Local 600 (UAW)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 16, 1976

225 N.L.R.B. 1299 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

LOCAL 600 (UAW) 1299
Local 600, International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) (Dearborn Stamping Plant of Ford
Motor Co.) and Al Puma . Case 7-CB-3133
September 16, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 15, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Paul Bisgyer issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
the Respondent Union has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. However, we do not adopt his
entire rationale for so finding. Rather, we conclude
that Unit Chairman Gines interfered with the
committeemen's rights under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement and find that Respondent Union vio-
lated their statutory rights by depriving them of a fair
avenue for resolving their grievance over Gines' allo-
cation to himself of overtime work previously shared
by all of them. Clearly, as found by the Administra-
tive Law Judge, Gines was Respondent's agent and
Respondent was aware that Gines was refusing to
assign overtime work to the committeemen contrary
to longstanding practices under the contract. Yet
when they filed a grievance under the contractual
grievance procedure, it was Gines himself who han-
dled it for the Union, notwithstanding his own status
as an interested party with a conflicting position. As
set forth by the Administrative Law Judge, although
the Employer denied the grievance at Step 2, the
committeemen requested Gines to appeal this denial
in order to obtain an umpire's ruling, but Gines re-
fused to do so. Yet Respondent took no steps to rem-
edy the situation.
It is axiomatic that an exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative is required to afford fair and unbi-
ased representation to all unit members. Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., et al, 323 U.S.
192, 202-203 (1944). While an individual's grievance
may be rejected for the greater good of the entire
unit, the contrary action cannot be accepted as valid.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-191 (1967). That
is precisely what occurred here-the Respondent
permitted its agent to reject the committeemen's
grievance for the individual benefit of that agent.
Such action was manifestly unfair.
Since Respondent by its above action or inaction
was responsible for Gines' action, we find that by
such action it restrained and coerced the committee-
men in their exercise of the protected activity of fil-
ing grievances, and therefore violated Section
8(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., National Football League Man-
agement Council, 203 NLRB 958 (1973); Kansas Meat
Packers, a Division of Aristo Foods, Inc., 198 NLRB
543,(1972).'
We find no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) in
Gines' allocation to himself of overtime work previ-
ously shared by Gines and the committeemen. It is
difficult to see just what union or other protected
activity of the committeemen was restrained by such
assignment. It is true of course that the
committeemen's job duties consisted of representing
other employees under the contract,' but Gines did
not act because of the committeemen's own union
activities, or because they were too militant or not
militant enough in representing employees, or even
clearly contrary, assuming that would make a differ-
ence, to any provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement.' As we view that agreement, it may be
read as giving the Union a right to have all commit-
1 We find no violation of Sec 8(b)(2) in Gines' denial of the appeal, for
such action lacks the element of causing or attempting to cause the Compa-
ny to take any action respecting the matter, much less causing it to discrimi-
nate against the committeemen in violation of Sec 8(a)(3) See the dissent-
ing opinion, and cases cited thereon on this point, in independent Metal
Workers Union Local No 1 (Hughes Tool Company), 147 NLRB 1573, 1591
(1964)
2 The case has not been tried on the theory that Gines' actions deprived
employees of adequate representation or of the full amount of representa-
tion the parties' agreement provided, although Gines' actions may well have
had that effect, as the Administrative Law Judge speculates
Contrary to Members Penello and Walther, we perceive no particular
difficulty in concluding that the representatives, including the committee-
men, are employees of the Company, performing work of value to the Com-
pany and directly related to its efficient operation, and within the unit rep-
resented by the Respondent Union That seems clear from a reading of the
parties' collective-bargaining agreement Thus art 1, sec I. Recognition-
Contract Unit, clearly includes in the bargaining unit all employees "actually
covered" by the agreement Art Vi, Representatives, contains numerous pro-
visions designating the number of allowable representatives, both part time
who perform some production work and full time who perform no produc-
tion work, determining the eligibility of production employees to move into
representative slots by election, keying their wages to their former produc-
tion jobs, including automatic step increases and production bonuses which
follow along as they perform their representative duties, setting forth the
effect of layoffs, which may include moving into part-time representative
status, and overtime work, and defining the duties of representatives to
include assisting employees in receiving representation on company time
An obvious benefit to the Company-and the Union-of the performance
of such duties is to enable the parties to the agreement to, in the words of
art VII, sec I, Grievance Procedure, "make a sincere and determined effort
to settle meritorious grievances in the voluntary steps of the Grievance Pro-
cedure and to keep the procedure free of unmeritorious grievances" More-
over, the complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that representatives are
employees of the Company and the only employees involved in this pro-
ceeding, as well as the Respondent's representative status and duty with
respect to such employees
It is plain that Gines acted as he did solely to increase his own wages
Ascribing his motivation to the Company, and characterizing his conduct as
that of the Company, still leaves the record short of demonstrating conduct
Continued
225 NLRB No. 185
1300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
teemen present when the entire plant worked over-
time and a proportionate number present when part
of the plant worked overtime, a right that it could
elect not to exercise. Under such an interpretation,
no particular committeemen would have the right to
work overtime, but would be dependent on the
Union's determination as to how many and which of
the overtime slots it elected to fill, a determination
made in the case before us by Gines. This is not to
say that this is the only or most reasonable interpre-
tation of the contract or that the Impartial Umpire
would so interpret the contract if a grievance over
the matter came to him. Clearly other interpretations
are possible, and may well be more in keeping with
the parties intent, and thus Gines' actions could quite
properly be grieved as they were by the committee-
men. It was the improper handling of such grievance
that constituted the injury to the employees involved
and infringed upon their exercise of Section 7 rights.
Though they were entitled to have the decision as to
whether that grievance should be carried forward by
the Union made by someone other than Gines, we do
not agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
Gines' actions giving rise to the grievance was itself
an unfair labor practice.
REMEDY
We have found that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by failing to provide fair and unbiased
consideration of the committeemen's grievance.
Accordingly, we shall order Respondent to either
arrange to have the Company's denial of the
committeemen's grievance appealed to the review
board for full and fair consideration and, if that body
cannot agree upon a satisfactory resolution of the
grievance, to give full and fair consideration to ap-
pealing the grievance to the Impartial Umpire, tak-
ing, if appropriate, all necessary steps to get the mat-
ter before the Umpire, or, in lieu thereof, pay the
affected committeemen backpay in the manner pro-
vided by the Administrative Law Judge.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Local 600, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace, and Agriculatural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), Dearborn, Michigan, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall:
violative of Sec 8(a)(3) Hence there can be no violation of Sec 8(b)(2) as to
this aspect of the case
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining or coercing the unit bargaining
and district committeemen at the Dearborn Stamp-
ing Plant of Ford Motor Company in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by
failing to represent, deal with, and treat them in a fair
and impartial manner with respect to grievances filed
by them over the denial to them of the opportunity to
share in overtime work stemming from the action of
Unit Chairman Gines in allocating to himself all
such overtime work.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Either arrange to have the committeemen's
grievance appealed to the review board for full and
fair consideration and, if that body cannot agree
upon a fair and satisfactory resolution of the griev-
ance, to have it give full and fair consideration to
appealing the grievance to the Impartial Umpire,
taking, if appropriate, all necessary steps to get the
matter before the Umpire, or, in lieu of the foregoing,
pay the affected committeemen backpay in the man-
ner recommended by the Administrative Law Judge.
