Linda Fields, Complainant,v.Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 7, 2005
01a41857 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 7, 2005)

01a41857

07-07-2005

Linda Fields, Complainant, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.


Linda Fields v. Department of Defense

01A41857

July 7, 2005

.

Linda Fields,

Complainant,

v.

Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Logistics Agency),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A41857

Agency No. CA-02-003

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision on

compensatory damages concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's decision.

The record reveals that complainant, an employee of the Defense Supply

Center in Columbus, Ohio, sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed

a formal complaint on March 5, 2002, alleging that she was discriminated

against:

(1) on the basis of sex (female) when, for a period from mid-1999

through December 2001, she was regularly harassed in a sexual manner

by a DSCC supervisor (not her supervisor); and

on the basis of race (Native American) when the same DSCC supervisor

made disparaging remarks about her ancestry.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its final decision on the merits of the case (FAD1), the agency

concluded that complainant had not been subjected to race discrimination,

but that she had been subjected to sexual harassment in the form of

�inappropriate touching and sexually tinged remarks� for a five-week

period, from approximately November 13 to December 19, 2001. FAD1 advised

complainant of her entitlement to submit a claim for compensatory damages.

Complainant did so by a claim letter dated May 23, 2003. In her claim

letter, complainant first requests $45,301.62 in monetary damages.

This amount covers prescription medications ($1,100.00), social worker and

psychiatrist costs ($1,435.00 and $940.00 respectively), wages lost due to

non-promotion ($7,556.00), and time/leave lost from work ($34,270.62).

Complainant additionally requests $491,745.00 for lost pay from now

until the date of her planned retirement since she �will never be able

to return to work due to the sexual harassment practiced upon her and

its emotional impact.� Finally, complainant requests $3,500,000.00 to

cover her claim for �future lost wages, and past, present and emotional

damages and suffering, and for future costs of treatment therefore...�<0>

In its final agency decision on damages (FAD2), the agency first noted

that in determining the amount of the compensatory damages award, several

factors were considered. First, complainant had pre-existing therapeutic

issues, and a history of taking medication. Second, FAD2 noted that

complainant's psychiatrist (P1) was unsure of the effect on complainant

of the sexual harassment. Additionally, FAD2 found that some of P1's

treatment of complainant focused on complainant's EEO case. Further, FAD2

found that the period of harassment (October 1999 to March 2002) on which

P1 based his opinion far exceeded the time frame of harassment determined

in the decision finding discrimination (five weeks). Ultimately, FAD2

awarded complainant $20,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages.

As for past pecuniary damages, FAD2 awarded (a) $990.00 for prescription

medications; (b) $661.00 for treatment costs; and (c) $2,710.00 for the

costs of twelve months of future treatment. FAD2 noted that it made

no award for complainant's request for lost wages due to non-promotion

because the selection at issue occurred in July 2000, over one year

before the commencement of the period of harassment according to FAD1.

FAD2 also noted that complainant's request for time/leave lost from work

due to emotional distress constitutes a request for equitable relief,

which is outside the scope of FAD2. Finally, FAD2 denied complainant's

request for future lost wages, on the basis that complainant was granted

disability retirement in July 2003, and awarding future lost wages would

constitute double recovery. In sum, FAD2 awarded complainant a total

of $24,361.00 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.

On appeal, complainant, through counsel, contends that FAD2 appears

to find that complainant's disability retirement resulted from a slip

and fall on ice in a parking lot. Complainant asserts that this badly

misconstrues the facts, as the disability retirement was due to the

sexual harassment and its emotional impact on complainant. Additionally,

complainant contends that FAD2 erred in failing to grant future damages

due to the fact that complainant received disability retirement.

Complainant requests �a far more justifiable and fair award.�

In its opposition to the appeal, the agency asserts that complainant's

slip and fall was not relevant to her claim for compensatory damages,

and notes that it was not considered in the calculation of damages.

Additionally, the agency asserts that complainant is not entitled to

future lost wages because she received wage replacement income in the

form of Federal Disability Retirement benefits. The agency contends that

by their very nature, the concept of retirement benefits, whether or

not disability benefits, and lost future wages are mutually exclusive.

In the alternative, the agency contends that it is entitled to offset

the wage replacement benefits from the amount of future lost wages,

as well as to proportionately reduce the amount of damages based on

complainant's preexisting condition.

