Johnston Lawn Mower Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1954

110 N.L.R.B. 1955 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION 1955
JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS , AFL. Case No. 15-CA-589 . December 16,
1954
Decision and Order
On February 18, 1954, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the In-
termediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, both the Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report,
and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and
recommendations, except to the extent that the recommended order and
notice are modified herein.
All that is involved in this case is the legality of the restriction,
imposed by the Respondent upon its employees, against soliciting fel-
low workers, both during and outside of working hours, to join in a
common effort to establish a union in the plant. The Board considered
this same restriction, called a broad no-solicitation rule because it ap-
plied on company property at all times, in a previous representation
case,1 and found that it was unlawful because it extended to the em-
ployees' own time. We also further found that, so long as the Respond-
ent continued in this manner improperly to impede the employees in
their statutory right to self-organization, its own antiunion campaign
in the plant was unlawful.
The question before us here is not whether an employer has a right
to address its employees in its plant on matters relating to union activ-
ities.2 Nor are we now concerned with its right to exclude outsiders
from its premises.' The facts are clear. As the Trial Examiner found,
and as appeared in the earlier proceeding, the Respondent imposed too
restrictive a limitation upon its employees' freedom of action. Ac-
cordingly, like the Trial Examiner, we find that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act (1) by maintaining a rule prohibit-
ing solicitation on company property during nonworking hours, and
' Johnston Lawn Mower Corporation, 107 NLRB 1086.
2 See Livingston Shirt Corporation et al, 107 NLRB 400 and N. L. R. B. v. American
Tube Bending Co, Inc., 205 F. 2d 45 (C A. 2).
E Monsanto Chemical Company, 108 NLRB 1110
110 NLRB No. 220.
1956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(2) by campaigning against the Union on company time and property
while enforcing such rule.'
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Johnston Lawn
Mower Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist International Association of Ma-
chinists, AFL, or any other labor organization, by maintaining a rule
forbidding solicitation on company property during nonworking time-
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post in its plant at Brookhaven, Mississippi, copies of the
notice attached hereto.5 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly
signed by the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof and maintained for sixty (60) consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices.
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, in.
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, as to what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER BEESON, dissenting :
I dissent from the determination of the majority that Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) by maintaining and discriminatorily en-
forcing its no-solicitation rule.
The pertinent facts are as follows : For some time before the events
involved herein, Respondent had in effect a rule prohibiting solicita-
tion, or distribution of materials, on company property, without the
4 Cf N L R B v F W Woolworth , 214 F 2d 78 ( C. A 6). We are of the opinion
that the Woolworth case, wherein the court denied enforcement of the Board 's remedial
order, is not here controlling . In the Woolworth case the court was confronted with a
valid no-solicitation rule , whereas in this case the no-solicitation rule is clearly invalid.
As stated by the court in the American Tube Bending decision , which decision the court in
the Woolworth case does not challenge , the refusal to allow any solicitation on an em-
ployer's premises during nonworking hours constitutes an unfair labor practice in those
cases where the employer is not engaged in the operation of a retail store Consequently,
and inasmuch as the decision in the Woolworth case stresses the fact that the no -solicita-
tion rule involved therein was a valid one , we consider the two cases distinguishable both,
in fact and in law
5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Ap-
peals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION 1957
express approval of the assistant manager. Shortly before the elec-
tion, Respondent made several speeches on company time and prop-
erty concerning union matters or the election and, in a number of in-
stances, distributed related memoranda or letters.' Union representa-
tives thereafter requested equal opportunity to address the employees
and to distribute memoranda, which request was denied by Respond-
ent. The employees themselves neither sought nor were refused ex-
press permission to solicit and distribute material on behalf of the
union. The employees in fact engaged in various organizing ac-
tivities during working time, such as wearing union buttons, caps,
and T-shirts, without objection by management. There is no serious
contention either that the union organizers lacked reasonable access
to the employees, or that they were unduly hindered in their organiza-
tional efforts by Respondent's action.
The majority finds, and I fully agree, that the subject matter of
Respondent's speeches and literature was not violative of the Act.
The majority nevertheless concludes that the promulgation and the
so-called discriminatory enforcement of the no-solicitation rule were
unlawful. I cannot agree.
Without deciding whether the promulgation of a broad no-solicita-
tion rule would be unlawful under other circumstances, here the em-
ployees were not only never denied express permission to engage in
organizational activities on plant property, but, in addition, they
actually engaged in some forms of such activities on company time and
property without company objection or censure. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is obvious that the promulgation of the no-solicitation
rule could not and did not constitute unlawful interference with the
employees' concerted actions.
