Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 27, 1961

130 N.L.R.B. 1551 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1551
Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders International Union of Long Beach and
Orange County; Culinary Alliance Local No. 681 [Leonard
Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, a co-
partnership ] and M. J. Diederich . Case No. 21-CB-1384.
March 27, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 4, 1960, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that
the Respondent Unions had engaged in and were engaging in certain
unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent Unions filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report to-
gether with a supporting brief.
The Board has, reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed..
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report and the entire record in this case, including the
exceptions and the brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, only insofar as consist-
ent with our decision herein.'
1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondents violated Section
8(b) (1) (A) of the Act by peacefully picketing for recognition at a
time when they did not represent a majority of the employees at.
Crown's Long Beach cafeteria. The Intermediate Report in this
case was issued prior to the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639 etc. (Curtis
Brothers),2 in which the Court held that peaceful picketing by a
union which does not represent a majority of the employees, to com-
pel immediate recognition as the employees' exclusive bargaining
agent, is not an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b) (1) (A). In
view of the controlling decision of the Supreme Court in the Curtis
case, we shall , in compliance therewith , dismiss the complaint insofar
as it alleges that the Respondent's peaceful picketing for recognition
is violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
2. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondents violated Sec-
tion 8(b) (2) of the Act by peacefully picketing for a union-security
clause at a time when they did not represent a majority of the em-
Respondent's argument that the complaint in this case should be dismissed on the
ground that issuance of the complaint in Case No . 21-CP-4 constituted a merger of this
case and that case is without merit. The violation of Section 8(b) (2) found in this case
is independent of the. violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) found in Local Joint Executive
Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union of Long,
Beach and Orange County, at at. (Crown Cafeteria), 130 NLRB 570.
2 362 U.S. 274.
130 NLRB No. 160.
1552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees at the Long Beach cafeteria. We agree that peaceful picket-
ing by a minority union for a contract containing a union-security
clause is violative of Section 8 (b) (2).
Between the time Section 8 (b) (2) was added to the Act in 1947
and the time the Board's Curtis doctrine was enunciated in 1957, the
Board held on several occasions that economic and other pressures in-
,eluding picketing, which had as their objective compelling an em-
ployer to sign an illegal union-security agreement, violated Section
:8(b) (2) as an "attempt to cause" discrimination.' During the Curtis
period, the Board continued to adhere to this interpretation of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (2), which was independent of, and unaffected by, the con-
siderations that led the Board to find under the Curtis rule that
minority picketing for recognition was violative of Section
8(b) (1) (A).'
The legislative history of Section 8(b) (2) indicates that that sec-
tion was intended to prohibit "all attempts" to cause an employer to
discriminate 5 whether by means of peaceful picketing or other types
,of pressure. Therefore, it is clear that picketing to obtain a union-
;security clause that would violate Section 8(a) (3) is an "attempt to
,cause" discrimination and is violative of Section 8(b) (2).e
Accordingly, we conclude that the Respondent Unions violated
,Section 8(b) (2) of the Act by peacefully picketing for the objective
of a union-security clause at a time when they did not represent a ma-
jority of the employees at Crown's Long Beach cafeteria.
3. Although the complaint alleged that Respondents' picketing for
a union-security clause violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) as well as Sec-
tion 8(b) (2), the Supreme Court's Curtis decision makes it clear that
peaceful picketing for any purpose does not restrain and coerce em-
ployees in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Therefore, we shall dis-
miss the allegation in the complaint that Respondents' picketing for a
union-security clause constituted a derivative violation of Section
.8(b) (1) (A).
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
The National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board
hereby orders that the Respondents, Local Joint Executive Board of
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union
? See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, etc., Local No. 421
(The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company), 81 NLRB 1052; Denver Building and
Construction Trades Council; International Union of Operating Engineers (Henry Shore),
,90 NLRB 1768 enfd. 192 F. 2d 577; Medford Building and Construction Trades Council
of 'the: American Federation of Labor, et at. (Kogap Lumber Industries ), 96 NLRB 165.
