Iron Workers Local 433 (United Steel)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 1986

280 N.L.R.B. 1325 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Association of Bridge , Structural and Or-
namental Iron Workers , AFL-CIO and United
Steel and Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc.
and Carlson Southwest Corp. Cases 31-CC-
1761, 31-CC-1777, 31-CC-1770, and 31-CC-
1801-1
31 July 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND STEPHENS
On 14 February 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Gordon J. Myatt issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed limited cross-excep-
tions and an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, l and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
r We note an apparently inadvertent error in the administrative law
judge 's decision as to the date the charge was filed concerning conduct at
the Hollywood jobsite . The relevant charge was filed on 27 June 1984.
The judge found that the Respondent 's statement to Blaise Possum,
Vegas Steel 's general manager, violated Sec. 8(b)(4xn )(B) of the Act be-
cause the Respondent failed to qualify its statement by clearly indicating
that its picketing would comply with the lawful restrictions placed on
common situs picketing . The Respondent excepts to the judge 's finding
on the grounds that Possum testified that the work it subcontracted to
United Steel was the entire job. The Respondent asserts that since Vegas
Steel subcontracted its entire job to United Steel , there was no need for it
to add that its picketing would comply with the restrictions established in
Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950) The Respondent
relies on Electrical Workers Local 38 (Cleveland Electra Metals), 221
NLRB 1073 (1975), in support of its proposition that it did not have a
duty to clarify its statement to Possum
The Respondent 's reliance on Cleveland Electra Metals is misplaced In
that case , we concluded that a statement concerning picketing by a
union 's business agent should not be construed as an unlawful threat to
engage in secondary picketing because it was clear that of the two other
contracts involved, one was virtually completed and the other had not
yet been awarded . Furthermore, the business agent's statement that the
union right picket was made in reply to a question by the contractor.
Therefore, the Board concluded it would be unreasonable to construe the
statement as an unlawful threat.
That is not the case here While Possum testified that Vegas Steel, a
subcontractor, was subcontracting its entire job to United Steel, the
record does not contain evidence showing that the Respondent had a
basis for assuming that other subcontractors, doing work other than the
steel erection work, would not be present at the site . Consequently, we
do not have the assurance that we had in Cleveland Electra Metals that
the Respondent understood the primary's employees would be the only
employees on the jobsite . In such circumstances , we conclude that the
Respondent had an affirmative duty to qualify its threat by clearly indi-
cating that the picketing would conform with the Moore Dry Dock guide-
lines, and we affirm the judge's finding.
1325
judge and orders that the Respondent, Ironworkers
Local 433, affiliated with the International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the
Order, except that the attached notices are substi-
tuted for those of the administrative law judge.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT in any manner induce or encour-
age employees of Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal
Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce , to refuse in the course of their employ-
ment to perform any service where an object there-
of is to force or require Carlson Southwest Corp.,
Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person to
cease doing business with Warehouse Equipment
Inc., with each other, or with any other person.
WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten , coerce,
or restrain Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors,
Ben F. Smith, or any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
an object thereof is to force or require Carlson, Cal
Erectors, Ben F . Smith, or any other person to
cease doing business with each other, Warehouse
Equipment, Inc., or any other person.
IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI-
ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL Asso-
CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL &
ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS,
AFL-CIO
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT in any manner induce or encour-
age employees of J & R Steel, or any other person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, to refuse in the course of their employ-
280 NLRB No. 152
1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment to perform any service where an object there-
of is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other
person to cease doing business with Aram Kaza-
zian Construction, Inc., or with any other person.
WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten, coerce,
or restrain J & R Steel, or any other person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where an object thereof is to force or
require J & R Steel, or any other person to cease
doing business with each other, Aram Kazazian
Construction, Inc., or any other person.
IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI-
ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL &
ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS,
AFL-CIO
APPENDIX C
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT in any manner threaten, coerce,
or restrain Vegas Steel , S. J. Amoroso, Nevada
Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, where an object
thereof is to force or require Vegas Steel, S. J.
Amoroso, Nevada Steel, or any other person to
cease doing business with United Steel, or with any
other person.
IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433, AFFILI-
ATED WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL &
ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS,
AFL-CIO
Arthur Yuter, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David A. Rosenfeld, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld), of San Francisco, California, for the Re-
spondent.
James T. Winkler, Esq. (Atkinson, Andelson Loya, Ruud &
Romo), of Cerritos, California, for Charging Parties
Kazazian and Carlson.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GORDON J. MYATT, Administrative Law Judge. On a
series of charges " filed by United Steel (United), Aram
i Several amended consolidated complaints were issued in this matter.
Among other things , they included an additional charging party and
Kazazian Construction , Inc. (Kazazian),2 and Carlson
Southwest Corp. (Carlson) against Ironworkers Local
433, affiliated with the International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-
CIO (Respondent Union or Local 433), the Regional Di-
rector for Region 31 issued a second amended consoli-
dated complaint and notice of hearing on 31 December
1984.3 In essence , the amended consolidated complaint
alleges Respondent Union was involved in a dispute with
an employer performing work as a subcontractor on a
construction project in San Bernardino , California where
Carlson was the general contractor. It further alleges
that Respondent Union engaged in picketing at the Carl-
son jobsite and the legend on the picket signs failed to
identify the employer with whom Respondent Union had
a dispute . This conduct is alleged to have been for an un-
lawful objective and in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
151 et seq.