(b) Post at its offices copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
7, after being duly signed by the Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma-
terial.
(c) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 7
signed copies of the notice for posting by Ford Mo-
tor Company at its Dearborn Stamping Plant in
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted, if the Company is willing to do so.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
MEMBER JENKINS, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that Re-
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
LOCAL 600 (UAW) 1301
spondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act by improperly refusing to process the grievances
of the committeemen who were deprived of overtime,
and I agree with the remedy they prescribe. I would
go further, however, and accept the Administrative
Law Judge's entire rationale and find, in addition,
that the actions of Respondent's agent, Unit Chair-
man Gines, in denying the committeemen their con-
tractual right to a fair share of the shops stewards'
overtime, constituted an additional breach of its duty
of fair representation as defined by a majority of the
Board in Miranda Fuel Company, Inc.,' thereby vio-
lating Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
Preliminarily I note my agreement with my majori-
ty colleagues, contrary to the position taken by the
dissenters, that the work performed by the commit-
teemen is unit work and that the committeemen are
therefore unit employees in every sense. Thus, the
collective-bargaining agreement created their work
and obligated the Company to pay for it, thus the
Company as well as the Respondent Union benefits
from this work. Accordingly, this group of employees
stands in the same position as any other unit employ-
ee with respect to the duties and obligations owed to
them by Respondent.
The collective-bargaining agreement, together with
its interpretation and application through the long-
standing practice of the parties, establishes the right
of all the committeemen to participate in the over-
time work. The majority has acknowledged that this
agreement, in article VI, gives the employees the
right to have representatives (committeemen) present
on company time, functioning full time as their rep-
resentatives. In section 11(b) of that article, entitled
"Hours on Company Time," it is expressly stated
that "all representatives shall be entitled to be on
Company time" (emphasis supplied) in overtime situ-
ations, in a proportionate number to the number of
employees on that shift who are called in to work
overtime. The Union, on the other hand, is given the
right in the contract to be notified of those employ-
ees who are called in for overtime, and to select from
among its representatives those who will serve during
the overtime period. While the contract itself is silent
as to how this representation overtime is to be dis-
tributed among the representatives, the record shows,
and the Administrative Law Judge found, that Gines'
predecessor as unit chairman had followed the prac-
tice of distributing the daily allotted hours of over-
time equally among the committeemen on a rotation-
al basis. This practice was in effect for at least 8 years
prior to Gines' becoming unit chairman. Upon his
election as chairman, Gines undertook, on his own
and solely for his own personal financial enhance-
ment, and without any reason related to effective
performance of the work, to change the then prevail-
ing system of overtime distribution so that he would
receive all such overtime work to the total exclusion
of the other committeemen.
The majority not only acknowledges the long-
standing past practice, but also the arbitrariness of
Gines' action in unilaterally changing this system.
Moreover, even if this past practice does not estab-
lish each committeeman's contractual right to equal
distribution of overtime, as I believe it does, it at
least establishes the terms and conditions of employ-
ment related to this work, so that any change in this
system, based on arbitrary, capricious, or invidious
standards, breaches the Union's duty of fair repre-
sentation. Since the change concededly was made by
Gines and was based solely on his own self-interest,
it was not only arbitrary but was also rooted in a
conflict of interest, and thereby violated the Union's
duty to represent fairly the other employees doing
this work. Miranda, supra
Accordingly, I would affirm the Administrative
Law Judge with respect to all of his findings and
conclusions and would grant the remedy provided in
his Decision.
MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER, dissenting:
Chairman Murphy and Member Fanning would
adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding of an
8(b)(1)(A) violation, but not of an 8(b)(2). Member
Jenkins would find a violation of both Section
8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A). Moreover, the Chairman and
Member Fanning in finding an 8(b)(1)(A) violation
rely only on the fact that Respondent failed to pro-
cess the grievance over assignment of overtime be-
yond the second stage of the grievance procedure;
they find no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), contrary
to the Administrative Law Judge, in Gines' alloca-
tion to himself of overtime work previously shared
by Gines and the committeemen. Member Jenkins
would adopt the entire rationale of the Administra-
tive Law Judge. We do not agree that Respondent
Union has violated the Act in any respect.
The committeemen occupy an ambiguous position
with relation to the Company. For payment purposes
they are treated as if they were company employees,
but they are in actuality agents of the Union present
for the sole purpose of representing employees in
grievance related activities. They perform no work 6
directly for the Employer. The union constitution
6 The present proceeding involves only full-time representatives who are
not required to perform production work, but spend all their working time
140 NLRB 181 (1962) representing employees in grievance matters
1302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and bylaws provide for their creation and controls
their functioning . They are elected by unit employees
and they act for the employees and the Union in
processing grievances against the Company . As such
representatives they stand in an adversary relation-
ship to the Company.
For the Company to undertake the responsibility
of allocating overtime among committeemen would
be tantamount to deciding who is to represent the
employees on the overtime shifts vis -a-vis the Compa-
ny. This would either constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) or come perilously close to it . It is there-
fore anomalous to hold that the Union violated
Section 8 (b)(2) by causing the Company to discrimi-
nate among committeemen in assigning overtime
since any such assignment would probably violate
Section 8 (b)(2). Section 8(b)(2) is directed at causing
or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3).
The committeemen when acting in their representa-
tive capacity are not employees under the direction
and control of the Company . Moreover , if the Com-
pany did discriminate among the committeemen, it
would probably be violating Section 8 (a)(2) and not
8(b)(3).
For related reasons we would not find that the
Union breached any duty of fair representation
either in refusing to process a grievance in behalf of
the committeemen or by its other conduct. The
committeemen ' s grievance was against the Union
and not against the Company . As we have tried to
show, the Company would be skirting illegality if it
undertook to decide which committeemen should
work any particular overtime shift . It was therefore
the Union ' s responsibility , and its alone , to make
such assignments . If it failed fairly to distribute such
assignments among the committeemen , the remedy
lies in its internal procedures or perhaps in some
other section of the Act , concerning which we ex-
press no opinion . The Union must have the right to
determine who its grievance representatives will be
without interference from the Employer , the con-
tract, or the collective -bargaining relationship, in-
cluding the grievance procedure . It is not a violation
of the Union's duty of fair representation required by
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. A union when acting
or failing to act fairly in relation to its agents does
not owe a duty of fair representation in behalf of
those agents against itself.
