albeit pursuant to the requirement of a union shop provision,
Gleaton made herself subject to the Union's constitution and
bylaws and the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Company. Her resignation from the Union
herein may be found in her act of quitting her employment
thereby placing herself in the category of a new hire if and
when she resumed employment with the employer.
It appears to me, in view of the credibility resolution
hereinabove, that when Gleaton quit her employment with
the Company on September 14, 1973, she signaled the
Union's steward and president that she did not want their
assistance in achieving a leave of absence as she would
"rather quit anyway," and by ceasing her payment of dues
thereafter, ceased being a member of the Union.
Additionally, it is clear from a perusal of the Union's con-
stitution and bylaws read against the uncontradicted tes-
timony of Union Sub-Regional Director Sam Sparacio that
Gleaton clearly was not covered by article XII, section 6,
thereof.
First the union constitution at article VII, section 6, pro-
vides in part that the president shall interpret the meaning of
the constitution.
Second, Sparacio testified credibly and without contradic-
tion concerning the inception of section 6 that he participated
in the drafting of the original provision. Sparacio defined the
4-month period as one in which a member is permitted to pay
what was referred to then as unemployment dues covering
individuals who were either laid off because of curtailment of
production or who were on approved leave of absence or sick
leave. Sparacio stated that the question concerning quits had
come up in the past and that former International presidents
had interpreted the union constitution as to the coverage of
article XII, section 6, and the union interpretation was that
under no conditions could anyone who quit their place of
employment be covered by section 6.
Finally, there is implicit in the contentions of the General
Counsel in this case, a charge that the Union in dealing with
other employees employed by the Company discriminated
against Gleaton and applied its rules in a disparate manner.
The record does not support such a conclusion.
It is well settled that a union occupying an exclusive bar-
gaining status must serve the interests of all bargaining unit
employees fairly and in good faith, and without hostile dis-
crimination against any of them on the basis of arbitrary,
irrelevant, or invidious distinctions Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962). The
record herein is completely devoid of any evidence of illegal
motive or action on the part of the Union concerning Glea-
ton. The evidence adduced during the proceedings relating to
the treatment of other employees fails to establish discrimina-
tory treatment of Gleaton or disparate application of union
rules by the Union, nor does it establish arbitrary, irrelevant,
or invidious distinctions.
Viewed from one perspective, this case represents an
oblique attack on the authority of the International president
to interpret the union constitution. There is nothing in this
record that would support such an attack. There is no evi-
dence that the constitution has been interpreted so as to
interfere with the Section 7 rights of employees. Nor is there
evidence of discriminatory application, interpretation, and
application of union policy. While the Corsaro incident repre-
sents an exercise of waiver by the Union of one of its transfer
requirements it also is clearly one in which the basic require-
ments of the transfer provisions of the constitution were satis-
fied.
Finally, even assuming that Gleaton had retained some
element of membership status with the Union following her
quit in September 1973, she would nevertheless fall in the
category of all other union members who were members of
the appropriate unit at the Company and would be covered
by and subject to the terms and conditions of the appropriate
collective-bargaining agreement.
The Union herein specifically provided in its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Company covering the unit
employees including Gleaton that quits who lost their seni-
ority would for all purposes be treated as new hires when
rehired by the Company. Insofar as this record is concerned
the Union has applied this provision to all employees indis-
criminately and with an even hand. I conclude therefore that
by its actions in requiring Gleaton to pay an initiation fee
subsequent to her reemployment as a new hire and by requir-
ing the Company to drop her from the rolls when she refused
to pay same the Union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Voyager Emblems, Inc., is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not , as alleged in the complaint,
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]