J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 15, 1975

220 N.L.R.B. 270 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc . and Textile Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO. Case I1-CA-5945
September 15, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On April 18, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Marvin Roth issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the
Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein:
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by coercively interrogating an employee con-
cerning her own and other employees' union sympa-
thies and activities. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party except to the omission of a specific
remedy by the Administrative Law Judge for the
Respondent's solicitation of the same employee to
report to Respondent on the union activities of other
employees. We agree.
The Administrative Law Judge credited the testi-
mony of employee Rogers that her supervisor, Riven-
bark, "requested her to report upon the union sym-
pathies of other employees." No exception was filed
by Respondent to that finding. Accordingly, we shall
correct this omission by amending the conclusions of
law and providing an appropriate remedy in our Or-
der and in the notice.
The Charging Party also urges, in view of the ex-
tensive unfair labor practice history of the Respon-
dent, that the Board should order extraordinary rem-
edies in this case. The Charging Party requests that
the Respondent be required to post the notices at all
of Respondent's plants in North Carolina and South
Carolina; that the union be given access for 1 year to
the bulletin boards at Respondent's plants in North
Carolina and South Carolina; and that Respondent
be required, upon request, to furnish to the Union a
list of the names and addresses of all of the employ-
ees at all of the Respondent's plants in North Caroli-
na and South Carolina.
We have considered the numerous prior violations
of the Act by this same Respondent at various loca-
tions. As set forth in the Decision of the Administra-
tive Law Judge, the Respondent has an extraordinary
history of unfair labor practice litigation before this
Board and the courts. The Respondent has commit-
ted violations of the Act which are iridentical or simi-
lar to the violations found in this case on numerous
other occasions.
In J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 869
(1966), enfd. as modified 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2, 1967),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 1005 (1967), the court of ap-
peals affirmed the Board's findings that the Respon-
dent had engaged in "massive violations" of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. Thereafter, in Stevens
11, 163 NLRB 217 (1967), enfd. as modified 388 F.2d
896 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 393 U.S. 836 (1968),
the same court affirmed the Board's findings that the
Respondent had committed additional violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). The Fourth Circuit en-
forced in substantial part the Board's order in Ste-
vens 111, 167 NLRB 266 (1967), 406 F.2d 1017 (C.A.
4, 1968), which was based on findings of violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In Stevens V, 171 NLRB
1202 (1968), enfd. 417 F.2d 533 (C.A. 5, 1969), and
Stevens VI, 179 NLRB 254.(1969), enfd. 441 F.2d 514
(C.A. 5, 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971), the
Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's orders against the
Respondent, including a remedial bargaining order
in Stevens VI. The Fourth Circuit also enforced the
Board's order, 183 NLRB 25 (1970), enfd. 461 F.2d
490 (C.A. 4, 1972), relating to violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3).
The Board has recently found violations of Section
8(a)(1) by the Respondent in 217 NLRB No. 90
(1975), and further violations of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) by the Respondent in 219 NLRB No. 156 (1975).
As a result of Respondent's repeated unfair labor
practice violations at its various locations, including
the Wallace, North Carolina, plant here involved, the
Second Circuit entered an order adjudging the Re-
spondent in civil contempt of the court for continu-
ing to discriminatorily discharge employees in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 464 F.2d
1326 (C.A. 2, 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 926 (1973).
In view of the extensive history of unfair labor
practice violations by this Respondent and the re-
peated violations of the Act which are similar to
those found in this case, we find that employees of
the Respondent at other plants must be assured of
their rights under the Act and that other employees
must be assured that they are protected against simi-
lar violations by this Respondent. Accordingly, we
find it necessary in these circumstances to order that
Respondent post the notice at all of its plants.
220 NLRB No. 34
J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC.
With regard to the additional remedies sought by
the Charging Party, the Union seeks access to the
plant bulletin boards and names and addresses of
employees at plants in North Carolina and South
Carolina . We are not persuaded that the nature and
extent of the violations found in this case have signif-
icantly diminished the Union's ability to initiate
communication with Respondent 's employees. As
the remedy provided is designed to eliminate
Respondent 's coercive interference with employee-
union organizational activities , we shall not grant the
request for additional extraordinary remedies in this
case.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete Conclusions of Law 3 and substitute there-
for the following:
"3. By coercively interrogating employee Faye
Rogers concerning her own and other employees'
union sympathies and activities and by soliciting
Faye Rogers to report to Respondent on other em-
ployees' union activities, the Company has interfered
with , restrained , and coerced its employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed to them by Section 7
of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below and hereby orders that the Respondent, J. P.