We would therefore dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity
to give evidence, the National Labor Relations
Board found that we violated the National Labor
Relations Act and ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce the Unit Bar-
gaining and District Committeemen at the Dear-
born Stamping Plant of Ford Motor Company
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act by failing to represent, deal
with, and treat them in a fair and impartial man-
ner with respect to grievances filed by them over
the denial to them of the opportunity to share in
overtime work stemming from the action of Unit
Chairman Gines in allocating to himself all such
overtime work.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL either arrange to have the
committeemen's grievance appealed to the re-
view board for full and fair consideration and, if
that body cannot agree upon a fair and satisfac-
tory resolution of the grievance, to have it give
full and fair consideration to appealing the
grievance to the Impartial Umpire, taking, if ap-
propriate, such steps as will bring the matter be-
fore the Umpire, or, in lieu of the foregoing,
reimburse, with 6-percent interest , the Unit Bar-
gaining and District Committeemen at the Dear-
born Stamping Plant for overtime earnings they
lost by reason of our unfair and discriminatory
treatment.
LOCAL 600, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA (UAW)
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BISGYER, Administrative Law Judge- This proceed-
ing, with all the parties represented, was heard on April 15
and 16, 1975, on the complaint of the General Counsel
issued on February 13, 1975,! and the answer of Local 600,
1 The complaint is based on original and amended charges filed on July
25, 1974 , and February 6, 1975 , respectively, copies of which were duly
LOCAL 600 (UAW) 1303
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), here-
in called the Respondent or Local 600. Two questions are
presented for decision. The first is whether the Respon-
dent, in violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the National La-
bor Relations Act, as amended,2 breached its duty of fair
representation owing to the employees at the Dearborn
Stamping Plant of Ford Motor Company, herein called the
Company, by reason of the conduct of Willie Gines, the
unit chairman at that plant, in allocating to himself all au-
thorized daily overtime contractually prescribed for em-
ployee representation purposes to the exclusion of the unit
bargaining and district committeemen. The other question
to be resolved is whether, as a result of Gines' conduct, the
Respondent also violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by
causing the Company to discriminate against the commit-
teemen in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.3 At the
close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argument but
subsequently filed briefs in support of their respective posi-
tions.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration
being given to the arguments advanced by the parties, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal
office in Dearborn, Michigan, is engaged in the the manu-
facture, sale, and distribution of automobiles, trucks, rapid
transit systems, parts for said vehicles, and related prod-
ucts. It operates plants in Ohio, California, Michigan, and
other States and foreign countries. The only facility in-
volved in this proceeding is the Company's Dearborn
Stamping Plant located in Dearborn, Michigan In the reg-
ular course and conduct of its business operations, the
Company annually manufactures, sells, and distributes at
its various Michigan plants, including the Dearborn
Stamping Plant, products valued in excess of $1 million of
which products valued in excess of $100,000 are annually
shipped from these plants directly to points located outside
the State.
The Respondent agrees for the purpose of this case, and
I find, that the Company is an employer engaged in com-
served on the Respondent by registered mail on the day following the re-
spective filing dates
2 Insofar as relevant, Sec 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 " Sec 7
provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through represen-
tatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
3 Sec 8(b)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents, among other things, "to cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of [Sec 8]
(a)(3) " The latter provision prohibits, in pertinent part, employer "discrimi-
nation in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act
Ii THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Evidence
1 The bargaining relationship between the Company, the
International Union and the Respondent Local 600; the
questions presented
Since at least 1950, the Respondent's parent organiza-
tion, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Company's production, maintenance, and other employees
employed at vaious plants and facilities throughout the
United States pursuant to successive national collective-
bargaining contracts. The current contract, which was in
effect during most of the period of the alleged unfair labor
practices, was executed on October 31, 1973, for a term
beginning November 1973 and ending September 14, 1976,
with provision for yearly automatic renewal, absent appro-
priate notice to terminate or amend the contract. "For the
purpose of providing representation and operating under
this Agreement," this contract, as apparently did its prede-
cessor agreements, designates the covered plants and facili-
ties as units.4
In administering its contract, the International Union
functions through its Local Unions having jurisdiction over
a particular unit or units.' The Local Unions, which partic-
ipate in the contract negotiations, are empowered, and do,
negotiate supplementary agreements with local plant man-
agement with respect to matters of purely local concern.
For their part, the Local Unions have subordinate, autono-
mous bodies, each of which furnishes representation to the
employees in the particular unit or plant with respect to
their contractual rights, grievances in the initial three
stages of the contractual grievance procedure, and other
problems and matters pertaining to the plant .6 Under the
°Art Vi, sec I, of the current contract, entitled "Unit Structure," pro-
vides "For the purpose of providing representation and operating under
this Agreement, the Company shall be divided into Units Each depot, plant
or works shall constitute such a Unit"
This provision also lists as separate units the 12 plants comprising the
Rouge Area complex The Dearborn Stamping Plant here involved is one of
the units in this group
5 Art II of the Respondent's bylaws states that the jurisdiction of Ford
Local No 600 shall extend to, and include, all eligible members, employees
of the Ford Motor Company Plants in and around the Dearborn area,
except plants duly chartered by the International Union, or as otherwise
excluded by jurisdictional agreements "
6 Art Xi, sec 5, of the Respondent's bylaws provides
The Local Union shall be composed of various autonomous units Each
autonomous unit shall have jurisdiction over its respective membership
on matters which are purely unit problems, as defined in these Bylaws,
providing, however, that no action of a unit shall conflict with these
Con tinued
1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's bylaws, each of these local unit organizations
is composed of the Local Union's members who are em-
ployed in the specific plant and has its own unit officers,
headed by a unit chairman (president), a unit bargaining
committee,7 and district committeemen, each of whom rep-
resents a separate district in the unit. The bylaws also con-
tain provisions for the election of unit officers, bargaining
committeemen and district committeemen by the employ-
ee-members of the Local Union at an election conducted
and supervised by the Local Union's election committee at
which Local Union officers are also chosen (art. VIII). By
reason of their position unit chairmen serve as delegates to
the general council, which is the "highest tribunal" of the
Local Union (art. XI, sec. 1 and art XII, sec. 1(a) ), and on
the Local Union's executive board (art. XXIII, sec. 1). The
necessary funds to meet the expenses of the respective local
units are furnished by the Local Union (art. VII, sec. 4(d) ).
Article VI of the contract between the International
Union and the Company acknowledges the unit arrange-
ment for the representation of employees and, among other
things, prescribes the number of full-time representatives
who may serve the employees on company time. Specifical-
ly, these representatives are the unit chairmen, the unit bar-
gaining committee, and the district committeemen, all of
whom are compensated by the Company for the perfor-
mance of their representation functions.' In accordance
with the contractual grievance procedure, these representa-
tives handle and process the grievances and complaints of
employees in their unit-the district committeemen in the
first stage; the unit bargaining committee in the second
stage; and the unit chairman in the third stage.
