International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 20, 2014

14-CB-101524 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 20, 2014)

JD–38–14
Des Moines, IA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
WASHINGTON, DC
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL
STAGE EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE
TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND ALLIED CRAFTS Case 14–CB–101524
OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES
AND CANADA LOCAL NO. 151 (SMG AND THE
FREEMAN COMPANIES d/b/a FREEMAN
DECORATING SERVICES, INC.)
and
KATIE M. MARTENS, an Individual
William F. LeMaster, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Krista Carlson, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
Katie M. Martens, Esq.,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Lincoln,
Nebraska, on January 22 and 23, 2014. Katie M. Martens (the Charging Party) filed the initial
charge on March 29, 2013, and amended it on October 29, 2013.1 On November 5, 2013, the
General Counsel issued the complaint against the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its
Territories and Canada Local No. 151 (SMG and the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman
Decorating Services, Inc.) (the Respondent).2 The Respondent filed a timely answer denying all
material allegations. (GC Exhs. 1-A to 1-N.)

1 All dates hereinafter are in 2012, unless otherwise indicated.
2 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s exhibit; “CP Exh.” for Charging Party’s exhibits; “ALJ
Exh.” for administrative law judge exhibit; “Jt. Exh.” for joint exhibit; “GC Br.” for General Counsel’s
brief; “R Br.” for Respondent’s brief; and “CP Br.” for Charging Party’s brief.
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2
The complaint alleges that the Respondent operated an exclusive hiring hall, and utilizing
it, attempted to cause or caused employers to violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in violation of
Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the Act) by the following 5
conduct: Since September 29, the Respondent has discriminated against nonunion employees by
granting priority to Respondent’s members for job referrals from its exclusive hiring hall for
employment with the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services, Inc. (Freeman),
SMG, and other employers;3 on or about February 4 and 5, 2013, the Respondent failed and
refused to refer employees Sheila Brunkhorst (Brunkhorst) and Tony Polanka (Polanka Junior)410
from its exclusive hiring hall to Freeman;5 on or about February 7, 2013, the Respondent
suspended from its referral list Brunkhorst, Les Haake (Haake), Dennis Hansen (Hansen), Steve
Hike (Hike), Danny Ladely (Ladely), Anthony Polanka (Polanka Senior)6 and Polanka Junior.7
The complaint also alleges that Respondent separately violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the
following conduct: Since September 29, the Respondent maintained a rule in its constitution and 15
bylaws prohibiting legal proceedings against it by employees without providing for the 4-month
limitation on such prohibition required by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) Section 101(a)(4);8 since September 29, the Respondent has maintained referral rules
that allow for the refusal to refer an employee to enforce the collection of a fine and/or
assessment;9 since September 29, the Respondent failed and refused to remit V fund moneys to 20
employees who are not members of the Respondent;10 and since November 26, the Respondent
has failed and refused to remit V fund moneys to Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka
Senior.11
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and 25
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
30
The complaint alleges that Freeman is an employer that has maintained an agreement and
practice requiring that the Respondent be the exclusive source of referrals of employees.
Freeman, a corporation with an office and place of business in Des Moines, Iowa, provides event

3 This allegation is alleged in par. 7(d) of the complaint.
4 Tony Polanka is the son of Anthony Polanka. Although his legal name is “Tony Polanka,” there
was testimony that members referred to him as Junior and Anthony Polanka as Senior in order to
distinguish between the father and son. Therefore, I will continue that distinction in this decision.
5 This allegation is alleged in par. 7(e) of the complaint.
6 The parties stipulated that Polanka Senior died on April 13, 2013.
7 This allegation is alleged in par. 7(f) of the complaint.
8 This allegation is alleged in par. 6 of the complaint.
9 This allegation is alleged in par. 7(c) of the complaint.
10 This allegation is alleged in par. 8(b) of the complaint.
11 This allegation is alleged in par. 8(c) of the complaint.
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3
and exhibition planning, setup, and management for convention and trade shows. I find that in
conducting its operations during the 12-month period ending September 30, 2013, Freeman
performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in states other than the State of Iowa.12 I also
find that Freeman is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act. (GC Exh. 35.)5
The complaint also alleges that SMG (herein called SMG/Pershing)13 is an employer that
has maintained an agreement and practice requiring that the Respondent be the exclusive source
of referrals of employees. SMG/Pershing, a corporation with an office and place of business in
Lincoln, Nebraska, is engaged in the business of managing, marketing, and developing 10
entertainment venues for governmental and commercial enterprises. I find that SMG has
purchased services valued in excess of $50,000 which were furnished to SMG/Pershing directly
from points outside the State of Nebraska within the last 12 months. I also find that SMG is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The
Respondent, however, argues that SMG/Pershing Center does not meet the Board’s discretionary 15
monetary standards. The Respondent contends that because testimony on this point was not
limited to SMG/Pershing but rather addressed the purchase of services by SMG as a corporation,
which manages over 200 different facilities globally, the discretionary monetary standard has not
been established.
20
I find the Respondent’s argument is without merit. Thomas Lorenz (Lorenz), general
manager of Pinnacle Bank Arena and Pershing Center for SMG, testified that SMG has
purchased services in excess of $50,000 from entities outside the State of Nebraska within the
last 12 months. It is irrelevant whether this amount applies to SMG globally or only
SMG/Pershing. The Respondent failed to provide case law to support an argument for making a 25
distinction. Board law is contrary to the Respondent’s argument. In Siemons Mailing Service,14
the Board explained “Under the new standards, the Board will continue to apply the concept that
it is the impact on commerce of the totality of an employer’s operations that should determine
whether or not the Board will assert jurisdiction over a particular employer. (Footnote omitted.)
Accordingly, the Board will continue its past practice of totaling the commerce of all of an 30
employer’s plants or locations to determine whether the appropriate jurisdictional standard is
met.” Based on this standard, SMG clearly meets the jurisdictional standard.
Further, I find that the alleged unfair labor practices at issue are exactly the type of
activities Congress envisioned when passing the Act. Changing the terms and conditions of 35
employment in retaliation for engaging in concerted activity would tend to lead to a labor dispute
that would “burden or obstruct commerce” or the “free flow” of commerce. The Respondent has
alleged that the actions have caused the loss of labor calls. Therefore, presumably, reducing the
amount of services sold intrastate and the amount of services needed to purchase from interstate
suppliers, thus burdening the “free flow” of commerce. Stoppage or disruption of work in 40

12 Pursuant to the NLRB investigation into the charges, Freeman acknowledged that it met the
Board’s discretionary monetary standards and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. (GC Exh. 35.)
13 SMG refers to the entity that manages venues globally. SMG/Pershing refers to SMG’s local
management of the Pershing Center venue in Lincoln, Nebraska.
14 122 NLRB 81, 84 (1958).
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Lincoln involves interruptions in the steady stream into and out of Nebraska, of credit, cash, and
supplies. Congress has explicitly regulated transactions and goods in interstate commerce and
also activities which in isolation might be found to be “merely local but in the interlacings of
business across state lines adversely affect such commerce.” See Polish National Alliance v.
NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).5
Accordingly, I find that SMG purchased services valued in excess of $50,000 which were
furnished to SMG at the Pershing Center directly from points outside the State of Nebraska, and
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
10
The Respondent admits, and I find that it is a labor organization. However, the
Respondent denies that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The Respondent provided no bases or arguments to support the reasons for its denial.
Section 2(5) of the Act reads:15
The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 20
work.
The evidence contains collective-bargaining agreements that the Respondent has entered
into with various employers on behalf of its membership, and testimony from the Respondent’s
officials about negotiating wages, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of 25
employment on behalf of its membership. Finally, the Respondent’s constitution and bylaws
make it abundantly clear that it considers itself a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. (GC Exh. 8.) Therefore, I find that the Respondent is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES30
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operation
The Respondent is a union that represents individuals (members and nonmembers) in
Lincoln, Nebraska, to provide set-up, support, and tear-down of the equipment and staging 35
requirements for entertainers and exhibitors producing shows in Nebraska. (GC Exh. 12.)
Trades represented by the Respondent, include but are not limited to, stagehands, lighting
technicians, and rigging technicians. The current membership is approximately low 30s. In
2013, the following members were elected to the Respondent’s executive board: President
Denny Buffum (Buffum), Vice President Breck Shilling (Shilling), Secretary Erik Holy (Holy),1540
Treasurer Eugene Trausch (Trausch), Business Agent T. Perry Gillaspie (Gillaspie), and
Sergeant at Arms John Green (Green). Polanka Junior immediately preceded Gillaspie as the