The sole remaining basis for the majority determination is therefore
the fact that the rule was enforced against union organizers who were
denied the same right as Respondent to distribute material and speak
to the employees on company time and premises. Stated in other
words, the majority is-holding that an employer who exercises his
protected right to confer in a noncoercive manner with his employees
violates the Act unless he also dedicates his property and working time
to the union's organizing campaign. To hold that an employer must
thus underwrite the union's organizational efforts as a condition to
expressing and disseminating his own views and opinions-despite
the reasonable availability of other facilities to the union-is contrary
to Section 8 (c) of the Act' and is in direct conflict with the reasoning
9 The record is not clear as to whether the Company 's distribution of literature occurred
on working or nonworking time
° Section 8 ( c) provides that : "The expressing of any views , argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written , printed, graphic , or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
1958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the court in N. L. B. B. v. F. W. Woolworth, 214 F. 2d 78 (C. A. 6),
setting aside 102 NLRB 581.
In the Woolworth case, the analogous question arose as to whether
a company which had in effect a rule prohibiting solicitation without
approval and which addressed its employees on company time and
property regarding unionization , violated the Act by refusing equal
opportunity to the union agents to address the employees , there being
adequate facilities in the immediate area for union contact. The
Board found a violation because of an alleged discriminatory applica-
tion of the no-solicitation rule. The court reversed the Board, Judge
Allen stating, among other things ( at p. 81) :
.. . In light of the sweeping statutory provision [Section 8 (c) ]
and the legislative history a no-solicitation rule cannot prevent an
employer from conferring with his own employees on his own
premises and on his own time and the rule is not discriminatorily
applied because of the employer's refusal to permit the union to
campaign on its premises when there are adequate facilities for
access to the employees.'
The instant case of course provides even stronger circumstances than
Woolworth for refusing to undermine the Respondent's statutory right
to confer with its own employees, and its traditional control over its
own property and working time. For here, the employees themselves
were in effect granted permission to engage in campaign activity dur-
ing working time without company interference.
Under all the circumstances, I would find that Respondent did not
violate the Act 9 and I would dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
8 Judge Miller concurred in the opinion of Judge Allen, without deciding what position
he would take if the employer 's conduct had involved nonworking time However, the
latter situation , so far as the present record shows , did not prevail in the case before us
8 Although there is dictum in the Livingston Shirt case , cited by the majority , indicat-
ing that the denial of equal access to a union would be unlawful if a broad no - solicitation
rule was maintained , that point was not in issue in the case and the decision issued before
the Woolworth decision mentioned above- in any event, I did not participate in, and
therefore do not feel bound by , the Livingston Shirt determination . As to the American
Tube case also cited by the majority , I am more persuaded by the dissenting opinion of
Judge Swain in the related Bonwit Teller decision, upon which the court relied in Amer-
scan Tube . Moreover , the court , in American Tube, was not presented with the present
situation where the plant employees were not in fact circumscribed in their activities.
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION 1959
WE WILL NoT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist International Association of
Machinists, AFL, or any other labor organization, by maintain-
ing a rule forbidding solicitation on company property during
nonworking time.
JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------ ---- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations
Act as amended (61 Stat. 136), was heard in Brookhaven, Mississippi, on Novem-
ber 30, 1953, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, issued on August 12, 1953,
by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' and based on
charges duly filed and served, alleged in substance that Respondent had engaged in
unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by maintaining
an illegal no-solicitation rule; by engaging in surveillance of union activities; by
threatening reprisals, loss of employment or plant shutdown, and loss of oppor-
tunities for promotion because of union activities or if representation by the Union
were voted; by promising economic benefits if the Union were rejected; and by dis-
tributing antiunion memoranda on company property and making various addresses
on company time concerning union activities and concerning a representation election,
while maintaining a no-solicitation rule and while refusing the Union's request for
similar privileges. Respondent by its answer filed August 21, denied the alleged
unfair labor practices.
All parties were represented at the hearing by counsel or by representatives and
were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
to introduce relevant evidence, to argue orally, and to file briefs and proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel
and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jacobson Manufacturing Company,
of Racine, Wisconsin, is a Mississippi corporation with its principal office and place
of business and a plant in Brookhaven, where it is principally engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of lawnmowers. It began operations at its Brookhaven plant in
November 1952. During the 3 months commencing January 1, 1953 (a repre-
sentative period), Respondent purchased materials in the approximate value of
$100,000, substantially all of which were purchased outside the State, and during
the same period Respondent sold finished products valued in excess of $100,000, of
which more than 50 percent was sold and shipped to customers outside the State.
