Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc. and Manas Hospitality LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Sacramento, a Single

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 2018

366 NLRB No. 118 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 118
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc. and Manas Hospitality
LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Sacramento, A
Single and/or Joint Employer and UNITE
HERE! Local 49. Case 20–CA–176428, 20–CA–
178861, and 20–CA–182449
June 25, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, MCFERRAN, AND EMANUEL
On September 8, 2017, Administrative Law Judge
John T. Giannopoulos issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The Gen-
eral Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.3

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In excepting to the judge’s findings that it violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
(1) telling Vanessa Abel during her interview and on multiple other
occasions not to join the Union, and (2) telling Suhad Salman not to
sign anything from the Union and falsely equating union benefits to
government benefits, the Respondent does not state, in either its excep-
tions or supporting brief, any grounds on which these purportedly erro-
neous findings should be overturned. Therefore, in accordance with
Sec. 102.46(b)(2) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, we shall disre-
gard these exceptions. See Holsum de Puerto Rico, Inc., 344 NLRB
694 fn. 1 (2005), enfd. 456 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2006).
We do not rely on Universal Fuel, Inc., 358 NLRB 1504 (2012), a
decision that issued at a time when the Board included two persons
whose appointments to the Board the Supreme Court subsequently held
were not valid. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014).
2 The judge found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by cir-
culating a decertification petition while bargaining for a successor
contract. Although the Respondent excepted to the judge’s fact and
credibility findings regarding the decertification petition, it does not
argue on exceptions that the judge’s legal conclusion that such conduct
violates Sec. 8(a)(5) is unwarranted.
3 We have amended the judge’s remedy, and we have modified the
judge’s recommended Order and notice to conform to the Board’s
standard remedial language.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist from engaging in such conduct and, as explained in
the remedy section of the judge’s decision, to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
We reverse the judge and order the Respondent to read
aloud our remedial notice to employees during worktime.
In so doing, we observe that in March 2016, a notice was
read to employees, pursuant to an agreement settling
earlier unfair labor practice charges, expressly stating
that the Respondent would not “ask employees to get rid
of the Union by signing a decertification petition.” But
only 2 months later, the Respondent did just that. As
detailed by the judge, the Respondent—through its hu-
man resources manager and housekeeping manager—
repeatedly directed employees to sign a decertification
petition and used threats, deceit, and interrogation to se-
cure signatures. In addition, the Respondent repeatedly
directed employees not to associate with the Union, mis-
led employees about the nature of union membership,
and engaged in sham bargaining. In light of these cir-
cumstances, we find that a public reading of our notice is
appropriate “to dissipate as much as possible any linger-
ing effects of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices,”
and to allow the employees to “fully perceive that the
Respondent and its managers are bound by the require-
ments of the Act.” Homer D. Bronson Co., 349 NLRB
512, 515 (2007) (and cited cases), enfd. mem. 273 Fed.
Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2008). We find the need for a notice
reading to be particularly compelling here in order to
counteract the Respondent’s flagrant disregard of the
earlier reading to employees, which signaled that it had
no intention to adhere to the law.4
Accordingly, we will require the Respondent to con-
vene a meeting or meetings at which the remedial notice
shall be read aloud to the Respondent’s employees by a
responsible management official in the presence of a
Board agent and an agent of the Union if the Region or
the Union so desires, or, at the Respondent’s option, by a
Board agent in the presence of a responsible management
official and, if the Union so desires, in the presence of an
agent of the Union. Given that the Respondent’s general

4 Member Emanuel agrees with the judge that a notice-reading rem-
edy is not warranted in this case. He emphasizes that the settlement
agreement into which the Respondent entered in February of 2016
included a nonadmission clause and that the Respondent has not been
found to have otherwise committed any similar violations of the Act in
the past. The Respondent’s violations in the present case, although
serious, are simply not numerous or egregious enough to warrant the
extraordinary remedy of a notice reading.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
manager, human resources manager, and housekeeping
manager participated directly in the unfair labor practices
here, it is appropriate to require supervisors and manag-
ers to attend the notice reading. See HTH Corp., 361
NLRB 709, 716 (2014). In addition, because many of
the Respondent’s employees speak Spanish or Hindi, we
will require the Respondent to provide Spanish and Hindi
language interpreters, who shall translate aloud for the
assembled unit employees the language of the notice.
Among other remedies, the judge recommended an af-
firmative bargaining order to remedy the Respondent’s
refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union.
For the reasons set forth in Caterair International, 322
NLRB 64 (1996), we agree that an affirmative bargain-
ing order is warranted in this case as a remedy for the
Respondent’s unlawful refusal to bargain in good faith
with the Union. We adhere to the view that an affirma-
tive bargaining order is “the traditional, appropriate rem-
edy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful col-
lective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit
of employees.” Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has required that the
Board justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition of
such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Industrial Plastics v.
NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber &
Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d
1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Vincent, supra at 738,
the court summarized its requirement that an affirmative
bargaining order “must be justified by a reasoned analy-
sis that includes an explicit balancing of three considera-
tions: (1) the employees’ § 7 rights; (2) whether other
purposes of the Act override the rights of employees to
choose their bargaining representatives; and (3) whether
alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the viola-
tions of the Act.”
Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s re-
quirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra, we
have examined the particular facts of this case as the
court requires and find that a balancing of the three fac-
tors warrants an affirmative bargaining order.5
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the Re-
spondent’s refusal to bargain in good faith with the Un-
ion. It is particularly appropriate here, where the Re-

5 Member Emanuel agrees with the District of Columbia Circuit that
the Board should justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition of an
affirmative bargaining order. He finds that the imposition of an affirm-
ative bargaining order in this case is appropriate for the reasons that
follow.
spondent overrode the unit employees’ exercise of their
Section 7 rights not only by engaging in sham bargain-
ing, but by simultaneously directing employees to sign a
decertification petition, making unlawful threats and
statements, and engaging in unlawful interrogation. At
the same time, an affirmative bargaining order, with its
attendant bar to raising a question concerning the Un-
ion’s continuing majority status for a reasonable time,
does not unduly prejudice the Section 7 rights of em-
ployees who may oppose continued union representation
because the duration of the order is no longer than is rea-
sonably necessary to remedy the ill effects of the viola-
tion.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. That is, it removes the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope
of further discouraging support for the Union. Eliminat-
ing this incentive is particularly compelling here, where
the Respondent sought to delay bargaining so that it
could undermine the union by forcing employees to sign
a decertification petition. It also ensures that the Union
will not be pressured by the Respondent’s failure to bar-
gain in good faith to achieve immediate results at the
bargaining table following the Board’s resolution of its
unfair labor practice charges and issuance of a cease-and-
desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, alone, would be inade-
quate to remedy the Respondent’s refusal to bargain with
the Union in these circumstances because it would permit
another challenge to the Union’s majority status before
the taint of the Respondent’s unlawful failure to bargain
in good faith has dissipated, and before the employees
have had a reasonable time to regroup and bargain
through their representative in an effort to reach a suc-
cessor collective-bargaining agreement. Such a result
would be particularly unjust in circumstances such as
those here, where the Respondent unlawfully sought to
undermine the Union on multiple fronts and, as described
above, brazenly repudiated its earlier pledge not to ask
employees to sign a decertification petition. In these
circumstances, the Respondent’s failure to bargain in
good faith would likely have a continuing effect, thereby
tainting any employee disaffection from the Union aris-
ing during that period or immediately thereafter. Moreo-
ver, the imposition of a bargaining order would signal to
employees that the rights guaranteed under the Act will
be protected. We find that these circumstances outweigh
the temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order
will have on the rights of employees who oppose contin-
ued union representation.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 3
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification
bar is necessary to fully remedy the allegations in this
case.6
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc., and Manas
Hospitality LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Sacramento,
a single employer, Sacramento, California, their officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Instructing employees to sign a petition, or any
other document, to decertify the Union.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge if they do
not sign a petition, or any other document, to decertify
the Union.
(c) Instructing employees not to sign any documents
given to them by the Union.
(d) Instructing employees not to go with their cowork-
ers if they are invited to join the Union.
(e) Instructing employees not to join the Union or not
to talk to union representatives.
(f) Purposely misleading employees about the benefits
received from union dues deductions in order to dissuade
them from supporting the Union.
(g) Coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion membership, activities, sympathies, and/or support,
including by asking employees why they cancelled their
signatures from a petition to decertify the Union.
(h) Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms

6 The Respondent argues for the first time on exceptions that it did
not have an obligation to bargain with the Union; the Respondent on
this basis excepts to the judge’s 6-month extension of the successor bar.
We reject this exception because “[a] contention raised for the first time
in exceptions to the Board is ordinarily untimely raised and, thus,
deemed waived.” Yorkaire, Inc., 297 NLRB 401, 401 (1989), enfd. 922
F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1990).
In any event, we find the judge’s 6-month extension of the successor
bar to be duplicative of the affirmative bargaining order remedy—
which requires that the Respondent bargain in good faith with the Un-
ion for a reasonable period of time, at minimum 6 months. See Lee
Lumber & Building Material Corp., 334 NLRB 399, 402 (2001), enfd.
310 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree-
ment:
All employees employed by Respondent at the Holiday
Inn Express, located between 15th & 16th Streets and
G & H Streets, in Sacramento, California, performing
the work covered by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and Hospitality Sacramento
L.P., effective June 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
the Holiday Inn Express Sacramento, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix,”7 in English, Spanish,
and Hindi. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consec-
utive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other elec-
tronic means, if the Respondent customarily communi-
cates with its employees by such means. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at the closed
facilities any time since March 3, 2016.
(c) Mail a copy of the notice to the last known ad-
dresses of Suhad Salman, Sylvia Arteaga Figueroa, and
Vanessa Abel.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a
meeting or meetings, which shall be scheduled to ensure
the widest possible attendance of unit employees, at
which time the attached notice marked “Appendix” is to
be publicly read by a responsible management official in
the presence of a Board agent and an agent of the Union
if the Region or the Union so desires, or, at the Respond-
ent’s option, by a Board agent in the presence of a re-
sponsible management official and, if the Union so de-
sires, the presence of an agent of the Union. In either
case, the Respondent shall make translation available for
Spanish and Hindi-speaking employees.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 25, 2018
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT instruct you to sign a petition, or any
other document, to decertify UNITE HERE! Local 49
(the Union).
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge if you do
not sign a petition, or any other document, to decertify
the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct you not to sign any documents
given to you by the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct you not to go with your cowork-
ers if you are invited to join the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct you not to join the Union or not
to talk to union representatives.
WE WILL NOT purposely mislead you about the benefits
received from union dues deductions in order to dissuade
you from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about your
union membership, activities, sympathies, and/or sup-
port, including by asking you why you cancelled your
signatures from a petition to decertify the Union.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the following appropriate unit concerning
terms and conditions of employment and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
All employees employed by Respondent at the Holiday
Inn Express, located between 15th & 16th Streets and
G & H Streets, in Sacramento, California, performing
the work covered by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and Hospitality Sacramento
L.P., effective June 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS
HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS
SACRAMENTO
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-176428 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 5
Yaromil Velez-Ralph, Esq., and Joseph Richardson, Esq. for the
General Counsel.
Scott Wilson, Esq. for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS, Administrative Law Judge. Based
upon charges filed by UNITE HERE! Local 49 (Union), on
October 26, 2016, the Regional Director for Region 20 of the
National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued an Order con-
solidating cases, amended consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing (complaint) alleging that Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc.
(Kalthia Group) and Manas Hospitality LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn
Express Sacramento (Manas Hospitality) (together referred to
as “Respondent” or “Holiday Inn Express”), committed multi-
ple violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act).1 Specifically, the Complaint alleges
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: instructing
employees not to engage in union activities; threatening em-
ployees; promising employees better benefits, and continued
work, if they did not support the Union; soliciting employee
signatures for, and instructing employees to sign, a decertifica-
tion petition; arranging for employees to meet with the decerti-
fication petition solicitor; interrogating employees; and creating
the impression of surveillance. The complaint also alleges that
Respondent failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent denies the
alleged violations. The complaint allegations were tried before
me on November 29, 2016, in San Francisco, California, and on
November 30–December 2, 2016, and January 10–11, 2017, in
Sacramento, California.
Based upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by the parties, I make the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law.2
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
Kalthia Group is a California corporation with an office and
place of business in San Diego, California where it is engaged
in the business of owning and operating hotels. It derives an-
nual gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchases and
receives goods valued in excess of $5000 directly from points
located outside the State of California. Kalthia Group admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Manas Hospitality is a California limited liability company
with an office and place of business in Sacramento, California
where it is engaged in the business of operating a hotel. Manas
Hospitality derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and
purchases and receives goods valued in excess of $5000 direct-