Next it alleges that Respondent Union induced and en-
couraged certain of its members to withhold services
from their employer at a jobsite in Hollywood, Califor-
nia, where Kazazian was performing work as a concrete
subcontractor. Additionally, it alleges that Respondent
Union brought internal charges against and subsequently
fined certain of its members for working behind a picket
line established at the Hollywood jobsite. This conduct is
also alleged to have been for an unlawful objective and
in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
Finally, it alleges that in Las Vegas, Nevada, Respond-
ent Union threatened to picket two separate jobsites in
order to prevent United from performing steel erection
work: the first incident occurring at the Circus Circus
Hotel where United had been awarded a subcontract; the
other occurring at the McCarran International Airport
where United was performing on a subcontract. In each
instance, this conduct is alleged to have violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
A hearing4 was held in this matter in Los Angeles,
California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, on 4 March and 18
April 1985, respectively. All parties were represented by
counsel and afforded full opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses and to present material and rele-
vant evidence on the issues involved. After presentation
of the evidence, the General Counsel argued orally on
the record and, in addition, all counsel submitted written
briefs which have been duly considered.
cited several other labor organizations as respondents along with Iron-
workers Local 433 Immediately preceding the hearing herein, the Re-
gional Director approved settlement agreements relating to the other
labor organizations and, on request , a withdrawal request was approved
at the hearing involving the additional charging party cited in the final
amended consolidated complaint Hence, the caption of these cases re-
flects the remainder of the charges underlying the final amended consoli-
dated complaint.
The name of this Charging Party appears as amended at the hearing
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates herein refer to the 1984.
4 At the hearing, Respondent Union admitted certain allegations of the
final amended consolidated complaint , denied others, and specifically
denied engaging in any conduct which violated Sec . 8(bX4Xi) and (u)(B)
of the Act
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
On the entire record in this consolidated matter, in-
cluding my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The pleadings admit and I fmd the following:
(1) United Steel is a Nevada corporation engaged in
the business of steel erection and fabrication. United has
an office and place of business located in Las Vegas,
Nevada. In the course of its business operations, United
annually sells goods or services valued in excess of
$50,000 to Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation, a compa-
ny located in Nevada, which in turn meets the Board's
jurisdictional standards.
(2) Kazazian is a California corporation engaged in the
building and construction industry as a concrete contrac-
tor. In the course of its business operations, Kazazian an-
nually purchases and receives goods and services valued
in excess of $50,000 from a combination of suppliers-
some of whom are located within the State of California
and some of whom are located outside the State of Cali-
fornia. Of those suppliers located within the State of
California, the goods and services they supply to Kaza-
zian are received from sources located outside the State
of California.
(3) Carlson is a Texas corporation engaged in the
building and construction industry as a general contrac-
tor. In the course and conduct of its business operations,
Carlson annually purchases and receives goods and serv-
ices valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers
located outside the State of California for use on its con-
struction project located in San Bernardino, California.
(4) Vegas Steel (Vegas) is a Nevada corporation oper-
ating in the building and construction industry as a con-
tractor engaged in the business of steel erection and fab-
rication. In April 1984, Vegas awarded a subcontract to
United to perform steel erection work on the Circus
Circus Hotel jobsite located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
(5) S. J. Amoroso Construction Corporation (Amor-
oso) is a California corporation which maintains an office
and place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. Amoroso is
engaged in the building and construction industry as the
general contractor. Amoroso is the general contractor
for structural construction at the McCarran International
Airport.
(6) Nevada Steel Corporation (Nevada) is a Nevada
corporation engaged in the business of steel fabrication
and installation in the building and construction industry.
Amoroso subcontracted steel fabrication work at the
McCarran jobsite to Nevada who in turn subcontracted
steel retrofitting work on that jobsite to United.
(7) J & R Steel Company (J & R) is a California cor-
poration with an office and place of business located in
Fontana, California. J & R is engaged in the business of
installing structural steel stairs and building frames in the
building and construction industry. In the course and
conduct of its business operations, J & R annually pur-
chases and receives goods and services valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the
State of California.
1327
Based on the above, I find that United Steel, Kerr-
McGee, Amoroso, Vegas Steel, Nevada Steel, Carlson,
Kazazian , and J & R Steel are, and have been at all times
material herein , persons engaged in commerce or an in-
dustry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings admit, and I find, that Ironworkers
Local 433, affiliated with the International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-
CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Carlson Jobsite in San Bernardino
The undisputed testimony indicates that in November
1984 Carlson was the general contractor on a project for
Southland Corporation constructing a distribution center
in San Bernardino , California. The project involved the
construction of a 300,000-foot warehouse facility and a
25,000-foot vehicle maintenance facility. Carlson had 70
to 80 of its own employees working at the jobsite and
none of these employees were represented by a union.
There were also 8 to 10 subcontractors of Carlson em-
ployed at the jobsite. In addition, Southland directly sub-
contracted the installation of metal racks in the ware-
house to Warehouse Equipment, Inc. (Warehouse).
The unrefuted testimony of Larry Aronson, Carlson's
project manager at the jobsite, reveals that on 7 Novem-
ber Dan Prentice, a business agent for Local 433, came
to the project. Prentice went into the general contrac-
tor's trailer and spoke with Aronson's superior. Aronson,
who was in the trailer at the time, heard Prentice ask the
name of the company that had been awarded the con-
tract to install the racks in the warehouse. When told
that Warehouse was performing the work, Prentice
asked for and was given the telephone number of that
employer.
Aronson testified that Carlson's officials subsequently
heard rumors that Local 433 was upset over the fact that
the racks were being installed by a company employing
workers who were not members of Respondent Union.
As a result, Aronson sent a telegram on 8 November to
Prentice at Local 433 notifying the Respondent Union
that Warehouse would be installing the racks and that
Carlson was establishing a reserved gate for that employ-
er at the jobsite. Aronson acknowledged on cross-exami-
nation that the telegram designated Gate 1 as the gate re-
served for Warehouse.
On 14 November, two pickets appeared at the jobsite
at approximately 7 a.m. and began picketing at Gate 1
and Gate 2. The sign erected by Carlson at Gate 1, how-
ever, reserved its use for several contractors other than
Warehouse. Specifically, the posted sign reserved the
gate for the use of the personnel, visitors, and suppliers
of General Floor Company, Continental Plumbing,
Aldon Electric Co., and Southcoast Electric. The posted
sign directed all others to use Gate 2. (See G.C. Exh. 5.)
1328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Aronson testified that Gate 1 was reserved for contrac-
tors who did not employ ironworkers.