1 The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are referred to herein as
the General Counsel and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board. Johnston
Lawn Mower Corporation is referred to as Respondent and as the Company and the charg-
ing union as the Union.
The summary of the pleadings Includes amendments made at the hearing. All events
occurred in 1953 unless otherwise specified.
1960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent is therefore engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization which admits to membership employees of
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Conduct affecting the election
This case involves mainly an application of the new rules which the Board re-
cently laid down (Livingston Shirt Corporation, et al., 107 NLRB 400; Peerless
Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427), in discarding its former broad Bonwit Teller
doctrine ,2 to govern speeches by employer and union spokesmen on company time
and property prior to Board-conducted elections . Furthermore, the subject matter
of the present complaint proceeding is largely identical with that of objections to
conduct affecting the results of the election in a pending representation case involv-
ing the same Company (Case No. 15-RC-908). It will, therefore, be helpful to
review briefly the salient facts in the representation proceeding, as established in
part by stipulation herein and in part by taking official notice of the Board's formal
files.
The Union filed its representation petition on March 23, and after a scheduling
and rescheduling of a hearing by the Regional Director, Respondent and the Union
on April 13 entered into a stipulation for consent election . An election was there-
upon scheduled for and held on May 8, between 11 a. in. and 12 noon , resulting in
a vote of 51 for , and 56 against, the Union , with 1 challenged ballot . On May 13,
the Union filed objections to conduct of the election and to conduct affecting the
results of the election . After investigation of said objections , the Regional Director
issued his report on August 14 , finding that 6 of the objections raised no material
or substantial issues, but that 3 of them did , and recommending that the Board set
aside the election and direct a new one.
On August 20, the Respondent filed exceptions to that report; and on February
5, 1954, the Board issued its Decision (107 NLRB 1086) in which it sustained the
Regional Director's finding in part (later more fully adverted to), found that Re-
spondent's conduct had interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in the se-
lection of a bargaining representative, set the election aside, and directed that a new
election be held when the Regional Director should determine that the circumstances
permit the free choice of a bargaining representative.
In the following respects, Respondent's acts and conduct are common to both
the complaint and the representation proceedings:
Respondent had in effect a rule forbidding any solicitation or distribution of hand-
bills, etc., on company property for any reason whatsoever, without the express ap-
proval of the assistant manager. From April 10 through May 7, Respondent issued
some 12 letters or memoranda concerning the election or matters relating to union
representation, at least 2 of which were distributed to employees in the plant. On
April 6, April 27, and May 7, Respondent's vice president, H. M. May, made speeches
to employees on company time and property concerning union matters or the election.
On April 16, the Union wrote Respondent requesting that it be accorded equal
opportunities to address employees on company time and property, to distribute let-
ters to employees on company property, and to mail letters to employees, in reply
to Respondent's letters, by use of Respondent's mailing list of employees. On April
24, Respondent denied the Union's request, though it continued to mail and to dis-
tribute memoranda to employees, and though it made two more speeches on company
time and property.
Passing on the foregoing facts, the Regional Director found that: (1) The com-
pany's antisolicitation rule was per se an unlawful restriction on the activities of
its employees; (2) Respondent's refusal to permit the Union to distribute letters or
handbills on company property, or to address the employees, as Respondent had
done, or to supply the Union with a mailing list of the employees, raised material
and substantial issues affecting the results of the election; and (3) a portion of the
contents of one of Respondent's memoranda distributed in the plant on May 7 con-
stituted implied threats of shutdown or job loss if employees voted for the Union.
3Bonwzt Teller, Inc, 96 NLRB 608. And see Metropolitan Auto Parts, Incorporated,
102 NLRB 1634; Seamprufe, Incorporated, 103 NLRB 763; Onondaga Pottery Company,
103 NLRB 770; Stow Manufacturing Co., 103 NLRB 1280.
JOHNSTON LAWN MOWER CORPORATION 1961
The Board agreed with the Regional Director 's finding that Respondent 's no-solici-
tation rule was illegal , since it applied to the employees ' own time, citing the Liv-
ingston Shirt case, supra . It observed further that:
Here we are confronted not merely with the existence of such a rule but with
the Employer 's discriminatory enforcement of the rule which we find was rea-
sonably calculated to, or tended to, interfere with the election . [ Citing Bonwit
Teller, Inc., v. N. L. R B., 197 F. 2d 640 (C. A. 2), cert denied 345 U. S. 905;
N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co ., 205 F. 2d 45 (C. A. 2).]