Stevens & Co., Inc ., Wallace , North Carolina, its of-
ficers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the
action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(c):
"(c) Soliciting employees to report to Respondent
on other employees ' membership in, activities on be-
half of, or sympathy for Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion."
2. Substitute the following sentence for the first
sentence in paragraph 2(a):
"(a) Post at all of its plants copies of the attached
notice marked `Appendix.' 13"
3. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's notice.
APPENDIX
271
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give
evidence , the National Labor Relations Board has
found that our Company at its Carter Plant , Wallace,
North Carolina , violated the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and has ordered us to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act protects em-
ployees in their right to form , join, or assist labor
unions or to refrain from such activity.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concern-
ing their own or other employees ' membership
in, activities on behalf of, or sympathy for Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to report to us
on other employees' membership in, activities
on behalf of , or sympathy for Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other la-
bor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed.
J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARVIN ROTH , Administrative Law Judge : This case was
tried at Wilmington , North Carolina, on March 26, 1975.
The charge and amended charge were filed , respectively,
on November 22, 1974, and January 21, 1975, by Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO , herein called the
Union . The complaint , which issued on January 29, 1975,
and was amended at the hearing , alleges that J . P. Stevens
& Co., Inc ., herein called the Company or Respondent,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended . The Company's answer denies the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
Issues
The issues are:
1. Whether, during the course of an organizing cam-
paign by the Union among the Company's employees at its
Carter plant in Wallace , North Carolina, the Company, by
its supervisor Roland Rivenbark , violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by interrogating employee Faye Rogers as to
how she felt about the Union and by requesting her to
272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
report upon the union sympathies of other employees; and
2. Whether a remedial order is warranted.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate,
to present relevant evidence, to examine and cross- examine
witnesses, and to argue orally on the evidence and the law.
The parties waived the filing of briefs. Upon careful con-
sideration of the arguments of counsel, the entire record in
the case, and from my observation of the witnesses and
their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Company is a New York corporation engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of textile products, with
plants located in several States of the United States, includ-
ing plants located at Wallace, North Carolina. The Com-
pany annually receives goods and raw materials at its Wal-
lace plants directly from points outside the State of North
Carolina valued in excess of $50,000, and annually manu-
factures at its Wallace plants and ships directly to points
outside of North Carolina products valued in excess of
$50,000. The Board has in prior cases asserted jurisdiction
over the Company's operations. Upon these undisputed
facts I find that the Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the Company admits and I find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background: The Company 's History of Unfair Labor
Practices
The Company has an extensive history of unfair labor
practice litigation in the Board and courts. In J. P. Stevens
& Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied
389 U.S. 1005 (1967) (known as "Stevens I"), the court of
appeals affirmed the Board's findings in 157 NLRB 869
(1966) that the Company engaged in "massive violations"
of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. Thereafter, in
"Stevens 11" (388 F.2d 896 (C.A. 2, 1967), cert. denied 393
U.S. 836 (1968), the same court affirmed the Board's find-
ings in 163 NLRB 217 (1967), that the Company commit-
ted additional violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In
Stevens III and IV (406 F.2d 1017 (1968) ), the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals enforced, in substantial part, Board
orders in 167 NLRB 266 (1967) and 167 NLRB 258, based
on findings of violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4). In
Stevens V (417 F.2d 533 (1969)) and Stevens VI (441 F.2d
514 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971) ), the Fifth
Circuit Court enforced Board orders against the Company,
including a remedial bargaining order in Stevens VI. The
court noted "Stevens' known predisposition to violate the
law . . . unchastened by and impervious to judicial homi-
lies" (441 F.2d at 516), and "the tenacity with which the
Employer persists in the exercise of deep seated anti-union
convictions" (417 F.2d at 534-535.1 Thereafter, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enforce a Board order
relating to charged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) at
the Company's Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina plants
(449 F.2d 595 (1971), affg. in part and setting aside in part
181 NLRB 666 (1970) ), but enforced a Board order relat-
ing to violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) at company
plants in Shelby and Hickory, North Carolina (461 F.2d
490 (1972), enfg. 183 NLRB 25 (1970) ).