As indicated previously, this case is solely concerned
with the Dearborn Stamping Plant, which employs some
3,000 bargaining unit employees and is one of about 12
units comprising the Rouge Area complex under the
Respondent's jurisdiction. At the time of the significant
events, Willie Gines was the unit chairman; Al Puma, Jerry
R. Hauser, and Willie Washington constituted the unit bar-
gaining committee; and an undisclosed number of individ-
uals served as district committeemen. All were full-time
representatives, performing their duties during periods of
overtime, too. Thus, art VI, sec. 11(b) 9 provides:
When all of the employes on a shift in a Unit work
overtime, all of the representatives regularly on that
shift in that Unit may come in overtime to represent
them. When part of the employes on a shift in a Unit
work overtime, the number of representatives on that
shift in that Unit who may come in overtime to repre-
sent them shall be proportionate to the number of em-
ployes on that shift in that Unit who are called in to
work such overtime, subject to the provisions of Sub-
section (f) of this Section The proportion shall be
Bylaws, the International UAW Constitution, or actions of the Interna-
tional Executive Board
Art XXVIII, sec 3, declares that "[e]ach autonomous unit is an integral
part of the whole
7 A unit bargaining committee is also referred to as a unit committee
8 Unlike part-time representatives, with whom we are not concerned in
this case, full-time representatives are not required to perform production
work
v A comparable provision was embodied in earlier contracts as Sec 10(h)
based on the ratio of employees called in for overtime
on that shift to employes working on that shift during
that workweek
The Chairman or a member of the Unit Committee
shall be notified when there is to be overtime worked
in the Unit.
This case arises out of Unit Chairman Gines' preemp-
tion for himself, to the exclusion of the bargaining and
district committeemen, of all authorized daily (Monday
through Friday) representation overtime 10 during the peri-
od from August 1973, shortly after he assumed office, until
September 1974, when the Company reinstituted the for-
mer rotational system of distributing daily overtime where-
by the committeemen were again able to share in such
overtime. Because of Gines' conduct the Respondent Local
600 is here charged with unfair representation and treat-
ment and in causing the Company unlawfully to discrimi-
nate against the committeemen in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act The underlying facts are es-
sentially undisputed and appear below
2. The prior rotation system of allocation overtime to
committeemen ; the change effected by Unit Chairman
Gines
It has always been the accepted procedure at the Dear-
born Stamping Plant for the Company to determine, pur-
suant to an established formula, the number of hours of
overtime available for employee representation purposes
during periods of overtime worked by employees in the
unit and to notify the unit chairman of the allocated num-
ber of hours. After receiving this information, the unit
chairman transmitted to the Company the names of the
unit bargaining and district committeemen who would per-
form the overtime representation services. For at least 8
years before Gines was elected unit chairman, his prede-
cessor, John F. Szluk, followed the practice of distributing
the daily allocated hours equally among these committee-
men on the basis of a rotation list.) i It was his decision not
to participate in daily overtime.12 As soon as Gines as-
sumed office about July 9, 1973,13 he undertook to change
the then prevailing system of overtime distribution. Thus,
in the second or third week in July, at a scheduled unit
negotiation meeting 14 between Gmes and the bargaining
committee (Puma, Hauser, and Washington) and Frank
Drabek, the Company's supervisor of labor relations,
Gines, announced to Drabek that he was unhappy that
everyone in the plant was making more money than he was
and that, as unit chairman, he was entitled to and wanted
12 hours a day (which meant 4 hours overtime), 7 days a
week. At first, neither Drabek nor the committeemen took
Gines seriously. However, when Gines persisted in his de-
10 Not involved in this case is the distribution of overtime on weekends
and holidays
The rotation list was maintained by one of the committeemen
12 Szluk was evidently content with performing weekend overtime serv-
ices Before his incumbency, the unit chairman was included in the list and
shared in the daily overtime with the committeemen
13 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1973
14 These were negotiations for a supplementary contract applicable only
to the Dearborn Stamping Plant unit
LOCAL 600 (UAW)
mand, Drabek rejected it, stating that the allocation of
overtime would continue as in the past.
The next day a second unit negotiation meeting was
held, attended by the same individuals as those present at
the previous one, and Jack Cortese, another company rep-
resentative. On this occasion, Gines declared that he in-
tended to take an hour of daily representation overtime,
alternating between the day and afternoon shifts.
Management's response was that, since Gines was the unit
chairman, it was his prerogative to assign overtime to any
representative, including himself, as he saw fit. However,
the bargaining committeemen challenged Gines' right to
impinge on their right to overtime. Gines retorted that his
family was not going to starve and that he intended to take
care of himself. Drabek then sought to put an end to the
overtime argument, suggesting that they proceed with the
scheduled negotiations . However, Gines departed and no
discussions ensued.
Later the same day, Bargaining Committeeman Hauser
met Gines in the hallway. When Hauser again questioned
Gines' right to daily overtime, Gines claimed he had it by
reason of his being the unit chairman. Subsequently, for
the pay weeks ending July 22 and 29, Gines assigned I
hour daily overtime to himself, with the committeemen
sharing the balance of the allotted overtime on a rotation
basis.
At the end of July, Gines decided to attempt to secure all
the allotted overtime for himself. At a third unit negotia-
tion meeting, which the bargaining committeemen and per-
haps several district committeemen also attended, along
with Drabek and Cortese and the Company's Industrial
Relations Manager, Hewitt, Gines joined the group late
Throwing his briefcase on the table, Gines vented his anger
with the committeemen for complaining to employees that
he was depriving the committeemen of their overtime. For
this reason, Gines announced that henceforth he was going
to take all the available representation overtime. When the
committeemen voiced their strenuous objection, Gines re-
peated his demand, adding that he had talked with his
"people" at the Local and was informed that he had the
right to claim all such overtime for himself. Gines left the
meeting before any management representative could re-
ply. After the meeting, the committeemen engaged Gines
in a conversation and questioned his right to appropriate
all the daily representation overtime. Gines reasserted his
right as unit chairman and noted that other unit chairmen
were making more money than he was.
Thereafter, Drabek received a directive from his superior
and informed Gines that, as unit chairman, he had the
authority to distribute representation overtime as he de-
sired; indeed, even to allocate all the overtime to himself.
Gines indicated he would take all the overtime. At or about
this time, the committeemen were also advised by the
Company that they could no longer expect any overtime.
Following these events and beginning with the pay week
ending August 5, Gines preempted all the available daily
representation overtime, leaving nothing for the bargaining
or district committeemen until about September 9, 1974,
when, as will be later discussed, the Company reinstated
the rotation system under which the committeemen were
again able to share in the overtime.
3. The committeemen seek Local 600's
assistance to resolve the daily representation
overtime dispute
1305
In the early part of August, following Unit Chairman
Gines' appropriation of all the allocated daily overtime,
most of the bargaining and district committeemen visited
the offices of Respondent Local 600. There, they explained
the situation to Buddy Battle, the second vice president of
Local 600, and Bill Brown, its recording secretary and the
administrator of the Local's Dearborn Stamping Plant
unit, and requested their assistance to resolve the problem.