In view of its disposition of the case ( election set aside; new election ordered),
the Board found it unnecessary to pass upon the other grounds which the Regional
Director had found warranted the setting aside of the election.
In the present proceeding it is necessary to determine the extent to which Respond-
ent's foregoing conduct constituted unfair labor practices as distinguished from mere
interference with the election . The no-solicitation rule was unquestionably illegal,
as the Board held in the representation case, not only because it applied to the em-
ployees' own time, but because Respondent discriminatorily enforced it by itself
campaigning against the Union on company time and property while denying the
Union's requests for equal access to the employees .3 Consequently , Respondent's
refusal to accord the Union, on its timely request, equal opportunities to reply to
May's speeches on company time and property and to distribute literature in the
plant under the same circumstances as Respondent had done so 4 was also an unfair
labor practice .5 Livingston and Peerless cases, supra
Questions remain whether either the speeches or the written memoranda con-
tained matter violative of Section 8 (a) (1). Though the General Counsel con-
cedes in his brief that the speeches contain nothing of a coercive nature, he argues,
nevertheless , that under the Peerless Plywood and Livingston cases, the making of
the last speech should be found violative of the Act because it came within 24 hours
prior to the election. Even were his premise assumed to be correct , the General
Counsel is mistaken in his conclusion that the making of such a noncoercive speech
constitutes an unfair labor practice , for it is clear from the cited cases that in an-
nouncing its new rule , prohibiting either employers or unions from making election
speeches on company time on or off company property within 24 hours of the sched-
uled time of the election , the Board expressly limited it to election cases. Though
a speech which violates the new rule is thus ground for setting the election aside,
it does not constitute an unfair labor practice unless it is of coercive content.
The General Counsel also attacks as violative of the Act Respondent 's memorandum
No. 10, of May 4, and memoranda Nos. 11 and 12, of May 7, but his position
is considerably weakened by his pleadings and by the Regional Director 's report.
Thus, acting as the General Counsel's representative , the Regional Director, in his
complaint issued on August 12, characterized only the memoranda of April 13 and
May 7 as antiunion ; and in issuing his report to the Board on August 14, the Regional
Director found that none of Respondent 's memoranda exceeded the permissive limits
of Section 8 (c) save for the following portion of memorandum No. 12, distributed on
May 7:
The Union says-H. M. May signed a union contract with IAM Lodge 1465-
This is the same H. M. May telling you that our plant in Iowa is shut down-
a The discrimination being apparent from those facts, Turpin's testimony is immate-
rial that Respondent never told employees they could not engage in union activities on
company time and property and never reprimanded them for doing so Furthermore, there
is no evidence that the employees were affirmatively informed that they were free to
disregard the company's broad no-solicitation rule, to the existence of which it called at-
tention as late as May 1 and 6
4 Respondent offered evidence that it made no attempt to prevent nonemployees from
approaching the company property up to its property line, and it argues that the Union
therefore had access to the employees immediately outside the plant Actually, the plat of
Respondent's property shows that the employee entrances to the plant were a substantial
distance inside the property lines ; but even if Respondent's conclusion were accepted,
it is obvious that equal opportunities were not available to the Union in the distribution
of literature.
5 The complaint does not allege and the General Counsel does not contend that Respond-
ent's denial to the Union of access to its mailing list of employees constituted an unfair
labor practice. Furthermore , the evidence shows that the Union was able otherwise to
prepare a mailing list of its own by which it reached substantially all of the employees In
the unit in which It was soliciting.
1962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gone forever. The men working for us in Iowa are without jobs. Would you
rather be an ex-employee who used to make big pay-or one who is at work
now at good pay which will get better as your company can afford it?
Our Iowa plant produced union-made lawn mowers. It is out of business
today. Suppose the union demands a raise in pay and we do not give it-what
will they tell you to do?
Who is going to stand by you if these strangers get you in trouble and hurriedly
leave town?
Be wise. Be right. Vote No!
