Keith T. Turner, Complainant,v.Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 6, 2007
0120070966 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 6, 2007)

0120070966

06-06-2007

Keith T. Turner, Complainant, v. Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.


Keith T. Turner,

Complainant,

v.

Robert M. Gates,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070966

Hearing No. 340-2004-00610X

Agency No. 04AFIS007

DECISION

On September 28, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July

20, 2006, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

On February 10, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

he was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American),

sex (male), and color (Black) when he was not selected for the position

of Management Analyst, GS-343-9/11, in October of 2003.

The record indicates that complainant was employed by the agency as

a Personnel Specialist and Management Analyst between June of 1993

and approximately October 22, 2003, when he left the agency to work

for the Department of Homeland Security. The record indicates that

complainant worked for the agency's Defense Media Center (DMC), and his

immediate supervisor (S1; White male) was the Chief of the DMC's Civilian

Personnel Branch. S1's immediate supervisor (S2; Black male) was the

Chief of Personnel for the agency's Armed Forces Radio and Television

Broadcast Center. The record also indicates that the position at

issue which complainant applied for was in the agency's Defense Visual

Information Center (DIVC), and the Director of the DVIC (White male)

was the selecting official for the position. The selectee (White female)

for the position at issue was working at DVIC as a Management Assistant,

with the Director of the DVIC as her supervisor. In 2000, the Director

of the DVIC rewrote the position descriptions for the DVIC, and wrote

the position description for the Management Analyst position at issue.

S1 assisted the Director of the DVIC in the development of the position

descriptions; however, S1 advised the Director of the DVIC that the

position description for the Management Analyst position did not merit

the grade assigned to the position.

When the Director of the DVIC prepared the position description for

the Management Analyst position at issue, he thought that the position

would replace the selectee's Management Assistant position; however,

S1 believed that the position should be filled competitively and the

position should not be referred to as "the position [the selectee] was

filling" or "[the selectee's] position." As complainant was interested in

the Management Analyst position, he was recused from involvement in the

development of the position and the announcement and selection process.

During the process of developing the position description for the position

at issue, the Director of the DVIC was granted another staff slot and

thus the position became a new position which would have to be posted in

order to be filled. The selectee did not have any role in developing

the position description, but she may have seen some e-mails relevant

to the position. In June of 2003, complainant accepted a job offer

from the Department of Homeland Security, contingent on his passing a

background check. Subsequently, the Management Analyst position at issue

was posted in September of 2003, and complainant applied for the position.

The names of complainant and the selectee were referred to the Director

of the DVIC being qualified for the position. The Director of the DVIC

compared their qualifications and chose the selectee based on her resume

and personal knowledge of her abilities, specifically her familiarity

with the Freedom of Information Act, information technology, writing

skills and her understanding of the agency's mission.

Believing he was the victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and filed the aforementioned EEO complaint. At the conclusion

of the investigation, complainant was provided with a copy of the report

of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing

and the AJ held a hearing on November 3-4, 2005 and May 24, 2006, and

issued a decision on June 22, 2006.

The AJ initially found that complainant established a prima facie case

of discrimination on all his alleged bases, as he applied for and was

qualified for the position at issue, and was not selected in favor

of the selectee. However, the AJ found that the agency articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, namely that

complainant was not selected for the position at issue due to: (1)

the selectee's experience and skills; (2) the Director of the DVIC was

familiar with the selectee's work and abilities; and (3) the DVIC needed

an employee who could perform the requirements of the position with little

training due to staff reductions and a backlog of work. Further, the

AJ found that complainant failed to proffer evidence which established

that the agency's articulated reasons were pretextual in nature. In so

finding, the AJ noted that complainant failed to demonstrate that the

agency's reasons for choosing the selectee were false or were pretexts

for race, color or sex discrimination. The AJ found that the record

supported the Director of the DVIC's statement that the selectee was

more qualified for the position than was complainant. In addition, the

AJ found that complainant failed to establish that his qualifications

were superior to those of the selectee. AJ's Decision at 7. Finally,

while the AJ noted that complainant alleged pretext was evident from

the circumstances surrounding the selection process, he found the means

by which the selectee was chosen for the position was insufficient

to establish pretext.1 The agency subsequently issued a final order

adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that he was

subjected to discrimination as alleged. Neither complainant nor the

agency have made arguments on appeal.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's

credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the

tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other

objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

We find that complainant has failed to refute the agency's stated reasons

for his non-selection for the position at issue. Complainant has

not shown that his qualifications for the position were so superior

to those of the selectee as to warrant a finding that the agency's

stated reasons are pretextual. See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048

(10th Cir. 1981). In addition, even if we assume that the selectee was

indeed preselected as complainant alleges, the Commission and the federal

courts have determined that there is nothing unlawful in a preselection

of a candidate to a position if it is based on the qualifications of

the selectee and not on a discriminatory motive. See Nickens v. NASA,

EEOC Request No. 05950329 (Feb. 23, 1996); Goostree v. State of Tennesee,

796 F.2d 854, 861 (6th Cir. 1986); Kennedy v. Landon, 598 F.2d 337, 341

(4th Cir. 1979). As found by the AJ, the selectee not only had relevant

experience, but also had broader and more relevant skills (including

information technology, writing skills and corporate knowledge), the

Director of the DVIC was familiar with her abilities from working with her

and her experience allowed her to work at the DVIC with little training.

Given these facts, complainant would need to provide us with more specific

evidence showing discriminatory animus, but he has not. Without proof of

a demonstrably discriminatory motive, we do not second-guess an agency's

personnel decision. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC

Appeal No. 0120055246 (Jan. 5, 2007); see also Carson v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that "the question is not

whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision;

it is whether the real reason [was discriminatory]"). As such, we find

that complainant has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's stated reasons for his nonselection were pretext intended

to mask discriminatory intent.2

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's order,

because a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that

discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____6/6/07_______________

Date

1 The AJ also noted that while it was likely that the selectee was

preselected for the position, a preselection in the absence of other

evidence of discrimination was insufficient to establish a violation of

Title VII. AJ's Decision at 9.

2 As noted by the AJ, complainant conceded that at no time did the

Director of the DVIC display hostility or bias toward him. Hearing

Transcript at 22.

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0120070966

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120070966