There is no testimony regarding the identity or union
affiliation of the pickets other than the legend on the
picket signs they were carrying . The picket signs con-
tained the following legend:
Work Being Performed
Below Standards
Established By
Ironworkers
Local 433
Authorized By
San Bernardino
Building & Construction
Trades Council
AFL-CIO
(See G .C. Exh . 4.) The pickets remained until approxi-
mately 10 :30 a.m . and resumed picketing the following
morning.5
Aronson's unrefuted testimony indicates that two sub-
contractors on the project, Cal Erectors and Ben F.
Smith, employed workers who were members of the
Iron Workers and they were performing work on the
jobsite at the time the picketing began. Aronson stated
these employees refused to work on each of the days
that the picketing took place.
Respondent Union 's answer denied the occurrence of
each of the incidents to which the witnesses for the Gen-
eral Counsel testified regarding the Carlson jobsite. At
the conclusion of the General Counsel 's case, however,
Respondent Union rested without introducing any evi-
dence to refute the testimony or evidence presented by
the General Counsel.
Concluding Findings
Respondent Union contends the General Counsel has
failed to establish that the Union authorized and was re-
sponsible for the picketing which occurred at the Carl-
son jobsite on 14 and 15 November. It is argued that the
absence of such evidence constitutes a fatal defect in the
element of proof required to sustain a finding that Local
433 engaged in unlawful picketing on the dates in ques-
tion. I reject this contention and find that the record, in
the circumstances of this case , warrants a determination
that Local 433 bears a responsibility for the picketing at
the Carlson jobsite.
As the record reveals, Local 433 rested and did not
put on any evidence to rebut the testimony of the Gener-
al Counsel's witnesses nor did it make any attempt to dis-
credit or offer any explanation regarding the exhibits
placed into evidence . Furthermore, I find the testimony
of the witnesses for the General Counsel was candid,
precise, and straightforward . Accordingly, I credit their
account of the events which occurred and consider them
to be accurate and truthful.
6 The testimony indicates that the millwrights were also picketing the
project on the same days as the above pickets.
Thus, the record establishes that on 7 November the
business agent of Local 433 (Prentice) asked Carlson's
supervisors for and received the name and telephone
number of the employer (Warehouse) scheduled to per-
form the rack installation work on the project. It is also
established in the record that as a result of rumors to the
effect that the ironworkers considered the rack installa-
tion to be their work, Carlson's supervisors sent a tele-
gram to Local 433 on 8 November notifying the Union
again that Warehouse would perform the rack installa-
tion work and that Gate 1 would be reserved for that
employer's use. When the picketing occurred on 14 and
15 November, the pickets carried picket signs which the
record exhibit reveals to be commercially preprinted and
containing the name of Local 433. Additionally, there
was no indication on the picket signs of the name of the
employer with whom Local 433 had its dispute at the
project.
Although there is no direct evidence in the record that
Local 433 authorized or ratified the picketing, as counsel
for Carlson correctly stated in his brief, reasonable infer-
ences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence to
sustain the General Counsel's burden of proving respon-
sibility for the conduct; especially when there is no evi-
dence offered to rebut any of the circumstantial evi-
dence. Cf. Teamsters Local 536 (Connecticut Foundry),
165 NLRB 916 (1967). See also Iron Workers Local 433 v.
NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979). In these cir-
cumstances , I find the record supports the inference that
Local 433 was responsible for the picketing at the Carl-
son jobsite on 14 and 15 November and, further, that the
picketing occurred because the employees of Warehouse
were performing the rack installation work.
Respondent Union next contends that even if it is held
responsible for the picketing at the Carlson jobsite, the
picketing occurred at the gate which Carlson designated
in its telegram and the Union had a right to rely on this
notification. As with Respondent Union's first conten-
tion, I also reject this argument. Concededly, when the
pickets arrived, Gate 1 was not posted as reserved for
use by Warehouse or its employees but, rather, was
posted as being reserved for use by several other con-
tractors, their employees, suppliers, and visitors. The
posted sign clearly stated, however, that "all others must
use Gate No. 2." In these circumstances, I find the dis-
crepancy between the telegram notification and the
actual posting at Gate 1 did not invalidate that gate as
being reserved for use by the listed neutral employers.
Although Carlson did not directly notify Local 433 of
the change in the designation of the neutral gate, the
posting at Gate I was clear and precise and the employ-
ers not specified on the sign-"all others"-were direct-
ed to use Gate 2. Furthermore, because Respondent
Union presented no evidence whatsoever, there is noth-
ing in the record which indicates any confusion existed
among the pickets because of the discrepancy between
the notification and the actual posting of the neutral gate.
See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 400 (County of
Ocean), 269 NLRB 119 (1984); Carpenters Local 1622
(Specialty Building), 262 NLRB 1244 (1982).
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
Having determined Respondent Union picketed a
properly established neutral gate on 14 and 15 November
and that the picket signs did not identify the employer
with whom the Union had a dispute, the critical question
remaining is whether the picketing was for a proscribed
secondary objective. I find that it was and the Union
violated Section 8(b)(4XB) of the Act.
It has been long established that the provisions of Sec-
tion 8(bX4) reflect "the dual Congressional objectives of
preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pres-
sure to bear on offending employers in primary labor dis-
putes and of shielding unoffending employers and others
from pressures and controversies not their own." NLRB
v. Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341
U.S. 675, 692 (1951). In determining whether picketing is
primary (and therefore lawful) or secondary (and thus
designed to enmesh neutrals in the dispute ), the Board
has developed , with court approval , guidelines which are
found in the Moore Dry Dock case . 8 These guidelines,
however, are evidentiary in nature and are not to be ap-
plied in a mechanical fashion. Thus, compliance with the
Moore Dry Dock standards gives rise only to a rebuttable
presumption that the picketing is primary in nature, and
it is necessary to consider the totality of the evidence in
each case to determine whether an underlying secondary
objective exists . Electrical Workers IBEW Local 400
(County of Ocean), supra, fn. 2; Carpenters Local 1622
(Robert Wood), 262 NLRB 1211, 1216 (1982).