The Trial Examiner finds that none of Respondent's memoranda exceeded the per-
missive limits of Section 8 (c). Considered as a whole, they were legitimate pieces
of campaign propaganda; and when viewed in context, the specific portions excerpted
and relied upon by the General Counsel contain neither implied promises of bene-
fits not to select collective representation nor implied threats of reprisals in event the
plant were unionized. For example, the portion of the memorandum above, which
was found objectionable by the Regional Director, related to and answered a claim
by the Union that May had signed a union contract covering Respondent's Iowa
plant which called for higher wages than Respondent was paying at Brookhaven. Re-
spondent's reply to that campaign argument was that the Iowa plant was shut down
and that those employees were without jobs; it invited comparison of the situation of
the ex-employees of the Iowa plant at their former higher rates of pay with that of
current employment at Brookhaven at rates Respondent could afford.
Though the suggested comparison may have been an odious one to the Union, it
was one which the Union had invited by its own propaganda; it was, as well, devoid of
suggestion either that the closing of the Iowa plant was due to the fact of its
unionization or that the Brookhaven plant would close in event it, too, were unionized.
B. Other alleged unfair labor practices
Aside from the conduct involved in the representation case, there is no substantial
evidence that Respondent engaged in other conduct which was violative of the
Act. Mrs. Lee Davis testified that Charles Kraner (Respondent's personnel manager)
once asked her the name of an employee who wore a union button and asked his sec-
retary to make a note of it, and that Turpin also once asked her the name of an em-
ployee who wore a union button. Kraner and Turpin denied making such inquiries,
and their denials are credited in view of Mrs. Davis' apparent animus resulting from
the circumstances surrounding her subsequent discharge.
The only other evidence offered by the General Counsel was the testimony of
Fleet H. Wallace as to conversations, some 3 or 4 weeks after the election, with
Harold E. Graham, plant superintendent, and Vernon Hartgraves, foreman of the
press department, concerning the question of promotion to foreman of the toolroom.
The crucial portions of Wallace's testimony involved an alleged reference by Graham
to the "union mess," and by Hartgraves to the fact that Wallace had been passed
over for promotion, in favor of Howard McKee, because of Wallace's "mistake"
about union buttons. Both Graham and Hartgraves denied their alleged references
to the Union, and denied also that Wallace's union membership or the wearing of
the union button played any part in McKee's selection for promotion.
Turpin testified that Graham had discussed with him the question of filling the
foreman's post; that in making the selection they made, as usual, a comparative
evaluation of the two men on the basis of knowledge, skill, personality, attitude,
etc., and found that McKee ranked higher. Turpin testified that no reference was
made to the question of the union activities of either man, that the question did
not enter into the selection, and that, in fact, so far as he knew, all the toolroom
employees were union members, as indicated by the wearing of union buttons.
Indeed, Wallace admitted on cross-examination that all toolroom employees, in-
cluding McKee, had worn union buttons at one time. That significant corroboration
of the testimony of Respondent's witnesses on a crucial point substantially confirms
their testimony that Wallace' s union activities played no part in McKee's promotion,
and is persuasive in discrediting Wallace's testimony generally, particularly in view
of the denials by Graham and Wallace.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent's activities set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection
with Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY 1963
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow thereof.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of
the Act.
3. By maintaining a rule forbidding solicitation on company property during non-
working time, and by discriminatorily applying its no-solicitation rule by denying
to the Union, upon its timely request, equal opportunities to reply to Respondent's
speeches concerning the Union and the election or to distribute union literature
in the plant under circumstances comparable to its own distribution of literature
concerning said subjects, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (1), affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and. (7).
THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it
will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY and THE GEN-
ERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE OF BOSTON, AFFILIATED WITH AMAL-
GAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR
COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, AFL and LOCAL DIVISION 280,
AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND
MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, AFL, PARTY TO THE
CONTRACT
EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY and DOUGLAS
HOLDER, LYNWOOD M. HYDE, DONALD M. GAGNON, RAYMOND F.
MCCARTHY, FRANCIS T. SHANNON, ERNEST Z. MARCOTTE
EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY and LOCAL Di-
VISIONS 174, 235, 238, 240, 243, 246, 253, 261, 280, 373, and 503, AMAL-
GAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR
COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, AFL and LOCAL DIVISION 280,
AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND
MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OP AMERICA, AFL, PARTY TO THE
CONTRACT
EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY and LEROY F.
LAPHAM AND LAWRENCE F. CLARK
LOCAL 235, AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION -OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY
AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, AFL and LEROY F. LAP-
HAM AND LAWRENCE F. CLARK . Cases Nos. 1-CA-1390,1-CA-1374,
1-CA-1287, 1-CA-1335, and I-CB-213. December 16, 195 .
Decision and Order
On September 18, 1953, Trial Examiner Frederic B. Parkes, 2nd,
issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, find-
110 NLRB No. 235.