Neither Brown nor Battle viewed Gines' action favorably
and both indicated the need to settle the matter quickly.
Battle, thereupon, advised the committeemen to arrange
for a meeting of the local unit's executive board; to submit
the problem to that body for a ruling; and to report the
results of the meeting back to them. In the meantime,
Brown stated that he would undertake to discuss the mat-
ter with Gines
In accordance with Battle's advice, Bargaining Commit-
teeman Hauser requested Gines to convene the unit's exec-
utive board. Gines declined to do so and Hauser, who was
also a member of the unit executive board, called a meet-
ing which was held on Sunday, September 23. Although it
was his function, Gines refused to chair the meeting, stat-
ing that he was fully aware of what was going on and did
not intend to be associated with the meeting. Hauser,
thereupon, presided and a motion was made and unani-
mously carried that "all overtime both daily and weekends
and holidays be divided equally with the . . . [Unit] Chair-
man rotating on a common rotation list with the Bargain-
ing Committee and District Committeemen." Gines ab-
stained from voting.
The next day, Hauser and Bargaining Committeeman
Puma returned to Local 600 and reported to Battle and
Brown on the action of the unit's executive board, handing
them a copy of the executive board minutes which con-
tained the above-quoted resolution Probably on this occa-
sion, Battle and Brown suggested that the committeemen
should also proceed to secure at a unit membership meet-
ing the membership support of the executive board's deci-
sion. When Puma and Hauser requested to see Local 600's
president, Walter Dorosh, they were informed that he was
involved in the national contract negotiations and was not
available. It appears that, instead, they saw the then Local
600's vice president, Mike Rinaldi (now the president) who
stated that Dorosh was fully aware of what was happening
in the unit and that as soon as Dorosh returned he would
act on their complaint.
Subsequently, and apparently still in the early fall of
1973, Puma and Hauser met with Dorosh at Local 600's
offices and discussed Gines' overtime problem.15 Dorosh
assured them that he would speak to Gines and try to
straighten out the matter. Dorosh also advised Puma and
Hauser to present the executive board determination to the
15 According to Hauser's undisputed testimony, Rinaldi was present on
an occasion when Dorosh told the committeemen to secure membership
approval of the unit executive board's overtime resolution
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unit membership for its approval before the local could act
on it.
Pursuing the advice of Local 600's officials, Puma short-
ly thereafter requested Gines to call a unit membership
meeting. Referring to the committeemen's complaints
against his assumption of overtime, Gines stated that he
had no intention of helping them with a meeting. A similar
request by Hauser was turned down by Gines who voiced
his disinclination to call a membership meeting to consider
the overtime dispute.
No membership meetings were held by the unit from the
fall of 1973 until July 20, 1974, when one was called in
Local 600's offices to discuss a luncheon problem which
had arisen in the Dearborn Stamping Plant. 16 Present were
unit chairman Gines, who presided, and other unit officers,
the bargaining committee, district committeemen, Percy
Jackson, a Local 600 staff member, and approximately 10
employees. After the luncheon problem was disposed of,
the unit executive board minutes of the September 23,
1973, meeting containing the previously carried overtime
motion quoted above were read by Hauser An identical
motion was thereupon made at the membership meeting
which was unanimously carried. In addition, the unit exec-
utive board minutes were also unanimously adopted. After
the motions were voted upon, Gines commented that they
were out of order and that the overtime complaint should
be directed to the Company not to the membership After
Puma indicated that the committeemen were acting in ac-
cordance with the advice of Dorosh and Battle, the subject
was dropped and the vote on the motions remained intact.
On the following Monday (July 22, 1974), the commit-
teemen returned to Local 600's offices where they again
conferred with Brown and Battle, who were presented with
copies of the minutes of the unit membership and the earli-
er unit executive board meetings. Brown and Battle in-
formed the committeemen, who had asked to see Dorosh,
that Dorosh was not available but that they would transmit
the minutes to him. Thereafter, the committeemen inquired
of an office secretary whether they could see Dorosh.
When the secretary replied that Dorosh was too busy to see
them, the committeemen stated that they would wait. Later
in the day, Dorosh spoke to the committeemen in the hall-
way. Acknowledging that he had a copy of the membership
minutes, Dorosh said that he was going to take the matter
up with Local 600's executive board. He further stated that
as soon as possible he would discuss the situation with
Gines, to whom he had not yet spoken, and that he would
then get back to the committeemen. Thereupon, the com-
mitteemen departed.
In addition to the foregoing efforts to secure satisfaction
of their complaints regarding Gines' appropriation of all
the allocated overtime, the committeemen made other ap-
proaches to Local 600 officials between September 1973
and July 1974 However, the situation remained unre-
solved. As a consequence, Puma on July 25, 1974, filed the
original unfair labor practice charge herein against the Re-
16 A motion was passed at this meeting to cancel membership meetings
for the rest of 1974, unless urgent business came up This was based on the
president's report of lack of membership interest to attend meetings and the
absence of important business matters confronting the unit
spondent Local 600, alleging unfair representation in its
agent Gines' unlawful refusal to distribute authorized
overtime equally among nine named bargaining and dis-
trict committeemen l7 This charge was amended on Febru-
ary 6, 1975, to include a further allegation that, as a result
of Gines' conduct, Local 600 caused the Company to dis-
criminate against the named committeemen. Subsequently,
the Respondent unsuccessfully sought to persuade the
committeemen to withdraw the charges.
4. Continuous efforts of the committeemen to persuade
the Company to revert to the former rotation system; the
filing of a formal grievance and its disposition
While the committeemen were seeking Local 600's assis-
tance to compel Unit Chairman Gines to share representa-
tion overtime with them, they persistently tried to persuade
Drabek, the Company's supervisor of Labor Relations, and
other management representatives at meetings and infor-
mal conversations to revert to the former rotation system
of overtime distribution In these discussions, which con-
tinued until the Company reinstated the rotation system in
September 1974, the committeemen repeatedly asserted
their right to representation overtime and argued against
the Company's equally adamant position that the unit
chairman was contractually entitled to allocate all the ov-
ertime to himself or to any representative he wished.18 Dra-
bek invariably rejected the committeemen's argument and,
on several occasions, commented that all it would take to
straighten out the matter was a call from Local 600 or its
president, Dorosh. At one meeting in late fall of 1973, with
management representatives Drabek, Quinn, and Hewitt,
the committeemen voiced not only their resentment that
they were being deprived of overtime, but they also pointed
out that employees were complaining that they were not
receiving representation during their overtime hours as a
result of Gines' preemptive action 19 Quinn's response was
that this was a matter which should be settled within the
Union itself.