1 Citations to the transcripts will be denoted by “Tr.” with the ap-
propriate page number. Citations to the General Counsel and Respond-
ent Exhibits will be denoted by “GC” and “R.” respectively. Transcript
and exhibit citations are only intended as an aid, as factual findings are
based upon the entire record as a whole.
2 Unless otherwise noted, witness demeanor was the primary con-
sideration used in making credibility resolutions. Testimony contrary
to my findings has been discredited.
ly from points located outside the State of California. Manas
Hospitality admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
The parties stipulated that, for purposes of this proceeding,
Kalthia Group and Manas Hospitality have a common owner-
ship and management, a centralized control of labor relations,
interrelated operations, and are a single employer. (GC 2)
Therefore, I find they constitute an integrated enterprise and are
a single employer. See Radio & Television Board Technicians
Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380
U.S. 255, 256 (1965).
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. FACTS
A. Background
Respondent operates a Holiday Inn Express hotel in Sacra-
mento, California, near the Sacramento Convention Center.
Respondent purchased the hotel on about August 1, 2015, from
Hospitality Sacramento L.P., which had been operating the
hotel for a number of years. Hotel employees have been repre-
sented by the Union since at least 2006, and at the time of the
purchase were working under the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Union and Hospitali-
ty Sacramento.3 According to the CBA’s recognition clause,
the following employees were represented by the Union:
All employees employed by Respondents at the facility locat-
ed at 728 Sixteenth Street, Sacramento, California in the fol-
lowing classifications: Bartender; Bar Helper; Food/Beverage
Server; Busperson; Hostperson/Cashier; Head Banquet Serv-
er; Cook; Fry; Pantry; Kitchen Worker; Porter; Bellperson;
PBX; Guest Room Attendant; Houseperson; Inspec-
tor/Inspectress; Laundry Worker; Head Laundry; Room
Clerk/Reservation Clerk; Night Auditor; Head Gardener;
Gardener; Rug Shampooer; and Handyman.
The CBA contained a successorship clause requiring any pur-
chaser to retain the bargaining unit employees and assume the
terms of the agreement. Therefore, at the time Respondent
purchased the property, it hired the existing hotel employees.
For employees, the transition was seamless and there was no
interruption to their work schedules. As required, Respondent
also assumed the obligations of the CBA and has continued to
comply with the terms of the agreement through the date of the
hearing. (Tr. 189–197, 291–292, 298–299, 302; GC 3, p. 3,
11.)
Respondent’s management team at the hotel consisted of:
Mohammed Nazeem (Nazeem), the hotel’s general manager;
Sanjita Nand (Nand), the human resources manager; and Elsa

3 The CBA has an effective date of June 2006 through December
2009, and thereafter allows either party to terminate the agreement
upon 10 days written notice. There is no evidence that anyone termi-
nated the agreement. Instead, the parties decided to continue operating
under the terms of the CBA, except the employer agreed to pay all
healthcare/benefit premium increases. (Tr. 289–291.) The terms of the
CBA also covered a Clarion branded hotel; however that hotel closed in
2012. (Tr. 188, 272, 294.)
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gutierrez, (Gutierrez) the housekeeping manager. The Union
did not have a shop steward at the hotel. Instead, a committee
of workers would contact Union Representative Roxana Tapia
(Tapia) on a daily basis. Tapia, the Union’s assigned repre-
sentative for the hotel, reported directly to Chris Rak (Rak), the
union president. Along with speaking with the committee
members daily, Tapia would go to the hotel about once a week
to visit employees during their breaks. When Tapia visits the
hotel, she first alerts Nazeem or Nand that she is on the proper-
ty, and then goes to the employee break area, which is in the
first floor breakfast lounge. (Tr. 187, 194, 345–352, 387–388,
605–606.)
The first meeting between Respondent and the Union oc-
curred in late July 2015, prior to the hotel’s sale. Various indi-
viduals were present at this meeting including Rak and
Nazeem; the parties discussed their aspirations for a smooth
transition. Respondent committed to honoring the terms of the
CBA, and also stated its desire to delay bargaining for 6 months
in order to better understand the hotel’s operations before start-
ing negotiations. Rak replied that it was not his decision to
make, and that he needed to speak with employees. (Tr. 197.)
In mid-September 2015, Rak met with employees to discuss
the company’s request to delay bargaining. Rak asked whether
employees would consider a 6-month bargaining delay if Re-
spondent agreed to pay the increased health and welfare premi-
ums that were scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2016.
Employees thought this was a good idea. (Tr. 198–199.)
About a week and a half later, after a meeting about various
workplace issues, Rak told Nazeem the Union would be open to
a 6-month delay in bargaining if the company committed to pay
the increased health and welfare premiums due to be imple-
mented on January 1, 2016. Nazeem said he would check into
the matter and contact Rak accordingly. However, Nazeem
never replied to Rak.4 And the Union did not follow-up be-
cause it learned that a decertification petition was being circu-
lated at the hotel and it suspected Respondent was involved.
(Tr. 199–200, 309–310, 686–688, 715.)
Indeed, such a document had been circulating, and on Octo-
ber 19, 2015, Dharmesh Tandel,5 a front-desk employee, filed a
petition in Case 20–RD–162195 seeking an election to decerti-
fy the Union. The Union filed charges with the Board alleging
the hotel was behind the decertification effort, and on Novem-
ber 30, 2015, a consolidated complaint issued alleging, in rele-
vant part, that the employer’s actions surrounding the decertifi-
cation effort violated the Act (November 2015 complaint).
(GC 3, pp. 43–44, 52–59.)
On January 11, 2016, the decertification petition was dis-
missed.6 On February 9, 2016, the hotel entered into a settle-

4 Notwithstanding, Respondent continued to pay the health and wel-
fare premiums, along with all premium increases promulgated by the
benefit trust funds. (Tr. 310–311; Tr. 688–689.)
5 Tandell stopped working at the hotel in about May 2016. (Tr.
299–300, 823.)
6 I take administrative notice of the petition and the Region’s dis-
missal letter. The Levy Co., 351 NLRB 1237, 1238 (2007) (Board takes
administrative notice of NLRB proceedings, that certain charges were
dismissed for lack of evidence, and the dismissals were upheld by the
Office of Appeals.).
ment agreement with the Board, which included a nonadmis-
sions clause, settling the allegations in the November 2015
complaint.7 As part of the settlement, the company agreed to
post a notice in English and Spanish, and consented to a notice
reading. Respondent held an employee meeting on March 6,
2016, where Board agents read the notice to workers. Thereaf-
ter, a new decertification petition was circulated and filed on
June 30, 2016. (Tr. 823–824; GC 3, pp. 48–51.)
B. The Parties’ Bargaining History
While the allegations surrounding the hotel’s alleged in-
volvement in Tandel’s decertification petition were being in-
vestigated, on November 9, 2015, the Union sent Respondent a
formal request to start bargaining for a new collective-
bargaining agreement. The parties held their initial bargaining
session on December 8, 2015. From the start of bargaining,
through the close of the hearing, ten sessions were held and
over 2 years had passed. Notwithstanding, the parties were
unable to reach agreement on a new contract. (Tr. 200–203;
GC 12, 13.)
1. December 8, 2015 bargaining session
The December 8 bargaining session was held at the hotel. At
the meeting, Respondent expressed its desire to pay fair wages
and benefits. In turn, the Union presented its first set of pro-
posals for a new contract. The Union proposed changes to 13
sections of the CBA, including new proposals for the key eco-
nomic provisions of wages, healthcare, and pensions. The ma-
jority of the meeting involved reviewing the Union’s proposals.
(Tr. 208, 211–214; GC 14.)
At the time, hotel employees were still working under the
wage rates contained in the CBA, which had not been increased
since June 2009. For example, for the past 6 years, room at-
tendants had been paid $9.16 per hour. Therefore, the Union
told Respondent that a wage increase was the Union’s biggest
priority in negotiations. Accordingly, the Union’s initial wage
proposal called for increases across all classifications ranging
from 39 percent to 52 percent in the initial year of the contract,
and then 3 percent to 4 percent thereafter through August 2018.
Under the Union’s wage proposal, the hourly wage rate for
room attendants would increase from $9.16 to $13.30 in August
2015, and ultimately reach $14.60 per hour in August 2018.
Respondent listened, but did not make any proposals to the
Union. (Tr. 214. 297; GC 14.)
2. January 26, 2016 bargaining session
The next bargaining session occurred at the Union’s offices
on January 26, 2016. At this meeting Respondent presented its
initial bargaining proposals to the Union for a new contract.
Respondent proposed to significantly change the existing sen-
iority system, seeking a merit system with seniority being used
only if Respondent decided all else was equal. Respondent also
wanted to remove the union security clause, which had been in
effect since at least 2006, without advancing any business justi-

7 The facts surrounding Tandel’s petition, the 2015 charges filed by
the Union, and the November 2015 complaint, are included for back-
ground only and have not been considered in my analysis of the alleged
unfair labor practices.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 7
fication. Also, the company sought the ability to subcontract
without restriction, and proposed altering the successorship
clause so a future purchaser would not be required to hire exist-
ing employees or honor the union contract. Finally, for many
key provisions of the CBA, including medical, dental, pensions,
and wages, instead of making proposals, Respondent simply
stated that it “rejected” the Union’s initial proposal without
explanation and that its counterproposals would be “forthcom-
ing.” The Union viewed the company’s proposals as “aggres-
sive,” and informed the company that the proposal to remove
the union security clause would be “an issue” in negotiations.
The Union also expressed its concern that the seniority proposal
gave Respondent almost complete discretion to decide matters
including work schedules and vacations. Respondent replied
saying that it did not want to be bound by seniority if the com-
pany thought one worker was better than another. During the
meeting, the parties also discussed the issue of scheduling days
off, and the next day Respondent sent the Union a proposal on
scheduling time off. The next bargaining session occurred on
March 8, 2016. (Tr. 215–224, 230–231, 252–253, 326; GC 15,
16, 24.)8
3. March 8, 2016 bargaining session
No written proposals were exchanged at the March 8 meet-
ing, which started with Respondent agreeing to allow employ-
ees to be scheduled for consecutive days off. Respondent also
said it would try to give workers the same day off on a weekly
basis when practicable. (Tr. 231–233.)
The parties next discussed wages. Respondent stated that it
was premature to propose a wage increase until it had owned
the hotel for 1 year. According to the company, it was not nec-
essarily against a future wage increase, but it needed a 1-year
period to evaluate the hotel’s profitability and gage the amount
of an appropriate wage increase. Moreover, Respondent noted
that the California minimum wage had increased to $10 per
hour. Thus, as a practical matter, sixteen of the approximately
32 unit employees received an increase as they were making
less than the $10 minimum wage.9 Accordingly, Respondent
said that the issue of wages would be put on hold until it was
able to evaluate the hotel’s profitability for a year. Rak replied
saying that it was going to be very difficult moving forward
without knowing “where we’re standing on our wages.” (Tr.
234–236, 318, 759–760; GC 17.)
The parties then discussed benefits. Respondent said it had
significant homework to do before presenting a health and wel-
fare proposal, which it anticipated presenting at the next meet-
ing. The Union was expecting Respondent to present its bene-
fits proposal at this meeting, as the Union had previously ex-
pressed a willingness to examine an alternative health and wel-
fare plan, particularly if the company would put more money
into wages. Towards the end of the meeting, the parties dis-
cussed the appropriateness of some of the existing contract
language involving classifications related to restaurant opera-