4 See, e.g., Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , et at. ( Sierra Furniture
Company ), 125 NLRB 159. -
H. Conf. Rept. No. 510, on H.R. 3020, p. 44 (1947).
e The Board has long held that it is a violation of Section 8(b) (2) for a union to
-execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a union-security clause at a time when
the union does not represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Bryan
Manufacturing Company, 119 NLRB 502, reversed on other grounds 362 U.S. 411 ( 1960).
LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD. , HOTEL & 'RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1553
of Long Beach and Orange County; Culinary Alliance Local No. 681,
and their officers, representatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from attempting to cause Leonard Smitley and
Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria to discriminate against
employees by entering into a contract which requires membership in
Respondents, at a time when Respondents do not represent a majority
of its employees in an appropriate unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at their business offices at Long Beach, California, copies
of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first
Region, shall, after being signed by Respondents' representative, be
posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by them for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail to the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region
signed copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix" for
posting at the premises of the Company, the latter willing, for a period
of 60 consecutive days, at all locations where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Copies of said notice shall be furnished by the
aforesaid Regional Director.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, in
writing, within, 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps they
have taken to comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent Unions violated
Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH took no part in the consideration of the
above Decision and Order.
7In the event that this Order Is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF HOTEL
AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UN-
ION OF LONG BEACH AND ORANGE COUNTY; AND CULINARY ALLIANCE
LOCAL No. 681, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF LEONARD SMITLEY AND
JOSEPH W. DROWN D/B/A CROWN CAFETERIA
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify you that :
597254-61-vol. 130-99
1554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT attempt to cause Leonard Smitley and Joseph W.
Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria to discriminate against employees
in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, by entering into a.contract which requires membership in our
labor organizations, at a time when we do not represent a majority
of its employees in an appropriate unit.
LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF HOTEL AND
RESTAURANT EXPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS IN-
TERNATIONAL UNION OF LONG BEACH AND
ORANGE COUNTY; AND CULINARY ALLIANCE
LOCAL No. 681,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding was heard at Los Angeles, California, on November 18, 1959,
pursuant to a complaint of the General Counsel against Local Joint Executive Board
of Hotel and Restaurant Employees-and Bartenders International Union of Long
Beach and Orange County and against Culinary Alliance Local No. 681, both herein
called Respondent. The issue litigated was whether Respondent, commencing on
May 5, 1959, engaged in minority picketing for recognition and a union-shop con-
tract at the premises of Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafe-
teria, herein called the Company, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) of the Act. Respondent's answer
admitted the fact of the picketing; denied that the picketing was unlawful; and con-
tended that the picketing actually constituted an advertising picket line. Oral argu-
ment was waived at the close of the hearing and briefs have been submitted by the
General Counsel and Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, operate two cafe-
terias at Pasadena and Long Beach, California, where they sell and serve food to the
general public. The instant proceeding involves only the Long Beach operation.
During the period from July 1958 through June 1959, total sales of both cafeterias
were in excess of $600,000; of these, $521,000 represented sales at Pasadena and
$90,000 represented sales at Long Beach from May 5, 1959, the date of its opening,
through June 30, 1959. Also, from July 1958 to June 1959, both operations pur-
chased goods and equipment valued in excess of $100,000 which originated outside
the State of California. While the record warrants the finding that both operations
are centrally controlled and that the figures. of both may properly be considered
herein, a projection of the Long Beach figures on an annual basis discloses that this
operation considered alone meets the jurisdictional standards of the Board, I find
therefore that the operations of the Company affect commerce.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union of Long Beach and Orange County, and Culinary Alliance Local
No. 681, are labor organizations admitting to membership the employees of the
Company.
LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL &RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES - 1555
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
Early in 1959 , the Company purchased the Long Beach premises and the doors
were opened to the public on May 5, 1959 . These premises have been picketed by
Respondent continuously thereafter with the exception of a period of several weeks
when a State court temporary restraining order was in effect . While the General
Counsel does rely herein on Respondent 's conduct preceding the picketing , it is the
picketing activity allegedly in support of an illegal objective which is attacked. The
complaint , literally read , does encompass the prepicketing activity as an unfair labor
practice , but the brief of the General Counsel makes clear that the thrust of the
complaint is directed only to the picketing.
