J.F. Swick Insulation Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 28, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 626 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J. F. Swick Insulation Co., Inc. and Local 40, Heat
and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL-
CIO. Case 3-CA-8865
January 28, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND TRUESDALE
On September 20, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the Charging
Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order,
2 as modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, J. F.
Swick Insulation Co., Inc., Delmar, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Substitute the following as paragraph 2(b):
"(b) Upon execution of the foregoing agreement,
give said agreement retroactive effect to July 1, 1978,
and make such health, welfare, pension, and other
payments on behalf of those employees in the above
unit for whom such contributions would have been
made had Respondent not unlawfully repudiated the
said collective-bargaining agreement, and make the
employees whole for any loss of wages and benefits,
with interest on lost wages, and pay the Union any
loss of dues suffered, with interest thereon, as a result
of Respondent's failure to comply with the collective-
bargaining agreement, as provided in the section
herein entitled 'The Remedy' as modified by the
Board's Decision and Order."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the
247 NLRB No. 86
clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
The contract negotiated between the Union and the multiemployer
association, of which Respondent was a member, contained a valid union
dues-checkoff provision. Respondent, in unlawfully refusing to sign and abide
by the terms of the negotiated contract, may have failed to deduct the dues of
employees who had authorized such action. We find that any failure on the
part of Respondent to deduct the dues was, under these circumstances, a
violation of Sec. 8(aXS) and (1) of the Act. Thus, we adopt the Administrative
Law Judge's recommendation that, as part of the remedy for Respondent's
unfair labor practices, Respondent be ordered to pay the Union for any loss of
dues suffered as a result of its failure to comply with the collective-bargaining
agreement. In doing so, however, we note that the Administrative Law Judge
failed to include such a provision in the recommended Order. Accordingly, we
shall modify the Order to provide for the payment of dues to the Union as
required under the checkoff provision of the contract.
We also note that the Administrative Law Judge failed to provide in his
remedy-though he did include such a provision in his recommended
Order-that Respondent make those health, welfare, pension, and other
payments on behalf of unit employees it was obligated to make under the
provisions of the 1978 contract which it unlawfully refused to sign. We
therefore modify the remedy to require such payments. However, because the
provisions of employee benefit fund agreements are variable and complex, the
Board does not provide at the adjudicatory stage of a proceeding for the
addition of interest at a fixed rate on unlawfully withheld fund payments. We
leave to the compliance stage the cjestion whether Respondent must pay any
additional amounts into the benefit funds in order to satisfy our "make-
whole" remedy. These additional amounts may be determined, depending
upon the circumstances of each case, by reference to provisions in the
documents governing the funds at issue and, where there are no governing
provisions, to evidence of any loss directly attributable to the unlawful
withholding action, which might include the loss of return on investment of
the portion of funds withheld, additional administrative costs, etc., but not
collateral losses. Merryweather Optical Company, 240 NLRB 1213 (1979).
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties participated and
were given the opportunity to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses, it has been found that we have
violated the National Labor Relations Act in certain
respects. We have been ordered to stop such activity,
and to post this notice and to abide by its terms.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Local 40,
Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers,
AFL-CIO, by refusing to sign and implement the
1978-80 contract between that Union and the
employer-members of the Insulation Contractors
Association of Albany.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
WE WILL forthwith sign and implement the
above-mentioned contract and give retroactive
effect thereto from July 1, 1978.
WE WILL make whole any of our employees in
the bargaining unit for any loss of pay or other
626
J. F. SWICK INSULATION CO.
employment benefits that they may have suffered,
and the Union for any loss of dues suffered, by
reason of our refusal to sign and implement the
aforesaid collective-bargaining agreement, plus
interest.
WE WILL make those health, welfare, pension,
and other payments on behalf of our employees
which we were obligated to make pursuant to the
provisions of the aforesaid contract.
J. F. SWICK INSULATION CO., INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This matter
was heard before me in Albany, New York, on July 2 and 3,
1979, upon the General Counsel's complaint which alleges
generally that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151,
et seq.. by attempting, untimely, to withdraw from a
multiemployer association of which it has been a member.