On July 13, 1972, the Second Circuit Court found the
Company to be in civil contempt of the decrees in Stevens
I and II, by reason of the Company having engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) at several
of its plants, including the Carter plant in Wallace, North
Carolina, i.e., the plant here involved (464 F.2d 1326). On
the basis of its findings, the court subsequently adjudged
the Company and several of its supervisors in civil con-
tempt of court, directing that they take certain steps to
purge themselves of civil contempt, and "reserve[d] juris-
diction to assess fines, issue writs of body attachment or
take other appropriate action against any officer or agent
of the Company and against any of the individual respon-
dents responsible for noncompliance with the foregoing
[purgation] provisions; of this order and the decrees of this
Court" (cert. denied 410 U.S. 926 (1973) ). There is also
presently pending a second civil contempt proceeding be-
fore a special master of the same court, involving company
plants in North and South Carolina.
At the outset of the instant hearing, General Counsel
requested that I take judicial notice of the foregoing cases,
and I have done so. In light of those cases, and in particu-
lar the civil contempt adjudication by the Second Circuit, it
would appear that this case should have been prosecuted as
a contempt matter before a court of appeals, rather than in
an unfair labor practice proceeding. However, the General
Counsel, in the exercise of his discretion under Section 3(d)
of the Act, has chosen to proceed, at least initially, by way
of an unfair labor practice complaint. Therefore, it is in
this context that the present case must be decided. Supervi-
sor Rivenbark, the Company's only witness, testified that
the Company "was definitely against the Union" and that
it was part of his duties to do what he legally could to keep
the Union out. Whether, in this instance , the Company
exceeded the bounds of legality is a matter which I have
decided on the basis of the evidence adduced in this pro-
ceeding.
B. The Union's Organizational Campaign and the Alleged
Interrogation of Employee Rogers
In the early fall of 1974, the Union commenced an orga-
nizational campaign among the approximately 1,200 em-
1 In Stevens 1, the Second Circuit similarly observed that "[t]here is no
room for doubt of the Board 's ultimate conclusion " that Stevens "pursued a
pattern of conduct the purpose of which was to crush the union movement
. [wlith scant regard for the means employed other than their effective-
ness . " (380 F 2d at 301.)
J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC.
ployees at the Company's Carter plant. The Union distrib-
uted literature at plant entrances , and solicited signed au-
thorization cards . This campaign promptly came to the at-
tention of management .2
Faye Rogers was and is , knitter on the third shift in the
tricot department at the Carter plant . Rivenbark is her im-
mediate supervisor . Rogers , General Counsel 's only wit-
ness , testified that in early October, while Rivenbark was
making his nightly rounds and coming by her machines, he
apparently saw one Glisson , an employee in the tricot de-
partment, attempting to get her to sign a union card. Rog-
ers testified that about 3 days later, Rivenbark summoned
her alone to his office. Rivenbark first discussed certain
defects in her work. Rogers testified that after pausing, Ri-
venbark asked her how she felt about the Union. Rogers
answered that she didn't know because she had never
worked under one. After pausing again , Rivenbark said "if
you know of anybody that's for it, let me know." Rogers
then got up and returned to work. Rogers testified that
later that morning , Rivenbark approached her at her ma-
chines and said "if anything comes up , don't mention my
name ." Rogers testified that in November , she informed
Union International Representative Pope of her conversa-
tion with Rivenbark , and that Pope told her "it was a viola-
tion." Rogers testified that prior to speaking with Pope she
had "often wondered" why Rivenbark would tell her not to
mention his name should anything come up.
On his direct examination Rivenbark denied seeing Glis-
son attempt to get Rogers to sign a union card . Rogers
indicated that Rivenbark was about 45 feet from them at
the time of the incident . I might have been inclined to
question whether Rivenbark could have seen a union card
at that distance, even if he had seen the two employees
together . However, on cross-examination Rivenbark ad-
mitted that the incident occurred, but testified that he
couldn 't recall whether the incident occurred before or af-
ter Rogers allegedly told him that an unidentified employ-
ee had approached her with a "blue card" and asked her to
sign it . I find that the incident occurred as testified to by
Rogers.
Rivenbark categorically denied questioning Rogers
about her attitude toward the Union or about union adher-
ents . He admitted that he summoned her to his office to
discuss her work , but denied that the Union was discussed
in that meeting or in any other conversation between them.