15 Business Agent T. Perry Gillaspie testified that GC Exh. 2 is an accurate list of the officers elected
from 2007 to 2013 but notes that in 2012, three people held the secretary position at separate times.
JD–38–14
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Respondent’s business agent. The executive board oversees the Respondent’s general
operations. During the same period, the following individuals served as the Respondent’s
trustees: Gary Larsen (Larsen), Brian Wait (Wait), and Tom Stickney (Stickney). (GC Exh. 2.)
B. Respondent’s Referral Committee and Job Referral Rules5
In 2012 and 2013, the Respondent’s referral committee developed a list of qualified
individuals within the industry and referred those individuals for jobs with outside employers.
(Tr. 28–30.) In 2013, Gillaspie, Jessie Snyder (Snyder), Larsen, Wait, and Michael Madcharo
(Madcharo) were appointed by Buffum to serve on the referral committee. As the business 10
agent, Gillaspie was responsible for, among other duties, referring members and nonmembers for
jobs as they became available.
The referral committee’s duties are also codified at Section 6.0 of the Respondent’s work
rules which states15
6.1 The President of the Union shall appoint a Referral Committee consisting of five (5)
Union members in good standing, the term of office shall be for one year.
6.2 The Referral Committee shall be responsible for hearing complaints regarding the 20
operation of this Referral System and shall hear all appeals concerning these rules. The
Referral Committee shall not have the authority to change these rules.
6.3 Three (3) members of the Referral Committee shall constitute a quorum, All
decisions shall be made by a majority vote of those members present at any meeting.25
6.4 The Referral Committee shall meet as the need arises, or when so call by the
Executive Board.
Section 6.0 of the work rules explains the reasons for suspending or removing individuals 30
from the referral list and subsequent penalties. It reads
7.1 The Union may suspend or remove individuals from the referral list as follows:
7.1.1 Any person who commits a major or minor offense in violation of the Disciplinary 35
Code will be notified in writing to the referents last known address listing the date and
nature of the offense. The referent will be suspended ten (10) calendar days after receipt
of written notice unless the person has filed a timely appeal. In case of appeal, no penalty
shall be imposed until the appeal procedure has been completed except in cases of serious
offense. All letters of recommendation and offenses shall be kept on file indefinitely.40
7.1.2 Referral fees are due and payable at receipt of paycheck and shall be deducted
from said paycheck by Local 151’s payroll service.
JD–38–14
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7.1.3 Referents obtaining Stage and Convention work within the Union’s jurisdiction
without being referred by the Union or without permission of the Business Representative
will be removed immediately from the Referral List.
7.1.4 A referent that voluntarily removes his/her name from the Referral List, and later 5
wishes to return to the Referral List shall be required to notify the Union in writing of
same. The referral committee has the right to accept or reject the request.
(GC Exh. 7.) It is undisputed that these work rules pertaining to the referral list were in effect
during the relevant period.10
C. Complete Payroll Service, Inc.’s Agreements with Respondent and Gillaspie
In January 2013, the Respondent contracted with Complete Payroll Service, Inc.
(Complete), located in Omaha, Nebraska, to provide its payroll and accounting services. (GC 15
Exhs. 10, 11.) Anthony Gross is president of Complete. His brother, John Gross, also plays a
role in the overall operation of the company. In February or March 2013, Gillaspie was hired by
Complete as the full time labor director.
On or about October 4, 2013, the Respondent entered into an agreement with Complete 20
which read in relevant part:
3. IATSE Local No. 151 fulfills these requirements [to provide set-up, support, and tear-
down of the equipment and stage requirements for entertainers and exhibitors producing
shows in Nebraska] by contracting with Complete Payroll who provides Complete 25
Payroll employees to perform such services. The Complete Payroll employees may be
IATSE Local No. 151 members or may be non-members. Hereinafter said persons shall
be referred to as “IATSE workers” to distinguish them from other Complete Payroll
employees.
30
5. The IATSE Local No. 151 member and non-member workers who are provided to the
production companies and others through IATSE Local No. 151’s organization are solely
employees of Complete Payroll.
(GC Exhs. 12, 13.) Also, once Complete became the payroll processing company for the 35
Respondent, the Respondent notified members that they had to submit to Complete an updated
W-4 form, I-9 form (employment eligibility), authorization for direct deposit form, blank check,
copy of their social security card, and valid state identification. (GC Exh. 28.) The information
was needed to process and disburse the members’ paychecks.
40
Likewise, Complete entered into a contract with Gillaspie on October 4, 2013. The
contract listed his duties as:
a. Hire, direct, and supervise the Complete Payroll employees that IATSE Local No. 151
provides to the contractors through IATSE Local No. 151’s organization (Perry Gillaspie 45
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may do so either directly or by delegation of these duties to the person of his choosing);
and
b. Collect the funds from the contractors that have contracted with IATSE Local No. 151
and who have used Complete Payroll’s employees through IATSE Local No. 151’s 5
organization.
(GC Exh. 13.) According to Gillaspie, in January 2013, the Respondent’s referral committee
relinquished all referral duties to him as labor director for Complete and retained only the
responsibility of creating the referral list. However, I do not credit his testimony on this point. It 10
is clear that the contractual language between Complete and Gillaspie authorized him to fire
IATSE workers, both members and nonmembers.16 Further, if he needed assistance referring
individuals for jobs, two employees at Complete helped him to fill job requests from employers,
and one of the executive board members can also assisted. Likewise, it is established that
Gillaspie maintained his position as the Respondent’s business agent, even after his hiring as 15
Complete’s labor director. Despite his argument that the Respondent no longer exercises control
over the referral process, the evidence establishes otherwise.
As noted above, the Respondent’s referral rules were in effect during the relevant period.
Those rules show that the Respondent, through its referral committee, had ultimate control over 20
who was placed and remained on, and removed from the referral list. (GC Exh. 7.) Gillaspie’s
duties as Complete’s labor director are the same as his responsibilities as the Respondent’s
business agent. The Respondent’s constitution and bylaws gives the business agent full charge
of the Respondent’s local office and authority to represent it in all dealings with employers.
Gillaspie’s contract with Complete simply reinforces that authority. Further, it was in his role as 25
the Respondent’s business agent that Gillaspie exercised his authority not to refer members
(Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior) for jobs with outside employers (which I will discuss in more
detail later). Gillaspie’s testimony on this issue is also suspect because he gave shifting
testimony in response to often leading questions by counsel for the Respondent. As an example,
he explained “At some point last year in early spring, I turned [the referral list] over to the 30
referral committee and then they turned it back over to me to be used. So at that point, they took
possession of the referral list.” (Tr. 134.) This appears to be a complicated way to say that the
Respondent maintains control of the referral process but allows Gillaspie, as its agent and
Complete’s labor director, to administer those duties.
35
D. Gillaspie’s Responsibilities for Developing & Administering the Referral Process
Within 3 months of being appointed to the Respondent’s referral committee, Gillaspie
resigned because he felt it was a conflict with his position as labor director with Complete.
However, he retained his position on the Respondent’s executive board as the business agent. 40
Gillaspie explained that when he became the business agent no one gave him a referral list,
billing information, referral procedures, telephone or telephone line. The only resources he
received to enable him to carry out his responsibilities of referring individuals for work was a
computer stripped of data and a list of the names of approximately 30 members with phone

16 Gillaspie explained that nonmembers also refers to casual and extra workers. (Tr. 80.)
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numbers. The list of names he received for referrals did not contain nonmember names. Since
the list did not contain the members’ seniority dates, he created a new referral list starting with
these names and gave them all a seniority date of January 1, 2012, regardless of their initiation
date into the union. Nonmembers that worked the Blake Shelton concert were also given a
seniority day of January 1, 2012. (Tr. 129.) Subsequent names were added to the referral list in 5
sequential order, regardless of whether they were union members. In his affidavit to the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB/the Board) Gillaspie explained his referral practice as follows
“So if I receive a request for five stagehands from Pershing Center, I will go into my
referral program and start at the top of the list, which is based on their experience. I then 10
go down the list based on qualifications and ability. After I go through our Local 151
member list, I will sometimes contact IATSE Local 42 and other sister locals to see if
they have any qualified journeyman available. At that point, I will go through my casual
or extra list. The membership is aware of my referral process. I have announced my
process to them on more than one occasion.”15
(Tr. 87.)17
After leading questions posed to him by the Respondent’s counsel, Gillaspie changed his
testimony by noting that he found qualification more important to him in making referrals than 20
experience of availability and he defined experience and seniority as the same. (Tr. 128, 133.)
E. Alleged Unlawful Provisions in Respondent’s Constitution, Bylaws, and Work Rules
It is alleged that the provisions under Section 9.0 of the Respondent’s work rules are 25
unlawful because they authorize the removal from the referral list of employees who have been
fined for misconduct or rule violations until the fine has been satisfied. The relevant sections
read
9.1.3 Any referent who fails to show up for work and/or walks off a job after accepting 30
a referral shall be subject to the following:
9.1.3.1 First offense in a twelve month period: $50.00 assessment and removal from the
referral list until the fine is paid.
35
9.1.3.2 Second offense is a twelve month period: $100.00 fine and removal from the
referral list until the fine is paid.

17 During the hearing Gillaspie attempted to disavow this portion of his affidavit. He claimed that he
misspoke and he should have explained that he always refers the qualified individual first and then the
most experienced person who is available. He denied considering a person’s journeyman status in
making his referral decisions. (Tr. 82–84, 88–89.) I do not credit his denial that the statement he made in
his affidavit was incorrect. In May 2013, Gillaspie provided his affidavit to the Board’s agent.
Presumably, he reviewed his affidavit and had ample time to notify the Board’s agent or the Respondent’s
counsel of any inaccuracies. Notably, Gillaspie repeated the testimony he gave in the affidavit to the
Respondent’s counsel when she contacted him for clarification requested by the Region. (Tr. 83–88; GC
Exh. 24.)
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9.1.3.3 Third Offense in a twelve month period: one year suspension with the
suspension to begin on the date of conviction through one calendar year. The suspended
referent is not to perform any bargaining unit work while under the imposed suspension.
Upon completion of the suspension year, the suspended individual shall have the right to 5
petition the Referral Committee for review and possible reinstatement on the list. This
decision shall be made solely by the Referral Committee; all decisions on these matters
shall be final and binding on all parties.
(GC Exh. 7.)10
Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).
Section 101(a)(4) reads
Protection of the Right to Sue—No labor organization shall limit the right of any member 15
thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative
agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization of its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a
labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative
proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: 20
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any
officer thereof; And provided further, That no interested employer or employer
association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a 25
party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.
The Respondent’s current local constitution and bylaws were in effect during the relevant
period. (GC Exh. 8.) It is undisputed that article 12, section 6.0 of the local constitution and
bylaws addresses exhaustion of internal remedies but does not mention the 4-month limitation 30
required by the LMRDA.
F. Marriott Cornhusker Job Referral Incident on February 4 and 5
The underlying event leading to the charge that the Respondent unlawfully failed to refer 35
Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior for a job occurred on February 5, 2013. On that date, Polanka
Junior was driving past the Marriott Cornhusker Hotel (Cornhusker Hotel) and spotted a
Freeman truck in front. Since he was first on the referral list for Freeman work and was not
contacted, he decided to stop in the hotel to investigate. Polanka Junior spoke to Wes Backstrom
(Backstrom)18 who explained he had been called to work the job with Dan Stoner (Dan), Dale 40
Stoner (Dale), and Brian Wait (Wait). Backstrom told him they had set up the event space on
February 4, 2013 and returned on February 5, 2013 to clear the event space (also referred to as a
teardown). Polanka Junior tried to contact Buffum to get information on why he was not called

18 Backstrom is the foreman for Freeman and was supervising the job at the hotel on February 4 and
5, 2013.
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to work the Freeman job but was only able to leave a voicemail message. Buffum never returned
his call. Polanka Junior left the hotel but returned with Brunkhorst later the same day because
she was also higher on the seniority list than Dan, Dale, and Wait. They saw Dale and Dan
outside the hotel and asked them when they received the call to work the Freeman job. Dan and
Dale responded, “. . . if we were going to bump them off because they knew we had seniority 5
over them, and we said no. . . .” (Tr. 249.) The conversation lasted 2 to 5 minutes. Polanka
Junior and Brunkhorst proceeded inside to the hotel’s ballroom and encountered Wait. They had
a discussion that lasted about 5 minutes.19 Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior left, and once outside
of the hotel, Polanka Junior encountered Trausch and made a sarcastic comment to him. Trausch
responded that he had been called to the jobsite “because there could be some kind of 10
disturbance going on at the Cornhusker Hotel.” (Tr. 253.) Polanka Junior complained that he
and Brunkhorst were not referred for the Freeman job at the hotel. Trausch responded, “. . . we
needed to support the elected board and their decisions, I needed to support. As far as us getting
along with the Local, we just needed to drop the lawsuits and discuss this and try to solve it
within the Local without involving other legal means to resolve internal union affairs.” (Tr. 15
466.) Brunkhorst went to her car and Polanka Junior continued talking with Trausch about the
need for the union members to solve their differences and work harmoniously. The entire
conversation lasted less than 10 minutes.
G. Vacation Fund (V-Fund) Procedures and Payments20
For approximately 20 years, the Respondent has maintained a vacation account
commonly referred to as the V-Fund. (Tr. 58.) Members were paid bonuses annually from the
fund based on 5 percent of the employee’s gross earnings. The moneys in the fund were derived
from a portion of the processing fee the Respondent charged for referring workers to employers. 25
In addition to payment for payment of wages for hours worked, the employers paid a processing
fee to the Respondent. Over the years the fee has ranged from 29.7 and 31.5 percent. Included
in the processing fee were expenses that the Respondent had for State and Federal taxes, Social
Security contributions, worker’s compensation, general liability insurance, payroll processing,