Respondent generally denies that it engaged in any
violations of the Act, and affirmatively contends that it was
privileged to withdraw from the multiemployer association,
that the Charging Party knew of and acquiesced in Respon-
dent's withdrawal from the association, and that, in any
event, if its withdrawal from the association was violative of
the Act, such occurred more than 6 months prior to the
filing of the charge herein and is barred by Section 10(b) of
the Act.
Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of
witnesses, briefs, and arguments of counsel, I hereby make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, J. F. Swick Insulation Co., Inc., is a New
York corporation engaged as an insulation contractor in the
insulation of pipes, boilers, breechings, tanks, and equipment
and related products. During the year preceding the issuance
of the complaint herein, Respondent, in the course and
conduct of its business, derived gross revenues in excess of
$50,000 from services rendered to other enterprises which
are directly engaged in interstate commerce and/or from
services it rendered directly outside the State of New York.
Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material
herein it has been an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
' Finding that Respondent was and continues to be a member of the
Association is the principal issue in the matter and will of course be discussed
in more detail below.
I This figure is taken from the testimony of Swick. No documentation was
offered concerning the precise amount of the delinquency; however the
Union's business agent testified that the delinquency exceeded Respondent's
bond of 5.000. Thus I conclude that the delinquency was in the range as
testified to by Swick, the precise amount not being critical.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 40, Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Work-
ers, AFL-CIO (herein the Union), is admitted to be, and I
find is, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
Respondent has been in the insulation contracting busi-
ness since October 1, 1965. From that time until it joined the
Insulation Contractors Association of Albany (herein called
the Association) in 1970, it had a verbal agreement with the
Union. Thereafter, until the events involved in this matter,
Respondent, acting through its president, Joseph Swick,
participated in the business of the Association, which was
primarily to deal with the Union with regard to negotiation
and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.
According to Swick, in 1970 the members of the Associa-
tion were Johns-Manville, Armstrong Cork, Robert A.
Keasbey Company, and Tri-City Insulation. Subsequent to
1970, Armstrong ceased doing business in the Albany area
and Tri-City Insulation was absorbed by Tougher Industries.
Thus, during 1978 the members of the Association were
Johns-Manville, Robert A. Keasbey Co., Tougher Indus-
tries, and Respondent.'
The members of the Association and the Union have been
parties to a number of collective-bargaining agreements the
next to the last of which was entered into on July 14, 1975,
effective through June 30, 1978. The current contract was
entered into on July 24, 1978, effective through June 30,
1980.
Among other things, the collective-bargaining agreements
obligated each of the Association members, including
Respondent, to make certain contributions to various trust
funds, including a pension fund and a welfare fund. In 1977
Respondent became delinquent in payments to these funds
in the amount of S1 1,000, which amount it ultimately paid.
However, by May 1978 Respondent was again delinquent in
payments to these funds by $6,700.' During the latter part of
May or early June, Raymond Labonte, the Union's business
agent, confronted Swick with the fact of this delinquency
and demanded payment. Swick apparently paid $1,600 but
as of June 3 he continued to owe something in excess of
$5,000. Labonte met with Respondent's four union employ-
ees and they determined to cease working for Respondent,
e.g., go on strike, until Respondent made restitution to the
funds. This fact was communicated to Swick and on
Monday, June 5, 1978, Respondent's four union employees
did not come to work.'
On June 5 Swick contacted the president of the Associa-
tion, Theodore Reith, the branch manager for the Robert A.
Keasbey Co., and told him about the strike. During the
The then in effect collective-bargaining agreement provided that: "There
shall be no strike or lockouts for any reason during the life of this agreement."
However. welfare and pension funds provide: "In addition to any other
actions available to the Union against a defaulting Employer, the Union shall
have the right to strike against any defaulting employer."
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
course of their conversation Reith advised Swick that he
should not come to the contract negotiation session the
Union and the Association had set for the next day
presumably in view of these events.