8 On pp. 229 through 274 of the transcripts Respondent’s counsel is
misidentified as “Mr. Brown.”
9 The California state minimum wage increased from $9 to $10 per
hour effective January 1, 2016. (Tr. 312.) See also Bojorquez v. Aber-
crombie & Fitch, Co., 193 F.Supp. 3d 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
tions at the Clarion, which was now closed. Before adjourning,
Rak reiterated the Union’s desire to discuss wages. (Tr. 236–
237; GC 17.)
4. March 22, 2016 bargaining session
The next meeting occurred on March 22, 2016, at the union
office. (Tr. 237–238.) At this meeting, the employer presented
a set of written proposals on subjects including health and wel-
fare, subcontracting, union security and a wage reopener. (Tr.
237–240; GC 18, 19.)
Based upon their previous discussions, the Union was ex-
pecting a proposal from the company offering an alternative
health and benefit plan. Instead, Respondent proposed keeping
the existing union sponsored medical and dental plans for the
term of the agreement, which Respondent proposed to only be
for 1 year. Also, the proposal was subject to freezing the pre-
miums at the existing levels. The Union explained that this was
not viable because the trust funds required somebody (either the
employer or the employees) to pay for the cost of any premium
increases, which usually occur on January 1 of each year. (Tr.
241–242; GC 18.)
Regarding its other proposals, the employer wanted to re-
move the existing union security clause from the CBA, and
included a paragraph affirmatively stating that the payment of
union dues (or agency fees) was not a condition of employ-
ment. Respondent agreed to keep the CBA’s language prohib-
iting the subcontracting of bargaining unit positions, but again
proposed removing the CBA’s successorship clause. Regard-
ing wages, the Respondent proposed that employee pay remain
the same until July 31, 2016, at which point the contract could
be reopened for the express purpose of bargaining wages. As
for seniority, Respondent offered that seniority would be con-
sidered only if the employer decided that employee qualifica-
tions and performance were equal. The Union also presented a
package set of proposals at the meeting, agreeing to accept
Respondent’s proposals on tipped employees, work schedules,
and craft rules, if Respondent agreed to the Union’s proposal to
include food and beverage employees in the unit if such posi-
tions were created at the hotel. (Tr. 241–244; 319–320; 340–
341; GC 18, 20.)
5. April 28, 2016 bargaining session
The parties met again for bargaining on April 28, 2016, at
the union office. The Union presented bargaining proposals
which maintained most of the language previously put forth by
the Union. Respondent stated that it would respond at the next
meeting. (Tr. 245–246; GC 23.)
6. May 11, 2016 bargaining session
On May 11, 2016, the parties met and confirmed the tenta-
tive agreements they had reached to date. Respondent pro-
posed keeping the same benefit plan for the duration of the
agreement, and agreed to pay all premium increases. Respond-
ent also amended its sick leave proposal to conform to Califor-
nia law. An agreement was reached on a grievance procedure.
(Tr. 248–250; GC 22.)
At the end of the meeting, the parties said they would be “in
touch” for future bargaining dates. However, they did not
meet, or exchange proposals, again until September 20, 2016.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rak testified there were two reasons for this delay: (1) the
Union did not seek bargaining because committee members
were increasingly frustrated by the employer’s refusal to make
a wage proposal; and (2) the Union learned another decertifica-
tion petition was being circulated, believed Respondent was
involved, and thus focused their resources accordingly. (Tr.
254–256, 261, 739.)
7. September 20, 2016 bargaining session
The next bargaining session occurred on September 20,
2016, at the union office. At this meeting Rak congratulated
Respondent for owning the hotel for over 1 year, and stated that
he was eager to now hear the employer’s position regarding
wages. However, Respondent did not present any proposals.
(Tr. 256–260; GC 26.)
The Union presented its own set of proposals at the meeting,
which contained the same wage increases it originally proposed
in December 2015. The Union rejected Respondent’s previous
seniority proposal. Rak told Respondent that seniority was a
major issue for the Union, and that the employer’s proposal was
gutting the seniority clause. The employer did not reply to any
of the Union’s bargaining proposals at the meeting. (Tr. 256–
261; GC 25.)
8. November 2, 2016 bargaining session
The next meeting occurred on November 2, 2016. Respond-
ent had no proposals to present, but told the Union they were
standing firm on issues that the Union deemed important, such
as seniority, union security, and successorship. The Union
asked for Respondent’s reasoning behind its proposal to elimi-
nate the union security clause and Respondent replied saying
that it “shouldn’t be a condition of employment.” (Tr. 262–
269.)
At the meeting, Respondent said it would follow the trust
fund’s direction regarding pensions. However, the Union stat-
ed that pension contributions are negotiated by the parties, and
not set by the trust fund. Also, notwithstanding the fact they
had been bargaining for almost 1 year, the employer was hold-
ing firm to a proposed 1-year agreement term. Respondent
stated they were not going to propose any wage increases for
employees, as the California minimum wage was again set to
increase on January 1, 2017, and the majority of workers would
receive a 50 cent raise because of mandated increase.10 (Tr.
262–265; 270; GC 28.)
After hearing Respondent’s answer to the Union’s Septem-
ber 20 proposals, the Union presented the company a written
counter proposal decreasing its proposed wage increase $1
across all classifications. Thus, under the Union’s newest pro-
posal, wages for room attendants would increase in August
2017 from the $10 minimum wage to $13.10. (Tr. 261–264;
GC 27.)
9. December 13, 2016 bargaining session
While the hearing in this matter was in recess, Respondent
and the Union held another bargaining session on December

10 See Thompson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 590261, at *4
(E.D Cal. 2017) (noting that, for employers with 26 or more workers,
the minimum wage in California increased to $10.50 per hour on Janu-
ary 1, 2017, and will increase to $11 per hour on January 1, 2018.).
13, 2016. At the time, only 4 of Respondent’s 32 bargaining
unit employees made more than $10.50 per hour, which was the
mandated California minimum wage effective January 1, 2017.
Respondent presented a written proposal at the meeting giving
9 existing employees a raise that would put their wages higher
than the minimum wage. After discussions, Respondent orally
committed that wages at the hotel would be at least 10 cents
higher than the minimum wage. In response, the Union submit-
ted a counterproposal reducing their November 2 wage pro-
posal by 10 cents across all classifications. (Tr. 261–264, 693–
696, 719–720; R. 16; GC 27, 37.)
The parties also discussed the union security clause. Re-
spondent stated that if people wanted to voluntarily give dues
money to the Union that was fine, but that the company be-
lieved union membership should not be a condition of employ-
ment. At no time did Respondent present any business justifi-
cation for its position. (Tr. 729–731; GC 37.)
10. January 4, 2017 bargaining session
The parties held another bargaining session on January 4,
2017. At this meeting Respondent proposed that decisions
regarding layoffs would be made based on job classification
seniority. Otherwise, seniority related decisions were subject to
the employer’s discretion, with seniority only being used to
break a tie if all else was equal. The parties reached an agree-
ment that employees would continue to receive 5 days of sick
leave, as set forth in the existing CBA. The employer made a
written offer increasing its wage proposal 10 cents over the
previous written proposal submitted on December 13, 2016.
(Tr. 699, 700, 706; R. 16, 18; GC 38)
C. The June 2016 Decertification Petition
Another decertification petition was filed on June 30, 2016.
This petition was filed by Ranjeel Singh, who had worked at
the hotel for about 3 years. At the time he was working as a
front desk attendant, and reported directly to Nazeem. The
8(a)(1) allegations in the Complaint involve what Respondent
allegedly told some of the employees who signed the petition,
and how their signatures supporting the petition were collected.
The General Counsel and Respondent presented widely diver-
gent evidence regarding these allegations. (Tr. 820–821; GC 3,
p. 39)
1. The General Counsel’s case
a. Discouraging employees from supporting the Union
The General Counsel presented evidence that, as soon as Re-
spondent took over the hotel, it tried to discourage employees
from supporting the Union. Vanessa Abel (Abel), who was
hired by the Holiday Inn Express on April 4, 2016, as a house-
keeper, testified that a few days before being hired she was
interviewed by Nazeem, Nand, and Gutierrez. 11 According to
Abel, at this interview Nazeem and Gutierrez told her not to

11 Abel was injured on the job in May 2016. (Tr. 101.) As of the
date of the hearing, while she was still officially employed by the hotel,
she had not physically worked at the Holiday Inn Express since her
injury. (Tr. 101–103, 880.) Abel’s first language is Tagalog, however
she testified in English. (Tr. 150.)
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 9
join the Union, and that if she did the Union was going to get
some money from her salary. (Tr. 119–111; R. 11.)
Abel further testified that, “every day,” Gutierrez would tell
her “don’t join the Union.” Abel kept her lunch in Gutierrez’s
office, and testified that Gutierrez would discuss the Union
with her when she would retrieve her lunch. Sometimes
Gutierrez would tell her not to eat downstairs during her break
because Gutierrez did not want Abel to meet with the Union
and its supporters; so Abel would eat in one of the hotel rooms
instead. Also, on one occasion, Gutierrez told Abel not to
speak with Rak, referring to him as “the tall man.” (Tr. 111–
114, 142–143.)
Suhad Salman (Salman) worked as a housekeeper at the Hol-
iday Inn Express from April 1, 2016, until July 15, 2016.12
Salman testified that she first learned about the Union a month
after she started working at the hotel.13 Her colleagues ex-
plained to her that the Union deducted money from her salary
and in return she would receive benefits. (Tr. 26, 62, 65, 67.)
Salman testified that on May 9, she had a conversation with
Gutierrez in her office sometime between noon and 12:30 p.m.
Gutierrez told Salman not to sign any documents given to her
by Tapia.14 Gutierrez also told her the Union would deduct
money from her salary to provide her with benefits, but that
Salman already received her benefits from public assistance.15
Salman replied saying she would not sign anything, and that
since she received assistance from the government she did not
want the Union taking money from her check in return for ben-
efits. (Tr. 35–37, 66, 69–70.)
Silvia Arteaga Figueroa (Arteaga) worked at the hotel as a
housekeeper from February 2016 through May 2016.16 Arteaga
testified that she first learned about the Union on March 3,
2016. On that day, as she was ending her workday, she exited
the bathroom to find Gutierrez waiting for her. Gutierrez told
Arteaga that, if any of her coworkers invited her to join the
Union, not to go with them. Arteaga replied that she did not
know what a union was, and Gutierrez said she would explain
later. In fact, Arteaga’s coworkers had gathered outside with
Tapia, as they were having a union meeting that day. After
speaking with Gutierrez, Arteaga left; outside she told Tapia

12 Salman, whose primary language is Arabic, testified with the aid
of a translator. (Tr. 30–31.) Before the hearing opened, I granted the
General Counsel’s motion for Salman to testify via live video link,
from Cleveland, Ohio. Respondent did not object to Salman testifying
via video. (GC 1 (ii); Tr. 12.) All parties were able to view Salman
throughout her testimony, and I was able to assess the Salman’s de-
meanor including her facial expressions and body language.
13 During her testimony, at times Salmon referred to the Union as
“the company” or the “Nunion.” However, when she did so, it was
clear she was speaking about the Union. (Tr. 48.) (Tr. 34, 37, 47, 48,
72.)
14 Gutierrez referred to Tapia as the “fat woman,” but it was clear to
Salma that she was referring to Tapia. (Tr. 36.)
15 Gutierrez, who does not speak Arabic, would communicate with
Salman in English. (Tr. 609.) Indeed, based upon my observation of
Salman and her testimony, it was evident that she had a sufficient com-
prehension of spoken English to understand basic work-related conver-
sations. Also, various supervisors and coworkers testified that Salman
could understand and speak basic English. (Tr. 504, 603, 609, 657.)
16 Arteaga, who speaks Spanish, testified at trial via an interpreter.
and her coworkers what Gutierrez had said. (Tr. 152–153,
164–167.)
b. The decertification petition
Paragraph 6 of the complaint alleges that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting employees to sign a
petition to decertify the Union. In support of this allegation,
three employees testified that Respondent was, in some way,
responsible for their signatures on the petition.
(i) Signature of Silvia Arteaga
Arteaga signed the petition on May 9, 2016, and is the first
signature on the document. On that day, Arteaga testified that
Gutierrez instructed her to go to Nand’s office for training.
Present in the office were Arteaga, Nand, and Gutierrez. Nand
spoke in English, while Gutierrez translated into Spanish.
Gutierrez told Arteaga that she was there for training, and asked
her some questions such as whether she had worked at a hotel
before, if she knew how to service a hotel room, and could
avoid workplace injuries. After the questions, they gave Arte-
aga the petition and told her to sign it. Arteaga, who does not
read or write English, signed the document. At the hearing, she
specifically identified the petition as the document Nand and
Gutierrez gave her to sign. (Tr. 154, 167–171, 182, 184; R.
24.)
Arteaga left the meeting, while Gutierrez kept the signed pe-
tition. Later that day, Gutierrez told two coworkers what had
occurred, and that she was told to sign a document. A few days
later, Tapia learned about the incident and told Arteaga that she
had a right to get a copy of the document she had signed. Arte-
aga went with coworker Maria Vidal to Gutierrez’ office,
where Gutierrez was present with Nand. Arteaga asked
Gutierrez for a copy of the document she had signed. Gutierrez
became upset and told Vidal to leave. She then told Arteaga
that she was not going to give her a copy of the document and
that if she wanted to be in the Union she would not intrude.
Arteaga then left, without a copy of the paper. (Tr. 172–175,
365; GC 3, p. 40.)
At some point, Arteaga told Tapia she could not get a copy
of the document, and Tapia said she would request the paper
from the company. Tapia asked Nand provide her with a copy
of the document that Arteaga had signed. In reply to this re-
quest, on June 2, 2016, Tapia received an email from Nand
with a copy of a human rights training acknowledgement form
signed by Arteaga. While form is signed by Arteaga, it was
dated by Nand; the date reads 2/21/16.17 (Tr. 366–370, 478–
479, 542–543; GC 10, 33.)
(ii) Signature of Vanessa Abel
On May 10, 2016, Vanessa Abel received a phone call from
Gutierrez at 7:20 a.m., asking her to come into work early.
When Abel arrived at the hotel, she went straight to Gutierrez’s
office and asked her if there was a problem; Gutierrez replied
that she just wanted to speak with Abel. Gutierrez then wrote
the number “2031” on a piece of paper and told Abel to go to
that room and meet Olga Villa, who had a paper that Abel

