Iron Dome LLCv.Chinook Licensing DE, LLC

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 4, 2014

09796235 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2014)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 12
Tel: 571–272–7822 Entered: November 4, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

IRON DOME LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

CHINOOK LICENSING DE LLC,
Patent Owner.

_______________

IPR2014-00674
Patent 7,047,482 B1
_______________

Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, JAMES P. CALVE, and
TRENTON A. WARD, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAINDON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Denial of Rehearing Request
37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)

IPR2014-00674
Patent 7,047,482 B1
2
Petitioner filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–7
and 9–20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,047,482 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’482 patent”). Paper 1
(“Pet.”). Upon consideration of the Petition, we did not institute an inter partes
review on any claims of the ’482 patent. Paper 10 (“Dec. Deny Inst.”). Petitioner
now files a request for rehearing of our decision. Paper 11 (“Req. Reh’g”).
Petitioner’s request is denied.
A reconsideration request “must specifically identify all matters the party
believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.71(d). Petitioner sets forth two matters it believes the Board overlooked or
misapprehended.
First, Petitioner acknowledges that we “looked at the portions of Chen that
Petitioner had cited” but that we “overlooked other portions of Chen that are now
made more relevant” in view of our claim construction. Req. Reh’g 1–2; see also
id. at 2–5 (setting forth the various portions in Chen that Petitioner asserts are now
made relevant). We could not have overlooked arguments not presented, however,
and Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of success.
35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
Second, Petitioner argues that we relied on a dictionary definition that may
not antedate the priority date of the ’482 patent. Req. Reh’g 5–6. Specifically,
Petitioner alleges the priority date of the ’482 patent is February 28, 2001, whereas
the dictionary we cited was dated simply 2001. Id. For the reasons discussed
below, Petitioner’s argument does not persuade us we overlooked or
misapprehended any matter.
IPR2014-00674
Patent 7,047,482 B1
3
Petitioner has not established that the filing date of the ’482 patent is the
pertinent date for dictionary use in this case. The Federal Circuit has stated that
“[o]ur decisions have not always been consistent as to whether the pertinent date
[for dictionaries] is the filing date of the application or the issue date of the patent.”
Inverness Medical v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365, 1370 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202–
1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (pertinent date is issue date); Schering Corp. v. Amgen,
Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (pertinent date is filing date)).
Notwithstanding, we consulted a dictionary published contemporaneously with the
filing date of the ’482 patent (i.e., the same year), which is probative of the
meaning of the term as of the filing date. There is no indication that the meaning
of the particular term here, “contemporaneous,” was at hazard of changing. Thus,
we see no error in our use of a dictionary published the same year the ’482 patent
was filed.
The lay definition that we cited was not used to establish a term of art or the
content of the prior art. Instead, after we determined that the specification of the
’482 patent did not provide meaningful guidance as to the meaning of the term
“contemporaneous,” we properly consulted a dictionary as an aid in determining
the meaning of the term. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Judges are free to . . . rely on dictionary definitions
when construing claim terms, so long as [it] does not contradict any definition
found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents”)). We determined
that this meaning was consistent with the intrinsic record of the ’482 patent. See
Dec. Deny Inst. 7–9.
IPR2014-00674
Patent 7,047,482 B1
4
In view of the above, we are not persuaded we overlooked or
misapprehended any matter Petitioner has alleged in its request for rehearing.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is denied.

For Petitioner
Steven Yu
Email: syu@patent-intercept.com
John J. Yim
jyim@yimassociates.com

For Patent Owner:
Eugenio J. Torres-Oyola
Víctor M. Rodríguez-Reyes
Rafael Rodríguez-Muriel
José A. Medina
Email: etorres@ferraiuoli.com
Email: vrodriguezreyes@ferraiuoli.com
Email: jmedina@ferraiuoli.com