In West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999), the Supreme Court held that

Congress afforded the Commission the authority to award compensatory

damages in the administrative process. Section 102(a) of the CRA,

codified as 42 U.S.C. � 1981a, authorizes an award of compensatory

damages as part of the "make whole" relief for intentional discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages

that may be awarded to each complaining party for future pecuniary

losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss

of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses, according to the

number of persons employed by the respondent employer. The limit for

an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency herein,

is $300,000.00. 42 U.S.C. � 1981a(b)(3)(D).

Initially, we note that complainant does not contest the award of

$20,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages. Accordingly, we will not disturb

the amount of this award. Additionally, complainant does not contest

the amounts awarded for prescription medications, treatment costs, or

future treatment. Therefore, again, we will not disturb the amounts

of these awards. Additionally, we find that FAD2 did not find that

complainant's disability retirement resulted from a slip and fall on

ice in a parking lot.

We now turn to addressing the question of whether complainant is entitled

to future lost wages. Lost earning capacity represents a loss in

one's future earning power and is distinct from the issue of front pay.

That is, an award for the loss of future earning capacity considers the

effect that complainant's injury will have on her ability in the future to

earn a salary comparable with what she earned before the injury. St. John

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01996707 (January 29,

2002); Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652

(July 17, 1995); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370

(7th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Pharmacia Inc., 956 F. Supp. 1457, 1467

(N.D. Ind. 1996). An award of damages for lost earning capacity comports

with Title VII's goal of providing make-whole relief to the victims of

discrimination. Williams, 956 F. Supp. at 1466 (citing Albemarle Paper

Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-19 (1975)). The Commission previously has

awarded future pecuniary damages for the loss of future earning capacity.

See Brinkley v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980429

(August 12, 1999); Finlay v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal

No. 01942985 (April 29, 1997).

Proof of entitlement to loss of future earning capacity involves

evidence suggesting that the individual's injuries have narrowed the

range of economic opportunities available to her. Carpenter, supra.

Generally, the party seeking compensation for loss of earning capacity

needs to provide evidence which demonstrates with reasonable certainty

or reasonable probability that the loss has been sustained. Id.

We find that the record evidence is inadequate to make an award

for any claimed impact on complainant's future earning potential.

Although complainant was granted disability retirement and claims that

she can never return to work because of the discriminatory conduct, the

medical evidence of record does not indicate with reasonable certainty or

probability that complainant could not have worked in other federal or

non-federal jobs at some point before complainant's planned retirement

date. In so finding, we note the letter from complainant's social

worker, dated April 7, 2003, stating �Throughout our subsequent sessions

[complainant] has focused largely on the issues of the workplace and on

her increasingly difficult time in coping with the expectations of her

job, the continued presence in the workplace of the man who harassed

her, and her perception of the lack of protection and support provided

her by her superiors and most of her fellow workers. In general, her

condition has improved significantly during this time, as she remains

depressed and anxious and is even less able to function on the job,

currently applying for disability status.� These statements from the

social worker indicate that complainant had difficulty working in her

current job, but do not suggest a narrowing of the range of other economic

opportunities available to her.

The record is also devoid of evidence of the likely duration of

complainant's diminished future earning capacity. A letter from

complainant's psychiatrist dated March 21, 2003, indicates that

complainant could not currently work in the job she previously held,

and further states �Whether at some point [complainant] would be able to

return to employment in a different federal situation, in a different

type of job is impossible to define at the present. Her condition,

beyond the work responsibilities, would have an effect on her ability to

be in the workplace. She would be absent at times, episodically and not

necessarily predictably.� In the April 7, 2003 letter from complainant's

social worker, he states �It is very clear that the harassment has

significantly affected her ability to return to work in her present

condition, and has likewise caused her to miss substantial time at work

since it occurred.� This evidence does not demonstrate that complainant's

injuries have narrowed the range of economic opportunities available

to her. Complainant has failed to provide evidence which demonstrates

with reasonable certainty or reasonable probability that the future wage

loss has been sustained, and recovery for those losses must be denied.

Consequently, we AFFIRM FAD2, and the agency is ordered to take remedial

actions in accordance with this decision and order below.

ORDER

Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final and to

the extent it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to:

pay complainant $20,000.00 for non-pecuniary damages; and

pay complainant $4,361.00 for pecuniary damages.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 7, 2005

__________________

Date

0 1It appears that the figure of $3,500,000.00 includes the $491,745.00

previously cited.