He testified that on one occasion, as he was making his
nightly rounds, she approached him and said that she had
been approached by an employee (otherwise unidentified)
with a "blue card" who asked her to sign it, but that she
would not sign it. Rivenbark testified that he didn't know
that a blue card meant a union card, but that he "had
heard that there was union cards being passed out. And so
I didn't say anything." However, Rivenbark readily identi-
fied, at a distance of about 10 feet , a blue union card as
being the kind of card which "I received at the gate one
morning when I went out."
2 Supervisor Rivernbark 's testimony that he was not aware of any union
activity at the time of his conversation with employee Rogers contradicted
his earlier testimony that at the time he was in fact aware that union cards
were being passed out.
273
Neither Rogers nor Rivenbark varied in their testimony
concerning their alleged conversations. Neither version is
inherently implausable. Rivenbark's testimony indicates
that he was acutely interested in obtaining information
about the Union's organizational drive, even to the point
of listening in on employee conversations, e.g., by standing
close enough to hear them over the factory noises, or by
following employees to the smoking area or commissary.
Rivenbark admittedly had reason to believe that Rogers'
husband, also an employee in the plant, was opposed to the
Union. Given these factors, Rivenbark's observation of
Glisson with Rogers, and Rogers' apparent vulnerability as
a not too competent employee, Rivenbark might well have
viewed Rogers as a potential source of information about
union activity? On the other hand, given Rivenbark's so-
phistication in unfair labor practice law, it is also plausible
that Rivenbark would have avoided discussing the Union
with Rogers.
In this posture, the witnesses' relative candor and the
quality of their testimony with respect to related matters is
of particular significance.' Here, I find Rogers to be the
more credible witness. Her testimony was straightforward
and consistent, even with respect to matters which might
be considered adverse to her own interests. She candidly
admitted that Rivenbark had good reason to criticize her
work. I cannot, however, say the same for Rivenbark's tes-
timony. The inconsistencies in his testimony have previous-
ly been noted. I find it difficult to believe his testimony
that although he had only 21 employees, whom he knew
well, under his supervision, and had an intense interest in
learning about union activities, he could not remember the
name of a single person under his supervision who was
pushing for the Union, or who told him about Rogers' hus-
band, or from whom he learned that union cards were
being circulated, or in what month he saw union leaflets
being passed out at the gate. Therefore, I credit Rogers'
testimony that Rivenbark questioned her as to how she felt
about the Union and requested her to report upon the
union sympathies of other employees.
Rivenbark interrogated Rogers in "an atmosphere of
`unnatural formality,"' specifically, after she had been
summoned from her work station to his office s
Rivenbark's familiarity with the do's and don'ts of Section
8(a)(1), his pregnant pauses, and the circumstances de-
scribed above which apparently led him to question Rog-
ers, also lead me to believe that this was no mere casual
3 Faye Rogers joined the Union on November I I, 1974 Rivenbark testi-
fied that on October 17, 1974 , another employee had told him that Rogers'
husband had dust decided to support the Union , because he [Rogers) was
angry about having been reprimanded by Rivenbark Company counsel did
not question Mrs. Rogers about this matter . I am not inclined to give any
weight to this hearsay testimony . In any event , it is immaterial to my dispo-
sition of this case whether Rogers joined the Union for her own reasons, for
her husband's reasons, or both
4 Company counsel points out that the General Counsel did not call
either Pope or Glisson as corroborating witnesses . On the other hand, Gen-
eral Counsel argues that the Company, although furnished with two affida-
vits for use in its cross -examination , did not confront Rogers with either,
thereby indicating that her testimony was consistent with both . In light of
my credibility resolutions discussed infra, I am not inclined to accord con-
trolling significance to either factor
5 Bonnie Bourne, an individual, d/b/a Bourne Co v. N.G.R B., 332 F.2d 47.
48 (C.A. 2, 1964)
274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conversation, but an intentional act on the part of the
Company. Rivenbark had no legitimate reason to question
Rogers as to the identity of union supporters or, indeed, as
to her own views .6 Rivenbark gave Rogers no assurance
against reprisal;7 on the contrary, he admonished her not
to mention his name "if anything comes up." Moreover,
the interrogation was conducted in the context of the
Company's known hostility to the Union, and past demon-
strated proclivity to violate the Act. Therefore, I find that
the circumstances of the present case substantially meet
the standards set by the Board in Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
109 NLRB 591 (1954) for determining the coercive nature
of interrogation.8 In light of the foregoing, 1 find that the
interrogation here tended to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to support
the Union's organizational effort, and thus violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
The Company's principal contention is that, assuming
arguendo, that it violated the Act on this one occasion, the
violation was a de minimus matter which does not warrant
a remedial order. General Counsel concedes that but for
the Company's prior history, this violation might be viewed
as a minor violation, but that in light of that history, the
request that Rogers inform on other employees, and
Rivenbark's admonition to silence, the matter cannot be
viewed so lightly.