It is equally settled law that when the picketing occurs
at a common situs, such as exists here, an employer may
insulate neutral employers , their employees , suppliers,
and visitors from disputes not their own by properly es-
tablishing and maintaining separate gates for those in-
volved in the labor dispute as opposed to those not so
involved . When such gates are properly established and
maintained, a union may picket only at the gate of the
employer with whom it has the dispute . Operating Engi-
neers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Building &
Construction Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell &
Hartz), 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enfd. 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 914 (1968).
Because the unrefuted evidence shows Respondent
Union picketed at both the neutral and primary gates and
did so with picket signs which did not disclose the iden-
tity of the employer with whom the dispute existed, the
record supports the presumption that the picketing had a
secondary objective; i.e., to encompass the entire project
in the dispute by appealing to the employees of all em-
ployers having business at the jobsite . Inasmuch as Re-
spondent Union has failed to present any evidence to jus-
tify its conduct and therefore rebut this presumption, a
s Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950). The guidelines
developed by the Board to determine if the picketing is presumptively
primary are:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the sites of the
dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(b) At the time of the picketing, the primary employer is engaged
in its normal business at the situs;
(c) The picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the loca-
tion of the situs; and
(d) The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the pri-
mary employer.
Id. at 549.
1329
finding that the picketing was unlawful is fully warrant-
ed. Service Employees Local 32B-33J (New York Assn. for
the Blind), 250 NLRB 240, 247-248 (1980). See also
Plumbers Local 274 (Stokely-Van Camp), 267 NLRB
1111, 1114 (1983).
Accordingly, I find that by picketing the Carlson job-
site on 14 and 15 November, Respondent Union induced
and encouraged employees of Carlson, Cal Erectors, Ben
F. Smith, and other neutral employers to cease perform-
ing services for their employers and also threatened, co-
erced, and restrained these employers in order to force
them to cease doing business with Carlson and/or South-
land to compel the removal of Warehouse from the job-
site. Hence, the record establishes Respondent Union
violated Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
B. The Hollywood Jobsite
Kazazian Construction was employed as a subcontrac-
tor on a construction project in Hollywood , California.
The general contractor on this project was Van Baka-
layan. Kazazian's subcontract was for the building of a
subterranean parking structure . Kazazian 's employees
performed work as laborers, cement masons, and carpen-
ters and they were not represented by any labor organi-
zation.
J 8c R Steel was one of the subcontractors on the Hol-
lywood project and was responsible for the structural
steel work. Jose Para, a principal owner and officer of J
& R, performed hands-on work at the project along with
approximately 12 employees ; among whom were his two
brothers, Marbel and Pedro Para. Jose and his brothers
were members of Local 433 and that union represented
the employees of J & R.
Kazazian began working on the Hollywood jobsite in
August 1983 . In November 1983 , Carpenters Local 1052
began picketing the project protesting that Kazazian was
not paying prevailing wages . The picketing continued
until 17 December 1983 . It stopped until 27 December
1983 and continued thereafter until the second week in
February 1984.
The unrefuted testimony of Aram Kazazian , president
of Kazazian, discloses that on 28 December he went to
the jobsite and discovered his employees were not work-
ing. Kazazian was informed by his foreman that the iron-
workers had chased the Kazazian employees off the job.
Kazazian then spoke to Al Mendoza , steward of the
ironworkers employed by J & R, about the problem.7
Mendoza told Kazazian that the ironworker employees
would not work with "scabs" on the job. Kazazian then
called the office of Local 433 and spoke with Joe Ward,
the Union's business manager. Kazazian testified he told
Ward there was a two-gate system at the project. Ward
replied that Respondent Union did not recognize a two-
gate system but he would discuss the matter with the
4 Respondent Union denies that Mendoza was the Iron Workers stew-
ard. However, YA,,,m,n testified he was told by the business agent of
Local 433, Les Rogers , that Mendoza was the Iron Workers steward on
the project. Jose Para testified that Mendoza was the steward of his em-
ployees on the project and that Rogers appointed Mendoza to this posi-
tion. Neither Mendoza nor Rogers appeared as a witness in these pro-
ceedings.
1330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
business agent of the Carpenters Local.8 The next day
Rogers came to the jobsite and Kazazian spoke to him
about the problem he was encountering with the iron-
worker employees . Rogers promised that he would speak
to Mendoza, who Rogers said was the steward of the
ironworkers on the project.
The following Monday, 3 January, Kazazian over-
heard Mendoza speaking to the Carpenters business
agent outside the project. Mendoza told the business
agent that the ironworkers would continue to work on
the project until instructed by Rogers to do otherwise.9
The following morning when Kazazian arrived at the
jobsite he saw approximately 20 business agents from
various craft unions gathered at the project. Rogers was
among this group . He observed Rogers conducting a
meeting with the ironworker employees of J & R for ap-
proximately half an hour. After Rogers concluded his
meeting , Kazazian spoke with Mendoza in an effort to
ascertain what was going on at the project. Mendoza
told Kazazian the ironworkers could not work on the
job with Kazazian's employees . He stated that if they
did, they would be fined $500 and blacklisted . Kazazian
testified the ironworkers refused to work on the project
that day.
Jose Para testified J & R began work on the Holly-
wood project in mid-December 1983 and continued until
the end of February 1984. Para stated that about the
second week on the job he had a conversation in a
nearby restaurant with Rogers and Mendoza . Para said
they discussed the unsafe conditions on the job and that
the ironworkers could not work behind picket lines. Para
further testified that 3 or 4 weeks later, Rogers came on
the project and spoke to him and other ironworkers
about the unsafe conditions on the project. Rogers also
told the employees it was up to each individual whether
they would work behind the picket line. Para stated that
near the end of J & R's work on the job, he was putting
up a safety line and Mendoza called him to a telephone
to speak to Ward. Para was told by Ward to finish the
safety line and get off the job.'o
Sometime in March, after J & R had completed its
work on the project, Mendoza brought charges against
Jose Para and his two brothers before the executive
board of Local 433. The charges were for working
behind a picket line, cursing a union official , and work-
ing under unsafe conditions .l' A hearing was held
° Ward did not testify in these proceedings.