B. Sequence of events
The Joint Executive Board is the spokesman for two local unions, one of which is
Culinary Alliance Local No. 681. Clayton Smith is president and secretary of the
latter and is also director of organization for the culinary workers section of the
Joint Excutive Board.
During the period between April 15 and 17 , 1959, Smith made a visit to the
premises of the Company which were undergoing alterations . He handed a copy of
a complete collective-bargaining contract containing a union -security clause to one,
Etchepare , then the assistant manager, and asked Etchepare to deliver this to partner
Leonard Smitley. This document was a 20-page labor contract entitled "WAGE
SCALE AND WORKING AGREEMENT" as well as "CONTRACT." It states that
it is an "Agreement" between the Joint Executive Board and an employer whose name
is left blank . The agreement has a hiring clause which includes a union -security
clause requiring employees to join Respondent within 31 days from the date of
employment or the signing of the contract , whichever is the later . Etchepare duly
turned this document over to Smitley , according to the latter and I so find , on April
15, 16, or 17.1
Smith returned to the Long Beach cafeteria and spoke with Smitley on a date
which Smitley placed, and I so find, on May 2 or 3, and probably the former.2 Ac-
cording to Smitley, Smith asked where the Company was obtaining employees, and
Smitley replied that it was doing so locally. Smith asked if the Company planned to
operate a union house and Smitley replied in the negative , stating that the employees
would receive good wages and would be covered by a good health and welfare plan.
Smith again asked if the Company would operate a union house ; Smitley replied
that it was not up to him and that it was a choice for the employees to make by
having an election . Smith replied, "That is not the way we do it nowadays."
The contract previously left by Smith , or an identical copy thereof obtained by
Smitley from the local restaurant association , was on the desk. Smith commented,
"I see you have got the stuff I left for you . Have you read it yet?" Smitley replied
that he had not. It is undisputed that Smith made no claim to represent a majority,
made no demand that employees be hired from the union hiring hall, and did not
ask that the contract be signed.3
1 Smith's testimony as to the date of this visit as well as subsequent visits was con-
fused. He originally testified that he left the contract during April . He later testified
that this occasion was 3 weeks to 1 month before the cafeteria opened ; that it was
3 weeks before he first visited Smitley, as is discussed below ; and that it was 2 or 3 weeks
before the visit. He later claimed that this was but 2 days before he first saw Smitley,
an occasion which I find below to have been May 2 . I credit the testimony of Smitley,
a clear and meticulous witness, that he received this contract from Etchepare approxi-
mately 10 days or 2 weeks before the first visit from Smith , which Smitley placed on
May 2 , and, further, that Smitley received the contract from Etchepare on April 15, 16,
or 17.
2 Smith originally testified that this visit took place on May 5 ( the date the cafeteria
opened ) ; thereafter , after purportedly being refreshed by his affidavit , he placed this as
but 2 days after the original visit when he had left the contract . Still later , he placed
it as 2 or 3 weeks thereafter and then readopted his testimony that it was but 2 days
later. Smitley 's testimony is corroborated by that of Chef Abejon who placed Smith on
the scene 3 or 4 days before the opening when, as both Smitley and Abejon testified,
Abejon served coffee to the two men. In view of Smith's confusion on the subject,
Smitley's corroborated testimony is credited herein.