19 There was conflicting testimony about whether the exchange was loud and its proximity to other
individuals in the ballroom. Wait testified that during the discussion with Junior and Brunkhorst, Junior
swore at him, and he felt threatened by them. According to Wait the disagreement involved raised voices,
and it occurred within 12-feet of some of the event’s participants with no background noise to keep them
from overhearing the heated exchange. (Tr. 420–421.) Junior denied swearing at Wait. He and
Brunkhorst allege that Wait started the conversation by telling them it was not the appropriate time or
place for a confrontation to which Junior responded “Now you see why this Union is screwed up.” (Tr.
250–251.) According to Junior and Brunkhorst, the brief exchange was carried on at a normal
conversational level in a corner of the 75 feet by 75 feet ballroom. Junior testified that during his and
Brunkhorst’s conversation with Wait, the only other people nearby were Dan, Dale, and Backstrom who
were all standing about 10 to 15 feet from them. I find the overall evidence supports my finding that
Polanka Junior’s and Brunkhorst’s version of the conversation was more credible than Wait’s rendition.
There was no third-party testimony to support Wait’s version. Although Backstrom mentioned the
incident to Scott Young, Freeman’s sales manager, he found it so uneventful that he could not recall the
details. There is also no credible evidence that Freeman ever complained to the Respondent about
Polanka Junior’s and Brunkhorst’s action that day. Based on the totality of the evidence and the
witnesses’ overall demeanor, I do not find Wait’s testimony credible on this point.
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and unemployment insurance. The processing fee also included 5percent for the V-fund bonus
and 5 percent for member directed retirement benefit (cash annuity). ( GC Exh. 27.) Despite
receiving a processing fee from employers for both members and nonmembers, the Respondent
disbursed the annual V-fund bonus only to members. The portion of the fee received for
nonmembers remained in the Respondent’s treasury. (GC Exh. 31.)5
H. Nonpayment of V-Fund Bonus in 2012
Except for the sergeant at arms, John Green, all of the local union officers in 2012 were
newly elected.20 Following the election of new local leaders, an issue arose regarding the 10
continued annual payment of the V-fund. Beginning with the February monthly membership
meeting and throughout 2012, the trustees and other officers discussed suspending payment of
the V-fund bonus for 2011 and not issuing them at all for 2012 because of a lack of funds. In the
February membership meeting Buffum told the members that the V-fund bonus would not be
paid in 2012. During the March membership meeting, it was noted that “hopefully” the 15
following month V-fund bonus checks would be paid. (GC Exh. 17.) At the April membership
meeting Gillaspie put forth a motion to pay the V-fund bonuses to members when funds became
available. The motion proposed to authorize payment of the V-fund bonuses to members for
work performed in 2011. The motion was seconded by Tom Stickney (Stickney) and approved
by the membership. In about April, the Respondent gave members forms to complete and return 20
to receive their V-fund bonus. (GC Exhs. 16, 17.) The form read in part:
Calendar Year 2011 expenses exceeded income by approximately $25,000. Funds for the
V Fund check were transferred from the Local 151 treasury (CD). Please check the
appropriate box and return to the treasurer. ASAS25
___ For the good of the local, I decline a V fund check for the calendar year 2011
___ Taking a V fund check is financially irresponsible for the local, however, I choose to
claim a V fund check for the calendar year 2011.30
(GC Exh. 16.) Several of the members signed the form and accepted the V-fund bonus, while
other members chose not to receive the funds. (GC Exh. 16.) Additionally, some of the
members objected to the form’s language and others objected to a requirement that they had to
sign the form in order to receive their check. Specifically, Brunkhorst, Haake, Hansen, Hike, 35
Ladely, Polanka Senior, and Polanka Junior objected to signing the form.
Prior to the Respondent’s June membership meeting, Polanka Senior and Haake
consulted an attorney about the legality of the form sent to members to sign to receive their V-
fund bonuses. By letter dated May 30, the attorney, Joy Shiffermiller (Shiffermiller), notified the 40
Respondent that she had consulted with some members of the local about V-fund payments and
determined that failure to pay the bonus “is in violation of the wage payment and collection act.”
(GC Exh. 14.) The letter also read:

20 In 2012, Brian Wait became the only new trustee. Dean Smith’s term as trustee expired in January
2013 and Gary Larson’s term as trustee expired in January 2014. (GC Exh. 2.)
JD–38–14
12
In addition, the contract is still in force for this entire year so current comments about
discontinuing the payment for this next year is inappropriate.
(GC Exh. 14.) During the June membership meeting, the letter from Shiffermiller was discussed. 5
The meeting’s notes describes the discussion that occurred about the attorney’s letter threatening
action for nonpayment of the V-fund bonus as follows:
V-Fund: Discussion about letter from lawyer, Denny reads pledge calls out people who
went to the lawyer and broke their pledge. . . . Lawyer letter: no one takes responsibility, 10
Perry talks about meetings are the forum to state case, no joy there you [go] to
international, if not then you go outside. The letter writers didn’t do this, breaking their
pledge to the Union, and didn’t have the courage to stand up and take responsibility for
doing it in open meeting.
15
(GC Exh. 17.) Several union members again voiced their objections to the language of the
original form sent to members to sign to receive a V-fund bonus payment. After much
discussion, Gillaspie agreed to modify the form to delete the offending language and extend the
deadline for signing and submitting the form to receive the V-fund bonus to June 15. (GC Exh.
17; Tr. 60–61.) The modified form read:20
Would you like a V-Fund check for 2011?
___ Yes
25
___ No
(GC Exh. 16.)
The treasurer’s report dated June 4 indicates that 26 members submitted the V-fund 30
request forms for work performed in 2011. Among those 26 members who submitted the forms,
13 declined a bonus check and 13 members accepted it. Following the June 4 treasurer’s report,
Hansen and Haake submitted forms requesting a V-fund check for 2011. By the June 15
deadline, Brunkhorst, Polanka Junior, Haake, and Hansen submitted their request to receive V-
fund payments. (GC Exh. 16, 17.) There is no indication that prior to June 15, Hike, Ladely, or 35
Polanka Senior submitted the V-fund request form for work performed in 2011. Subsequent to
the June membership meeting, Haake had several conversations with Gillaspie inquiring about
when the remaining members would receive their V-fund money. Gillaspie told him that the
Respondent’s treasurer or trustees did not want to sign the V-fund bonus checks. Further,
Gillaspie informed Haake that he would likely seek legal advice about issuing payments from the 40
V-fund. Despite Gillaspie’s response, the Respondent paid all other members except Haake,
Hansen, Hike, Ladely, Polanka Senior, and those members who rejected the payment.
45
JD–38–14
13
I. Suspension from the Referral List for Seven Members in 2013
By letter dated February 7, 2013, the Respondent notified seven of its members that they
were suspended from the referral list for the remainder of the 2013 calendar year. Brunkhorst,
Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, Polanka Senior, and Polanka Junior received suspension letters. 5
(GC Exh. 20.) Brunkhorst, Haake, and Polanka Junior were also notified orally of their
suspensions. (Tr. 254–255, 294, 319–320.) Each of the seven members was suspended for the
same actions. However, Brunkhorst, Polanka Junior, and Polanka Senior were also notified of
additional bases for their suspensions
10
J. Underlying Incidents that Formed the Bases of the Seven Members’ Suspensions in 2013
On September 20, Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka Senior filed a lawsuit in the
County Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Respondent’s failure to pay their V-fund bonuses was a violation of the Nebraska Wage Payment 15
and Collection Act. (GC Exh. 18.) On November 26, the Respondent responded to the lawsuit
and also filed a counterclaim. (GC Exh. 19.) As of the date of the hearing, the lawsuit was
pending, and the Respondent had not paid the V-fund bonus for work performed in 2011 to
Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka Senior. (Tr. 63.)
20
The letter issued to Haake, Hansen, Hike, and Ladely describes the action that caused
their suspension as follows:
Bringing suit against Local 151 before exhausting procedures for redress outlined in
Local 151’s Constitution and Bylaws. As a result of this suit, venues and employers of 25
Local 151 have expressed concern about the Local’s ability [to] meet its duties and
obligations, and questioned the solidarity of the Local.
(GC Exh. 20.) This was the only reason given to Haake, Hansen, Hike, and Ladely as the basis
for their suspension.30
In addition to filing a lawsuit against the Respondent, Polanka Senior’s letter informed
him that he was also suspended from the referral list for:
Discussing Local 151’s internal matters with current and potential clients of Local 151 in 35
a manner designed to embarrass and denigrate the Local. This action places existing and
future contract relationships with these organizations at risk.
(GC Exh. 20.) The underlying incident giving rise to the second reason for Polanka Senior’s
suspension was his meeting with Brunkhorst and Donald Adams (Adams), the production 40
manager for SMG Lincoln and the Nebraska State Fair, to resolve Brunkhorst’s wage dispute.
(Tr. 68–71, 159–160.)
The Respondent notified Polanka Junior that he was suspended for the following reasons:
45
JD–38–14
14
1) Visiting Local 151’s payroll service on 31 January 2013 and a [sic] creating a
disturbance at their place of business. This disturbance resulted in the potential loss of
business to Complete Payroll, placed Local 151’s new relationship with Complete Payroll
at risk, and brought embarrassment to the Local.
5
2) Interfering with Local 151’s call at the Cornhusker Hotel on 4 February 2012. These
actions caused the client Freeman Decorating to question the Local’s ability to complete
the call in a competent manner, embarrassed Freeman Decorating in from of its client the
Nebraska Bankers Association, and embarrassed the Local in front of Freeman
Decorating and the Nebraska Bankers Association.10
(GC Exh. 20.) The reasons given for Polanka Junior’s suspension refer to his visit with
Brunkhorst to Complete’s offices on January 31, 2013, and his encounter on February 5, 2013,
with several workers at the Cornhusker Hotel that was discussed earlier in the decision.
15
Brunkhorst’s letter informed her that she was being suspended from the referral list
because of the following actions:
1) Bringing suit against Local 151 before exhausting procedures for redress outlined in
Local 151’s Constitution and Bylaws. As a result of this suit, venues and employers of 20
Local 151 have expressed concern about the Local’s ability [to] meet its duties and
obligations, and questioned the solidarity of the Local.
2) Discussing Local 151’s internal matters with current and potential clients of Local 151
in a manner designed to embarrass and denigrate the Local. This action places existing 25
and future contract relationships with these organizations at risk.
3) Visiting Local 151’s Payroll Service on 31 January 2013 and a [sic] creating a
disturbance at their place of business. This disturbance resulted in the potential loss of
business to Complete Payroll, placed Local 151’s new relationship with Complete Payroll 30
at risk, and brought embarrassment to the Local.
4) Interfering with Local 151’s call at the Cornhusker Hotel on 4 February 2012. These
actions caused the client Freeman Decorating to question the Local’s ability to complete
the call in a competent manner, embarrassed Freeman Decorating in from of its client the 35
Nebraska Bankers Association, and embarrassed the Local in front of Freeman
Decorating and the Nebraska Bankers Association.
(GC Exh. 20.) Brunkhorst’s suspension letter references as the bases for her suspension the
small claims action she filed against the Respondent on January 11, 2013; her discussion with 40
Adams to resolve her wage dispute for work she performed at the Nebraska State Fair; her visit
on January 31, 2013, with Polanka Junior to Complete’s office and discussion with one of its
owners; and her visit on February 5, 2013, with Polanka Junior to the Cornhusker Hotel.
The encounter between Brunkhorst, Polanka Junior, and other members at the 45
Cornhusker Hotel has been discussed earlier in this decision. Another incident that formed one
JD–38–14
15
of the bases for Brunkhorst’s suspension involved her repeated complaints about her wages for
working the Nebraska State Fair. Since 1995, Brunkhorst has worked the Nebraska State Fair
held annually in August. She is always referred for the job through the Respondent’s business
agent. In August 2012, she worked at the state fair but did not receive timely payment. She
raised the topic with the Respondent at the October membership. Brunkhorst explained, “I asked 5
if the State Fair bill had been presented to the State Fair board. At that point, it had not been.
The business agent [Gillaspie] presented me a version that he was going to present to the State
Fair board.” (Tr. 321.) She “pointed out” some mistakes in the bill to Gillaspie who refused to
make any changes to the bill. During the meeting, she questioned other members who had also
worked the state fair about their pay. Brunkhorst discovered that those members also felt that the 10
Respondent was not adequately paying them for the work they performed. After determining
that her proposed pay for the event was inaccurate, Brunkhorst contacted Adams. She asked
Adams if she could review a copy of the State Fair bill he received from the Respondent’s
business agent, Gillaspie. She told Adams that the billing for her services was incorrect.
Brunkhorst also mentioned to him (presumably at a later conversation) that she and other union 15
members had filed a small claims lawsuit against the Respondent. Adam’s provided
corroborating testimony that Brunkhorst never made negative comments about the Respondent to
him.
During the November membership meeting, Brunkhorst again raised the issue of her pay 20
for the Nebraska State Fair. The Respondent did not respond to her concerns. Brunkhorst “. . .
sent an email in early December to the president [Buffum] outlining the mistakes that [she]
found in the bill and the additional payments [she] felt that [she] deserved.” (Tr. 326.) She also
broached the topic at the December membership meeting. The Respondent asked Brunkhorst to
attend its executive board meeting to talk about the wage issue and she agreed. However, she 25
left without presenting her concerns because of a disagreement with the executive board about
whether she could video tape the meeting. She also consulted with Polanka Senior and Polanka
Junior in their capacity as former officers for the Respondent. Polanka Senior contacted Adams
on Brunkhorst’s behalf without disparaging the Respondent. Despite her and other members’
efforts, the Respondent did not resolve to Brunkhorst’s satisfaction her concerns about her wages 30
for working the Nebraska State Fair. Consequently, on January 11, 2013, Brunkhorst filed a
small claims action against the Respondent in the County Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska
for wages owed. (GC Exh. 21.)
Another basis for Brunkhorst’s suspension was her visit with Polanka Junior to 35
Complete’s office. On January 31, 2013, Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior went to Complete’s
office in Omaha, Nebraska, to submit their W-4 forms and ask why they received paychecks
despite their failure to provide the requested documents. They spoke with John Gross in his
office and asked to review the payroll documents that were on file for them. Polanka Junior
wanted to review the paperwork Complete had on file for him because the name on his paycheck 40
was inaccurate. John Gross could not find any paperwork on Polanka Junior or Brunkhorst but
told them that he would speak with his brother, Anthony, about the matter and get back with
them. They also questioned him about the contract between the Respondent and Complete. John
Gross assured them that it was a written signed 2-year contract and verified that Complete’s fee
for handling the Respondent’s payroll services was 22.5 percent. Their discussion with John 45
JD–38–14
16
Gross was cordial and lasted approximately 20 minutes.21 Brunkhorst provided corroborating
testimony about their conversation with John Gross.
K. Exclusive Hiring Hall5
1. SMG/Pershing
A threshold question in this case is whether the Respondent operated an exclusive hiring
hall with SMG/Pershing and Freeman. The General Counsel alleges the Respondent maintained 10
an exclusive referral relationship with SMG/Pershing through contractual language and practice.
The Respondent counters that there was not an exclusive hiring hall agreement with
SMG/Pershing because its contract with SMG/Pershing was 1) never ratified by the local
membership; 2) was negotiated by someone who lacked authority to do so; 3) the contract 15
expired on February 28, 2012, and the Respondent has not maintained a written agreement with
SMG/Pershing since the expiration of the contract; and 4) the contract language does not
establish an exclusive referral relationship.
Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent’s and SMG/Pershing’s had a practice20
of SMG/Pershing utilizing labor referred through the Respondent before obtaining labor
elsewhere and that this establishes an exclusive referral relationship.
The Supreme Court defines “exclusive” within the context of the job referral system as:
25
The word “exclusive” when used with respect to the job referral systems is a term of art
denoting the degree to which hiring is reserved to the union hiring hall. Hiring is deemed
to be “exclusive,” for example, if the union retains sole authority to supply workers to the
employer up to a designated percentage of the work force or for some specified period of
time, such as 24 or 48 hours, before the employer can hire on his own.30
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 71
110 S.Ct. 424, 428 (1989). It is well established that an exclusive hiring hall may be created by
written or oral agreement or by practice. See Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters (Perry
Olsen Drywall), 358 NLRB No. 3, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2012), and cases cited therein. An 35
exclusive hiring hall exists when an employer has the right to reject individuals referred by a
union; is required to use a union for referrals for a certain time period; and has a contractual right