° It should be noted here that the General Counsel represented at the
hearing that none of the events or conversations occurring on 28 and 29
December and 3 January are alleged to be violations of the Act. The rel-
evant charge in this matter was filed on 27 December and served shortly
thereafter . To avoid any problems relating to the 6-month limitation
period under Sec. 10(b) of the Act, the General Counsel does not assert
or plead any of these conversations or events as violations of the Act.
The testimony was presented, however , to shed light on and explain
events which occurred within the 6 -month limitation period . Machinists
Local 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
10 None of Para's conversations with Rogers or Ward are alleged by
the General Counsel to be violations.
11 Para testified he "lost," "misplaced," or "threw away" the docu-
ments notifying him of the charges and the subsequent imposition of the
fine. Pars also testified that while on the Hollywood project , he told his
ironworker employees, "Fuck Les Rogers." He stated this statement was
the basis for the charge of cursing a union official. The General Counsel
subpoenaed the Union's copies of the internal charges and the results of
before the executive board on Mendoza 's charges.
Rogers presided and Mendoza and other J & R employ-
ees testified against Para and his brothers . Para testified
they were each found guilty. He was fined $600 and his
brothers were fined $300 each by the Respondent Union.
Concluding Findings
At the hearing , Respondent Union denied Mendoza
was the Iron Workers steward or that he was an agent
for Local 433 at the Hollywood jobsite. Despite this
denial, however, the only evidence presented regarding
Mendoza's status was the unrefuted testimony of wit-
nesses presented by the General Counsel . Contrary to
Respondent Union , I find this testimony is sufficient to
establish that Mendoza was the steward for Local 433 at
the Hollywood project.
Kazazian 's testimony stands uncontradicted that on 29
December he was informed by Rogers that Mendoza
was Respondent Union 's steward on the job . Of equal
importance is the testimony of Jose Para, employer of
the ironworkers on the project , that Mendoza was the
Iron Workers steward and had been appointed to this
position by Rogers . In light of this uncontroverted testi-
mony, I find that Mendoza was the steward for Local
433 on the Hollywood project.
I also find that Mendoza, as the Iron Workers steward
on the project, was an agent for the Union within the
meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. He was the only
onsite union representative for the ironworker employees
on the project and in this capacity possessed and exer-
cised apparent authority to deal with any disputes in-
volving these employees ; including disputes arising over
working with nonunion employees on the jobsite.
Indeed, the record amply demonstrates that Mendoza
was cloaked with and exercised such authority on the
jobsite on behalf of Local 433. Thus, when Kazazian
complained to Rogers on 29 December about the trouble
between his employees and the ironworkers , Rogers
promised Kazazian that he would speak to Mendoza
about the matter . Likewise, on 3 January Mendoza told
the business agent of the Carpenters Local that the iron-
workers would continue to work on the Hollywood
project until advised by Rogers to do otherwise. I find,
therefore , that Mendoza was Respondent Union 's agent
on the Hollywood project and , in this capacity , his state-
ments and conduct are imputable to Respondent Union.
Cf. Teamsters Local 886 (Lee Way Motor Freight), 229
NLRB 832 (1977).
Thus, by telling Kazazian on 4 January that the iron-
workers could not work on the job with Kazazian's em-
ployees and if they did, they would be fined $500 and
blacklisted , Mendoza was disclosing the position adopted
by his superiors in the Union . His comments in this
regard clearly indicate that Local 433 was engaging in
unlawful secondary activity by involving J & R in the
dispute with Kazazian. The threats to fine and blacklist
the employees of J & R , if they worked on the job with
the executive board action against the Paras . Respondent Union refused
to comply with the subpoena and enforcement was not sought by the
General Counsel
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
Kazazian 's employees, were clearly intended to induce
and encourage the ironworker employees to withhold
their services from J & R to cause that neutral employer
to cease doing business with the general contractor and
Kazazian . In so doing, Local 433 also coerced and re-
strained J & R for the same unlawful secondary objec-
tive. Accordingly, I find that on 4 January Local 433 en-
gaged in conduct at the Hollywood jobsite which violat-
ed Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Cf. Carpenters
Local 180 (B & K Drywall), 181 NLRB 94 (1970); NLRB
v. Glaziers Local 1621, 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980).
The General Counsel contends the fines imposed by
Respondent Union on Jose Para and his two brothers
also violated Section 8(bX4)(B) of the Act. Specifically,
the fines against Marbel and Pedro Para are alleged to
constitute inducement and encouragement of these em-
ployees for an unlawful secondary objective and the fine
against Jose Para constitutes restraint and coercion of
him, as owner of J & R, for the same purpose. Respond-
ent Union contends there is no competent evidence in
the record that establishes charges were brought against
or fines imposed on the Para brothers. Further, Respond-
ent Union argues that Jose Para does not constitute a
"person" within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
Act. I reject all Respondent Union's contentions in this
regard and find that the record fully supports a finding
that the fines violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the
Act.
Jose Para testified regarding the charges brought
against him and his brothers and the events that occurred
at their joint hearing before the executive board of the
Union on the charges. Respondent Union offered nothing
to refute this testimony. Hence, the record establishes
that Para saw copies of the charges brought against him
and his brothers, participated with his brothers at the
hearing before the executive board, and received and
read the written notifications imposing the fines.
Respondent Union's contention that this testimony is
not competent to establish that charges were brought
and fines imposed upon the Paras misconstrues the pur-
pose of this testimony. Jose Para's testimony was not
presented to establish the precise contents of the docu-
ments charging him and his brothers or the contents of
the letters notifying them of the imposition of the fines.
Rather, he was testifying to the fact that charges were
brought, that a hearing was held, and that fines were im-
posed . The absence of the underlying documents, issued
by the Respondent Union, does not destroy the compe-
tency of his testimony on these matters. Contrary to Re-
spondent Union, therefore, Rule 1004 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence has no application here. Moreover,
because Respondent Union refused to comply with the
subpoena of the General Counsel requesting copies of
the underlying documents and did not present any evi-
dence to refute Para's testimony, it cannot now be per-
mitted to assert that the absence of these documents
causes the testimony of Para on these matters to be in-
competent.