In March the Union had notified the Association that it
wanted to negotiate a successor collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Preparatory to negotiations Swick and other represen-
tatives of the Association met on three occasions in March
and April to discuss bargaining strategy. Among other
things, Swick contended that the Association should take the
position that there be no increases in wages or fringe benefits
in the successor contract, Swick maintaining that he was
financially unable to meet any increases.
In any event, Swick participated in the prenegotiation
meetings but at Reith's suggestion did not attend the first
meeting with the Union on June 6, nor did he attend any
subsequent bargaining sessions. At the first meeting Labonte
asked where Swick was, and was told by Reith that he was
not there. Apparently nothing more was said between the
Union and other members of the Association concerning
Swick or his absence from the meetings. Specifically, there
was no suggestion that Swick had withdrawn from the
Association.
Unable to reach an agreement, the Union commenced
striking the Association on July I and continued to strike
until the contract was finally presented to and ratified by the
members in late July, the contract being executed on July 24.
Shortly following execution of the contract, Reith called
Swick and told him what the terms of the agreement were.
Then much later, in late November, presumably after Swick
finally made restitution to the funds, Labonte called him and
asked if he wanted to employ any of the Union's people and
if he wanted to sign the contract. At that time Swick told
him that he had some objections to the contract. A meeting
was discussed but apparently never held. In fact, Swick has
not become a party to the contract and has not abided by its
terms and conditions.
Swick contends that on June 30 he caused a letter to be
delivered to the Association in which he stated, inter alia:
Please be advised that J. F. Swick Insulation Co., Inc.,
hereby withdraws membership in the Insulation Con-
tractors Association of Albany, effective immediately.
He testified that he directed his secretary, Pat Mosely, to
deliver it on June 30. However, the letter was date-stamped
as received by Reith's company on July 31, and he
subsequently had copies sent to other members of the
Association.
B. Analysis and Concluding Findings
At the outset it should be noted that this matter involves
not what Swick could legally have done, but what he in fact
did do and when. Thus, the fundamental fact question here
concerns when Swick attempted to withdraw from the
Association and the circumstances attendant at that time.
And from this follow the legal conclusions. What he might
have done at other times forms the basic areas of defense,
but is really immaterial.
From all the credible evidence I find that Swick did not
attempt to withdraw from the Association nor communicate
an interest in doing so until late July, following agreement
on a new contract between the Association and the Union.
I simply do not believe Swick's assertion that his lawyer
drafted the letter of withdrawal in late June which he signed
on June 30 and had his secretary deliver to Reith on that
day. First, I found Swick's demeanor to be negative and his
testimony evasive. Second, Reith, who has no apparent stake
in the outcome of this proceeding, credibly testified that he
first received the letter at his office and that, as a matter of
corporate practice, the letter was date-stamped July 31. It is
thus substantially probable that the letter was in fact
delivered or sent to the Association's president and received
by him on July 31 rather than on or about June 30. Third,
Swick testified that his secretary typed the letter and was
instructed to deliver it. She is still an employee of Respon-
dent but was not called to testify in this matter. From this
failure I can and do draw the adverse inference that her
testimony would not support the assertions of Swick.
Finally, Swick testified, with regard to this very matter, "I
guess I seemed to have misplaced the file and this [copies of
correspondence relating to his purported withdrawal from
the Association] was in the file." Misplacing a file, thus
allowing for reliance on memory, is too convenient to be
credible.
On the other hand it is consistent with Swick's acts
throughout this matter that he would not in fact have
determined to withdraw from the Association until told by
Reith the terms and conditions of the new contract. By
Swick's admission, his talk with Reith occurred sometime
shortly after the parties agreed to the contract on July 24.
From all these factors I conclude that Swick first
attempted to withdraw from the Association in late July
1978, and this determination was first communicated to the
Association on July 31. Swick never personally communicat-
ed his determination to the Union, and there is no evidence
in this record that the Union ever consented to or acquiesced
in Swick's attempted withdrawal from the Association on
July 3 1.