17 As discussed later, someone tried to change the “2” to a “4” so the
date on the document would read “4/21/16.”
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
needed to sign. Gutierrez then said that if Abel did not sign the
paper she would be fired. (Tr. 115–117, 120–22; GC 6.)
Abel went to the room and Villa was waiting inside.18 Villa
gave Abel the petition and told her to “sign the papers.” Abel
read the petition and signed it. Abel testified that she signed
the petition because she did not want to get fired. She asked
Villa if she could take a picture of the document and Villa
agreed; Abel then took a picture of the petition with her phone.
After signing the petition, Villa went back to Gutierrez’ office.
Gutierrez told her to clock-in and gave Abel her room assign-
ments for the day. (Tr. 117–128; GC 3, p. 40, GC 7.)
In early June, Abel told Tapia about her conversation with
Gutierrez and what occurred regarding the petition. On June 5,
Abel sent Tapia a text message containing the picture she took
of the petition. Abel’s text to Tapia read, in part “That’s the
papers I was force to sign or be fired that day . . . I took a pic-
ture when they force me to sign.” (Tr. 129–131, 353–359, 375–
378; GC 8–9.)
(iii) Signature of Suhad Salman
Salman and her husband Shaheed Hussein (Hussein) testified
about Salman’s signature on the petition and how the signature
was rescinded. According to Salman, at around 3 p.m. on May
9, she had a conversation with Gutierrez on the third floor of
the hotel, near a utility room where housekeeping employees
keep their carts. Gutierrez told Salman that a guy was going to
bring her a paper for “no union” and to just sign the document;
Gutierrez then left. (Tr. 41–44, 68–71.)
About a minute later, Singh appeared and the pair went into
the utility room. Singh told Salman that, if she signed the peti-
tion she would not be a member of the Union, but if she did not
sign she was a member. Salman said okay, and signed her
name. Salman estimated that she signed the petition sometime
towards the end of her shift between 3 and 4 p.m. (Tr. 41–44,
56–57, 67–68.)
Salman clocked out that day at 4 p.m., and her husband
picked her up from work. As they were driving home, she told
Hussein about the paper she signed and said she was concerned
because she did not know what the document said. Hussein
asked her why she signed, and said he was going to go back to
the hotel and find out what the document was about. They
drove back to the hotel, and the pair went to the front desk
where Hussein asked Singh about the document his wife
signed, and asked to see the paper. Singh removed the petition
from his jacket, and Hussein told Singh to cancel Salman’s
signature until they could find out more about the Union.
Singh crossed Salman’s name off the petition, while both Hus-
sein and Salman watched. (R. 21, Tr. 44–45, 86–89; R. 21.)
At his wife’s request, Hussein then asked Singh if he could
take a picture of the document to show his friends who had a
better understanding of English, to explain it to him. Singh
replied saying he could not take a picture because the paper
contained the signatures of other workers. Instead, Singh gave
them a copy without any signatures; Hussein took a picture of
the petition’s blank signature form and they left. Outside the

18 Abel knew Villa worked in the laundry; laundry workers do not
go to guest rooms as part of their job. (Tr. 108.)
hotel, the pair stopped to talk with one of Salman’s friends.
Then Tapia appeared, introduced herself, and said she worked
for the Union. Salman told Hussein to ask Tapia what types of
benefits and services the Union provides, which he did. After
their discussion with Tapia, Salman and Hussein got into their
car and drove home. As they were driving, Salman received a
call from Gutierrez; she put the call on speaker so Hussein
could also hear. Gutierrez asked Salman why she cancelled her
signature, said that the Union would take money from her sala-
ry and give her benefits, but she did not need to join them be-
cause the government gave her benefits. Salman told Gutierrez
that she needed time to find out more information about the
Union.19 (Tr. 47–51, 72, 76, 86–91; GC 4.)
Salman testified that she went to work the next day and
Gutierrez and Nazeem both asked her why she cancelled her
signature from the petition. She told them that she wanted to
get more information about the document, and if it was good
for her she would sign it. (Tr. 52–53.)
2. Respondent’s defense.
Nazeem, Nand, Gutierrez, and Singh, all testified as part of
Respondent’s defense, generally denying everything that was
attributed to them by the General Counsel’s witnesses.
Gutierrez and Nand both denied that anyone told Vanessa Abel
not to associate with the Union. Gutierrez also denied that she
ever told Sylvia Arteaga not to involve herself with the Union,
and claims she was not at the hotel the day in question because
Thursdays were her day off. Gutierrez also denied ever telling
Suhad Salman not to associate with Tapia or the Union. (Tr.
464, 608, 614–615, 626, 633, 652–654.)
a. The decertification petition generally
Singh testified that he was the person responsible for the de-
certification petition, and collected all the signatures, with the
help of coworker Olga Villa for Spanish speaking employees.
According to Singh, workers did not want the Union as a ma-
jority of employees were only receiving the minimum wage.
On March 6, 2016, Singh attended a meeting at the hotel where
Board agents read a notice to employees relating to the settle-
ment of the November 2015 complaint. At the meeting, Singh
testified that he spoke with a Board agent about filing another
decertification petition and was told that he could do so in 2
months. According to Singh, the decertification petition pro-
cess started on May 8, 2016; he denied doing anything in sup-
port of the petition before May 8. Nazeem testified that he first
heard about the decertification campaign in the middle of
March 2016, when an employee spoke to him about it in his
office.20 (Tr. 823–230, 827–830, 843, 847–848, 860.)
According to Singh, all of the signatures on the petition were
gathered outside the property, near the main hotel entrance on
Sixteenth Street, between 3 and 4 p.m. Singh claimed that he
walked the hotel’s hallways during his breaks informing
coworkers to meet him at the 16th Street entrance to sign the
petition. He then stood outside the entrance with signature

19 This is an instance where Salman referred to the Union as the
“company.” (Tr. 47.)
20 There is an error in the transcript which reads “little of March.”
(Tr. 769.) It should read “middle of March.”
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 11
forms to gather employee signatures; Singh testified that he
printed the signature forms from the NLRB website. Singh
gathered signatures on May 8, 9, and 10, between 3 and 4 p.m.
To gather signatures, Sing testified that he would step outside at
3 p.m. for about 10–15 minutes, and then again at 4 p.m. (Tr.
850–856.)
After gathering the signatures, Singh filed the decertification
petition electronically with the NLRB and provided Nazeem
with a copy along with the completed signature forms. Singh
testified that it took him three tries to properly file the petition;
each time filing the petition online. He first tried on June 7, but
the NLRB wanted more information. Notwithstanding, on June
7 Singh gave a copy of the completed signature forms to
Nazeem showing which employees supported the petition.
About 8 or 10 days later, he tried to file the petition a second
time, but again the NLRB needed more information. The final
time he tried, on June 30, 2016, the petition was accepted. (Tr.
836–837, 853–854, 874–877; R. 23, R. 25.)
b. Respondent’s evidence regarding Sylvia Arteaga
Sing testified that he and Villa gathered Arteaga’s signature
sometime between 3 and 4 p.m. on May 9, while the pair were
standing outside of the hotel property, near the main entrance,
waiting to catch employees as they were leaving work. Singh,
who does not understand Spanish, testified that Villa spoke
with Arteaga, who then signed the petition.21 As for gathering
Arteaga’s signature on the decertification petition, both
Gutierrez and Nand claim were not involved, and that the only
document they gave Arteaga to sign on May 9 was an acknowl-
edgment regarding the hotel’s human rights policy training.
(Tr. 493–496, 668–670, 829–833, 860–861)
(i) Respondent’s alleged human right’s training for Arteaga
The Holiday Inn Express is affiliated with the International
Hotel Group (IHG), which requires that affiliated hotels con-
duct certain training for employees when they are hired, and
again annually. One such required training is human rights
training, which is part of new employee training and is mandat-
ed by IHG to occur within the first 7 days of an employee’s
hire. (Tr. 456, 467, 470, 514–515, 548; R. 2, 4.)
An IHG examiner came to the Holiday Inn Express for a
quality assurance inspection on May 11, 2016; Respondent was
notified about the inspection beforehand. On April 26, Nand
emailed Gutierrez saying the hotel needed to complete the new
hire training logs before the inspector arrived, and needed to
conduct human rights training for: Arteaga, Salman, Abel, and
Mujtaba Elia. She also noted that Gutierrez’ help may be need-
ed to translate for Arteaga. According to Respondent’s records,
Abel received human rights training on May 4, while the re-
maining three employees received it on May 9. (Tr. 508–509,
549; R. 3–11.)
Regarding Arteaga, Nand testified that she conducted human
rights training with Arteaga on May 9, and Gutierrez translat-
ed.22 According to Nand, she did not conduct human rights

21 Olga Villa did not testify at the hearing, even though she was still
employed at the hotel. (Tr. 880.)
22 Gutierrez testified that she was present as a translator at this meet-
ing. (Tr. 633–635, 680–682.)
training with Arteaga within the first 7 days of her February
2016 hire, as required by IHG directives, because she needed a
translator. And, despite the fact Gutierrez is at the hotel every
weekday, and the training was estimated to take only 5 to 10
minutes, it took Nand until May 2016 to get Gutierrez “on
board” so they could meet with Arteaga for the training.23 (Tr.
475–476, 521, 606.)
According to Nand, at about 2 p.m. on May 9 she called
Gutierrez telling her they were going to conduct human rights
training for the newly hired workers, and asked her to first send
Mujtaba Elia to Nand’s office. Nand testified that she complet-
ed the training for Elia, and had him sign an acknowledgement
form.24 Next, Nand asked Gutierrez to summons Salman to the
office. Nand conducted the training for Salman, and had her
sign an acknowledgment. However, it was Nand who dated the
document. (Tr. 522–528; R. 9, 16.)
Nand then asked Gutierrez to come to the office with Arte-
aga, as Nand needed Gutierrez to translate. Nand testified that
she read the human rights policy while Gutierrez translated to
Arteaga in Spanish; Nand does not speak Spanish. When the
training was completed, Arteaga signed the acknowledgment,
but did not date the paper. Gutierrez then said she wanted to
see Arteaga in her office next door about a lost-and-found inci-
dent, and wanted Nand to be a witness.25 Nand set the docu-
ment aside, and the three went to Gutierrez’ office, which was
directly next door to Nand’s. In Gutierrez’ office, Nand and
Gutierrez claim to have given Arteaga a verbal warning about a
lost and found incident. (Tr. 476–480, 524–526, 634–635, 667–
669)
Regarding the human rights training acknowledgment,
Gutierrez testified that Arteaga signed the paper but did not
date it. According to Gutierrez, Nand was the one who dated
the document, but Gutierrez was not present when she did so.
(Tr. 681–682.)
(ii) Arteaga’s human rights training acknowledgment
The record contains two versions of the human rights train-
ing acknowledgment signed by Arteaga. One is dated
“2/21/16,” however an attempt was made to change the “2” to a
“4” so the date would read “4/21/16.” 26 The second version is
identical to the first, but the original date is crossed out, and a
new date – “5/9/16” is printed on the document with the words
“wrong date.” Nand admitted that she was the one who dated
both documents. Nand testified that, sometime in June 2016,
she crossed out the original date, printed “5/9/16” on the docu-

23 I do not credit Nand’s hearsay testimony that Arteaga was unsure
whether she was going to continue working at the hotel because she
was finding the work difficult. (Tr. 522.)
24 While the form was signed by Elia, it appears it was dated by
Nand as the date is virtually identical to that on Abel’s acknowledg-
ment. Also, Nand testified that if an acknowledgment is not dated, she
fills in the date herself. (Tr. 523; R. 7; R. 8.) (Tr. 519.)
25 Respondent introduced training “logs” which are completed by
Nand (R. 8 – Salman); (R. 6 – Elia); (R. 4 – Arteaga); (R. 11 – Abel).
Nand testified that she is the one who fills in all of the logs; other than
her testimony, there was no other evidence introduced to show these
logs are accurate. (Tr. 498.)
26 Nand testified that she “believed” the original date on the docu-
ment is 4/21/16 and not 2/21/16. (Tr. 479–480.)
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment, and added the words “wrong date.” (Tr. 478–481; GC 5,
10, R. 5)
According to Nand, she made an “honest mistake” by putting
the original date on the acknowledgment. She did not remem-
ber exactly when she wrote the date, but “estimated” the origi-
nal date, instead of May 9, and then laid the document aside in
a pile of paperwork.27 Nand testified that Tapia called her and
asked for the document Arteaga signed regarding a training she
completed. So on June 2, Nand emailed the signed acknowl-
edgment, containing the original date to Tapia. Then, some-
time later that month, she crossed out the original date, and
wrote “5/9/16” on the document along with the words “wrong
date.” (478–481.)
(iii) Respondent’s evidence regarding Suhad Salman
Singh testified that he collected Salman’s signature on May
9, near the Sixteenth Street entrance sometime between 3 p.m.
and 4 p.m. According to Singh, earlier that afternoon, he spoke
to Salman in the hallway of the hotel telling her that, if she did
not want the Union, all she had to do was sign the petition.28
(Tr. 834, 862–863.)
Singh initially testified that, after Salman signed the petition,
she returned to the hotel at about 4:30 p.m. while Singh was
working at the front desk. At that point, Hussein approached
Singh, introduced himself as Salman’s husband, and asked
Singh about the document his wife had signed. Singh started to
retrieve the paperwork from his coat pocket and explain the
petition. However, according to Singh, Hussein was aggres-
sive, and wanted to tear-up the petition. Singh testified that,
using the front desk computer, he printed the “petition paper-
work” from the NLRB website and handed it to Hussein. And,
because he was “aggressive,” Singh crossed out Salman’s name
while Hussein watched. Singh denied that Hussein took a pic-
ture of the paperwork, but instead claims that Hussein took the
document with him. Although he initially testified that Salman,
herself, returned to the hotel at 4:30 p.m., Singh later testified
that Salman was not present during his interaction with Hus-
sein. Singh denied ever telling Gutierrez about his dealings
with Hussein. (Tr. 834–835, 864–866.)
Regarding the telephone call that occurred after Salman’s
signature on the petition was rescinded, Gutierrez testified that
Salman first initiated the phone call. According to Gutierrez,
she left work that day at 3:30 p.m., and was at home when she
received a missed call from Salman. Gutierrez returned the call
at about 5 p.m. Salman told Gutierrez that she was at home,
and that Hussein wanted to speak with her. Hussein then got on
the phone and demanded to know why Salman never worked 2
consecutive days. Gutierrez tried to explain that Salman was
lowest on the seniority list, and therefore received whatever
shifts were available. However, Hussein kept repeating his
request, saying Salman’s schedule was “no good.” Gutierrez