It is well established that fines imposed on members,
who are employees of a neutral employer at a common
situs, for working during a dispute with a primary em-
ployer at the situs, induces and encourages the fined em-
1331
ployees to withhold their services from the neutral em-
ployer for an unlawful secondary objective; i.e., to force
the neutral to cease doing business with the primary and
other employers at the common situs. Orange County
District Council of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 585 (1979);
Carpenters' District Council of Southern Colorado (Pace
Construction), 222 NLRB 613 (1976). See also Plumbers
(Hansen Plumbing), 277 NLRB 1231 (1985). It follows,
therefore, that the imposition of the fines on Marbel and
Pedro Para violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.
Although Jose Para's fine was imposed in his capacity
as a union member, he was also the principal owner of J
& R. Thus, a natural consequence of the fine imposed on
him was to force him, as a neutral employer, to cease
doing business with other employers, including Kazazian
with whom Respondent Union had its dispute. Contrary
to Respondent Union, I find Jose Para , as an owner of J
& R, was a "person" within the meaning of subsection
(ii) of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. See Carpenters Local
180 (B & K Drywall), supra. Accordingly, I find the im-
position of the fine on Jose Para violated Section
8(b)(4Xii)(B) of the Act.
Nor does the fact that J & R had completed its portion
of the work on the Hollywood project prior to the impo-
sition of the fines rule out the finding of a violation here.
The Board has consistently held that "the cease doing
business element of Section 8(b)(4)(B) embraces prospec-
tive as well as existing business relationships, and does
not require that the company-party to the primary dis-
pute even be known at the time of the union conduct in
question." Carpenters District Council of Southern Colora-
do (Pace Construction), supra at 618. See also Orange
County District Council of Carpenters, supra; Lithographers
Local 17 (Graphic Arts), 130 NLRB 985 (1961).
C. The Circus Circus Jobsite
The allegations relating to Respondent Union's activi-
ties in Las Vegas, Nevada, involve two separate con-
struction jobs. The first is alleged to have occurred at
the Circus Circus Hotel.
Blaise Fossum, part owner and general manager of
Vegas Steel (Vegas), testified that Vegas was awarded a
subcontract by Ainsworth-Faulkner in mid-March 1984
to perform steel erection work at the Circus Circus
project. Vegas in turn subcontracted the steel erection on
the project to United Steel. United was scheduled to
commence work on 2 May.
Fossum's undisputed testimony discloses that on 1 May
he received a call from Fred Toomey, business agent of
Respondent Union. Toomey asked who Vegas hired to
put up the steel on the Circus Circus project. Toomey
also stated he heard that Vegas hired a scab outfit to do
the work. Fossum replied that Vegas was going to have
United perform the steel work. Toomey then called
Fossum an "asshole" and asked if Fossum knew his laws.
He stated Respondent Union had $75 million to fight
Vegas if it used United. Toomey concluded this conver-
sation with Fossum by saying, "I'll picket the job and see
1332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Pat [Pat Puckett, president of United ] doesn't put up
a piece of steel." 12
On cross-examination, Fossum testified that the steel
erection was the entire job and he understood Toomey
to mean he would picket Puckett at the Circus Circus
job. Both Puckett and Fossum testified that United did
not perform any work on the Circus Circus job. Fossum
stated that after the conversation with Toomey , he with-
drew the contract from United. Puckett corroborated
this testimony . He stated that United was instructed by
Fossum not to do the work and that the contract was
"denied."
Concluding Findings
Respondent Union contends that Toomey 's statements
to Fossum were lawful . It argues that it had a right to
advise Fossum that it had a dispute with United and
would picket United at the jobsite. In support of this ar-
gument, Respondent Union cites Electrical Workers
IBEW Local 38 (Cleveland Electra Metals), 221 NLRB
1073 (1975). In that case, a union representative threat-
ened to engage in informational picketing of a neutral
employer's plant if the primary employer were awarded
a contract to perform certain electrical work . In revers-
ing the finding of a violation by the administrative law
judge, the Board found the primary employer was the
only contractor under discussion during the time the al-
leged threat was made and that other contracts on the
job had either been almost completed or were not yet
awarded. The Board held that under these circumstances
the threat was a lawful statement of the possibility to
engage in informational picketing only against the pri-
mary.
The General Counsel, on the other hand , relies on
cases of more recent vintage to support the finding of a
violation . In Sheet Metal Workers Local 418 (Young
Plumbing) 19 a union informed a neutral employer that it
would be forced to put up a picket line if the primary
employer were not pulled off the job at the neutral's
premises. There the administrative law judge found that
although there was no evidence that the union would
engage in unlawful picketing , Board precedent obligated
the union to give advance assurance the picketing would
be conducted within the Moore Dry Dock limitations.
The administrative law judge held a generalized threat to
picket did not carry a presumption that the picketing
would "conform with established restrictions." The
Board specifically adopted the reasoning of the adminis-
trative law judge in that case and upheld the finding of a
violation of Section 8(bX4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
The General Counsel also cites a more recent case in-
volving a threat to picket in which the Board affirmed
an administrative law judge's finding of a violation. In
Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distribut-
ing), 268 NLRB 475 (1983), the administrative law judge
found where threats are made to picket at a secondary
i a Toomey was not called as a witness during any portion of the hear-
ing regarding the Union's Las Vegas activity . Respondent Union rested
after the conclusion of the presentation of the General Counsel 's case and
did not present any evidence whatsoever.
la 227 NLRB 300 (1976)
employer 's business, "the burden is on the union to re-
strict its statement to the giving of notice of prospective
lawful activity against the primary. Unqualified or am-
biguous threats will be construed against the union as
threats to the secondary's business relationship with the
primary."