I cannot view a deliberate request, made during the
course of an organizational campaign, that an employee
inform management of the indentity of the Union's adher-
ents as a de minimus matter. See fn. 6, supra. Moreover,
the present interrogation must be viewed, for remedial pur-
poses, in light of the Company's hostility to unionization
and its demonstrated and well-known proclivity to violate
the Act. A transgression which might be excused as "isolat-
ed" or "minor" in the case of an employer without demon-
strated union animus or a history of unfair labor practices,
cannot be condoned in the case of an employer who has
repeatedly been found to have committed serious viola-.
tions of the Act. See Hecks, Inc., 191 NLRB 886 (1971)9
One may question what useful purpose would be served
by entering yet another Board order against the Company,
As I indicated above, this case might more appropriately
have been prosecuted as a contempt matter before a court
6 See Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165.NLRB 1062 (1967): "'An em-
ployer cannot discriminate against union adherents without first determin-
ing who they are: That such employee fear is not without foundation is
demonstrated by the innumerable cases in which the prelude to discrimina-
tion was the employer's inquiries as to the union sympathies of his employ-
ees.:"
7 See Hennepin Broadcasting Associates, Inc., 215 NLRB No. 32 (1974).
8 See also Mohawk Bedding Co., Inc., 216 NLRB No. 20, sl. op. p.l, JD at
7-8, 12 (1975).
9 Where isolated instances of interrogation have been found to be de,
minimus and not warranting a remedial order, the Board has viewed the
apparent lack of union animus as a significant factor in that determination.
See, e .g., Tracon, Inc., 184 NLRB 147, 158 (1970); Pepsi-Cola Allied Bottlers,
Inc., 170 NLRB 1250, 1256 (1968); see also N.L.R.B. v. The Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Company., 463 F.2d 184 (C.A. 5, 1972); J. J. Newberry Co.,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 442 F.2d 897 (C.A. 2, 1971).
of appeals. However, viewing this case in the context of an
unfair labor practice proceeding, I find that the issuance of
a Board order and the posting of appropriate notices may
have a salutary effect.10 Because of the Company's demon-
strated proclivity to violate the Act, I am recommending
that the Company be ordered to cease and desist not only
from the specific unfair labor practices found, but also
from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. However, I am recommending that
the requirement for posting of notices be limited to the
Carter plant, where the unfair labor practices occurred. See
J. P. Stevens & Co., 183 NLRB 25 (1970).11
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
L. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employee Faye Rogers
concerning her own and other employees' union sympa-
thies and activities, the Company has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, in viola-
tion of Section. 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. An order requiring the Company to cease and desist
from the unfair labor practices found herein, and to take
appropriate affirmative action, is warranted and necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-.
ed:
ORDER 12
Respondent, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Wallace, North
Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) . Interrogating employees concerning their own or
other employees' membership in, activities on behalf of, or
sympathy for Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of .their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
10 The Union has apparently not abandoned its organizational efforts at
the Carter plant. On February 19, 1975, in Case I I-RC-3987, an election
was conducted which resulted in 404 votes for, and 540 votes against, the
Union, with 3 challenges. Objections were subsequently filed, and the Re-
gional Director has directed a hearing on those objections.
''Neither General Counsel nor the Charging Party has requested any
extraordinary remedies.
12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec.102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. 275
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- tor for Region 11, after being duly signed by Respondent's
fectuate the policies of the Act: authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
(a) Post at its Carter plant in Wallace, North Carolina, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Cop- for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places,
ies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Direc- including all places where notices to employees are cus-
13 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced b a Jud ment of a
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
.7 g faced, or covered b other material.United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by y any
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writ-
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the National Labor Relations Board ." Respondent has taken to comply herewith.