21 Gillaspie testified that based on unidentified reports, he was concerned that the Respondent’s and
Complete’s business relationship was endangered by Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s behavior at
Complete’s office. However, I do not credit his testimony on this point. Gillaspie’s testimony was vague
and in response to a leading question by the Respondent’s counsel. Further, there was no testimony from
John Gross disputing Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s description of their visit. Equally important,
there was no corroborating or other evidence to support Gillaspie’s testimony. It is also significant that
months after Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s visit to the Complete office, Complete signed a contract
for services with the Respondent and hired Gillaspie as its labor director. These actions are not indicative
of an endangered business relationship.
JD–38–14
17
to use a certain number or percentage of its own employees for a job. Breininger at 73, fn. 1;
Local 334 (Kvaerner Songer, Inc.), 335 NLRB 597, 599–600 (2001); Teamsters Local Union No.
174 (Totem Beverages, Inc.), 226 NLRB 690, 690 (1976).
It is undisputed that there is no collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the 5
parties. However, general manager for SMG/Pershing Center, Thomas Lorenz (Lorenz), was
responsible for establishing the bargaining relationship with the Respondent that has been in
existence for more than 18 years. (Tr. 197–198.) Although the Respondent and SMG/Pershing
did not have a ratified CBA, Lorenz and the Respondent’s business agent at the time, Polanka
Junior, signed a letter of understanding for Contracted Services (LOU) on May 18, 2011 and 10
May 4, 2011, respectively. The terms of the agreement were in effect from the date of signing
until February 28, 2012. (GC Exh. 3.) The relevant part of the LOU reads:
NON-EXCLUSIVE SERVICE PROVIDER:
15
On those occasions when Local 151 cannot meet the staffing demands of an event,
Pershing/SMG will supplement Local’s call with its own personnel or with another
service provider.
(GC Exh. 3.) Subsequently, the Respondent and SMG/Pershing added an addendum to the LOU 20
which clarified the fee structure for billable expenses. (GC Exh. 27.) Although the wage rate
has changed, the Respondent and SMG/Pershing continue to operate under the same terms of the
expired LOU with a few minor changes. (Tr. 200-201.)22
The Respondent argues that the LOU simply makes clear that SMG/Pershing can use its 25
own personnel or labor from other sources when the Respondent cannot meet SMG/Pershing’s
staffing needs. The Respondent presented witnesses to testify that SMG/Pershing did not
exclusively use workers referred by the Respondent to staff all of its jobs. For example, Wait
testified that “for many years” he has performed work for SMG/Pershing under his private
business, Brian Wait Lighting Services. He has also worked at the annual Rib Fest as the 30
lighting director for McCray Lighting and Production, which was hired by SMG/Pershing to
provide lighting for the event. (Tr. 392–393.) According to Wait, he worked other events at
SMG/Pershing through his private company without being referred by the Respondent.
I find that Wait’s testimony, however, is insufficient to show that there was not an 35
exclusive relationship. For many of the years Wait worked events at Pershing Center, SMG was
not the management company. Consequently, Wait’s working relationship at Pershing is
irrelevant for the years prior to SMG taking over as the management company. In addition, his
testimony lacked specificity about the jobs he got directly from SMG/Pershing without being

22 The complaint at par. 7(d) charges the Respondent with discrimination in the use of its exclusive
hiring hall to refer workers for employment with Freeman, SMG/Pershing, and “other employers.”
Although evidence was presented that the Respondent also has a written agreement with SMG/Pinewood
Bowl to provide it labor and a verbal agreement with SMG/Pinnacle Bank Arena to provide labor, the
General Counsel failed to present any other evidence to establish that the Respondent referred workers to
“other employers” through an exclusive hiring arrangement. (Tr. 198.) Therefore that portion of the
complaint is dismissed.
JD–38–14
18
referred by the Respondent. Wait performed lighting work on some Rib Fests, New Year’s Eve
shows, and MMA Fighting. According to him, however, he did not receive any of those jobs as
a result of being referred by the Respondent, nor did any union members work those jobs with
him. (Tr. 393.) I do not find his testimony on these points persuasive because it lacks specificity
about when he worked the events, if SMG was the management company, how many laborers he 5
worked with on those jobs, the percentages that were union workers, the members that were
hired directly by SMG, the Respondent, or another source. Equally important, Wait failed to
establish that he had direct knowledge regarding how each person was hired to work the
aforementioned events.
10
In support of its argument against an exclusive referral arrangement, the Respondent also
points to Brunkhorst’s testimony admitting “she worked for Pershing/SMG following her
suspension from IATSE’s referral list.” (R. Br. 12.) However, Brunkhorst’s admission pertained
to an event, Luminners, where she worked one night as a runner at the Pershing Center in 2013.23
The General Counsel’s brief correctly sets out why Brunkhorst’s work at Luminners does not 15
establish a nonexclusive hiring hall. “The testimony at hearing established that the Luminners
show was originally scheduled to take place at an outdoor venue called the Pinewood Bowl.
However, due to rain, within 24 hours, emergency arrangements were made to move the concert
to the Pershing Center. Respondent provided no additional evidence concerning the use of
runners at the Pershing Center beyond this one limited exception.” (GC Br. 33.) The evidence is 20
clear that Brunkhorst was hired to work at Pinewood Bowl and Pershing Center was a last
minute weather emergency substitution.
The evidence persuades me that the Respondent and SMG/Pershing established an
exclusive hiring hall through a consistent practice. Lorenz, in his position as the general 25
manager for SMG/Pershing, continues to hire labor referred by the Respondent for the
classifications covered by the LOU before hiring outside its terms. Lorenz and his staff have
never hired “off the street” instead of using labor referred by the Respondent.24 (Tr. 202–203.)
Adams, production manager for SMG Lincoln, provided corroborating testimony that the
Respondent is the sole labor provider for the entertainment at Pinewood Bowl, Pershing Center, 30
and Pinnacle Bank Arena. (Tr. 160-161.) Pursuant to the provisions of the LOU, SMG/Pershing
obtained all of its labor through the Respondent without advertising for workers or hiring them
“off the street.” In keeping with the relevant provision of the LOU, SMG/Pershing has
infrequently exercised its right to use its own personnel or another “service provider.” (GC Exh.
3.)35
While the Respondent argues that SMG/Pershing frequently uses labor that has not been
referred by it, the evidence indicates otherwise. It is undisputed that the LOU between the
parties allows SMG/Pershing to “supplement [the Respondent’s] call with its own personnel or
with another service provider” when the Respondent was unable to meet the staffing demands of 40
an event. SMG/Pershing management and a former union official gave credible testimony that
this provision was used infrequently. Regardless, the Board has long held such provisions do not
negate the exclusivity of a referral arrangement. See, e.g., Theatrical Wardrobe Union Local