27 Regarding Abel’s training acknowledgment dated “5/4/16,” Nand
admitted the date also appeared to be in her handwriting, but Nand did
not know when she actually dated the document. (Tr. 519; R. 10.) She
similarly did not recall when the dates were placed on the acknowl-
edgments for Salman and Elia. (Tr. 527–530; R. 7, 9.)
28 According to Singh, Salman was speaking English, and she “defi-
nitely” understood Singh (Tr. 862.)
testified that Hussein then said that Salman was a good worker,
and she planned to quit. Gutierrez denied that the issue of the
petition was ever discussed in this conversation. She also de-
nied having any knowledge of what occurred between Singh
and Hussein that day. Finally, Respondent introduced Sal-
man’s timecard into evidence which showed that, during the
week of May 8 through May 14, 2016, she worked every day
except for May 10. (Tr. 615–621, 654–659; R. 21.)
(iv) Respondent’s evidence regarding Vanessa Abel
Gutierrez denied arranging for Abel to meet with Olga Villa
to sign the decertification petition. She also claimed the slip of
paper with the number “2031” was not in her handwriting. To
support this claim, at hearing Respondent had Gutierrez write
the number “2031” three times on a piece of paper, and intro-
duced the document into evidence, along with another docu-
ment in her handwriting. Conversely, the General Counsel
introduced the signature page of an affidavit that was admitted-
ly dated by Gutierrez.29 (Tr. 627–628, 642; R. 14, 15, GC 35)
Singh initially testified that he collected Abel’s signature be-
tween 3 and 4 p.m. on May 10, outside the hotel near the Six-
teen Street entrance with Villa’s help. However, when asked
by the General Counsel to explain the details of how Abel
signed the petition, Singh testified that “Sanjita [Nand] was
again taking it on the 16th [sic] by the main entrance.” In the
next breath, he then stated that “I think I was alone over there.”
(Tr. 833–834, 848, 867.)
Singh further explained that, during the morning of May 10,
he saw Abel in the hallway of the hotel, and told her to meet
him at the main entrance to sign the petition if she wanted to
get rid of the Union. Abel told Singh that she was willing to
sign and wanted to see the paperwork. Singh told her that he
could not solicit her signature “right now,” but he showed her
the petition and Abel asked to take a picture of the document.
Singh did not have a problem with the request, and Abel took a
picture of the petition—before she had signed it. When asked
again whether Abel had signed the petition before taking a
picture of the document, Singh testified “No. Sanjita [Nand]
was taking it on [sic] the 16th Street.” Then, later in the day,
around 3 or 4 p.m., Singh testified that Abel went out to the
Sixteenth Street entrance and signed the petition. (Tr. 867–
870.)
III. CREDIBILITY
Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses, I credit the testi-
mony of Suhad, Arteaga, Abel, Hussein, and Tapia over that of
Singh, Gutierrez, Nand, and Nazeem as to what occurred and
what was said on the various relevant dates. Along with my
assessment of demeanor, there are other aspects of the testimo-
ny of Respondent’s witnesses that generally detract from their
credibility.
A. Testimony of Ranjeel Singh About the Petition
Singh, who Respondent asserts was responsible for the ef-
forts behind the June 2016 decertification efforts, testified that
the petition process started on May 8, 2016. However, Nazeem

29 Ultimately, I find that the handwriting exemplars are inconclu-
sive.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 13
admitted that he heard about the decertification campaign in
March 2016. Singh’s testimony about collecting Abel’s signa-
ture also does not comport with the documentary evidence.
Specifically, Singh testified that he discussed the petition with
Abel the morning of May 10, and that Abel took a picture of
the petition before she had signed the document. According to
Singh, he told Abel she could not sign the petition at the time;
so she took a photo of the unsigned document and then signed
the petition later in the day outside the hotel. However, the
photograph that Abel actually took of the petition contains her
signature. (Tr. 769, 827–828, 869–870; GC 7.)
I also find it telling that, when discussing the solicitation of
employee signatures on the decertification petition, Singh twice
stated that Sanjita Nand was involved. Although he made these
comments in connection with Abel’s signature instead of Arte-
aga’s, I find this testimony is significant, and supports a finding
that Singh in fact knew that Nand was involved in soliciting
employee signatures on the petition. (Tr. 867–868; R. 24.)
Finally, Singh testified he printed out the blank petition sig-
nature forms from the NLRB website. However, it is evident
from reviewing the documents that these are not official NLRB
forms, as they contain no form number.30 (Tr. 835, 853.)
B. Testimony of Gutierrez About Damon Griffin and
Suhad Salman
Gutierrez’ testimony regarding the interaction between Da-
mon Griffin and Suhad Salman showed Gutierrez’ desire to
contour her testimony to fit what she believed would assist
Respondent’s case. Griffin, who worked as houseman stocking
linen closets with supplies, had a run-in with Salman on May 9.
They were working together in a hotel room and Salman, who
was dissatisfied with the pace of Griffin’s work, called him
lazy. Griffin perceived the comment as racist and reported the
incident to Gutierrez—who told him to report it to Nazeem.
Later, in the basement laundry, Salman again started complain-
ing that Griffin was working slowly and again called him lazy.
Griffin met with Nazeem and Gutierrez at 12:30 p.m. that day,
and signed a written statement saying that Salmon told him to
“move faster and she said, ‘people like you are lazy.’” Re-
spondent claims that Salman received a “verbal warning” about
the incident, as “per the collective bargaining agreement.” (Tr.
555–556, 562, 586, 591–594, 599–600, 680, 766; R. 13.)
During her testimony about the incident, Gutierrez stated
that, when Griffin came to her to complain about Salman, he
told her that Salman called him lazy “and he also told me that
she called him black.” (Tr. 622.) However, nowhere in Grif-
fin’s testimony or his written statement does he ever claim that
Salman called him “black,” or otherwise commented specifical-
ly about his skin color. This is but one more example of how
Gutierrez exaggerated her testimony to conform to what she
believed was in the Respondent’s best interest, and generally
detracts from her credibility.

30 Compare R. 24 with the various official agency forms, all of
which contain official form numbers, available at:
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/forms. (last accessed on September 5,
2017).
C. Testimony of Respondent’s Witnesses about
Verbal Warnings
The various testimony about “verbal warnings” also detract-
ed from the credibility of Respondent’s witnesses. In an at-
tempt to attack the veracity of various employee witnesses,
Respondent’s witnesses testified that these employees had re-
ceived verbal warnings for certain infractions. However, rather
than diminishing the veracity of the employee witnesses, much
of this testimony was contradictory and undermined the credi-
bility of Respondent’s witnesses.
For example, both Gutierrez and Nazeem testified that a ver-
bal warning is the first step in the disciplinary process, followed
by a written warning as per the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. However, the CBA does not mention verbal warnings
anywhere. Both Gutierrez and Nazeem testified that employees
first get a verbal warning and then a written warning for the
next similar infraction. However, Nand testified Respondent’s
progressive disciplinary policy consists of three verbal warn-
ings, two written warnings, a suspension, and then termina-
tion.31 (Tr. 500–501, 680–681, 766, 799, 809; GC 3, p. 3.)
Also, Nazeem changed his testimony at least three times re-
garding whether Respondent tracks verbal warnings. When
asked how he knows whether somebody had previously re-
ceived a verbal warning, Nazeem initially testified that he “just
would remember.” However, he then testified that Respondent
keeps a written list of people who receive verbal warnings, and
that this list is maintained by Nand in the human resources
office.32 When I brought to Nazeem’s attention his previous
testimony, he said that his initial testimony was correct, and
that no written records of verbal warnings are kept. However,
he later testified that he does, in fact, keep a list of names of
people who received verbal warnings, and that this list is kept
in his office, not Nand’s. This contradictory and confusing
testimony about verbal warnings detracted generally from the
credibility of Nand, Gutierrez and Nazeem. (Tr. 766, 796–798.)
D. Nand’s Testimony About the Date of Arteaga’s
Training Document
Nand’s testimony about the various dates on Arteaga’s hu-
man rights training form was simply not credible in various
respects, and undermined her credibility generally. It is clear
from the document itself that the original date is “2/21/16.”
And since Arteaga was hired on February 18, 2016, this date
comports with IHG’s requirement that human rights training be
conducted within the first 7 days of employment. Thus, I do
not credit Nand’s testimony that she believed she initially dated
the document as April 21, 2016. Instead, before Nand sent the
document to Tapia in June 2016, an attempt was made to
change the “2” to a “4.” Then, after sending the document to

31 Although all of Respondent’s management employees insisted
they follow the CBA, the agreement does not delineate progressive
discipline. Instead, it sets forth the standards for issuing a written
warning, and says the employer can terminate, suspend, or discipline
employees for just cause. (GC 3, p. 20 )
32 When asked if Respondent keeps track of an employee’s first ver-
bal warning in an employee’s personnel file, Nand testified “No.” (Tr.
530 )
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Tapia, again at some unknown later time, Nand crossed out the
original date, wrote the words “wrong date,” and put a new date
“5/9/16.” This new date better comports with Respondent’s
evidence that the document signed by Arteaga during her May
9 meeting was the human rights policy, and not the decertifica-
tion petition; evidence that I do not credit.33 Further I do not
believe Nand’s claim that she waited almost 3 months to give
Arteaga human rights training because Gutierrez was not avail-
able until May 9. The training was admittedly short, lasting no
more than 10 minutes. Gutierrez is at the hotel every weekday,
and if Arteaga’s training log is to be believed, all of the other
mandatory new employee training for Arteaga was completed
in February. The testimony from Respondent’s witnesses about
this issue was simply not credible. (Tr. 514–515) (Tr. 470,
514–515, 548; R. 2, 4, 5; GC 10.)
IV. ANALYSIS
A. 8(a)(1) Violations
1. Instructing Vanessa Abel to not join the Union during
her interview
A few days before she was hired in April 2016, Abel was in-
terviewed by Nazeem, Nand, and Gutierrez. Nazeem and
Gutierrez told her to not join the Union, and if she did so the
Union was going to take some money from her salary. The
General Counsel alleges that this statement violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
At the hearing, Respondent argued that this allegation
“makes no sense” because the CBA contained a union security
clause making union membership mandatory. (Tr. 460–461;
GC 3, p. 22.) Indeed, pursuant to the CBA employees are re-
quired to become union members after 30 days of employment.
That being said, Respondent was actively soliciting employee
signatures to decertify the Union in the hopes that it would no
longer represent employees. Thus, it does “make sense” that
Respondent would encourage new employees to avoid joining
the Union, as it fit the company’s aspirations to eliminate any
bargaining obligation. Telling an employee during a pre-hire
interview that they should not join the union constitutes an
8(a)(1) violation, as it sends a message that the new hire should
avoid joining the union if she wishes to remain on good terms
with management.34 Clear Pine Mouldings, 238 NLRB 69, 72,

33 Because the dates on the various training logs and human rights
training forms were completed by Nand, and she admitted that she
basically guessed when writing down the dates on the acknowledg-
ments, I find the veracity of these dates is suspect regarding the actual
date human rights training was completed. And, because I generally do
not credit Gutierrez or Nand, there is no other independent evidence
that human rights training occurred on May 9. Neither Arteaga, Sal-
man, nor Abel were asked about the date they signed their human rights
training document or when they took human rights training. Further,
there is no explanation why Abel purportedly received her training on
May 4, when everyone else who required the training allegedly re-
ceived it on May 9. (R. 5, 7, 9, 10.)
34 As noted by the Ninth Circuit, it is “reasonable to infer coercion
when a personnel manager urges a prospective employee not to join the
union,” and the “absence of express threats by the company does not
alter that conclusion.” Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d
721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Eddyleon Chocolate Co., Inc., 301
77 (1978), enfd. 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451
U.S. 984 (1981). That message, if successful, also prevents the
union from obtaining a new member, which would tend to
make negotiations more difficult. Id. And here, if successful,
that message would assist Respondent’s scheme to jettison its
bargaining obligation. Accordingly, I find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling Abel during her interview to
not join the Union.
2. Elsa Gutierrez and Sanjita Nand soliciting employees to sign
the decertification petition
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act “by actively
soliciting, encouraging, promoting, or providing assistance in
the initiation, signing, or filing of an employee petition seeking
to decertify the bargaining representative.” Mickey’s Linen &
Towel Supply, Inc., 349 NLRB 790, 791 (2007) (internal quota-
tions omitted), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. R.T. Blankenship &
Assocs., Inc., 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000) (table); Enterprise
Leasing Co. of Florida v. NLRB, 831 F.3d 534, 544–545 (DC.
Cir. 2016). In deciding whether an employer’s conduct is un-
lawful, the test is whether the conduct constituted more than
“ministerial aid.” Id. (citing Times Herald, Inc., 253 NLRB
524, 524 (1980)). And in making this inquiry, all the surround-
ing circumstances are considered “to determine whether the
‘preparation, circulation, and signing of the petition constituted
the free and uncoerced act of the employees concerned.’” Id.
(quoting Eastern States Optical Co., Inc., 275 NLRB 371, 372
(1985)).
Here, the credited evidence shows that on May 9, under the
guise of conducting “training,” Nand and Gutierrez presented
the decertification petition to Arteaga and told her to sign the
document; Arteaga, who does not read or write English, com-
plied. Under these circumstances, it cannot be argued that Ar-
teaga’s signing of the petition constituted a free and uncoerced
act. Thus, the conduct of Nand and Gutierrez violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Placke Toyota, Inc., 215 NLRB 395, 395
(1974) (“[A]n employer’s solicitation, support, or assistance in
the initiation, signing, or filing of an employee decertification
petition interferes with the employees’ Section 7 rights.”); Tex-
aco, Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 1226, 1234 (5th Cir. 1984) (Em-
ployer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it “participates in the cir-
culation of anti-union documents.”).
Also on May 9, Gutierrez told Salman that a man was going
to bring a paper for “no union” and to sign the document.
Singh then appeared with the petition, telling Gutierrez if she
signed the document she would not be a member of the Union,
but if she did not do so, she was a member; Salman signed her
name. I find Gutierrez’ directing Salman to sign the “no union”
paper went beyond providing “ministerial aid, and constituted a
violation.”35 Sociadad Espaniola De Auxilio Mutuo Y Benefi-