Thus, it would appear that more recent Board deci-
sions require that a union, when expressing threats to a
secondary to picket a primary at the premises of a sec-
ondary, to qualify the threat by clearly indicating that
the picketing will conform with the lawful restrictions
imposed on such picketing . Accordingly, I am con-
strained to find that when Toomey told Fossum he
would picket at the Circus Circus Hotel if United per-
formed the steel erection work, Respondent Union's
threat did not contain the necessary qualifications re-
quired by Board law . I find this to be true in spite of the
fact that Fossum testified the steel erection work was the
entire job. Therefore, I find that the threat to picket the
Circus Circus Hotel if United performed the work was in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
D. The McCarron Airport Jobsite
S. J. Amoroso Construction Co. (Amoroso), a general
contractor, had a contract at the McCarran International
Airport for the retrofitting of structural steel . Amoroso
subcontracted a portion of the retrofitting work to
Nevada Steel (Nevada) who in turn subcontracted a por-
tion of its work to United.
Carl Mumper, a project manager for Amoroso on the
McCarran job, testified that he received a telephone call
from a person who identified himself as Toomey at ap-
proximately 10 a.m . on 25 July. Mumper had never seen
or spoken to Toomey prior to this conversation. He testi-
fied that he was able to ascertain the caller was Toomey
not only because the caller identified himself as such, but
also because the caller imparted certain information
which caused him to conclude that he was in fact speak-
ing with Toomey . 14 Mumper stated he had been in-
formed by his superintendent that Toomey had appeared
on the McCarran project shortly after midnight on 25
July in the company of the foreman from American
Bridge and inspected Amoroso's jobsite . Mumper testi-
fied that during the telephone conversation he asked the
caller how he got on the jobsite because security require-
ments enforced at the airport mandated that all persons
had to have a picture badge. The caller replied that he
had been brought on the project by the foreman of
American Bridge and he had inspected Amoroso's job-
site.
Mumper further testified that during the telephone
conversation, Toomey asked if Mumper realized he had
nonunion workers on his job and he identified them as
the employees of United. Mumper replied that he did not
have a contract with United and stated that Amoroso's
contract was with Nevada. Toomey then requested that
Mumper ask Nevada to remove United from the project.
14 It should be noted at this point that on cross-examination Mumper
stated he had talked with Toomey subsequent to this initial telephone
conversation As previously indicated, Toomey did not appear at or testi-
fy in these proceedings.
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
Mumper refused , stating that the work was at a critical
point and he would not ask United 's employees to leave
the job . Toomey then said , "You know I can throw up a
line." Mumper replied, "Go for it," and repeated that the
work was too critical to stop at this point . The conversa-
tion concluded with Toomey stating he hoped they
could work something out and he would talk to Mumper
later.
Puckett testified that in the early morning hours on 25
July, he spoke with Toomey at the McCarran jobsite.
Toomey told Puckett that Puckett had been caught
"sneaking around " again . He said Respondent Union was
going to put up a picket and get United pulled off the
job just as it had on the Circus Circus job. During this
conversation, Toomey repeated that Respondent Union
was going to get United 's contract "pulled."
Paragraph 23 of the final amended consolidated com-
plaint alleged a purported conversation between Toomey
and the president of Nevada Steel relating to United
working on the McCarran Airport jobsite . Although sub-
poenaed by the General Counsel, the president of
Nevada failed to appear at the hearing and no other evi-
dence was presented in support of this allegation. On
motion by counsel for Respondent Union, without objec-
tion by the General Counsel, this allegation of the con-
solidated complaint was dismissed at the hearing.
Concluding Findings
At the hearing , Respondent Union strenuously object-
ed to Mumper's testimony regarding the telephone con-
versation in which the caller identified himself as
Toomey . Although the objection was overruled, it was
renewed by Respondent Union in its brief . In essence,
Respondent Union argues that because its answer denied
Toomey made the telephone call to Amoroso's project
manager and because Mumper had never met or spoken
with Toomey prior to the telephone conversation, the
caller 's identity must be established by evidence inde-
pendent of the caller identifying himself as Toomey. Fur-
ther , that Mumper's testimony regarding the information
he received from his superintendent was hearsay and in-
admissible to establish the factors on which Mumper
relied in concluding that Toomey was the calling party.
After consideration of Respondent Union's renewed
objections , I find no reason to reverse my earlier rulings.
As correctly noted by the General Counsel, it is a "well
established rule that the substance of a telephone conver-
sation may itself be enough to make prima facie proof of
the identity of the caller , based on circumstantial evi-
dence." See U.S. v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.
1974); U.S. v. Alper, 449 F.2d 1223, 1229 (3d Cir. 1971);
Kansas Electric Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 448 F.2d
647, 650-651 (10th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, Mumper's
testimony regarding the information given him by his su-
perintendent concerning Toomey's early hour visit to the
jobsite does not constitute hearsay . Rather, this testimo-
ny was offered, as the General Counsel correctly indicat-
ed at the hearing, to establish that the statements were
made to Mumper and were not offered for the purpose
of establishing the truth of these statements.
Therefore, when the caller independently corroborated
the information previously given Mumper by his superin-
1333
tendent, this was sufficient circumstantial evidence to au-
thenticate the identity of the caller as being Toomey. In
the absence of any evidence whatsoever to the contrary,
I find the record establishes that Toomey made the tele-
phone call to Mumper on 25 July. I further find that
Toomey 's independent corroboration of information
passed on to Mumper by the superintendent constitutes
admissions by a party-opponent under Rule 801(dX2) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and are not hearsay.
Moreover , it should be noted at this point that in re-
sponse to a question on cross-examination by counsel for
the Respondent Union, Mumper stated he had spoken
with Toomey subsequent to the telephone conversation
in question.
Toomey's statement that he could "throw up a line" at
the McCarran project was an unqualified threat made to
a secondary employer. The Board has long ago found
that such expressions by union agents to secondary em-
ployers constitute threats within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. See Sheet Metal Workers Local
418 (Young Plumbing), supra ("would be forced to put up
a picket line"); Carpenters Local 180 (B & K Drywall),
supra (union "would get kind of rough" and "could
picket job"); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 5 (Janet
Construction), 164 NLRB 455 (1967) (threat that there
would be "trouble"). As in the Circus Circus situation,
such generalized threats, made without assurance that
the picketing would be within the limitations established
by Board law, have as their objective the purpose of co-
ercing secondary employers to force a cessation of busi-
ness between the secondaries and the primary employer.
Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distribut-
ing), supra; Sheet Metal Workers Local 418 (Young Plumb-
ing), supra.
In light of the above , I find Toomey 's statement to
Mumper was a threat to force Amoroso and Nevada to
cease doing business with United on the McCarran
project . It follows that, in so doing, Respondent Union
has violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1. Carlson Southwest Corp., Ben F. Smith, Inc., Cal
Erectors, Warehouse Equipment, Van Bakalayan, Aram
Kazazian Construction, Inc., J & R Steel, Vegas Steel, S.
J. Amoroso Construction Co., Nevada Steel, and United
Steel are employers engaged in commerce or in an indus-
try affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By picketing the Southland Distribution Center con-
struction project in San Bernardino , California, with
picket signs that did not disclose the employer with
whom Local 433 had a dispute, and by picketing at a
gate reserved for neutral contractors , Respondent Union
has violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
4. By inducing and encouraging employees of J & R
Steel to withhold their services and by fining members
who were employed by J & R Steel for working behind
1334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a picket line for the purpose of forcing or requiring J &
R Steel and other neutral employers to cease doing busi-
ness with Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., Respondent
Union has violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.
5. By fining a member who is the principal owner of J
& R Steel for working behind a picket line at a jobsite in
Hollywood, California, Respondent Union coerced J &
R Steel in order to force that neutral employer to cease
doing business with Aram Kazazian Construction Co.,
Inc., in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
6. By making an unqualified threat to Vegas Steel that
Local 433 would picket the job if United Steel per-
formed the steel erection work at the Circus Circus
Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, Respondent Union threat-
ened, coerced, and restrained Vegas Steel to force that
employer to cease doing business with United Steel and
thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
7. By telling S. J. Amoroso that Local 433 could put
up a line at the McCarran Airport jobsite in Las Vegas,
Nevada, to force Amoroso and Nevada Steel to remove
United Steel from that construction project, Respondent
Union threatened, coerced, and restrained S. J. Amoroso
and Nevada Steel to force those employers to cease
doing business with United Steel and thereby violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
8. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Union has engaged in
unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(iiXB) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative
action designed to remedy the unfair labor practices and
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Counsel for the
General Counsel and counsel for Charging Parties Carl-
son and Kazazian urge that a broad remedial order be
issued in these cases. Review of the violations found
herein and consideration of prior cases, in which Re-
spondent Union has been found to have violated the sec-
ondary boycott provisions of the Act, fully persuade me
that a broad order is warranted.
On 23 October 1984, the Board, in the absence of ex-
ceptions, adopted the decision of an administrative law
judge finding that Respondent Union violated Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.15 In that case, the ad-
ministrative law judge found Respondent Union engaged
in proscribed secondary conduct from 29 September
through 24 October 1983. Although no exceptions were
filed to the administrative law judge's decision, thereby
accounting for the Board's pro forma adoption, the adju-
dicated conduct is a legitimate factor to be considered in
determining whether Respondent Union has demonstrat-
ed a proclivity to violate the Act's secondary boycott
provisions. Operating Engineers Local 12 (Associated Engi-
neers), 270 NLRB 1172 (1984). Again, in Iron Workers
Local 433 (Oltmans Construction), 272 NLRB 1182
(1984), the Board affirmed and adopted my decision that
15 Iron Workers Locals 433 & 416 (V Systems), "SF)- 163-84 (not re-
ported).
Respondent Union engaged in conduct proscribed by
Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act for a period of
time lasting from 7 to 30 December 1983. The unlawful
secondary activity found in these prior cases and the vio-
lations found in the instant cases (occurring at four dif-
ferent jobsites in two different States) sufficiently estab-
lishes a pattern of conduct by Respondent Union that
evinces a proclivity to violate the secondary boycott
provisions of the Act. Accordingly, I find the request for
a broad remedial order is appropriate and that it should
be granted.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed's
ORDER
The Respondent, Ironworkers Local 433, affiliated
with the International Association of Bridge, Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) In any manner inducing and encouraging employ-
ees of Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F.
Smith, or any other person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in the course
of their employment to perform any services where an
object thereof is to force or require Carlson Southwest
Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or any other person
to cease doing business with Warehouse Equipment, Inc.,
with each other, or with any other person.
(b) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining
Carlson Southwest Corp., Cal Erectors, Ben F. Smith, or
any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force
or require Carlson, Cal Erectors, Smith, or any other
person to cease doing business with each other, Ware-
house Equipment, Inc., or any other person.
(c) In any manner inducing and encouraging employ-
ees of J & R Steel, or any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, to refuse in
the course of their employment to perform any service
where an object thereof is to force or require J & R
Steel, or any other person, to cease doing business with
Aram Kazazian Construction, Inc., or any other person.
(d) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining
J & R Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object
thereof is to force or require J & R Steel, or any other
person, to cease doing business with Aram Kazazian
Construction, Inc., or any other person.
(e) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining
Vegas Steel, or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object
thereof is to force or require Vegas Steel, or any other
person, to cease doing business with United Steel, or any
other person.
38 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 .46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 433 (UNITED STEEL)
(f) In any manner threatening , coercing, or restraining
S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, or any other person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce, where an object thereof is to force or require
Amoroso, Nevada, or any other person, to cease doing
business with United Steel, or any other person.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its business offices and all meeting halls, lo-
cated in the States of California and Nevada, copies of
the attached notices marked "Appendix A" (Carlson
Southwest), "Appendix B" (Aram Kazazian), and "Ap-
pendix C" (United Steel).17 Copies of the notices, on
17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
1335
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31,
after being signed by the authorized representatives of
Local 433, shall be posted by Respondent Union immedi-
ately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to members are customarily posted . Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent Union to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Furnish the Regional Director for Region 31 with
a sufficient number of signed copies of each of the ap-
propriate notices for posting by Carlson, Cal Erectors,
Ben F. Smith, J & R Steel, Aram Kazazian, Vegas Steel,
S. J. Amoroso, Nevada Steel, and United Steel, provided
those employers are willing, at all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.