23 The runner position is also covered by the parties’ LOU.
24 Gillaspie testified that SMG has hired from off the street. I credit Lorenz’s testimony on this point.
JD–38–14
19
769 (Broadway in Chicago), 349 NLRB 71, 72–73 (2007) (employer hired outside the union
referral list on a few occasions when the list was exhausted); Morrison-Knudsen, 291 NLRB
250, 258 (1988).
The Respondent’s argument that the LOU was invalid because it was not ratified by the 5
membership is also without merit. There is no credible evidence to show that it was a
requirement or standard practice for the membership to ratify all contracts (or any contract) that
the executive board entered into on behalf of the Respondent. Polanka Junior gave undisputed
testimony that while he was the business agent, and during the union meetings he attended,
contracts were never put up for a ratification vote by the membership. (Tr. 229–230.) Haake 10
provided corroborating testimony that based on his more than 47 years in the union, it has not
been the Respondent’s normal practice to put agreements and contracts before the general
membership for a ratification vote. He explained that the agreement or contract was discussed in
the meeting and “if anybody had any objections to it being signed or agreed upon, they had [the]
right to a say.” (Tr. 292.) However, there is no credible evidence that a member’s objection 15
voided the agreement or contract. Board law has established that ratification is a requirement to
the creation of a contract only when the parties have an expressed agreement to such effect. See
Observer-Dispatch, 334 NLRB 1067 (2001)]?. There is no evidence of an express agreement
that ratification by the membership was required for the LOU with SMG/Pershing to be valid.
20
Last, it is nonsensical to believe that Gillaspie, as the business agent, did not have either
express or implied authority to negotiate the LOU on behalf of the Respondent. Article 7,
section 5 of the Respondent’s constitution and bylaws reads in pertinent part:
The Business Agent shall have full charge of the office of this Local, represent it in all 25
dealings with employers, but shall at all times be under the supervision of the Executive
Board.
(GC Exh. 8.) The actions of Gillaspie and the executive board establish that Gillaspie has
express and implied authority from the executive board to enter into binding agreements and 30
contracts on the Respondent’s behalf. There is no evidence that anyone on the executive board
(or the general membership) objected to the agreements and contracts Gillaspie (or past business
agents) negotiated and executed on behalf of the Respondent (LOU with SMG/Pershing, contract
with Complete, CBA, and successor agreement with Freeman). These agreements were
negotiated and signed by the business agents and enforced by the Respondent. Despite the 35
Respondent’s argument that Gillaspie did not have authority to enter into contracts on behalf of
the Respondent, it is notable that the Respondent never sought to have the agreements and
contract declared void by a court of law. Again, the Respondent adhered to the terms of the
agreements and contracts for the length of their terms; and in the case of Freeman sought to
negotiate and entered into a successor agreement. (GC Exhs. 4, 5, 6.)40
2. Freeman Decorating
The Respondent and Freeman entered into a CBA effective September 1, 2010 to August
31, 2013. (GC Exh. 4.) A successor agreement was effective September 1, 2013 to August 31, 45
2016. (GC Exh. 6.) Both agreements contain the following relevant language:
JD–38–14
20
The Employer agrees that the work described above shall be performed only by qualified
workers assigned by the Union through its job referral procedure.
(GC Exhs. 4, 6.) Scott Young, Freeman’s sales manager, is responsible for notifying the 5
Respondent’s business agent when Freeman needs labor for an event. He makes the “labor calls”
by sending an email to the business agent, notifying him or her that he needs workers. Young
does not deviate from this practice.25 (Tr. 404, 406; GC Exhs. 4, 6, 33, 34.) Prior to February 4,
2013, the Respondent worked on average 4 to 6 labor calls year for Freeman.
10
Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent has operated an exclusive hiring hall
for work it performs for Freeman.
In the case at hand, the parties’ written agreement and practice show that laborers must be
referred by the Respondent to obtain work with Freeman, i.e., they cannot be hired directly by 15
Freeman off the street or through a referral from other sources. While Freeman occasionally
uses its own foremen to oversee the labor of the workers, may reject a referred worker, or hire
other workers if the Respondent is unable to fill a numerical request, it does not negate the
exclusivity of the agreement between the parties. The Board has consistently held that these
types of limited exceptions do not make an otherwise exclusive referral arrangement 20
nonexclusive. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local 247 (Inland Industrial Contractors, Inc.), 332 NLRB
1029, 1031–1032 (2000) (employer had right to request up to 50 percent of employees by name
and to hire from other sources if union failed to furnish workers without 48 hours); Ironworkers
Local 843 (Norglass, Inc.), 327 NLRB 29, 31 (1998) (employer had right to request 50 percent
of employees by name, to reject any applicant referred by the union, and to employ applicants 25
directly at jobsite if union was unable to fill the employer’s requisition within 24 hours).
The Respondent argues that it did not maintain an exclusive hiring hall with Freeman
because the fact it conducted so little work for Freeman infers that Freeman was getting workers
from other sources in the area; the contract with Freeman was invalid because it had not been 30
ratified by the membership; and the Respondent has “never disciplined any member for working
for Freeman directly instead of going through the Local.” (R. Br. 17.)
None of the Respondent’s arguments are persuasive. The evidence establishes that the
Respondent received calls from Freeman to work 4–6 events during the period at issue. None of 35
the parties presented evidence to show that Freeman had work for more than that number, and if
it did how much more. Second, there is no credible evidence to show that it was a requirement
or standard practice for the membership to ratify all contract (or any contracts) that the executive
board entered into on behalf of the Respondent. See Observer-Dispatch, 334 NLRB 1067
(2001)]?. There is no evidence of an express agreement that ratification by the membership was 40
required for the contract with Freeman to be valid. Furthermore, the express language of the
contract and its successor agreement clearly states that “the work described above shall be

25 The Respondent argues that Young does deviate from the practice and therefore should not be
credited on this point. However, I credit Young’s testimony because there was credible corroborating
testimony. (Tr. 244–245.)
JD–38–14
21
performed only by qualified workers assigned by the Union through its job referral procedure.”
(GC Exhs. 4, 6.) Witnesses confirmed that the job referral practice was carried out by Freeman
according to the terms of the agreement and, except in rare circumstances, workers were not
hired outside of the referral system. Finally, even assuming the Respondent never disciplined
members who worked for Freeman without being referred by the Respondent, it is irrelevant to 5
the question of whether the Respondent maintained an exclusive hall arrangement with Freeman.
Accordingly I find that the Respondent operated an exclusive hiring hall with Freeman
and SMG/Pershing.
10
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
Section 8(b)(2) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor 15
organization or its agents “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) [of subsection (a)(3) of this section] or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.”2620
Unions can maintain and enforce internal regulations if those regulations do not affect a
member’s employment status or “invade or frustrate an overriding policy of the labor laws . . .”
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969). Nevertheless, a union operating an exclusive hiring
hall cannot stop an employee from being hired or cause an employee’s discharge, even if it does 25
so pursuant to an internal union rule. The Board will then presume that the effect of the union’s
action is to unlawfully encourage union membership because the union has displayed to all users
of the hiring hall its power over their livelihoods.” Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (AVW
Audio Visual), 332 NLRB 1, 2 (2000), revd. on other grounds 333 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2003).
30
In Stagehand Referral Service27 the Board explained, “The Supreme Court has upheld the
legality of hiring hall referral systems, acknowledging that “the very existence of a hiring hall
encourages union membership,” but holding that “the only encouragement or discouragement of
union membership banned by the Act is that which is ‘accomplished by discrimination.’”
[Citations omitted.] In Operating Engineers Local 18 (Ohio Contractors Assn.), 204 NLRB 681 35
(1973), the Board explained that there is a rebuttable presumption that arises when a union
interferes with an employee’s employment status for reasons other than the failure to pay dues,
initiation fees, or other fees uniformly required, that the interference is intended to encourage
union membership:
40
When a union prevents an employee from being hired or causes an employee’s discharge,
it has demonstrated its influence over the employee and its power to affect his livelihood

26 An 8(b)(2) violation has as a derivative an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 611, 618
(2000); NLRB v. Iron Workers Union, Local 433, 767 F.2d 1438, 1440 (1985).
27347 NLRB 1167, 1170 (2006).
JD–38–14
22
in so dramatic a way that we will infer—or, if you please, adopt a presumption that-the
effect of its action is to encourage union membership on the part of all employees who
have perceived that exercise of power. But the inference may be overcome, or the
presumption rebutted, not only when the interference with employment was pursuant to a
valid union-security clause, but also in instances where the facts show that the union 5
action was necessary to the effective performance of its function of representing its
constituency.
Thus, a union bears the burden of establishing that referrals are made pursuant to a valid hiring-
hall provision, or that its conduct was necessary for effective performance of its representational 10
function.”
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents “to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of this title]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair 15
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.” The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include, in relevant part,
the right “to form, join or assist labor organizations . . . and the right to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorize in Section 8(a)(3)20
. . . .”
B. Complaint Allegations
1. Respondent’s refusal to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior on February 4 and 525
The General Counsel argues “Respondent’s failure to adhere to its normal referral criteria
was in retaliation for its members engaging in protected Section 7 activity. As such, Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) when it refused to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka (Junior) to
the Freeman Decorating Services job at the Cornhusker Hotel on February 4 and 5, 2013.” (GC 30
Br. 47.) According to the General Counsel, Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior engaged in several
acts of concerted protected activity which formed the bases of the Respondent’s refusal to refer
them to the Freeman job. The Respondent counters that they were not referred for the Freeman
job because of “their prior behavior and inability to work with others assigned to that [sic] the
Freeman job. . . .” (R. Br. 26.) Further, the Respondent contends that the job required a certified 35
Freeman forklift operator and Wait was one of only two available operators to work those days.
I find that this allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Board has consistently held that employees’ discussions about wages are inherently
concerted. In re Sabo, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 36 (2012); Trayco of S.C., 297 NLRB 630 (1990); 40
U.S. Furniture Industries, 293 NLRB 159 (1989). In Copper Craft Plumbing,28 the Board held
that two employees who wanted to meet with a manager to discuss wages were not pursuing
individual interest simultaneously. Instead, their issues (wages) directly affected the terms and
conditions of employment for both employees. Likewise, the Board has repeatedly held that