NLRB 887 (1991) (a violation to ask applicant to pledge in writing that
she would not join a union, notwithstanding the fact the applicant was
never presented with a document to sign).
35 I also note that Salman’s interaction with Gutierrez and Singh did
not occur in a coercive free context. Gutierrez previously had told
Salman that the Union takes money from her salary to provide her
benefits, but that Salman already received her benefits from public
assistance. I find this statement was intended to encourage Salman’s
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 15
cencia De P.R., 342 NLRB 458, 459, 471 (2004) (violation
where supervisor called employee into her office and asked her
to sign decertification petition); Warehouse Market, Inc., 216
NLRB 216, 221 (1975) (finding a violation where supervisor
encouraged employees to sign decertification petition); Inter-
Mountain Dairymen, 157 NLRB 1590, 1612–1613 (1966) (vio-
lation where decertification petition was left on supervisor’s
desk, and supervisor proffered the document to some employ-
ees for perusal, telling them it was a petition for another vote).
Finally, by directing Abel to meet with Olga Villa, and say-
ing Abel would be fired if she did not sign the paper Villa gave
her, Gutierrez provided unlawful assistance to the decertifica-
tion effort, and also unlawfully threatened Villa with discharge
if she did not comply with Gutierrez’s directives. NLRB v.
Proler International Corp., 635 F.2d 351, 354–355 (5th Cir.
1981) (Section 8(a)(1) “makes it unlawful for an employer to
instigate and promote a decertification proceeding or induce
employees to sign any other form of union-repudiating docu-
ment, particularly where the solicitation is strengthened by the
express or implied threats of reprisal or promises of benefits.”);
Davies Medical Center, 303 NLRB 195, 200–201 (1991), enfd.
NLRB v. Davies Medical Center, 991 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1993)
(table) (violation where supervisor arranged for employee to
meet with coworker who then solicited signature on decertifica-
tion petition); Fritz Companies, Inc., 330 NLRB 1296, 1300
(2000) (violation where supervisor threatened employee with
discharge if he did not support decertification of the union).
3. Solicitations by Rajneel Sigh and Olga Villa
The complaint also alleges that Singh and Villa were agents
of Respondent, and therefore further 8(a)(1) violations occurred
when they solicited Salman and Abel to sign the decertification
petition. I agree.
The Board found just such a violation in Davies Medical
Center, 303 NLRB 195, 206 (1991), and the decision was en-
forced by the Ninth Circuit. NLRB v. Davies Medical Center,
991 F.2d 803, 1993 WL 117519, (9th Cir. 1993) (table). In
Davies Medical Center, the Board found that two rank-and-file
employees, Elizabeth Santos and Betty Lerias, were agents of
their employer when they solicited employees to sign a decerti-
fication petition, and therefore the solicitations violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. at 206–207. Regarding the signature
solicited by Santos, an admitted supervisor named Ethel Hendy
took employee Evelia Tijerino to the laundry to see director of
housekeeping Bob Bailey. Santos was in the laundry, and
when Bailey arrived, Santos told Tijerino “They want me to
talk to you about a union.” Id. at 198. At that point Bailey and
Hendy left, and Santos spoke to Tijerino about the decertifica-
tion petition, and ended the conversation saying “they just want
me to tell you this.” Tijerino had never met Santos before. Id.
Later that month, Hendy instructed Tijerino on multiple oc-
casions to go and see Lerias in the payroll office. Id. at 198–
199. After two failed attempts, Tijerino eventually found Ler-
ias who showed Tijerino the decertification petition and said
she wanted to talk to Tijerino about the Union. Lerias said that,

disaffection from the Union. And it was reinforced when Singh told
Salman if she did not sign the petition she was a member of the Union.
if Tijerino wanted to be out of the union, she had to sign the
paper, that a lot of people had signed, and if they got enough
signatures they could “take the union out of the hospital.” Id. at
199. Lerias ultimately told Tijerino to “think about it. We’re
not forcing you,” and to return if she wanted to sign the docu-
ment. Id. That was the first time Tijerino had spoken to Lerias.
Id. Later, Hendy also instructed another employee, Felix
Ramirez, to meet with Lerias; once there, Lerias solicited his
signature on the decertification petition. Id.
The Board affirmed the trial judge who, applying the concept
of apparent authority, found that Santos and Lerias were agents
of the employer when they solicited the signatures of Tijerino
and Ramirez. Id. As the Ninth Circuit noted, when it enforced
the Board’s decision, “[u]nder agency law, the question of ap-
parent authority is whether the principal engages in, or con-
dones conduct which is reasonably likely to create the belief
that the employees were authorized to act on behalf of the prin-
cipal.” Davies Medical Center, 1993 WL 117519 at *3. Apply-
ing this standard, the Board “concluded that in the eyes of Tije-
rino and Ramirez, Hendy’s and Baily’s actions conferred ap-
parent authority on employees Santos and Lerias.” Id. In mak-
ing this finding, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Board relied
upon the fact both Hendy and Baily directed Tijerino to talk to
Santos, and that Hendy directed both employees to see Lerias
for the purpose of Lerias soliciting their signatures on the de-
certification petition. The employees were not told that Lerias
had no supervisory or other authority, the meeting was arranged
as part of an official work request from their supervisor, and the
employees did know Lerias’s function either on the job or in
relation to the antiunion petition. Id.
I find that the circumstances here are sufficiently similar to
find that Villa and Singh were agents of Respondent within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, and that their conduct
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) for which Respondent
is liable. Gutierrez called Abel, telling her to come to work
early. When she arrived, she ordered Abel to a particular room
and told her to meet Villa who had a paper that Abel needed to
sign, and if she did not do so she would be fired. When Abel
went to the room where Villa was waiting with petition; Villa
then told Abel to sign the papers. Although Abel knew Villa
worked in the laundry, there is no evidence that Abel knew
about Villa’s function in relation to the petition, and Abel was
never told that Villa had no specified authority. Under these
circumstances, I find that it is reasonable to conclude that, in
Abel’s eyes, Gutierrez’ actions conferred apparent authority
upon Villa, and that Abel felt compelled to sign the petition
when Villa told her to do so. Indeed, Abel testified that she
signed the document because she did not want to get fired.
The same is true regarding Salman. During work, Gutierrez
told Salman that a man was going to bring her a paper for “no
union,” and to sign the document. A minute later, Singh ap-
peared with the petition, telling Salman if she signed the peti-
tion she would not be a member of the Union, but if she did not
sign she was a member. The situation here is similar to Tijeri-
no’s meeting with Lerias, who told Tijerino that if she wanted
to be out of the union to sign the petition. Davies Medical Cen-
ter, 303 NLRB at 199. Gutierrez instructed Salman to sign the
petition, and never told Salman what authority Singh did, or did
16 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not, possess. Indeed, there is no evidence that Singh and Sal-
man had ever talked with each other before this encounter. As
such, I find it reasonable that Gutierrez’ conduct created the
belief that Singh was authorized to act on behalf of Respondent.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent further violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when Singh and Villa, as Respondent’s
agents, solicited Abel and Gutierrez to sign the petition.
4. Elsa Gutierrez’ statement to Suhad Salman about
Roxana Tapia36
On May 9, during a conversation in Gutierrez’ office,
Gutierrez told Salman not to sign any documents given to her
by the “fat woman;” it was clear to Salman that Gutierrez was
referring to Union Representative Tapia. She then explained to
Salman that the Union deducts money from her paycheck in
return for benefits, but that Salman already receives benefits
from public assistance. Salman replied that she would not sign
anything. She said that, because she received assistance from
the government, she did not want the Union taking money from
her paycheck in return for benefits.
I find the conversation here goes beyond the acceptable pa-
rameters of Section 8(c), and is indeed coercive. The Supreme
Court’s admonition in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 620, (1969), about the employer/employee relationship,
although made in a different factual setting, is equally applica-
ble here:
But an employer, who has control over that relationship and
therefore knows it best, cannot be heard to complain that he is
without an adequate guide for his behavior. He can easily
make his views known without engaging in “brinkmanship”
when it becomes all too easy to overstep and tumble over the
brink. At the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by
avoiding conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will
mislead his employees. (Internal quotations and citations omit-
ted.)
Gutierrez falsely equated the benefits provided by the Union
to those that Salman received from public assistance in order to
purposely mislead Salman to refrain from union membership.
In context, Gutierrez was telling Salman that she did not need
the Union because Salman was already receiving the same ben-
efits that union membership provided for free from the gov-
ernment. Salman, whose primary language was Arabic and was
unsophisticated in such matters, could reasonably rely upon her
employer to honestly explain the benefits received in return for
the union dues deducted from her paycheck. Thus, I find
Gutierrez’s purposely false and misleading statement was coer-
cive, and a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

36 Complaint par. 10(a)(iv) alleges this conversation occurred in the
area of the hotel where employees record their work hours; the evi-
dence shows the conversation occurred in Gutierrez’ office. Any minor
variations between the evidence and the complaint allegation regarding
the date or location of the conversation are immaterial, Fraser & John-
ston Co., 189 NLRB 142, 150 (1971), as this matter was fully litigated.
Park N Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 133 (2007) (citing Pergament United
Sales, Inc., 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989)).
5. Elsa Gutierrez’ statement to Silvia Arteaga37
On March 3, 2016, employees were gathering outside the ho-
tel with Tapia for a union meeting. As Arteaga was ending her
workday, Gutierrez told Arteaga not to go with her coworkers if
she was invited to join the Union. Arteaga replied that she did
not know what a union was, and Gutierrez said that she would
explain later. Outside, Arteaga told Tapia and her coworkers
what Gutierrez had said. The General Counsel alleges that
Gutierrez’s instructions violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; I
agree.
In Keystone Lamp Manufacturing Corp., 284 NLRB 626,
634–635 (1987), the Board found a violation where a repre-
sentative of the employer asked an employee, as a personal
favor, to “please stay away from the union meetings.” The
Board’s decision was enforced by Eighth Circuit. Keystone
Lamp Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied 488 U.S. 1041 (1989). Here, Gutierrez’ statement was
much more direct than the “personal favor” in Keystone Lamp,
and thus even more coercive. As such, I find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.
6. Alleged threat of unspecified reprisals against
Silvia Arteaga38
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent threatened Ar-
teaga with unspecified reprisals when she asked Gutierrez for a
copy of the document she had signed, and Gutierrez told her to
leave. (GC Br., at 75–76.) After she was duped into signing
the petition, Arteaga and her coworker Maria Vidal went to
Gutierrez’s office and asked for a copy of the document.
Gutierrez became upset and ordered Vidal to leave. She then
told Arteaga she was not going to give her a copy of the docu-
ment, and that if Vidal wanted to be in the Union she would not
intrude. The General Counsel does not cite any precedent
where, under similar circumstances, either the Board or the
courts have found a threat of unspecified reprisals. Instead, the
government cites cases for the generalized proposition that
innocent words, “uttered in circumstances where the employees
could reasonably conclude that the employer was threatening
them with economic reprisals,” can constitute an illegal threat.
Concepts & Designs, Inc., 318 NLRB 948, 954 (1995) (internal
quotation omitted). The problem for the General Counsel is
that in these circumstances, the words Gutierrez used cannot
reasonably be concluded to constitute a threat. Although
Gutierrez was upset, ordered Vidal to leave, and would not give
Arteaga the paper, she told Arteaga that she would not intrude
if Arteaga chose to join the Union. There was no threat, either
direct or implied, that Arteaga would suffer economic reprisals
by joining the Union. As such, I recommend this allegation be
dismissed.