On July 22, 1974, the bargaining and district committee-
men reviewed among themselves the futility of their efforts
to have their overtime dispute with Gines resolved, and the
resultant loss of overtime wages they were suffering. Con-
sequently, they decided to resort to the contractual griev-
ance procedure to secure satisifaction A second stage
grievance against the Company was drafted by Bargaining
Committeeman Puma, which the other committeemen ap-
proved It alleged, in substance, the Company's violation
of article VI, section 11(b), among others, in denying over-
time to full-time representatives on a rotation basis on the
17 The individuals named are Al Puma, Lorenza Simpson, Henry Dou-
dell, Willy Washington, Jerry Hauser, Nelson Hill, Thomas Lloyd, Virgil
Gilbert, and Marvin Shine
18 Gines, who was present at some of these discussions , agreed that the
committeemen should get overtime but not to the point of relinquishing the
overtime hours he was then enjoying
19 As indicated previously, Gines handled grievances in the third stage
only and did not participate in processing grievances in the first and second
stages Nor did he police the floor, as the committeemen customarily did in
the performance of their functions Indeed, the parties' contract recognizes
the unit chairman's privilege "to leave the plant in the course of the perfor-
mance of his functions " (art V 1, sec 9(f) )
LOCAL 600 (UAW) 1307
erroneous assumption that the unit chairman had the sole
right to distribute overtime as he saw fit. The next day, July
23, Puma and Hauser filed the grievance in the Company's
labor relations office. At a regularly scheduled second
stage grievance meeting held a day or two later, L. J Ha-
ney, the Company's senior labor relations representative
denied the grievance.
On or about July 26, 1974, Haney returned the grievance
form to Hauser in the labor relations office, containing the
following notation of the Company's disposition. "Pur-
suant to Article IV, Section 6 2 the amount of overtime
generated for daily overtime is alloted to the chairman of
the Unit, who does designate the representative (s) on that
overtime. See Umpire Memo A 233 for reference. Griev-
ance denied." 21 Hauser thereupon handed the rejected
grievance to Gines, who was present on this occasion, and
requested him to appeal it 22 and thus ultimately obtain an
umpire's ruling on the controversial question. Gines re-
sponded that Hauser could guess what the (Gines) intend-
ed to do with the grievance and walked into Drabek's pri-
vate office where Gmes noted on the grievance form that
the grievance was closed.23 Under the contractual griev-
ance procedure, the unit chairman's action is final and pre-
cludes further appeal. Gines testified that he closed out the
grievance because the Company took the position that, as
unit chairman, he had the right to allocate all the overtime
to himself.
5. The Company's subsequent change in daily overtime
distribution, enabling the committeemen to share in it
In the latter part of August 1974, Drabek received a di-
rective from his superior that, effective September 9, 1974,
the unit chairman may no longer assign all the representa-
tion overtime to himself but that the bargaining and dis-
trict committeemen must share in the allocation. However,
the method customarily used by the Company to de-
termine the number of allocated overtime hours was to
remain the same. Accordingly, Drabek summoned Gines,
the bargaining committee, and three or four district com-
mitteemen to his office and informed them that, pursuant
to the management directive, a change in the system for
distributing daily overtime would go into effect on Septem-
ber 9 whereby Gines would be allowed one overtime in-
crement of 2 hours a day (Monday through Friday) and
the remainder of the allocated overtime would be assigned
20 Art IV, sec 6, of the contract , entitled "Assignment of Overtime
Work," provides, inter aka, that , "[w]hen in the judgment of Management.
overtime is required for a given department , the regular employees assigned
to the department will work such overtime periods "
21 Drabek testified that , in denying the grievance , the Company relied on
the following quoted passage from the Umpire's Memo A-233 "When few-
er than the usual number of representatives is to be called for overtime
work , the Chairman designates the representatives to be called He may
desinate himself as such a representative
22
9
Art VII, sec 4 , of the contract dealing with the third stage of the
grievance procedure states "If a satisfactory disposition of the grievance is
not made in the Second Stage , the Chairman of the Unit Committee may, if
he considers the grievance to be well founded , carry it to the Third Stage "
23 Although on the following day, Puma was informed by Haney that the
grievance was closed and Puma testified that on this occasion he had seen
the notation on the grievance form, a third stage grievance form prepared
by Gines contains a notation "Closed 8-5-74" signed by Gines
to the committeemen on a rotation basis which prevailed
before Gmes' incumbency. Gines objected to this change
and threatened to file an unfair labor practice charge. On
this note, the meeting ended. The following week the incre-
ment allotted to Gines was reduced to 1 hour a day.
Thereafter, in the latter part of the month, a meeting was
held in Drabek's office attended by Drabek, Gmes, the
committeemen, and Local 600 officials, consisting of Vice
President Rinaldi, Recording Secretary Brown , and Ken
Bannon, identified as the chief administrative aide to
President Dorosh. Rinaldi argued that Gines was entitled
to overtime separate and apart from that assigned to the
committeemen and requested additional overtime for
Gines. This request was denied by Drabek Rinaldi also
questioned the validity of the Company's method of com-
puting the amount of overtime to be allocated for represen-
tation purposes and stated that Dave Sharpe, another Lo-
cal 600 official, would come to the plant in a month or two
to review the records. Such a visit, however, never materi-
alized as all overtime was subsequently discontinued for
economic reasons.
B. Analysis; Concluding Findings
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the General
Counsel contends that Unit Chairman Gines unfairly and
arbitrarily deprived the unit bargaining and district com-
mitteemen of daily representation overtime to which they
were entitled under the parties' collective- bargaining agree-
ment but which Gines appropriated entirely for himself for
personal gain from August 1973 to September 1974. It is
the General Counsel's position that such conduct is charge-
able to the Respondent Local 600 and constitutes unfair
representation and discriminatory treatment of employees
under the Miranda doctrine 24 in violation of Section
8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act. Denying that it engaged in
any unfair labor practices, the Respondent urges various
grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Specifically, it
urges that Gmes' preemption of daily overtime was sanc-
tioned by the bargaining contract, that Gines was not its
agent for whose acts it was responsible; that the commit-
teemen failed to exhaust internal union and contract griev-
ance procedures for redress of their complaints before fil-
ing the charge herein; and, finally, that Gines' conduct did
not fall within the prohibitions of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) of the Act. I find no merit in the Respondent' s conten-
tions but conclude, instead, that violations of the indicated
provisions were established.