Respondent argues that Swick withdrew from the Associ-
ation on June 5 and this was communicated to the
Association and to the Union when he did not appear for the
negotiation session on June 6. Respondent also argues that
Swick was privileged to withdraw from the Association at
that time because the Union had engaged in a strike in
breach of the current collective-bargaining agreement. While
the legality of the Union's strike may be arguable (though I
think permissible when one considers the language in the
trust documents notwithstanding the prohibitory language
in the contract itself) such is immaterial here. Swick in fact
did not withdraw or attempt to withdraw from the Associa-
tion following the strike. Nor can his absence from the
negotiation session on June 6 be construed as tantamount to
withdrawal. Indeed, he was instructed by the president of
the Association not to attend the negotiation session presum-
ably in view of his trust fund delinquency and the strike
action by the Union.
Multiemployer bargaining is common. Although it is not
statutorily recognized, the Board concluded early on that all
628
J. F. SWICK INSULATION CO.
parties could consent to bargaining on a multiemployer
basis.'
Subsequently, the Board set rules concerning whether and
to what extent an employer or union might withdraw from
an established multiemployer bargaining arrangement.' In
essence, the Board has held that, prior to the beginning of
negotiations, either a union or an employer member might
withdraw its consent upon giving adequate, unequivocal,
written notice of its intention to do so. However, once
negotiations have begun,' then neither a member-employer
nor the union can withdraw without the consent of the other
party, except in the event of "unusual circumstances." There
have followed a number of cases dealing with the question of
what constitutes "unusual circumstances."
The major thrust of Respondent's argument here is that
unusual circumstances existed which would permit Respon-
dent unilaterally to withdraw from the Association even
following the commencement of negotiations for a new
collective-bargaining agreement. The unusual circumstance
contended by Respondent is its unfavorable financial situa-
tion, as demonstrated by its delinquency in payments to the
fringe benefit funds and Swick's desire that any new
agreement hold the line on wages and fringe benefits.
The fact that Respondent was in arrears on payments to
the fringe benefit funds does not prove a detrimental
financial position. Nor is there any independent evidence
other than the vague assertions by Swick, which I generally
discredit, to the effect that he was having financial difficul-
ties in 1978. The fact of the matter is that in late 1978 Swick
in fact paid into the funds the amount of his delinquencies.
While a deteriorating financial condition which threatens
the very existence of the member of a multiemployer
bargaining association may be such a circumstance as to
warrant its withdrawal, ' I conclude that this has not been
established by sufficient credible evidence.
Nor is the fact that the Union engaged in a strike against
Swick on June 5 a circumstance which would justify
withdrawal from the bargaining association. Indeed, the
Union struck the remaining members of the Association 3
weeks later, and, in any event, a strike against one
association member during the course of negotiations has
never been considered sufficient justification to withdraw
unilaterally from multiemployer bargaining. Respondent
contends that the strike was in effect an impasse and that an
impasse in negotiations is a sufficient unusual circumstance
to justify withdrawal. While five circuits have in fact
adopted this position,' suffice it to say that the Board has
never acquiesced in these determinations by the circuit
courts and has never held that an impasse in and of itself is a
sufficient unusual circumstance to justify withdrawal from a
multiemployer bargaining association. In any event, the
strike of June 5 was not tantamount to impasse; nor is there
evidence that impasse ever occurred during the course of
' Shipowners'Association of the Pacific Coast. 7 NLRB 1002 (1938).
'See RetailAssociales Inc., 120 NLRB 388 (1958).
' Even accepting Swick's assertion concerning his attempted withdrawal,
such occurred on June 30, after negotiations began but less than 6 months
before the charge was filed on December 28. However, as found above, I do
not believe he ever attempted to withdraw until late July, which was well
within the 10(b) period, as was his subsequent refusal to abide by the contract.
'See Hi-Way Billboards Inc., 206 NLRB 22 (1973).