37 This allegation is contained in complaint paragraph 10(a)(i). In its
posthearing brief, the General Counsel withdrew that portion of com-
plaint par. 10(a)(i) that alleges Respondent threatened employees that
the company had a plan to get rid of the Union.
38 This allegation is contained in complaint par. 10(a)(vi). In its
posthearing brief, the General Counsel withdrew that portion of Com-
plaint paragraph 10(a)(vi) that alleges Respondent promised employees
they would never be without work if they trusted Gutierrez.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 17
7. Instructing Vanessa Abel not to talk to the Union
Complaint paragraph 10(a)(iii) alleges that, on various dates
between April 4 and May 10, 2016, Respondent instructed em-
ployees not to talk to union representatives or join the Union,
and impliedly threatened employees with discharge for support-
ing the Union.39 In its brief, the General Counsel moved to
amend this complaint allegation by withdrawing the alleged
implied threat of discharge, and instead allege an impression of
surveillance. (GC Br., 67 at fn. 52.)
In support of these allegations, the General Counsel points to
the various statements Gutierrez made to Abel to not join the
Union, not eat in the break area so as to avoid meeting with the
Union or its supporters, and to not speak with Rak. As set forth
above, with respect to complaint paragraph 10(a)(iii), I have
already found that Gutierrez’ instructions to Abel to not join
her coworkers if they invited her to join the Union constitutes a
violation of Section 8(a)(1). For the same reason, I find that
Gutierrez violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, on various
occasions, she told Abel not to join or otherwise associate with
the Union. See Acme Brick Co., 102 NLRB 173, 187 (1953)
(violation where superintendent told employee that, when he
was rehired, he was not to join the union).
As for the General Counsel’s request to amend the complaint
and allege an impression of surveillance, I grant the amendment
and dismiss the allegation.40 An employer creates an impres-
sion of surveillance when the employee would reasonably as-
sume from the employer’s statements that her union activities
had been placed under surveillance. New Vista Nursing & Re-
habilitation, LLC, 358 NLRB 473, 482 (2012). “In general, the
Board finds that this test has been met when an employer re-
veals specific information about a union activity that is not
generally known, and does not reveal its source.” Id. Here,
while Gutierrez’ statements may have been otherwise coercive,
her “statements do not suggest that [s]he acquired [her]
knowledge through solicitation or spying.” Carrick Foodland,
238 NLRB 568, 569 (1978).41 Therefore, I recommend that the
General Counsel’s allegation that Gutierrez’ words created an
impression of surveillance be dismissed.
8. Elsa Gutierrez’ telephone conversation with
Suhad Salman on May 9.
On May 9, as Salman was driving home, she received a call
from Gutierrez; Salman and her husband had just finished
speaking with Singh at the hotel, and had crossed Salman’s

39 Complaint par. 10(a)(iii) also alleges that Respondent promised
employees better benefits if they did not support the Union, but in its
posthearing brief the General Counsel withdrew this allegation.
40 Because the amendment arose from the same set of conversations
between Gutierrez and Abel that gave rise to other complaint allega-
tions, and the issue of what was said in these conversations was fully
litigated, I find that the amendment was not so late so as to prejudice
Respondent. Folsom Ready Mix, Inc., 338 NLRB 1172, 1172. fn. 1
(2003).
41 Because the General Counsel withdrew the allegation that
Gutierrez’s statements constituted an implied threat of discharge, there
is no need to discuss the allegation. Compare SKD Jonesville Division.
L.P., 340 NLRB 101, 101 (2003) (supervisor’s statement to employee
that “it wasn’t in her best interest to be getting involved with the union”
constituted an unlawful threat).
name off the decertification petition. Gutierrez asked Salman
why she cancelled her signature, said that the Union would take
her money from her salary and give her benefits, but that she
did not need to join them because the government already gave
her benefits. Salman replied that she needed time to find out
more information about the Union.
The General Counsel alleges that Gutierrez’ conversation
with Salman constituted an unlawful interrogation in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.42 In determining whether an un-
lawful interrogation occurred, the Board examines the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the questioning rea-
sonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guar-
anteed by the Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984),
affd. sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 11 v.
NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985);
Gutierrez was Salman’s direct supervisor, and she was ask-
ing specifically why Salman exercised her statutory right to
cancel her signature from the decertification petition, factors
which support a finding that the questioning was coercive.
While the conversation occurred over the phone, and Salman
was truthful, Gutierrez never gave a legitimate reason for the
inquiry and never assured Salman that no reprisals would fol-
low based upon her answers, which are “also important consid-
erations.” NLRB v. Champion Labs, Inc., 99 F.3d 223, 230 (7th
Cir. 1996). Moreover, Gutierrez demanded to know why Sal-
man cancelled her signature only hours after she unlawfully
told Salman to sign the petition, making the questioning even
more coercive. As such, considering the totality of the circum-
stances, I find that Gutierrez unlawfully interrogated Salman by
asking her why she cancelled her signature in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Poly Ultra Plastics, Inc., 231 NLRB
787, 789–790 (1977) (unlawful interrogation where employer
telephoned rank-and-file employee, during the early stages of
an organizing drive, asking if she had signed a union card);
Twin Frocks Co., 199 NLRB 750, 752 (1972) (violation where
manager asked employee whether he signed a union card, and
after learning employee signed, asked him why he did so).
9. Alleged interrogation and impression of surveillance
involving Suhad Salman
On May 10, the day after her telephone conversation with
Gutierrez about cancelling her signature from the petition, Sal-
man testified that she went to work and both Gutierrez and
Nazeem asked her why she cancelled her signature from the
petition. Salman stated that she told them she wanted to get
more information about the document, and if it was good for
her she would sign it. The General Counsel points to this con-
versation and argues that “Respondent’s violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating Salman and creating the

42 This allegation is contained in complaint par. 10(a)(viii), which
also alleged that, during the conversation Gutierrez created the impres-
sion of surveillance and impliedly threatened Salman with unspecified
reprisals. However, in its posthearing brief, the General Counsel only
addresses the issue of interrogation, and appears therefore to have
abandoned the other alleged violations. GC Br., at 26–27, 70–71.
Notwithstanding, because of the violations found herein, any further
violations based upon this short conversation would simply be duplica-
tive.
18 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
impression of surveillance on May 10.” (GC Br., at 71.) Re-
spondent argues that no violation occurred, as Salman’s time-
sheet shows that she was not working on May 10. Instead, her
next day back to work was May 11.
Although I have generally credited Salman as a witness, I
cannot credit her testimony about this alleged May 10 incident,
as her timesheet clearly shows that she was not working that
day. While it is possible that Salman was simply mistaken
about the date, the General Counsel never recalled Salman to
ask her whether this conversation occurred on a later date, as
her timesheet showed she was not working on May 10. Instead,
in its brief, the General Counsel implies that Salman’s time-
sheet may have been altered by Respondent. (GC Br., at 72–
73.) However there simply is no evidence supporting this
claim. The General Counsel also argued that Salman may have
been present at the hotel on May 10 notwithstanding the fact
she was not working. However, again this is simply conjecture;
Salman’s testimony was that she went to work on May 10, the
day after she cancelled her signature from the petition, “[y]es, I
did, normal . . . [n]o problems there.” (Tr. 51) Finally, the
government argues that “even if Salman got the May 10 date
wrong, there is no reason not to credit her testimony that after
May 9 she was called into Nazeem’s office to discuss the decer-
tification petition.” (GC Br., at 73.) However, that was not
Salman’s testimony. Salman specifically testified that she went
to work on May 10, and that this specific incident occurred on
that day. While the timesheet was introduced into evidence
after Salman had finished testifying, if Salman was confused
about the date this alleged conversation occurred, it was in-
cumbent upon the government to resolve the issue; it did not do
so. A violation must be based upon credible evidence, and not
conjecture, speculation, or surmise. Cf., Ramada Inn of South
Bend, 268 NLRB 287, 298 (1983); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1976). Because
Salman specifically testified this incident occurred on May 10,
and the evidence shows she was not working that day, I rec-
ommend that this complaint allegation be dismissed.
B. 8(a)(5) Violations of Bad-Faith Bargaining
For an employer, soliciting employees to sign or circulate a
decertification petition is “antithetical to good-faith bargain-
ing.” Haymarket Bookbinders, Inc., 183 NLRB 121, 121
(1970). Indeed, in Alle Arecibo Corp., 264 NLRB 1267, 1267
fn. 1, 1274 (1982), the Board found that the employer violated
8(a)(5)’s obligation to bargain in good faith by soliciting em-
ployees to sign a petition to decertify the union; the Board
found the conduct to be an independent violation of both Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Here, as outlined
above, there are multiple instances of Respondent soliciting
signatures on the petition to decertify the Union, either directly
or surreptitiously. Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s con-
duct in soliciting employee signatures on the decertification
petition is a breach of its obligation to bargain in good faith and
constitutes is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The General Counsel also asserts that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) by “delay[ing] and extend[ing] bargaining to
avoid reaching a collective bargaining agreement.” (GC Br., at
77.) While the duties imposed under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
does not obligate a party to make concessions or yield a posi-
tion fairly maintained, it does require a “serious intent to adjust
differences and to reach an acceptable common ground,” rather
than “merely go[ing] through the formalities of negotiation[s].”
Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 47–48 (2d
Cir. 1974) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, negotiating as a
kind of “sham” while intending to avoid an agreement amounts
to bad faith bargaining in violation of Section 8(a)(5). Id. at 48.
To resolve an allegation of bad faith bargaining the “state of
mind” of the alleged offender, insofar as it bears upon negotia-
tions, must be resolved. Id. And, because “it would be ex-
traordinary for a party directly to admit a ‘bad faith’ intention,
his motive must of necessity be ascertained from circumstantial
evidence.” Id. This includes “the party’s overall conduct and
on the totality of the circumstances, as distinguished from the
individual pieces forming part of the mosaic.” Id. Specific
conduct, while standing alone may not amount to bad faith
bargaining, when considered in relation to all the other evi-
dence, may support an inference of bad faith. Id.
Applying these principles here, I find that the totality of Re-
spondent’s conduct amounted to bad faith bargaining. Viewed
in its entirety, the evidence shows that Respondent pursued
tactics designed to delay and prolong negotiations while at the
same time trying to undermine support for the Union and solic-
iting employee signatures to decertify the Union.
1. Delay in providing bargaining proposals.
“It is manifestly detrimental to the Union’s preservation of
employee support to delay the submission of proposals.” J.P.
Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 NLRB 738, 765 (1978), enfd. in pert.
part 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, Respondent’s delay in
presenting counterproposals is a factor I have considered in
finding bad faith. Fallbrook Hospital Corp., 360 NLRB 644,
652 (2014), enfd. 785 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
At the initial bargaining session on December 8, 2015, the
Union presented its proposal for a new contract which included
proposals on wages, pensions, and healthcare. I find it signifi-
cant that, when the parties next met on January 26, 2016, Re-
spondent did not present any counterproposals on these key
economic issues. Instead, it simply “rejected” the Union’s
proposals without explanation and said that its proposals were
“forthcoming.” However, Respondent did not present a specif-
ic proposal on wages or healthcare until March 22, 2016 (15
weeks after receiving the Union’s initial proposals); and did not
present a proposal on pensions until November 2, 2016 (almost
11 months after first receiving the Union’s initial proposal). In
Bewley Mills, 111 NLRB 830, 831 (1955), the Board found a
delay of “almost 7 weeks” in submitting counterproposals to be
a factor indicative of bad faith. And in J.P. Stevens, the Board
noted that when “an employer takes 6 months or a year just to
submit proposals, it can reasonably foresee the erosive effect
. . . on a union’s strength among the employee population . . .
[and] strongly suggests that such an effect was deemed desira-
ble.” 239 NLRB at 765. Given the circumstances of this case,
and as further explained, I find Respondent’s dilatory tactics on
presenting its initial counterproposals on the key economic
provisions of wages, healthcare, and pensions as evidence of its
bad faith.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 19
a. Bargaining regarding Respondent’s medical/dental
proposal
The facts surrounding Respondent’s medical and dental pro-
posals support a finding that Respondent was intent on “slow
walking” the bargaining process to gain time until a new decer-
tification petition could be circulated. The Union presented its
initial healthcare proposal on December 8, 2015. At the time,
Respondent was facing the unfair labor practice allegations in
the November 2015 Complaint, which included allegations that
Respondent was asking employees to sign a decertification
petition. (GC 3, p. 52.) At the next bargaining session, on
January 26, 2016, Respondent indicated that it “rejected” the
healthcare proposal, but did not present a counterproposal.
At trial, when questioned by Respondent’s counsel, Nazeem
testified he reviewed alternate health and welfare plans in the
middle of February 2016 and decided that Respondent would
keep the Union’s benefit plans because they could not find any
better alternatives.43 Notwithstanding, at the next bargaining
session on March 8, 2016, Respondent did not inform the Un-
ion that it would keep the existing health and benefit plans, or
otherwise present a counterproposal. Instead, Respondent
simply said that it had significant homework to do before pre-
senting a proposal. It was not until the March 22 bargaining
session that Respondent made its healthcare proposal to the
Union: keep the existing healthcare plans, but freeze the pre-
miums.
During the delay in revealing to the Union that it had agreed
to keep the existing plans, Respondent was busy settling the
allegations from the November 2015 complaint. On February
24, 2016, the government approved a settlement agreement
with Respondent regarding the November 2015 complaint; the
settlement contained a 60 day compliance period. (GC 3 p. 48.)
Thus, it was in Respondent’s interest to draw-out negotiations
until the compliance period could end and a new decertification
petition could be circulated. Meanwhile, during this same time
frame Respondent was telling newly hired employees to not
join the Union. And when Singh started circulating a new de-
certification petition after the compliance period had ended,
Respondent was ordering or otherwise soliciting employees to
sign the petition. Under these circumstances, I find Respond-
ent’s 15-week delay in presenting the Union with a proposal on
healthcare is indicative of bad faith. Bewley Mills, 111 NLRB
at 831.
b. Bargaining about wages
At the first bargaining session on December 8, the Union
stated that wages were its biggest priority, as employees had
not received an increase since June 2009, and presented its
initial wage proposal to Respondent. Notwithstanding the fact