28 354 NLRB 958 (2009).
JD–38–14
23
individual action is concerted if it is conducted with the intention of initiating or inducing group
action. See Family Healthcare, Inc., 354 NLRB No. 29 (2009). Brunkhorst believed that the
Respondent had inaccurately calculated her wages for the time she worked at the Nebraska State
Fair. She raised the issue in meetings with union officials and with Nebraska State Fair
production manager, Adams. Further, in a union meeting she also inquired of other members 5
about the accuracy of their pay and discovered they had the same concerns. In addition,
Brunkhorst was open and vocal in her criticism of the union official’s billing for the Nebraska
State Fair. Her criticism is protected by Section 7 of the Act, regardless of whether or not it is
concerted. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 657 (Texas Productions,
Inc.), 342 NLRB 637 (2004); see also Plasterers Local 121, 264 NLRB 192 (1982) (individual 10
employee’s right to criticize union leadership clearly protected by the Act.) Further, Polanka
Junior and Polanka Senior contacted Adams to support Brunkhorst in her wage dispute.
Although Brunkhorst’s actions may have initially been motivated by concern for her own wages,
the activity was carried out in a concerted fashion. See Benjamin Franklin Plumbing, 352 NLRB
525 (2008); Alton H. Piester, 353 NLRB No. 33 (2008), enfd. 591 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2010).15
Likewise, Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s meeting with an official of Complete to
discuss their concerns about their paychecks and Complete’s business relationship with the
Respondent also constitutes protected concerted activity.29 The contract for services between
Complete and the Respondent designates as Complete employees the “IATSE Local No. 151 20
member and non-member workers who are provided to the production companies and other
through IAS|TSE Local No. 151’s organization. . . .” (GC Exh. 12.) Therefore, Brunkhorst and
Polanka Junior were discussing with their employer (or a party aligned with their employer)
subjects that affected the terms and conditions of employment for them and other employees.
They talked with John Gross about how Complete obtained their financial information. They 25
also asked him if the contract between Complete and the Respondent was a verbal or signed
agreement. The conversation about the method for processing their paychecks, the maintenance
of their confidential financial records, and the structure of the agreement with Complete
impacted the terms and conditions of their employment with the Respondent. Copper Craft
Plumbing, at 965.30
It is undisputed and Gillaspie admitted that Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior’s meeting at
Complete was the basis for his decision not to refer them for the Freeman job at the Cornhusker
Hotel on February 4 and 5, 2013. (Tr. 78–79.) Although Dale and Dan Stoner had less seniority
than Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior, Gillaspie testified that he referred them for the Freeman job 35
because he was “worried about destruction and possible further complications with contractual
issues with our vendors.” (Tr. 137.) I do not find Gillaspie credible on this point. There is no
credible evidence to contradict Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s testimony that their meeting
with John Gross at Complete was cordial and professional. Likewise, there is no substantive
evidence that Respondent’s business relationship with Complete was negatively impacted by 40