In Miranda, a majority of the Board adopted the princi-
ple of fair representation as developed by the Federal
courts that the statutory representative of employees in a
bargaining unit is under the fiduciary duty to represent and
deal with its constituent employees fairly and in a manner
untainted by considerations or classifications which are in-
vidious, capricious, irrelevant, or arbitrary. The majority
there held that a breach of this duty violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and, in addition, violated Section
8(b)(2) where such conduct resulted in employer discrimi-
nation against employees prohibited by Section 8(a)(3) of
24 Miranda Fuel Company, Inc, 140 NLRB 181 (1970)
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act. Accordingly, it was held in Miranda that the union
violated these provisions of the Act by discriminatorily de-
priving an employee cf his contractual seniority, thus caus-
ing him a loss in earnings. Reaffirming the Miranda princi-
ple, a majority of a Board panel had this to say about the
nature of the duty of fair representation in its recent deci-
sion in Rhodes & Jamieson: 25
Whatever the precise outlines of this duty, a subject
of scholarly debate of long standing, its fiduciary na-
ture connotes some degree of affirmative responsibil-
ity with regard to the allocation of benefits the union
has secured for the employees in a collective-bargain-
ing agreement. At least as to rights under an existing
agreement, the duty of fair representation is more than
an absence of bad faith or hostile motivation. So much
is implicit in Miranda Fuel itself, where the majority
found a breach of the duty because the union caused
the forfeiture of an employee's seniority status, to
which he was entitled under the contract, and the
union's action was based on pressure asserted by other
employees to persuade it to do so. There was no find-
ing of hostility toward the employee affected, of bad
faith in the union's assertion of its erroneous contract
interpretation (although the facts might have justified
such a finding) or of any other unlawful motivation on
the part of the union. The union's violation consisted
simply, in the words of the Board majority, in violat-
ing the employee's "right to fair and impartial treat-
ment from his statutory representative."
Although the panel majority in Rhodes & Jamieson as-
sumed that the union in the case before it was privileged to
interpret its collective-bargaining contract with the em-
ployer as empowering it to deny job bumping rights to
laid-off employees, it, nevertheless, concluded that the
union breached its duty of " `fair and impartial treatment'
that Miranda Fuel dictates it owed" an employee when it
decided to deprive that employee of bumping rights on the
basis of a poll of employees who had conflicting interests 26
Applying the Miranda principle to the present case, I
find that the conduct of Unit Chairman Gines in appropri-
ating all the daily representation overtime to himself to the
complete exclusion of the unit bargaining and district com-
mitteemen from August 1973 to September 1974 fell far
short of the fair and impartial representation and treat-
ment Gines was dutybound to accord to the employees in
his official capacity. Without repeating the details, it is
clear that, shortly after he became unit chairman, Gines
demanded, and succeeded in inducing the Company to ac-
cept, a change from the rotational system of distributing
daily representation overtime among the committeemen to
one where Gines preempted all such overtime for himself.
Undeniably, Gines' reason for the change was solely to
enhance his own earnings at the expense of the committee-
men who had previously shared in this overtime Contrary
25 General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, Helpers and Automotive Employ-
ees, Local 315, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd), 217 NLRB 616
(1975)
26 Board Member Penello dissented on the ground that the union acted
fairly and impartially within the authority vested in it by the contract
to the Respondent's contention, I find nothing in the col-
lective-bargaining agreement or in the cited umpire deci-
sions and opinions which sanctions such preemption of
overtime by Gines. Indeed, article VI, section 11(b), which
deals with the subject of overtime for representation pur-
poses, plainly recognizes the right of unit bargaining and
district committeemen, therein designated as full-time rep-
resentatives, to be assigned such overtime. Specifically,
that provision states that "[w]hen all of the employees on a
shift in a Unit work overtime, all of the representatives
regularly on that shift in that Unit may come in overtime
to represent them." It further provides that when, however,
"part of the employees on a shift in a Unit work overtime,
the number of representatives on that shift in that Unit
who may come in overtime to represent them shall be pro-
portionate to the number of employees on that shift in that
Unit who are called in to work such overtime ...." It is
thus apparent that, rather than sanctioning the retention of
all overtime by the unit chairman, the language of article
VI, section 11(b), contemplates the assignment of overtime
to more than one representative when employees work
overtime. Any other interpretation would distort the pur-
pose that section was designed to serve; namely, to afford
the employees representation concerning their complaints
and grievances which might develop on their shift during
overtime hours. Manifestly, the unit chairman, who has
many overall and high-level functions, including the han-
dling of grievances in the third stage of the grievance pro-
cedure, cannot possibly service all the employees on the
different shifts assigned overtime work throughout the
plant. These are functions customarily performed by com-
mitteemen who attempt to adjust problems as they arise
and to process grievances in the first and second steps if
those problems remain unresolved
Nor do I read the various cited umpire decisions and
opinions, and particularly Opinion A-233, dated Septem-
ber 3, 1946, as interpreting relevant predecessor contractu-
al provisions to authorize the unit chairman to assign all
representation overtime to himself to the exclusion of the
committeemen. These umpire decisions and opinions mere-
ly recognize the right of the unit chairman to distribute
overtime among the various representatives, including him-
self.27 Indeed, this was the prevailing general practice fol-
lowed for years by Gines' predecessor who established a
rotation system whereby the committeemen shared equally
in the allocation of daily representation overtime. More-
over, in September 1974, when the Company discontinued
the assignment of all representation overtime to Gines, it
reverted to the prior rotation system under which the com-
mitteemen resumed sharing in the overtime. It is not with-
out significance that, although subsequently Local 600 offi-
cials unsuccessfully sought to recoup some of Gines' lost
27 See, for example, the following quotation from Umpire's Opinion A-
233, which the Respondent cited in support of its position
For the purpose of determining the number of representatives to be
called for overtime work under the proportionate method prescribed by
Section 10(b) [Article VI, Section 1l(b) in the current contract ], as also
for the purpose of determining the total of representatives at any time,
the Chairman is included as a representative When fewer than the
usual number of representatives is to be called for overtime work, the
Chairman designates the representatives to be called He may designate
himself as such a representative
LOCAL 600 (UAW) 1309
overtime, there is no evidence that the Respondent filed a
grievance against the Company protesting the Company's
alleged breach of Gines' purported contract right to claim
all the overtime for himself.
In sum, I find that the committeemen had a contractual
right to participate in overtime for the purpose of repre-
senting the employees Unquestionably, this right, no less
than the employee's contractual seniority right in Miranda,
related to a working condition which Gines could not im-
pair without breaching his duty of fair and impartial repre-
sentation and treatment. This is particularly so where, as
here, Gines assumed all the overtime at the expense of the
committeemen for no other reason than personal gain.28
Moreover, I find that Gines' conduct caused the Company
unlawfully to discriminate against the committeemen with
respect to the allocation of overtime. The fact that the
Company acceded to Gines' demands that all the overtime
be assigned to him certainly does not exonerate the Re-
spondent of liability under Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act if it is responsible for Gines' acts-a contention to
be presently discussed. The most that can be said is that
the Company might have also been found in violation of
Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act had it been charged here-
in. However, this is not the case here.
The Respondent Local 600, nevertheless, disavows re-
sponsibility for the acts of Gines whom it pictures as an
individual elected by the unit membership, possessing in-
dependent authority, and who is beyond its control. I do
not agree with this position.