' The Second Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Independent Association of Steel
Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 US. 1130
negotiations even though in order to force its bargaining
position the Union did determine to strike as of July I rather
than work without a contract. There is no showing that after
July I negotiations between the Union and the Association
would have been unproductive. Indeed, they were produc-
tive, and within about 3 weeks the parties had reached an
agreement. The history of bargaining, so far as this record
indicates, does not establish that an impasse ever existed.
I therefore conclude, based upon the credible evidence of
record, that only after negotiations for a new collective-
bargaining agreement had commenced did Swick attempt to
withdraw from the Association, that such attempt was
"untimely and therefore ineffectual to relieve him from the
obligations of any agreement that [was] ultimately
reached,"' and that to remedy this is not barred by Section
10(b).
Further, I conclude that Respondent's attempted with-
drawal from the Association was not with the consent,
express or implied, or acquiescence of the Union.
Finally, I conclude that there were no special circum-
stances here to justify Respondent's untimely attempt to
withdraw from the Association. Accordingly, I conclude
that, by refusing to execute and abide by the collective-
bargaining agreement negotiated on its behalf by the
Association, Respondent has breached its bargaining obliga-
tions in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
I further conclude that at all material times herein the
Union represented a majority of the employees of Respon-
dent as well as of all of the Association members in a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act as follows:
All mechanics and apprentices performing insulation
construction work as defined in article X of the
collective-bargaining agreement between the Associa-
tion and the Union within the geographical jurisdiction
of the Union who are employed by the employer-
members of the Association, including the Respondent,
excluding all office clerical employees, all professional
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act, and all other employees.
The fact that the union members withdrew their services
from Respondent on June 5 pending payment by Swick of
the delinquencies to the fringe benefit funds does not alter
the Union's status as majority representative of Swick's
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring in
connection with its operations, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
(197q); the Third Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Beck Engraving Co., Inc., 522 F.2d
475 (3d Cir. 1975); the Fifth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Hi-Way Billboards. Inc..
500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir 1974); the Eighth Circuit in Fairmont Foods Co. v.
N.L.R.B.. 571 F.2d 1170(8th Cir. 1972); and the Ninth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v.
Associated Shower Door Co.. Inc., 512 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1975). In brief, the
circuit courts reason that, absent allowing an employer to withdraw after
impasse, the union would have two economic weapons (the selective strike
and individual negotiations) whereas the employer would have one (the lock-
out), and such a situation is not equitable.
NL.R.B. v. John J. Corbetr Press. Inc.. 401 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1968).
629
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. In this connection,
Respondent should immediately sign and implement the
agreement reached between the Union and the Association
retroactive to July 1, 1978, making its employees whole for
any loss of earnings, and the Union for any loss of dues,
suffered as a result of its failure to comply with the
agreement, with interest only upon loss of wages and union
dues, if any, which Respondent failed to withhold from
employees' wages in violation of the collective-bargaining
agreements as provided for in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977).'
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this matter, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, J. F. Swick Insulation Co., Inc., Delmar,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing to sign and give full effect to the
agreement executed on July 24, 1978, between the Insulation
Contractors Association of Albany and Local 40, Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL-CIO.
(b) Failing or refusing, upon request, to bargain collective-
ly with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
above-described appropriate unit.
o See, generally, Isis Plumbing Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962), and
Fitzpatrick Elecric. Inc., 242 NLRB 739 (1979).
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Forthwith sign and implement the agreement executed
on July 24, 1978, between the Association and the Union
insofar as it applies to employees of Respondent in the
above-described bargaining unit.
(b) Upon execution of the foregoing agreement, give it
retroactive effect to July 1, 1978, and make such health,
welfare, pension, and other payments on behalf of those
employees in the above unit for whom such contributions
would have been made had Respondent not unlawfully
repudiated the said collective-bargaining agreement, and
make the employees whole for any loss of wages and
benefits, with interest on lost wages and nonwithheld union
dues, as provided for in the remedy section above.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination or copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its place of business in Albany, New York,
copies of the attached notices marked "Appendix."" Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 3, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it fr 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
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