29 Earlier in the facts section, I established that Brunkhorst’s and Polanka’s conversation with John
Gross was cordial. I did not find credible the Respondent’s argument that their discussion at the
Complete office was disruptive and, or threatening. Therefore, the evidence does not warrant an analysis
pursuant to Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979), to determine if, because of their actions, they lost
protection of the Act.
JD–38–14
24
Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s conversation with John Gross. Since it has already been
established that their conversation at the Complete office is concerted protected activity,
Gillaspie’s testimony is a clear admission that the refusal to refer them for the Freeman job was
illegal.
5
I find that Gillaspie’s admission, combined with the other less than credible reasons that
he gave, support an inference that discriminatory animus was the actual motive for Gillaspie’s
refusal and failure to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior for the Freeman job at the Cornhusker
Hotel on February 4 and 5, 2013.
10
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has established that the Respondent’s
refusal and failure to refer Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior to the Freeman job on February 4 and
5, 2013, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
2. Nonmembers and the Respondent’s referral list15
In the complaint, the Respondent is charged with discriminating against nonunion
employees by granting priority to its members for job referrals for employment with
SMG/Pershing and Freeman. (GC Exh. 1-K.) The General Counsel alleges that the
“Respondent conducted an unlawful exclusive hiring hall operation when at all material times, 20
Business Agent Perry Gillaspie has utilized membership as a basis for referrals.” (GC Br. 48.)
The Respondent disputes that it operates an exclusive hiring hall. Further, the Respondent
contends that Gillaspie “did the best he could” to create a fair referral list given the information
he possessed at the time. (R. Br. 34.)
25
The Board has long held that unions operating exclusive hiring halls cannot discriminate
against and among employees in its referral practices. Laborers Local 334 (Kvaerner Songer),
335 NLRB 597 (2001); Boilermakers Local 154 (Western Pennsylvania Service Contractors
Assn.), 253 NLRB 747 (1980), enfd. mem. 676 F.2 687 (3d Cir. 1982) (union’s systemic
discrimination against nonmembers in the operation of hiring hall violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) 30
and (2) of the Act); Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters (Perry Olsen Drywall), 358
NLRB No. 3, slip op. at 8 (2012) (“a union operating an exclusive hiring hall may not
discriminate with respect to registration and referrals on the basis of membership or
nonmembership in the union. . . .”), citing Sachs Electric Co., 248 NLRB 669, 670 (1980). A
union must act fairly and impartially because of its status as the exclusive collective-bargaining 35
representative of employees in a specified unit. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
In the case at hand, I have found that the Respondent operated an exclusive hiring hall
with SMG/Pershing and Freeman. Therefore, the Respondent’s first argument fails. The
Respondent also insists it treats nonmembers and members equally for purposes of referrals. The 40
charge against the Respondent stems from the method Gillaspie used to create a referral list
when he became the business agent. It is undisputed that the first 30 names Gillaspie placed on
the referral list were all union members. Gillaspie insists this is because Polanka Junior did not
provide him with a working referral list when Polanka Junior was voted out of office as the
business agent. According to Gillaspie, he was therefore unable to create a referral list based on 45
employees’ actual seniority dates. Consequently, for every name and contact information he
JD–38–14
25
had, Gillaspie reset their seniority date to January 1, 2012. Gillaspie contends it was purely
coincidental that the first 30 to 40 names on the referral list were union members. The
Respondent argues Gillaspie “did the best he could and acted in the most fair way that he was
able with the information he was given.” (R. Br. 34.)
5
I am not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument. There is no case law to support
absolving the Respondent of using discriminatory methods for referrals because its agent,
Gillaspie, “did the best he could” with the information he possessed. Second, in his sworn
affidavit to the Board agent investigating the charge, Gillaspie admitted that he first referred
workers from the local member list and sometimes contacted “IATSE Local 432 and other sister 10
locals to see if they have any qualified journeymen available. At that point, I will go through my
casual or extra list.” (Tr. 87.) Although Gillaspie attempted to change his testimony through
responses to leading questions by the Respondent’s counsel, he presented no credible basis for
believing this new version of his referral procedure other than that “he was confused.” (Tr. 121.)
15
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent conducted an unlawful hiring hall operation by
using union membership as a basis for referrals in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2) of the Act.
3. Respondent’s suspension of seven members on or about February 720
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent suspended seven members (Brunkhorst,
Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, Polanka Senior, and Polanka Junior) from its exclusive hiring hall
because of their protected concerted activity. According to the General Counsel, the
Respondent’s decision to suspend them for filing lawsuits prior to exhausting internal union 25
remedies is illegal because as an exclusive hiring hall there is a duty of fair representation. Even
assuming the Respondent operates a nonexclusive hiring hall, the General Counsel argues that
the Respondent violated the Act because “the incidents relied upon for suspension by
Respondent all constitute protected concerted activity under the Act.” (GC Br. 43.) The
Respondent counters that it does not operate an exclusive hiring hall so it has no duty of fair 30
representation. Further, the Respondent contends some members were suspended for discussing
internal union matters with outside businesses; others for failing to give the Respondent an
opportunity to resolve disputes internally before resorting to the court system; two members for
intentionally destroying union property and, or refusing to return documents to the Union; and
two members for “directly causing tension between IATSE and parties with which it contracted 35
. . . .” (R. Br. 19.) The Respondent argues these actions violated work rules and constituted
egregious misconduct that affected the entire bargaining unit. (R. Br. 20.)
As previously noted, a union’s internal discipline process, or the application of an
internal union rule, must not negatively impact the employee-employer relationship. 40
Consequently, union discipline cannot stop the reemployment of an employee or impose
negative working conditions on employees. See Plumbers Local 420 (Carrier Corp.), supra;
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969). When a union operates an exclusive hiring hall, it
cannot prevent an employee from being hired or cause an employee’s discharge, even if it is
pursuant to an internal union rule. The Supreme Court explained that when a union operates an 45
exclusive hiring hall it, “wield[s] additional power . . . by assuming the employer’s role,’ [and]
JD–38–14
26
‘its responsibility to exercise that power fairly increases rather than decreases.” Breininger at 89.
In order to rebut this presumption, the Board had indicated the union must establish that “its
interference with employment was pursuant to a valid union-security clause or was necessary to
the effective performance of its representative function. Operating Engineers Local 406 (Ford,
Bacon & Davis Construction Corp.), 262 NLRB 50, 51 (1982), enfd. 701 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 5
1983). A valid union-security clause is not present in this matter. Even if the situation involves
a nonexclusive hiring hall, a union owes a “duty of fair representation” to the workers who use
its referral service and it cannot deny them referrals because they exercise their Section 7 rights.
See Plumbers Local 13 (MCA of Rochester), 212 NLRB 477 (1974); Teamsters Local 923
(Yellow Cab Co.), 172 NLRB 2137, 2138 (1968).10
I have previously held that the Respondent operated an exclusive hiring hall; thus the
Respondent’s first argument (that it did not operate an exclusive hiring hall) fails. Therefore, the
Respondent has to overcome the presumption that the suspensions were discriminatorily
motivated by showing its actions were necessary to perform its representative function. I find 15
that the Respondent has not met its burden.
During the hearing and in its brief, the Respondent listed several reasons for suspending
the seven members. However, the plain language of the letters notifying them of their
suspension cites their act of filing a lawsuit prior to exhausting internal union remedies as set 20
forth in article 12, section 6 of the Respondent’s local constitution and bylaws. (GC Exh. 8.)
Haake, Hansen, Hike, and Ladely were informed that their suspension was based on the lawsuit
that they filed against the Respondent before exhausting internal remedies. The suspension
letters issued to Polanka Senior, Polanka Junior, and Brunkhorst noted the lawsuits as one of
several bases for their suspensions. Moreover, the Respondent agrees that all seven members 25
were suspended because they “failed to exhaust internal remedies before bringing a lawsuit. . . .”
(R. Br. 22.)
Gillaspie insisted that their suspensions were necessary because their actions were
damaging to the Respondent’s business relationships and disruptive to its ability to carry out its 30
“duties and obligations.” (GC Exh. 7 and 20; Tr. 148–155, 169, 388–391.) Gillaspie testified
that labor calls from Freeman dropped precipitously after the February 5 incident at the
Cornhusker Hotel. In addition, Gillaspie claimed after the members filed lawsuits against the
Respondent, its relationship with SMG deteriorated. The difficulty, however, with the
Respondent’s argument is that there is absolutely no evidence that the lawsuits negatively 35
impacted its contractual relationships with the employers. Further, the Respondent’s contention
that it “legitimately perceived it was in danger of losing those contracts” is not credible.
Representatives from the companies that regularly conducted business with the Respondent
testified that they were aware of the lawsuits but that it did not negatively influence their
business relationships with the Respondent. Lorenz testified that even after becoming aware of 40
the lawsuits, SMG continued to conduct business with and signed a new contract with the
Respondent. Similarly, Young testified that he continued to use the Respondent for Freeman’s
labor calls after Backstrom informed him of the incident involving Brunkhorst and Polanka
Junior that occurred on February 4 or 5 at the Cornhusker Hotel. (GC Exhs. 33, 34.) As an
example, Young noted that he used the Respondent for a labor call in April 2013. (GC Exh. 34.) 45
Despite Gillaspie’s claim that Brunkhorst’s and Polanka Junior’s actions caused tension in the
JD–38–14
27
relationship with Freeman, Young testified that he never had a discussion with Gillaspie or any
other union official about the Cornhusker incident. Finally, the business relationship with
Complete clearly did not suffer after Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior met with John Gross in
January 2013, because the Respondent signed a contract for services with Complete in or on
January 13, 2013, and a second agreement on October 4, 2013. (GC Exhs. 10, 11, 12, 13.)5
The suspension letter to Polanka Senior also listed as a basis for his suspension the
meeting he had with Brunkhorst and Adams about Brunkhorst’s disputed wages for working the
Nebraska State Fair. Polanka Senior’s action to assist Brunkhorst’s efforts to recoup wages
owed to her is protected concerted activity. The meeting involved a discussion about wages that 10
the Board has consistently held is inherently concerted. In re Sabo, Inc., supra. Therefore, the
Respondent’s admitted use of the incident as a basis for suspending Polanka Senior is likewise a
violation of the Act.
In addition to filing a lawsuit, the suspension letter notified Polanka Junior that he was 15
suspended for his visit to the Complete office in January 2013, and the incident at the
Cornhusker Hotel. Previously, I found that both acts were protected under the Act. The
suspension letter to Brunkhorst also listed as a basis for her suspension the meeting she had with
Polanka Senior and Adams about her disputed wages for working the Nebraska State Fair;
visiting the Complete office with Polanka Junior; and the incident at the Cornhusker Hotel in 20
February 2013. Earlier I found that each of these acts was also protected concerted activity.
Since the Respondent admits these actions were the bases for their suspensions, the Respondent
is unable to show that it would have suspended Brunkhorst and Polanka Junior even absent the
protected concerted activities.
25
During the hearing, Gillaspie testified that the members were suspended for other reasons
not specifically listed in the suspension letters. As an example, the Respondent alleged Polanka
Junior was also suspended because he destroyed data from the Respondent’s computer prior to
his suspension; and Polanka Senior embezzled the Respondent’s money and falsified bills to
employers. I find that the reasons are not credible and were formulated simply in anticipation of 30
trial. These are serious allegations, yet Polanka Junior and Senior were never notified that they
were part of the bases for their suspensions. Further, in its April 2, 2012 meeting minutes
Polanka Junior was cleared of the charges. The relevant portion of the minutes note:
Executive Board met with Tony Polanka Jr. where he answered all their questions. The 35
Board did not have time to look to review the retrieved material on the computer prior to
this meeting. During the questioning, Tony Jr. mentioned that Steve Hike helped him
delete some old bills and spread sheets. Steve Hike apologized for his actions. President
Buffum stated upon reviewing the “Missing” files which [were] all old bills, which are
already printed up and in the filing cabinet as well as some old excel spread sheets. At 40
this time, they could not find anything damning against Tony Jr.
(GC Exh. 17, IATSE 00294.) The executive board also pointed out that the accusation that
Polanka Junior maliciously cancelled his cell phone (which was also the phone number listed in
the union bulletin) was unfounded because the number listed was still active.45
JD–38–14
28
Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent’s reasons for suspending the members
from the referral list are simply pretexts for discrimination. Accordingly, I find that the General
Counsel has established that the Respondent suspended the seven members because of their
concerted protected activity in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
5
4. Respondent’s work rules and the collection of fines and assessments
The General Counsel alleges that the plain language of certain provisions of the
Respondent’s work rules are a per se violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Since
September 29, the Respondent has maintained rules that authorize the Respondent to refuse to 10
refer an employee for work until he or she has satisfied an unpaid fine and/or assessment. (GC
Exh. 7.) The General Counsel argues that the Board “has historically found that a labor
organization cannot refuse to refer an employee to enforce the collection of a fine and/or
assessment.” (GC Br. 56.) The Respondent does not dispute the plain language of the work
rules, but rather argues the issue is moot because the rules were never enforced against a member 15
since the new executive board has taken office. The Respondent further notes, “when it was
brought to IATSE’s attention that the language was unenforceable, IATSE began the process of
removing the language from its rules.” (R. Br. 8.)
The Respondent’s arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. The Board has long 20
held that unions’ internal discipline process, or the application of an internal union rule, must not
negatively impact the employee-employer relationship. Consequently, union discipline cannot
stop the reemployment of an employee or impose negative working conditions on employees.
See Plumbers Local 420 (Carrier Corp.), 347 NLRB 563 (2006); Fisher Theater, 240 NLRB
678, 691–692 (1979) (unlawful for union to refuse to refer members who failed to pay union 25
fines imposed for violating union’s no-bumping policy). In the case at hand, the adopted rules
interfere with the employees’ ability to procure work through the Respondent’s exclusive hiring
hall. The Respondent acknowledges that the work rules are unenforceable; and the reason for its
unenforceability is due to the restrictions the rules place on the employer’s ability to hire an
employee with uncollected fines and that employee’s ability to obtain employment. The 30
Respondent contends that the issue is moot because the current executive board has never
enforced the rule. However, a violation can be found even if the Respondent has never imposed
discipline. See Teamsters Local 492 (United Parcel Service), 346 NLRB 360 (2006).
The Respondent’s alternate argument, the issue is moot because it is in the process of 35
removing the language from its rules, is likewise unpersuasive. First, there is no Board law to
support this argument; and the Respondent does not present any. Further, it is undisputed that
since at least September 29, the Respondent has maintained these illegal job referral rules. There
is also no evidence in the record to support a finding that all of the unlawful rules have been
removed. Consequently, since September 29 to the present the rules would have a reasonable 40
tendency to restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in
Section 7 of the Act.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it created the
work rules at sections 9.1.3, 9.1.3.1, 9.1.3.2, 9.1.3.3. (GC Exh. 7.)45
JD–38–14
29
5. Respondent’s failure and refusal to remit V-fund moneys to nonmembers
The General Counsel charges that the Respondent’s failure and refusal to pay money
from the V-fund to nonmembers violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Respondent argues 5
“IATSE has not yet remitted V-fund monies to non-members because it is waiting to see if the
NLRB or Lancaster District Court will find the Pershing/SMG Addendum to be illegal in the
first instance.” (R. Br. 36.)
The V-fund money was derived from a portion of the processing fee that the Respondent 10
charged employers for referring laborers to them. Members were paid annually from the V-fund
at a rate of 5 percent of the employee’s yearly gross earnings. Despite referring members and
nonmembers for employment and charging employers a fee for those referrals, it is undisputed
that the Respondent has never paid money out of the V-fund to its nonmembers. The
Respondent has failed to present any authority to support its defense that it is waiting for a court 15
order to direct it to pay the moneys to its nonmembers and no precedent supports its position.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s failure and refusal to pay V-fund moneys to
nonmembers violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
20
6. Respondent’s failure and refusal to remit V-fund moneys to members Haake,
Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka Senior
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent breached its duty of fair
representation when it refused to pay V-fund bonuses to members who filed lawsuits against it. 25
The General Counsel charges that the “Respondent failed to pay the objecting members their V-
fund bonus for arbitrary, irrelevant, and discriminatory reasons.” (R. Br. 17.) The Respondent
counters that the charge should be dismissed because the Board does not have jurisdiction over
SMG/Pershing or Freeman and the V-fund did not relate to Freeman. Second, the Respondent
argues “there was no ratified agreement by the local to pay a V-fund to the members.” (R. Br. 30
35.) I find that the Respondent’s arguments fail for the following reasons.
I have already determined that the requirements for the Board to assert jurisdiction have
been established in this case. Second, failure to ratify the contract authorizing the Respondent to
pay V-fund bonuses to members is not a valid or credible defense in this instance.35
Article 7, section 5 of the Respondent’s local constitution and bylaws gives the business
agent full authority to “represent it in all dealings with employers . . . .” (GC Exh. 8.) It goes
on to state:
40
The Business Agent shall be a member, ex-officio, of all negotiating committees.
Contracts negotiated by any such committee shall be subject to ratification of the
membership unless the membership has in advance empowered the Committee to
conclude the contract without ratification.
45
JD–38–14
30
(GC Exh. 8.) In addition to its processing fee, 5 percent for all labor referred was charged by the
Respondent to employers for the V-fund bonus. Freeman was excluded from paying a
processing fee that included the V-fund bonus because it administered its own payroll.
SMG/Pershing paid this fee and it was explicitly spelled out in the addendum to the LOU entered
into in May 2011 between SMG/Pershing and the Respondent. It is undisputed that neither the 5
LOU, nor the addenda were ratified by the members. (GC Exhs. 3, 27.) However, it is irrelevant
because despite the contract not being ratified, the Respondent paid V-fund bonuses to all
members who elected payment except for those members who filed lawsuits against it.
Additionally, at the membership meeting on April 2, 2012, Gillaspie made a motion to approve
payment of the 2011 V-fund bonus. His motion was seconded by Tom Stickney and approved. 10
(GC Exh. 17.)
The Respondent also reasons that it did not pay the V-fund bonuses because “there were
legitimate concerns over the legality of paying the funds to members and not paying them to
non-members.” (R. Br. 36.) Further, the Respondent contends that except for Haake and 15
Hansen, the remaining complaining members did not submit “the required request form for the
payment by the deadline established by the secretary (or ever).” (R. Br. 36.) Again, I reject the
Respondent’s arguments. If the Respondent had a legitimate concern about the legality of
making V-fund payments to members and not nonmembers, then the Respondent would not have
paid any member until the issue had been settled in court. Instead, the Respondent paid every 20
member who elected to receive the bonus, while refusing to pay the members who asked for their
V-fund bonus but also consulted a lawyer about their concerns over administration of the V-
fund; collectively objected to the V-fund decisions made by the executive board; and collectively
filed a lawsuit to get the V-fund moneys owed to them. Second, it is clear to me that the
Respondent’s requirement for members to submit a form electing to get their V-fund bonus was 25
an attempt to embarrass and coerce them into foregoing it. (See GC Exh. 16.) I find that this
action was arbitrary and unrelated to whether they were entitled to receive the bonus they had
already earned and that had been a past practice since at least the early 1990s. (Tr. 223.) There
is no evidence that in all the years members received V-fund bonuses, they ever had to submit a
form asking for it. Therefore, I find that the Respondent’s refusal to make V-fund payments to 30
those members who had consulted a lawyer over the issue and filed a lawsuit to recoup their
bonus money was based on arbitrary and discriminatory reasons.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s failure and refusal to pay V-fund moneys to
Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka Senior violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.35
7. Respondent’s constitution and bylaws allegedly contain unlawful provisions
The General Counsel alleges that article 12, section 6 of the Respondent’s constitution
and bylaws violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act because it requires members to exhaust its 40
internal remedies without including the 4-month limitation required by section 101(a)(4) of the
LMRDA. The Respondent, however, counters that the LMRDA “does not require the
Constitution and Bylaws to build into its provisions an explanation that the requirements are
limited to 4 months; it simply allows the member to proceed with his action in court after he or
she has pursued reasonable hearing procedures for four months.” (R. Br. 5–6.)45
JD–38–14
31
It is undisputed that the Respondent’s constitution and bylaws require members to
exhaust all internal remedies before seeking relief from outside tribunals. Likewise, the
constitution and bylaws do not include language containing the 4-month limitation period set
forth in the LMRDA. However, the General Counsel has the burden of proving the allegations in
a complaint, and I find that the General Counsel failed to articulate a strong argument or provide 5
case law to establish that the LMRDA requires the Respondent to include in its constitution and
bylaws an explicit clause noting the LMRDA’s 4-month limitation period.
The record contains minimal testimony or other evidence to support the General
Counsel’s case on this issue. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of this allegation in the 10
complaint.
C. Respondent’s 10(b) Argument as an Affirmative Defense
The Respondent argues that the allegation pertaining to the referral procedures is barred 15
by Section 10(b) of the Act because the Respondent did not maintain a referral hall in the 6
months prior to the filing of the amended charge. According to the Respondent, it maintains a
list of available workers but “IATSE no longer chooses who will be sent on any particular call,
and has not since February or March of 2013.” (R. Br. 37.) The General Counsel contends
“Gillaspie and Respondent attempt to deflect any referral responsibilities to Complete Payroll by 20
arguing that Respondent has nothing to do with referrals and has not for some time.
Respondent’s claim is not accurate.”
For the reasons discussed in section II, subsection C of this decision, I reject the
Respondent’s argument, and find that the Respondent at all times maintained control over and 25
referred workers from its exclusive hiring hall. Therefore, the Respondent’s 10(b) argument has
no merit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
30
1. The Respondent, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving
Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada
Local No. 151 (SMG and the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services, Inc.), is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
35
2. The Respondent did operate an exclusive hiring hall with respect to referral of
employees to SMG/Pershing and the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services,
Inc.
3. By refusing to refer Sheila Brunkhorst and Tony Polanka for a job with Freeman 40
because they engaged in protected concerted activity, the Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
4. By discriminating against nonmembers by granting priority to its members for job
referrals for employment with SMG/Pershing and Freeman, the Respondent has violated Section 45
JD–38–14
32
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
5. By maintaining work rules that authorize the Respondent to refuse to refer an
employee for work until he or she has satisfied an unpaid fine and/or assessment, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.5
6. By suspending seven members (Brunkhorst, Haake, Hansen, Hike, Ladely, Polanka
Senior, and Polanka Junior) because they engaged in protected concerted activity, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.
10
7. By failing and refusing to pay money from its V-fund to nonmembers, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
8. By failing and refusing to pay money from the Respondent’s V-fund to Haake,
Hansen, Hike, Ladely, and Polanka Senior because they filed lawsuits against it, the Respondent 15
has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it did not include
explicit language in its constitution and bylaws an explanation that there is a 4-month limitation
required by section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA.20
10. The above violations are unfair labor practices that affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth above.25
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the 30
policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily refused to refer Sheila Brunkhorst and Tony
Polanka to the Freeman job at the Cornhusker Hotel on February 4 and 5, 2013, I shall
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make the employees whole for any loss of 35
earnings and other benefits they suffered as a result of the discrimination against them from the
date of the discrimination to the date they are reimbursed for their losses. The Respondent must
notify them in writing that these actions have been completed and that the refusal to refer them
for the job will not be used against them in any way.
40
The Respondent having discriminatorily granted priority to its members for job referrals
to the detriment of nonmembers, I shall recommend the Respondent create a referral list that
does not discriminate based on membership status.
JD–38–14
33
The Respondent having maintained work rule provisions that unlawfully authorize the
Respondent to refuse to refer an employee for work until he or she has satisfied an unpaid fine
and/or assessment, I shall recommend that the Respondent remove the unlawful provisions. The
Respondent must notify workers that the unlawful provisions have been removed.
5
The Respondent having discriminatorily suspended members (Sheila Brunkhorst, Les
Haake, Dennis Hansen, Steve Hike, Danny Ladely, Anthony Polanka, and Tony Polanka) from
its referrals from its exclusive hiring hall, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to
make the employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits they suffered as a result of
the discrimination against them from the date of the discrimination to the date they are 10
reimbursed for their losses. I shall also recommend that the Respondent rescind their
suspensions, restore them to the referral list in rightful order or priority, and remove all reference
to their suspensions from the Respondent’s official and unofficial records. The Respondent must
notify the suspended members in writing that these actions have been completed and that the
removal will not be used against them in any way.15
The Respondent having discriminatorily refused to pay V-fund bonuses to members Les
Haake, Dennis Hansen, Steve Hike, Danny Ladely, Anthony Polanka, and nonmembers, I shall
recommend that the Respondent remit V-fund payments owed to those members and
nonmembers. The Respondent must notify the affected members and nonmembers in writing 20
that these actions have been completed.
Backpay because of the discriminatory suspensions, failure to refer for work, and failure
to remit V-fund money shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), with interest as provided in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), 25
compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010) enf.
denied on other grounds sub. nom. Jackson Hospital Corp. v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating backpay 30
to the appropriate calendar quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Sheila Brunkhorst, Les
Haake, Dennis Hansen, Steve Hike, Danny Ladely, Anthony Polanka, Tony Polanka, and other
affected workers for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum
backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year, Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44
(2012).35
Further, in accordance with the Board’s decision in J. Piccini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9,
slip op. at pp. 5–6 (2010), I shall recommend that the Respondent be required to distribute the
attached appendix and notice to members and employees electronically, if it is customary for the
Respondent to communicate with employees and members in that manner. Also in accordance 40
with that decision, the question as to whether a particular type of electronic notice is appropriate
should be resolved at the compliance state. Id, slip op. at p. 3. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 25,
358 NLRB No. 15 (2012).
JD–38–14
34
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended30
ORDER
5
The Respondent, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture
Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada Local No.
151 (SMG and the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services, Inc.), Lincoln,
Nebraska, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
10
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to refer employees from its exclusive hiring hall, who are or
rightfully should be on the Respondent’s referral list, for work with employers because those
individuals exercised the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act.15
(b) Discriminating against nonunion employees by granting priority to union members
for job referrals to employers, thus attempting to cause or causing those employers to
discriminatorily fail to employ employees because of their status as nonunion members.
20
(c) Maintaining unlawful rules and policies that authorize the Respondent to refuse to
refer employees for work from its exclusive hiring hall until he or she has satisfied an unpaid
fine and/or assessment.
(d) Suspending employees from its exclusive hiring hall referral list, who are or rightfully 25
should be on the Respondent’s referral list, because those employees exercised the rights
guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act.
(e) Failing and refusing to remit V-fund payments to members because those individuals
exercised their rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act; and nonmembers because of 30
their membership status.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Act.
35
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, make Sheila Brunkhorst and Tony
Polanka whole for any loss of earnings and benefits suffered as a result of the Respondent’s
unlawful refusal and failure to refer them from its exclusive hiring hall to the Freeman
Decorating Services job on February 4 and 5, 2013.
40