As noted above, the Respondent Local 600, on behalf of
its International which is the only union signatory to the
collective-bargaining contract here involved, administers
this contract with respect to the Company's plants and fa-
cilities, designated as units, which come under its jurisdic-
tion. In performing this function, the Respondent acts
through a subordinate body at each unit which is com-
posed of Local 600 members who are there employed
These local unit bodies are established pursuant to the
Respondent's bylaws and the International Union's consti-
tution; are autonomous; and have their own elected offi-
cers and committeemen to conduct the affairs of their unit
and to handle grievances in the first three steps of the
grievance procedure. However, these local units are also
subject to various limitations and restrictions embodied in
the bylaws and the International constitution regarding
unit elections, removal of unit officers and committeemen,
their responsibilities and related matters. Membership dues
and initiation fees are paid by the members to the Respon-
dent which, in turn, furnishes the units with funds to defray
their expenses. Moreover, a Local 600 official is assigned to
oversee the operation of the local units, while unit chair-
men serve on the Respondent's general council, its highest
tribunal, and on its executive board. Further, local unit
members are also chosen to serve as delegates to conven-
tions and as local officials in various capacities. Signifi-
cantly, article XXVIII, section 3 of the Respondent's by-
laws expressly recognizes that "[e]ach autonomous unit is
an integral part of the whole . . .
The foregoing facts apply to the Local 600's Dearborn
Stamping Plant unit which Gines, as unit chairman, heads
up, and with which this case is solely concerned. On the
basis of the evidence, I find that this body is but an integral
part of Local 600's organizational structure, operating as
an administrative arm for the enforcement and administra-
tion of the parties' bargaining contract and for the han-
dling and processing of plant grievances in the initial three
stages of the contractual grievance procedure. In my opin-
ion, the local unit is not a distinct and independent entity
beyond Local 600's control, as the Respondent seems to
argue. In these circumstances, I find, contrary to the
Respondent's contention, that Gines, as unit chairman,
was the Respondent's agent and that, in improperly depriv-
ing the committeemen of their fair share of representation
overtime, he acted within the general scope of his authori-
ty. I find therefore that Gines' conduct is chargeable to the
Respondent. The fact that Gines was elected by Local 600
members of the unit does not absolve the Respondent of
liability for his acts.29 Nor does the fact that the Respon-
dent was not a signatory to the contract render it less ac-
countable for Gines' conduct where, as here, the Respon-
dent had participated in the contract negotiations and was
entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the
contract with respect to the Company's plants under its
jurisdiction. 30
Apart from Local 600's responsibility for Gines' acts, I
find that the Respondent itself defaulted in its statutory
duty to represent its constituent employees fairly and im-
partially when it failed to take measures to protect the
committeemen's contractual overtime rights. It is undisput-
ed that, despite the committeemen's persistent complaints
to the Respondent's officials concerning Gines' appropria-
tion of all representation overtime in an effort to have
them intervene to rectify the situation, nothing was done.
While these officials appeared to be sympathetic to the
committeemen's problem and indicated that they would
speak to Gines, there is no evidence that they actually did
so. When these officials suggested that the committeemen
secure the support first of the unit executive board and
then of the unit membership, and the committeemen subse-
quently complied with these suggestions and submitted to
the Local 600 officials minutes containing resolutions of
such support, it appears that the Respondent still did noth-
ing to vindicate the committeemen's contractual rights.
Such apparent indifference on the part of the Respondent
does not demonstrate to me the fair and impartial treat-
ment the committeemen were entitled to receive from it. In
fact, it is quite revealing that in September 1974, after the
Company withdrew Gmes' privilege to assume all the over-
time and reinstituted the rotation system of distributing
overtime among the committeemen, Local 600 officials in-
terceded on Gines' behalf to secure additional overtime for
28 See , for example . UAW Ethic al Practices Codes, appended to the Inter-
national constitution (G C Exh 3) which stated the following at page 97 29 N L R B v International Longshoremen's and Warehousemens Union.
Any person who represents the UAW and its members , whether Local 10. et a! [Pacific Maritime Assn ] 283 F 2d 558, 564 (C A 9, 1960)
elected or appointed , has a sacred trust to serve the best interests of the 10 Loinl No 1373. District No 30. United Mine Workers ofAmerica ( Island
members and their families Creek Coal Company). 186 NLRB 361. 364 (1970)
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
him. Clearly, this further betrays the disparate treatment
accorded the committeemen.
Finally, the Respondent urges, in defense, that the com-
plaint should be dismissed because the committeemen did
not follow internal union and contract grievance proce-
dures before bringing the charges herein. I find this conten-
tion equally without merit.
At the outset, it is noted that, even though the commit-
teemen followed all the suggestions made by Local 600
officials, at no time did the officials advise the committee-
men to file with the Respondent charges of misconduct
against Gines or to initiate procedures for Gines' recall, as
the Respondent now argues the committeemen should
have done In any event, the committeemen's failure to do
so cannot operate to deny them access to the Board to seek
vindication of their statutory right to fair representation
and treatment by their bargaining representative. Section
10(a) of the Act expressly provides that the Board's power
"to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . [cannot] be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be estab-
lished by agreement, law, or otherwise . . . .
As for the committeemen's resort to the grievance proce-
dure, there is no question that they did file a grievance
against the Company, asserting their contractual right to
representation overtime. However, the Company rejected
the grievance and the committeemen's attempt to appeal to
the third level of the grievance procedure was aborted by
Gines who, under the contract, had the power to decide
whether to proceed further with a rejected grievance.
All things being considered, I conclude that, by Gines'
conduct in depriving the unit bargaining and district com-
mitteemen of representation overtime and by the
Respondent's failure to take steps to rectify the situation,
the Respondent Local 600 breached its duty of fair and
impartial representation owing to its constituents and
thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I further
find that this conduct also constituted a violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(2) of the Act in that it caused the Company to
discriminate against the committeemen in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
tam affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
To remedy the loss of overtime earnings suffered by the
unit bargaining and district committeemen at the
Company's Dearborn Stamping Plant as a result of Unit
Chairman Gines' improper preemption of representation
overtime, it is recommended that the Respondent make
these employees whole by payment to each of them of a
sum of money equal to that which each one normally
would have earned under the prior rotation system of dis-
tributing overtime during the period beginning 6 months
prior to the filing of the original unfair labor practice
charge herein with the Board and the service of a copy on
the Respondent 31 and the date in September 1974 when
the former rotation practice of overtime distribution was
reinstituted by the Company. Interest at the rate of 6 per-
cent per annum shall be paid on the sums due these em-
ployees Posting of appropriate notices at the Respondent's
business offices and meeting hall and the Company's Dear-
born Stamping Plant is also recommended.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing to represent the unit bargaining and district
committeemen at the Company's Dearborn Stamping
Plant in a fair and impartial manner with respect to the
distribution of overtime, the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
4. By causing and attempting to cause the Company to
discriminate against these employees in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act with respect to the distribution of
representation overtime, the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication ]
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is
recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices
found and in like and related conduct and that it take cer-
31 Sec 10(b) of the Act provides, in rei.vant part. "[t]hat no complaint
shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a
copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made