. s These findings are based on testimony of Smitley which Is largely undenied and in
part corroborated by that of Smith . Smith also testified that he told Smitley Respondent
1556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On May 4, Smith returned to the cafeteria and again spoke with Smitley who was
occupied with various tasks prior to opening on the next day. According to Smitley,
Smith asked if he had "read the stuff yet ." Smitley replied that he had not , where-
upon Smith approached Manager Walter Kelting who was familiar with Smith 's posi-
tion with Respondent . Kelting uncontrovertedly testified , and I find , that Smith
asked him "if I had any influence with Mr . Smitley in regard to union activities so to
speak. . That I should do so . . . if we don't he will have to throw a picket
line around the place tomorrow morning, the morning of the opening." 4
On the morning of May 5, the cafeteria opened to the public at 10 a.m. and seven
pickets were present, according to Smitley . Five paraded before the front entrance
of the premises which is the only one available to the public. Another picketed at
an alley on one side which provides access to the parking lot and an employee and
delivery entrance to the rear of the premises, although it appears that only one
employee, an early morning cook, uses this rear entrance . Another picket was sta-
tioned near a second alley on the other side or the premises which provides access
to the above-mentioned parking lot and delivery entrance , and also to another
parking lot. It appears that the number of pickets diminished and, according to
Smith , the number was not in excess of four at any time. I find that the number
was smaller subsequent to the first day.
It is conceded that the picketing was under the control and direction of Respondent
and, as noted , it has continued since then except for the brief period when it was
halted by a temporary restraining order . At other times , however, pickets have not
been present at the alleys at times when pickets were stationed at the front entrance.
As of the date of the hearing , the technique of the pickets is to arrive at 11 a.m. and
leave at 7 p .m.; the cafeteria is open from 7 a.m. until 8:30 p .m. It is Respondent's
express position that this was not a picket line for recognition and further , that it
was not an organizational picket line. Respondent contends expressly that this was
an "advertising" picket line which named Respondent as the aggrieved sponsor thereof.
The original sign carried by the pickets stated , as Respondent contends:
Notice to members of organized labor and their friends. This establishment is
non-union . Please do not patronize.
A week or two later another sign was used which stated:
Notice to members of organized labor and their friends. This establishment is
unfair . We are picketing because this establishment is attempting to break down
our standard of wages, vacaitons , health and welfare, workday, work week con-
tracts as paid by over 600 union establishments . Please do not patronize.
Both signs have the name of the secretary of Respondent at the bottom thereof.
C. Analysis and conclusions
Respondent's position is that its picket line was solely on advertising picket line
and, in support thereof , Respondent demonstrated herein that there was no literal
demand made upon the Company is such words for union recognition or for the sign-
ing of the contract and further that the signs carried by the pickets did not refer to
these topics. While these contentions of Respondent as to the facts are supported
by the record , the Board has regularly and realistically inspected all the circum-
stances surrounding picketing in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the true purpose
thereof.
I believe that a preponderance of the evidence supports the position of the General
Counsel herein that an objective of the picketing was to achieve recognition and a
contract. While Smith did not use the literal terms of recognition and signing of a
contract , he did present a contract to the Company and twice asked a company
official if he had read it. Smith admittedly sought to have employees hired through
the union employment hall; and , after the second occasion when he asked if Smitley
would like to supply him with employees "through our union office" and that they had
a number of "good" employees available.
* Smith was not questioned about Kelting ' s testimony . He admitted that he possibly
asked Smitley if the latter had read the contract . He further testified that he asked
Smitley to reconsider hiring people through the union employment service ; that he spoke
to Smitley about the hiring hall ; that he stated he could supply Smitley with all the
efficient help he needed ; that he did refer to the prevailing wage scale in the contract;
and that there was no mention of union membership . I have credited Smitley's version
because , even on Smith ' s testimony , it is apparent that he referred to the context of the
contract , viz, the wage scale and to the hiring list specifically provided for in this contract.
LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1557
had read the contract, he conveyed a threat of picketing to Manager Kelting. More-
over, in his statement to Kelting, he made specific reference to Kelting having influ-
ence with his employer "in regard to union activities." This can hardly be correlated
to an interest in wage rates and fringe benefits divorced from union recognition and
a contract.
When Smitley stated to Smith that it was not his decision whether the shop be
unionized and that he thought an eleciton was the proper procedure, Smith merely
replied that things were not done that way. I deem it significant that at no time
during these crucial talks did Smith disavow any desire for recognition and the sign-
ing of the contract, despite the fact that one would logically conclude from the con-
tract presentation and his references to the contract that these were among his objec-
tives. Surely, the context was such on May 2, when Smith said that no election was
necessary, that Smith would have indicated disinterest in union recognition and the
contract, were such his position.