30 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–38–14
35
(b) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, create a referral list that does not
discriminate based on membership status.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, rescind or make lawful the
Respondent’s work rules at sections 9.1.3; 9.1.3.1; 9.1.3.2; and 9.1.3.3.5
(d) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, make whole Sheila Brunkhorst,
Les Haake, Dennis Hansen, Steve Hike, Danny Ladely, Anthony Polanka, and Tony Polanka for
any loss of earnings and other benefits they suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them from the date of the discrimination to the date they are reimbursed for their losses. Further, 10
within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from the Respondent’s files any
reference to the unlawful suspensions, and within 3 days thereafter notify the aforementioned
employees in writing that this has been completed and that the suspensions will not be used
against them in any way.
15
(e) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remit V-fund payments, including
interest, owed to nonmembers and members Les Haake, Dennis Hansen, Steve Hike, Danny
Ladely, and Anthony Polanka, and within 3 days thereafter notify the aforementioned employees
in writing that this has been completed.
20
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Lincoln, Nebraska,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”31 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 14, Subregion 17, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees and members are 25
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of 30
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since September 29, 2012.
35

31 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–38–14
36
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 20, 20145
____________________________
Christine E. Dibble (CED)10
Administrative Law Judge
JD–38–14
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to refer employees from our exclusive hiring hall, who are or
rightfully should be on our referral list, for work with employers because those individuals
exercised the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against nonunion employees by granting priority to union members
for job referrals to employers, thus attempting to cause or cause those employers to
discriminatorily fail to employ employees because of their status as nonunion members.
WE WILL NOT maintain unlawful rules and policies that authorize us to refuse to refer
employees for work from our exclusive hiring hall until he or she has satisfied an unpaid fine
and/or assessment.
WE WILL NOT suspend employees from our exclusive hiring hall referral list, who are or
rightfully should be on the referral list, because those employees exercised the rights guaranteed
to them under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to remit V-fund payments to members because those individuals
exercised their rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act; or fail and refuse to remit
V-fund payments to nonmembers because of their membership status.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, refer employees from our
exclusive hiring hall, who are or rightfully should be on our referral list, for work with employers
because those individuals exercised the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act.
JD–38–14
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, stop discriminating against
nonunion employees by granting priority to union members for job referrals to employers, thus
attempting to cause or cause those employers to discriminatorily fail to employ employees
because of their status as nonunion members.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order rescind the unlawful rules and
policies that authorize us to refuse to refer employees for work from our exclusive hiring hall
until he or she has satisfied an unpaid fine and/or assessment.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order make whole employees suspended
from our exclusive hiring hall referral list, who are or rightfully should be on the referral list,
because those employees exercised the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order remit V-fund payments to
members who were denied those payments because they exercised their rights guaranteed to
them under Section 7 of the Act; and remit V-fund payments to nonmembers who were denied
those payments because of their membership status.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any
reference to the unlawful suspensions, and within 3 days thereafter notify, in writing, those
employees who were suspended that this has been completed and that the suspensions will not be
used against them in any way.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating back payments to the
appropriate quarters.
WE WILL compensate the affected employees (both members and nonmembers) for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods
longer than 1 year.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists
and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada Local No. 151 (SMG and
the Freeman Companies d/b/a Freeman Decorating Services, Inc.)
_____________________________________________________________________________
(Employer)
DATED:_____________________BY_____________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office
set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
JD–38–14
1222 Spruce Street, Suite 8.302
St. Louis, Missouri 63103-2829
Telephone: (314) 539-7770
Fax: (314) 539-7794
Hours of Operation: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. CST
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/14-CB-101524 or by
using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by
calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (314) 539-7770.