43 When cross-examined by the General Counsel, Nazeem attempted
to portray his “research” into healthcare options as being much more
detailed and prolonged, claiming he did not complete his evaluation
until April. However, I credit Nazeem’s original testimony on direct
examination that “in the middle of February . . . [he] spoke to three
different independent insurance carriers and . . . decided since we
couldn’t find anything as good as what the Union was offering, that we
would keep their health, welfare, pension and dental and vision plans.”
(Tr. 761.)
that it had owned the hotel for over 4 months, Respondent just
listened; it made no counterproposal on wages. Similarly, at
the next bargaining session on January 26, 2016, Respondent
merely “rejected” the Union’s wage proposal, and said a pro-
posal on wages was “forthcoming.” Not until March 8, 2016,
did the Respondent inform the Union that it was “premature” to
put forth a wage increase and proposed instead that wages be
“put on hold” for a year to evaluate the hotel’s profitability,
noting that wages for about half of the unit increased on Janu-
ary 1 because the California minimum wage was raised to $10
per hour.
Thus, it took Respondent 3 months to finally give the Union
its initial position on wages—and that position was simply to
wait until July 2016. And, in November 2016, when Respond-
ent finally gave a wage proposal to the Union, it stated that
wages would remain the same, this time remarking that em-
ployees were again due to receive a minimum wage increase in
January 2017. Meanwhile, according to Singh, the fact that
hotel workers were only getting the minimum wage was a rea-
son employees supported the decertification petition. Again,
under the circumstances set forth above, I find that Respond-
ent’s conduct in delaying its initial proposal on wages for 3
months is evidence of bad faith. Bewley Mills, 111 NLRB at
831.
2. Respondent’s various other bargaining proposals
As further evidence of bad faith, I find that several of Re-
spondent’s other bargaining proposals were put forth to either
purposely delay bargaining while a new decertification petition
could be circulated, or were otherwise advanced to “make con-
cessions here and there . . . to conceal a purposeful strategy to
make bargaining futile or fail.” NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co.,
Inc., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960).
a. Respondent’s position on Union Security
The Board has found that an employer’s opposition to a un-
ion security clause “for purely ‘philosophical’ reasons, without
advancing any legitimate business justification” can be evi-
dence, when viewed in the context of a party’s overall conduct
as a whole, that an employer is bargaining without a sincere
desire to reach an agreement. Universal Fuel, Inc., 358 NLRB
1504, 1504 (2012). See also Bryant & Stratton Business Insti-
tute, 321 NLRB 1007, 1043 (1996) (philosophical objections to
union security clause do not satisfy the obligation to bargain in
good faith). In its January 2016 first set of proposals to the
Union, Respondent wanted to eliminate the union security
clause, notwithstanding the fact the clause had existed since at
least 2006. The Union replied that this proposal would be “an
issue” for the Union in negotiations. Throughout negotiations
Respondent consistently maintained proposals to eliminate the
union security clause without advancing any business justifica-
tion, let alone a legitimate business justification. Instead, Re-
spondent simply argued that people could voluntarily pay union
dues, but that it should not be a condition of employment. Un-
der the circumstances presented here, where Respondent was
simultaneously telling employees to not join the Union and
soliciting signatures on the decertification petition, I find that
Respondent’s bargaining posture regarding the removal of the
union security clause from the CBA was designed to delay and
20 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
frustrate bargaining in the hope that the Union would be decer-
tified before an overall agreement could be reached. It is there-
fore evidence of Respondent’s bad faith.
b. Subcontracting and Seniority
I also find that Respondent’s proposals regarding subcon-
tracting and seniority were designed to “make concessions here
and there” while “conceal[ing] a purposeful strategy to make
bargaining futile or fail.” Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d at
232. Regarding subcontracting, Respondent originally pro-
posed altering the existing subcontracting language to allow it
to subcontract without restriction. Then, after its settlement
agreement involving the November 2015 complaint had been
approved, on March 22, 2016, Respondent agreed to keep the
existing language on subcontracting. Thus, it appeared that
Respondent was making a concession; however, on March 3
Gutierrez was telling Arteaga to not join her coworkers if she
was invited to join the Union.
Respondent’s position regarding seniority was similarly de-
signed to feign a concession and to delay bargaining. In Janu-
ary 2016, Respondent proposed radically altering the exiting
seniority proposal, seeking a merit system with seniority as a
deciding factor only when, in Respondent’s opinion, everything
else was equal. Respondent held firm to this position until
January 2017. Then, at the January 2017 bargaining session,
Respondent proposed using job classification seniority for pur-
poses of layoffs. Otherwise, seniority would only be used as a
tie breaker if Respondent deemed all other factors were equal.
Of course, by the time Respondent had “moved” on the issue of
seniority, it had already committed the various 8(a)(1) viola-
tions set forth above, and the trial in this matter had already
started.
Based upon the foregoing, the totality of the circumstances
show that Respondent engaged in bargaining without a good-
faith intent to resolve differences and reach common ground in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. See Universal
Fuel, Inc., 358 NLRB 1504, 1504 (2012).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. UNITE HERE! Local 49 (Union) is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees employed by Respondent at the Holiday
Inn Express, located between 15th & 16th Streets and G & H
Streets, in Sacramento, California, performing the work cov-
ered by the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union
and Hospitality Sacramento L.P., effective June 1, 2006, to
December 31, 2009, constitutes an appropriate unit for purpos-
es of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
4. By instructing employees to sign a petition to decertify
the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By instructing employees to sign a petition to decertify
the Union under threat of discharge, Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
6. By instructing employees not to sign any documents giv-
en to them by the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By instructing employees not to go with their coworkers
if they are invited to join the Union, Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
8. By instructing employees not to talk to union representa-
tives or join the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. By purposely misleading employees about the benefits
received from union dues deducted from their paycheck, in
order to dissuade them from supporting the Union, Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
10. By asking employees why they cancelled their signature
from a petition to decertify the Union, Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
11. By soliciting signatures on a petition to decertify the Un-
ion, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
12. By bargaining in bad faith, Respondent engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Specifically, having found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing to bargain
with the Union in good faith, Respondent shall, upon request,
bargain collectively with the Union as the bargaining repre-
sentative of unit employees with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement.
The General Counsel also seeks as a remedy that Respondent
be ordered to bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of
time as required by UGL-UNICCO Service Co., 357 NLRB 801
(2011). In UGL-UNICCO, the Board reestablished a “succes-
sor bar,” and held that in successorship situations there is a
conclusive presumption of majority support for a defined peri-
od of time, preventing any challenge to the union’s status. In
cases, such as here, where the successor has recognized an
incumbent union and adopted the existing terms and conditions
of employment as the starting point for bargaining, without
making unilateral changes, the union is entitled to a conclusive
presumption of majority support for a period of 6 months,
measured from the date of the first meeting between the union
and the successor employer.44 Id. at 809. During this period
the Union’s majority status cannot be challenged “through a

44 In situations where the successor recognizes the union, but unilat-
erally establishes initial terms of employment, the period of conclusive
presumption of majority support will be a minimum of 6 months and a
maximum of 1 year. UGL-UNICCO Service Co., 357 NLRB at 809.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS, INC. AND MANAS HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS SACRAMENTO 21
petition filed by employees, by the employer, or by a rival un-
ion; nor . . . may the employer unilaterally withdraw recogni-
tion . . . based on a claimed loss of majority support.” Id. at
808
Here, the first bargaining session between the parties oc-
curred on December 8, 2015. Thus under the standard estab-
lished in UGL-UNICCO, the Union was entitled to a conclusive
presumption of majority support for 6 months—until June 8,
2016. During this time, Respondent was entitled to bargain
with Respondent in an environment free from any challenge to
its representational status. However, Respondent’s unfair labor
practices during this period denied the Union this opportunity,
particularly its solicitation of employee signatures to decertify
the Union, which is the antithesis to good faith bargaining.
Haymarket Bookbinders, Inc., 183 NLRB at 121. Therefore, in
an attempt to restore the status-quo ante, as part of the order
that Respondent bargain with the Union in good faith, it is fur-
ther ordered that the Union is entitled to a further 6 month suc-
cessor bar period as defined in UGL-UNICCO Service Co., 357
NLRB 801 (2011).
I also order that Respondent post a notice in accordance with
J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010), in English, Spanish,
and Hindi.45 In addition to the notice posting, the General
Counsel seeks a notice-reading remedy, arguing that such a
special remedy is “warranted by the serious and persistent na-
ture of Respondent’s unfair labor practices, especially in light
of Respondents’ repetition of the alleged misconduct.” (GC
Br., at 99.) A notice-reading is a “special” remedy imposed
where the violations are particularly numerous and egregious or
where the respondent is a recidivist violator of the Act. Sprain
Brook Manor Rehab, LLC, 365 NLRB No. 45, slip. op. at 60
(2017) (notice-reading ordered where employer was recidivist
violator, engaged in numerous 8(a)(5) violations, and dis-
charged three employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3)); Ishi-
kawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175, 176 (2001) (multi-
ple 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) violations not sufficiently egregious to
warrant a notice-reading, which is an extraordinary remedy).
Here, while Respondent has bargained in bad faith, it made no
unilateral changes and has continued to apply the terms of the
CBA to unit employees. Moreover, Respondent is not a recidi-
vist violator. Although the November 2015 complaint accused
Respondent of engaging in substantially similar violations, the
government approved a settlement agreement containing a non-
admissions clause, and no independent evidence was intro-
duced regarding the alleged conduct covered by the settlement.
Accordingly, while Respondent’s violations in this matter are
indeed serious, I do not believe the circumstances warrant a
notice-reading remedy.
The General Counsel also seeks the extraordinary remedy of
a notice-mailing, arguing that Respondent has high “turnover
rates,” and that some employees are unfamiliar with their Sec-
tion 7 rights. However, evidence of the actual amount and
specific timing of employee turnover is slim. Therefore, I find
that the remedies already ordered are generally sufficient to
effectuate the Act’s policies. That being said, I will order that a

45 The record shows that employees at the hotel speak English,
Spanish, and Hindi. (Tr. 503–504, 670.)
copy of the Notice be mailed to the last known address of Sal-
man, Arteaga, and Abel. This will ensure that the three indi-
viduals who were directly exposed to Respondent’s 8(a)(1)
violations, but who are no longer physically working at the
hotel and therefore unable to view the notice posting, will be
made aware of the violations and Respondent’s obligations.
Finally, the General Counsel asks that I order training for
employees on their rights under the Act, and for supervisors
and managers on compliance under the Act. However, I de-
cline to do so, as I find that the other remedies ordered herein
are more than sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended46
ORDER
Respondent Kalthia Group Hotels, Inc., and Manas Hospital-
ity LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Sacramento, a single em-
ployer, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights by ordering, encouraging,
and soliciting employees to sign a petition to decertify UNITE
HERE! Local 49 (Union) as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative.
(b) Instructing employees to sign a petition, or any other
document, to decertify the Union.
(c) Threatening employees they will be discharged if they do
not sign a petition, or any other document, to decertify the Un-
ion.
(d) Instructing employees not to go with their coworkers if
they are invited to join the Union.
(e) Instructing employees not to join the Union.
(f) Instructing employees not to talk to union representatives.
(g) Purposely misleading employees about the benefits re-
ceived from union dues deductions in order to dissuade them
from supporting the Union.
(h) Asking employees why they cancelled their signatures
from a petition to decertify the Union.
(i) Refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the
Union concerning rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment, by soliciting signatures
from employees on a petition to decertify the Union, and by
bargaining with the Union in bad faith with no intention of
entering into any final or binding collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union for a rea-
sonable period as set forth in the remedy portion of this deci-
sion, as the bargaining representative of unit employees with

46 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
22 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the un-
derstanding in a signed collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the
Holiday Inn Express Sacramento, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix,” in English, Spanish, and Hindi.47 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intra-
net or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. Respondent shall also mail a copy
of the notice to the last known addresses of: Suhad Salman,
Sylvia Arteaga Figueroa, and Vanessa Abel. If the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at the closed
facilities any time since April 1, 2016.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 8, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half

47 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith with
UNITE HERE! Local 49 (Union) involving the terms and con-
ditions of employment in a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
WE WILL NOT soliciting employee signatures on a petition to
decertify the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees to sign a petition to decerti-
fy the Union, or threaten them with discharge if they do not
sign such a petition.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees to not sign any documents
given to them by the Union or instruct them to not join the Un-
ion.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees to not go with their
coworkers if they are invited to join the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees to not talk to union repre-
sentatives or purposely mislead employees about the benefits
received from union dues deductions.
WE WILL NOT ask employees why they cancelled their signa-
ture on a petition to decertify the Union.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the Union concerning
the terms and conditions of employment for employees repre-
sented by the Union, and if an understanding is reached, em-
body the understanding in a signed agreement.
KALTHIA GROUP HOTELS INC., AND MANAS
HOSPITALITY LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS
SACRAMENTO
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-176428 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.