Smith displayed but perfunctory interest in the proposed conditions of employment
at the Company. And while the evidence on the topic disclosed that the Company's
standards variously met, perhaps exceeded, or may not have met union standards,
there is no evidence that this was a matter of knowledge to Smith and the union
officials prior to the onset of the picketing.
Even on May 4, the day before the start of the picketing, on Smith's version of the
conversation with Smitley, he made reference to employment of personnel at the
wage scales provided in the contract and sought use of the hiring hall. Yet this hir-
ing hall was contained in the same section of the contract as the union-security lan-
guage. This too warrants the inference that a primary, if not the exclusive objective
of the picketing, was recognition and signature by the Company of the union-security
contract and that this objective represented the alleged unfairness attacked by the
placards of the pickets. I so find.
The Board has regarded picketing by a minority union for recognition as an at-
tempt to compel an employer to commit an unfair labor practice by foisting a
minority union on its employees in derogation of their statutory rights. It has held
that this economic pressure perforce affects the employees, since their livelihood
depends upon the successful operation of the business, and that it consequently tends
to coerce them in their union activities. I find that by engaging in such conduct
Respondent has restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1) (A) of the
Act. Paint Varnish & Lacquer Makers Union, Local 1232 AFL-CIO et al. (Andrew
Brown Company), 120 NLRB 1425; Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local
No. 420 etc. (Fisk and Mason), 120 NLRB 135; United Transports, Inc., 123 NLRB
668; Local 1922, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Mid-
Island Electrical Sales Corp.), 122 NLRB 850; United Hatters Cap & Millinery
Workers etc. (Louisville Cap Company), 123 NLRB 572; and Local 208, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehouses & Helpers of America, et
al. (Sierra Furniture Company), 125 NLRB 159.
As the contract sought by Respondent contained a union-security clause, it follows
that this picketing constituted an attempt to cause discrimination by an employer
against nonunion employees under circumstances not permitted under the Act. Alloy
Manufacturing Company, 119 NLRB 307. While in N.L.R.B v. International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, Lodge 942, AFL-CIO (Alloy Mfg. Co.), 263 F. 2d 796. the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a portion of a Board Order
finding a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by promulgating a "We do not patronize"
list, the remainder of the decision is significant . The labor organization in that case
conceded that its picketing under circumstances similar to the present case was vio-
lative of Section 8(b)(2) and the court, in view of this concession, did not pass
upon whether the picketing, as such, was violative of Section 8(b)(1) (A) of the Act.
That question is therefore deemed to be open in this circuit. See also Local 420 (Fisk
and Mason), supra and Local 208 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sierra
Furniture Co.), supra.5
c Respondent has cited Radio Broadca ' t Technicians. Local Union No. 1264 , etc., 123
NLRB 507. In support of its position herein. In that case. the Board found. on the facts
therein, that minority picketing was for the purpose of inducing a. boycott by the nubile
and by the advertisers of the employer's broadcasting station and not for the object of
recognition and signing a contract. That decision therefore turned on tie facts in the
case. While the present case is not an exceedingly strong one, I believe that the present
factual situation is stronger in support of the General Counsel's position than that
found in the cited case.
1558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of the Company set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall re-
commend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Barten-
ders International Union of Long Beach and Orange County and Culinary Alliance
Local No. 681 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
2. Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria are an em-
ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
3. By picketing the premises of Leonard Smitley and Joseph W . Drown d/b/a
Crown Cafeteria, as found above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
4. By picketing for a union -shop contract, as found above, Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (b) (2) of the Act. -
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation and East Bay Union
of Machinists, Local 1304, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO and United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO.
Case No. 20-CA-1682. March 27, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 27, 1959, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the allegations of the complaint were not supported by substantial
evidence and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety, as set forth in the copy of the intermediate Report attached
hereto. Thereafter, the 'Respondent, the Union, and the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and briefs in
support thereof.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the parties' exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modi-
fications and additions.
130 NLRB No. 161.